https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4a68e7994a04bf3c9bbcebca65f0d4ab.pdf 1ee7d9ae159f5ae6aa8201c1a76c875e PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulg en vertu de la Loi surl’accesI'information Gpy No. o of 8 copies. I ER TOP SECRET March 4, 1952 Procedures for U.S, -A.C. Flight Clearences It will be recelled that rather over a year ago discussions were held with the State Department extending over a period of two or three months in an effort to draw up a canopy agreement" between the two governments regulating the u.se of facilities in Canede by the U.S. S. .C. and establishing procedures to be followed in connection with such activities. The discussions eventually broke down when it became apparent that there were certain requirements held by each government to which the other could not agree. The U.S. Government was at that time unwilling to enter into any agreement which would appear to qualify the right and responsibility of the President of the United States to make the decision that atomic weapons should be used. The Canadian Government for its part could not agree to surrender the right to decide whether or not Canadian facilities should be used for atomic strikes in any particular situation. It was obvious, however, th t some kind of procedure 2. would have to be evolved to permit the U.bs .1. to carry out those operations in Canada appropriate to its peacetime programme of preparation for an emergency. The proposal for a canopy agreement having been abandoned, there was substituted the "Agreed Minute" to which Mr. Pearson and Mr. Acheson gave oral assent on June 14 last. This Agreed Minute was designed to afford a record of procedures which had been developed on an ad hoc basis for the mutual convenience of the two governments and which did not represent a formal intergovernmental agreement. It provided for frequent consultations between the Canadian /mbassedor and the Secretary of State or his representatives, and expressed the hope "the t by such consultations it will be possible to arrive at common appraisals of situations which may necessitate the use of stomic weapons". It also specified the channel throu h which requests of the U. . Government "for permission to make use of facilities in Canadian territory for the deployment of atomic weepons... and for the conduct of operations involving the use of such weapons, or to overfly Canadian territory with such weapons" should be directed. By implication, therefore, it indicated the willingness of the U. • Government to obtain the prior consent of the Canadian Government for U. . . .C. special op ations in Canada, although it could hardly be regarded as legally and formally binding the U. . Government to such a course. 00091 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulg en vertu de la Loi surl’accs J l’information - 2 3. AS far as is known, the U. . authorities have meticulously followed the procedures outlined in the Agreed Minute since it was approved. Toward the enc of list summer, it was realized that these procedures probably appeared unduly hampering to the U.S.A.F. in the conduct of training end si ilr operations of more or less routine significance. It became known that the U.S. S.A.C. was somewhat impatient at havin to follow a rather elaborate clearance procedure for operations of minor importance, partly because of the measure of delay inevitably involved, and perhaps more because of the necessity of working through the State Department in each esse. It was considered that there might be a distinction made between the clearance procedures for routine and for politically significant operations, and there was prepared a tentative list of categories of operations on the basis of which such a distinction might be made. It was recognized that the effort to define par4. ticular eategories of operations in this way ropresented a reversion to the concept of a canopy agreement setting out specific procedures to be followed in connection with defined types of operations. This effort had formerly proved unsuceessful. The Agreed Minute, however, would presumably continue to apply as a matter of general doctrine, and it micht readily be modified in the inturests of convenience to permit less cumbersome clearance procedures for categories of operations of lesser significance. This approach would enable Governments to agree on what would be essentially administrative procedures where they had not been prepared to record formal agreement in terms of general principles. One difficulty was to establish the validity of S. the suggested criteria for distinguishing between routine and politically significant operations. The R. J.A.F., lacking direct experience of the type of operation carried out by the U. . . was not prepared to reach s decision as to whether or not those criteria would prove workable in practice. It was decided to arrange for an examination by suitable representatives of the R.C.A.l • and U.S.A. . of the technical issues involved. Accordingly, at the meeting last Auguat of the P.J.B.D., A/V/M Miller discussed these que tions briefly with General walsh of the U.S. .7. While A/V/M Miler has not circulated a written report of their talk, he informed the Department of External Affairs informally on his roturn to Ottawa that the proposed criteria appeared suitable. . . 3 00092 �- 3 = Further developments were delayed temporarily by 6. the Ottawa and Rome meetings of the North Atlantic Council. Before anything further had been done in Ottawa, the Embassy in Washington was informed by the State Department that Mr. Lovett had written to Mr. Acheson a letter which put the question in a somewhat different light. Mr. Lo ett apparently wished to return to the old concept of a more or less formal canopy agreement, with one significant difference. He was now prepared to have such an agreement include a specific provision to the effect "that initial strikes from Canadian bases or overflying of Can dian territory on strike operations will not be undertaken without prior ap roval of the Canadian Government through government-to-government channels". He framed his proposals in terms of three categories of operations, superficially resembling those prepared here; indeed, it appeared that his letter was based primarily on the discussions between A/V/M Miller and General Walsh. He listed his three categories as follows: "A. Intransit flights not involving strikes. Such intransit