https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f2c6dc3969039f46a26844189a5adbba.pdf b814e28f5c722724a429381090b39da4 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information GEOFFREY PEARSON Good afternoon. [HILL]* the former Ambassador Pearson, Pearson, Geoffrey Our guest this afternoon is Mr. Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, which is sponsoring agreed project. the present participate in this work, Mr. Pearson, to with your perspective own that you have We are very pleased and provide us to Canadian policy in NATO. on [PEARSON] I'm pleased also, because I don't think we've done enough in work Canada Canadian defence on point of view of the practitioners. history, of but done we've foreign policy from the and We've done little very which memories of those who participated, unlike done a great to know our be able to deal. own I think we need history better. help with this the lot is based we're going pleased to was forward look we the on Americans who have the Institute and the basis on this in Canada if So work, a to the additional work that will be done on the basis of grants we've made University and to others. to York [HILL] an Pearson, Mr. oral history. in interest We're NATO Thank you. what we're you know, as engaged in trying to trace the development over time. We taking are a here is of Canadian at look the development of Canadian foreign and defence policies since 1945, trying and example, We are have we see are trying NATO to fitted see how has into to NATO. ways in which Canada's national interests served by membership trying long These the the For the Canada's at framework. Canada contributed in determine how effective NATO has been are this at looking been how to term goals of and NATO as a we're mechanism for pursuing international peace and security. types of things we're trying to examine, various stages of to world development in the as last 40 we look years, through the eyes of those Canadian ambassadors and senior officers and officials, some retired and some still serving, who played key roles in the formulation of efforts inside *Interviewers: the NATO Canadian foreign organization. Mr. policy or in Canada's Pearson, the reason Hill Pawelek 000328 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information because Institute, but Department of External between 1973 and 1980, 1983, Emissary of as peace initiative of reflections on Canadian before focusing NATO-related people's interview. in may have As I or questions two or more closely look is to less their about their periods of directly on should remark here that the way I think I we will go on say will deal we that the NATO on be at period. I dealt with in the are we career later years of the to some focus more should also is that life and your own of the NATO period will I 1980 Mr. Trudeau's go along. careers one subsequently return to second NATо approaching these interviews more and then in fact most the of the Soviet Union in to first with the earlier years of your think the positions in Ottawa will be proceeding in these two interviews, and then in foreign policy, and the wider international activity. the Department, career and in those various other phases of posing order, the Minister during Prime the are the various phases of chronological we Ambassador as of member a 1961, then in various 1983-84, mentioned, the way we scene, as which we will touch on as we your career at notably Affairs, Director previous your only is not Executive as of because also Secretariat from 1958 to to position present your of project, in this we're keen to have you involved aiming, in these tapes, to be reasonably structured and disciplined in our approach, but without essential to discouraging good a oral spontaneity the history. We which are believe I looking is Canadian at policy in NATO in terms of political and defence issues which arose in the various phases, but we are also looking at things as a very human endeavour, which was experienced by those diplomats, officers and others who were actually carrying out Canada's policies in NATO over time. Part I If - Early we describe years, could as to turn 1952 now part to "the early years up 1 of 1952". to born in Toronto, and educated in Canada and completing school Ontario. your career at Subsequently, you went Mr. interview, Pearson, in England, Trinity College in to 149 the the I this you I were believe, Port Hope, University of Toronto and 000329 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information graduated with Oxford in 1952. 1950. in B.A. a wonder if you could tell I obtained you Then us a B.A. a from little about those early years and how they have coloured your outlook on life and on the international I scene. should remark, preface, of course, a as family as we all know is a diplomatic one, that your spent you must have and I suppose time in Ottawa and with Canadian missions some abroad, where international affairs and Canada's role in the worla part much very been would have wanted to ask how your perception of the world everyday life. experiences have of earlier especially and scene So really I your affected views your on international peace and security. [PEARSON] I did Well, my early life up in grow when quite formative a playing school I and age, suffering and up grew I in and the between young, was cricket typical of Canadians, not diplomatic family a England, was and 13, English school boy about of ages an cold, the educated partly in was as because in 9 English way the boys used to do, probably still do, and trying to adapt from being a Canadian, being to Englishman. an So I learned early some of the first rules of diplomacy, which are to do with imitating our surroundings, At the anyway time of same course, identity, of own sense own government's the to or point as else or who has lived in diplomat, a you won't be able to I was only, the express and they were foreign. very England and especially gone to school they understand I you or you them. think, them. understand you have to retain your would know that just because they speak the mean that can your But I quickly learned how to country's views. adapt to foreign surroundings, you that foreigner, same So, Anyone England, in language doesn't this was quite an certainly in the - boarding and I quickly learned how to speak and not quite think but speak the way they did with an English accent and learned school I went to, how to play their games. I great triumph for a But also that was a able to speak English. conscious then and that he in the was won a Canadian; so at afterwards of my in touch with various press and reading prize on, we home, I remember, and weren't supposed to be of father's people, and was very and the fact course, work, one I read about them like the Secretary to the Queen and the 150 000330 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information various politicians. lot a of English people and things That was at. He officialdom and I tremendous sort of occasion, a were coming the of the old enough to be was I missed the war. here, war years of background affairs, and because, an me years. there at were interest an That was were, of mainly as them but not as scholars, they [HILL] to good rarely and the all of that and Munich, But that kind in European certainly in, in the war, Then I went back much the course, were fellow students from other countries, of was that I spent the so a in same, more small as one some overseas in ways, students minority and most really, their especially the colonies, rowing and for that to Oxford undergraduates were English, who continued to ignore, thought I last, well not the England then, in what happened school, those of that and be interested in it; and aware interest although than there the and my father went back to London. two for King in 1938, I came home before the war, gave of I remember that vividly. in we were wouldn't have had growing up here. 1950, some somebody living there rather than here, struck home to I war, but he saw really still top nation Coronation was a tremendous celebration. And know to came like the Coronation of the but when the English last, the High Commissioner, not was and other sports, some scholars. Presumably by that time you'd more or less forgotten how play cricket. [PEARSON] where I going hadn't, I really, because I played cricket and I was good at cricket, to at least watch it. My before I went to Oxford, were more Canadian the schooling in Ontario had Toronto, at satisfying and environment undergraduate experiences. years enjoyed quite liked I so where for me. the usual I lived in residence at I I was preferred sort of Trinity, which tremendous experience, much better than living in some dreary rooming house which they seem to do now. I made a lot of friends. was a There was in the a very country, good history department at Toronto, then the best one Creighton, Underhill, influenced me because of the best and Martin. of his views 151 in the world probably, in particular relations pertaining Frank Underhill on the with 000331 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information between London and guess was I Canada, which bit of a radical then, because a I first hand. about at knew I didn't feel at all I sympathetic to English causes. [HILL] in this period. fairly You must have sizeable feature [PEARSON] Well, I been example, atomic weapons, and I scene. by. really didn't think much about, for period largely passed war they although the great were a and sense. for good Most people assumed that the war would not be répeated couldn't there that undergraduates, Europe Holland. of students and the the to the others that been born; but again, so didn't the at times when anything 1950, influenced although because sense, decided then sense to literature and I policy. knew almost we a as Europeans. very Canadian There External more war. nothing interest my NATO in had just great subject for anxiety. I I would suppose amount there Nor NATO Affairs. were in that Europe in any in England and we came weren't did to being don't remember it much. troops began in 1950, war it though but Dutch European the back to Canadians having to fight again. of join was the and I was taking I hadn't English interested in Shakespeare than in foreign job, and not having a it would have been hard to find a job teaching English. But doctorate, I me they went to Germany. didn't have any there, The Korean it might have expanded, which went questions, sharpen to me was time or I in European through much to learn; I don't think it seem were been didn't talk very much about war. it finished and was When I went to Oxford in 1950, anything affecting England So, who had who the So war. University Service Seminar in World experience helped foreign policy again. We accepted that this students German Young Canadians really had that; end to war That revived my interest, I guess, because about third a as therefore, was interesting but not vital. summer one be less, or more foreign affairs, to thing. new over suppose undergraduates probably accepted the war in it had been a of that; aware emergence me think the post undergraduate, and its NATO the international on I was an I of the consciousness about What joined I got married External and so Affairs, needed after 152 a doing my exams in London