https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b4a922db3519872b3d4337685d1c00a2.pdf 75e7e47d79b8a362c74a71f3a4f8db11 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a /’information 1 Copy No. 5 of five copies. 1 WISER TOP SECRET RECORD OF THE EIGHTH MEETING BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CANADIAN AND . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS TO ASSESS . THE WORLD SITUATION AND THE RISK OF WAR, FRIDAY, JANUARY 30, 1953. The meeting, which was held in the office of the Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, was attended by Mr. Paul Nitze, Mr. Frederick Nolting,. Mr, R. Gordon Arneson, and Mr. Andrew Foster . r - ; for the United States Government and by Mr. H. H. Wrong, Mr. George Ignatiff, and Mr. D. LePan for the Canadian Government. Mr. Freeman Matthews, the Deputy Under-Secretary, who, usually attends these . meetings, was absent due to pressure of work because: of Mr. Dulles’s departure for Europe that day. Mr. Nolting of Mr. Matthews’ office attended instead. 2. Mr. Wrong enquired whether the S.A.C. arrangements which had been agreed, with particular reference to Goose Bay, had been working satisfactorily since the: last meeting. It was agreed by the United States , representatives that the, arrangements had been working satisfactorily. , ' ' .1 • REVIEW OF WORLD SITUATION AND RISKS OF WAR *?.. .3. Mr. Wrong enquired whether the United States authorities had altered in any way their appreciation of the risks of war or their estimate of /period of maximum danger since the last meeting. He referred particularly to the meeting of the Soviet Party Congress in Moscow and the accompanying statements by Stalin, which at least provided some basis for the conjecture that the Soviet Government was counting upon the Western. . Allies falling out among themselves rather than expecting an attack upon itself. He said that'there had been: some disposition in Western Europe as well as in Canada to draw the inference from this statement that the danger of a general war. at, least in the immediate Mr. Nitze replied future, had receded to some extent. that the U.S. authorities were willing to draw encouragement from Stalin’s statement only as itconcenned the immediate future. The U.S. authorities attached more importance to the assessment of Soviet capability of attack than iton any inferences regarding Soviet intentions that might be drawn from statements by Soviet leaders. The Soviet leaders. had shown in the past that they were capable of making very rapid changes in their intent. 4. Turning/ 00267 �′$ 0 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surfaeces a I'infomation -2 3 Turning to the possible significance of the . 4. . current and prospective purges in the Soviet Union and . the satellite countries, Mr* Wrong asked whether the’ State Department was prepared to draw any inferences from these developments, as they might affect the risk Mr. Nitze said that the State Department was . of war. frankly at a loss to form any firm appreciation of the significance of these developments. Onithe one hand, they' could be regarded as evidence of internal weakness; on the other hand, they might possibly point to preparation . . for war by rooting out weaknesses on the home front. An early assumption that the trial of the Soviet doctors ■' , for alleged medical sabotage might portend the purge' of fieri a, the Chief of Secret Police, does not seem to . have been.borne put by the fact that recently he has been shown signs of official favour, having accompanied . All that Mr. Nitze Stalin to the theatre in Moscow. ’ . could say was that the situation warranted close . . . -.observation,; ’ 4 ‘ ... -5. . Turning to developments in Soviet policy towards Germany, Mr. Wrong recalled that in previous discussions the thought had been expressed that Soviet .. reactions to the re-armament?of Western Germany might take the form either of violent Soviet response against the West, or the incorporation of Eastern Germany into Mr. Wrong asked, the Soviet orbit as a satellite. whether the State Department had formed any judgment / Mr. of the trends in Soviet policy towards Germany. Nitze replied that on the whole the trend had been towards the full incorporation of the Eastern Zone in ; \ Germany as a Soviet satellite. . The present danger lay in the efforts of the Soviet authorities to incorporate the East Zone of Berlin into the Eastern * This would Zone of Germany, and thus divide Berlin. - . produce serious problems for the Western Occupying . / .. Powers in Berlin., Turning to recent developments in the Far East, .. 6. Mr. Wrong observed that the intentions of the United States Government seemed both as important and obscure . for the purposes of this discussion as the intentions ; y of the Soviet Government. Mr. Nitze said that he was not in a position at the present time to say anything about, p With regard the policies of the new Administration. to Korea, the most that he would say was that, the State . Department attached .some significance to the fact that ■ the Chinese Communists in their broadcastshad made no . , reference in recent months to the prisoner-of-war issue. ' He recalled that when the armistice negotiations at . Panmunjom had been concerned with the 38th parallel as ... the main issue, the Chinese Communists had likewise refrained from commenting on this question in their, Mr. Nitze said that this fact might radio broadcasts. at least suggest the possibility that the Chinese Communists were re-examining, the prisonereof-war issue. 9 So far as the question of the discussion of the Korean issue by the General Assembly when it re-convenes was concerned, Mr. Nitze said that the United States authorities would be under strict limitation in so far . as their choice of action was concerned, as the Indian 7 . Resolution adopted at the previous meeting represented just about "as far as the United States Government was , prepared to go in the matter of concession on the . prisoner-of-war issue. 4). 7. Turning to/ 00268 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge,en vertude la Loi.surl’acces & I’informatibn •' 'l. (. ' -3- t. •■ ‘ .. - . -a .*. .*‘ ** ■ - > ' - .* - !: ‘ - 44..................-1. i, .. 