https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e3cb17b4d9603aef32f1a315800cd8a3.pdf 5970bc34e52d7cfcffe9b37f94119dde PDF Text Text • . $4 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge envertu de la Loi suri’acces a I'mformation g ■ - TOP SECRET December 11th, 1950 MEMORANDUM . KOREA AND THE ATOM BOMB Memorandum of conversation between Mr. R. G. Arneson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy, and Mr. G. Ignatieff, December 11, 1950. Mr. Ignatieff saw Mr. Arneson again on December 11th to follow up the talk which took place on December 6th, when he gave Mr. Arneson a copy of the Memorandum containing the views of the Canadian Government on the . possible use of atomic weapons in the Far East, The conversation on December 11th took place at the request of Mr. Arneson, as he said that he was in a position to give certain written comments on the ? questions discussed with Mr. Ignatieff on December 6th. Mr. Arneson opened the conversation by recalling that . the Canadian Government Memorandum stated in particular .* that there should be consultation among the governments ' ■ • - 2 - ■ .** principally concerned before a decision to use the atomic bomb was made. He had now been authorised by the Secretary of State to give a written statement of the U.S. Government’s position on this question in the light of understandings reached between Mr. Truman and Mr. Attlee during their meetings in Washington. The text of the written statement given to Mr. Ignatieff is contained in a letter dated December 11th, a copy of which is attached.. Mr. Arneson said that he had also been author- ized by the Secretary of State to give a verbal explanation of this understanding. He also undertook to give Mr. Ignatieff an account of how the penultimate paragraph, referring/ 00498 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a /'information ■•• $ -2referring to the discussion between President Truman and Mr. Attlee on the use of the atomic bomb , came to be inserted in the joint communique on December Sth, He explained that Mr. Attlee had raised the question of consultation between the U.K. and U.S* Governments before atomic weapons are used, in a private meeting at which no others were present. . No written statement of the U.S. position passed between President Truman and Mr. Attlee. Mr. Arneson explained that the "statement" to which he had referred in his conversation with Mr. Ignatieff on December 6th was a United States "position paper" for the use of the United States . participants'in the Attlee-Truman talks, and had not been given to the United Kingdom delegation. When the Joint communique of the Attlee-Truman talks came to be drafted on December Sth, Sir Roger Makins, who was the U.K. representative on the drafting group, suggested a reference to the verbal exchange between President Truman and Mr. Attlee, in terms which, in the opinion of Mr. George Perkins (the U.S. representative on the group), seemed to go beyond the United States position as stated in the U.S. "position paper". A meeting was hurriedly called at the White House between U.S. officials concerned, at which Messrs. Acheson, Lovett, Harriman, Snyder, and Arneson were present. It was decided to recommend to President Truman that an agreed text should be included concerning the use of atomic weapons in the Joint communique to avoid the possibility of any mis, understanding arising in the future. mitted to President Truman. A text was sub- After approving it, the President suggested that Mr. Acheson should see Mr* Attlee and Sir Oliver Franks personally to obtain their concurrence. With/ 00499 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a /’information .2' -3- With minor alterations, the language used in the joint communique was agreed to in this manner.. Mr. Arneson went on to, explain that the language so used was the only authoritative record of what had been agreed between President Truman and Mr. Attlee on this question. The decision to make this * - understanding public was due to the fact that there was, Some, apprehension on the part of the President and his advisers that some misunderstanding might arise, particularly in the Congress, on what assurance President Truman had in fact given to Mr. Attlee in their private conversation. In.the Blair House meetings called by President Truman a year ago last summer, for the purpose . of consulting with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy before the tripartite discussions were resumed in the fall of last year, the President had given assurance to the congressional representatives that there would be no secret commitment made to any foreign government without prior consultation with.and the consent of the Joint Congressional Committee, Mr. Arneson also : recalled.the strong objections expressed in the Joint * , 5 1 ■ • ■ ■ . Congressional Committee, when it was consulted on the negotiations leading to the modus vivendi of 1947-48 when the question came up of renewing the undertaking contained in the Quebec Agreement that the United States would seek the consent of Canada and the United Kingdom before using atomic weapons. Mr. Arneson explained that it was the considered view of the United States Administration that there could be no return to the position stated in the .Quebec Agreement. He,said that the State Department wished to make it quite clear that what the President had undertaken to, do/ 00500 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri'atces a /’information P -4= • to do in respect of Prime Minister Attlee, 'and would be .prepared to do in respect of the Prime Minister of Canada, was to consult on the conditions or circumstances which . - ' • ■ ' • ‘ -**. .*. • might in the future give rise, to a situation in which the atomic bomb might be used. The Administration could not undertake a commitment which would bind it to obtain the ... i . prior consent of any other government before atomic . weapons are used. The language included in the Joint communique had, in fact, enabled the President to inform I the Joint Congressional Committee on December lith, that I .it was the President! s understanding that the United .. States Government had not relinquished in any way its 0 . ~ i . * . -I •* * . power of decision to use atomic weapons. Mr.Arneson concluded the conversation by referring again to the remarks which he had made to Mr, . : Ignatieff on December 6th. He thought that the position which had now been clearly established was that the -*** - . . - ' ' -• ..* consultation between the three governments Would be on ' . the developing international situation and the military " measures which it called for, rather than upon the use, , in a particular situation, of atomic or any other kind of weapons. ... ; ■ _ .1 ' 4 gi.hhw.gm 00501 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW (Wiser) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDNW16621 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16621 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wiser Consultations, RG25-B-2, Volume number: 3094, Library and Archives Canada.