in 000332 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information 1952. that So sort of things. decided couldn't I and go back to some other career after that. really change wondered I have often what I would have done if I had gone back to University to teach English literature. started My father's by teaching history. diplomacy began with my career Anyway, was a bit like that; think my real I posting to Paris in 1953, he interest in to the Canadian Embassy. Part II - [HILL] The Embassy in Paris, I'd ask interview. like As I to later, about that you understand 1953-57 it, you spent a year in part or so 2 of the in Ottawa after joining the Department, and then were posted to Paris, to the Embassy. [PEARSON] Yes. assignments started I for three in six months to with Ottawa the usual round in various Divisions. of Work in Defence Liaison Division was of interest, especially vis-à-vis the United States. We were then beginning to negotiate the bilateral agreements with the United States which have since developed into panoply the whole wasn't of high enough later. North American defence co-operation. But I up to develop any great knowledge of them until Then I went to Paris. [HILL] You [PEARSON] '53 to country. Having had the awful experience of occupation with people were in Paris from '53 '57; at the time, France from amongst the same families who had De Gaulle. It was humiliating mood. a very There sour was a '57. to mood, very was still a very divided supported either Pétain or difficult, impatient and a live Communist party to take advantage of it. [HILL] It was the year also [PEARSON] And Algeria. they defeated in Indochina, and the opening were of Dien Bien Phu. '54 was a key year for the French, because 153 shots were fired 000333 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information in Algeria. These bandits who had to worry the FLN which in turn 1962. I in was truly divided. major differences [HILL] Plus, [PEARSON] And about NATO Russians; Disputes between UN NATO was time a countries now Turkey have conflicts of interest. of opinion and of course, But then, later, Suez Suez. added solidarity, and so it on was that was these long France as matter a a as time when [HILL] So was you were when we talk times when there That had nothing to do with the and different decolonization views and it divided the allies at tried to vote with could, certainly on the Algeria question. But questions. we forget We that there on, of that. to I think Soviet threat, the Canada as less concern than these internal of there Algeria in That although Greece and about what the right policies were, was Algeria. in town "few bandits" increased to The question of any solidarity. no the small few a policy in Indochina and in North Africa split the Alliance. French was some of work became the government of minor questions mostly, over are simply the Paris for most of that period. was when NATO in about. become be to trouble caused nothing There was taken were have come to call we it, allied problems. arrived there in the year Stalin's death and of the whole period of de-Stalinization. [PEARSON] That's right, and I took little interest in that, because of the greater problems the French own country. were having just running their Their governments lasted about a year party the Communist was the largest French party, on average, with 27 percent of the vote. The Christian Democrats also got about [HILL] They got to almost [PEARSON] They were how to keep them 30 percent, very close to out of or and 28 that. the Communists. that, and the whole problem was party was government. The Communist thought to be linked to the Soviet Union, and it was not the Soviet military threat, therefore, that people 154 were concerned about; it 000334 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information political the was below, Soviet a Italy, to speak. That invasion Soviet so because there still was a once a week and the Alliance would be That was still It was trying, simply, were worked political scene, in '53, seven years to sort and went to It must have been [PEARSON] I France, itself, itself out, man were as of of Europe. French politics and was one of political party conferences. the fascinating. much interest in Ottawa. Canadians had been for years and knew how to run things. we on (we weren't made to the two mother countries. It wasn't until De the decade that same time, difference of we learn there. We'd rather Canadians had no So the in early even though it Quebec was not active at the paid little attention to Quebec into office Gaulle came Lesage bilingualism French) and France sat up and began to take notice course, but electing Liberal the periphery of our foreign policy, time in foreign policy and Ottawa views. the domestic unreliable country which didn't know how an whereas in Ottawa to speak of rather politically both double standard in regard to the world; there was was eight years or reported solemnly on all these goings on in France, don't think they governments about country suffering from the effects a internal on meat duties at that time? your [HILL] run France in Paris. I on policy. country--we could only get [PEARSON] given up anyway poor What a change in Soviet a acute less was question of The relatively [HILL} to of force use in undermined from concern. economically; France was then the sick and I the main was hope then for was after the War. of war, or if you had the Communist party that or in France power threat Quebec years was in retrospect, because aside from Indochina, at the again. beginning Paris where were to end of At the make a strange, in after 1954 we sent peacekeeping troops, we did not have any common political/military interests outside Europe. We had the air division in the north of France in Metz, and I don't recall any major problems all. The only problems came when 155 we had our over that at differences with the 000335 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information French [HILL} on? colonial questions. these on What about the interest in the European movement and [PEARSON} Yes, in Ottawa in that? interest Was there much in the there was, so bring sense that German re-armament was Efforts to Community were very much France in 1954. the whole European movement, which the French an had issue. So, set back, was European a but defence '54 '54; In questions were its place protocols the to important an was the major not were when? But year. ones in treaty allowing our the whole on relations with It may well have been different in NATO. France at the time. [HILL] rejected by were and Germany took German accession to the Western European Union [PEARSON] Defence under different circumstances. negotiations and The into favoured in Ottawa, begun to lead earlier, in the Alliance [HILL] Germany Did you have any personal connections with other Canadian diplomats serving with NATO? rather different worlds, [PEARSON] Yes, different worlds; we then But think. I Was that the lots of connections, had the people in does tend one NATO but live in to case? did live in quite thought the embassy was unimportant. They quickly developed that superior mystique about international organizations compared to bilateral relations. at embassy the thought mattered what was bilateral the relationship, although Ottawa showed little interest in it. looked to international organizations foreign policy, both in NATO and Bilateral suffered External the very relations the for UN, that as and the leading in the of the seriously, future. because through NATO, through the The embassy in Paris in Ottawa UN or some 156 edge was they preferred of Commonwealth. Affairs had become thoroughly multilateralized. vision Ottawa Officials reason. We in That was never taken do things to other way. 000336 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information That's [HILL] fascinating comment, a living in England and that time because at I know everyone there, I think, took a I was close things like Dien Bien Phu and all French politics. I remember very clearly the night the French Assembly rejected the interest in EDC, which themselves M. broke out [PEARSON] the UN of Yes, after first in '58 the way one remember the election of another. or British you said, as the Algerian Then course... poor France, and of course France newly independent countries the think--it I I Not that time France had seemed to become, At that virtually ungovernable in war everybody. to ready to join in it. were Poujade. big shock a was time, especially over was Algeria. admitted, were the problem for France at the very real a outvoted in was The Algerian war was priority for a France, and it had almost nothing left for the defence of Europe. So it's helpful to keep a sense of perspective when we think today about whether we have enough troops to face this Soviet advantage weapons. in conventional virtually nothing. In the '50s, there was nothing there, The German army hadn't started yet, in Algeria, the British were not doing very much; were they had no alternative but to [HILL] That was also a turn period of NATO movement in [PEARSON] '56, a sense, was the France then and our Mr. St. while but also Very sensitive, which Laurent most of so nadir and in thought to nuclear weapons. some very significant changes in East-West relations, in terms of the developments in the Hungarian uprising, and the French forth. It was remained touchy a Poland, and period of forward in other ways. difficult, especially after Suez in inter-alliance relations. in I was relations very rapidly deteriorated after Suez. was outraged by what happened the problems British, the French were or also the part so, and with the the process of dispute. In and after-effects of said were fact, they were the main cause of the problem, because the Israelis had been negotiating with the French before the British. that in the Embassy, evidence we partly because of knew rumours, partly because of had been able to discover through contacts. 