https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b05aecb336aaac99f7acbfbe211019a2.pdf 686de351d9ff4126daf9e0f7aca1366b PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri’acces a /'information -• Copy No. ‘ Ext. 182B 3 of three copies. FILE COPY OTTAWA FILE s: Letter No. . ................................ Date.. April 10 9, 1951. No SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C. TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA Reference Your Letters Nos. D-1407 of April 2 and D-1412 of April 3. Subiect- United States Strategic Air Command Projects. 1. On receipt of your two letters, I arranged for Mr. Arneson of the State Department to receive your comments orally from Mr. Ignatieff and myself. Copies Referred To.................. .. No. of Enclosures Post File No I explained that it was recognized that the 2, United States has responsibility under North Atlantic Treaty arrangements for strategic air operations and that the Canadian Government would not wish to hinder the fulfilment of these responsibilities. We could not agree, however, to permit unrestricted use in peacetime of the facilities in Canadian territory by giving approval for all such activities in advance subject to Service notification. Preparatory arrangements which the Strategic Air Command might undertake in Canada and which would not involve the use of fissionable materials, such as training programmes, provision of storage facilities and the deployment of aircraft, as well as the movement; of non-nuclear components might be handled on a Service-to-Service basis. On the other hand, for any activity which involved the movement, storage or use of fissionable components or the nuclear core of atomic weapons, it was our view that the Canadian Government should be consulted in each case at the highest political level, and that the channel should be civil rather than military. Arrangements would have to be made to permit such consultation to take place at very short notice in the event of an emergency. If the U.S. authorities-wished to proceed with negotiations for a canopy agreement, it was our view that the terms of the agreement should be placed squarely within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. I also drew Mr. Arnesonfs attention to the agreement concerning the channels of communication between the- United States and Canadian Governments on defence matters, which is set forth in Appendix No. of the Journal of the P.J.B.D. for June 3rd and 4th, 1948. Mr. Arneson made notes of the points which I hs 3a made and said that he would first consult Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, who./. is conversar with this problem; he will also probably later consult Mr. Acheson and officials of the Defence Department. Mention was made of the possibility of a meeting between Canadian and United States representatives on a high level, including Mr. Pearson and Mr. Acheson as well as representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of both countries, as a prelude to any agreement. Mr. Arneson. fully recognized the risk of a mis4. understanding arising between the United States9 Canada and the United Kingdom as to the nature of the commitment which has been given by President Truman for consultation in advanc of the00454 / �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulg en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a'l’information Letter No 1164, page 2. " ■ op SECRET • - of. the use of the atomic bomb. ■. He 'said that'agreement on this point was the real key to the whole question.. It 2 appears, however, that since Mr Attlee’s visit further’ , consultations with the British have reduced the risk’of mis» understandings on the lines mentioned in my Letter No. 764 of March 3rd. 2/ * 7/0. 1 ■ * . ' * — "... : . ' . . :. . : 5. . ' . - He said that what ever more extensive verbal ” assurance may have been given by President Truman to Mr. Attlee had been superseded by the communique issued at the . conclusion of these talks, i The United States Government has committed itself only to consultation (as you note in 1 your letter) "on'the developing international situation and the military measures which it called for, rather than- . . upon the use, .in a particular situation, of atomic or any other kind of weapons". "Mr • Acheson’s assurance to the ’ Joint Congressional Committee was accurate, and no commitf - ment hasbeen undertaken by Mr. Truman which would bind the United States Government to consult, with,, any, foreign government: before the President decides upon the,use of the atomic . ... bomb, , Mr. Acheson, however, in his talk with the Joint . Congressional-Committee had not touched upon the question of consent for the use of facilities in foreign territory . ■ - : for the employment of atomic weapons. • - ; 6. ; ; Mr. Arneson also recalled the procedure which, has been laid down before a decision is made.-by the.?' ■ ■, President to deploy or to use,‘both. nuclear' and non-nuclear • components -of atomic weapons. A separate decision is • ■ required in each case and this decision is made upon the advice of the Secretaries of State and of Defense, as well - as the Chairman: of the Atomic Energy Commission. These . . . three. meet as. a' committee of the ■ National Security. Council • ' So far no decision has been made by the'President to. deploy = any nuclear components of "atomic weapons except for tests. 