https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5cd3ed9fec62270814ad8b745b4c43a5.pdf e8f0176421204743d9d0dce1a7e2f299 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project PCO ATIP A-2024-00115 PCO Special Registry 'S&I Old' File 7855-1 PCO "Foreign Intelligence Collection: A Proposal" 29 March 1994 (Draft) �Docu lnforr Relea 1 Act/ nder 1 ment ( 1 cess t J8 en s.15(1) UC'f 1 0 2013 (,_'"''"- ..___ ._..,..;.:J, ) Distribution limited to: MINl§IEBS* EYES ONLY - ■ ■ I, DFAIT -" Hensler, CSIS, R. Marcoux, PCO March 29, 1994 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION: A PROPOSAL INTRODUCTION • Canada is the only G-7 country, and one of the few countries in the westem world, that does not have foreign intelligence ■ I -----■ The Canadian intelligence community and its clients are increasingly recognizing the need for such a capacity to collect intelligence abroad. Foreign intelligence can provide indispensable hTfermation on the rapidly changing world. Canada has diverse international interests because of our advanced industrial status, our international role in peacekeeping, and our large ethnic communities. This. paper makes the following points: more strategic, focused intelligence can play a useful role in determining Canada's future foreign and economic policies in a competitive, global environment; and 000019 �Docu lnforn de la ~leased .et I Doc l'acces, he Aces Jivulgue nation s.15(1) ( IO SECRET UMBRA MINISTERS' EYES QNlY -2- key to the above is the establishment of a foreign intelligence collection capacity abroad which would enhance and complement our current collection capabilities. • • ..Following on these points, this paper proposes a . model for enhanced foreign intelligence collection abroad, based on existing organizational structures. CURRENT CONTEXT • Several Canadian government agencies are involved in foreign intelligence collection: Communications Security Establishment (CSE), for signals intelligence • - - - _ 1 _ _ _ _ •andthe reporting of intelligence collected under s. 16 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Act; Department of National Defence, for military reporting and the interpretation of satellite imagery; External Affairs, for interviews of people with useful information, and responsibility - I and- - - I_ - -- ■ 000020 u �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act/ Document divulgu8 en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) s.16(1)(c) -3- CSIS, for the collection of foreign intelligence within Canada (under the increasingly useful s. 1 6 program), and national security investigations. • Canada's foreign intelligence, however, is provided to us by our intelligence allies, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. Therefore, Canada has over the past decade begun a The CS S et. passed by Parliament in 1984, included a section (s.16) that allowed for the collection of foreign intelligence within Canada. 000021 �s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) s.16(1 )(c) ( TOP SECRET UMBBA MINISIEBS' J;YES ONlY -4- The creation of a capacity to collect foreign intelligence abroad would be a logical progression in the cautious expansion of Canada's foreign intelligence program. RATIONALE • The collection of foreign intelligence can make an important contribution to government decision- making because it provides unique information {otherwise unavailable) on a foreign government's or foreign organization's capabilities, intentions, or activities. s. 16 (CS S et> I 1111 I has stimulated an interest in and emphasized the need for Canada-relevant intelligence. It has demonstrated the usefulness (and cost-efficiency) of foreign intelligence collection targeted to uniquely Canadian needs. 2. • r--• Improved Intelligence Sharing Arrangement& - Canada directly benefits from the money spent by the Allies on intelligence collection and assessment (approximately - alll - - 000022 �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act/ Document divulgu8 en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1)(a) s.15(1) IQ MINISTERS' EYES ONlY -5- • • Until recent years, Canada's foreign intelligence collection effort was directed primarily at Soviet military targets, taking particular advantage of the geographic proximity of Canada's north to the former ·Soviet Union. This allowed Canada to make a •meaningful contribution to the allied intelligence collection effort . This is a source of concern since we depend on our allies for a very large part of our foreign intelligence product, and there is an expectation of reciprocity by the allies As the concept of a common enemy continues to diminish, Canada will be expected to contribute more An independent capacity for intelligence collection would enable Canada to enter into issue-specific cooperative arrangements that suit Canadian interests 000023 �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act/ Document divulgu8 en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) TQP SECREI UMBRA MINISTERS' EVES ONLY -6- thereby diluting our dependence on any one intelligence ally. 3. Role of CSfS • The absence of a central foreign intelligence collection capacity abroad has, by default, led to growing ..demands on our domestic intelligence agency to act as a surrogate. • Notwithstanding this, since CSIS's mandate limits its foreign intelligence role, In addition, in many cases CSIS is the sole link between Canada and foreign intelligence services holding information potentially valuable to Canada, Alth~ugh there is a growing need to fill the existing vacuum, Other Western democracies do not task their domestic security intelligence agency with foreign intelligence collection abroad, and for good reason. • Foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence collection have fundamentally different objectives: concentrating these responsibilities in the hands of one agency (and the different safeguards and controls that 000024 �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act/ Document divulgu8 en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces !'information a -7- this would require) risks undermining the agency's credibility and integrity. Therefore, an alternative approach is needed. FRAMEWORK • A successful proposal would have five key elements: 1. It should require no new resources, but rather depend on the redistribution and refocusing of existing resources within the Security and Intelligence sector. 2. A modest, incremental approach is therefore proposed. This would allow for a g d transition, based on the re-allocation of existing resources, progressing as value is demonstrated over time. s.23 3. 