157 We We knew 000337 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information the Israeli Defence Minister had thing, and reported that. been in France and that sort of We didn't know they were going to attack Egypt, but we knew something was going to happen. with France recovered, but didn't matter all that Our relations they weren't very close any way, as It didn't which have much. affect our it forces in since the Europe. [HILL] of beginning, all that crises the one probably came closest NATO faced tearing to the Alliance apart. [PEARSON] think it did, I same time. very tough telegrams interesting Indochina the because of our involvement from everything about Our I ask for to In this report I a go to the So, that was spent I '54 map, a the from agreement to a French have out there, but good detailed your father was and spent time because he came to Paris to write most of in a trying to put hotel report him a fair and a lot of it by him personally. the Norwegian, much map good That was the of NATO? Yes thought into of involved in writing [PEARSON] who go One map. Did you have much contact with him then? amount. and Canada going down to the Ministère de [HILL] there on they didn't know Yes. did, very a time more French. [PEARSON] I were onwards with that. the remember period, also, improving on "Do : people had Indochina after got was they were going. la Guerre, Laurent St. of knowledge about Indochina was Paris, telegrams Vietnam?" the although there, commissions [HILL] replies. be first where the were so to learn control and time The main source had to addressed to Eden by telegrams The the American reactions at the because of a like he did. was written it together. The His main help came Italian, I saw mostly by Canadians from Lange, personal friend of his, good it, Martino, was and also a medical 158 000338 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information doctor, who questions but interested less was was easy whole it. about It before, original, at was a vital and had interest thought script, a Lange and my one Canadians. for was all new for of the Europeans, but for us it some normal way to go about the conduct of an alliance. much you seemed to be It in that don't think the report itself I so least Americans, and maybe a in NATO, just like writing out was learned years that of consultation process But it Canadians had political these of some cooperate with. to father who wrote the report. the in was just We put great emphasis on Article 2 again, on what NATO potentially could become. The emphasis reminder, French, the on non-military side of the Alliance was a helpful especially the the Alliance that weren't treated relevant. to more could equals. as always the problem But principles into practice; as NATO table, civil servants, special [HILL] common break up if It document is a the has been how or the smaller allies that still is translate those to really settled whether these people should have their governments sense, when you read the that the at home. For example, report. machinery basically is satisfactory and may that need what the section few adjustments a really was required but was implementation of consultative practices. [PEARSON] Perhaps that prepared really, any was more Canadian than common anyone vital to us. We weren't going else, to but sense, to consult them looks It without really sometimes being prepared to be careful about that. so consultation--the to though Canadians live up to the But nevertheless, realistic about these matters. for eight years as He he stopped short report was had of written 159 I weren't the NATO that we bilateral arrangements with the Americans, for example, questions. we give to Council decision-making authority about questions were and I think it smacks to me very much of good sound Canadian emphasizing proper British the whether you should have politicians around the to access and and you know they haven't such questions or Americans thought on on these defence are preaching sermon. We have think my father been the Foreign Minister laying down the law in were terms was which about not 000339 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de offensive the others. to But whether interest is which it considers of vital national we say anything, a not consulting". the Allies, point. moot the table on because we're us anything oppose it, which they didn't like to do, they'd be in trouble at home. us", consult "please The And often that was true, Mr. Dulles would consult and the Allies would be afraid to say they'd have to say, the because you're afraid to commit yourselves. don't put them on the table, you complain to said yes, expect ever if we put these questions "All right, Americans say: If can l'information in particular, to consult its allies about questions United States, you don't you la Loi sur l'accès à but It was they then, they if or well to all very might either - to have do something. III Part [HILL] We are Control and Disarmament, Arms on advisor III, Part 1980. to Advisor - on moving now arms and disarmament, control over the NATO we'll return period and phases in your career, and tape. From 1978 to 1980 you were advisor to the control and disarmament: public to arms in that issue [PEARSON] on Disarmament Special an race. the on government reaction of second on was for public interest widely covered by Mr. address It was arms Canadian the how interested - was the in Trudeau, were the Special one press, that attention, when he elaborated his strategy arms those other some they Session in 1978, which in fact led to my appointment. Session subject of to 1978 time? that trigger The the about and disarmament control at what 1978-80 of and was The the everybody's caught suffocation of the of the more innovative proposals put to the Special Session, and I think was widely supported in Canada amongst the public, although not by all officials in Ottawa, thought it was of following too radical up utopian. and that speech. on I the first disarmament since General Burns. greater authority, in that he special Minister, session whereas as I was was was I of whom left with the task appointed right after the advisor General able was some to on arms Burns control had and been given report directly to the asked to report through the departmental 160 000340 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information Nevertheless, process. intention to try to Session. these. for We There formed organizations, non-governmental indication of an was Government's the implement some of the ideas that had been put forward in the Special support it was consultative a in good deal of public a order to with group have continuing a dialogue with the public, and we created the disarmament fund which small, was the beginning, in which grew over fifty thousand dollars, about time to closer to million a So, dollars. we but had the instruments in place for consultation and for help to research participation. and to public for these, And think, I the were bases subsequent Canadian policy in terms of initiatives and work on disarmament, especially in the realm of verification, which we have done now for ten years. some years that was an important beginning after inattention after General of Apart from being members years. in Geneva, attention we was Mr. things. other on '60s. the Committee of and there was resistance So this It wasn't over SALT, Carter Carter on and relations therefore fell there was therefore, into as period follow up to The Americans were the Soviet kind of vacuum which was a in a way, rejected the whole outlook Union. And in Washington. When I of proposals our As left hadn't been able to get the Allies to part of the strategy, [HILL] though, The tragedy was, decreasing interest in Ottawa. we The Government's embroiled in domestic problems became of course, with a ten Disarmament on return to the inside the government. presidency Reagan, a easy, not prepared to accept his proposals. the was almost They were difficult to implement anyway, ideas. Trudeau's that left, Burns hadn't contributed all that much. of initiative of the on So, a in result 1980, agree on any pity. Did you attempt to promote this through NATO consultation well? [PEARSON] Yes, we did. We promoted it especially the cut-off of production which was one of the four points of resolutions in the Assembly on allies to support. did, but Some that 161 through NATO consultations, of the fissionable strategy. We materials, introduced subject which we asked our NATО the major allies abstained-000341 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information the British, French and the Americans--which meant that they the weren't prepared to support it in of gradually died. cut-off a meaningful sense, and the idea a inspection and they weren't ready for that. it in principle about it. testing the on chance, and of but we wasn't really our fault; [HILL] This was the we didn't really stand We much Special the Second after continued to work we on had of verification before. It involved in any of that work? you directly. side than on the NATO introducing working more on the arms control I was side. I was mildly opposed Europe, idea of the to intermediate-range new weapons as you know, the Europeans were along. We didn't take any lead role in that; did the United States. So that but, weapons, the Americans went neither, at first, European show, into when it reason to and doesn't have much comes to new in favour of weapons stand out. So I in it, and actually a was Europe, think that Canada was a bit non-event for Canadians, who paid very little attention to it. every other defence in particular. But more my for year resolution interested in then were continental on two interested in were what was '78, years as subjects, I advisor, materials, fissionable verification questions, in So time of the famous NATO two-track decision. not We a think the whole climate changed. I No, We strategy involved the momentum that lost [PEARSON] a of strategic weapons and was bitterly new disarmament efforts our agreements of another part was Other parts of the Session in 1982 fizzled out. Were supported kept alive, but the Reagan Administration quickly was opposed by the United States. of The Soviets nobody really believed that they were genuine but abandoned that goal too. a kinds of The Comprehensive Test Ban, which the strategy, freeze all would have meant It we of did go down to the UN apart and took in the question of and questions an from interest our in military budgets. transparency and more publicity about more happening in arms control, and because of our initiatives we pushed for studies of these questions, more public the basis that if the public governments would find it more difficult&to involvement, happening more on 162 knew what was increase 000342 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information military spending. the UN Perhaps that was an illusion. give much to Disarmament Yearbook attention more was of that period, result one But we did help questions. these to and many UN studies which have since been done were partly interest from countries like Canada. followed the Alliance view allies there on were almost none that a result of we generally voted with our We stood out against. majority the from we alliance occasionally the Danes or the Greeks. a [HILL] think I There view good reason were interview by asking one very except then, There was always tremendous and you not to do so. like to close off I'd that think I together on major questions of security, pressure to vote had to have UN great a almost all the major nuclear weapons questions. dissidents few Aside from that, atomic weapons. on The further questions. two or part of this the seems to It me that in the mid '70s there was relatively little interest in Canada in disarmament, but then subsequently there interest in peace and so I do believe information is from Canadian there has that the public is going to take the more the been informed, more a long way to go. an I think we're contro1? arms information available, interest, especially if the And over the last few years information available, money more inevitably leads to greater public available for research, and this interest and or more sources. such more great growth of a How do you rate the constancy of the on. Canadian public's interest in disarmament [PEARSON] Well, was educated public. We still have a still under-developed when it comes to knowledge of these kinds of questions, compared to the Germans, the French, full-time the British, who defence correspondents, experts in these areas. major newspapers have We have only recently