https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c89b6e67b28fe83ca6d3f1dc1cbad5a5.pdf 0d875bcea57846369e857ae45b8a03e3 PDF Text Text / • Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a I'information -. TOP SECRET August 11th, 1952. . } Note for "Atomic Energy" and "Wiser" files: One copy of attached "Summary of Conversation at a Dinner given by Sir Oliver Franks for Air Marshal Slessor", dated August 7, 1952, is on TOP SECRET Registry file entitled "Visit of Air Marshal Slessor to Ottawa"* Two extra copies of this Summary were given me by Mr. Ignatieff, to be put on the "Atomic Energy" and"Wiser" files* G. Mather, i 00163 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri'acces a I'information - / » Summary of Conversation at a Dinner Given by Sir Oliver Franks for Air Marshal Slessor.. . TOP SECRET August 7, 1952. PMT:eru On the eve of the departure of Air Marshal Slessor from Washington to Ottawa, Sir Oliver Franks gave an informal dinner at which the following were also present: Mr. Bohlen, Counselor at the State Department; Hr. John Ferguson, Deputy Director of the Planning Staff of the State Department; Sir William Elliott; Professor Harrod of Oxford University; Mr. Aubrey Eorgan and Mr. Ignatieff. The conversation which ranged over many subjects 2.' ' touched upon three topics which are of sufficient importance, perhaps, to warrant a record being made. (a) The implications of the "stretch-out1* in the attainment of the military targets agreed at the NATO Lisbon meeting. (b) The current efforts of the U.K. Government to establish solvency while maintaining a reduced rearmament programme. (c) The prospects of the Presidential elections in the United States. The question of the implications of the stretchSo out in the attainment of military targets set at the . Lisbon Council meeting had evidently been the subject of a more formal discussion by Air Marshal /Slessor with the U.S. authorities. He suggested that the revision of NATO military programmes involved the re-assessment of "a fact" and "an argument". The fact was the economic capabilities of the respective NATO nations which simply did not permit the attainment of the high goals set at Lisbon. The argument, be. said, was the erroneous strategic conception which assured that it was necessary to match the known Soviet military capability in Europe in terms of conventional forces and armaments. Air Marshal Slessor expressed himself in very critical terms of the preparatory work of the TCC and the Screening Committee which led to the acceptance of the military force targets at Lisbon. The main defects in this preparatory work, he suggested, had been the failure to make a proper analysis of the economic capabilities of the NATO countries, particularly the European members], to ass me these burdens. Heakancellijed emphasis given to the idea that Soviet military capabilities in Europe must be matched by a buildup of conventional forces and armaments until a balance was established in this area. \ 4. ' Air Marshal Slessor suggested that NATO military thinking had been dominated too much by conceptions of land warfare more appropriate to the, war of 1914-18 than to the requirements of tswar of te future. He admitted that it was necessary, in order to attain the primary objective of EATO, of deterring Soviet aggression, that there should be adequate covering forces to prevent easy I ...2 00164 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a /’information -90 -2= victory by Soviet forces in Europe. This aim, however, did not necessitate the buildup of massive land armies to the extent, for instance, of 93 divisions in Curope. 5. To attain a proper perspective, he suggested it was necessary to consider Soviet defence commitments as well as their capabilities. The Soviet Government was obliged, in order to maintain itself in power, to provide for the defence of all the territory of the U.S.S.R., as well,as to support the satellite countries within its orbit. Regarded from this standpoint, the " large Soviet military resources were perhaps no more than adequate for the defence of the Soviet orbit. 6. On the Allied side. Air Marshal Slessor suggested that insufficient account had been taken, so far, in NATO of the new developments of technology in warfare, particularly in the air potential, including atomic weapons. Indeed, he suggested that special weapons had not been put into the scale at all, so far, in the working out of NATO military targets* 7. In the discussion which ensued, Messrs. Bohlen and Ferguson seemed, on the whole, to agree with Air Marshal Slessor’s arguments. They both, hosever, emphasized the advantage which the Soviet Government have in holding the initiative in aggressive moves throughout . the world, while the democratic nations were held under the constraint of being unable to initiate preventive or aggressive actions. If there were to be a stretch-out in the attainment of military targets in Europe or an actual reduction in the goals for thia area, there would have to be certain compensating increments, at least in the strategic strength of the Western powers in other areas. Bohlen tpartieular Wil" suggested that if United States obligations in Europe might be reduced, at least to some extent, it might have the effect of releasing certain resources which could then be made available as necessary to meet Soviet threats in Asia. 