4. The -existing capability for domestic collection of foreign intelligence by CSIS (under the s. 1 6 program) is working well and will not be affected by any proposed change. 5. This gradualist, resource-neutral approach would argue for a /ow-key approach, without public announcement or debate. 000025 �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act/ Document divulgu8 en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) T BRA M S ONLY -8- OPTIONS CONSIDERED • Given the above, and having eliminated CSIS as an option, the options below were considered but rejected. 1. Separate Agenc~ • Creation of a separate agency at this time was found unsuitable. • While it would be possible to create such an _agency administratively, mandating it (especially with special powers) could require legislation unless it were done under the Royal Prerogative. A separate agency would also almost certainly require significant new resources to establish the new infrastructure, (since a gradual re-allocation could not be contemplated as easily). A separate agency would almost certainly generate a public debate which would not be helpful to the successful launching of 2. Locate the capacity in CSE, ONO or PCO • Giving this responsibility to CSE, DND or PCO was also found unsuitable, since it would, among other things: 000026 �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act/ Document divulgu8 en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces !'information a re-direct accountability away from the Secretary of State for External Affairs for overall foreign policy; result in a significant readjustment in mandate (i.e. not an obvious fit); and create the potential for unwieldy management problems. OPTION PROPOSED: "Co-locate" in External Affairs The establishment of a new and capacity within External Affairs to undertake the collection of foreign intelligence abroad, drawing on existing machinery and experience within the community, is proposed, s.15(1) In essence, the existing foreign intelligence collection capacity in the Security and Intelligence Bureau of External Affairs would be expanded. This. simple expansion of an existing function would mean that no legislation would be required. CSE, ONO and CSIS intelligence collection programs would remain intact. 000027 �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act/ Document divulgu8 en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) TOP SECREI UMBRA MINISTERS' EVES ONLY MANDATE • The proposed expanded foreign intelligence collection capacity would have a two-fold mandate: the collection abroad of foreign intelligence directly related to Canadian interests, and would not be permitted. ACTIVITIES • The mandate, objectives and reporting structures of existing agencies would essentially be unchanged. \ \ Operations would be tightly controlled and monitored at senior levels. l 000028 �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act/ Document divulgu8 en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) ( -11- MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT • Accountability for this new capacity must reflect: the Prime Minister's ultimate responsibility for national security and foreign affairs, the Secretary of State's responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, and the Minister for National Defence 1 s responsibility concerning defence. To reflect the above, and provide appropriate direction (at the level of officials), it is proposed that a 000029 �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act/ Document divulgu8 en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces !'information a ( TQf SECRET UMBRA MINISTERS' EVES QNLY _, 2- Coordinating Committee be formed. Its members would be: the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs the Deputy Minister of National Defence# and the Deputy Clerk, Security and Intelligence in the Privy Council Office (the Coordinator). The committee would be chaired by the Coordinator in the Privy Council Office, consistent with his responsibility for the coordination of all foreign intelligence activities of the government. This would strengthen the Coordinator's role as the focal point for the leadership and management of the security and intelligence sector. The Coordinating Commiuee would: formulate recommendations to Ministers as appropriate; task the capacity to collect foreign intelligence (with the assistance of other organizations, as required) according to Government priorities; and generally coordinate, direct and review foreign intelligence collection activities. • The new function would come under an Assistant Deputy Minister reporting to the Secretary of State for 000030 �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act/ Document divulgu8 en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces !'information a ( TOP SECRET UMBRA Ml~ISTERS' EYES ONLY -13- External Affairs, but through the Coordinating Committee for these purposes. RESOURCES • What follows is a tentative outline of resources required to set up a capacity along the lines described -above, It is based on the premise that implementation would be gradual, and certain functions performed by the domestic agency and others to fill the existing vacuum would now legitimately, and over time, be assumed by External Affairs. 1. 1 995s.15(1) Analysts: (Existing) Interview section: (Existing) Intelligence support: Support staff: TOTAL: 000031 �Docurn Inform<: de la Li ~ased U / Docu icces a 3Acces: 1ulgu8 e :ition rap SECRET UMBRA Ml NISTERS' EYES ONLY -14- 2. OPERATING BUDGET: In the first few years, the total operating budget ■ ■■ r--­ ■ ■ - s.15(1) ■ CONCLUSION • In conclusion, it is useful to stress that while modest in scope, this proposal constitutes a major departure in Canada's approach to intelligence collection. There is no doubt, however, that the implementation of such a proposal would constitute a significant step forward, toward: making our intelligence product a timely and relevant part of decision-making by the government, and providing Canada with the advantage it requires to compete successfully in the global environment. 000032 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00009 Title A name given to the resource Foreign Intelligence Collection: A Proposal, 29 March 1994 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 29-Mar-94 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived PCO Special Registry 'S&I Old' File 7855-1 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource PCO Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2024-00115 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English