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Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
IGNATIEFF
GEORGE
Good afternoon.
[HILL]*
Representative
NATO,
to
to
pleased to have with
are
Ignatieff,
George
Ambassador
We
formerly
United
the
Canada's
Nations
and
today
us
Permanent
to
the
Geneva
Disarmament Conference also previously Provost of Trinity College,
University
of
debate
international
on
Ignatieff,
Toronto and
and
we
very
security issues.
delighted
an oral
that
you
history of
Ambassador
ready
are
to
policy in
Canadian
to hearing what
look forward
much
participant in the public
active
and
peace
participate in this project,
NATO,
an
certainly
are
we
now
you
have to
say.
[IGNATIEFF]
project,
I
looking
am
which
think
I
forward
is
participating
to
worthwhile.
very
were
this
teaching
In
international relations at the University of Toronto,
there
in
found that
I
different perspectives in approaching just what
very
Canada's role had been.
On the
generation,
whole the current
I
think, underestimates the importance of Canada's contribution not
only in NATO but in the United Nations and the whole system of
international institutions.
[HILL]
Ambassador
Ignatieff,
do in this project is
to
know, what
as you
obtain the
examine the
over
look at the main
policy developments and issues
the years.
We are
developments.
So
periods
of
your
career
affairs
or
NATO-related issues:
on
the focus of
when you
our
Interviewers:
long term foreign
trying to
in
our
field
were
over
affected by various
discussions will be
were
directly
on
those
involved in NATО
for example when you were Canada's
the working group that set up the consultative
and defense planning structure for the
*
are
fairly systematic fashion and to learn what
happened and how Canada and the Alliance
representative
We
importance of NATO membership to Canada and
policy interests
a
trying to
dealing with NATO.
how well NATO has served Canada's immediate and
the past 40 years in
are
views of those Canadians who
have been most active over the years in
trying to
we
Hill,
new
North Atlantic Treaty
Pawelek
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Organization and when you
Council
than a decade later.
more
get the real flavour of your
the world
Ambassador
were
and
scene
on
interesting
explain that
One
was
far
working with
and reflections on
So we will
extensive,
is concerned,
NATO
as
also
and if I may
think that
I
Escott Reid
in the negotiations
was
signed
of the North
April
4
on
should
I
intervention.
different stages of
four
Treaty itself, which
Atlantic
to
career.
really
had
I
would also like
Canada's foreign policy.
say so,
As
we
personal views
own
of the other periods of your
[IGNATIEFF)
the North Atlantic
However,
touch on some
very
to
1949;
I
was
then sent to Washington to replace Tommy Stone on the international
committee which was meeting, representative of all the members that
had
signed
Treaty,
the
to
set
the
up
machinery
consultative
provided for under the Treaty and particularly under articles 4 and
2,
and
then
liaison
defense
as
dealing with the
War,
and
Affairs.
I
Korean
liaison in External
then
was
later
Washington
in
both
officer
as
head
keen
when
is sometimes overlooked
signed
we
dispositions,
involved in developing the
there
because
had,
the
but
deployments,
I
was
very
a
should
stage was
where
Crisis,
other
go
to
immediate
into
commitments.
and
the
direct
imbalance
We
of
that
back
the
part
of
any
was
all
sparked
on
when
It
I
was
got
involved
Berlin
Crisis,
I
'48
in
stress
military commitments.
'66,
nobody was extremely
is that
military
all
were
in
the
security
in
Europe,
Soviets had not demobilized the way the Western powers
great enthusiasm
fourth
Treaty
One of the
demobilizing, which was one of the reasons why it seemed
process of
that
the
defense
of
military aspects really related more to the Korean War.
factors that
in
things that went
on,
of
the
the
such
allies
NATO,
course
to
was
go
no
into
and then the
between
the
as
Greek-Turkish
and then of
there
'49
by Korea,
Ambassador to
in things
and
Cuban
crisis
and
'62
and
Missile
all
the
the whole question
of nuclear weapons.
[HILL]
are
We will
look
at those
built in terms of your
own
various periods.
career,
so
These
interviews
they are done in certain
phases. And we have had the pleasure of reading your autobiography,
72
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The Making of
Peacemonger.
a
international
affairs,
anecdotes.
think
I
Not
only was it
I
greatly
but
revealing about
very
enjoyed
many
your
of
it all helps to bring international
affairs
alive.
Part
I
-
Early Years,
[HILL]
If
I
to
might
1939
start
briefly with what
very
part 1, which would be the early years up to 1939,
referred
you
to
in your memoirs
and then finding
a
University of Toronto
studied at Jervis Collegiate and then at the
and then subsequently won a Rhodes scholarship to Oxford.
if you could just
the main
tell
impressions
us
a
made
on
by them,
you
thinking about international peace
your
[IGNATIEFF]
Yes,
ongoing interest
was
in
a
sense
recollections
not
very
rational,
is going on,
and
child of World
the age
I.
That
when
one
was
that.
My
begins to have,
but at least some impressionistic view of what
of the March revolution in 1917,
was
and
my career
on
and then through
the Civil War, which we encountered when the family moved down
to
to the Caucasus
the
-
to
Kislovoosk
whole upheaval in
then.
We
arrested
rescued
were
a
the
brought
and
by
in
the
to get away from the tensions and
-
capital city of
middle
before
of
a
the
revolutionary
it
was
father
was
as
My
War.
Civil
a
lot
of
escaped death.
We were
on
attempt
on
life
Lenin in Moscow,
Russian
aristocracy
the
without trial.
counter
Petrograd,
tribunal.
He
was
student who recognized him as the former Minister of
Education who had brought forth
or
security.
really is the fact that
War
four,
of
as
diplomatic life and
your
in peace and security
at
wonder
think particularly
I
think that the main effect
war
a
first
a
I
I
little bit about those early years and
they affected your later approaches to
I
Canada.
home in
new
your
lived in Montreal and Toronto, worked in the interior of в.C.,
You
my
cal1
experiences of the Russian Civil War,
your
in England,
years at school
could
we
of
were
an
reforms, and
execution list
revolutionary activities
73
-
whole
a
one
way
as
a
which he
narrowly
hostages after
when
put to death in
Father was arrested
as
we
or
lot
of
an
the
another with
hostage, charged with
could
not
have
been
000253
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
in,
active
very
trouble,
from
but
-
University,
Moscow
tribunal.
time
the
at
he
because
say he
I
as
bed,
in
was
sick
a
rescued by
was
recognizing him he
He said that if father
was
with
man
was
heart
student
a
of
member
a
the
shot he would raise hell with
the teachers and the students in the town where this tribunal was
sitting,
a
and
as
Bolsheviks
the
were
relying
then at that time
good many of the students and teachers, that sort of thing in the
him go.
then
We
get through with the help of
to
able
were
White Russian movement to the
So my very first recollection
worse,
was
breakup
many
of
saw
Japan.
World
of
end
the
at
British war ship.
a
of civil war, of death.
the end of,
not
defeat in
of
War
war,
which of
in Germany and
II
to
mutiny.
the
experience with
water
of bread;
This
to
breakdown
in society.
electricity
war
a
those
England
had
a
and
found myself
time
in
were
as
This
was
impressionable
refugees.
I
years.
position
father
tried farming.
of
the
It was
of
as
Bolsheviks;
a
financial
which I had
employment
in
crust
of war.
74
as
course we
schooling
there
that most
children
of
Bolshie,
although
my
and
we
tried
disaster,
four, found
Canada.
of
Then
started my
was
chance
result
a
then
all between the years of four
father
better
and
by terrible bloodshed and
would regard anybody from Russia
a
a
first
which in the west had been celebrated
course
little my elder brothers,
as
army
running,
lucky to get
were
in society
in the equivocal
persecuted by
my
was
Trains stopped
In Russia it was celebrated
and
that
wasn't available
gas
or
breakdown
of
sort
breakdown of society.
seven
and
Tzarism
and scarcer until you
the end of
victory.
the
;
was
that
Then that
Imperial
mutiny in the
the
was
of
scarcer
that
It
breakdown
safe,
wasn't
food became
a
was
and
defeats in which whole
to the Soviet army led to terrible
led
course
Austria
armies were surrounded and defeated and taken prisoner.
that
the
and the failure to provide for munitions and
losses
led gradually to
And
only of war but
Russia, what isn't perhaps generally realized,
In
supplies
saw
society as a result
a
terrible
the
that I
was
was
the
and were
coast of the Black Sea,
sea
taken off the beaches of Novorossijsk by
what
they let
democratic ranks rather than the Bolshevik ranks,
social
a
on
One
farming
and little
-
by
that they had
came
over
as
a
000254
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Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
another
harvester,
came
over
as
which
labourers,
Crows
the
bringing
was
Nest
sent to
engineer
an
when
15
was
brought in on
labour
in
came
we
a
there
an
as
axeman,
well
me
to
get
university
to
win
and
certain
a
by the bohunk
enabled
scholarships,
several
on
Trail
with the
intellectual; this experience and other jobs,
as an
but
actually
did get
I
so
Canada
intellectuals,
not
railroad construction crew,
a
to
one
colonization
CPR
amount of initiation in Canadian life as it was lived
as
another
and
joining the Crows Nest Line
Pass,
worked
I
as
I
and since I was
I was
Smelter.
over
mining engineer.
a
with my mother,
scheme
came
one
which
culminated with the Rhodes Scholarship in 1930 for Ontario, which
got me to Oxford.
were
living,
were
in
in order
to
boarding
little
could in hotels,
up
one
brought
take
was
the financial burden off my parents,
in
farms
father who had,
Revolution,
become
emigrés and
the
He
He
felt
was
that
to
But,
fact
a
quite upset
were
he
In fact,
years.
I
looking after the
Cross,
the Red
that
was
get
to
away
good for
not
that
accepted
I
sort of
that
should be going back to Europe.
I
lucky
very
strange way
this
so
that
to be
returning so
much
an
was
plunged
was
me
of
from
sort
distress
honour
into the
and
to
our
so
on,
replay of the
I
was in
working on a Ph.D. in Eastern Europe in Bulgaria when the war
I
was
my grandfather's
crisis in 1877/78
working
historical material relating to
some
on
activities when he
and
the origins of the
here
same
sort
when
I
was
at
Oxford,
I
was
of
in
a
way,
America.
Mike
Counsellor at Canada House and he brought
a
Pearson
looking back
enlarging and
Eastern crisis
North
met
75
dealing with the Eastern
myself,
found
I
engulfing the whole of Europe and
time
Scholarships and
threat, the German threat against Eastern Europe.
broke out.
on
But it did lead
when he recovered his health after the
President of
The thought it
although in
German
Rhodes
the
the continent which had brought
family.
thing.
refugees and setting up clinics and
we
background.
soon
for
get whatever jobs I
to
and that sort of
remember my
thing.
trying
and
here
to Europe in the immediate pre-war
me
except very few
I
entering the competition
to
that these
was
way or another in financial straits.
house
on
Everybody in Canada,
Years.
the Depression
fortunates,
a
think the significance of that
I
I
remember the
who
was
then
number of the Canadian
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Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
together,
students
which
students
on
We were very
during this period of 1939, just after the Munich crisis.
divided
think
the
majority
out
of
that
stay
should
that
try
and
to
late
was
something
do
and
found
I
it seemed to me,
and
France
to
chance
of
together
work
League
the
of
a
I
in
the
perhaps
not
collective
the
This
of Nations.
League
the
myself
was
resurrect
to
before the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.
was,
provisions
wars,
Canada
that
felt
at that late stage it
even
security provisions of
may say
Canadian students
of
European
minority arguing
too
discussion
a
Canadian
the
among
in
Just what should Canada do?
scholarships in Britain.
I
participating
remember
I
interesting,
very
was
and
discussion I
said that there
getting the Soviet Union, Britain
security
under
the
collective
to
stop
Czechoslovakia
Covenant
consumed by the Germans, but if we did not do that, there
being
every
was
likelihood that Germany would just move forward into Eastern Europe
East
as
they had done before.
And
bigger threat in the end and Canada would
[HILL]
Just
as
a
matter
of
curiosity,
Bulgaria and Romania pro-German
independent,
I
prejudices
had
to
have
Yugoslavia
sovereign?
I
discovered,
course,
of
Boris,
of the then King of Bulgaria,
Bulgarians
fundamentally
were
have taken whatever side
so,
was
more
that
the
a
was
German,
the
pro-Russian
Soviets would
have
The
and
were
Hungarians,
the Yugoslavs,
you're quite right,
I
say and,
I
never
to Eastern
completed,
popular opinion
And that's what Tito
But to return to the effects of
on.
I
taken,
would
belonged to the Austro-Hungarian empire;
definitely against the Germans.
build
and
because they had
but with
of
was
who
very unwilling victims of the German occupation.
that
of
great deal to do with the German orientation of the Bulgaria
a
less
in.
come
the alignment
wasn't
at that time?
much
a
believe.
What
[IGNATIEFF]
faced with
be
would
we
European politics
going
in my
was
back to
was
able to
Europe,
as
Ph.D. project, which
warned
by British Intelligence
would be among those candidates for
early internment because
the
German
because
penetration
I
was
into
the
Bulgarian
government
and
military circles.-My grandfather had signed the Treaty which gave
76
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Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
Bulgaria
independence
its
streets
Sofia
in
regarded
Part II
England,
-
[IGNATIEFF]
War I,
after
named
so
of the main
one
grandfather and he is
my
England at
got back to
I
outbreak of World
the
decided to go to Oxford to join up.
regiment which
system,
curious
still
returned, but
never
Russia,
1939-43
So,
and
local
I
with
war
of their patron saints.
one
as
is
result of the
a
hardly inconspicuous.
I was
the
as
was
the
"Oxford
regimental
I
joined
Bucks".
and
up with
It
headquarters
was
a
you
went
to
the
Oxford and Bucks and
were
met
by a recruiting sergeant and doctor
and
preliminaries of
the
over.
The
here".
I
regimental
said:
in Murmansk
joining
major
sergeant
Armed
the
said:
"It comes from Russia".
in the First World War".
with mills bombs.
and
Forces
"Oh," he
said:
He
mills bombs up
We threw the
a
queer name
said:
"I
stream and
was
to fish
used
"We
the
quickly
were
"You got
at
the fish
everything
you had".
Well,
that was
my
introduction into the Armed Forces but then you were brought before
up
came
a
took
Board which
Armed
Forces
there
was
a
Balliol and
were
you
to
were
General
they
decide your
to
was
and
serve
that
And,
in.
which
there
branch
was
looked through my university record
wondering which service
suggested
to
as
might
I
I
the
you
fitted
for.
cavalry.
I
best
was
into
go
an
you have all these languages,
you're a natural
an
So they wrote out that
I
was
see,
extraordinary place,
an
notorious tourist spot.
Bedford.
At the
intelligence,
MI5
That
intelligence
for the
to be made a cadet,
outbreak
and
MI6
Woburn Abbey
of war,
and
so
on,
in
-
a
"Look,
training
which is quite historic and
was
and
not
officer in the Intelligence Corps and that was that and I
sent to
of
Admiral,
was
but the head of Balliol said:
as
the
Somebody
particularly keen horseman
course."
of
Force Group Captain and the head of
Air
an
fate
seat
was
now
a
of the Duke
addition to the regular
with the War
Office,
sir
Campbell Stuart, who was incidentially a Canadian, was asked by the
Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, to set up a headquarters at Woburn
Abbey which would combine
spying
in
one
form
or
economic
another
and
against
77
political
the
warfare
Germans,
with
in neutral
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countries.
I
interruption
deal with the
to
and the
supplies
of
Germany from Russia
to
Balkans.
this
But,
Before the
in 1940.
was
Bulgaria,
from
assigned to that part of the operation which had
was
in 1939,
there
had come back
I
for admission to External
exams
were
Affairs and Mike Pearson urged
war when
to write them in London.
me
written and forgotten all about it and apparently I
had
I
top of the
was
list of eligible candidates for the Third Secretary competition of
had written
who
those
in London.
Under-Secretary, had sent
of
who
the things
short staffed with all
very
then
was
message to Vincent Massey who was Head
a
Mission in London begging for reinforcements,
the
were
Skelton,
Doctor
because they
that had to be done
with the Canadian Armed Forces coming over, the agreements that had
to be negotiated, and dealing with the evacuation of Canadian
and children from the
war
being
sent
to Canada.
House
were
an
zone
and
problems.
"Well,
said:
job.
That was my first
there
that
there
said
in
The staff of Canada
Vincent Massey,
was
to
reply
to
deal with all
appeal
this
George Ignatieff passed the
and
exam
asked.
that
that
would
be
way
one
menagerie
strange
appreciations,
intelligence
leaflets
well
as
that
and
of the
thrown
But
at
my reply to
you
can
get
that
was
done.
if
so
were
and
Abbey,
were
the
where
he
could
So I was
get
into
we
were
in
doing
preparing propaganda
also
Germans
war
about
making
peace,
as
conducting intelligence activities in Switzerland and in
Portugal.
that
Woburn
at
I
these
instead of being
active service with the Canadian Armed Forces,
the
Léon
understand
we
England, why don't you get him".
thought
there
for help,
that he is somewhere in
I
children,
mean
I
Charles Ritchie and
Hume Wrong,
was
all
was
Skelton
So
and children out
women
extraordinary group of people:
Mike Pearson,
Mayrand,
Getting
zones.
and a whole lot of English people,
of the
was
war
women
me
out
I
Mr.
Pearson,
and
transfer
who
me
I
approached
me,
was,
willing
to
come,
am
arrived at Canada House
just at the time
collapse of the Western Allies in Europe, just after Dunkirk
and then without
any
this whole business
training
or
of how to
Europe back to Canada,
women
and
preparation
I
pitched right into
get these Canadian refugees
children.
78
from
And then the immediate
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
threat
invasion
of
Canadians,
Britain
of
non-combatants
made
England
of
out
question
the
acute.
more
getting
of
So
I
was
shoved right into this job alone,
to
people onto the troop ships that
were
going westward to bring
was
quite
Division
First
and
over
that
this and put these
organize
initiation
an
the
into
diplomacy.
Particularly as the bombing started during the days as
well
nights,
as the
addition
I
and became rather
given
was
job
the
complicated operation.
a
dealing
of
Canada
saddled
with
arrested under the Alien Legislation.
they had
people
of
The Home Office and the War
Office had just arrested people whether they were refugees
they were declared to
were
shipped
out
be
to
torpedoed on the way,
Canada
Australia.
and
Some
Italy.
a
we
commission to
us
inquire into them.
Baum,
the
interned
lists of names.
famous
as
an
refuge
taken
in
did
We
theologian,
"enemy alien".
and
He
he
me
again the
victims
of
military
it gave me,
But
take
in
over
to give way and
one
of
was
was
way
just shipped
another:
or
Britain period,
it was
ring
a
agreed that
bell
if
within sight of
we
saw
we
flag
Canada House,
the bell and everybody would
on
with
out
had
other
Blitz,
gave
increasingly
are
the
breaks out the
war
everything else has
Then there
on
the roof
the
we
air
never
the
Air
and watching.
raids
took place
got any work
would take turns to be
the
and
turns, not
During the
so
origin
We all had to take
being
we took shelter,
people
these
the Blitz
the
day,
C.V.'s,
was
only in duties during
If
from
as
But that took some time
When
justice.
in England and air raid precautions.
during the days.
among
Jewish
with their priorities and
of
people
They had simply
that together with the
that includes
Battle
were
people like Gregory
was
the civilians
impression that
war,
well
have their
not
turned out that
It
people; lots of people were just refugees.
to sort out.
as
did the British.
nor
Catholic
England
not;
months to discover this and to set up
It took
did not have any papers,
given
them
of
but we got this unsorted collection of
which included all kinds of refugees from Nazism
Fascism in
or
in the event of invasion and they
threat
a
of
because the British
collection
unsorted
an
internment
with
prisoners of war and that was quite a handful,
In
on
roof
and
which
was
the
Ministry,
done,
hoisted for danger.
We would ring
just fly down to the
shelter in CMHQ
79
000259
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
which
and
door.
next
was
encoding
addition to that
In
with
along
of
messages
coming in.
Some
of them
were
military
operations
and
others
military had strange ideas.
I
sleep
available
Canada
at
door in the CMHQ
and this was
of pillows,
"Instead
Well
aspects
then,
of our
mission
succumbed
a
a
the bombing.
was
actually
breakdown and the
a
I
did
at
This
directions.
who
who
Massey and briefing the Prime
provide
a
In
in charge of
sort of
I was
found
I
was
happened while Mr. King
Mr.
Somebody
myself
"pinch-
not
only
Minister but also
trying to do all these jobs
photographer at the first meeting
That
was
providential
London because Canada was
(before the
between Mr.
He
was
the main
we
and
the
USSR
on
because
this
Canadian
job
Military
full-time and
had to look after Mr. King
made
Freeman
of the
City
of
ally undefeated and with troops
available to support the
USA
from
to take
But even then,
various capacities.
supplies
borrowed
was
Campbell Moodie,
relieved of it.
in his
and
the place,
of
satisfy Mr. Massey that I really could not be in three places
once.
was
could take it, but
I
these
King and Mr. Churchill.
