https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/be3e3f6b0fe93452ba2ab7af6ab8fc06.pdf b0962b782348e0a85306d2f555b86777 PDF Text Text 4 s . - Copy No. 5 Ext. 18 2B Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi Surl'acces a /’information of five copies. FILE COPY OTTAWA FILE No WISERLetter No..... .... ... SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Date.. May. 15th, . 1952.. FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, Washington, D. C. ■ THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA TO: Reference.-. Subject: WISER -TOP SECHISE .., Your. isor. Tologrem. No. .33 . of. May. 9th and. m.N. 44... of May 14th. ' . .. - Sixth Meeting of Consultation, on- May 13th, • 1952. . .. I enclose four copies of a record of the - meeting., This : we have not yet 7 compared with the P0m cord made by lr. Chase of the State Department. ■ If there prove to be substantial differences, I shall inform you. of them Paragraphs 3 to 6 of the enclosure have already been reported in my telegram Wiser Ito. 4les as I thought it desirable that you should receive as.soon as possible the views expressed at the. meeting on the likelihood of Soviet pressure in Berlin'in the ■ vory near future. , 5 Copies Referred To...... No. of Enclosures ....X. Post File No. 2. On the risks that may arise in the Far East,. ■ there was a brief discussion reported in paragraphs 11 to 15. I thought it well, however, to reserve for a later meeting consideration in detail of the position in Korea, since I have not yet received the telegram from you which you said in your message No. - ' 31 ■ that you expected to send before the end of last . week. Paragraph 17 of the enclosure reports the ready acceptance of the suggestion made by me that beforo long there should be a meeting of consultation attended by a senior military adviser of each government. X Should be glad if you would mention this to General Foulkes, and if he endorses the proposal, request him; to let me know as far in advance as possible when he expects to be in Washington so that a special meeting can be arranged. 1 3. . At this meeting Ir. Hitze was more ready than on previous occasions to take the initiative in bringing up subjects for consideration. . He ' also . refrained from asking me, as he has done in the past, "for the views of the Canadian Government. I did not bring up all the matters mentioned in my message Wiser No. 42 of May 3rd and your reply, Wiser No. 31 of Hay 9th. Some of them seemed to be not sufficiently related to the central purpose of the consultations; on others it seemed to me that we could get fuller information by approaching directly officers in the bureaux concerned in the State Department, 4. I note that no reply has yet been received to my Wiser Letter No. 2l of March 20th dealing with a possible public statement on the use of Canadian facilities by the Strategic Air Command. At the meeting here on March 10th attended by fr. Pearson it was proposed that such a statement should be prepared • ■ in consultation and held in reserve until the need for its use arose. I should be glad to know whether any • ■ further considoration has been given to this matter. • 00185 C 0. IIa WT0730 �■ 4 - Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge envertu de la Lo'i surl'acces aTinformation 3 COPY no. s OF 5 COPIES " — ‘s ••. f. F WISER — TOP SECRET =4 7 ,* 4 ■ . -4 4 . < RECORD OP THE SIXTH MEETING BETW hir ? *, r # • #' . REPRESENTATIVES OF TUB CANADIAN AND * r UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS TO ASSESS . : THE WORLD SITUATION AND THE RISK OFWAR, / 9 TUESDAY, MAY 13, 1952 . . J * The meeting, which was held in the Office of the Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State 1 5 Department, was attended byi * ■. ' * *ur. Paul Nitze, —dle " *= . Mr. Freeman Matthews, - 7 3 ; • 2 r. Joseph Chase 5 i .527 for the United States Government and by . "74/ • * ■ -f e!1 . ' * ts i 21 • • Mr. H.H. Wrong. Mr. Georgo Ignatieff, ■ Mr, ’' Douglas . LePan “Y .V for theCanadian Government, 7 .8 - 2, 1Y .At the outset, Mr. Nitze suggested that he would . be willing to offer some comment on all the trouble spots around the globe, if that would bo useful. " Mr. Wrong n ■ 4 warmly welcomed this suggestion. : 25 i _ a ■. , 1 . . 13, Germany.Mr. Nitze began with the situation in: . Germany, which he described as being the most serious 2 and worrying of all’ those in which the risk of war was . involved. The State Department had regarded the offor . - made by the Soviet Government in its note of the 10th of March of reunification for Germany and the creation f - of German national military forces as a serious move designed to disrupt progress towards the raising of German. military forces by the Federal Republic and the < . integration of Western Germany into Western Europe. That original judgment, had been abundantly justified . \ 007 by subsequent events. The Soviet Union almost certainly . 