sent correspondents to knowledge than there greater knowledge ten will be towards the kind of was years ten are Canadian correspondents still in New York, which is remarkable when you think of now have editorial writers who and no that from now. There Moscow. years I ago, it. and And we have greater is there will be think the long-term trend asking difficult questions about nuclear weapons, questions that McNamara and others 163 have been asking 000343 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information since they retired. information, That's another officials; retired the officials mostly disappear gardens. But be, That's lot a public interest. terms of not are we evaluated point. the not writing about. to be. And involved than more see in is what are in be to used we of demonstrations basis The point can Canadian the scene and they cultivate their Their publications you retired although The peace movement cannot be, the on from advice and stream of possible and should the streets. they learning, are and than they used far better committee reports, it in parliamentary although the members of Parliament don't have the staff to do the research that they need. Senator Kennedy has more people staff than one-third of our M.P.s put together. be like staffs which of Kennedy, Senator can Commons. been have strategic analysis we do need now living for 30 years, off and it's question this, situation different States and or from is should lead to somehow of Britain that [PEARSON] Well, for you have parliamentary I think American only in the last few from to ask whether the of that This is a the United good sign, independent Canadian policies. more Is there change way? under the public is beginning to influence in ways that they didn't before; to go; don't have to of and Germany. or Could you explain further? [HILL] We capital the years that we've started to Canadian to his questions into the media and into the House feed We but on policy but we still have quite a long way don't see in the current defence debate enough analysis, example, of the need The British Press for things like would have chewed that if that had been the issue. We new submarines and for months so on. or years haven't really come to that point over yet. [HILL] 1978-80 Here's another period: how question linked to your experience in the valuable, in your view, is NATO as an instrument for the promotion of international peace and security, for example through arms control and disarmament? [PEARSON] think it's valuable. I still very It is theonly 164 000344 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information available to us to promote goals of instrument in a forum where impulses NATO. for values. have shared we One to was shore peace and security There were Western up original two Europe which everybody thought was about to collapse, not because of the Soviets but because of the Communist parties; hold of the United States, change American policies. valid, Western It is now a Europe and the other was to get and somehow be able to The first reason longer needs no is influence and obviously no longer be saved from Communism. to deterring any military threat from the Soviet matter of Union. But the second motive-- of maintaining influence States policy--has NATO had fact things would existed. So important. important. One on say that can different sense, I if think the it instrument, any other The public, too, there Alliance remains you have to tends to be academics and [HILL] Thanks, - [HILL] so on writing The NATO use to cover now. on on left out, with the one key in NATO If we as went to the Soviet 1958 and 1961, Union, your time that was had just previously served with you had there Ambassador between you issues that arose, I member of the NATO a and then the other period I'd like wonder if you could that your career I'd like might examine the first period, Secretariat, Paris, where I [PEARSON] what 1958-61 is when you were would be your time responsibilities the or correspondent in Brussels. there are two parts of The first from 1980 to 1983. Embassy. a Paris, Secretariat, from 1958 to 1961, course it to enough analysts, correspondents, the subject. Secretariat, Mr. Pearson, to touch hadn't think we will adjourn at this point. I Part IV in We don't have don't at this point have We but extremely and I don't think knows enough about how the Alliance works actually happens. United policy in Vietnam for example, been that It's like more even US on have in effective. keep it become influence no a as tell us of the something about the main in that time and also about some of you saw them. partly because I had 165 a French friend whom 000345 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information I had known while I Embassy who the at was serving was the NATо on Secretariat as the Chef de Cabinet of Mr. Paul Henri Spaak, who had just assumed his duties if So this I arranged, was and political the on My time there of side very interesting time NATO the same qualities that he brought to European is, institutions federal the West, Spaak's questions and strong supporter of a persuade the United States to involving matters was interesting feature of my time there operate with the Europeans just he all matters on Soviet the questions colonial of the the construction institutions for both Europe and common or and the most attempt That Market. Common his three years But and indeed Spaak brought to NATO, for working with Spaak only stayed In fact, NATO. Spaak Mr. after spent was he went back to Belgium in 1961. three years; a shortly there went I Secretary General. became were and he asked would be interested in working in the Political Section. me Spaak Secretary General, NATO as and of and common threat, but indeed global was Mr. to co- interest, not Canada economic also questions. A factor which prompted him to resign was his disappointment at his failure bring to that matter) main reasons States, to that. One but consultations the This was to objectives. the opposition also of others, particularly true, although able solve during my time there, question. that The consultations about Tunisia and reluctant to accept any NATO Morocco. for United the widening of course, of same to of Algeria NATO colonial so-called the include France, There were two was French refused to consult anybody; France; (and Canada and co-operate with these for territories. to United States particular, in political where the Algeria, of of part was De Gaulle was French view applied to course, The interference, as Belgians were also they might see different view it, in the Congo. The Americans, of took course, quite a colonial problems than the Europeans. The Americans, under President Kennedy, fixed had their eyes on of especially the global issues and were keen to disassociate themselves from the policies of their allies. these They rejected questions. The Spaak's wish to have was true of Canada. same 166 a NATO position Because of on our 000346 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information relations with the francophone Africa, matters. I take strong a in especially in respect of the Congo, which was of course problem. He Lumumba, who as thought was wanted to to be Soviet a NATO's support enlist you know was with Spaak He wanted NATO to. penetration Communist against views. own think, preferred the European views. line beginning We knew that such a position would the Europeans than to our that of himself, just and nothing to do with any so-called would have we NATO position on these be closer to Commonwealth, new a Africa, Belgian for resistance first Congo Prime Minister, the protégé to some extent. Spaak to and was a social-democrat but like many European social democrats, strongly anti-Soviet. He with Howard Green, nothing to (HILL] do into difficulties with President Kennedy and ran the Foreign Minister, who would have Canadian policy. with that kind of So then the colonial issue was felt very much inside NATо headquarters? Spaak felt that the NATO allies should take a global security and therefore of the implications of the end of [PEARSON] view of colonialism in Africa. It was of concern to NATO, in Spaak's view, because of Soviet threat to Africa. He foreign ministers a potential Soviet penetration of of Americans the the on Africa. at the to need work lectured NAТО together to And he failed; that was time, although it prevent not the view be may any now. That appalled the Canadians, especially, as I say, Mr. Green, who was busy cultivating new friends at the UN. The UN was where doctrine Mr. Green felt most UN in ways which he at home, justified support of the new countries, Allies in Europe, too attitude; they couldn't in the way [HILL] to vote at the if that meant have been more as '58 a couldn't different, and needed the split with our understand this those two men, significance of NATO. fair amount of decolonization by differences of viewpoint as and Spaak a far the grounds that we bad. I believe there was so on they approached the value or the progress of were and he went disappointment with by '60. But still there to how to proceed in this area. 167 000347 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information how NATO allies should still difficult a as you know. vote at the UN on Angola or or other Europeans, which the Americans rejected. other the of issues is Spaak's views, and the views of Mr. was The question of of those some whether it's Nicaragua one, In those days it places. some still are, and there Yes, [PEARSON] that the Americans and many others in the [HILL] It West were looking for rapid dis-entanglement from colonial empire seems period. in that would be able [PEARSON] Yes. [HILL] That comment to me Once that had been done, to concentrate much particulary felt was more it was on felt, the Allies security in Europe. the French. about you Could that? on [PEARSON] One question of of French French refused major the to issues policies in in NATO then Africa. North Of Algeria, although it discuss the was was whole course, voted major problems the at upon for the NATO allies, Canada in particular being strongly anti-colonial. Denmark the and UN. These Norway Europeans, votes or more pretty the UN caused at shared less well agreed, the country surface. They wanted involved not to stand by the French at them Spaak pressed the Allies the always were discussed openly unless the Belgium wanted the Congo discussed to of rest issues discussed. Belgium's efforts to bring about The At NATO these weren't question of the future of the But views. if least not to vote against them. under our a after the failure of peaceful transition agree to common policies of power. and that proved to be impossible. The other strategy, major issue at the time was the question of nuclear after short-range nuclear Europe in the late December, 1956. these weapons was '50s. weapons were introduced into The NATO Council took that decision in Thereafter the whole question of the control a of central policy issue, and it was never settled. 