Headquarters,
I
man
and most junior
being the public relations liaison.
between Mr.
so
all
remember failing to
remember
I
had the man who was looking after the coding
We
arrived and as the youngest
I
political
and
public relations had
janitor
the
public relations had a breakdown.
on
it said:
But
We had several people break
I was young,
our
attendant
next
cases".
of
in charge
was
encoding, he had
in
or
dealing with
of the things that
One
and
hitting"
telegram
a
diplomatic
the
course
well.
who
who
committed suicide.
had to
conference attended by Mr. King in 1940, and
result of
person,
I
the
getting very annoyed
once
to
amendment
down under the strain of war.
had
again
duties,
these
for
pillows and pillow
of
as
war
official
we
there
but
had previously deciphered.
I
read
the British
as
an
had
we
well was the first
the
decipher an immediate top secret telegram for
operations that
naval
all
remember being woken up.
bunker, and I remember
at being woken up to
operations,
be
to
House
of
top secret dealings with
not,
were
coding
do the
staff
English
couple
a
had to
I
came
war
effort based in Britain
into the war).
The
meetings
King and Mr. Churchill were extremely interesting, and
80
000260
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
very
important
in the
the
supply
aircraft
of
priorities
that the
sense
and
which
tanks
that time were
at
Canada
top
given
was
priority to do and of course Lord Beaverbrook was another Canadian,
who
Howe
in charge of the production
put
was
turning
in charge of
was
and- tanks
Canada,
in
end
American help.
with
and
c.D.
and producing aircraft
the heat
on
in Britain
"Chubby"
Power,
the
Minister of Defence for Air,
was
in charge of the Commonwealth Air
Training
The
other
Plan
American help
the
point
easier.
possible
as
of
liaison.
It
of the
war
was
was
regarded
our
that
much
to
get
at
that time as
as
things
made
much
special relationship in
the European
time when
that
defeated and indeed there
the headquarters
was
beginning of
at
thing
Ogdensburg
After
happened
all
Canada
and
And that was the
defence.
were
Canada.
in
serious discussion
allies
to whether
as
effort would be moved from London to
Ottawa, including the question of possibly moving the Bank and
reserves
and
[HILL]
I
Ogdensburg
thing.
It
from the
that sort of thing.
think it was John Holmes who made the
-
that
us
witnessed
strictly North American
see
Canada
and
was
the situation where
kind
every
it was out
of
boat
of
action,
and
defence
day Canadians would
The British Army had been,
by
it's
peculiar situation which
in 1940, which present
There
defeated.
but
to
When I say this sometimes I find it
had been rescued
Dunkirk,
a
unless you go back to this
believe myself.
had been
difficult
is
It
hardly believe.
to
really
not
was
point about
beginning.
relationships
of
it
same
really a device to get the United States involved,
was
[IGNATIEFF)
some
the
the
even
all
that
the allies
remnants of it
and volunteer
into
difficult
device at
situation
the
Canadian First Division arrived with Andy McNaughton.
And Andy
McNaughton was greeted literally as a saviour and the Canadian
First
Division
Britain.
Canadian
was
on
duty
Canadian airmen
Navy
was
fighting
Britain supplied with food
to
were
the
as
prevent
the
invasion,
to
defend
in the Battle of Britain, and the
Battle of
well
81
as
the
munitions
Atlantic, keeping
of war.
000261
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
[HILL}
Canadian Army
The
in Britain at that time
[IGNATIEFF]
course
They
very adequate.
not
rifles,
Ross
we
But
thinking in terms of
were
in.
of
rest of
it
So
It took the character of
funny,
make it sound
but it
people like
not.
was
well
period to be
Charles Ritchie to
Charles has in
his memoirs you know, about his sleeping somewhere else when
hit the place that he
supposed
was
morning
the ruins.
remember going with him to
I
the ways in which
one
of
by
going
to
different
the
crux
of
it
kept alive,
places
was
Italy,
kept dodging
we
when
unless the United
at
that
this
site,
bombs
the
could
we
was
sleep.
sometimes at home.
moment
was
the
only
in spite of all of his brave words,
way in which
see any
see this
night
Canada
that
undefeated ally and Churchill,
could not
at
bomb
suit hanging above
one
sometimes in Canada House,
Sometimes in bunkers,
But
find nothing but
we
a
sleeping in and he came
to be
back the next
to
first
as
and took snatches
joke that
The
kind of
some
incredible
an
was
day and you worked all night,
You worked all
sleep.
it.
as
Home
immediate
an
everybody was trained in
and
shipped
the
arm
of
were
and we
could to
we
defence and we all had to do air raid precautions
aid and all the
them
of
some
Ross rifles
There were
we
that time,
at
and
shipped Ross rifles all
Guard in Britain.
invasion
only ones,
the
that had any arms
ones
quantity.
in any
were
only
the
were
we
could prevail
States came
in.
over
the Nazis and
reckoning
He was not
on
invading the Soviet Union, although interestingly enough,
Churchill anticipated that possibility. It was that very immediate
Hitler
reaction on the part of Churchill, when Germany attacked the Soviet
Union,
allies.
who had absolutely
And, indeed
Canada House
not
was
we
in
saying
that
of the things that affected
one
that
hesitation
no
were
our
we
were
work at
engaged through Ambassador Mayski in
only supplying Britain, but Canada began to supply food and
various
munitions
to
the
among the escorts of the munition
northern route to Murmansk.
used
to do
with Mr.
came
back,
because
Massey
it
was
attacked by German Stukas
Union,
Soviet
and
Canadian
ships
were
supply and food which went up the
I
remember
was
greet
one
our
of the things that we
heroes when they
naval
the way they
a
dickens
of
as
well as
submarines.
82
a
run,
But
were
anyway the
000262
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
crux
strategy at that time was that
of the
with the help of Canada,
the United States would somehow be brought into the
brought into the war effort.
be
were the
was
munitions,
the
production
of
course
and
the
British survival,
in the
really engaged
became
in
regarded
this
his
as
whole
and
the
and
tanks,
undertaking
of
the
done also with American
1940,
in
business
of
that
first
we
Canada/U.S.
the
in
Ogdensburg.
And Mr.
important
achievement.
There
defence,
most
there
course,
it was through that threat
effort,
war
the
relationship in
special
was
But,
at least
or
provision of supplies to
tremendous
help and some American volunteers.
of
success
aircraft,
of
Commonwealth Air Training Plan which
to
a
loans of the destroyers and the
to help
Canada
It
war
King
was
no
doubt in his mind, and in Churchill's mind. The two characters were
very
I
unlike.
have
King was
Mr.
met.
ever
remember when
I
Prestwick, he got out of
ground,
the parade
around
of the most
one
greeted him
I
Liberator bomber,
a
inspecting the troops
he
on,
which
was
appreciated.
end
of
the
war,
line, but that is another
in
those
they booed him;
was
were
early meetings about use
the
When he went
and
and he became
introduce conscription
short
troops
of
in
the
McNaughton and Mackenzie King had
reorganized.
being under British command.
over
in
had
told
been
the
that
primary duty would be to stand on guard in Britain
while the British Army
or
story.
we
to
early meetings with Churchill,
Canadian Army's
in those
when
to do.
the postal service was
increasingly unpopular when he refused
towards the
arrival
on
much more interested in such
was
But
characters
backside foremost onto
and did not quite know what
essentials as how they were fed and what
so
un-martial
question
of
anticipated by McNaughton.
He
discussion
no
was
the Canadian Army in Europe
developed
The trouble that later
reinforcements
of
There
and
conscription
had
had been in the First World
been
War
and
had noted that Canadians had been thrust by British commanders into
situations
such
casualties
were
not
commit
as
Vimy
use
and to
of
Canadian
the
Norway.
the
Somme
likely to be highest,
troops
personally reconnoitred.
any
and
He
in
any
was
so
on,
and he vowed
situation
He
see
where
the
that he would
which
went to Dunkirk to
Canadian forces going in.
He
and
he
had
not
if there were
also went to Calais
also prepared to go to Russia before there
83
000263
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
would be any commitment of Canadian Forces,
for
while.
a
because
But,
an
developed,
argument
had
Forces
Armed
Canadian
the
of which there was talk
not
and
it
been
in
largely
was
while
action
British Forces were in action in the Middle East, that increasingly
McNaughton lost out in my opinion.
[HILL]
did
also
He
want
not
if
piecemeal,
be used
to
them
I
understand well.
concentrate
not want
them down in
happening,
and
go
to
wanted
he
generals.
No,
nationalist,
and it
he
because
inspect them and
for
himself
what
was
he
would
have
him
McNaughton
was
at that
appointed by Mr. King in
was
"That
said
great
a
time that
to
1946
Italy and
to
relationship
unprecedented
an
was
see
that kind of background,
of
He did
sent
think
I
and
view
Italy, and when they were
Montgomery
General
arrested".
was
McNaughton's
in
liberation of Europe in the main attack.
the
on
command
Canadian
under
remain
to
piecemeal, they had
He did not want them to be used
[IGNATIEFF]
I
between
national,
think
I
got to know him and it
that he asked for
represent Canada,
when
me
first of
all, in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and then at the
United Nations
the
on
diplomatic advisor.
got to know
Massey.
one
We
There
not
of
me and
I
very
General,
the
looking character.
signs
were
and he asked
In
I
1944,
close
friends;
might say,
he
moved to Washington,
ways,
but
I
was
was
we
had
come
and
see
Mr.
were
all
a
formidable
very
that
rather
I
shown
had
from Ottawa to replace
D.C. to take
John Holmes in Post Hostilities Planning.
some
we
partly by the fact
exhaustion, three people were sent
was
be his
to
me
various other candidates but
another during the war, he used to
were
frightened of
Security Council,
I
over
was
the work with
sorry
to
go
in
thoroughly exhausted by this whole business
of not being able to get any
rest
at
night and working during the
day, day after day.
[HILL]
Well,
it
was
a
sort
of
theory that grew up
that the Blitz had all been great fun,
at
but
in
afterwards,
fact when
you
look
it it had been pretty devastating
84
000264
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
[IGNATIEFF]
Sunday when
I
It
was
was
on
both climbed
we
devastating,
duty
and Pearson
came
there
no
roof,
the
on
mentioned that
I
as
was
one
scene
into Canada House and
electricity
the
water,
was
broken off, the mains had been broken and the Treasury building
was
on
fire.
files
The
White Hall.
stand of this kind of thing".
giving in,
you
As
he
say,
I
just keep escalating aerial warfare,
society.
but it breaks down
it does not break morale
military
The
reckon that
way to intimidate the other side into giving in.
giving
of
you got
up,
wanted to get
those
at
into account is that
civilized
all
so
you
numbed, you
bastards.
did not want to
isn't
What
comes
to
end
an
bombardment of course, this is escalated to
We
well within the margin of
were
just
occurred to
down
of
essential
same
Dresden and
Tokyo.
Part III
Ottawa
-
[HILL]
services.
thing about
writing the
wonder if
I
It
the
New
we
now
can
go
on
to
at that time and partly in New York,
wonder
if you could say
a
time and also what part the
[IGNATIEFF]
King.
He started
because
are
on
the
that
Britain
few
UN
an
and
a
under nuclear
unacceptable degree.
even
coming
of
the
out,
then, it
the break-
people
are
bombing of Berlin,
city take?
the next part,
which is Part
You were partly in Ottawa
mainly working on
UN
affairs.
things about what you did in
played in Canadian
foreign
that
policy.
again one goes back to the preoccupation of
Here
What
You
give up.
1944-mid-1950s
York,
can
is
III, that is from 1944 to the mid-1950s.
I
did not think
city stand of
a
effects
Just how much
and
the
sufficiently taken
acceptability but
just how much can
us,
You
this is
gradually reduce society to a standstill,
gradually
life
talking about
not
was
civilization
a
can
It crossed our minds that if
anything of that sort.
or
being blown about
were
just how much
"Well,
said
Pearson
Treasury
the
of
circumstances which brings
simple proposition.
was
at war,
but Mr.
85
Canada
into
war?
We found ourselves at
King insisted
on
Mr.
war
waiting for
000265
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
a
and having the House of
week
declaration of
to
end,
an
But
war.
and discussions
of
security,
Mr.
preventing
any kind
of
system
the
as
began
King
Lord
actually
sent
questionnaire
Government,
asking
at war".
was
such
thing
a
an
as
King,
Empire,
Meighen who had
automatically
be
at
following World
remember
and I
I
was
proposals
Cranbourne
describe in my
book,
given the
how
instance
we
task to
could not
National Defence believed that it
of
the
be at
were
one
Crown who took their
peace
British
be at
war
of
come
was
was
That
unconceivable
continuity and
to Lord Cranbourne,
I
reply.
Canada's relations
this to
it
incident
Carnak
the point of departure
an
to
answer
National
these
Defence.
I
agreement because
that
one
officers
to
the
should be at peace and
some
brought
answer
And I
that he
was
in the
be
yes,
pointed out that Mr.
looking for
Well we
up
should
careful to hold up the declaration,
United Nations Security Council.
on
the
to any
in terms of collective security through the
no
and
not
Canada would not
inconceivable
if Britain is at war.
been very
was
King had
write
with
They argued that
tradition.
to break that
there
Canadian commitments
in Canada while other officers with regiments which
Canada is at war,
King had
as
commission and oath to the Crown could
intertwined, would be at war.
should
such
imperial defense
an
that
sort of
conjunction
in
Mr.
decided
this was
So
I.
War
talk of
and certainly
in the
system
defense
although he spoke very eloquently
Mr.
war
saying
considering whether there
imperial
to
back
goes
Canadian
the
to
would Canada consider itself
war
Bennett had not approved of
the British
Secretary,
but in effect
system.
about
with
happening
ever
Mr.
to
had been
to the imperial defense system,
from
Commonwealth
of.
Mr. R.B.
collective
a
the
Churchill dreamed
There
coming
And the other thing was that the
in the context of
And this
be
could
is at
Britain
was
pre-occupied
much
whole lot of questions
a
the event that
"In
very
was
separate
a
or
the question of
on
Cranbourne,
through
end,
an
automatic commitment
British,
a
to
came
war
certainly in his lifetime.
again,
decide to make
Commons
especially
some
solution
new
institution of the
never
did give any reply
think it could be found in the archives that
There
was
a
very definite
reply as far
in defence to the USA was concerned.
We
as
worked
follow-up Mr. King's.exchange with President Roosevelt
86
000266
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
at
Ogdensburg.
would
the
accepted.
of course revised to
It was
and Norman Robertson, but
Defence.
on
word
The
America, but it would
not be
a
treaty, it was
addressed
that the P.J.B.D.
in Canada.
That
prejudices
-
wind them up
because
was
he
was
as
quickly
a
of his day.
possible.
as
his opposite
a
politician,
P.J.B.D., based
the
to
London.
that
series
Holmes
us
of
is why it
That
John
keeping
much
power circuit,
would
sent
to
up
to
smoothly because
very
realized
that
issue.
But anyway the framework
papers
that
was
to
came
agreed soon after
go
to
London.
but
and to
U.K.
some
the
Official Secretary and at the
point
same
then
I
was
we
mainly through
came back in 1944
I
Office
were
big
the
extent France,
about
And John Holmes
on.
contact,
of
time
so
of
us,
Foreign
The
kind
what
accepted,
was
be
these
quite
is, U.S.,
London
think he wanted to
closely informed of the thinking in
more
that
and the first
long as he had Fiorello La
As
the preparations for the United Nations and
was
defence of North
wanted to wind
He
Ogdensburg,
on
side or
he
and
on
one
Canadian national
I
number, things went
sensitivities Canada had
that
was
very far from NORAD.
McNaughton's
of
Mel Hurtig
as
was
turned
a
closing down of US bases
the
was
war-time commitments with the USA.
the
for the
continuing consultation on defence problems,
It was a
of
prepared
idea
The
joint staffs of
and consider plans
he
We
in
up a Permanent Joint
permanent.
was
the other would meet
Guardia
co-operation
extent by Hume Wrong
some
proposed setting
we
without commitment to governments, the
area
of
nature
this in the Post Hostilities Planning Committee, which was
on
Board
be
between the United States and Canada?
peacetime
paper
What
and
I
was
made
also made Secretary
of the Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee and the Secretary of the
Tripartite
Nuclear
arrangements
of
and
1943, whereby
participate
directly, though,
the
the
in
usual
as
provide the materials,
help incidentally of
evacuated
to
actual bomb
Canada,
project
Canada
the
on
Quebec
Conference
to supply
the uranium
the
agreed
the nuclear reactions
(not
decision-making concerning the bomb).
in his
we
cautious way,
would continue
British and
and those
or
under
research
involved in
However, Mr. King,
would
Agreement,
who
were
the
not
the Manhattan project
87
agreed
that
we
the research with
French, who had been
taking part in
or
in Montreal
the
were
000267
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
in
then
Chalk
Secretary
of
[HILL]
That
that,
[IGNATIEFF]
dropping
it
as
bomb
Nagasaki
on
and
I
was
well...
it?
was
partly because of
was
project.
reactor
our
when you were in Ottawa,
was
the
on
tripartite arrangement
a
Yes,
of
working
River
that
that after the
Hiroshima,
Mackenzie King
joined Attlee, the Prime Minister then who succeeded Churchill, and
Truman,
making
in
governments who had worked
energy
atomic
developing safeguards
to
object
this bomb project,
on
peaceful
for
the
that
declaration
the
only
purposes
ways
find
to
develop
to
was
three
of
And, this was a declaration
this.
ensure
and
the
of
which was made by the three governments and the very first decision
at
Energy Commission to work
Atomic
think
is that
stress
to
Committee
Planning
Committee
Uranium
on
thing about the
It
was
what did we
know.
Secretary
I
am
the
or
emphasize this,
C.
sure
D.
the
took
level,
place,
a
Dr.
except
C.
I
technologically
I
Post-
Tripartite
an
be
tremendously
so
of us knew
President
of
planning which
the
that
that
am sure
I
Mackenzie,
J.
just
have been asked
great deal of relevance to the
would
atomic bomb.
secret and none
planned without knowledge
we
of
knew, and
Howe
at
That had
point
the
of
the
of
preparation
King knew, but it was absolutely top
N.R.C.
The
Secretary
as
Mr.
official
UN
Secretary of the Advisory
was
and
the
up
set
to
Supplies for Canada to the USA, I did not know
would
I
I
was
project.
this
on
well
as
Committee
existence
secret,
so
although
Energy,
Atomic
on
Hostilities
a
after San Francisco,
United Nations,
the
whole
by
affected
world
this
new
method of warfare.
Actually, that is
[HILL]
strongly in the
about that
about
The
period
the atomic
did not know what
[IGNATIEFF]
deliberate
of
Peace.
and the fact that some
programme.
was
Well,
on
Shaping
point which
a
There
Holmes makes
is
a
very
whole section
people simply did not know
Most of the people in Ottawa simply
happening
this was,
the-part
John
of Mr.
in the US.
I
think,
King.
88
looking back
Mr.
Churchill
on
it, quite
insisted
on
000268
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
being
a
never
quite
partner of Roosevelt in all strategic decisions.
satisfaction,
his
to
correspondence
has
one
realizes that he could
issues.
have enough
never
was
all
the
Roosevelt,
one
from
know
and
influence
strategic
on
Quebec that Britain would be consulted
at
before the bomb was used.
you
Churchill
between
And he insisted
but
It
Whether that agreement
the two of them out of the presence of Mr.
did not know that they made
decision,
made between
was
do not know,
I
Quebec
and
the
proceedings in Quebec were not committed to paper.
The
there.
That
that I
saw
I
in
not
was
I
and
what
all that.
and
purpose
But
do not think wanted to be consulted,
King,
Howe
told both of the tests at Los Alamos and when
dropped,
but I
I
was
Although,
supply of uranium,
the
fact
did
I
as
know
say,
I
what
was
think C.D.
I
the bomb
absolutely in the dark about the bomb,
know anything about it at all.
with
whole
only papers
the
that Mr.
was
not
was
had to do with the supply of uranium and how it would
partitioned
be
1943;
was
a
just
and Mr. King
King,
did not
I
I was concerned
uranium
being
was
supplied and also the safeguards which were developed for it.
I
understood
the
situation,
it
was
for
radiation hazards and all the rest of it.
York,
New
present
was
were
we
in
were
atomic
about
do
Baruch:
to
know'
what
you
are
sharing it
"Well we have been
concerned.
much.
same thing
very
I
if
Canadians
do not know
with
other
the
proceeding
a
have
I
the
was
three
members
thing.
a
the
remember saying
as
'need
far
as
not needed to know
Why don't
you
apply
the
to
know.
If
bomb, why do you need to know.
We
damn
make
of
the basis of
on
apparently
the question is asked, why do
you want to know how to
are
would
this has been interpreted pretty narrowly
and
Plan
Baruch
Baruch raised it,
Mr.
conversations),
the
And when we
by the
course
commission and particularly the Soviet Union.
to Mr.
is
parties to certain shared knowledge about the
governments who
bomb
confronted of
first question that arose,
and the very
I
that
first Atomic Energy
hazards, and was not related to military uses.
came to
(and
The
safety,
As
principally to the handling of uranium for purposes of
Act related
health
health
was
you
need
gathered here to stop making bombs, to abolish the arsenals and
so
on".
a
scientific
But this was the approach that was
committee
set
up
89
of
adopted,
scientists
and there
who
was
exchanged
000269
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information, that was necessary really to explain and to understand
I only learnt
the Baruch Plan.
later that
Americans only had
the
about five bombs in their arsenal and could have easily disposed
them instead of the 25,000 they have to dispose of now.
of
But,
the important development that I
think relates to that UN Atomic
Energy Commission was that
whole,
King
and
C.D.