flights would include stops at bases in Canadian territory and overflight of Canadian territory on flights to Alaska, European areas or other bases outside Canadian territory. "B. Deployments to Canadian bases in preparation for a strike. "C. Actual strikes frora Canadian bases or involving overflight of Canadian territory." Ab indicated above, he was prepared to agree that 7. the consent of the Canadian Government was required for operations in category C. It was his understanding that the Canadian Government was prepared to grant a blanket prior authorization tor the activities outlined in category 4, subject to "a mutually satisfactory prior notification procedure...preferably on a service-to-service level". With regard to category B, he admitted that "the Canadians have not specifically indicated a willingness to grant a blanket prior authorization for deployment in preparation for a strike". He bent on to say that "it is believed that this matter should be the subject of further conversations at the political level with the Canadians with a view toward acquiring such authorization, together with a mutually 8. . . 4 00093 �Do o m disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulg en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a /'information - 4 - should cive the Canadians positive assurance tnaEn ledEnbee ization is given lor such preparatory deployments, no strikes wi] be undertakendovernment from Canadian without prior Vo t o v ^ Onanneisonadlen throughbases sovernmont-to-covermont satisfactory prior notification procedure. The United ...... we have rot as yet met the request of the State 9. Department for formal comments upon Mr. Lovett’s proposals. Since we first learned of them, a number of the people concerned, both on the Canadian and on the U.S. side, have been tied up with other matters, lany of the implications of Mr. Lovett’s su gestions, moreover, were by no means clear, and various conversations have been held with a view to obtaining a more exact understanding of what they would involve. It is now known fairly accurately what Mr. Lovett wants, and it remains to be decided whether or not the Government is prepared to meet his wishes. In the first place, he is anxious to obtain agree10. ment on a procedure whereby the U.S.A.F. could carry out the various routine operations involved in its general programme of preparedness without in each case having to obtain the consent of the Canadian Government. In this regard, he would wish to have accepted the right of the U.S.A.F. to conduct such operations merely upon a basis of prior notification according to terms which may be agreed. He appears quite prepared to keep Canadian authorities fully informed, both through service channels and, if it should be desired, through the diplomatic channel, of the general purposes and extent of these preparatory programmes. Provided that satisfactory procedures are established for keeping the Canadian Government informed of what is going on, it is suggested that Mr. Lovett’s wishes on this point can be met. 11. He is prepared to accept what has always been con- sidered the basic Canadian requirement, namely that the consent ol the Canadian Government must be obtained before actual strike operations are launched either from Canadian bases or throueh Canadian air space. On this question again no difficulty is seen in what he suggests. 12. The critical problem, it would appear, is the ques- . . 5 00094 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulg en vertu de la Loi surl'accs a l'information - 5 = of special weepons to intermediate or advanced bases (such as bas s in the U.K., in Greenland, 1® Alsska, or in Canada) may be no more than a matter of assuming and maintaining a position of full preparedness. To this, the Government micht be willing to agree, subject to the conditions sug ested above in paragraph 10. Deployment operations mey, however, be undertaken in consequence of political or other developmonts likely to lead to an early outbreak of hostilities. Operations of this nature would be of immediete and critical significance to Canada. It has been mede Quite ol ar thet the U.J. military authorities, and Mr. Lovett, wish to have prior author! ition for these activities as we 1. Mr. Lovett apparently considers that such prior authorization by the Canadian Government would be reesonable in view of the arrangements made for elose political liaison between the two governments, through which the Canedian Government would, it is supposed, be kept fully informed of the political developments and of the intentions of the V. . Government. It should be noted that Mr. Lovett’s category B. refer* to "Deployments to Canadian bases". Deployment operations, even of an emergency nature, through Canadian airspace to other territory such no Alaska or Greenland, might be regarded as felling within his category A., "Intransit flights not involving strikes". 13. The difficulty concerning deployment would arise 14. only in a case where the appreciation of the two governments might differ as to what action should be taken. Such a difference night easily occur in the event of a critical situation developing in the Far East. It la unlikely that the Canadian Government would wish fletly to refuse the use of Canadian sirspece in preparation for strikes against Far Eastern targets should the U.S. Government insist thet such preperation was urgently necessary. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that it would be easier, in such a situation, for the Government to impress its views upon U.S. authorities if it had not previously author! ed the use of either Canadian bases or Canadian airspace for emergency deployment. — further point raised in Mr. Lovett’s letter was IS. his wish to have the arrangements "bilateral in nature and ex-NATO, leaving any authorisation for S.A.C. oprations under the NATO agreement as completely separate end apert from these errengementa". While this passage appears somewhat . . 6 00095 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surl’accesI'information 13(1)(a) .15(1) . . -6- unattractive, it has been explained to us in fairly satisfactory terns by U. . officials. Tha NATO provisions for mutual support are so ill-defined, end the po sibla complications to which they might give rise so undesirable, that in the interest of efficiency and clarity it was desired to supplement (but net to supersede, the general NATO undertakin s by a specific understanding between Canada and the U.S. in regard to strategic sir operations. It may be mentioned that the particular matters proposed for Inclusion in the agreement concern Ga ac da more directly than any other NATO power except the V. ., as the North American continent must of necessity be the base of all NATO strategic air operetiona. 