168 000348 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information retaining control of any decision to The United States insisted on such use weapons. allies wanted They were in their say a American use. the other But weapons. military objective The was obviously to have a decision-making process which was as effective and as rapid should be as possible, but the than finger on the trigger. The issue was of more one contradictory requirements. political issue was that there These were particular interest to Canada at the time because of the introduction into Canada of nuclear weapons as well, Should Canada have do? brought under with the control, allies shared or 1956, Union NATO on from at control. What use, should The be also issue remains wanted was shared The form today. of In that any attack by the Soviet use of nuclear That meant that the question of who vital. Because this of some alive forces in Europe should be met by the was less or more form some Canada they be should or agreed time, agreed the beginning. should really never could accept that. the the Council took the decision [HILL] their on there States Norstad NATO December weapons that but the United commander, NATO veto a The Canadian government NATO? other Bomarc missile. the But it was spelled never out. the time when De Gaulle also called for the Three-Power Directorate. {PEARSON] one, of That was the third issue which emerged because the French solution was to say, them and "We'll three will decide what to do we in indeed in matters of high policies generally". feasible, accept and it. I It proposed, so [HILL] Where don't think created a lot it didn't lead did forget the rest emergency an But that the United States of tension. It to NATO from the other was was decision of was never prepared never any to formally kind. discussions on these private sessions of the Council with the or issues take place inside NATO? [PEARSON] There were no staff present. There was also an arrangement under which the Standing Group could discuss some of these matters, but that was in the 169 000349 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information military net and weren't we to privy civilians working in the political concerned with consultations political questions and about especially Soviet policies. the time, new leader and inspired came to Paris in U2. the saying what good thing a NATO, Summits would happen, or thing did of for the Summit, 1960 we it Cuba took power in '59, and that Was this discussed [PEARSON] Well, Committee. letter more colonial in Council arose was was that of relatively a the was We couldn't be But that policies of what the sort Europe and was in discussed. in various committees? of Three Report in Committee Political report, But it greatly was where and we led '57 into questions of increased after real obstacles politics. global from that, helped I Secretary General. the head of German who were I was to over Economic the discussed all We the Deputy were Palais de Chaillot that result of working questions and under Kennedy were colonial for speeches an and in and scrutiny. to brief office; we had Head, two Frenchmen and an Italian Paris then We worked of - a we mainly in French and course... then at the Porte the Englishman who had been the political section in the foreign was a of Political interests to Alliance write quite an international group. English. as The Americans not prepared to submit their global Apart '56, the to Spaak was very keen that it should take place. and because ran Castro after course, for sure these issues and then recommended action to the Council. was He it broke down because, Soviet The Political Committee consultation at father at the time my to issue then too, Group the of establishment an were which broke down because of a analysis was we were these Krushchev dangerous. were elsewhere. [HILL] about how much we would be told. - so We certain amount of hope for progress. a remember writing I in us, section, questions that any other that. of any beginning Dauphine, just at the outside Paris. [HILL] So, it was a group of about ten, was it? 170 000350 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [PEARSON] Yes, about eight to ten of about or two on five six nationalities. the secretariat. When the Canadian representative with press jobs Secretariat, There was and on the conspicuous by their presence. We were the on whole there, dominated the military structure. but [HILL] think when I I people, they so British the and rather limited group, a others, directly were not They were mostly people only seconded there the Americans had was some were The Americans didn't have many still were competition for Canadians very few. as remember. job or He dealt mainly lot of a Europeans, I a D'Iberville Fortier became Secretariat. the on Canada usually had left, I information. and people in the Political Section, whereas, say, hired by the Secretariat. [PEARSON] say That's right, enjoyed I it, politics. And I because on we because did to his on or NATO, or like The UN great deal a a for three years. on more the I must about Alliance critic of Canadian policy, importance to the least so it seemed to me, than objected to that. the UN, and Mr. then was just becoming the UN was were so policies sheep. not on, and the greatest Belgian Portugal was the black importance of Green he tended to lecture importance of the UN and policies, French policies, especially of Portugal. about the on that. at and I disarmament and critic of British (Green's) learned I the UN, colleagues at NATO they didn't seconded whole tended to attach the Europe very strong was became somewhat of Commonwealth and to we I and His views reciprocated, except possibly by the Scandinavians. [HILL] What would you say about the NATO and the [PEARSON] sure that quality of analysis, for example We had the existed, tended to one or quality butter was to be NATO quality of consultation in to two good was act as a people on Soviet issues. high, anti-Soviet. on Soviet issues? though, That was the because our reason that I'm not bread we thought shield against Soviet aggression. interpret Soviet policies in a very cautious 171 - and not We to say 000351 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information aggressive manner, evidence Soviet good will, of [HILL] willing not were we whole the on Spaak certainly wasn't. and about analysis of Third World issues. What accept to not mean I necessarily directly related to the decolonization issue, but shall we in southeast Asia. of affairs say the state than of for some area which is other [PEARSON] affairs regional Europe, and we the Secretariat. were not familiar writing although, I so did try at attached Africa. view. thought of us said to me, a as being anything to give him he ever some much not had served in Asia. I don't Europe; Spaak why Canada sense like our think, I Canadian the and some way; always he he as once His successor, understanding of these questions, more more. of it, understood slightly disloyal in was on outside kind of North American "Yugoslavia". Stikker from Holland, although or experts relations with the emerging countries our sure not Africa us no of Commonwealth importance-- to matters I'm But of time to explain to Mr. one did my best I on had We Most with piece single a relations with India and of that. just looking interest to NATO. direct on remember was good at not were We I'm generally speaking, NATO's Secretaries General have not being very understanding of Canadian issues and views of the world; [HILL] Were there, Luns certainly wasn't. this time, at meetings experts of on, for example, South East Asia or Soviet policy? [PEARSON] were On Soviet policy, organized not in the there were way they've since become We'd just established matter. usually, of ministers, was They'd but otherwise only afterwards between certainly we come were from for pretty that consultation the officials and delegation, twos", and there were only rarely visits from Ottawa capitals. an The Political Committee from each NATO counsellors as Political Committee a with all questions of this kind. up, occasional meetings but they capitals. 172 the well it dealt was or our made "the number from other meetings on annual own. of So the it developed into consultation The Canadian delegation got 000352 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de their instructions from Ottawa, [HILL] The reason I there that I mean that in that because it does was capability research political issues. seem to meetings the of experts, NATо That's still the case. NATO where expertise from all the allied capitals. me inside could say that to some extent there's But of course one for on l'information each issue. on little very is headquarters, asked la Loi sur l'accès à a vehicle draw can on really wonders how But one effective that is. [PEARSON] Well, the think it helps to be able to speak directly to I experts, especially policy. issues of Soviet on immense analytical establishment in Washington, You have an example, for and somewhat less but still significant resources in London, Paris and Bonn. good And when deal. people these But available, with at some come, time that exceptions the kind that e. allies other g., learn can expertise of wasn't Laloy of France. Jean a I don't remember the Americans producing the kind of people they have since. There Kennan, I no was suppose, one had in particular that more interested in the rest of the very much a course they [HILL] to problem-solve, What viewpoint of about I a Kennedy statesman. global I the mean, we contributions Canadian the are Secretariat. Canada's contribution? [PEARSON] as world then; They was of And deeply anti-colonial. were consultations. George State Department by then. left the were man out. stood looking at would How it you a to from the little see And also what did Canada get NATO the value out of of it? think you have to think of that period, in particular, in terms of Howard Green; he was the Minister who dominated foreign policy after remember, crisis, death the critical for of deserting of the view; But, he he was previous Britain strange, because after he that Sydney Smith. in became And he was, as you government's role in the Suez its hour of need. Which Minister, Mr. Green did very critical of some really was Canadian policy, 173 as was not take aspects of British policy. far as NATO was concerned, 000353 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information and his over-riding goal that's where vote on we disarmament, on for example. got into trouble in the UN, We and would disarmament issues there, with a small minority in NATO--on tests, nuclear nuclear tests. who did. Before that, We That Testing example. for '63. in abolished of to make progress was was were Green's priority. weapons the whole and that Canada, into in the Alliance And the other preoccupation issues, of question not was was to abolish all UN few countries Canadians, aside from the colonial defence--NORAD--and atmosphere the voted in the we of the one in an was North American introducing nuclear great interest issue of to the other allies at the time. [HILL] Except equipping the Canadian the CF104 by this time? it that not We were the other nuclear There in serve last minute, can't remember Canada's weapons allies then, Only Norstad, the or but was with some a strange arrangement they had to go and pick something like that. big issue follow to in NATO. I don't through on equipping didn't poison the relationship with presumably? United the Commander, jumped States; into that conference in Ottawa which was regarded He in NATO, why. reluctance nuclear was role, that do not recall that being [PEARSON] affairs. role nuclear up the weapons at the itself with a in in Europe the aircraft was not equipped with whereby, to actually [HILL] great issue in NATO or step of stock piling the warheads. if I'm not mistaken? I a Diefenbaker Mr. least weapons, why. of prepared At Even know question the not last I to Hadn't Canada acquired Europe? accept to [HILL] [PEARSON] linked That was not prepared in North America. to take the bit a forces in [PEARSON] That's true. Canada. was said, "There is no as and, then, of argument with course, a press interfering in Canadian point in Canada accepting nuclear 174 000354 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- . Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information missiles, if they are prepared not a pretty logical statement, I recall, NATO in and that '61, [HILL] But then I Yes. I left later. came the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, In [PEARSON] but, that was the only direct incident role in our nuclear troubles. in NATO's It's accept the warheads". to during the wasn't there I think. Cuban Missile Crisis, by our allies as some kind of Canadian abdication of responsibility. We refused to go on alert, and so which, I think, was regarded I don't remember if on. bound by the NORAD agreement. we were in the early nuclear '60s weapons. impression is, some But Our ever went on developed that regarded was any alert, but The Canadian defence debate part of the NATO debate was Canada respects. after as left. I of kind a the control over military contribution was So my free of main rider, not very high, in and prepared to discuss any of the subjects that Spaak and we were not others the Europeans wanted discussed, and on. so It was a low period for Canada's reputation in NATO. [HILL] At the same time, not very much comprehension of of the there always had good wasn't, earlier, there was Canadian points of view on the part Scandinavians. We and those continued. The foreign troops was not a on reduce our Mr. NATO, a as extent, later, so there withdrawal centre We weren't Canadian leadership, some Canadian the accept nuclear Trudeau pulled forces, for Norway, their soil. time of That recovered to course, except relations with Norwegians had refused to of mentioned Europeans. [PEARSON] No, it you as and for us has indeed, any completely alone, but certainly not in in the sixties. back again with his been, return, our weapons or, and foreign over time, a withdrawal policy. If And NATO. then, decision to fairly constant and you return, to looked at the history of our NATO policies, you would be struck by the way that the graph goes up and down. clearly there is a tension in Canada whatever government is in power, between 175 our NATO obligations and 000355 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information our ourselves of sense NATO. In that [HILL] Of sense, course, was since Europe had particularly with it is early the percentage of good deal '60s we the of 1960s, the Arrow, Avro in the whole the already changing. was spending were by change the and budget and our major military power, Whereas yet. weapons, the situation a mid-50s, the in that, fact the cancellation nuclear strategic equation, In also recovered the our unique. position of being not about indecision higher are still in the Canada [PEARSON] we including countries outside the Commonwealth and with other with relations having global interests, as than we are reputation as a GNP defence, on more a In the now. '50s, a NATO's military role declined after about the mid '60s and into the '70s. then, Before contribution. And [HILL] We [PEARSON] We were We had NORAD So more. There and America, North and size the military? the of thought to be making a respectable contribution. was accentuated the process of Europe respectable a criticized for that. criticized for division there. a contributor to quite making were we weren't we not were our no great quarrel about that. splitting the interests between our Europeans did not take much interest in North America. [HILL] So, it's more question a of really, attitude, than of policy thrust? [PEARSON] think it was more a matter of attitude and I to be involved in European colonial policies, like. That rest, with, the others Turkey, and blacker as the was as I essential said, supported, so on. far as the more Portugal we were or which less, was of reluctance we did not Canada and the Norway and Denmark; all difference between exception a European the black polices sheep. Greece, - Only a little concerned. 176 000356 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information - [HILL] yet, And Diefenbaker when office to came the government Conservative in'57 inside NATO to drawing up '58, or they did and Mr. devote some declaration, or something of that kind, to reiterate allied solidarity and Canadian interest in effort But, NATO. as that impulse declined. [PEARSON] Well, as have varied that say, I Mr. Trudeau thought Mr. Green challenged NATO. the was that our challenged never Mr. took Trudeau military the political interest Green. of NATO addition, In him. he There were Norman Robertson was example. for What maintaining solidarity the only one. He was not disarmament, in view a contribution. in many in the Department that agreed with strong believer interests military contribution was redundant. with many of our NATO allies. a reading? incorrect an think Canada's reputation and I in that is very different from that of Mr. not was Or time over charge of Canadian foreign policy, Green took Mr. a this So is a Canadian phenomenon, if you like, that we back away from NATO every ten years and then so, or find it hard we expects. Alliance policies, which maintain to new interest, the kind show perhaps So this has global commitments but we we and resources between many Whereas for a one a solidarity that the pattern Canadian The United don't have. don't have global commitments. always been only is But we are in surprising when you think about it. is not the other side of the Atlantic. on of now. as of States is also, We have global We We are have but interests, to divide our time different kinds of interests. NATO has strands policy. the several country like Belgium, or involved in Holland, or Spain, to a lesser extent Italy and maybe Turkey, it's their major concern. [HILL] in general, expect Canada to behave I suppose if the Europeans, like the Netherlands, they are always going to be rather disappointed. [PEARSON] We but I could say we have priorities. think they've given that up. "All right, a we large country We would also We had a quid pro quo. will assist in the defence of and we have some of our own appreciate it if you would help 177 France, defence us from 000357 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information time to time"; nothing and of course, the only country ever in the Alliance which has with the United States for air defence, of continental engagement. policy... current, Europe, the are separate arrangement example, and this kind And this is going to continue to affect is now running away again from in my view, outlook term contribution, because of is for gradual a decrease in our increasing responsibilities for our our defense. own [HILL] In way, a there is never age [PEARSON] Yes, I to be more of continuity a think if you look back, probably, than our relations with India, for example, it will be seen in the '50s, relations outside NATO. Our it seems, pre-occupied with still we were going to be any return to a sort like the early 1950s. golden of We though we are reinforcing our forces there. The medium even longer and a for of that. came were because more even important in the '50s in some ways than our relations with France, which is extraordinary when think you of When it. was I Embassy, Paris the in our telegrams were not of nearly the same significance as the telegrams from between and Delhi. New our our So we have always Commonwealth and NATO commitments, of sense being ourselves a tension, this had and our country and new I think, aid programs one that is sympathetic to the problems of new countries, problems of identity, problems of colonialism. There are countries of Europe and of North America, break between more we were a centre 1956 and important 1986. a as political for respected and we had a It non-military side of NATO. What of that issue in the [PEARSON] side of about We NATO were and period proud to of I don't in the that any see great early days Our views were highly good diplomatic service. whole What just consultation. very so military power, and more important as the {HILL] was differences between the real question of Article 2 and the did Canadians feel about the state NATO? you were our contribution to political at consultations. 178 the non-military Even though we 000358 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loí sur l'accès à l'information dragged fully. feet our often about their policies, Kennedy we succeeded much, to some extent. that 2 Article with good made pool we we knowledge our 2. Dulles hadn't.consulted The progress economic policies and what should and under Eisenhower dialogue greater was in NATO and that only exports all was Soviet on In what way to the Soviet Union, what kind of trade relations should we have with them? we pretty should matters The well act as trying to convince an organization for economic consultation of trade and payments and Organization for so on others that NATO on between western countries. so in that respect, were we accomplish what we had hoped to do in the beginning, never able to that was to make the treaty into a basis for collaboration all on of western policies. [HILL] The somewhat, in comparison with the hopes of [PEARSON] It ran it. the European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) played that role and then the Common Market, aspects But up gave itself of aspect other do about them. military political on consultation was could of contributed bring the Americans So we were leaders in that respect, really do could Article there later but questions. we otherwise we We were one of the leaders in trying to to consult more and issues, colonial on whole idea out of of Community had Atlantic an an down run earlier time. steam because the Europeans did not want They had their own interests. [HILL] What about the Twin Pillars concept. when President Kennedy issued for call a a came new in, or effort to [PEARSON] Well, and did, the re-organize And of thought it seems to course, that had serious naturally we were opposed pillar, with the Europeans being the other pillar. history directorate. and experience. This was During 179 partly the he Alliance, to any arrangement which would imprison us in North America political that me maybe slightly afterwards, basically on a Twin Pillars basis. implications for Canada. we It as one We resisted any a matter of Canada's Second World War we were 000359 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information treated as minor partner, a armed forces. So none contradicting ourselves. though we had even of that would We directorate wanted Community. had as we be was preparing for in mind them, I is this: have been immediate post-war period, External Affairs