Howe
Secretary
of
State
as
Mr.
Laurent
came
in,
anyway,
they
all
Plan
relations
well
so
with the
United
prescience than myself,
put
and
amendments that
in
and
then
Mr.
1947,
I
think,
not
in
way
any
Strangely
St.
Baruch
strain
our
with
more
enough,
Reid felt that the Baruch Plan was
Escott
added himself,
Baruch
stil1
was
of additions
namely that
breach
any
just
the agreement would not be subject to the veto which had
of
been
agreed
Yalta
at
And,
co-operation.
we
control
we
outlaw
atomic
insisting
row,
a
which
energy
other
the
these
were
peaceful
that
way,
then
decide
purposes,
the
Americans
should
we
that
acceptable
up this
set
I
not
even
St.
Laurent
to
try
Bevin, after
I
finished explaining that the dual
uranium
purposes,
reactions
said:
if
"What
electricity
for
be
in
you were
to
England,
day:
he
were
monopoly
had
"Look here,
of
to
Ernie
military
Bevin,
and
Ernie
of
reactors
for
peaceful
use
and
by Mr.
asked
was
and inspection of all stages
prevent diversion to military
would have happened
government of the
so
could
this
and you had to have control
of the process
he
explain
and
to
and this proposal was
British.
to the
how
all the nuclear activities
of
in all countries that had nuclear capability,
all
was
Baruch,
up to
and
first
weapons
for
He
insisting on their proposal which
international agencies with control
in
characteristic
was
insisted that we stand
He
that the Soviets
saw
that
was
the basic agreements for post-war
had quite
missionary in spirit.
when he
of
one
as
both in his good aspects and his bad aspects.
of Escott,
a
States.
year,
view that
should support the
we
should
King
Mr.
good faith, particularly the kind
not
forward
which
view that
we
time
Prime Minister
as
that
supported the
I
that
at
forgotten
the
had
and
-
I've
in principle,
on the
if,
come
when
along
this here
use,
Faraday discovered
and
source
said
to
the
of energy is
dangerous it's got to be put under international control.
Where
do you think that electrification in the homes of Britain would be,
90
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�Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
where
Britain
would
in Britain would still
classes
inspector."
-
but
The ordinary
stand?
And he said:
they went
of
examination
be waiting
all
options
just the Baruch Plan;
international
some
principle
on
get up and say that
we
the
for
working
the
buy this at all".
"I do not
along in the vote
Escott Reid urged that
homes of
So it was,
like we
did, and
insist on
we
a
international control
for
proper
and not
possibilities
that we insist on examining the
of international inspection without all the ready made provisions
of
the
Baruch
appealed
take
Treaty.
Pearson,
to
Pearson said
and
advice,"
Ignatieff's
argued this,
We
advice
what Ottawa instructed anyway.
that
And
I've
always regretted
advice
more
seriously,
Reid's
on
finally
the telephone:
"Well,
happened
voted
we
in principle.
McNaughton
and
that
we
in
because
coincide with
to
the Baruch Plan
for
did not take Escott
fact
we
recovered the ground that could have been made before
of weapons
We
had
began.
The
Tripartite
Agreement broke
retention
of
down
weapons,
Truman,
however,
Hickenlooper,
provided
there
they would
privately by
they
Kennan
did
proliferation started.
not
go
course the
poisoned
the
as
not
And,
and
along with it.
to
use.
Gouzenko
atmosphere.
The British
All kinds of ideas
Lorry
meet
the
of
course,
Norstad,
spy business
were
Air
Soviet
I
put
Force
requirements;
British
the
the
followed in 1949; whether they had the bomb before,
of
1947.
under pressure from Senators like Vanderberg and
said
but
consultation
was
decided then to make their own bomb.
Then
in
said that they would not make
the Quebec Agreement,
nuclear
general,
proliferation
meeting in Washington in which the British, pleading for
a
forward
really
never
and
counter-bomb
do not know.
broke in 1946,
so
that
Plus the rejection by the Soviets of the
Baruch Plan and the Soviet advance into,
or
threatened advance into
Iran, and Turkey, and the Communist pressure
on
Greece, all led to
the Truman Doctrine and the begining of the Cold War.
Now, whether
that coincided with independent Canadian appreciation of the events
leading up to the Cold War,
of
the
Soviet
I
do not know.
There were two members
Department who had rather strong or developed views on
policy.
They were Arnold Smith and Escott Reid.
Arnold
Smith wrote
archives
-
me
a
series of
letters from Moscow
he started these letters
91
because
I
-
was
they
are
working
in the
on
Post
000271
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-
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Planning,
Hostilities
first
the
and
letter
"It's
says:
tremendously important what you are doing, George,
and I thoroughly
support what you are doing and your ideas would be very interesting
And then,
to me."
that we
sure
count
can
it from Stalin.
made in
out
And
Escott went
further.
it
as
stress
wrote
much the
drop
the need to
Union
is not going to get
as
and
going
are
be
stressed.
he
that
to
George
measures
on
this
Kennan
did
against Stalin,
Washington, based on the concept of the
an
ally
Stalin
and
benevolent kind of dictator who
Kennan
he
illusions which were very rife in certain parts
of the political machine in
Soviet
signs of
no
direction of George Kennan
military
idea of
so
the undertakings he
knew George Kennan well at the time.
so
see
article I think for PAFSo
an
you
"Are
even
non-co-operation
Escott went in the
-I
I
countries
these
all
the
was
and of "containment"
not
Soviet co-operation.
on
Romania;
satellites."
I
these letters:
is not carrying out
He
Hungary,
subject.
come
about elections in Poland;
Yalta
of
before 1946,
Harriman
appreciations of the
not
against
Soviet attitude
Joe",
"Uncle
really was
working
were
as
that
sort
of
danger in any way.
a
kind
the
some
were
of
optimistic
being put forward
by Vice-President Wallace, who was quite openly sympathetic to the
Union
Soviet
quite
bit
a
and
of
continued to
be.
Truman
the
part
of
effort
on
to make Truman take
Kennan,
a
was
people like
tougher attitude
on
it
but
not,
took
Forrestal
and
subject,
and
the
the Truman Doctrine was the first sort of step in the direction of
But the thing which really made all the difference,
NATO.
Canadian standpoint,
Mr.
St.
Laurent took
Mr.
St.
decency,
was
Laurent,
was
first
all the seriousness with which
of
the whole Gouzenko spy business.
who
had
horrified when he
very
a
keen
sense
scientists
Civil
the
who were working with
Service.
us,
The Canadian Civil
penetrated, it turned out, than
very closely at that time.
justice
and
not only in the Soviet
Military Attaché's Office but through the various
in the Gouzenko trial,
of
really confronted with the full
was
evidence of the espionage that was going on,
revealed
from the
that were
links to the British nuclear
and
some
Service
the
links
was
British,
penetration
of
the
comparatively less
but
we
were
working
People like Fuchs and Nunn May this put
92
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-
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the
joint effort
whole
Catholic,
took
argument
that
peril
into
strong view.
a
Escott
ideological, cultural, economic,
that
we
by
argued
Escott
political
military threat.
begin
To
nobody's prepared for
threat
we'd
with
but
be
alike, and
out
France.
the
time,
was
the
in
not
idea
weapons.
which
Alliance
Italy,
Yes,
When you say "He",
[IGNATIEFF)
community
right
interest,
community
of
versions
which Article
Dean Acheson.
shared
States,
of
Britain,
St.
Laurent
Portugal,
Greece,
the
they belong
to
the
He
was
thinking
from
the
start
policies
Two
referring
you
and
in
so
were
ideas,
those who
of
it.
institutions",
in
this
is
the
community
And
on.
of
terms
a
various
the
a
of
very,
very
grudgingly by people
in the State Department
but Escott would have had
were
willing
What
bringing
we
our
to take this
us
who
unite
approach seriously,
ambassador in Washington, who would
ended up with
about
a
better
was
"strengthening free
understanding
principles on which these institutions were founded.
mention of
Laurent?
religious mystique in defense of Christian values.
but others like Hume Wrong,
none
St.
to
and
through,
went
There were those
Escott's
around an almost
idea of
the sort
was
Greece he might have
no.
boiled down version which was finally accepted
have
have to
You
of
are
Escott.
No,
Atlantic
There
and
war
but not Turkey.
[HILL]
perhaps
a
a
terms
of
because
Atlantic area, but not Greece and Turkey,
tolerated,
United
thought
he
with by
nations who think
that Canada
the
it
Escott used to say you
as
having Spain,
about
keen
Community".
"Atlantic
like
dealt
Reid, who was the chief advisor to Mr.
Escott
Turkey
this
came
of the Atlantic triangle;
pin
linch
of that
an
the kind of
to
through
gone
nuclear
or
cannons
not
a
of
And throughout,
against them by combining the influence of
work
at
could
another war,
ideas with
kill
cannot
this
that
as
with
faced
were
values that Western civilization stands for.
was
anyway
He was very amenable to the kind
advanced;
Reid
Laurent,
St.
and
"Judeo/Christian civilization"
promoting conditions
North Atlantic area.
of
Escott had
-
There
of
was
the
no
but he retainded the
stability and well-being in the
a
93
great deal
of influence
on
the
000273
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Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
thinking of Mr.
Laurent.
St.
Pearson was
pragmatic,
He did not believe
he was persuaded, Pearson was always pragmatic.
in all this.
high
Wrong
Hume
positively skeptical about
was
it
after all
oratory,
flown
is
self-defense in view of
the
proven
because
of
the
Council
work
to
issues such
He
Iran
Acheson,
the
son
of
and
can
back
this, what
on
I
Soviet aggression and expansion,
a
action.
What's
was
of consultation,
quickly followed by breakdown in
One
of the
breakdown in consultations
never
can
report of
was
the Three Wise Men.
I
1955,
in
report
Men's
Wise
in
I
afraid, in Europe,
am
consultation
over
on
crass
the Suez.
This
the
US
example
led to
worked with Pearson
on
the
Paris.
of
the
He,
as
one
Italy and Norway,
of
realized how tremendously important it was for Canada,
was
basically
consultation
constant
foreign ministers
authors who worked with the
But anyway,
was
forget the fact that the most
side.
They
really weakened the Alliance
started,
and it
buy
cannot
solidarity among allies around
against unilateral
and
from
solidarity to prevent
a
effective and
lack
on
veto.
the
sell to Congress.
through
was
Union
get away
"Let's
policies strengthened
Three
of
use
is that Escott
feel
right in saying that what was required was
the
the
going to buy this kind of messianic language".
not
looking
as
Soviet
the
Security
UN
Episcopalian Bishop,
an
this stuff, he wants something that he
are
of
the
of
for
it is not going down at all well in Washington.
all this oratory,
Even Dean
inability
correspondence saying:
in all the
kept,
this
all
regional arrangement
a
attitude
Turkey and
Greece,
as
do not think
I
that if NATO
to be the triangle which helped to resolve the continentalist
pulls
which
to
consultations
Canada
It
was
there
had
intra-Alliance
to
be
regular
differences
and
important this should not just
military affairs but should be about economic policies as
Of
well.
the
resolving
and
trying to unite policies.
be about
exposed,
was
community
unilateral
course
ran
the whole movement
right
action
across
on
it;
Suez,
towards the European economic
and likewise the British and French
and while
the
Wise
Men's
Report
said
everything that could be said about strengthening the consultative
procedure, the fact
USA
that
as
it
well
was
as
is that
it has too often been
other major powers.
But
ignored
-by the
it should be considered
the non-military cooperative provisions which really
94
000274
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
made
the
Atlantic Treaty
North
acceptable
Parliament,
to
as
a
departure from peace time commitments for Canada.
{HILL]
You mean primarily on the economic side
the political
or
side too?
[IGNATIEFF]
side,
last
Well,
started by being
it
then began being ignored
in
-
Libya,
Union
times,
recent
trade disagreements
the
and Poland and all
the
about
Union
united front.
face
a
was
anybody
in Western Europe or North
contemplate
to
a
Soviets
on
with the Soviet
deal
of
the
essence,
if
idea that
was
sort
the
are
the
of
Soviet
behind the
America
they would have
that
There was not going to be any chipping
world war.
In that
this
attack
the
Those
away as there had been by the Nazis.
in experience.
mean
should know if they moved against
was
the
I
it.
The
Treaty,
that
how to
economic
the
of
rest
realized
to
business,
Reagan
things which Canada
was
on
the political side.
on
the
on
ignored
sense,
the
There
idea
was
that looking back
that
was
there
should
be
community which would act together and confront any adversary.
This is what had been weakened.
This is where the failure in 1947
a
on
the control of the atom and the Cold
the Korean War combined to
produce
a
War together
new
emphasis on the one weapon
which seemed to give the West superiority
and
China.
It
started
during the
combined, and
over
the Soviet Union,
Korean War.
functions
My
Senior Counsellor of the Embassy in Washington were threefold.
was
to represent Canada
the
various
bodies
under the North
Committees,
The
institutions
and
on
say difference
of opinion,
whether Canada
should
in NATO.
Group.
But
which
would
be
We
what
One
working out
established
Defense
on.
question
Group
the international committee
Atlantic Treaty, the Council, the Military
and so
only
on
as
or
did
which there
the
not
any real,
only matter of
should not be
happened
proceedings, claimed
was
want
was
to
that
a
any
I
would not
difficulty,
was
member of the Standing
be members
Italy,
of the
very
early
Standing
in
the
Standing Group which was to be
reserved to the United States, Britain and France
(the idea was
a
seat
on
the
-
95
000275
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
they
that
working
would
act
the
as
plans).
out the strategic
strategists
main
I
so
five members instead
was
that
we
quite happy
were
But,
three.
I
Alliance,
seat there was no
a
there would have to
way in which Canada would stand down,
of
the
simply told to say in the
was
Italy claimed
international committee that if
of
if we weren't
told at the
it.
on
We
same
be
time
to the
held
policy of stressing the functional principle as viewed by Mr. King.
economic power;
it
military
power.
It
that
sought
the
we
he
seat
principle,
functional
being
I
asked
as
far
he
as
military
any
about
The
commitment.
concerned,
was
Canada's
representative
in
I
Commission
Economic
UN,
the
of
Council
was
that we
were
supply food through UNRRA, and that sort of thing.
to
being
remember
Security
the
on
principle
basis of the functional
Mr. King let Australia have it on the grounds
leery
very
was
on the
was
of Canada's
assertion
in any way the
not
was
following Australia.
that
especially in terms of Canada's
Laurent continued the same,
St.
Mr.
1947.
given
was
Far
the
on
Eastern
absolutely
no
instructions whatsoever, and we were sitting around discussing what
we
would do and
entirely
an
you
as
over
cow
a
speaking
must say,
there
and Canada is
a
place
economic
our
for
minerals
that
materials for Europe and
been
a
report
strategic
the
on
material
problem
in
time
Americans were very alive
would be cut off
from
to
"no
In
use
fact,
resources,
I
we
am
not
are
not
in having
a
will elect
we
what
we
and supplies
in
States
United
the
Asia.
Canada,
But we were being sought al1
forward, particularly in terms of food
another:
was
cow.
chairman of this commission".
the
for
this commission because
on
Somebody said
country".
dairy without
"I
why Canada is
clear
Asian
said
I
could
form or
one
wanted,
put
food
and
When I went to Washington there had
of
strategic supplies,
Paley
of
war,
the
dangers in the
supplies
the
of certain
supplies of
Report,
event of
and
war;
the
they
strategic materials and
they wanted to get them from Canada on some assured basis, and they
offered
a
deal
turned that
was
role
down,
interested
Nations.
on
free trade in
on
Mr. King and Mr.
St. Laurent
but in terms of the functional principle,
in
We were
fact.
its
economic
contribution,
through
the
Canada
United
interested for instance, at the beginning, in our
the Economic and Social Council
96
of the UN.
This. turned out
000276
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-
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to be rather
a
disappointment,
functions
its
agencies
of each
also
especially
expected,
as
that were
set up.
But
founding
Organization.
establishing
and
ILO,
The
in
right in the forefront
the
and
a
new
framework
Nations,
with
internationalism,
diminution of
a
Union, quickly followed by the
right
the
unilateral
to
cooperative approach
already,
and in the fifties,
North Korea
or
invaded South
assistance
intervened.
which
the time
At
finds
I
power
think,
that
who
had
the
taken into account.
time,
began
The
go
fact
to
On the
on
but
the
feel
that
one
hand,
the connivance
Then Communist China
the
I
am not sure
dangerous
more
to
if one looks back to the fifties,
it
that
against
was
an
advice
the
-
was
that
China that
was
American commander
of
was
India
not
and
other
sufficiently
in Korea,
and later the threat
islands of Matsu and Quemoy,
that brought Canada
It was
the
war
the deployment of
and
This was what I
anything
was
We
as
insisted
each
in Washington,
regarded
was
discussions about the possible
first
Soviet
the Korean War.
countries and cross the 49th parallel
into
the
United States felt that it
decided to
to the offshore
sovereignty,
for.
was
on the whole,
the greatest threat.
or
United
with, apparently,
when I
realized
we
the
support of the Soviet Union.
Communist
security.
one
or
What
around
It
hoped
Korea
were
We
multi-lateral,
new
big powers,
other
over
Health
important.
built
national
action.
had
we
World
thought we would be setting up
fact that when we
of
but
Agricultural
the
also
were
and
Food
co-operative, approach to international affairs.
gradually was the
these
influential member
an
the exponents of the
as
all
being the host to ICAO,
Geneva,
Organization, under Dr. Chisholm,
fulfilled
never
coordinating
Canada was
of the functional agencies,
one
in
because the Council
was
use
of nuclear weapons for the
nuclear
involved in, very much,
Washington.
in
Japan,
the Japanese Peace Agreement.
over
Canada.
in the defense-liaison
and the termination
field
That
weapons
of
the
war
with
That proceeded quite well,
without any great friction with the United States, but we ran into
immediate
United
difficulties
States
military
threat
was
and
Alaska and at sea,
over
persuaded
the
question
that
China
they began to deploy
of
the
fact
represented
nuclear
the
the
main
weapons
into
and we were involved in over-flights.
97
that
Our first
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
reaction
was
that
over-flight,
with
requests
be
to
there had
indication of exact timing and direction
an
flight and all the rest of that.
We had to have
addition;
agreement,
and that
each individual
for
first
the
was
flight plan, in
a
think.
I
of
The first
involved in
agreement indicated also that if
we
flights of Canadian territory
would need to be consulted about
the
possible
of
use
we
against
weapons
nuclear
to be
were
China,
over-
because
we
pointed out, if nuclear weapons were used against China, there was
the Sino-Soviet
not
be
military treaty at the time, in effect and we could
retaliation,
And it
alerts.
officials
with
agreed that there would
in
which
I
conditions,
strict secrecy the kind of
of
there
that
States
addition,
be
did
not
level
the
with Pearson;
threat
a
affect
a
least
at
of
of
state
be
about
it
was
Korea
sovereignty,
in
consultation
about
but
of these things
when I
met
that
the
also
was
against
in
only
the
which
Canada.
at
President
the
Foreign
the
would meet
in
And
the
that
was
the joint defense
to
was
sent to
of
all
Yugoslavia.
in
In
initial
the
raised
it
basis of retention of
to
was
clearance
of
be
on-going
an
each
flight
possible
use.
senior officials
came
There
up
was
from
one
or
occasion
Washington and
in my presence with the Prime Minister and Mr. Pearson.
under
In
consultation about the possible consequences
in terms of
remember that
United
Minister of Defence
the
on the strict
the
unlikely
ministers,
in
a
over-flights and deployments,
that
sense
not
I
first
continental defence and
but the initial agreement
deployment
was
or
possible circumstances
discussions relevant
North America under NORAD stood when
question of
it
that
of nuclear weapons.
use
a
then
Boyce,
nuclear alert
a
with
people and
and other senior
in which the
words
Bob
Secretary of State in the United States,
which there might
other
periodic meetings
alert
an
year,
a
once
similar consultations
would go to
nuclear
retaliation
meetings
be
in
kind of circumstances,
the
did recognize
We
would
there
ministerial
state
Canada.
could
that
Minister,
in
alert
involved
and
declaration of
which might give rise to the
Chinese
discuss under the conditions of
to
was
as
be
involved;
was
well
as
be
was
Secretary of the Cabinet,
state
Soviet
be
not
Canada would
least
at
and
would
it
that
sure
Eisenhower,
and the question had
98
been
It was
put to him
000278
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
by the Pentagon, of the possible
Matsu
Quemoy
and
crisis,
adamant that this
agree to the
islands,
war.
St.
and
quite
meetings and
nuclear weapons over
Mr.
and
the question.
Pearson
We
right
the
out
of
question.
We
emphasized
was
the
thing which
I
did
that there was
We
agreed
to
programme
a
flights and deployments, subject to consultation,
up
at
hours
all
of
processing
of every flight plan,
of flights
over
a
period of,
the
but
night.
no
over-
we
would
be
they would give us a schedule
let us say,
which was the way
month;
a
operating when I was sent to Yugoslavia.
between
1956
and
that
so
of
There would not
we were
Now that
happened
1958.
Could I
just interrupt at that point.
like to check first,
I would
several
of the sort
exists under NORAD.
