https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a3801b511ab94e5c25f99a9994864a3c.pdf 91f148fa15fe1f3221250d8f551b3e7b PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri’acces a I'information ..3 Copy No. $ ) — of three copies OTTAWA FILE N050069--6--40 Letter No.... . p . - / 40 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION April 2,.1951... Date TOP SECRET FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA TO: Reference THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D. C. Your letter No. 19 of January 3 and other corresp ond enc e Subject: United States Strategic Air Command Projects The United States proposal for a "canopy" agreement concerning the use of facilities in Canada by the Strategic Air Command was discussed at a meeting with Mr. Pearson, Mr. Claxton, Mr. Robertson, General Foulkes, A/V/M James and myself. The subject has also been discussed with the Minister several times and the Prime Minister. The comments which follow are based on these discussions, but they should be regarded as my own, since it is felt that the matter should be kept on this more or less informal basis for the present. Copies Referred To........................ No. of Enclosures Post File No 2. As you have suggested, we should consider the United States request for a "canopy" agreement in the broader setting of the talks between.President Truman and Mr. Attlee about the use of atomic weapons. I quite agree with your view that there is a very real risk of misunderstanding arising between the United States and the United Kingdom as to the nature of the commitment which was given by President Truman. The United Kingdom Government apparently feels that a specific commitment for consultation in advance of use of the bomb has been made by the President. On the other hand, Mr. Acheson was quite specific in his secret statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there was no commitment to any government regarding prior consent. A close examination of the press communique issued after these talks and the memorandum of the conversation between Mr. Ignatieff and Mr. Arneson on December 11, 1950, would seem clearly to support Mr. Acheson’s statement. The concluding sentence of the memorandum of the conversation with Mr. Arneson, if a correct statement of the United States Government's views, clearly indicates that the United States Government has committed itself only to consultation "on the developing int’ernational situation and the military measures which it called for, rather than upon the use, in a particular situation, of atomic or any other kind of weapons". Canada is assured of only equal treatment in this respect. 3. The draft canopy agreement forwarded with your letter No. 19 of January 3, if accepted by us in its present form, would constitute, in effect, advance consent to the use, subject to notification, of facilities in Canada by Strategic Air Command in preparing for carrying i out operations in atomic warfare. Although the phrase 2 . . 00468 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri’acces a /'information 2 ,/) "consultation and notification procedure", is used in the final paragraph, it is fairly clear from the text as a whole that the "consultation" envisaged would not necessarily entitle the Canadian Government to refuse. In short, the canopy agreement as outlined would seem to leave the Canadian Government with little, if any, more control over the use for operational purposes by Strategic Air Command of facilities in Canada than it has over policy under the TrumanAttlee formula. 4. The desire of the United States authorities in view of responsibilities under NATO for strategic air operations, to have a free hand, subject to notification, for the Strategic Air Command to overfly Canada and to use Goose Bay and Harmon Field for operational purposes is fully appreciated. At the same time, if the Canadian Government agree to such an arrangement, it might well forego any opportunity it may have of influencing policy in the use of atomic weapons by reason of Canada’s geographical location. In the event of an all-out war, it would perhaps be unrealistic for the Canadian Government to hope that it could really exercise an effective influence on such policy. But it would clearly seem unwise for it to "throw in its hand " in advance. / Such an argument, of course, can scarcely 5. be put to the United States authorities. It might, however, be pointed out to them that although the United States has a responsibility under North Atlantic Treaty arrangements for strategic air operations, and although the Canadian Government would not wish in any way to hinder the United States in the fulfillment of these responsibilities, it is felt that it would be improper for Canada as a sovereign nation to permit unrestricted use in peacetime of facilities in Canadian territory for these operations, even on assurance of notification in advance of use. 6. The above observations apply particularly to the storage of fissionable components on Canadian territory, to the overflight of Canadian territory by planes carrying fissionable components, and to strikes from bases in Canada. These are matters on which it is felt the Canadian Government should be’consulted in each case at the highest political level. The channel for such matters should be civil rather than military. The normal procedure would be for the State Department to make its request to you, and for this request, on receipt here, to be relayed at once to the Minister or the Prime Minister. (I shall write you separately suggesting a procedure for assuring security and speed). Emergency situations may be envisaged 7. when the utmost speed in dealing with a request would be required, but I do not think the procedure suggested would mean any more delay than if the request were forwarded through military channels. I cannot quite foresee the Government being prepared to authorize the military authorities here to decide on such a request. There 3 . . 00469 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri'acces a /’information " 3 should be no more delay in getting a decision from the Ministers if a request were to come through diplomatic channels than if it were to come through military channels. 8. Arrangements could, I think, be made for handling other than the above matters on a Service-toService basis. I have in mind such matters as training programmes, the provision of storage facilities, the deployment of aircraft, and even such matters as movement and storage of bombs without fissionable components. Having. agreed to facilities in. Canada for the Strategic Air Command and having agreed to the division of responsibility under NATO, which leaves responsibility for strategic air operations to the United States, I do not see any objection to purely Service questions such as the above being settled directly between the RCAF and the USAF at whatever level they agree-. upon. In conclusion, should the United States 9. wish to proceed with negotiations for a canopy agreement, I suggest the agreement should be placed squarely upon agreed arrangements under the North Atlantic Treaty. A reference might be written into the introductory part of the United States Note to our common obligations under the Treaty, to the special responsibility of the United States for strategic air operations,and to the agreement of Treaty nations through the Council Deputies that member nations should agree to give immediate and special attention to the granting to the United States of appropriate facilities for fulfillment of its responsibilities (Document D-D/183). I am not suggesting that the text of the Note need refer to this Document or quote its language, but that it should reflect agreed North Atlantic policies under which both the Canadian and United States Government would be acting. I suggest that you present these views orally to the State Department. We have tried our hands at a redraft of their proposed Note enclosed in your letter NS. 19 of January 3, but with unsatisfactory results. In any case it is perhaps preferable to let them do their own redrafting in the light of our comments, should they wish to proceed with the proposed note. 10. A.D.P. HEENEY Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. 00470 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW (Wiser) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW16635 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16635 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wiser Consultations, RG25-B-2, Volume number: 3094, Library and Archives Canada.