7. . Turning to Indo-China, Mr. Nitze said that . :. * there had been no significant /.change' in the military . : situation.Assistance from the Chinese Communists 3 continued at about the same level' in material. There/ was still no evidence of any air support for the " : ; 2 Viet-Minh forces.; .The. political situation seemed more " < encouraging as the result of the elections. . / : . U. s. PROPOSALS FOR AN-EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ) ■ ■ . ■■ •' . ‘ \ ‘ l: . ... .. ■' : • " t FOR AIR DEFENCE IN THE FAR NORTH, 0 . • . " 1 . " 59 1 - 0001 .. 6 . t ; 8. '. Mr. Nitze said that there was one new. item, s of busines s whi ch he wished to bring rup as a matter to . which the United States Government at the highest . 1 level attached urgency and importance. . He said that li there had been growing concern in the United States — f. .Government, at the state of vulnerability, of the United - 1 States to surprise attack from the air involving perhaps . . the use of atomic weapons. He said that this vulner/ ' : . ability was not regarded solely from a military stand-: . point, but also because of its importance in regard to ’ . civil defence as well as from the point of view of its / 1 ' international political implications. He explained / ‘z; that in the opinion of the U.S. authorities, so long 111 as the Soviet Government were aware that they had the 0 capability to strike s surprise blow at targets in the 7 United States, a strong temptation existed which ’. : , . increased the risks of war. Thus, he suggested that " 11 l a decrease in the vulnerability of the United States ′ " — would act as a deterrent to war as well as providing 7 " for the defence of the civilian population of the " Y United-States. ‘ He suggested that the Canadian . / ? " Government might wish to consider the common interest . which they, would have in both aspects of,the proposal i which he-was under instruction to make toxsubntexax in a // diplomatic note setting forth proposals for a project : designed, by the establishment of an early warning * . / system in the Far North, to improve the air defences ...of North America; ?" . . ,. . * . : . e . . 3, - • r 0, . - ’ ′ ■ . 9. After submitting the State Department note, J dated January 30th, copies, of which are being transmitted : • separately, Mr. Nitze made comments on some of the more 5 - important points made in this note. He observed that - the note makes a point of the fact that in the view of s ? the United States Government a much earlier warning is 14 required for an effective air defence system than can 4 . be given by the existing joint radar system at the < * —54th Parallel, which.. is in the process of completion. " / . The object of the early warning system to be established.. in the Far North is to provide the Civil Defence at ... • t : least five hours’ warning of impending attack from the . air. The essential feature of the proposed construc-.. . tion of an eerly warning system would be to provide . ' thi s. extra warning. It was not conceived primarily as a measure of military defence, to be considered in . . terras of the necessity of providing aircraft and other 1. 4 equipment required for interception. The immediate . / ' ..X planproposes that, three stations should be built \e immediately, on an experimental basis, one on Barter 0 1 Island, Alaska, the other two at Herschel Island and t Aklavik. Mr. Nitze said that the United States- . ■ pis ' '•. . 4 authorities hoped that these three experimental . ‘ .7 stations could be installed during the coming open ‘.: navigation season in the Arctic. . The United States 4 authorities therefore hope that the approval of the Canadian Government to this proposal could be received . ; ■ at an/ ' . 00269 �* 7 •■ Y Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu-de la Hoi surj'acce?a I'ififormetion * A t .4-. ■ '1 n. t- , Ri - ' ?• 2 at an early date. t .. . •• 177 7 — 10. . Mr. Wrong asked whether Mr. Nitze was in a ■ . position to indicate in general outline at least the 7 - 1 magnitude of the.total program envisaged to provide. — . an early warning system in theFar North. Mr. Nitze said that the present plans, which had been worked out " by the. Research and Development officials in the United States Government, contemplated thirteen additional" : ’ stations (i.e., fifteen in all, if the two experimental stations now proposed are included in the full chain) which would stretch from Hers chel Island to Thule in — ~ 7 Greenland. In addition; similar early warning stations . would have to be installed on the ensxnrni flanks both " : 2 26 215 in the Pacific Ocean and on the- western coast of Mr. Nitze said that the capital and con- ' Greenland. gstruction cost of' each station was estimated to be approximately #3 millions. . The whole project, including. /- the chain in the Far North and the stations on the . flanks, it was estimated, would cost about $300 millions. .. - ' 11. ’ ? Mr. Nitze concluded by saying that as this - .' : , . matter of providing an early warning system was regarded, ? i by the United States authorities as directly affecting " i the vulnerability of the United States, and in conse- h '. . quence " connected- with their ' appreciation of the risks ” . ; i. of war, he had taken the opportunity at this meeting . • .to bring this matter to the attention of the Canadian., t . .Government.. Mr. Wrong replied that this question would . no doubt have to be considered by Cabinet in the light . of reports andappreciations prepared by the military . am and scientific advisers of the Canadian Government. . . ; . Consequently, there would inevitably be a delay before he was in a position to; reply to the note which had t ? ; t . 7. been submitted, ( . .det 2 . . 1 *" 2 . . " • .. i* , ■■' : . 4 ... 4.37 . ‘* .. . n .f . : ■■.,■■■-'- . - . - . .* . . - . • • . : 1* : ■ r - 1 •' j. 1 Ar A* ■ ’ * .. t : y: ?r • ■ Pdd 97 “ '• 7. . •<’. .. • A 2 0 ■> ‘ y 4* ‘i ■ ■r * .• ‘ h 3S 2 ‘* : ‘he 2 o 00270 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW (Wiser) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW16823 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16823 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wiser Consultations, RG25-B-2, Volume number: 3095, Library and Archives Canada.