[HILL]
have
deployment of nuclear weapons or anything
that
woken
nuclear
declaration
or
be
a
a
of alerts
not
were
would never
risk of escalating into
a
automaticity, there was no blank cheque given about
now
the
of nuclear weapons in the defence of the offshore
use
was
of
Laurent
of
out
this would involve
as
It
was
uses
that is, you
There is
point
one
somehow involved in
were
treaty itself, and then there was also the working
group in Washington on the mechanisms that were set up afterwards.
the work on the
Could you distinguish between those two?
This situation has
treaty
also done
not
[IGNATIEFF]
It
been
unclear
to
me.
done
was
in
Washington
the
Ambassadorial level, Hume Wrong really
the
but in fact the
Assistant
international committee met
articles,
Pearson,
to
Secretary
was
was
the
then
the
dealing
so
to
directly
Now
of
the
specific
dealt with at
were
Escott
official
Under-Secretary,
proposals and reactions and
committee, which
to discuss various drafts
was
time Tommy
Hickerson.
foreign minister level.
Under-Secretary,
who
on
Treaty was negotiated at
but the main substantive of proposals
the ambassador
Assistant
that
the international
on
dealing with details;
and
at
but
was
that
the work
in Washington?
Stone was the representative
with
Was
Reid,
who was
responsible
prepare
the
under
various
on.
99
000279
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
Now
I
temporarily brought
This
and
was
arrangements,
institutional
the
from
involved in the actual treaty negotiations distinct
was
in 1948.
from
The meetings
of the
and while I was
think it was,
in Ottawa,
Escott who,
brought
instructions
was
to
Paris,
it was only for the three months,
knowing that
I
had
been
small
involved in the actual negotiations in the
opinion
the
of various
views,
particularly
whereby "the parties would
in
of
of
any
them,
the
territorial
the articles which we really thrashed
You
[IGNATIEFF]
here;
I
UN
went
moved
was
in this
in Ottawa
Then
Because
there
after that
his
I
was
to
permanent Council would be,
controversial
or
That
of
was
one
work
time
you were
were
back
presumably.
moved to Washington in 1948,
place with the rank
Committee
I think
and
2
independence
and then you
took
out
the
of
Tommy Stone
Counsellor
details
of
was
on
the
what
the
the Defense Committee and the various
And there was the
and all the rest of
on Article
the
was
and
so on.
of dealing
under Escott.
in time for the signature in 1949.
bodies and
sense
period?
there
I
In other words
there.
then you went to Washington after that,
International
[HILL]
out
just prior to that, in New York;
[IGNATIEFF]
I
also
Working with him?
[HILL]
at the
were
sending
together whenever,
consult
political security of the parties is threatened".
[HILL]
involved in
group that worked within,
these North Atlantic Treaty issues.
4,
the
would take his
and I
on
Article
normally
was
into
with the exchange
was
had been moved to Paris,
me
the
I
in Post Hostilities and all the rest of
defense matters in London,
I
UN
because
of the UN Division.
it had been decided that Gerry Riddell who
place,
it,
only
New York to be head
head of the UN Division, would go
I
later,
question of the standing group
it.
that you mentioned earlier, that the only really
issue in that
period,
100
is
really that of the standing
000280
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
committee, and its responsibilities and so
[IGNATIEFF]
on.
There was some controversy about the question of the
permanent
Council.
We
did
not
move
Council.
Dana Wilgress
was
our
Ambassador
required but
used to meet as
idea of
a
regular meeting,
immediate
an
and
regularly.
not
but it
to
was
at
permanent
time they
the
favoured
But we
an
not until 1955 and the Report
of the Three, that the full machinery for regular consultation
adopted.
would
This provided that, first of all, the permanent Council
meet
at
Counsellors
of
met,
think,
I
least
the
on
once
the
but
discussed
and
strongly
very
what
the
previous
day.
We
difficulties
the
maybe on
or
day and went
the previous
something
on
met,
Wednesdays,
on
they met
But
they
before
would meet the
Thursdays and they met
agenda
felt
Canada
week,
a
Ambassadors
Tuesdays and Wednesdays.
over
was
If
were.
disagreed
and
with
something, the counsellors would report to the Ambassador that, you
know,
you
going to have trouble
are
tomorrow and the position is
course,
get
to
delegations
views.
see
But
the
if
was
not
until the
While
1955
struck me about
to
Market
machinery
really
question
of
Particularly,
the
into action.
came
consultative
Also,
machinery
reasons
set
up
to
there
always
was
a
Europe,
you
could
solidarity
of
the
in
the
concern
Alliance.
why
I
My
it
the
dialogue about
still maintain
arms
experience
in
we
the
North
it
European
raise
any
Alliance.
control
and
is
of
That
should
that
thing
is that while
the relationship between defence and arms control.
the
was
worked out the main framework,
we
really
being
was
other
change their
did not include economic questions for the reason that the
Common
of
also
report from the Committee of Three that the
consultative machinery
that
us,
consult
persuaded
be
consultative
whole
or
agenda
the
on
enabled
It
guidance
or
others could
comparatively modest.
this item
follows.
as
instructions
to
over
remain
Atlantic
one
in
the
Council
consultations is that the kind of discussions that take place are
the very kind of
discussions which
those
who
advocate
foreign policy to defence policy actually achieved
Atlantic Council.
smaller
powers
This
raise
is
precisely
political
101
what
issues
in
relating
the
North
has
happened.
The
and
the
political
000281
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
military planning.
implications of
is
that
NORAD
because
My
reservation and
objection
effect
agreement
established
was
in
between the Pentagon and National Defence,
St.
the
Laurent
in the transition from
the Diefenbaker regime.
to
by
There
was
similar
no
provision made for the discussion of contingency plans under NORAD
of
the
kind
same
that
went
on
in regard
reporting
to the North Atlantic Council.
to
to
come
governments react
Group,
Planning
discussion.
can
of
it
But
alert
an
as
contingency
case
there
brings us
That
little of
a
we
would
How
the North Atlantic
of
was
report
no
without
and
no
prior consultation.
up to around the end of the
you were at Defence Liaison and then Ambassador to
spoke
and
plans
Ottawa and Yugoslavia, in the 1950s
-
[HILL]
The military would have
President Kennedy did for NORAD at the time
Cuban Missile Crisis,
Part IV
commands
other
NORAD did not report to NATO and the fact is that they
declare
the
in the
called,
was
the
implications.
political
to this?
as
their
with
their
for
them
discussed
Council
the
to
Co-operation,
your
but also
fifties, when
Yugoslavia.
We
involvement in the Report On Non-Military
there
was
the
famous
visit
to
the
Soviet
Union.
[IGNATIEFF)
then
called
planning,
visit
to
the
the
the
in passing,
Washington in 1953.
Imperial
then
and
Now
1955.
to
I left
I
London,
back to
be head
of
Defence Liaison
was
something which
but it has
United
States,
about
the
in
alluded to
only
profoundly affected my attitude
that
that Pearson,
was
the increasing pressures
following
I
on
apart from the
issue that came up,
Canada/U.S. defence relations, and
much concerned
defence
in
came
in my book,
year at what was
College
Union,
Soviet
a
Defence
important
most
I had
deployment of
on
Canada from the
nuclear
over-flights, wanted a statement to be prepared
very
weapons
and
by the equivalent
of your institution in the present days, the Parliamentary
Centre,
Parliamentary
for the
(but there
information
elected
was
of
not
a
parliament.
What
Centre
he
had
responsible body should be given
102
in those
in
a
mind
days)
was
paper to
that
be
the
jointly
000282
�.Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
prepared by the departments of Defence and External Affairs,
of
the title
it
Foreign and Defence Policies Of
Inter-continental Missiles".
wanted
short
a
The Advent Of Nuclear Weapons
And the
which would
paper
defence
foreign policy
and
position of Canada,
of
-
confrontation.
of
This
for
Laurent was of
course in total agreement and
such
with
paper
Staff, and I said:
General
authority,
if
and
Foulkes
as
I
three
by Mr.
were
not
that
Campney,
I
at
least
reply given by Foulkes
an
to
was
me
have to be included in such
parliament would
a
issue would have created
final
act
US
as
a
in
happened if
that I think in 1955,
Bryce,
the
on
as
General
you wish.
letters
were
and
the minister level and
And the
issue!
information which would
that the
paper for
of
Minister
by the Prime Minister
effective discussion in
an
Army.
National Defence's reaction
simply not to reply to the Prime Minister.
believe ever
of
of the Joint Chiefs in Washington and General
Bradley, the head of the
The
he
compromise the special relationships which he had
with the Chairman
issue.
Chief
contact
Five
absolutely basic
such
on
be,
And Mr. St.
the
will do
I
done".
be
two
to
then
will
Pearson to National Defence
answered,
then
was
certainly
is what should
recollect,
who
to
was told to prepare
I
Minister writes
this up and
follow
entirely agree
written
Ralph
had
a
I cannot of course do so on my own
"Well
Prime
the
Defence,
National
I
but
Foulkes,
General
and long
by then in
were
something that
is
geographic
missiles
by the House of Commons.
thought, at least considered,
a
consequences both
-
range bombers between the two superpowers who
state
he
that
was
strategic
new
route
it
and
representatives in
the
the new
the
shortest
the
on
of
of
essence
inform
parliament and the Canadian public
on
"Implications For Canadian
recollect was:
I
as
and
Secretary
this strange
I
had
not
on
extremely important
an
play which
been
one
-
attend.
had
come
to
had
a
for
Easter
terrible automobile
I
of the
would hardly
players,
was
it was agreed that Bob
the Cabinet, would call
Foulkes would come and I would
to Toronto
Of course to press the
it was Easter 1955
-
to
cabinet crisis
was
Anyway,
a
meeting
at
which
in the meantime
I
visit my mother-in-law and had
accident, nearly got killed.
I
came
to
this meeting on crutches and feeling extremely weak and vulnerable.
I
still
remember that Foulkes bluntly said
103
that
there would be
no
000283
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-
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joint
paper.
It
addition
in
pretences
Foulkes
was
got
who
stone-walling
to
representatives of Canada.
NORAD under false
into
us
established
the
public would not believe
The
that is why Mr. Diefenbaker was so unreasonable,
National
a
rage
Defence and
about
the
they
that
He
misrepresented
had
it.
And
if you like, about
its demand for nuclear war-heads.
way
elected
was
things
in
and
brought him into this impossible position which finally ended up
with the fall of his government.
The
himself
a
in
was
I
on
hospital
from
understand that
unless
issues,
and
cannot
we
relationships with
Europe,
-
delayed reaction from
said
especially
say, when
I
as
not
in External Affairs plan rationally
our
what
on
Campney to
Foulkes,
"General
do
Union
Soviet
Parliament
the
are
the
or
have the guidance of
we
St.
the
you
I
United States
the
situation,
In this
report to Parliament.
a
came
like
failure to get National Defence under
Laurent/Pearson
move
you
if
-
trouble Mr. Diefenbaker found
on
with
or
these crucial
of
consequences
our
new
position between the two super powers in the nuclear age.
strategic
are the
out,
not necessarily in
and
That we must know,
consequences?
What
set them
we must
any detail about exactly who does what, but
what are the essential factors and consequences of the situation".
"First of all,
He
said:
to
prejudice the information that
own
"eggheads"
from
was
it.
Secondly,
Well, when
a
reaction.
crisis
me
in Moscow
danger of war.
Union in the
I
mean,
new
-
which was
was
go
not
need
run
any
defence
get George".
Pearson
Pearson,
and
there
a
see
typical
a
for
-
why don't you come
himself
danger of
Pearsonian
invitation which he
an
general sort of way
to
on
Laurent, that he would not press
He decided that he would pick up
a
you
answer
in my
pass
to
how
me
I
do
I
reported this to
I
in the cabinet,
received from Molotov in
and visit
final
the
first of all decided to tell St.
this to
tell
anything
will not do
I
get and which
I
Affairs to
External
policy in Canada, and this is
And that
repeat that
Minister.
Prime
the
to
way
that I
war
strategic position to which
we
what
was
from the
the
Soviet
in Canada
were
exposed?
[HIIL]
This
was
in
some
way related
104
to
the NORAD
issue?
000284
�Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de
[IGNATIEFF]
National
part and parcel
It
was
Defence
a
joint
appreciation
he
said:
"Well,
So,
consequences.
say that
not
United States,
war with
a
public.
in
crisis in the cabinet.
not
joy ride
a
in any
should I have been,
to
the
Soviet
Russian.
when
I
"I
not
go
with
that in my book, but this
way
used most of
basic thing here
an
argument
pursue
Malenkov who
against the
means
of
came
out
Embassy
of
use
promoting
go
I
know
I
kept
I
is also in the
was
had
nuclear
Soviet
policy.
and
If
So,
I
be
did
I
diary,
the
Peacemonger.
a
The
nuclear
successor
war
to
named
by
secretary,
was
dead
against
war
as
indeed
Now the
a
The
engaged in
themselves
were
private
weapons
ex-
Trinity College archives.
they could risk
his
an
going to
is
diary and
a
expansion.
been
as
I said to my wife
there
The Making of
not
or
want
of compromising me".
way
military
of
not
impossible situation.
an
spirit.
to whether
policy
a
Stalin,
as
a
And why
concerned.
was
going to be trouble.
was
that the Soviets
was
I
was
certainly did
I
in my book,
it
as
there
which
actually from day to day,
I
far
as
I
could
You
importance
was
a
that he
quite definitely in a statement at lunch at the Canadian
in
Moscow.
There
were
Molotov
and
Kaganovitch
and
Voroshilov and several others who seemed to disagree with Malenkov.
particularly if they were threatened,
They argued that,
interests
to
were
war.
It
in
those
circumstances
anxious to see Khrushchev, who was
to take power
that
Malenkov
question
said,
as
as
did;
that
means
of
and
war
Pearson
Khrushchev took the
nuclear
war
and about
same
out
were
quite
was
obviously on the rise,
Secretary.
General
that
view
of
settling international disputes.
But
"You must understand that we do not go back in any way on
concept of
by
a
if their
basically threatened, they would not hesitate to go
was
competition with the capitalist world.
political
concerned,
if
and
economic
you
insist,
methods.
as
you
105
have
So
far
done
We will
security
as
just
do
a
few
-
l'information
preparing to
are
say
blithe
any
me,
I did not
some
a
the
would show that
trouble, they will find
am
were
it
If
I
from
tell
not
nuclear war".
a
get
Again,
coward.
refuse,
start
faced with
am
what
of
if they
see
to
Liaison, brought into this journey
I knew there
left:
failure
Defence
as
Union,
the
if they will
will go and find out from Moscow and
fight
of
la Loí sur l'accès à
the
he
our
so
is
months
000285
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
before,
we
bringing West Germany into
on
will do the
with East Germany.
same
re-arming Germany,
and
NATO
only circumstances in
The
which we will reconsider the
security policies of Europe is under
conditions of neutralization
of
the
of what
essence
why Pearson
went
was
said,
but
it is important
USSR
in
1955.
the
to
and he spoke
Atlantic Minister to go,
And that
the two Germanies.
He
to
tie this
first
the
was
great deal about
a
was
to
North
this, but
nobody has related it to this stalemate in the cabinet and with
National
I
instructions
direct
exactly
what
Eastern
Europe.
on
the
threatening
Mr.
from
got back with the report,
we
related.
as
I
St.
Laurent,
Khrushchev had
said to
That is,
the
to
way
[HILL]
had
sooner
off to Yugoslavia,
sent
was
No
Defence.
moving
were
was
off with
sent
in effect
in
us
to
test
out
policies towards
his
by invading Hungary,
Soviets,
Yugoslavia
into
westward
I
than
possibly
and
the West?
to Yugoslavia
When you went
was
that
actually after the
Hungarian uprising?
[IGNATIEFF)
Yes,
Because,
[HILL]
again,
there
[IGNATIEFF)
Yes,
simply that this
had
the
do not
I
is the
occasion when I
one
opportunity
like to say that in
being
of
Minister and the Foreign Minister
[HILL]
That
[IGNATIEFF]
when
was
Which
arrived,
I
a
was
the
States.
was
Tito
And while he
finding ways in
militarily
sent
directly
told
what I
was
the
book,
on
I
say
mission
a
by the
Prime
had been sent to do.
change.
not
had
anyway.
his
up
States,
called himself
which to
experience.
the usual
followed
getting aid from the United
bloc,
had not realized that
I
why you were sent to Yugoslavia.
reason
and
just after.
breach
military aid
a
But,
with
in
fact,
Stalin
from the
by
United
Communist, he was already
complete the breach with the Communist
So,
I
had
106
a
very
interesting time in
000286
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
Yugoslavia
a
but
the
say,
I
as
purpose
being
of my
sent
really
was
follow-up on the mission to the Soviet Union and the concerns to
know just where
Because
of
what
scenario",
stood
we
in regard to the
Foulkes
course,
from the Pentagon,
as
threat of
was
getting,
one
could
was
nuclear war.
"worst
a
imagine.
case
The Soviets
said to be massing here and massing there and doing this and
were
that with the massive
capability they enjoyed.
[HILL]
What
the
foreign
policy
were
that
at
conclusions
time,
you
you
while
about
to
came
Soviet
in Yugoslavia?
were
I
remember in your book you mentioned you had at least some
meetings
stage you actually briefed
the NATО
with President Tito and at
Council
one
Tito's foreign policy thinking.
on
views on what the
[IGNATIEFF)
Soviets
up to
were
Well, what I
You must have had his
well.
as
convinced of was,
was
first of al1
that
the Communist threat should not be thought of in monolithic terms.
There
was
not
great
one
Communist
threat
or
combination of
a
the
Soviet Union, Communist China and the whole of the satellite world.
They all had internal problems.
The Soviets
very severely from the effects of World War II,
in the
least bit anxious
for
still suffering
were
and
They
another war.
they were not
were
very much
obsessed about what to do about Germany and they were not inclined
to push things to the point of nuclear war,
method
of
war
to
eventually did in Egypt
and
Cuba.
every
[HILL]
I
uprising,
short
read
the
Czechoslovakia
somewhere
Soviets
was
at
expand
but would obviously
their
during
recently that,
some
about to revolt
point
as
influence,
became
well.
the
as
they
Hungarian
convinced
That
use
that
really worried
them.
[IGNATIEFF]
That it might spread,
yes.
That is
I
representing Canada
on
obvious to
me
that
in the 1967-1968 period because
the
Security Council in the Czech crisis.
that
what
economic
the
Soviets
orbit
of
feared,
central
was
the
Europe,
107
was
It
was
revival
and
so.
that
I
go into
that
natural
would
include
of
000287
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Austria and Hungary as well
to
extent,
some
these
all
countries
had
been
Austrian/Hungarian/German imperial economic orbit.
Romania
as
within
the
They prospered
mightily in providing certain raw materials, having assured markets
high quality goods instead of making Kalashnikov
kinds of
for all
rifles to export to Africa which they get very little for,
and such.
That,
I
Dubcek.
Because
arriving
at
Germany.
They had
believe,
is
the
as
I
understand,
like
a
free
Dubcek,
something
come
very close
real
turfing out
for
reason
with
agreement
trade
point
the
on
was
aspirins
of
West
it and the Soviets put their
to
foot down.
[HILL]
question
Yugoslavia.
on
that you
have the impression that
I
enjoyed particularly.
there was one that you
enjoyed the bilateral diplomacy.
embassy
first
situation must have
been
very interesting.
[IGNATIEFF)
it was
an
Yes,
with because,
game.
as
for
On the
as
one
other hand
the
time
you
course
was
were
political
the
and
a
Communist;
a
he
would
accept
not
what
he
On the
Communist".
having broken completely from the Warsaw Pact
COMECON,
head
playing a very, very sophisticated
Communist I will die
a
impression
the
he claimed that he was still
hand,
he said to me "Once
Of
period
your
extremely interesting time, to begin
an
Tito
I say,
I have
yourself,
the
of
just one final
finish off this afternoon,
Just before we
regarded
and
from
Soviet
as
monopolistic claims over the Balkan economies, especially shipping.
He
would
not
accept
that
COMECON
industry would be developed
of
a
Bulgaria wanted
was
should decide
in Yugoslavia.
some
general
on
what
What he and Dimitriev
autonomy for
the
Balkans,
minimum condition for remaining in the Communist bloc.
be outside the direct
control
which he did not like at all.
an
extremely sophisticated
the dictators
of
keeping
sort of
I have ever
in touch with
of
central
planning
It would
from
across,
politician.
Tito had
a
I
Moscow,
mean
public opinion; and he kept away
there was some strike,
108
or
if there
of all
much keener sense
daily routine of Belgrade by living in Brioni.
heard that
as
And the other thing was that he was
and astute
come
kind of
was
even
from the
But
if he
unrest
in
000288
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
university,
the
resolve
-
I
it.
used
to
say
"You are
situation and
the
only dictator
the
would really think would win
I
on
and always in favour of the popular side,
him:
to
know that".
"I
suddenly descend
would
decided,
He
across who I
say:
he
I
have
come
He
would
election".
an
"Why don't you go to the
would say to him:
step and allow an opposition".
He said:
"That is contrary
to Communist doctrine, you cannot have an opposition, it affects
next
whole planning,
our
allowed
he
I
a
certain
and
opposition and
tacit
individual disputes
managed to resolve
sentiment.
system
on,
so
you
opposition".
cannot have an
But
rationing
whole
our
mean,
University
the
of
in
of
favour
I
as
say
he
popular
the
Belgrade, when they
were
having university trouble because they were expelling professors
who
not
were
Communists
and
students
the
in
were
of
state
a
uprising and the police arrived with machine guns
and all the rest
students, Tito comes and says,
"Since when have
of it to subdue the
you
thought
ever
that
educate
you
thing,
students
with
machine
guns,
you".