us of future always out, and some on a long as it. want this period. interviews and these to be a Atlantic the did not we any showed by the fact that struck there seemed to if somebody else, but doing in which we concept our were either extent, some just a couple of other questions have I Americans, left or I have point Community we alliance direction, think, to the way, a in the men we wouldn't agree that about In strong a major role in its construction, like the French One in I ambivalent The Atlantic a [HILL] lead strong pillar. or to ourselves might which million accept. we involved both economics and politics but arrangement a the in group of people in other government departments, who had a very strong sense of wanting to do something about the state of the They world. they had a seemed be as to very have a strong sense What about this sense people there, they unified in their objectives, had that a people very capable people, [PEARSON] It's difficult in the early office. opportunity, statesman or now a period, while you were at NATO, did of how would or for me to comment, you because of was at telling him, at the time, that he in wasn't NATO, office, my father's he that and had he as an drawing on his experience, former statesman, He excitement of the early '50s '60s, we did to extent. lost later, was were some more of Department wasn't in the federation changed the and and there civil service, of withdrawal. at kind that time, the same the elder to put But the concerned about Leadership a of and with the bilingualism. was out was affairs, especially with Quebec and the whole question future senior that? assess I minority governments of the own especially the External, in forward initiatives and proposals. sense They something. do to period, but when remember I need a strong sense of a need to do something and that were role of but exactly; intellectually pretty capable people and very astute diplomats. you not were our of the in the There spark that we 180 000360 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information had had before. [HILL] ferment, and [PEARSON] and UN World categorize could One high a level There was. NATO, of another the Commonwealth, could, once of time again, of sort a intellectual early period of construction of the In the Now we they have served their purpose, facing as commitment. of put in place. were it pieces these beginning are of post-War the to wonder and you could argue that now reconstruction and contribute, but not in India, China. But now that have we the same [HILL] we also, intellectual input. You While it is true that they in their own way, on sometimes, mentioned are there Brazil Brazil, and as of one a China role and for so on. each the other hand they don't necessarily always impact on the rest of struck by something that world that they might the have. I Arthur of Our way. very major powers these days, have the China--and is and seem to was Canada still have influence. think, I are constitution in place, we our should be able to devote more time to these matters, the Summit Seven we thinking. new weight has changed compared to other countries: relative whether course, he knows China very Menzies well--that said about part of the problem with China is simply to keep them in contact with the rest of world. and they [PEARSON] They have a tendency to be off in a world of their own, find I the rest of the world very difficult to understand. didn't mention Japan and Germany as two of the powers leadership. take it, but, of the future who can be expected to show this kind of The role is there if Canadian governments want to until recently, we we have been haven't wanted it. expect we might find a so concerned with our own affairs that we new generation are into those shoes again, provided [HILL[ or moving Now there out of that phase, and I of officials who will step is political leadership. Before we leave the NATO period, are there any thoughts, recollections, that you would like to mention at this point? 181 000361 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information [PEARSON] later Well, Policy Advisory Group term. which country. units of each in life, I became on met We made was once up policy/planning the of year and looked at the a reports didn't have much influence, Our the Atlantic member of a it but was longer very a useful way of thinking with our allies about common problems of the future. Allies the meet, to policy/planning in the Commonwealth, ways are public view, attribute. up quickly. which but vital are are, so that think in We the Summit meetings. the are hidden from the life of the most important almost every level and build be held very consultations interesting the with is don't have that continuing the it probably its at crisis, a of one to think, I exchange views can I don't have that at whether relations or of talking to each other which We contacts guises, continuing vitality. a we and which Alliance, conflicts regional or and informal capacity for different various in Soviets, which gives it There familiarity, NATO does have this can could be studies which made is how, through this process of consultation, crises have been avoided. tend to think about but We study it would be useful to place, because of crises that have taken place, the the crises that have not taken consultations and the role of the Alliance NATO in finding compromises amongst different views. potential crises that have been dealt with, in the Gulf, of substitute even in NATO But the point undertaking for if for So continuing détente with other Part V [HILL] - way of the and consultation, that lost, are Soviet and Union. there I wonder to the Soviet is no essential, remain will NATO there is a kind of imagine that these There is doing that. Ambassador to the I what will knows consultation and cooperation will continue. functions of no of think I subject and who that that the Alliance provides the vehicle is kind this it. on original purposes its potential crisis the instance--there must have been hundreds of hours for consultations happen. One could take the if we Soviet Union, could go on 1980-83 to your Union, which was from 1980-1983. initially which.is: looked at from Moscow, period I as have Ambassador one question of role do what sort 182 000362 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information think Canada should play within NATO in order to deal with the you Soviet Union in the best kind of way? [PEARSON] Well, should I think that opportunity to put forward Union, partly the Soviet we our own particularly the United States, consensus have to have need the future on views, We have tended and in the an views That that in Canada. to neglect to come some that we to express them. We an others, of means capacity to understand the our as happening in is attempt to willing forum NATO what on Soviet Union. the and we have to be strengthen to of views balance to the use Soviet We Union. don't have the kind expertise that some of our allies do. We are now beginning to develop that, but until we do, it will be hard for us to have real of influence Union. on the policy questions I hope that of how in five to ten years to deal with the Soviet who have served there two or three times in major a that you way this to learn overnight. can able to It's not leaders, analysis and (b) may be contrary neighbour. Soviet speaking the language, it It means have the political will those to of others, If you confront the policy, you are particularly true world: Communist touching over most a least States those on sensitive nerve, involving the others. Those Moscow, what it was a terms a kind of monolith and we've got to overcome that goes inside of the on. In of and this is rest of the addition, Soviet empire, the we At one of the point, bloc which included China, Chinese defection exploded that myth. in questions difficult, where some understanding tended to assume that our the questions that are relations inside the Communist world are important. think of Cuba, relations with Nicaragua, relations with troubling and to express views which at or United questions relations with Vietnam and the something So that I think we have (a) to improve our capacity etc. for we contribute keeping up with the Soviet press and with the speeches of the means are to be analysis. of process will have enough people we But with we still orders but tend to coming from image in order to understand have to understand land mass of the what happens Soviet Union, and future. And that requires understanding of Soviet Asia, the Baltic Republics, Trans-Caucasia, and the rest. what that means for the 183 000363 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information The major allies: Germans, ahead of are that is reason the Americans, in terms of this analysis. us universities our the French and the the British, of the produced enough yet not have Part scholars. Looking (HILL] at period in the Soviet Union, during your own the Brezhnev period, how would you of the Soviet Union, and how would you situate long-term development the see the years that you there? were [PEARSON] I was there at the beginning of the end of the Brezhnev therefore, time, speculation about era. It People tend to think that Gorbachev is a was change when of were signs that period was Andropov. died before he could I of a there was new as phenomenon, but there well. much of figure in key A period of change but He initiated the implement the future. wanted he what to do. Almost any leader after Brezhnev would have had to initiate change, because, the any of change facts growth, economic and he one stagnation the many who had been bound be to in some in there '84, and he wasn't alone. It was not a as even exaggerate Gorbachev phenomenon. everyone then, by the long. So there sudden transition; signs of change surprised face corruption of whom who had been for thirty in office almost change. the the agriculture, Gromyko had been made Prime Minister in place. still was reluctant to was in Soviet society--the decline in the rate of amongst the senior officials, years in he long in power, leader like there had to be. On was were almost there were think we tend to other hand, he has So I the There 1957, speed with which he is acting and that couldn't have been predicted. [HILL] I years, few think has been a thing I have been series of articles by over the last talking about the fact struck it is not just the senior leaders who have to be replaced in that the Soviet Union, whole been was one it is the entire middle management throughout the society, because it's simply the fact that many of them have in their present positions for nearly thirty bound to be a.generational change there. 