8. Elaborating on this further, Bohlen suggested that the greatest danger of Communist aggression lay in Asia. He thought that the Soviet Government was now convinced that they could not make any aggressive move in Western Europe without accepting the responsibilities of a general war. This, he.thought, could be accepted as a guide to Wester actions with the possible exception of Berlin, where the situation was, to some extent, confused by the possibility of Communist initiative which might be localized. In the Far East, on the other hand, the Soviet Government was still free to support local Communist initiative through satellite forces, although after their miscalculations in Korea they would probably so conductedaZ. with s greater caution, to minimize the risk of general war 9. In the Middle East, Bohlen suggested that the surge of nationalism could not be effectively met by the use of military force. In Tgypt, for instance, despite the substantial British military garrison in the Suez, Western power and influence had suffered a severe defeat. Likewise, ..3 00165 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge envertu de la Loi sur/'acces a /’information ' <t =30 in Iran, the military forces available to the Shah had failed to maintain the growing power of the Tudeh Party and its growing ascendancy over the National Front led by Mossadegh. ... .. 10. . Both Bohlen and Ferguson also expressed the view . that the Restorn world could not afford to risk any serious diplomatic defeat at the hands of the Communists. ■' They were particularly worried about the current situation in Iran. lie. Professor Harrod, who is visiting Washington in . connection with business with the International Monetary Fund, led in the discussion on the current, economic : policies of the U.K. Government. He said that MPo Churchill’s government was determined that the United Kingdom should attain solvency and put an end to' th® un‘ balance in its international trade by stern deflationary . measures, This policy was being pursued at a time when : there was a notable decline in demand for soft consumer goods, both at horn®'and abroad. while textiles especially had been affected, there had been a decline in demand for other notable British exports, such as pottery, . furniture, radios, .etc. At the same time, demand for hard capital goods had been sustained, and, in fact, British exporters had been unable to keep up with current orders. Recognizing the undesirability of further reducing British imports to any appreciable extent, the British . Government was now bent upon increasing exports, particularly in the field in which a buoyant demand is still maintained, namely, in hard capital goods. This involves the necessity of releasing a substantial quantity . \ ..of metals to provide materials for the engineering and other industries which are expected to play a major part in this new drive for oxports. Professor larrod suggested that it was this consideration above all that was in the minds of Mr. Churchill and his government when they . decided to cut back the .British re-armament programme. 12. The discussion on the prospects of the Presidential elections in the United. States was led off by a comment from Sir Oliver Franks, suggesting that General Eisenhower might be expected to win the Presidential election. This view was not supported by the two Americans present, ..... Eessrs. Bohlen and Ferguson. ' Dr. Ferguson observed that , he thought that many people would take even odds on the ■ election, but he personally thought that the chances were more' shan in favour of the Democrats winning the election, le mentioned several factors to support this argument. • The statistics, he suggested, were definitely in favour of the Democrats. - They had the largest number of registered '• voters. The party had become united- since the convention; there were no prospects of substantial fragments splitting ' off from the party as had occurred.in 1948 when the Dixiecrats and the Wallaceites reduced Democratic majorities substantially in important areas of th® country. . Another important consideration was that the independent voter : ' might prefer to support a programme which had' given the 1 country unprecedented prosperity as against the untested promises of the Republican Party. Governor Stevenson, moreover, although obviously not as well known a figure as o .4 00166 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri'acces a /'information =4* General Eisenhower, seems to. be winning wide support. Mr. Bohlen soomed generally in agreement with these remarks, but observed that two factors might Influence events between now and the elections. He suggested that if the Communists won any substantial victories, diplomatically or militarily, voters might turn against the Democratic administration. He suggested that he particularly had in mind some unpredictable turn of events in Korea or a Communist coup in Iran. He also thought that some change in the economic picture, such as a sharp increase in inflationary trend, might also affect the vote. 00167 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW (Wiser) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW16862 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16862 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wiser Consultations, RG25-B-2, Volume number: 3095, Library and Archives Canada.