So
whoever
thought of
such
course
the students
all
cheered
Tito,
danced
protector".
He did
not
anything, he did not
fired.
He simply resolved
friend,
our
put the professors back,
a
get out,
the
particular confrontation in favour
And
likewise if there were
some
Solomon
He would say:
and half".
He was
favourable
He,
a
around him,
of the students,
strike, he would
judgment and buzz off.
negotiate.
of
as
of
"our
resolve
who had been
a
all
along and make
come
He would not
and left.
stay around and
"That is the way it is going to be, half
very astute politician and I got into
a
fairly
position with Tito because of the Hungarian refugees.
of course, was caught in this situation that he had broken with
Stalin but
was
still
concluding in Budapest,
some
a
Communist,
the
Austrians
and
when
had
closed
the
the
fighting
was
frontier and
of the last freedom fighters had absolutely nowhere to go but
to
Yugoslavia.
And the Yugoslav police and
up
and put them
into concentration
camps.
military rounded them
I
heard about this
asked the Foreign Affairs Minister whether this
was
they had never heard about it.
I
told at first that
I was not
true and
let
slip
and
was
that
just being curious but that Canada might be able to help.
109
000289
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I get
Sure enough,
because
they did
Ministry
of
none
said,
I
(I
was
would
case,
"Yes".
and
sent
I
a
mission to
got
cable to
come
Yugoslavia.
to
He sent
were
And
said:
I
for
immediate
an
mission right away and we
people who went to Yugoslavia
people who fought to the last.
They were the most convinced
have
they
because
fighters
and
I
have
into
run
forgotten how many we took but
quite
a
lot.
Once
I
of
some
them
in
Toronto,
500
or
600,
would say
governments
then other
and France took some.
matter of months and Tito
American aid
and
really anti-communist,
there
were
shipped
V
-
was
The
whole thing
if
he
wound up
was
in
a
very grateful because if he had sent
them
kept
he
professors and professionals
and he would have
was
really tough people.
and
afraid
There
some
they
were
actors,
were
students
and
so
They were very grateful.
them out.
The Diefenbaker years,
1959-62
Ambassador Ignatieff, from
[HILL]
it was
Norway,
and
Sweden
like
them back to Hungary they would have been shot
lost
I
took them and of course it became known that
we
there,
were
Britain
Part
that is
hundreds of them
and asked
a
if
"Well,
the
freedom
we
many
then Minister of
camp?"
the
see
Pickersgill
Jack
the best,
of
some
were
and
went there the next day and there
I
good
a
In
might be able to help you."
we
And they said:
like to go
you
and
through Austria, and it occurred to me that,
Citizenship and Immigration).
the
-
in this subject.
friend of Jack Pickersgill at the time,
a
the
from
police
accepted
know Canada
understand you have refugees,
I
but
-
other than the secret
you
"Well
refugees from Hungary,
as
words
their
eat
to
Foreign Ministry
from the
not
-
"We understand you are interested
way"?
what
like
not
Interior,
the
they said:
call from them
a
1959
to
1962,
you
were
to be
Deputy High Commissioner for one year in London and then you became
Assistant
Under-Secretary
responsibility,
advisor
on
to
me
believe, to
I
national defence
if you could tell
us
to have been
of acceptance
or
of
a
State
for
serve as
External
Affairs
Mr. Diefenbaker's personal
issues and nuclear
affairs.
something about those three years.
period in which there
not
of
nuclear
weapons
110
with
I wonder
This
seems
was
this whole question
for
the
Canadian armed
000290
�Document disclosed under the Access to Informatión Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
forces.
beginning
the
of
And then
this was the period of Howard Green,
course
his period.
of
I
could just tell
wonder if you
us
something about how you saw the crucial issues of that period,
including the relationship of Canada's policies towards NATO?
[IGNATIEFF]
Well
word,
a
perhaps
on how I
catapulted from
was
being Ambassador in Yugoslavia, appointed by Mr.
Mr.
Pearson,
into
the high ranks
Conservative Administration.
explanation,
because I
was
known that Mr. Diefenbaker
too
closely with
keen about them.
Nor
itself,
regarded
as
those
It
under the
think, needs some
I
Pearson
and
it
was
who had been associated
"Pearsonalities"
Drew.
Laurent and
Service
Civil
associated with Mr.
Mr.
was
the
That in
Pearson
Mr.
of
St.
was
and
was
too
not
interesting,
of
one
those happenstances, that the first Secretary of State for External
Affairs that Diefenbaker appointed
the
President of
my brother,
the University of
to whom
I
appointed Warden of Hart House.
as
a
veteran
under
veterans
help
to
secondary education.
the
found
He
been
He had
university
the
policy
the
Toronto.
It
with
too
many
massive
details,
stroke
President
as
not
not
quite
undergraduate children.
their
and
disagreements
died
at
apparently,
Hart
for
of
post-
in frequent friction and
the eyes of veterans who expected to be treated
least, and
was
back
came
influx
the
financed
government
himself
and
overseas
cope
disagreement with the President who did
the
happened that
so
closely attached, Nicholas,
very
was
Sidney Smith, who had been
was
grew
House
as
things from
adults, to say
Without going into
and
all
see
my brother had
of
sudden.
a
a
The
tremendously
affected by this.
Hе
sensed somehow this might have been related to the state of tension
that had
was
in
was,
developed
between the two,
Washington.
know at the
friends,
time,
what
from Belgrade
I
However,
I
found
from
happened.
out
and
attended
I
did
not
the funeral,
1958,
I
but did not
But to my great
surprise,
I
was
summoned
by Sidney Smith to the meeting of heads of Canadian
when
there
was
a
government level at NATO.
assembled and
as
correspondence, through mutual
missions in Europe, to Paris, in the presence of
in
know this
I
had taken
meeting
of
John
ministers
Diefenbaker,
at
heads
of
And I was even more surprised when we'd
a
very meek
111
place at the back, expecting
000291
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
to
be regarded with intense suspicion
NATO which is not from within NATO.
I
on
person
best
qualified
Ignatieff".
And I
"And
start
to
start
an
think the first
discussion
the
with
Mr.
be
would
totally unprepared for this and I explained
was
from Yugoslavia
the outlook
would
we
appointment,
Liberal
to
outlook
that
a
like
said:
Minister
the
when
as
that of
was
non-aligned nation
a
which regarded both the Warsaw Pact and NATO as responsible for the
They considered that the militarization
militarization of Europe.
on
one
side provoked militarization
escalating
pump,
reciprocal
other and
the
on
situation.
the
acted like
from
outlook
The
a
Yugoslavia therefore was one of extreme criticism of the policies
of
confrontation
and
accommodation
or
sides
both
Moreover,
sides.
both
instead of
-
strategy
were
working
out
defence,
of
provoking
they
-
mutual
of
kind
a
nuclear
a
both
were
subordinating strategy to nuclear weapons and this presented a very
serious problem which,
was
not
in
arms
negotiations.
control
for this
of Tito
attitude
that he had not
and
come
kind
what
Yugoslavs thought.
the
Sidney
surprise
intended to
George
Drew
intervened to say
bound
by
that
therefore
of
Mexico
had to
then
it
was
or
of
business
this
to say that
the
in relation
Sweden:
that the
necessarily of
very
thought
support
the
ringing assertion of Canadian
What did that matter?
intervened
the commitments
Well,
to
was
He
listening
To my
new
the
to
to
great
Alliance,
a
position
government was not
the Liberal
appropriate
to
government
possibly consider for instance adopting
to that
Ignatieff
a
all
pledged
was
look at all the options
that we would
similar
Smith
the
but that
government
was
would be
I
to listen to such neutralist talk.
and what
NATO
thought
I
talk,
Alliance, and that he had expected
support for
again,
or
neutralist
Yugoslavia.
Conservative
the
either between the alliances
Well,
of
the non-aligned,
view of
point of
being properly addressed,
knocked down
that
from the
government and
listen
what
to
Mr.
say.
I
was
introduced to
the
Prime
Minister, which I
found very surprising, and the Prime Minister asked me to introduce
the various heads of Canadian missions.
I returned
to Belgrade
Nothing more was said,
and almost immediately received
112
a
and
telegram
000292
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
Sidney Smith,
from
then
Secretary of State for External Affairs,
saying that they wanted me to return to Ottawa.
said that they
Minister he
the
anxious
very
were
When I went to see
accept the post of Deputy High Commissioner in London.
Mr.
Smith
NATO
in
"You
how Mr. Drew reacted to
saw
Paris,
decide and he has decided
putting me
can
into
be of any
and,
in London
use
looked at
Minister
the
me and
up
problems,
need for
because
I
not
So,
Mr.
I
said
it
is
see
how
"Well,
really can't
Then
by both hands and said
me
my brother who died.
those grounds,
across
and all I asked
Canada which I did to pick
could about current Canadian internal
I
as
on
I
knew Mr. Drew
extremely conscious
was
of
the
diplomats to know more about Canada than about the country
which they
to
chance to go
information
as much
over
was
happy in Yugoslavia".
am
was
refuse
I could not very well
given the
I
clutched
"Do this for Nick's sake", which
was to be
will go".
you
very difficult position,
a
it
appointment".
this
to
and
to
it, and let it be for the Prime Minister
Smith said "Well let's try
I
kindly
take
said
I
intervention
at the head of missions meeting,
likely that he would
to
my
should
that I
were
visit including
one
accredited.
to where
after
And
had worked
I
on
a
brief
trans-Canada
railroad construction
in the Kootenay Valley, I arrived in London, and found my fears at
first
were
more
than
suspicion,
both
on
to send
and
because
me
concerned.
the
justified.
Mr.
Drew
regarded
me
with
grounds that the Prime Minister had chosen
I
was
"Pearsonality"
a
far
as
Indeed jokes went on with Prince Philip.
as
he was
Prince Philip
reported to have asked Drew "How are you getting along with
your Pearsonality"?
Because I often filled in for Mr. Drew at
was
functions at Buckingham Palace.
There
pulling, and
announced that
at
first Mr.
Drew
was
a
certain amount of leg
I
was
to
only do
those things which he specifically assigned me, that it was not to
be
assumed that
as
his
deputy,
decisions in any degree.
grew
from
two
sources.
became great friends.
She
was
Johnson,
a
I
I
could act
must say that
One
was
that
She had a
great
very remarkable woman.
the
great
Metropolitan
my
113
the
wife
and
on
Firenza
make
and
Drew
George Drew.
the daughter of
singer,
or
improvement really
influence
She was
Opera
in his place,
head
Edward
of
the
000293
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
Metropolitan Opera,
that the Prime Minister
was
I had this "bohunk"
that I
this was
As
so
was
too,
she
The other thing that happened
was
because
Drew very
clearly
and whether it
over,
came
and
background, but he showed Mr.
in his favour.
was
talent,
great
Italy and so on.
being brought up in
much the exception as far
so
the bureaucracy was concerned, he had to take that into account.
as
I
of
man
a
asked by the Prime Minister to be his sort of
was
liaison while
he visited London and this was his first visit after he had won the
election,
I
good and
the
election, and he wanted to meet all the
the second
mean
great.
had been in London with the Masseys,
I
As
I
knew some of these people and arranged meetings, and took the Prime
Minister around.
on
Then
he made
speech
great
a
the Empire sponsored by Lord Beaverbrooke.
in the Albert Hall
stood out à great
He
perhaps the last spokesman for the Empire at the time when the
and
British
were
retreating from the Empire and Commonwealth in favour
Community.
of the European
Actually,
[HILL]
[IGNATIEFF]
I
It was
attended that meeting.
an
extraordinary experience.
But anyway,
my
stay in London coincided with the effort of Diefenbaker to divert,
as
you probably remember,
percent
15
I
think it
the United States to Britain and the drive for
It
was
a
busy time,
had
you
marketing Canadian products,
Drew is
a
person who
either liked
or
Then we became
more
than
Mr.
in
a
and
fast friends
good deal
of the
representing him in all
and
was
not
promotion of trade.
as
I
too
and
I
found
particularly
time in
in social
and
saw
Churchill
to be
any
in
England,
incidentally.
asleep and
change
visit to
He was
and
And he
114
functions.
had to fit
I was
there to represent
that
was
De Gaulle,
the
last
in
time
I
in a wheelchair and was thought
Macmillan came up to
the General"?
I
to do
functions which meant making
kinds of
Canada at the famous dinner given by the Queen for
only official
He
by disliking
myself having
Canada,
and
because Mr.
easy
say he started
going to Buckingham Palace.
his
speeches
making
intensely personal in his relations.
thought was my share
Drew was
speeches,
and it
disliked you,
me.
I
is
around
go
to
of trade from
was,
him
and
looked
said:
up
and
"Did you
said:
see
"Yes,
000294
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
before he
like
was
burgundy".
bottle of hock;
a
Stroke or not, he
also Mr. Drew's plan to
was
still
was
is
like
much
on
he
now
very
bottle of
a
the
ball.
It
High Commission's office from
move the
Canada
House
in
Trafalgar Square to Grosvenor House in Grosvenor
Square,
and
to
buy the old
negotiate this purchase and plan to
I
so
asked
to
perhaps
that
nothing of the kind.
arrived
him.
in London
He
and
will
I
the
of
new
forget
never
we
go,
busy time and
had rather taken
stop,
would
but
Howard Green
my first meeting with
a
your
civilities
few
office tomorrow".
Foreign Minister
of
and
I
but he
and it will be two old
ladies.
this
was,
was
in the
provide just tea and biscuits, and you
happened
to
going to be put out,
am
I
understand,
you
Do you think you could
What
I
elevation
sudden
would like to borrow
"I
"Only for tea
too".
a
His successor was Howard Green.
thought to myself, here
come
my
So,
into my office and exchanged
came
then he said:
said
was
had
we
less than two years I
Sidney Smith had died.
course
granted
for
and
back to become Assistant Under-Secretary and
come
meantime of
It
move.
surprised that after
somewhat
was
Embassy,
American
the
was
Canada
first official
England and
to
can
visit
instead of
going to see immediately Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary or the
high people in Whitehall, his
with
the
wounded
two
in
nurses
who had
thought well
we
started
to
looked after
in the First World War.
1917
ladies who had been his
I
first thought was that he would meet
and
nurses
him when
He invited
after him
looked
he
was
first
these two old
in hospital.
goodness, what a new and sincere approach.
my
talk and then
of
course
it
turned
out
that
And
while
Howard Green had been educated in the University of Toronto he had
been born and brought up in the Arrow Lakes which is close to the
Kootenay district.
War I.
and
on
we
I
knew
He had served in the
exactly where his home
was,
where his mother
the whole life
Again,
friends.
part of,
somehow
or
it was
a
in that part of the world.
question that
felt that I
he
to, his background.
other related
some
smart alec
bureaucrat that did not understand him.
was
that
I
Norman
lived
chatted about all these things and the old paddle wheelers
Kootenay lake and
became
Kootenay Regiment in World
when
Robertson,
came
to
Ottawa
who
was
Under-Secretary
I
115
found
myself
and
as
had
I
was
was
not
The result
Assistant
been
We
to
appointed
000295
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
Under-Secretary by Sidney Smith.
Sidney Smith's appointment
that while Diefenbaker could not refuse
Robertson,
Norman
of
would
he
found
him
too
intellectual.
figure
in
the
whole
of
not
He
patterned
great
a
was
politics
his
too
on
everyday".
This
could not
no
Howard
say
Green
development
believe
for
I
all
put
me
any
in
and
said
"I
I
Minister,
The
sakes
you'd
will
whatever
do
think he particularly wants advice
to
you
come
on
I went to
them
say,
you
I
during the
and
came
to
think
"I
the
Prime Minister wants,
the
question
And that did turn out to
NORAD and
of
be the
happened
What
St.
Laurent
election:
Pearson
last months of the St.
problem
was,
as
said that this
there were
reflects
was
too many
in his
not to
that
been
Minister
Prime
be decided until after
political issues.
memoirs,
I
Laurent, Pearson regime,
just before the election, and
Cabinet
see
not
do
described briefly in my memoirs, that the NORAD Agreement had
drawn up
I
strange
the
they said:
And
Prime Minister's mind.
in the
would like
told
and
better do what
these nuclear problems."
was
"You are to feel that
I could not.
leap-frogging system."
in this
uppermost
with Norman.
on
extremely difficult position.
Robertson,
Norman
I
time and
an
to the Prime
and
our
office
my
to
as
strategies
that, when I arrived, again to my great surprise I
come
can
figured
had
and
well
summoned by the Prime Minister, and he said:
you
outstanding
the
He
he
incidentally, Diefenbaker admired.
of
deal
Robertson;
Norman
obviously
was
Mackenzie King but he did not get
result
to
warm
Foreign Service.
the
advisor to Mackenzie King whom,
He
difficult situation was
But the
known, as
It was
did
Pearson
the
not
want
а
bilateral defence command, that he had argued with Dulles and with
the State
Department
of the Alliance
that he did not
see
why
one
should be bilateral and confined
of
to
the commands
America,
North
while all the others were subject to the North Atlantic Council and
the consultative machinery which
was
faced with the
adamant
was
involved.
And
related
purposes
on
he
that
the nuclear
That was the key issue, and they were insistent that this
should be therefore
be
course
position that the Americans had
they would not allow any other ally to have a finger
trigger.
of
as
a
separate command structure and that it would
only
nominally,
being
described
to
NATO
the
"North American Regional Planning Group".
for
NATO
But in
116
000296
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
fact
they did
report
not
plans and so on.
to
But,
that.
submit
did not
their
of
any
And the question of consultation with allies
the rise of nuclear weapons
to
and
NATO
therefore unresolved.
over
will
come
the key problem from the Canadian standpoint
was,
was
I
that Mr. Diefenbaker in the early days of his Prime Ministership,
when
he
still
was
Secretary
also
Defence with making
decision.
a
Sidney Smith would have
would
and
sticking
have
Prime Minister,
of
as I
pals
but
He was
in
in
intelligent
an
army),
went
which you know,
It
fact
been to
to
literally
Cabinet
the
was not
only
Foulkes,
said:
him and
was
one
and had
not
fish
But,
self-confident
very
a
think
I
particular
this
under the urging of General
in the
in
the fish hook
was
Cabinet";
had
up.
because
said, before Smith's appointment,
State
General Pearkes,
old
seen
was
by National
confronted
mention that
I
what
seen
was
Affairs
External
for
and would have warned the Prime Minister.
out
Secretary
State
appointed Sidney Smith)
(before he had
man
of
mood
and
(they
were
"This has been to
of
these
half truths.
approved.
been
But,
Pearkes said:
"It had been to Cabinet and it is just waiting for
signature,
Americans
defence
been
the
have
signed
arrangement for North America,
working
for
on
time.
some
Liberals have been working
signed
before the
without
looking
into
implications
and
later,
this
that
strategy,
the
And
it is
you
know the kind
simply
under
comes
NATO
so
joint
a
have
we
and
the
was
not
for years and it just
this
on
election".
It
it,
the Prime Minister signed it,
background
and
without
getting
the
the rest of it.
And then he discovered,
subordinated Canadian defence to American
all
the nuclear
strategy, and
that having
signed
the
NORAD
Agreement, which was what the Americans wanted, i.e. for purposes
of defence, the Canada-US frontier was down.
That was one of the
reasons
should
overfly
why,
when
I
detailed
be
Canada
in
was
in
Washington,
and
consultations
each
case.
I
we
insisted
permission
was
to
that
there
deploy
instruction
under
and
very
definitely to say that the Canadian Government would not agree that
the border
did not exist for the purposes of defence.
then
this
that
purposes of
would
defence.
be
the
This,
end
of
Canadian
together with the
We realized
sovereignty,
for
of
trans-
nationals in the economic field, very seriously affected us.
NORAD
117
presence
000297
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
therefore represented a very major political decision regarding our
sovereignty.
explained in any way to Mr. Diefenbaker,
This was not
whose one great,
think sincere, belief was in Canadian integrity,
I
unity and nationalism.
[HILL]
If
interject,
might
I
still think you get that sort of
I
situation now, where there are people who would like
of "straight
alliance", mainly anti-Soviet.
to have
a
sort
They would brush aside
the whole sovereignty business.
exactly
[IGNATIEFF]
This
Pentagon view,
that the enemy
a
was
and
Foulkes
the Soviet Union,
was
in
was
that
on
the
they were
direct threat to North America and that for purposes of defending
America
North
could
there
sovereignty.
But
this
then
told
that
he
was
British-Canadian
weapon which
needs
-
there
he
would take
shape
or
no
the
explained
build
to
purposes,
Mr.
to
aircraft,
Arrow
of
separation
an
all
authority
which
to
need for such
of all
care
an
aircraft,
that and
one
case
of
fit Canadian
NORAD,
the United States
because
they would not buy the Arrow in any
they had all kinds of aircraft and missiles and
form;
a
interceptor
weather
designed
under
was
in other words it was
constructed, planned,
or
Diefenbaker, and
told by National Defence after he had signed
was
no
was
was
be
not
was
consortium
specially for Canadian
a
it,
fury,
we
I
think,
Diefenbaker not only made the decision to scrap the Arrow,
but he
were
going into the missile age anyway.
said
that
made,
had to
every
plane,
even
the
few
models
that had
been
be destroyed.