2 would endeavour to increase the tens ion in Germany. 7 . There was a possibility that to thia end they would use threatening pressure in addition to the seductive offers which they had already held out. Tho easiest. . way in which they could exert pressure in Germany was \ 77 n by roimposing a blockade on Berlin. Thisprospoct, . Mr. Nitze said, had to be faced as a real possibility. . . - 4..* * In the case of a renewed blockade of Berlin,, the Soviet Union would have some advantages that had not been in their hands in 1949. It was believed that they had. at their disposal improved methods of impeding . the airlift, which would again become necessary. Aircraft flying on tight schedules in bad weather reliod . heavily on assistance from radar; and the Soviet forces . probably now had methods of interfering with these . . navigational aids. The Soviet authorities., were also in ■ . bettor equipped to maintain a blockade by reason of . two railway lines which they had built around Berlin, so that they were now less dependent on facilities ; \ / ’ in the Western sector. On the. other hand, the supply ‘ 7* « position in the Western sector of Berlin was now much . bettor than it had been in 1949. . ( .... 3• . ■ • ' •.. I ‘,* . 5.: If the,..2 7 * - 00186 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ document divulge en vert de la Loj surVacces a /’information / WISER: - ' TOP ' SECRET - 2 ■ / If the Soviot Union decided to reimposothe 5. T. blockade, the Western allies would have to show once, again at least as much solidarity and determination as they had displayed in 1949, One of the purposes of . the blockade, if it metorialized, would be to split . : the Western allies. If they stood firmly togother, . 7_ 7 however, notonly could this purpose bo frustrated . " but the blockade could be turned into a moans of weld* ing the Wostorn coalition even more closely together. : If the blockade were reimposed, the proper policy for = the West, “r. Kith© said, would bo to use the resulting . tension as an opportunity to get a number of things done which might be. vory difficult to accomplish other- 7 wise .. ... . . 1 . 00 . * a . " - .. , .* • ' : ’ .* 6. / In reply to quest ions about when tension in Germany might be expected to reach its peak, Mr, Nitze . said that, in, his opinion, there was some possibility _ that the blockade might be resumed even before the signature of the German contractual agreements and . the EDC Treaty, in any event, tension could certainly ; be expected to continue throughout the period. be tween = signature of these interlocking agreoments and their ratification - and for some months, thereafter, Mr. Matthews added that, as he foresaw the trend of events, 7 5 the critical moment at which the Soviet authorities would have to make up their minds on how far they, intended to go to prevent the rearming of Western Germany would be immediatoly after the ratification”’, of the agreements had been completed but before the 7 rearmamont of Western Germany had got really under way. 7. Mr. Wrong suggested that the Politburo would. ■,-•.■■ make their decision on the basis of a calculation of . 4 how intolerable to thoir interests they considered the . rearming of Western Germanyxto be, Mr, Nitso-said that P: while he agreed, it must be romembored that they would also have other considerations in mind when deciding what action they would take in Germany,: Every projected -. move. would be examined to determino whether it would be effective in splitting the Western allios. In trying to.estimate what would be the most dangerous period in Germany, it should not be forgotten that there were two. risks involved. One was the risk of war. The other . was the risk that,the German contractual agreements and . 3 7 the EDC Treaty might fall to be ratified and at the same . time no progress be made in reconstituting a free and -united Germany. This risk of the utter defeat of Western : - policy towards Germany was almost as serious as the risk ]. > of-war Itself,/ 7' 1 . . .71 / 4 5 .. ' 1 S . ■' . It was agreed that the important thing now was " to push forward with signature of the agreements and. 7 then. with ratification. Alternative policies would be very hard to find if the present policy of tying Western Germany firmly' to Western Europe were frustrated, in r answer to a question of what could be done to mitigate the consequences of possible failure to secure ratification for tho now arrangements, Mr, Matthews said, simply, . that another effort to obtain ratification would have to be made. After supporting that view, Mr. Nitze added that a distinction should be drawn between the situation : that would. be created by failure of the Bundestag to .. ratify the agreoments and failure of the French National . ■■; - Assembly to' ratify them. -The ■ cause of failure of the Bundestag to ratify the agreements would almost certainly 50 a desiro that another attempt be made to explore with Soviet representatives the possibility of reaching a • ’ “ . ■ - .