https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/59b079db5523c8ed8d5e6ceec86cf292.pdf 085b4d3b1fa5e9dd6ad4fcddf9a82f7f PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /’information • 77 Please return to Miss Mather. TELETYPE MESSAGE > From: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES To: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS WASHINGTON, November 17th, 1951. .Time.... 10: 3Q.a.m.... H. H. WRONG ' Originated by. Authorized by ..... /W Cypher (X ) or En clair ( Time. . 2 ‘v ) Mlm..ts.. _ . Despatched by. THE APPROPRIATE SECURITY OR URGENCY PREFIXES, WHEN REQUIRED RY3 J ‘/c THE CONTENTS, SHOULD BE TYPED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MESSAGE T ------- ---- ----- ---- —------- --- ----- --------------------------------- ----- 02 WISER No. W—.... 16. WISER - TOP SECRET. Following for Reid from Wrong. Begins: Heeney’s Wiser No. 15 of November 15th. Procedure for Handling U.S. Requests. 1. I agree that all three categories of flights listed In Lovett's letter to Acheson include flights of political signi- ficance. I have some doubts whether we should go as far as the proposal summarized in paragraph 9(1). of the message under reference, but I agree with the proposals in paragraph 9(2) and (3). 2. I suggest that before consul-ting the Prime Minister you should seek an opinion from the RCAF on the probability of any strikes with atomic weapons being made in the event of war from Canadian bases or through Canadian airspace. My impression is that intercontinental bombing/is no longer considered a practical possibility' because of the vulnerability of unescorted B.36‘s and B.29's to attack by Russian jet fighters. Indeed, in Korea escorted flights of B.29‘s have proved too costly to be continued in daytime. It seems to me unlikely therefore that any flights falling within Category (c) of Lovett's letter would take places at least until new carriers for atomic weapons have been developed of very -long range and very high speed. You might consult Solandt as well as the RCAF on this point. 3. In practice therefore our national political interests will probably for some years have to be safeguarded through / ' /procedures 00341 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri'acces a I'information 2 procedures devised under Categories (a) and (b). In this connec- tion mention of the domestic procedures adopted by the U.S. Government is not irrelevant. As previously reported, the re- lease from the custody of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Strategic Air Command of both containers and nuclear components for atomic weapons requires the personal authorization of the President, given after consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Similar consent is required for the deployment by SAC outside the United States of the bombs and also of their nuclear cores. (It is unlikely that except on actual strikes any flights by SAC would be made with fully assembled bombs.) This indicates that the political significance of the movement of atomic weapons is recognized at all stages by U.S. Government practice, although they are asking us to recognize that several types of flight involving Canadian territory do not have political significance. 4. While I think that we should agree to some modification of our present arrangements and to a greater use of the Serviceto-Service channel, we must be careful not to go too far. * It should, I think, be established clearly what channel is to be used between the Services, and I would prefer that this should be from Chief of Air Staff to Chief of Air Staff. I presume that instructions could be given to the C.A.S. in Ottawa that he can only reply to such requests after consultation with the ko wall Minister of National -Defence,. who would himself/consult the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs. Furthermore, we might insist that whenever the Service channel is used in this connection a minimum notice of at least fortyeight hours must be given, in addition to the provision through this channel of information of the sort outlined in your para- + ul "e —/ *2h2=rh 4n657 cep22) graph 7. 5. ) V Another point is that in paragraph 3 you refer to the // movement of containers "in a condition where they could not be y detonated”. You will remember the explosion over the.St. Lawrence River a couple of years ago of a container which had /to be jettisoned. 00342 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri'acces a I'information - 3 to be jettisoned. My impression is that containers carried on flights in Categories (a) and (b) can always be detonated be- cause of the importance of the destruction of the bomb if the aircraft gets into difficulty. 6. You make no mention of the first quoted paragraph of Lovett’s letter, which refers to these arrangements being "ex- NATO”. I think this point needs clarification also. It is my understanding that through the approval of the strategic concept governing NATO military plans, the Canadian Government assumed an obligation to assist the United States in carrying out its responsibilities for the strategic air offensive. No such obligation can be said to exist in relation to responsibilities which the United States has assumed or may assume outside the NATO area. 7. I think that we should not reply at once to the pro- posals of the Department of Defense. We might suggest that the.State Department should now only acknowledge Lovett's letter and say that it is under discussion with the Canadian' Government. Arneson is now in Paris, but we could tell Chase, his Deputy, that because of the absence of some of the Ministers concerned in Europe it will take us a little time to formulate the views P Another 8 of the Canadian Government •/ reason for delay is that the British have not got as far as we have in making specific arrangements covering the U.S. bases in England, and that this is almost certain to be a matter which Mr. Churchill will take up when he visits Washington in January. I am reporting separately on the state of the British discussions on this subject. Ends. 00343 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW (Wiser) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW16693 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16693 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wiser Consultations, RG25-B-2, Volume number: 3094, Library and Archives Canada.