They were burnt,
[HILL}
[IGNATIEFF]
given
Arrow
And in his
Apart
werent they?
from the
mounting cost of
the explanation for scrapping it,
the Arrow, which was
was
horrified when
he
found himself committed under the joint plan to
the Bomarcs to
be
installed in Canada to
as
the industrial
NATO
we
had
defend,
if you please,
empire of the United States.
also
to
Starfighter converted
accept
to
he
the heartland of
We were
told that in
capable weapons, the 104
strike aircraft, and the Honest
nuclear
nuclear
118
000298
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
for
Johns
Army.
the
Suddenly
Diefenbaker
Mr.
considering a Canadian defence policy,
instead of
tied to a defence
policy subordinated to a certain type of weapons,
weapons programme.
policy.
It
Canadian
unity
witness,
because I
and I
sovereignty
Canadian
and
were
which
asked
was
attend,
to
for
unusual
saw the
I
of
concepts
all
were
nuclear
a
Canadian defence
any
about.
by the Prime Minister
asked
was
that is
against all his
absolutely
went
cabinet defence meetings,
But Bryce
question of
There was no
himself,
found
I
attend
to
occasion he was
Staff,
of the Air
me,
time
you
outspoken
he said
you talk about
face
me
had to
with
fait
a
intervene
attacks, personal attacks
minister responsible.
of
this crisis
breakup
of
in
the
by
misled
accepting,
Chief
was
deliberately
misled
bomber threat then you
as
on
the
could not
accept such
Defence
staff, when he was
the chiefs of
the
to understand the build-up
cabinet,
ended
the
say,
that he
say
Harkness,
It is difficult
and
a
which
the
defeat
of
of
course
with
the
Diefenbaker
the
that Diefenbaker felt that he had
terms
National
I
accompli."
to
cabinet
the
government, except in
been
a
who
On
missile threat, and that the Americans have to decide,
a
Minister,
Campbell,
to Hugh
"You have misled me,
and time again,
say it is
and
so
some
fury with which
Diefenbaker attacked the representatives of National Defence.
one
was
servant.
civil
a
what
Defence,
had
he
policy
defence
been
for
tricked
which
Canada
into
was
subordinated to a certain type of weapons programme and also to the
interest of
a
foreign government.
in relation to the United States.
his personal antipathy to
a
It affected his whole attitude
I
mean
a
lot has been said about
young President such
as
Kennedy.
But
it had this background in the defence issues, where he felt he had
been cornered into
convictions.
was
he
was
Market.
and
subordinate position and contrary to all his
The only solution that he could
see
was
twofold, one
to try to strengthen the ties with Britain and the Commonwealth
and there he
as
a
his
ran
into,
concerned.
The other
various
was
the fact that the tide
The
to
British
were
was
going
out
as
far
about to enter the Common
gain time by encouraging Howard Greene
initiatives
on
arms
control
and
disarmament
negotiations.
119
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[HILL]
period of the European free trade area.
That was the
[IGNATIEFF]
beginning, but he did turn on this tremendous
It was
effort to divert trade and it became almost
you
you could do
know
accomplished.
percent
15
always
not,
questioned
annoyed him
extraordinary
the
Diefenbaker,
things.
wanted to
It
this,
what he
became
clear,
fact
was
real
a
in
some
felt was
was
of
one
was
drive,
but
way
another
or
report
to
the
that
rather similar
We
thing
re-open.
And
great conviction,
to
with conviction.
Howard
thing world
against
is,
war
the
the
a
he
it
who succeeded
far
as
it
when
was
review
or
it.
In
Foulkes,
as
I
was
path
they were willing
that
through
not
had
in
a
age what
of
hell
a
a
absolutely
was
He
He would have been
for
was
the
leader in the
a
given the chance.
been
think any
I
veteran in the First
form.
any
to
Howard Green accepted
that
convinced pacifist and
elimination of nuclear weapons.
peace movement if
from
there was no way in
that
Green having been
commitment
nuclear
that he
was
him,
and seen in his early
was
all kinds
times with Bob Bryce and tried various
follow
wounded,
didn't
and
front he chose,
that
on
an
position,
there was nothing
but
so,
World War and
I
extract himself
to
nothing to discuss
was
several
met
possible options
there
-
that
there was
Things
other
Marshal Miller,
the attitude of Air
concerned.
things
the
to
experts
Trade
and
fact was,
the
isolated
an
had to
I
as
that
But
Finance
of
which the Americans would agree to re-open NORAD
fact,
was
Furniture, costume jewelry, clothes,
NATO
use
in
what
things sold in England.
amount of
expect to be sold.
of
that
amazing
was
Department
George Drew.
and
it
and
matter of faith,
do not know if the actual diversion amounted
I
or
it
a
In
fact,
his
closest friend and colleague in the House of Commons was the member
for
Kootenay, Mr.
his
arm.
He
was
Herridge, who also had
been
member of the CCF.
Anyway,
a
Minister who decided.
I
advised him.
And
I
a
veteran
it
said:
lost
and
Prime
was
the
"The
only sort
of way that you can hold some kind of position in principle against
nuclear weapons
is
to
say:
and control of these weapons
that
we
Bomarks
'We
are
negotiating
the Honest
the position that he
Johns
the reduction
in the multilateral fora,
do not accept nuclear warheads
and
on
and all
even
the
rest
though
of
and
we
it".
pending
have
the
This
was
held, and Howard Green rushed around starting
120
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with
had
very fertile area, which
a
namely
stop
to
problem
fallout
testing
nuclear
in
particularly
was
in the
radioactivity,
as
was
quite
Marshall
east
noticeable
Islands and
in Western
atmosphere.
Calgary and
also
Canada
when
Prairies.
coming
the Soviet tests
from
the
There was fallout,
the
British Columbia,
in
Because
in
But
from
it
the
the Chinese
and
So, he joined up with the Foreign Minister of Ireland,
tests too.
Aiken,
far
atmosphere.
the
serious
testing was being conducted
as
good deal of public support
a
to
lead
the
attack
testing
nuclear
on
at
UN.
the
He
organized the monitoring of radioactivity and our Air Force did the
monitoring,
were
very considerable risk I may say,
a
flying through radioactive clouds and quite a
suffered
race
at
as
for
result.
a
the
moon
greater thrust, and
danger of
arms
an
This
with
the time of
was
all
interestingly enough, Mr.
race
extending
number of them
and the
the Sputnik
missiles
these
because they
with
and
greater
a
Green anticipated the
into outer
space.
In 1962
meeting of the disarmament committee in
when
we
both attended
at
ministerial level, without consulting the Americans and to their
a
Geneva
great annoyance,
Howard Green launched his campaign for a treaty
excluding military uses of outer space. It came as a surprise both
to the Soviet Union and to the United States,
objected
beyond
very
strenuously,
tolerance
any
that
and
said
Canada
and the United States
"This has
that
should have
done
really
gone
thing
like
a
this, without even consulting its closest ally in NATO or anybody".
It did result in the United States and
least,
having
orbiting of nuclear
to ban the
because it was taken up
the
by other Governments
Soviet Union,
weapons
in
at
space,
of the United Nations
and at that time the United Nations was still more influential than
it is today
least
-
signing
weapons
a
treaty,
which
excluded
ban,
Canada did
and
initiative.
in
As I say,
the
show some,
not
say
-
it
pressured into at
orbiting
as
in monitoring,
a
of
nuclear
memorial to
in the partial
peaceful uses of outer space,
only initiative, but some results.
We
the question
of
got support from other countries,
able to
were
into outer space and that still remains
Howard Green's
test
the two nuclear super powers
and
therefore Diefenbaker
did not persuade National
121
Defence
or
was
those who
000301
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
believed
in
the
Canadian/American security
there
possibility
a
was
affecting
that
-
that
the
as
jury was
the
first
attack,
heart
conjunction
Denmark
addition,
In
the NATO forum
Mr. Diefenbaker sent
to the UN.
try
to
to
me
out,
of
their soil.
want to occupy,
not
even
And he said that that
the
position.
NORAD
Leger had
in
Norway
nuclear
particularly Norway and Denmark, which would not
on
addition
could
I
like
countries
proliferation
the
limit
whatever
do
to accept
used in
was
that
reached
be
NATO when Jules
and
non-nuclear-weapon
with
to
weapons
still
would
agreement
some
to
answer
nuclear weapons which would enable Canada not
nuclear weapons.
his
deterrent
nuclear
and
weapons:
allow nuclear
position we
is the
The situation
gave some
ground for discussion because the Europeans had raised, themšelves,
question
the
Americans
understood,
specific
for
the
use
the Americans
agreements
with
information and having
piles.
of
the
nuclear weapons
established by
Alliance.
it
governments,
mention this because that
I
But
required
this
that
both
clearly
was
sharing
on
nuclear
two-key basis to the stock
the
to
access
the
was
fling
last
from
Diefenbaker side to try and avoid the crisis in the cabinet,
that
particular formula.
possibility
multilateral
a
weapons
would
be
nuclear
drawn
based
force
nuclear
warheads,
use
merchant
on
crews
of
willing
to
the
and
countries
all
from
to
the
discussing the
When I was in NATO we were
being equipped with
vessels
these
of
1958
in
agreement
an
it very clear,
made
nuclear
the
control
There had been
be stock-piles of
there would
that
and
consult
you
within the Alliance.
weapons
the
just how
of
participate.
[HILL]
that
was
to ask
when you were
and
last
one
his
all
in the next phase,
one
if
I
know I
could,
have
on
to,
and
of
Canadian
policies.
As
you
these problems with NORAD and
is that
didn't
Government,
they still
they launch
which
was
some
agreed
just wanted
impression that Diefenbaker
an
committed
part
I
the Diefenbaker period,
remained
impression
fact
to that
government
fundamental
were
I
on
actually Ambassador to NATO.
question
from what
which is:
1
wonder if we could go
I
so
on
-
saw
mentioned,
of
by the
122
declaration,
rest
of
a
there
but nonetheless my
wanted to work through NATO.
sort
as,
NATO
the
And
in
the Canadian
allies
in this
000302
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
period?
[IGNATIEFF]
way
Yes,
Diefenbaker looked to NATO rather in the
the Liberals had previously, namely
as
same
the other allies,
that
especially as far as Mr. Diefenbaker was concerned, would counterthrough the consultative machinery of
balance the United States,
He attended NATO ministerial meetings with satisfaction and
NATO.
was
impressed by the fact that NATO had this kind of provision for
consultation at various levels.
of
getting through NATO what he
is what
that
indeed
He
thought he could
see
was
not able
bilaterally,
namely that
thought,
Pearson had
get
to
way
some
the
NORAD
arrangement, whatever the nuclear command and control arrangements,
be
should
subordinate
military commands.
do.
had
We
contribution;
we
had
time
a
a
that
at
we
that
basis,
time
of
On
effective
we
that while
course
sent to
naval
had
an
a
of
What was,
So,
equipped with
agreement to have
instance go
on
doing anything;
and
very unhappy about
as
a
Honest
training
a
allies
in
growing defect
we
discipline and
of
thing, but here
had
to
weapons
see
the
we
had
but
no
104s
for
the
motions
going
of
to
alert
to these weapons,
and
similar situation that there were to be
heavy
but
there
were
increasingly
acute
problem.
about NATO.
that
symbol without any capability of actually
warheads, there they were.
talking
and
going through
Johns,
had at
air force personnel, naturally, they were
our
likewise the army was in
these
terms
being able to actually have access
without
we
were
a
nuclear-capable
the warheads,
alert
Canadian
the
excellent quality of personnel training,
in maneouvres and that sort of
division
air
we
course,
coula
full brigade and
a
division and
component.
like other
what I
see
weakened
not
in all these various contests in
won
performance
an
we
was
had an air division and we had
reasonably good standing.
was
I
commitment to build up to
more
Atlantic Council,
the North
to
equipped
howitzers,
with
nuclear
They could go through the motions for
not
any
warheads
Things
First of all,
came
the
and
so
that
to
a
head,
became
I
am
an
now
Europeans themselves had
raised the question just what
was
in planning and control
nuclear weapons and the Americans had
tried,
as I
over
to be the answer to
participation
say, this multilateral force idea, which Canada did not
123
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in.
take any part
motley crew would
this
weapons which
and it
merchant vessel,
certain
I,
submarine
armed with nuclear
vessel
in
be
plying the
a
oceans
disguised
were
strange idea
very
a
something that was
was
vessels
merchant
to be in this, what
us
be
supposed to
was
want
and it was
"The Pirates of Penzance",
he called
that
Diefenbaker did not
as
tried in
fight
to
ordinary
a
World War
German
the
But with modern methods of detection the Soviets
menace.
would have quickly nailed any of these ships by the presence of the
missiles
deck.
on
I
part in these discussions,
did not take
seriously pursued, the key to that problem was really
but they were
relations
the
And,
France
between
Germany
Germany.
and
been
had
required under the Western European Union Treaty,
and under the
Paris Agreements that brought Germany into NATO,
foreswear,
access,
course,
having direct
their
to having
mean
I
nuclear weapons on their territory
nuclear weapons
own
have
never
up
by
as
against
de Gaulle
the
please,
Germans
really intended against
was
Soviets.
to
have
a
little
were
"Pirate"
concerned,
came
things
Here
Crisis.
was
the Germans,
in
these
forcibly to bring to
and
crews
interested than
some
ships.
end,
rather
to
In the
head
a
nervous
about
the attention of
therefore
of the
as
if
the
others
to
far as we were
Cuban
the
over
state of affairs where
a
very
were
much
as
and part of the MLF scheme was,
Germans
get on board these
they
anyway,
But
more
weapons.
nuclear
whether the independent deterrent set
sure
idea of the Germans,
the whole
you
been quite
to
allied, and the French were
or
particularly concerned about the Germans having
I
or
of
They could have American
to nuclear weapons.
access
to
Missile
Khrushchev attempted
the Americans the threat he
felt the Soviet Union was exposed to by the positioning of American
missiles
in Turkey right
reasons,
such
nuclear
I
gather,
into
missiles
on
its border,
Khrushchev
American Ambassador to Canada and
Diefenbaker,
just
at the
State
for
equipped
same
came
with
to see
time that
Foreign
Affairs
all kinds
these
of
on
was
him and
Dean
in
For
move
warheads
and
detected
by
who had been the
showed him the photographs
United
photographs.
124
Italy.
in
reasonably good terms with
Acheson, the
the
as
were
Livingston Merchant,
reconnaissance aircraft.
Mr.
well
decided to
and
Cuba,
as
former
States,
Secretary of
came
to
NATO
And the Council met at
000304
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
night
and
went
we
accepted
had
Council
these photographs.
over
the
evidence
of
reported
I
that the
photographs
these
as
sufficient proof that indeed Soviet vessels were on the way to Cuba
with nuclear missiles.
[HILL]
just
Can I
ask
question here.
a
Ambassador to NATO,
I
believe?
[IGNATIEFF]
I
was
already,
'62.
And
in
was
Yes,
the
of
fall
acknowledges
fact
the
in the summer, this
gone
Diefenbaker
Mr.
he
that
I had
You at this time were
did
receive
in
his
memoirs
report.
my
But
Livingston Merchant having shown him the photographs, which he did,
received
fine,
say
the
is
reply from
do not accept in
but I
this
following
a
direct nuclear
this should be put before
to
establish
the
a
exactly what are
threat and
This, in effect,
to
United
Nations
said.
as
Is there
threat or is
a
course
horrified when
We were still
discussing in NATO
what the allied response to the Soviet action should be,
of
alert
was
President Kennedy,
America only.
the
President Kennedy had authorized the declaration
nuclear alert under NORAD.
degree
to
Security Council".
the
of
He was
think that
threat
a
you
that this
-
I
-
is
commission established
to
go
that
seriousness
North America
the facts.
that should
was what he
he discovered that
a
threat
and there should be an international
there not
of
of such
matter
unilaterally by the United States.
should be decided
peace,
a
"Well,
Diefenbaker:
The
NORAD
alert,
the highest
degree
and
appropriate.
was
of
The situation was that
and what
declared by
affected
North
Diefenbaker, having taken the
position that this had to go to the United
and should be
Nations,
dealt with by an international commission, certainly was not in any
mood to accept
the
implication
that
Canada
readiness by the say-so of the US President.
[HILL]
in
a
And this
state
was
of
war
done....
Without any consultation between....
[IGNATIEFF]
did not
was
accept
Yes,
the
and
for that reason
NORAD declaration
President had failed to consult him.
125
Diefenbaker said that he
of
readiness
And you
see
because
that
the
provision,
000305
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
the power of
the
NORAD Without
consultation,
NORAD,
of
USA
to make
a
by
alert
nuclear
is still the most objectionable feature
time
reaction
the
because
declaration of
a
of
now
missiles
and
computerized controls of these weapons has been reduced to a matter
of minutes,
should imagine it is questionable
in any case now I
so
be
consultative process to declare
whether
there
NORAD.
Anyway NATO consultations proceeded daily
can
a
degree of danger and threat
the
beginning with France,
Wednesday
it
was
a
state
he
historical
and
a
as
getting
was
half,
Sunday,
in his memoirs, based
says
NATO,
that
was
think
I
not
interesting
An
NORAD.
from
Tuesday, at least two days,
on
advice
on the
concerned
that
might
there
be
authorized
a
in
NORAD was concerned,
by
the Government,
Maritime
of
maritime
one
Atlantic,
asking
that
declare
how
were.
known,
me what
I
got
the hell
a
unready,
state
of alert.
in
state
a
of
using both
Kennedy,
as
a
as
well
gesture
contacts
the
as
UN
the
getting in
until
statement in the House
alert,
-
between
and
our
idly by,
it
as
hemisphere, and
this focused attention on
But,
war
on
instructions
threat against the Western
a
direct
through
in Washington
a
was
for Harkness.
of course Canada could not stand
After the crisis had been resolved
Khrushchev,
threat
happening, what was
was
absolutely no
when the Prime Minister made his
in the face of
must
just
the
(since
precautionary battle stations), had slipped
did not know,
I
to the effect
we
Halifax
immediately without even waiting
touch with me and
Thursday,
been
not
SACLANT, the commander of the naval forces of the
and
left
going on?
far
the Cabinet made the decision
in Europe did not know what to do and kept
forces
were,
in
Command
was taking up
anchor and
until
as
And this had been preceded by the fact that Canadian
day later.
ships
But this had
state of alert.
a
of
state
a
mutiny, declared that Canadian Armed Forces were officially,
as
day
a
or
final decision by the Cabinet and the Prime
before the
Harkness,
Minister,
he
from
fact
on
was
I
USA.
Thursday before Diefenbaker finally accepted
or
alert,
of
with the
think it started
I
exactly what
on
ally after another,
one
solidarity
declared
any instructions.
without
and
was,
alert in
an
the Canadian
Forces
in the way that is well
President
Kennedy
Soviet Ambassador
and
Dobrynin
direct communications with Khrushchev
towards
the
126
allies
for
-
showing solidarity
000306
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi
Loi sur
s
l'accès à l'information
(we
not excluded),
were
to
Washington.
of
us
with
thanked
in 1962,
was
silos,
installations
the nuclear
and so
board
Command,
Air
military command units,
on
United
the
the
us to
States.
headquarters,
and the submarine
nuclear submarine.
a
and invited
This
learned what all the installations were, the
I
Strategic
the
in
one
Office,
in the Oval
us
solidarity that we had shown,
for the
visit all
He received
it.
on
names
Atlantic Council
North
little tray which he gave each
I still have the
our
us
invited the whole
bases.
various
the
I
actually
was
Now, while I was in Washington being
thanked by the
President,
this business,
particularly the role of the 104s (modified for
nuclear-strike
capability
my
on
really important
of the
one
no
doubt about the
in command,
a
and
situation
I
Air
our
without
subject
possible
to
our
the
him.
regarded
attacks,
here
with
in a
we
to
see
to
take off
McNamara,
Robert
the
and get out
Secretary
of
crisis.
because
the way.
Defense,
of
Washington DC, and asked him what was his advice.
to be the
Chief of the Pentagon.
that he took down
one
this is
the Korean War
that
the
North
a
on
They
they
So
my
He was
were
So,
all
I
went
own,
in
supposed
The curious thing about it was,
of his black books,
black reference books behind his desk,
said, "Yes,
faced
nuclear-
targeted as a nuclear-capable unit, but with no warheads.
they could do was
well
and there was
But
equiped
was
communication
missile
a
Air Marshal Dunlop was
meet
Division
been
was
Alliance,
airmen.
used to constantly
capacity aircraft,
were
The Air Division
units of the
quality of
where
worried about
I
because the Air Division had
equipped for an interception role).
as
initiative,
own
he
had
a
whole
and looked up the
lot
104
of
and
high level interceptor, planned and built for
for the
interception of the then advanced MIG types
Koreans
had
use
of
from
the
Soviet
air
force".
Their main characteristic was manoeuvrability at high levels; they
were
I
speedy and manoeuvrable at high levels of interdiction.
said:
strike
are
"How
aircraft"?
totally
levels,
does this
and
He
useless.
they
relate
said:
To
have
to
conversion
their
nuclear
"That should never have happened, they
begin with, they
to
into
And
be
for
the
are
not
role
of
aircraft, they have to fly under radar or
nuclear
strike
at low levels to avoid
radar and that is why there are a lot of accidents.
127
reliable at low
I
believe your
000307
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
luckier
is
division
fliers, they are not supposed to be
thing
is
that
we
have
We
are
moving
weapons.