16. It should, of course, be remembered that deploycent through Canadian sirspace to Alaake would not necessarily be en action taken to wet the needs of MATO. 17. This papur has attempted to cet out the background and significsnee of Nr. Lovett’ a propossl for a general agree- ment to cover ' . &.4.C. operations in Canndn. It is understood th t MT. Pesrson will discuss the matter with U. . ministers and officials lx the neer future, end will wish to express the views of the Government on the particular isauss involved. There are suggested below certain points which Mr. Pearson might make to the U.S. ministers concerned. 1. The Canadian Government is anxious to cooperate in every possible way in simplifying the procedures to be followed by the 1. . .F., and wishes to ensure that the letter's operetions shali in no way be impeded by unnecesssrily cumbersome arrangements. To this end it welcomes Mr. Lovett’s pro possl to draw up a detailed agreement specifying elearly a) those eategories of operations for which it is prepared to grant blanket prior suthorizstion subjeet to the establishment of a mutually satisfsotory notiflection procedure. b) those categories of operntions for which it considers that its concent would heve to be sought through the forml government-to-government channel in the light of perticular circumstances. . 7 00096 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulg en vertu de la Loi surl’accs l l’information - 7 - The Government considers, however, that the categII. ories of operations suggested b Mr. Lovett obscure to some extent the distinction indicated in I. between operations of routine importance and those of major political significance. There is suggested below a redefinition of the various categories of operations which the Government would regard as more suitable. Flights to bases in Csneda or involving overflight (A) of Canadian territory for purposes of training, testing and related aspects of the general progremne of preparedness being carried on by the U. . S.A.C. Deployment of atomie weapons to bases in Canada or (8) Involving overflight of Canadian territory undertaken ns a part of the general progremne of preparedness mentioned in (A). Deployment of atomic weapons to bases in Canada or (C) involving overflight of Canedian territory occasioned by a specific political situation or development. Actual strikes from bases in Canada or involving (D) overflight of Cansdian territory. The Government 18 prepered to grant prior authority XII. for operations of the types indicated in (A) and (B) above, subject to the receipt of suitable prior notification as discussed in V. below. The Government would wish to indicate its consent IV. before any initial operation of the types indicated in (C) and (D) above are carried out. It should be added that the Government has already undertaken to respond with the utmost promptness to requests relating to S.A.C. operations, and for some months has had in effect arren ements designed to ensure that in an emergency its views would e given to the 1. . Government within a very few hours. In view of the arrangements already made to provide for full and frank consultations at a high political level concerning "situations which may necessitate the use of atomic weapons", the U.S. Government should at any time be in a position to anticipate with some confidence the decision of the Canadian Government in a perticuler situation. It is to be . . . 8 00097 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulge en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a /'information - 8 - hoped that the consultations will become sufficiently intimate to remove any likelihood of a situation arising concerning which either Government is ignorant of the other’s views and intentions. It will be appreciated that the Canadian Government is unwilling to commit itself in advance to permitting the initial stages (such as emergency deployment) of operations which in the event it night oppose. V. The Government wishes to be informed regarding the nature and extent of the various progremmes of routine operations indicated in categories () er d (By above. To this end it would wish to be given in edvance, preferably both from ... to C.A.8. and fron State Department to Canadian Embassy, a general outline of proposed V. . . •. operation s involving the use of Canadian facilities. Such an outline might be made available on an annual or semiannual basis, and might be amended and supplemented from time to time by more detailed information. In addition, of course, in accordance with normal operations procedures, there would be required prior notification on e service to-servce level of details such as flight plans for individual flights. These two forms of prior notification would satisfy the Government's requirements in regerd to operations of the types indicated in categories (1 and (B) The Government has noted Mr. Lovett’s wish th at the VI. proposed agreement should be "bilateral in nature and ex-N TO". The Government sees no objection to the 8uggestion that the proposed agreement should be specifically bilateral, on the understanding that it wot id supplement (rather then supersede) any undertakings set out in WTO defence plena. It would prefer, however, to have the preamble of the agreement make some reference to the mutual obligetions of Canade and the I ,i e, as members of HATO, to make such provision as may jointly be deemed necessary for their common defence. Such a reference need not specify that the particular arrangements set out in the agreement are s part of the approved N T0 defence programme, but should merely indicate that the egreement is undertaken in fulfilment of the ceneral NATO requirement regarding mutual cooperation in defence planning and preparation. 00098 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW (Wiser) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW16892 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16892 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wiser Consultations, RG25-B-2, Volume number: 3095, Library and Archives Canada.