https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f16c14e2b1b25dd213e92496bb4f55c9.pdf 0b178cde84901cf18d77caac54b38497 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri’acces a I'information . . 6 Copy No. 5 of five copies. Ex.." 182B FILE COPY S OTTAWA FILE No WISER Letter No. .................................... Date.. October. 4. 1951. FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, Washington, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION WISER - TOP SECRET D. G. THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA TO: Ztter No. 35, • September 28, 19516 Reference.. Subject:...... Arrangements. coserDing the possible -US®- 02 atomic -wsapens. In may lettor of September 28th 1 "said that I would shortly send you some comments and suggestions on the arrangements made with tho Department of State. kty comments can be divided under two general headings relating, ■ respectively, to questions of procodure and to the future course of the consultations on developments which might give rise to the use of atonle weapons. la ■ 2o Copies Referred To............ .. No. of Enclosures Post File No questions of Procedure. (a) In your Wiser message no o 6 of August 16 th a suggestion,was made, which was later accepted, / that there, should be discussions between the two Air Members of the P.J.B.D. on the possibility of making an acceptable distinction between flights conveying atomic weapons to or across ■ Canadian territory which had political significance - and those which could be regarded as routine® We have'hot heard the results of these discussions, although th© State Department has let us know that they took place. X should be glad to learn what is the present position® (b) General Foulkes wen in Washington on October' 3rd told me that he had had a talk with General Bradley not long ago (X think during the MATO Council Meeting in Ottawa) on methods of ensuring rapid and secret communication between Washington and Ottawa in an emergency. He mentioned that he and General Bradley had agreed to a telephone code to be used between themselves; a call to him from General Bradley might provide the earliest warning to Ottawa, as information of a '-sudden military move by the Russians would reach the Pentagon first® This channel would of course supplement and not replace the agreed "Hiser" channel from the State Department to the Embassy to External Affairs. (c) General Foulkes also told me that arrangements were now in effect to keep open continuously the Rockex communications system between Ottawa and the Canadian Joint Staff, London, and that consideration was being given to keeping open continuously the teletype line equipped with Rockex machines between the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington to General Foulkes’ own office* (A second line, operating with Typex machines, which/ 00391 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi sur/'acces a /'information , C-w. -2= WISER • TOP SECRET which runs from the Canadian Joint Staff here to National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa is already on a 24-hour basis.) (d) To test our arrangements for establishing rapid . communication with the Department at times outside the regular operating hours of the Embassy Communi cations Section, I propose shortly, withe ■ out giving warning, to have ■ a trial alarm the purpose of which would be to test the period within which an emergency Wiser message could be put on the wires after ' the receipt of a " warning from the State Department. Future course of consultations on developments in the world situation.’‘ "UUUL " nrmpmnn 3. I have not as yet made any effort to arrange another meeting with the State Department as I have thought it unwise to do so unless I knew that matters of some substance would be brought up by the U.S. representatives or by ourselves. The last meeting at the end of July was a disappointing performance. While we have received from time to time intimations that the State Department expected to have something to communicate with us after further talks with the Pentagon, nothing has so far developed. One does not, however, want to leave the consultations too long in abeyance, and I should be glad to learn how you would like me to proceed. 4. I am awaiting word from you on the constitutional matters, which were last mentioned in my Wiser Letter Ko. 10 of July 28th. The State Department, in the light of the information given at the meeting that day, considers that there is no doubt about-the constitutional authority of the president to take defensive and retaliatory action against, a serious act of aggression without securing congressional approval. The Canadian situation was discussed at a meeting in Ottawa early in July at which I was present, and this discussion was,followed by an exchange of letters (not in the Wiser series) between Mr. Mackay and myself, ending with my letter to him of July 23rd. It seems to me to be important that there should be a further clarification of the’ extent to which the Government is committed to consult Parliament, and I hope that this matter will be dealt with at the forthcoming session. When Parliament is asked to approve the despatch of the 27th Brigade to the Integrated Forces in Europe, an admirable opportunity seems to arise for making the position clear, in terms which would also cover ministerial authorization of the operational use by the United States of facilities in Canadian territory before a Canadian declaration of war. 5. It would be useful if I could receive your comments on the paper on Atomic Warfare of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, of which a full summary was enclosed with my Wiser Letter NOo 8 of July 21st. Sir Oliver Franks expects to receive detailed U.S. comments on this paper at bis next meeting of consultation. I think that it will not be possible to extract from the State Department a similar paper representing the views of the United States Government, as it has been intimated to us that they would be unwilling, for fear of implied commitments, to take up these issues except orally. 00392 66 An important/ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri’acces a /’information WISER m TOP SECRET -3- An important gap in my own knowledge is the 6. . very limited information available to the Embassy of the strategic plans of the United States in the event of general war. In commenting on the British paper, in my Wiser Letter No. 0 of July 2lst, X remarked that the British Chiefs of Staff appeared to have an extensive knowledge of the United States plans for atomic warfare. This question has a bearing both on matters of policy ' coming up in the consultations and on particular Canadian issues, with respect to questions such as the planning of actual strikes from Goose Bay and the number of atomic weapons which they may wish to store there. Of course on such a subject one cannot expect much; the Canadian Chiefs of Staff may already have some information. Finally, if the State Department suggests that 7o a further meeting should take place, I shall agree. If, however, no such suggestion comes from the State Department, I shall await your views before proposing a meeting. (Sgd.) Ho Ho WRONG. hhw.gm 00393 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surl’acces l /'information 00394 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW (Wiser) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW16670 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16670 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wiser Consultations, RG25-B-2, Volume number: 3094, Library and Archives Canada.