4 The custodian of all nuclear components is3 of course,. the United States Atomic. Energy: Commission. * 1 | ..7 ' f*/11The United States Government has committed T itself only to consult with Canada and the United Kingdom 5 on the circumstances in which the atomic weapons might be used. ; Following: the Attlee-Truman talks, further dis- ’ cussionstook place in Washington-when'Air Marshal Slessor ■•• visited Washington last January. "A main purpose of this : visit was to find out from the U S. Joint Chiefs of Staff what, their' strategic-plan was, for the use of the bases, in . . the United- Kingdom of the. Strategic Air Command. . The U.S. . - authorities gave Slessor their general Ideas on strategic " . deployment and possible use of these bases, but apparently . did not. express' any specific views on the possible use of . atomic weapons. Informal consultations have continued _ ; through meetings in the State Department between Sir Oliver Franks, General Bradley, and'Messrs; Matthews and Nitze, . ‘ They again have been concerned with the strategic ' circumstances, which'.might give occasion for the use of atomic weapons, especially the political and military situation'in.Eastern Europe and the Middle East, There has . been no definition forthcoming from the U.S. side of the . conditions., in which the atomic- bomb would probably be . employed® Mr., Nitze has been under instructions to,make . it clear that the United States Government could, not agree . , to any definition of the word "consultation" which'would enable the. Uni ted, Kingdom Government to' withhold consent to the employment of atomic weapons.3 .. 2 8, Thus the arrangements which exist between, the 0 : 1 United States/ . 5 • . . 00455 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri’acces a I’information 1 Letter No. 1164, page 3 TOP SECRET United States and the United Kingdom Government apparently boil down to an agreement to have continuing consultations on the circumstances which might give rise to the employment" of the atomic weapon. The United States has clearly reserved the sole right to decide upon the use of the atomic bomb, particularly in the event of an attack upon the United States. Some thought has been given to the possibility 9. of defining more clearly the circumstances in which atomic. Mr. Arne son said that he had tried weapons might be used. to work out some consistent criteria. Apart from coming to very general conclusions such as that atomic weapons should be used only in the event of a general war, he had found it impossible to establish any criteria which could be applicable to all cases. Indeed, considering that the value of the atomic bomb as a deterrent rests partly on the uncertainties in any potential aggressor’s mind as to how, when or whether it could be used, any definition of the occasions for its employment would remove some of the deterrent value. Mr. Arneson's preliminary conclusion was that it could be said almost with certainty that any attack upon the United States or another NATO country would result in retaliatory action by the United States with atomic weapons. 10, In concluding our conversation, Mr. Arneson explained why the United States Government attaches prime importance to the use of Goose Bay by the Strategic Air Command. It was possible, in the event of an emergency, that nuclear components would not have been deployed to Strategic Air Command bases in the United Kingdom or to other.strategic locations along the periphery of the probable targets. If such deployment had not taken place,' the United States Government would wish to use Goose Bay as the base from which initial strikes- against the enemy would take'place. As the take-off of the heavy aircraft employed consumes largo quantities of fuel, their fuel supply would have to be replenished in the air by tanker aircraft. A bomber laden with an atomic weapon would take off at Goose Bay and refill its tanks over Harmon Field, or possibly another field in Newfoundland, before proceeding on its mission. On completion of its mission it would seek to land in the United Kingdom or at some base 'in the European theatre. In the event that nuclear components had been deployed overseas in advance of the emergency. Goose Bay ■ * would be regarded as an important staging area in the movement of aircraft of the Strategic Air Command to and from more advanced bases. ' Do you think that it would be unreasonable for 11. the Canadian Government to give prior consent in advance to strikes with atomic weapons from Goose Bay or Harmon Field in the event of a clearly-established Soviet air attack on North American territory, subject to as. much prior notifica- tion as might be possible in the circumstances? It seems to me that we could not reasonably refuse our agreement to the use in such conditions of Canadian facilities or airspace, and that we would in fact be anxious to see a counteroffensive undertaken with the minimum of delay. Furthermore, we might find in such an event that wire communication between Washington and Ottawa was severed and that it would take some time to discover alternative means of communication. If this concession were made,' it might be easier for the United States Government to agree to our desire for political consultation before the use of Canadian territory for the delivery.of atomic weapons in circumstances not involving a direct/00456 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a /'information e ofor Letter No. 1164, page 4. TOP SECRET a direct attack on North American territory. 12. . I shall be sending you a further report as’ soon as Mr. Arneson informs us of the preliminary reaction of the United States Government to your comments. (Sgd.) H. H. WRONG. n gi shhw.gm 00457 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW (Wiser) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW16642 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16642 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wiser Consultations, RG25-B-2, Volume number: 3094, Library and Archives Canada.