;
no
perhaps
Germans,
the
than
flown at low levels.
them
for
need
as
the missile
into
they're
The other
carriers
of
and
we
era,
better
nuclear
will
deploying missiles to take care of that particular thing".
"What do
do with the
we
I
to be
he
"How do
said:
tell
we
nuclear-capable
said "That
know.
would
I
background,
in 1965,
is
I
reported to
a
to make
made
"Are you
it
aircraft they knew
mistake,
cost
these aircraft into this
role.
Hellyer
that
came
do not
I
against that kind
was
I
substitute
different role,
deadlock in Ottawa
It was a
very considerable
a
I
This deadlock continued until 1965
with
a
He
went
directly
to tell
had
delegation
to
meeting
for the
the SACEUR,
got
opposition what my own views
the
My only contribution
subject.
of
to Canada's
looking
for
a
policy,
the
first
defence
policy, moving towards
that
functions,
most
of
which
our
I
Forces
were
we
had
trained and committed to Canadian
look
at
was
northern defence;
to
train
re-open
forces in Arctic weather;
and
And
I
possibly the British,
or
at
doing
I
felt
on
the
was
that
we
were
country
every
was
striking
peace-keeping
situated
in the
really no plans and no
forces
or
were
northern defence and what we
least
some
of
Churchill and train at
and work out an
our
forces
for
least part of our
arrangement with Norway
the Germans and some others of
128
him
Canadian defence
a
said what
either
thoroughly supported,
central area in NATO and that
should
were
in NATO,
responsibility and obligation of
under the Alliance was self-defence.
was
role
NATO
from
Diefenbaker, and this was accepted, that if
I did stress to
over
convert
to
sum
what he could have got from me, but did not get it from me.
that
of
reported they
and
to take out
or use them for a
over
parliamentarians.
Well,
photographs."
National Defence did not want to admit they
suspect that
I
it
when
said:
I
meeting of NATO parliamentarians
photography or interception.
a
"Well,
for diplomats,
is
decision, either
a
another aircraft, which we could,
this.
and said:
that the 104 issue continued unresolved.
really had
even
the
to take
that
Well,
them".
said:
possible role in photography".
a
only good
business,
scrap
me
at
Soviets that
the
are
your
which
it has
"Yes,
He said:
looked
try photography".
if you want to keep the 104,
serious".
He
104?"
I
be
reciprocal
000308
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
defence commitments with our European allies to undertake
of
North
American
defence,
European
partners
would
it
and
intended
was
in
share
the deterrent,
defence of
as
share
NATO.
Our
responsibilities
the
would in
we
under
a
of
part in
turn take
our
the
defence of Northern Norway which was mostly exposed to the nuclear
concentrations
tried out,
Arctic,
the
of
indeed
and
it
Soviets in the
went
I
was
a
first
the
on
success
Kola
that
sense
equipped and trained,
even
other.
There
occasion when
Canadians
matters
as
frost bitten,
the
ski-doos,
was
the
we
one
least
had
with
kinds of
all
limited
our
in the Northern
manoeuvres
the
in
things,
And this was
Peninsula.
we
better
were
resources,
than any
stood
out
in such
most
mobile,
we
had the
skiis,
and
impressed
the
Norwegians even with our mobility; and we had helicopters.
This
was
the
direction which I still feel is desirable under an
alliance,
that
specialization.
change,
but
equipment,
need
you
to
changed,
is not
this is really
that partly sheltering
division
a
of
on
I
worked
to
lack of standardization of
is the
scandalous
a
based
labour
big defect in NATO which
The other
it
have
state
of
affairs.
It
under the American nuclear guarantee,
is
but
increasingly using defence as a means of developing high tech
also
industry,
except
role
each
country developed it's own weapons (I may
American
agreement).
The
that,
which, as you know, merely assumed a subsidiary
for Canada,
to
say
industry
defence
result
NATO,
each country
even
for such basic
was
in
that
virtually had
a
under
the
maneuvers
defence
and
sharing
exercises
in
motley selection of equipment
things as ammunition for quick-firing weapons.
The ammunition was not standardized and therefore you
not sure
were
if the lines of
supply would even provide the basic amount required
for
days with the kind of rapid-firing weapons used in
a
matter of
modern warfare.
troops,
trucks
Tanks
were
were
not
standardized
because what has
happened has been
make deals with
industries.
and
therefore,
in
a
way
standardized,
not
and
this
the
carriers
has
been
for
serious
that governments have sought to
And various firms bid for contracts,
again,
our
strategy
in
NATO
has
been
subordinated to commercialized trade in equipment.
Part
VI
-
Ambassador to the North Atlantic Gouncil, mid-1960s
129
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
[HILL]
Can I
in Government.
in, and
question
In
The Liberal
under Lester Pearson
irritant.
equipment for the
nuclear
of
there
1964
in
Then
Government
degree of pull back.
some
that Canada was not
in the
future
as
was
again.
US,
and
Could
a
was
decisions
came
the
on
that
Defence White Paper, which
the
I mean
not outside NATO but
already see at that
could
One
time
perhaps going to play quite so prominent a role
Germany
example,
For
the past.
in
it had
already becoming very strong,
up
there
forces which resolved
really looked in some other directions,
at
1963
at the outset he took
believe right
I
change
ask you another point?
was
coming
France was under De Gaulle and
This was also the period of the McNamara strategy in the
the
move
tell
you
us
towards
and
defence
forward
flexible response.
something about the changes in allied strategy
period, and how Canada fitted
What
part did Canada
play in thinking about both the conventional side
and the nuclear
in that
in?
side?
[IGNATIEFF]
that
of course Pearson
Well,
"The government had
up
lived
not
to
gone nuclear
capable without getting the
the warheads
and
But,
I
it's commitment,
out
the
of
it had
He would get
warheads".
then negotiate Canada
by saying
the election
won
role.
nuclear
think it would be honest to say that the allies regarded
this whole business as something that was peculiarly Canadian and
not anything for them to interfere with.
severely about
what
we
I
felt
that
interests.
I
briefings
about
the shelf
which did
may say that Mr.
industry
subordinate
stated,
defence,
to
not fit
Again,
our
have always
defence expenditures
prevailed
but he bought
an
any of the needs which
Armed Forces
and
defence
were
again
aircraft off
were
described
made the victims
our
strategies
of
were
than
equipment made related to
It
has
been
it
is not
rather
said,
over
but
Hellyer came over and I attended the
needs
functions.
began,
taken out and the CF-5
contracting,
equipment,
defined
I
aircraft
the
by the military.
defence
were
considerations
commercial
very
going to do in the matter of the Air
were
Division because the 104s
questioned
We were
in terms of GNP.
130
I
so
our
main
problem
much weakness
went
over
all
of
this
in
our
sort
000310
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
of thing many times in our examination
given
all
of
kinds
Conservatives,
that
had
we
transportation needs of
the
used to look at me and say,
kind
that
try
"You
stuff, all
of
we
big country.
a
we
are
want
to
see
commitment to European defence".
big boys
know
bring
to
but
raise
shown
to
the
in
their
Unfortunately,
environment.
was
is
in
we
did
Europeans
Diefenbaker,
and
they
were
say
the
in
Arctic
did accept this
never
reciprocity.
There is training of
here,
of
air space
is
some
use
Canadian
particularly those
countries,
contacts
in the Arctic,
have
idea
that
interests
and
no
should accept specific commitments
the Canadian North
defence of
which
we
as
course
training of
for
aircraft and gunnery and all that sort of thing, but
certain
and
take part,
I
as
the
Northern
idea that there should be
there
your
really this;
operations
defence
the
and do not
what
I raised it under
the Armed Forces,
of
And they
now
is
specialization
under the Liberals and
morale
tops
be
of
That did come out,
it was approved
it did
degree
some
Arctic defence.
and
only constructive new element
The
that happened after the change of government
effort
Liberals
in the CNR deficit and the cost
count
to
by
both
arguments
Highway and Air Canada and all kinds of things
of the Trans-Canada
in view of
ingenious
every year in NATO and I was
have accepted
for the
in support of
Norway.
I would not
apart
from
the
Hellyer, NATO
put
fact
found
reasonable
up
by the time I left in 1965,
say that
that
that,
in
you
dealing
with
Mr.
Pearson
know, they were at
arguments,
they
and
had
marked shift in
fact,
in
Because
NATO
I
my
experience,
subject
realized that
representative of Canada
they did expect
Although
the
weakened
in
support
role
a
my
there
remained,
opinion
aircraft
by
decided
-
severe
on
certain
but there was
not much
he
immobilized, but
the
Pearson
the air
division
from
was
131
this
not
CF5,
administration.
was
which
regarded
questioning.
going after the
use
was
in
Diefenbaker the
under Mr.
because
having
which
more
that
was
in NATO
little more
brigade
say
to
-
Mr.
and
increasing Canada's commitment and we were,
think it was true to
people
that,
least willing to
equipment in the direction of conventional weapons,
no
1966,
as
definitely
was
an
army
a
very
big
000311
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
contribution to strengthening the NATO alliance.
significant
element
new
In
NATO's
attention
while
you
devoted to
was
kept very busy in
been
have
period,
this
of
business
say the
only
accepting
the
I
Norway.
commitment to support
[HILL]
this
was
As
done, in the group of
relations with
time.
that
There
think, working
14 I
there,
were
good
a
France.
was
a
of
deal
You must
of work
lot
out the arrangements
for
Did Canada play a particular role in this
negotiating with France.
in helping to keep the French in the Alliance?
area,
[IGNATIEFF)
Yes,
first of all,
was
I
pretty active in this operation because,
and by this time Jules
had succeeded Jules Leger,
I
Leger was Ambassador and we were very close friends and worked very
closely with the French Government,
French
of
series
Ambassador de Leusse,
came
to
head.
a
I
chairman
also
was
felt could not be
course
protection to France
small.
so
had
Gaulle
institutions,
as
well
of
was
reservations
his
"machins",
"machins".
were all
He
prejudices and peculiarities.
remember
Stikker
telling
go"?
said:
"Well,
because
of
aura
the
because of the
others.
the
of
gave
Distances
une
he
NATO,
all the
the UN,
(in
He
hardly
it.
me
I
two
one
received
ever
Once when he did,
said:
"Well,
questions,
French) '?"
and
one
was
'Est-
"No,
Stikker said:
be
a
deterrent and the United States;
as
long
I
do not
think
there
"(In French)
homme
responsable"?
Est-ce-que
And
a
I
how did it
will
Alliance.
nuclear
asked
guerre
international
all
Stikker.
Dr.
about
me
Gaulle said:
un
even
This system
it stays with the United States there will not be
est
NATO
of restoring the monarchy,
terms
Secretary General of NATO,
y
in
really did live in the 18th
knew his
ce-que'il
committee
something which
about
and thought in
He
the
to the
as
Century,
the
with
integrated command came as a great surprise.
he called them all
organizations,
a
My recollection was that the actual decision
of France to leave the
De
particularly
but
easily destroyed.
French
all
friends with
also
was
the representative at the time when all this
dealing with early warning, and this
were
I
NATO,
to
Ambassadors
and
war".
war,
as
Then de
le Président des Etats-Unis
Stikker said:"I do not discuss
132
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
heads of state,
I
do not think
Then the conversation ended.
I
I
competent to respond to that".
am
But the
strange thing
say with all these eccentricities, it really did
His
often
moves
d'Orsay and
came as
to
surprise
a
commanders.
the
Like
the
come
shock.
a
as
as
officials, the Quai
to his
even
that,
was
Missile
Cuban
affair:
what happened was that he declared solidarity with Kennedy over the
Cuban Missile
Crisis.
SACLANT,
over
Gaulle,
came
because
of the highest
Then afterwards,
US
naval
orders
of
Lorry Norstad, SACEUR, one
given
Légion d'Honneur.
the
largely because Lorry Norstad
was
think that
I
he
came
over,
to
his
great
when he thanked the President, the President said:
"What
do you
mean
said:
"Well,
were
the
own".
the
French
fleet
it's
you know
was
Gaulle said:
agitated; and this
I
Légion d'Honneur.
The
Navy and said:
"I
under your
integrated
an
French, the British,
De
was
disagreement with President
in
Kennedy about missiles.
So Admiral Dennison, when
also expected to get the Légion d'Honneur.
But,
surprise,
commander,
by General de
to Paris expecting to be thanked
de Gaulle had
-
the
heard
some
And
heard from Robert Schumman.
General
summoned
he
was
very
was
Dennison got
the Admiral
"Was it true that the Navy
There
Germans, and our
it".
of
Dennison
command.
naval
the Canadians,
never
command".
of
no
French
a
under command of an
American Admiral during the Cuban Missile Crisis"?
"But,
He said:
do you realize that France could have been plunged into nuclear war
by a decision of the United
Nobody ever told me".
a
States
integrated command.
under this
This is very interesting because there is
parallel to Diefenbaker.
always feel that there
I
is
a
certain
parallelism, which is not sufficiently realized in Canadian reading
of
the situation,
President
that
Kennedy
integrated.
He
by
"Absolutely,
army,
orders
navy,
only
air
will
De
leave
force
from
the
and
on
told
briefed
that
NATO
commands
implications of
Diefenbaker,
and
their reaction
Gaulle
flew
into
of
today
all
as
you will
of
learn
France,
immediately".
133
rage
and
an
was
said,
integrated commands,
that you will
and that rule will
and I want this carried out
a
by
were
the
President
authority to declare war,
that he had been misled
on
been
had
nor
similar.
we
being
not
had not
integrated command,
remarkably
de Gaulle felt
he
alone
receive
has
the
be observed from now
Well,
as I
say,
this
000313
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-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
came
as
sort
a
of
a
reaction,
but
was not
decision in any
a
if you like,
tantrum
it took
some
time
not unlike Diefenbaker's
filter down to the French.
to
favoured by the Quai d'orsay
way
They found themselves in
the French Department of Defence.
It
by
or
very
a
difficult position because, you know, there were all the pipelines
based
France, the headquarters were in France, all the military
on
machinery was in France and this is what the
to go.
De
And so it was that
Leusse
and
confrontation,
had
it
through
gone
was
sort of
something
in
not
were
on
explained,
I
were
in
Anyway,
we
the
of
sort
the
and he
came
that
mind would
be
changed.
disentangle
to
would be
External Affairs
these
that
This
was
final,
only question
the
other
integrated
in his
how
French
And of
thing that was negotiable, and this was worked out
just between Canada and France but
mentioned
was
the
extent
between all of us,
France would remain in the North Atlantic Council;
the
President's
whatsoever
arrangements and to what
Couve
and
way
the
of
Paul Martin
was
in support of the military integrated commands.
course the
not
by this time
and
no
there was
a
suggestions.
make
or
and had talks with Couve de Murville,
over
explained
for
on
integrated command not
explain
to
Diefenbaker
with
consultation,
constant
Secretary of State
course
so-called
of
hand-holding, and particularly as I
able
was
form
the
parallel situation of the implications of
being
d'Orsay and with
talks with the Quai
our
so
immediately, everything had
said,
And here the General
favoured.
French establishment
commands,
leaving
the
the Alliance,
that
was
that in
leaving
specifically
President
had
and he
persuaded that it
was
not
interest, particularly in relation to Germany,
was
to remain in
the Alliance.
[HILL]
So,
in
effect,
the
other
allies
did
not
confrontational fashion really towards the French.
a
matter
of
[IGNATIEFF]
react
It
was
in
a
rather
....
Of
trying
practically in hysterics
in sympathy too,
and
I
to
and
hold
their
hands.
they did not know what
They
to
do.
remember Admiral Dennison coming to
and because I had got this direct from
a
French
Minister,
were
I
was
see me
he wanted
134
000314
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information ActDocument divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
to
have
explained,
it
thunderstruck at
what
he
absolutely
was
happened.
had
And
non-plussed
explained
I
terms of
my experience with the reaction of Mr.
this
irreversible and
was
this
watch,
business
command.
How
[HILL]
I
then
is
of
one
decision-making
of
exactly you take
"The Future Tasks of the Alliance",
think Canada was already keen
[IGNATIEFF]
tied
Yes,
the Three Wise
in
questions to
on
I
that phase?
see
in that direction.
NATO
Canada's role in this,
Pearson's role
to
also a
case?
that the
Was
was
which eventually,
How do you
moving
on
NATO
working
was
think, turned into the Harmel Exercise.
I
integrated
an
sovereignty.
period in
Your
period of detente in Europe, and NATO
do with,
under
have to
we
wonder if I might ask two more questions about NATO and
final wrap-up question.
one
that
of political
care
in
him
Diefenbaker, that
things
the
to
and
Committee of
in
1956.
Three of
that exercise,
and
I
knew what
is
course,
directly
military or political co-operation
non-
exercise,
Men
of
contained
in
the
Report of
the
had been his political advisor in
behind
was
it.
That had also been
tied to his visit with Khrushchev which I had also been associated
with,
and
since
discussions,
Green
even
very
was
detente.
can
truly
in,
and
This
can
say
reported to
had
detente.
for
Sidney
Smith
and
that Canada played
about
our
a
is something which
is still
He was
of
was
who has served longest
also
Belgium,
position
in the
because
Howard
was
Howard
Green
no
opposition
were
a
to
thorough
close friend
later
of
what
the other
and
important
going
was
leading
in NATO,
De
135
in
figures.
that Canada
stress
the
instance, the Dean
Staercke,
the Ambassador of
Council and has influence.
Spaak the former Prime Minister
Secretary General.
in urging the discussion
on
For
on the
Mr.
one
leading role in feeding views
special relationships with certain allies to
the North Atlantic Council
Belgium,
years,
There
non-military obligations of the Alliance.
of
much
very
was
appreciation of
in the Khrushchev period,
have
I
in the political consultations about detente,
so
reports
NATO
during the Diefenbaker
much
Both
detentists and
Moscow
I
of
We
were
detente.
in
In
a
very
strong
other
words,
000315
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while
United States may have
the
not been
European allies at the time,
the
we
had
keen about detente as
as
than
more
question.
to press this in relation to dealing with the German
in
mentioned
business
book
my
shooting
of
frighten them,
thing,
I
North
Atlantic
is that the quality of
had
Council
bows to
The other
representation on the
the
deal
great
a
with
do
to
it.
representative of the United States had been Secretary of
and
Truman
under
and
Finletter
had
I
our
relationship
embarrassing situation,
as
did
I
over
the Cuban Missile
privately to Tom
and he
never
sort of
Missile Crisis, knowing that
of
chiefs
indeed
our
two
there
was
never
the
on
Defence
Tom
was
had
an
Crisis,
I
I
spot throughout the Cuban
instructions and knowing that
no
governments
attempt
an
The
and tell him what the situation
had
I
If
very
to go
put me
close.
was
simply used
was,
in Washington and he
him
known
the
Belgium and myself shot
quickly that it was not raised again.
may say,
I
with
up
came
the Soviet
nuclear weapon across
a
the Ambassadors of Norway,
idea down so
that
military
the
when
that
opportunity
our
isolate
to
loggenheads.
at
were
make
to
or
me
But
me
uncomfortable, and that had a great deal of importance in the North
And I urged that NORAD Somehow
Atlantic Council.
or
other be
like
all other commands be put under the North Atlantic Council, because
the North Atlantic Council
representatives
that caliber of
of
are
people, they are not just passive, they ask questions, they discuss
things
diplomatic
political,
in
they
terms,
militarists and the particular trio in my days,
of
the
led
detente
representative,
also,
of
to
keen
was
very
the
Soviet
Norway,
on
and
and
that sort
say,
And Spaak
had been
difficulty that
only
the
Belgian
the
myself.
just
not
He himself
detente.
Union
I
Staercke,
De
was
of
Lange
Halvard
course,
times
several
discussions
as
are
really arose in my recollection, during the Diefenbaker period over
political consultations,
Howard Green
was
a
was
over
the
passionate supporter of the UN; and while Spaak
was
all for detente with the Soviet Union,
as
a
former
interest
in
considerable
Union
trying
to
interests
the
he could not
of
Belgium's,
salvage
whatever
Foreign Minister
Minière,
its role in the Congo.
UN and
remained
supply
of
in
the
uranium
136
take
and
direct
very
Belgium's
very
particularly
the
of
Congo,
a
help but,
the
whole
uranium
000316
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industry.
this
He
was
He therefore
wanted NATO to regard it
similarly,
since
still claimed by Belgium at the time of the Congo crisis.
support from
wanted
the
Allies,
support of
in
Howard Green would not have any of this kind of militarism.
supporting Hammarskjöld
He was
and insisted that
crisis,
the Congo
over
And
Belgium.
Belgium had to get out lot, stock and barrel; and there was to be
no NATO
fiddling with "volunteers".
parachute troops
thing.
in support of
inherit,
did
the
because most
Howard Green.
that Congo
of
said he
He
This
exercise.
UN
under Leger, and for that reason Leger
to
who,
as
General, threatened to resign over Howard Green's
NATO's Secretary
I
population and that sort of
to save the European
this did really create trouble with Spaak,
Well,
position
There was some talk of sending
was
was
something that
was
crisis took place more
uncompromisingly hostile
quite mad;
he
did not know what
possible and not possible because he created great friction and
was
distress in the North Atlantic Council.
By the time I arrived the
Congo business had simmered down considerably, but Spaak was still
agitated whenever Howard Green's
say,
Howard
detente,
never
did anything but
the
effort
not
and
resort
understand exactly what
the
was
Green
crisis, without
to
name
Soviet
Union
to
But,
support
policy of
the
only to deal
with
the
Berlin
military action,
but
also
to
was
and
mentioned.