** ‘** .* .0* - ** - . . 7- . r. . --* - . ■ . . • - • - ’— . four-power.. ..3 - . . . ■ _ . . 00187 ■ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri’acces a /'information - 3 . . WISER - TOP SECRET - four-poweragreomont on Gormany. If tho Bundestag " • rofused to ratify the agreements for that reason, clearly the three Western powers would have to meet > . with the Soviot Union to •discuss a settlement for . : Germany. He was convinced that it would become clear in tho course of such negotiations that the Soviet Union had no intention of allowing a free and united - Germany to be reconstituted. When that had been mad© • ; clear, ratification of the contractual agreements and _ of the EDO Treaty, by the Bundestag might be expected ; with some confidence. An adverse vote by ths French National Assembly, on the other hand, would bo based .on a more tangled complox of motives; and it was much more difficult to see what course should be followed .. in order to socure a reversal of an adverse vote, if that should occur. . . " 9. " Host of Europe. Mr. Nitzo said that he could see no evidence that any other part of Europe was in danger of overt Soviet action. There were no indications. of any Soviet design to apply pressure to Austria. Nor did Finland, Finnmark or Bornholm seem to be in any , present, danger. The Yugoslavs seemed to bo less anxious than a year ago about tho possibility of an attack on their country; and, so far as could be discerned, the 5 risk there, if anything, had decreased. In Europe, ' . Mr,’ Nitzo concluded, what was most disturbing was the • - : danger overhanging Borlin and the increased risk of. • war that would be created by reimposition of the Soviot: . blockade. | ’ / - ■ ■: 10. ’■. ’ Mtddto East, ■ Tn the' Middle East, Mr. . Nitze : , said, the. "situation was dangerous but not for the same ‘ . : reasons.. The whole aroa was weak and exposed; and the . effort to establish a command structure had been stalled) < by the inability of Egypt and the United Kingdom to .y • reconcile thoir differences. However,, there were no . . . signa? that’ th®.Middle East was in danger of any overt ‘ ) ■ Soviet action; the dangers arose from, the diminution . 1 . of the influence of the Western powers rather than from ( .an increase in Soviet, influence. . . . 5 • 1 J 11. Korea: Mr. Wrong said that he expected to a receive from Ottawa within a few days a message on the present situation in Korea and the possible alto mat Ive courses that might be followed. When it arrived, he hoped that it might be • possible to hold another mooting of consultation exolusively directed to the situation in Korea. it was agreed-that this should be done. . 12. . In the meantime, Mr. Nitze offered some comments on the truce negotiations at Panmunjom, The points at issue had become somewhat clarified. As . a result of the exchange of "package" proposals between the United Nations and Communist Delegations, it was ■■ now clear that compromise solutions could be reached on the airfiolds issue and on the issue of how the inspecting body should be composed, Tho one intractable problem was prosentodby the prisoners -of-war. , The United Nations negotiators had made it clear . (a) that thoy would agree to oxchango . ■ 70,000 Communist prisoners for 12,000 United Nations prisoner; and } . (b) that they could never consent to . an agreement by which the United Rations Command would be obliged to manacle and . fe3°HFopatsenesa. who were un-.. This....4 00188 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu dS \aLoi suri’ecces'a /'information . 4 " : WiSER - TOP SECRET ' : This difficulty had/ of course, boen aggravated by . . . . the largo number of prisoners held by the United Nations . who had declared their unwillingness to return to Comunist-held territory* Thoy had done so in spite P .of the fact that the likely consequences to their •■ / familitkes of unwillingness to roturn had been pointed . out to them, . 7. _ ' f .. 13. Lsting"some of the possible coursos which tho ' " United Nations negotiators might follow, Mr. Wrong said • that, in theory at least, . : — (a) ' th® present serios of almoot daily. -■ - - meetings could be continued; "0 2 **' ' .(b) the meetings might be adjourned to • '• be resumed at the. request ofithor sidet. or ■ . . _ " ‘ •. 