https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/881d1ea7c469440742c367061b52b9ea.pdf 6fb8d9de604274f5f69e8b9cde200e5f PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi sur/’acces a /’information T" Copy No. 3 of three copiei Ext. 182B FILE COPY OTTAWA FILE No Letter No. 1220 ?...................... SECURITY CLASSIFICATION April 13, 1951. Date t o p ' SECRET FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C. TO: Reference THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA My Letter No. 1164 of April 10, 1951. Subject: United States Strategic Air Command Projects. Mr. Arneson came to the Embassy on Thursday 9 1. April 12th, to tell Mr. Ignatieff and myself about Mr Acheson’s reactions to your preliminary comments on the He said that Mr. Matthews, proposed "canopy" agreement. Deputy Under-Secretary of State, and Mr. Nitze, Director of the Planning Staff in the State Department, had been present when he had reported to Mr. Acheson. Copies Referred To........................ After informing Mr. Acheson of the points made in 2. 407 of April 2nd, he had repeated to 'Mr. your Letter No. Acheson the comments, which he had made to me on the meaning and extent of consultation envisaged in the Truman-Attlee communique as it is understood by the United States GovernMr. Acheson had approved his interpretation as ment. \ given to us last Saturday. 3o No. of Enclosures I learned from Mr. Arneson that Mr. Acheson was visited earlier this week by Sir Oliver Franks, who wished to have an informal talk with him on the same question. Sir Oliver had brought with him an appreciation by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff of the various circumstances which might give rise to consideration of the use of He had said that the United Kingdom atomic weapons. Government fully recognized that there was a wide variation in the shades of meaning which could be ascribed to the term "consultation"; he realized that the U.S. Government could not accept a definition "at the extreme end of the spectrum” which would always involve obtaining consent from the U.K. Government before atomic weapons were used. Post File No Sir Oliver had wondered whether it would be possible to work out some clarification of the circumstances in which Mr. Acheson had told him atomic weapons might be used. that it would be difficult for the U.S. Government to adopt any rigid definition of these circumstances, and had gone on to suggest that the most useful way in which1 progress could be made was to continue on a regular basis the consultations which had already begun between Sir Oliver and Mr. Nitze (in which General Bradley has participated from time to time) on the developing international situation and on the conditions which might lead Mr. Acheson had recognized that it to a general war. would be difficult to arrive at a joint agreed appreciatior of every situation examined, but thought that such continuing consultation, carried on through the diplomatic channel and aided with such military advice as might be appropriate. would result in a common understanding of They would also international dangers as they arise. provide a means of giving prior notification to the United Kingdom of any circumstances which might give rise to the use of atomic weapons by the United States. 4. . , Mr. Arneson/ 00451 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surl^cces a I'informt/fan LetterNo. 1220, page 2. TOP SECRET 4. Mr. Arneson said that Mr. Acheson had instructed' him to offer to us informally the same arrangement as had been offered to the United kingdom. As to the method of consultation,- Mr. Arneson suggested that there might be periodic meetings between Mr. Nitze and myself, at which General Bradley or others might at times be present.. These meetings could be arranged on a tripartite basis, but difficulties might be foreseen with the French Government, and possibly with other signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty, should it become ..known that such consultations were being carried on between the U.K., the U.S. and Canada. Mr. Arneson therefore suggested that it might be better if there were two sets of bilateral consultations of a continu. ing nature. Mr. Acheson would like to have our reaction . . . to this proposal... 21 - S I asked Mr. Arneson how this proposal was related 5. to the proposed "canopy" agreement; consultations on worldwide politico-strategic issues might .fulfil the agreement , to keep Canada as well as the United Kingdom "at all times informed of developments" which might "call for the use of the atomic bomb", but they would not cover the use of Canadian territory for specific activities in connection with the possible, delivery of atomic weapons. Mr. Arneson replied that the United States authorities would still, prefer to have an agreement Which would permit the United . States Air Force.to dp specific things in certain emergency situations, such as the employment by the Strategic Air Command of the,facilities at Goose Bay, subject to prior , notification of actual use and subject also to the continuing consultation on the developing international situation. 6. As to the different circumstances which might, give rise to the use of atomic weapons, Mr. Arneson pointed out that in the event of a direct attack on any. part of the North American Continent it would almost certainly be necessary for the President to order immediate retaliation. I think that we must foresee the possibility of communications being interrupted between Ottawa And Washington under the most extreme conditions of direct attack on this continent. It may therefore be necessary to agree in advance, that in such an event immediate retaliation on the part of the United States would be justified for.the purposes of self-defence under the North Atlantic Treaty or the .Charter of the United Nations. 7. Mr. Arneson remarked that the .British Government was .interested rather in the conditions giving rise to the use of atomic weapons than in the bases from which the first atomic.strikes were delivered. It was possible that the first strikes would be by. carrier-borne aircraft. . 8. . : - Mr. Arneson also touched upon the question of the deployment of nuclear and non-nuclear components of atomic weapons. . It could be expected that the Strategic Air Command may wish to deploy to Goose Bay non-nuclear components, i.e., the weapon without its nuclear core, as had been done last summer. He asked what procedure we would wish to be followed, I suggested that.pending a more general agreement such requests should be submitted through me by the State Department, in sufficient time to enable Ministers to give.the matter proper consideration. He said/ 00452 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri'-ecces a 1'informatidn $ . Letter No. 1220, page 3. TOP SECRET said that the possibility should not be overlooked that the Strategic Air Command might also have to deploy nuclear, cores in advance of any.decision for their use. He explained that constant attention was required to keep . atomicbombs in readiness for use because of the • electrical equipment powered by batteries which is an . essential part of the mechanism. . The fitting of the . : nuclear cores is a comparatively simple operation which would be done at the last moment. " (It was actually done in the air after' take-off in the case of the first bomb, dropped at Hiroshima.) . It was possible that the nuclear cores might not be distributed to bases such as those at Goose Bay and in the United Kingdom in advance of a .. decision to employ the weapons; on the other hand, it . might be thought desirable to have enough material on the spot to enable the weapons to be completed without awaiting the arrival of cores from the United States. He proposes to have further discussions with the U.S. Air Force and others on this question. in conclusion Mr, Arneson proposed that we con. 9. tinue. an exchange of views on these issues through the ■same channels. He repeated his hope that the lack of a general covering agreement would not impede the execution of any arrangements'that might be desired by the Strategic Air Command, with of course the approval of the President, to deploy to Goose Bay atomic.weapons without the fissionable elements. I mentioned to him that I had heard that the U.S*.Air Force desired to .secure facilities for use in the event of war at Torbay and Gander in addition to the facilities at Goose and Harmon Field. He proposes to find out from the Air Force whether their desire to have adcess to these fields is related to the use of atomic weapons. 10. The main point on which I should like your views as soon as possible is whether it is agreed that I should participate in continuing consultations of the character outlined in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this letter, if these consultations were to be conducted frankly and freely, they should provide a valuable additional source of information on the world situation and the policies of the United States, and. I believe that we could avoid any risk that they would give rise to a belief in Washington that the Canadian Government was accepting implicit military commitments through them. I should also like to be able to inform Mr. Arneson that we are prepared to agree that suitable Service channels should be used to clear the deployment to Goose Bay of atomic weapons without nuclear components and similar arrangements, such as the over-flight of Canadian territory by aircraft carrying these weapons from the United States to Alaska, ■ (Sgd.) gi hhw.gm H. Ho WRONG. , 00453 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW (Wiser) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW16643 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16643 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wiser Consultations, RG25-B-2, Volume number: 3094, Library and Archives Canada.