In
fact
that
Europe.
Eastern
was
I
Wall
try and
possible and not possible in relation
That
was
examined and discussed in my time.
[HILL]
as
what
led
on
eventually
to
very
fully
the
Harmel
Report.....
[IGNATIEFF]
the Harmel Report, and also to the Ostpolitik of
Germany, which was encouraged by NATO.
[HILL]
done
on
To
There was
it while you
[IGNATIEFF]
lot of
a
were
discussion about it,
and
a
lot of work
there.
only emphasize, as I say; that the
Harmel and all those developments hinged on the Report on Political
Co-operation,
Yes,
I
would
of the Three,
that Pearson issued
137
in 1955.
000317
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[HILL]
question
second
The
dealing with
the
issue
nuclear
Multilateral Nuclear Force (the MLF)
Nuclear Force
(ANF)
smokescreen
or
end what
-
NATo
up
a
Harold Wilson's Atlantic
or
Power Directorate.
De Gaulle's Three
even
with
out
two
was
which
committees,
In the
the
were
Affairs Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group.
Defence
Nuclear
set
to
end
of
way
NATO's
which always seemed to me to be a magnificent
-
came
the
in
not
was
this:
is
NATO
on
What was the Canadian position on this question, and what role did
Canada
play in finding this eventual solution?
[IGNATIEFF)
would
I
the
that
say
not
role
Canadian
very
was
active, because we had hang-ups both in the Conservative Government
the
and
part
Liberal
Government.
in
whatsoever
meetings.
I
MLF
I
ANF.
or
instruction to have
under
was
did
I
attend
not
any
kept informed through the friendships
was
time,
but
we
support of the nuclear planning device,
the
committee,
the British representative at the
of
hopefully
again
trying
get
to
strategy.
on
some
There
kind
the
was
agreement
of
shift
a
means
consensus
the
from
in
course
as
and
the
of
had with
I
of
were
no
massive
retaliation schemes of Foster Dulles to the strategy of flexible
response under MacNamara,
now,
really
with
forward
strategy
have
to
we
thin red
a
never
happy then,
of
nor
happy
namely
is,
NATO
which would
line
the Canadian
fact that
The
were
basic strategy
the
what
nuclear response.
but
the
trigger
brigade, while
I
a
was
there, quite often covered the forward positions of several British
divisions,
which
in
a
way to the British
as
I
say,
or
another
Ireland,
at
the time
and
Lord
whether
it
did not feel that it
that
I
was
Zuckerman
interesting
Army of the Rhine,
else
somewhere
we
did not help.
things
and
We
we
felt
were
a
Suez,
viable
or
one
the head
of defence
was
his
scientific
advisor.
One
while
Americans
talked
the
in
Also
consensus.
Mountbatten
that,
time
wherever
there,
was
was
was
was
attached
substituting
British divisions which were either
for several
and
there,
not
were
of
the
about
flexible response and forward defence and triggering this kind of
nuclear response,
was
Zuckerman,
saying that it was
both in NATO and in visits to Ottawa,
totally unrealistic, that the use of nuclear
138
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Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
weapons
on
tactical
a
would
level
create
such
in
havoc
the
battlefield as well as resulting in massive casualties in the civil
population in
in which the fighting took place, that it
the areas
would not be feasible to conduct
had
"limited"
a
very considerable effect I think.
a
in the
nuclear
remember
Zuckerman's theories
Part VII
Ambassador to
-
I
because
time,
to
I
confirmed.
United Nations and
the
That
defence college in
at the
was
time
from
pretty well
were
battle.
It certainly did,
place
which took
took part in them when
I
London,
exercises
nuclear
the
ENDC
late
-
1960s and early 1970s
[HILL]
I
Well, if
will make sort of
left NATO,
then you
might move
I
you went
were
for
time
a
things you
role
in
the
Eighteen
(ENDC).
Looking
back
on
fact that
while you
were
at NATO that
in which the Cyprus
Cyprus,
as
that the
Canada's
crisis
and
arose
that
Canada
and
Nations,
the United
to
which
After you
Ambassador in Geneva, where amongst other
Disarmament Committee
linking to
be Ambassador
to
responsibility
had
comprehensive, overview one.
very
a
to the very last question,
on
Nation
period,
and
was
the
sent troops to
could you say what value do you think NATO has to Canada,
mechanism
for
promoting
international
and
peace
security,
relative to the role of
the United Nations, amongst other
and the roles of
like
[IGNATIEFF]
Well,
assumptions
measured
groups
is
only
that
in
somehow
terms
of
military contribution.
consensus
about
the disarmament conference?
view
my
is
or
the
that
other
about
of
the
the
contribution, it was my experience, that
the number
of
troops
that
we
of
one
Canada's
quantity
Because
strategy,
things,
or
role
the
in
extent
extraordinary
nature
of
the
I was sort of
could muster up
on
mistaken
the
a
NATO
is
of
its
lack
of
military
"marked"
certain
on
day.
What is overlooked is the fact that the quality of the volunteer
forces that Canada sends to Europe is much higher than that of most
of the
we
conscript armies that the others produced,
are there in
Europe has political significance.
139
and the fact that
I
was
told that
000319
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
many times
many,
Canada
the
on
seriously.
Atlantic
North
think,
I
was,
I
Council,
because
consulted,
a
Government
and
close.
that
at
we
"George,
on
one
point,
Council,
support
quite
was
was
of
remember
that
Greece
the
cat,
the
by
me
many
sent
do that
indeed
I
found
more
to
available
our
allied
information
I
said:
"All
information,
right,
but
him
urge
I
am
may
you
from your government.
I
liar.
a
I
information
is
of
reinforcements
of
if
we
are
because the
Turks will
to
try
react
am
to
in
Since
Tom
say
Palamas,
who
Palamas
was
flew into
a
and then I had to go
with
check
to
prepared
not
Of course
often
find
own
say that this
to
have
his
had
the
latest
myself without
Don't
let's say
simply saying that the
latest
be
taken
and
and
troops
Government
our
having the latest information from my government.
that I'm saying you are
the
and
government.
CIA.
the
in
did not coincide with the
of the Council chamber,
and
in fact,
Council
in the
friend Ambassador
my
Finletter and
Tom
privately
him
government.
account
going
discussion
the
in
issue
we
am
to take the lead because
had to
information given by
fury, and walked out
see
you know
say I
I
And
others".
intelligence information made available to
given to
is
do you mind taking the
look,
secretly
had
I
intelligence information
and
closely with the
the Greek-Cypriot side than they admitted.
the
said
I
as
of
under Reagan's
now,
are
worked very
later became Foreign Minister of Greece,
the
happened,
It
the Greek-Turkish crisis,
pressure
I
would not bell
that
a
kind
in dealing with the
both Tom Finletter and his successor
trouble with the
in terrible
there
be
and
consult
committed directly to both sides and whatever
be
was
Atlantic
North
the
to
Cyprus one.
the
say:
lead in the discussions
to
the Council
opportunity to
do not know what they
I
Finletter would
are
to
very
think that that
do not
be sent
an
but in those days
representation,
US.
taken
think the very highest officials
should
that my relations with
very
I
found that
I
crisis that you mentioned,
were
be
the representation that Canada has had has been of
and
very high order,
before,
I
have
do
you
should
first person to go
the
particularly a good precedent,
Canadian
Council
Under-Secretary.
that had not been
in the
is that the representation of
is important
what
that
resolve
the
this has
what
is
to
threatening,
figures which the alliance
140
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And we had to work
has."
both sides to reduce.
but
they did
was
an
irony,
Cyprus
issue
mentioned,
not
this and in the end we managed to get
on
That
not actually go to
that I got
in
NATO
of
course
before
war
while
I
was
because
of
the
circumstances
was
supporting both and did
say,
leading part and
this
was
on
the
Security Council.
on
directly,
I
the
representative
But there
as
that is the United States
that
in NATO.
involved
want to take
found
was
they went to war,
plate
our
very
asked
when
to do
us
I
to
came
in the
which
But
so.
be
I
I
Canada's
The three most serious crises in which I got directly involved
were
Six Day War
the
Crisis
the Middle
in
East
resolution 242; the Cyprus crisis; and the crisis
and
the
incident.
Pueblo
active part.
But
in
each
Cyprus crisis, of
In the
himself and took the initiative to
case,
working
over
North Korea
Canada
course,
set up
and
took
Martin
Mr.
out
very
a
down
came
peace-keeping force by
a
making personal appeals to heads of governments and prime ministers
to
contribute.
We had
to pay the
peace-keeping forces and have had
required
money
to
ever
since.
that, initially, it did keep the two sides
while NATO
of
put
pressure
the state of
war,
Greek
can
excitement
Turkish passions
or
intervention
in
the
is
United
situations under control.
domestically
such
that
Nations
and the Canadian peace-keeping force,
two communities
going
from
realized the degree of
Turkish persecutions.
the
and
and
massacres
that
and
is aroused
by
really requires
both
keep
such
in
NATO
to
very important part in keeping the
a
at
mean
and
going to war,
to go to the point
other's
each
throats.
passion which goes back
I
fact was
though it has been expensive
to
I
the
had
not
memory of
the Greeks feel about the Turks like
Armenians, they think in terms of
Century
it
But the
is not contradictory to the other,
One
and very difficult, has played
from
both sides not
on
to produce these
this
all
what
sort
happened in the 19th
of
thing,
and
their
almost
fight and all the rest of it. So, all these historical,
tribal, ideological passions,
and religious,
Christian
against
Moslem,
liberation
which
now
have
are
to
related
be
dealt
to
historical
with
on
the
rivalries
and things
basis
the
of
inter-
dependence of world communities, and through the United Nations and
141
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through NATO.
The most serious thing that happened while I
was
on
the
Security Council of course, was the Middle East crisis, because
it
involved
confrontation
direct
the
between
States
United
the
supporting Israel, and the Soviet Union supporting both Egypt and
Syria, which were in
federation at
of
state
a
And the
time.
the
climax came when the Israeli forces, having defeated Jordan and the
Egyptians,
were
point
the
on
would have brought them
to
headquarters
all
and
was,
defeating
of
Damascus
the
where
the
that
Soviet Middle
East
ring
and
began
bells
alarm
Syrians and
the
to
immediate cease fires were negotiated and Kosygin came rushing over
the
Soviet delegation was
fired for having given poor advice about the
possibilities of Egypt
to
President
see
Syria's scoring
and
they
diplomatic triumph
a
Israel,
over
by getting rid
they might,
thought
of
most
and
Johnson,
Then
UNEF.
of
in the way
got
we
involved in negotiations, with Soviet participation, for about four
months,
work out
to
this
adopted in the Council
withdrawal
for
of
Israeli
territories,
in exchange
by
neigbours.
its
Arab
diplomacy,
This
provided
virtually
all
occupied
Israeli
territory
forces
This
agreements.
international
peace
conference
the
from
for the recognition of
other
have
unanimously
was
basis for agreement.
no
been
have
which
would
to
have
from the peace agreement
apart
but
the
as
242,
resolution
We
are
based
on
still
242,
negotiated
be
Egypt,
with
talking
participation of the displaced Palestinians,
there
about
which would
have
request
of
the
was
instance where I
an
Americans,
in personal
of course,
ship keeping
an
on
North
North Korean
waters, boarded, captured, and this
water
rights
not getting
I
could
accusing
coastal
water
anywhere,
to
find
release
of
about.
The
North
I
American spy
an
the
other of
rights
breaking
and the rest of
out whether the
the
crew,
Koreans
that
obviously
We
were
to
see
what
Koreans
would
they
really
what
had
territorial
it.
me
North
was
captured
managed to get hold (through- a Hungarian contact)
142
in
brought to the
was
and the Americans then asked
the
equipment.
the Pueblo was
Korean activities and was caught
each
do quietly
negotiate
worried
or
The
diplomacy, quiet diplomacy.
was
Security Council,
to
involved again at the
was
What happened there
eye
an
which is the
thing which is very difficult to accept for the Israelis.
Pueblo business
by
the
of
000322
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
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the North Koreans,
Panmunjom.
in
and establish the negotiations that took place
The
of
crew
Pueblo
the
that particular crisis resolved.
western
the
in
group
I
debate
in fact
was
also
was
the
over
released,
and
lead
the
seizure
of
asked
to
Soviet
Czechoslovakia and the expulsion of the Dubcek Government, and that
only leadership role in the Security Council.
That
was
my last and
was
because the Americans were changing their representative, after
Goldberg, whom I worked very closely with.
and his
replacement
underlines the
ways,
some
had
arrived,
not
they asked me to.
so
fact that
while the United States
threat
to
a
affairs do other than work
international
be,
can
sovereignty,
Canadian
replaced,
He was being
This
and is in
in
cannot
we
closely with them,
very
sharing the intelligence information and working on diplomacy.
is
relationship which
state of
a
do not
see
that
learned
I
that
we
was
will
ever
that,
as
is not unlike
in the
absolutely frank and very firm.
to
the
relationship,
that if
was,
allows itself
and
partnership
the
I
of
If
one
to
get
does not
a
marriage you have to
partner just gives in
into
sort
a
really work.
alternative,
some
My experience
I
other
or some
stooge
of
said
very
so
way of
doing
simply said no.
or
[HILL]
in
case
and I
My only lesson
disagreed with my American partners,
firmly and suggested
it,
marriage,
quite get out of it.
be
other,
a
It
So you would in effect say that continuing to participate
some
kind
of
NATO
organization is a good idea, although
the form
of the organization might change significantly?
[IGNATIEFF]
think so,
said,
in NATO,
what
is still
important is the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty,
which are
still
there,
I
and
and
particularly
as
I
Article
4,
where
it
says
"parties
will consult whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial
integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties
is threatened".
the
or
There
is
an
obligation to consult,
and there
is
machinery to consult and Canada does not have to find itself,
assume
that
particularly
I
it will
be,
advocate
following reasons,
that
isolated with
participation
the alternative
143
in
the
the
seems
United
States,
Alliance
to
me
that
and
for
the
we
will
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simply, through NORAD, drift
into
which in fact all the positions
by
would cost
Canada
because
have
we
States that
our
in threats
territory,
form
within
but the interests
that
is
air and
So
do not
I
around
common
always all uniform.
not
And the
West,
and
East
between
any
see
is that we
say,
I
as
alliance
the
United
the
would not be used
sea
other.
which
ability,
our
and
Union
our
dialogue
the
of
out
are
neutrality,
beyond
be
and the other factor,
groups
own
our
interests,
other
our
try
to
Soviet
aggression against the
or
feasible alternative;
can
both the
assure
in
will be taken without consultation,
infinitely more, indeed
to
situation,
fortress-America
the alternative is
Or,
the Pentagon.
a
particularly in view of the new leadership in the Soviet Union that
is seeking
some
kind of accommodation for
only through the dialogue between the
that
I
possible
some
see
Alliance and the Warsaw Pact
comprehensive
more
new
it is
internal reasons,
security
arrangements being worked out, with guarantees, such as was arrived
at
at
Stockholm
the
Conference
inspection and
confidence building measures,
and
reductions
of
nuclear
weapons.
always be re-created after they
reduced,
to
a
minimum
strategy which is
related to
[HILL]
some
Can I
are
deterrent,
all
do
I
completely devoid of nuclear weapons,
Security,
European
on
the rest
not
with
being
it
see
it,
of
because nuclear weapons
destroyed.
and
we
not subordinated to
any
still
one
can
But
they
can
be
need
to
have
a
system,
weapon
but
agreed function between the allies.
ask you
couple
a
more short
questions, then we are
finished.
you
When
Conference there,
Council.
you
In fact I
the Ambassador
Ambassador
were
in
sometimes had
Geneva
to
to
Disarmament
the
reports
make
to
the
NATO
attended one NATO Council myself where you were
from
Geneva.
There
were
What do
you
think
is the
utility
of
that
the
that exercise?
[IGNATIEFF]
standard
one
for
of
the
security was
Geneva
two
one
defects
in
it.
One
was
thing for NATO and quite
delegation.
144
It
was
a
a
ridiculous
different
state
of
000324
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affairs, that
the
did
we
not
in Geneva have access to information about
negotiations,
SALT
restraints
weapons,
information about
So,
it
[IGNATIEFF)
form,
or
biological
about
testing,
nuclear
on
what
to NATO to get that
[HILL]
things
parallel
negotiating
shape
any
in
but
we
were
chemical
weapons,
did not have any
we
happening in SALT.
was
while
We had
go
down
was
NATO
to
information.
was
Well,
useful
in that sense?
it
useful
was
in
sense
one
it
but
policy to say that the standard of security governing the bilateral
talks must
be
set
on
NATO's
standards,
and
if
a
mission did not
fulfill the standards and therefore it meant that all
top secret
to be up to
whatever
or
it was,
personnel had
and the safes had to
And yet,
this way, the safe houses and all the rest.
I
as
be
pointed
military knew where the Americans were, the state
their nuclear balance, and so on.
Who was kidding who, why
out, the Soviet
of
these
should
excluded?
what was going
Council,
the
on
[HILL]
you
be
remember, in connection with the
I
because
down
went
to
the case in the
was
this,
and that
was
clued up to
of the security situation, and
report
seabed,
said
was
we
the
to
North
it required
all
do not
favour
the
Atlantic
was
that
Canadian
that.
End of discussion.
[IGNATIEFF]
In the
case
doing
the
to
in NATO,
American representative
position
things
parallel
than the Geneva Conference
more
on
when
as
negotiating
were
The NATO Council was not tuned in to what was going
in Geneva, any
therefore
who
went down to NATO,
Treaty.
Seabed
on
I
people
End
discussion.
of the seabed,
same
job;
things
these
of
I
pointed out that there
and how,
being
You did not persuade anybody.
first of all,
prohibited,
if
at
were
submarines
did submarines relate
all?
and
how
was
inspection to be carried out without interfering with the rights
of
the
coastal
resources,
state
and so on?
to
continental
The Americans
shelf
and
oil
simply said they did not want
to discuss those questions, either question.
145
mineral
I
learned later, from
000325
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
admiral
an
in
Pentagon,
the
they
that
thought
that
I
was
questioning something which is now under current discussion, namely
by submarines to our northwest passage
the American access
but
question,
creepy
here
that
we
prohibiting
were
crawlies, which nobody seemed to think
were
we
said
I
tackling
not
operations,
which
in
any
the
were
directly raise that
I did not
Arctic and coastal waters of Canada.
to the
-
something,
practical,
were
way
the
restrictions
real
way
of
of
conducting
but
submarine
underwater
nuclear operations.
[HILL)
So,
effect,
in
that
reporting
fairly loose liaison; and that is about
[IGNATIEFF]
It
restriction,
the others
[HILL]
was
because
say,
I
as
neither side
One last
This
know
I
that
NATO
there were
an
"out
of
of
those
discussions?
on
high
believe George
I
period of the
consultations
look at NATO in geographic terms.
heard
What
Ball
in NATO,
level meetings
area"
and
how you
[IGNATIEFF]
Yes,
saw
problem
was
the
a
on
one
report
them was that the Americans would present their
was
on
came
case
this was met by "embarrassed silences" for the most part.
if that
what
on
some
if you
number of occasions to
I
in
was
nature
in
clued
was also the
question, although for NATO this was
it
or
definite
very
a
was
question, and it is in the period while you were
at NATO and at the United Nations.
this
a
it got.
as
was
like
doing.
were
Vietnam War.
far
as
sounds
NATO
liaison, and it
loose
a
to
and
I wonder
it?
that
was
And I may
the case.
say
there was
an
embarrassed silence when Vietnam was discussed in NATO, there were
questions about the diplomacy related to trying to find a peaceful
settlement, in which Canada participated to
was
no
discussion about the Vietnam War
Security Council,
-
Arthur
some
prohibited
multilateral
from
such.
but there
extent,
When I
was
on
the
Goldberg wanted- indeed he was very keen
to bring Vietnam before the UN,
about
as
some
to try and stop the
intervention
doing so by President
to
that
Johnson,
end,
war
and
but
and that
was
bring
he
was
one
of
146
000326
�Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
-
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
the
why he nearly
reasons
told me that himself.
allowed
over
No,
to
came
there
the Vietnam
resign,
was
War.
no
It
he
was
very
upset,
multilateral intervention
was
the
classic
example
unilateral
action,
course
the
whole
background
involvement
included the fact that
our
advice
was
of
and
to
part
take
commission,
the
as
Western
our
When we were
representatives
strongly advised against military
we
of
of
ignored at the
time of the withdrawal of the French from Indo China.
asked
he
on
the
advisors
and
military intervention on the part of the United States to replace
the
French.
said,
We
you
know,
would
that
make
it
impossible to get any kind of settlement in Indo China,
for under the Geneva Agreement.
were
I
against it.
and
so
on,
United
States
Koreans
and
[HILL]
I
The Chinese were willing,
as
Soviet
we
think
am
the
Well,
we
very
to
Union both
on
Vietnam and
settle for neutralization in their
thought
in
driving out both
terms
of
have
taken
provided
discovered, when
accompanied Howard Green to meetings in Geneva
Laos
I
China and the
as
almost
The
area.
the
North
Chinese.
I
think
we
will close at this point.
grateful
to you for
I
up
a
lot
of
your time,
and
would just like to say that
having participated in this project.
147
000327
�
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George Ignatieff: "In Alliance" Interview
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