https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3db3772f7bc93663386fd09b784100c3.pdf aba417c2a29e478a82811d46278015c9 PDF Text Text Copy No t Of 9 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - COT) ?°eS‘ dv.lg6 en vertu de la Loi suri'acces a information Ext. 181A OTTAWA FILE No Letter No D- 1819 ■ Date May 4, 1951. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET ■ FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA TO: The Canadian Ambassador,- Washington, D.C. Reference . Your letters No. 1164 of April 10 and No. 1220 of April 13. Subject:...... U.S.. Strategic. Air Command Projects.. .................... ....... . 1. We have been considering carefully your reports of the reactions of Mr. Acheson and Mr. Arneson to our preliminary comments on the proposed ’’canopy” agreement. Copies Referred To........................ No. of Enclosures Post File No Mr. Acheson’s suggestion that there should 2. be regular consultations between Sir Oliver, Franks and Mr. Nitze, and his offer to make similar arrangements for you, is a most interesting one. . We agree that continuing consultations, such as you describe in paragraphs 3 and 4 of your letter., could provide a valuable additional source of information on the world situation and on the circumstances which might lead to consideration of the use of atomic weapons.. You may tell Mr. Acheson that you. would be glad to participate. If you think it necessary or desirable, you may indicate that, in authorizing you to attend, the Canadian Government would not, of course, .be accepting any implicit;/ commitments of any kind. In reply to Mr. Arneson’s enquiry as to 3. whether we think such consultations should be on a hilateral or a trilateral basis, lt seems to us there might be advantages in trilateral discussions. As we assume that such’consultations would be entirely private and that even the existence of such meetings would not be known to others (such as the French), we would see ho reason for asking Mr. Nitze or General Bradley to go over with you separately the same ground as they were covering with Sir Oliver Franks. Furthermore three-way discussions might afford less temptation perhaps to the.Americans to discriminate in any way between the information made available to us and that going to the United Kingdom. We should like it to be quite clear that the 4. general discussions Mr. Acheson is proposing would not take the place of, but would be in addition to, the specific consultations outlined in my letter No. D-1407 of April 2. We welcome the opportunity of your having continuing discussions with Mr. Nitze, but we trust that it is understood that we want nevertheless to be consulted (whatever the form of words used) through diplomatic channels at the highest political level on: (a) possible strikes from bases in Canada; (b) storage of fissionable components on Canadian territory; (c) overflight of Canadian territory by plonec carrying fissionable components. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri’acces a I'information 2 2 It may happen, of course, that specific con5. sultations, of the kind mentioned above, would be gegun. . through the same channels as the general consultations proposed by Mr. Acheson. We take it, however, that specific requests through diplomatic channels would normally be addressed to you by Mr. Arneson, 6. We are willing to modify, the position set forth in my letter No-. D-1407, in the two respects you have recommended. In paragraph 11 of your letter No. 1164, you ask whether we do not think it would be reasonable for the Canadian Government "to give prior consent in advance to strikes with atomic weapons from Goose Bay or Harmon Field in thevent of a clearlyestablished Soviet air attack on North American territory, subject to as much prior notification as might be possible in the circumstances.” The Minister has discussed this point with the Prime Minister and Mr. Claxton, and it - has been agreed that we would not object -to immediate ■ retaliation by the U.S. Strategic Air Command with all available means and from all available bases,-in the event of a major outright Soviet attack against continental North America. In these circumstances, we would not insist on prior consultation, but would, of course, wish to have as much prior notification aspossible , provided communications between Washington and Ottawa had not been severed. 7 You may also inform Mr. Arneson that we are prepared to agree (as an exception to the P. J.B.D. Recommendation of lune, 1948) that suitable _____ Service channels should be-used to clear the deployment of atomic weapons without fissionable components, to bases in Canada used by the U.S. SAC, and to bases in Alaska requiring the overflight of Canadian- territory en route, however, as stated in paragraph 4 above, we still expect diplomatic channels to be used for clearing any movement of fissionable components to bases in Canada or over Canadian territory. - '■ 8. .I hope that you will be able to let us have before long the State Department’s comments on the substance of our proposals summarized in Paragraph 4 of this letter, as modified in Paragraphs .6 and 7. a i A Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. 00446 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW (Wiser) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW16647 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16647 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wiser Consultations, RG25-B-2, Volume number: 3094, Library and Archives Canada.