184 years. And one So there wonders if 000364 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information obliged to run fast simply because otherwise the thing Gorbachev is get out of hand. can [PEARSON] who did not have any choice. He then in power were forgets that the people office in the '50s and to came One Stalin had killed off all the older people. '40s. in the even Gromyko became Ambassador to Washington when he was thirty-four, and other people generation assumed high office very young. That generation of that is now disappearing. they not are young as fifties now, their tended to be the first time, These a new a cycle of younger people, predecessors their as the new men, decade younger. men new There is and in the 1940s is important What the leaders are able owe nothing to Stalin, embark to They were. and in is that for now have are leadership the on but new a course. particular no loyalties to [HILL} You see quite a difference between the current situation, then, the time of and that at [PEARSON] Indeed, Khrushchev Kosygin, and was no they were there. called it different those all the renege the can system, which is Third Revolution. hope for permanent change. an educated élite, universities. accept a I don't that will see a do, never not real change. There members, political leaders. see any alternative It to Lenin's, was So in that sense, how they Somebody can go then one can back. They and university. they have a The are or if that, and be willing return to the past. party Stalin and got past grade 10, been to never by they are doing, and and could Now not be brought to only alternative is a military take-over and I don't think that is in the cards. loyal trained were all of whom have been to trade schools Khrushchev Brezhnev had certainly generation people, because disclaim responsibility-- or Stalin's and now there is the third one. are situation, positions of responsibility under What these people now is to de-Stalinize has and they could way Khrushchev. completely a Stalin and grew up in there system. Stalin's probably The incapable military are of becoming simply not in their genes. So I don't continuing change in the way Gorbachev is is 185 000365 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information proceeding, except that if he against him and more look for It is change direction. won't I styles, life So I question of the kind of regime, whether--it is not it is a going to be democratic tolerate opposition in changes the productivity. who will be which is a some of living that is in it is about half of standards or four free sense standard for there. I've You can't eat meat get their the way for that said should we first term a borders begin may there is plenty that should NATO in the Soviet Union? on If we follow open, to policy a of the Reagan show ourselves willing by used exchange people and them and to communicate and to their can go all think you do South Africa. administration about to trade with not will basic resources. most limited degree, a How engagement, constructive 1living and, of enterprise. change Well, [PEARSON] leader comparable to they have--they they might who knows, respond to whatever is going on, some Unless they week. a if it was done in Even [HILL] room our education times system to work, kind of greater to things they expect, of accept the continuing lack of the than three economic lead which organization buy a decent pair of shoes in Moscow. You can't more not, and whether it will be prepared to make give them the kinds to able standard or sense--whether it will continue to our think the Soviet people will support any I given the high tolerate or in economic Right now, ours. so they But of the pace of change, matter a leader. they can't stop communication with the outside world. guess of cautious rather the others may turn fast, They can't stop the young from wanting western think. and a too goes they will allow more innovation and they won't put people in prison for political views. Gradually, Soviet Union all by the are they that we race in certainly willing to not are accepted this weapons systems about and arms the the pace of to affect policies turning back the ideas and that may be able we enemy China; to in follow. some That means deal old with We have to accept just as we've people. New sense, them everything which leads first of They have offered way. compromise. the change inside the to as greater military 186 000366 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information competition that. and us put arms control I list between of the process the and will agreements arms engaging them of Union Soviet on tend at the top of the They all fronts. block to are also talking about converting the ruble; they want to join the IMF, and they convert once should pursue the ruble there is so co-operation in all why they can't. reason enterprises of all kinds: common the Arctic, and no on. think there I these wants the USSR to become there are other kinds kinds of of constructive chance a things Gorbachev ways. we the oceans, space, exporter of wheat again. an of is We that he says In that case, could do in common. But all possibilities could be blocked by political developments in Eastern Europe: if Poland or East Germany, etc. reject the system these imposed There them, on is way, no leadership is, opportunities for détente would disappear. the what matter no Gorbachev does whatever or the they will allow, in the foreseeable future, the that countries of Eastern Europe to become allies of the West. [HILL] that the It puts particular a in Europe situation possible. In the past, were [PEARSON] Well, think will try to go its [HILL] I on as a when there the West, whole is also, managed explosions, were to make as sure well the ones as who the peoples of Eastern Europe. suffered the most I onus they continue to fear that Eastern Europe way. own wonder if you'd like to say brief word about Soviet a policy towards Eastern Europe and towards Germany. [PEARSON] One of the capacity or ability allied to the that West. keys to I to overcome in a policy is their Soviet their fear don't think there's They have to allow now. change of a united Germany, any way they will accept certain amount of creative freedom in Eastern Europe simply to prevent further revolt, and on our part we have to be careful particularly East not Germans join the Western alliance, would then, I think, encourage to to believe that Eastern they can, whatever form it has. abandon all Europeans in a and sense, The Soviet Union co-operation with the West, and 187 000367 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information and we would be back where we were in 1950. re-arm, of the process of of change in Eastern Europe is the key to the East/West relations. want become part of of a process of non-alignment, internal freedom but external purposes and serve future We must avoid the mistake of appearing to Eastern Europe to rather The management their encourage, and West, the Finlandization, constraints. would That is that serve our They have accepted Finland; purposes. there is no pressure on Finland in regard to its internal policies. is losing ground rapidly. Communist party the Indeed in Finland They have accepted Austria, and they run, couldn't accept a I see quite reason no different why, in the long Eastern in system Europe. Dean, an military? What about the attitude of the Soviet [HILL] a remarked in former US ambassador to the MBFR negotiations, article completed two in a years ago that three or matter of agreement could be MBFR an Jonathan months, provided that the Russians could be reassured about the situation in Poland, or themselves reassure perhaps, and also provided that the Soviet military was willing accept some reductions; a Gorbachev and do But people you to accept arms [PEARSON] I think the party able is willing to reductions in the Soviet armed forces, nuclear weapons). But Soviet and say a 50 percent reduction. of troops, not of that the West was not a threat to security, and they would have to be convinced of that. example, if the United States withdrew its German numbers, I army see no was in the under reason from Eastern Europe. sense the anything other than that I think they could provided they believe accept, except compromise, think they wil1 accept that (I'm talking I don't the persuade the Wil1 They will draw the line at deep military will have to go along. their to case? in Eastern Europe? deals control is the think that be like him military Soviet military being he clearly saw the major problem here. to some form of forces from constraint For Europe, and in terms of why the Soviet military would not withdraw They have no particular reason to be there, that they fear attack, defend their country outside their borders. 188 and would prefer to The big nightmare is 000368 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information that they would have borders. But again to defend security--then I agree to disarm up to [HILL] So, country inside they could be convinced that there if threat to their their see no reason was no their great why they shouldn'7 point. a for example, just to take instance, one Germany, where the Soviets have 20 divisions, if that of East you get something comparable in the west, would the Soviets be prepared to cut their there, do forces think? you [PEARSON] People have argued that they keep those forces in Eastern Europe control that to is not the reason is to want for as defence against attack, any attack on west as far they How would [PEARSON] I think Eastern Europe or their And can. this was no longer a threat, [HILL] of but I personally think primary reason for them being there. prevent themselves that the Eastern Europeans, then forward The primary defence. They homeland by defending they were satisfied if they would withdraw. they then control Eastern Europe? they are prepared to accept the Findlandization over time. Now that may be optimistic, but I think it is worth exploring. Part VI [HILL] like to - General One last question: make about Canadian in Canadian you would policy in NATO, and on the role of NATO policy? [PEARSON] Originally, United is there any last comment States into I an think, our alliance objective was to bring the Europe and to break the with isolationist tradition of American policy, and obviously that has been accomplished. In so far as NATO did not and has not developed into an Atlantic community, then I think we could accept, given relations with the Soviet Union which were relatively stable, that 189 000369 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information NATO become purposes mentioned have I Whether it purely political alliance, a could survive could live with that, such as help the UN as and in sense permanently such, I don't it would enable in my view Europe; etc.. for they expensive, and it distorts In the our Canada defence a non-military NATO, feasible concept I don't know. work us to towards, improve, then [HILL] Well, and I I for the co-operation. But I think we do other things, do our share of the long run that would be our to contribute with live could know. Certainly, from a military point posture. little and consultation in its peace-making tasks, defences of the continent, best of like, and if you of view, it makes have forces stationed very little, but priorities. though think it's So whether I think we is a that something it's we might if relations with the Soviet Union continue to think it's something that might become feasible. thank you very much indeed. 190 000370 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNA00004 Title A name given to the resource Geoffrey Pearson: "In Alliance" Interview Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived “Research - In-House Research - Oral History of Canadian Policy in NATO - Hill Roger,” RG154, Volume number: 13, File number: 2100-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en