304 : (c) tho meetings might be broken off. It was agreed that the third course could not be adopted on the initiative of the United Nations side. It was also agreed that it was very perplexing to decide what tactics in the negotiations it would now be wise to follow. “ Mr. Matthews said that the time was cortainly 77. approaching when it would have to be settled whether to ait. In the tent at Panmunjom day after day or to work . . out some way of holding less frequent meetings. . ■, ' • 14. ; “r. Ignatieff enquired whether one reason fors the Commniste t desire to continue daily, or almost daily, meetings at Panmunjom might not be that they valued the ■ ; - moetinas ■ as; a mise-en-scno for making dramatic charges . against the conduct of the United Nations forces, ■ Mr. 5 - •' Nitze was inclined to agre. W said that initially fantastic charges about bacteriological warfare, for example, -had very little impact; but, in-the long run, 4 tho big He could have very serious propaganda effects. .21 14. • : Japan, In reply to an-enquiry from Mr. Wrong " whether Increased Communist agitation in Japan might be ' expected following the ratification of the Japanese Peace 7 Treaty, Mr. Nitze said that he thought Communist influence inJapan, for the time being, was declining. The Hay Day riots in Tokyo had not been so serious ah most of the newspaper reports had suggested. .Japanese Communists (11144 ■ had ' so obviously been working for; Soviet, rather /than ; ’. . Japanese, interests that their credit had fallen. Nor wore there any indications at present, that overt action was intended against the Japanese Ialands. -rs . 15. . South-East Asia. It was also improbablo, Mr. : Nitze said, that any overt military ■ action would be ■ . . attempted by foreign forces against any of the countries, of South-East Asia. The Chinese Communists, he thought, realized that the immunity from attack which China had onjoyed (as a rosult of its alliance with the Soviet Union , and the possibility that an attack on China would precipitatoathird world ear) might not protect them from : ‘ 1 -retaliation, if they launched an attack on Indo-China . or Burma. For that reason, it was more probable/ Nr. Nitze thought, that the Chinese Communists would continue - to give indirect support to the forces of Ho-chi-minh in the hope that Fronch rosistanco would weaken. Mr. Nitze confirmed that no Chinese prisoners had- boen taken . _ r. by the....5 00189 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ ■ A F Aed , ' Document divulge envertu de la Lotsurl'a^ces e 1’ihforl^afion • WISER — • TOP SECRET .“ 5 9 , . : "" ' by the Viet-Jan forces. In Durma, there had been a — . distinct improvoment in the situation during the past".six months. It had been pessimistically forecast by . many knowledgeable observers six months ago that the _ , whole of northern Burma would by now be in the hands" of the Communists. Kot only had this prediction been ' Falsified, but the control oxercise by theGovernmont in Rangoon was now considerably firmer than previously.; -- ■ * . - ■ . ■ - ■ ■ J. ■ ■ ." • ■' • Possibility of Communis t~ Action on Two Fronts, . 16. Finally, Mr.Nitzosaid that- there was a slight1 possibility’ . that the Communists would docide to launch a now military a attack inKorea and at the same time to make a move else- ?) where, perhaps by reimposing the blockade of Borlin. - Such a synchronised programme, however, would be put . 2 .. into effect only if the Soviet strategists had decided 7 4 that they wanted to precipitate a general war or were ' ... at least prepared to accept a general war as the con- U. sequence of their action. Mr. Nitzo did not think that 3 3 such a two-pronged attack was at all likely; but perhaps J : • that dire possibility could not be entiroly ruled out. Beforo the meeting concluded, Mr. Wrong proposed — 17. . that it might be helpful if: General Foulkes, the Chairman ■ of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, were to attend )1i in the near future one of these meetings of consultation ■ ■ on the risks of war. . He came to Washington from time to 3 . time for discussions with General Bradley; and Mr. Wrong ? l hoped that it might bo possible to arrange a meeting . : during one of his visits. If so, it might be appropriate . for a United States military expert also to be present. , * Mr. Nitze and Mr. Matthews readily agreed with this .1 : 5 . ' suggestion. .0 ■ Pm H . " : : : • DVLeP/lt • ' . 2 ' . " ' . 4.0 " : .0 . 4 , . . ne . $* . f : * 7 2 2 116 ■' •- *- ' ■ . * ■ 00190 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW (Wiser) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW16854 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16854 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wiser Consultations, RG25-B-2, Volume number: 3095, Library and Archives Canada.