https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/da612e0af229d0d142048c2a71db8312.pdf e587539131fd2403ecc71b32841807a1 PDF Text Text CONFIDENTIAL • Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information SUMMARY RECORDOF DISCUSSIONS ON t, ,)., ... , THE DRAFT 1971 WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCEPOLICY •-, CDS STUDYGROUP _,.. •£.1 } u 2 ,..., !.#•. - TRENTON, ONTARIO- 18 JANUARY1971 PRESENT. Honour2ble D.S. Macdonald Armstrong Dr. L.J. L'Heureux Gener~l f.R. Sharp LGEN M.R. Dare LGEN M.E. Pollard LGEN D.A. Waldock LGEN J.A. Dextra~e Mr. G. Smith COL A. C. Bowes Mr. E.B. MND DM CDRB CDS VCDS CG CTS CP Policy Adviser/MND DPCC/CDS (Secretary) INTROIXJCTION 1. In opening the Study Group discussion, the CDS welcomed the members and expressed his pleasure that the Minister of National Defence was able to participate. He explained that the agenda originally planned would not be followed but that the discussion would concentrate on the draft 1971 White Paper on Defence Policy. SCHEDULE 2. The MNDmentioned that the timing of publication White Paper is significant; it should either: a. be co-ordinated with the Department of External Affairs by mid February, referred to the Cabinet Committee on External Affairs and Defence, cleared in Cabinet and tabled in the House by mid April, or b. alternatively, be held until the earlier schedule was preferable. In his view, 3. activities of the early summer. The VCDS supported this position, because certain currently underway require authentication . . . ./2 CONFIDENTIAL 000398 �• Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information CONFIDENTIAL -2- 4. The MNDmentioned that a disadvantage of early presentation was that government interest would probably then be focussed on unemployment problems, to the detriment of attention to the White Paper. BUDGET 5. The MNDmentioned that discussions with the Prime Minister and the President of Treasury Board have led him to believe that the 1.8 billion dollar budget ceiling for National Defence would remain in force for two more years or at least until ONOhas· produced a policy statement that will convince Cabinet of the necessity to change it. He said that, in working to develop arguments to that end, estimates of manpower and equipment costs must be as accurate as possible, and particularly must not contain errors of under-estimation. DEFENCEPRIORITIES 6. The MNOemphasized that the White Paper, as drafted, a direct reflection of the government's priorities, stated the PM on 3 April 1969: a. the i.e. b. the defence US forces; c. the fulfillment be agreed upon; d. the performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may from time to time assume. is by surveillance of our territory and coast-lines, the protection of our sovereigntyj of North America in co-operation of such NATO commitments and with as may The MNOstated that the primary task is to define clearly the activities involved in the maintenance of sovereignty and Canadian independence. This necessity is exemplified in the Arctic, where Canada must establish a presence which represents, in effect, total occupation of her territory. This will provide a framework of control which will demonstrate her sovereignty and thus establi·sh a legal position which will be recognized internationally. 7. The OMobserved that considerable progress had been made in recent months by his staff and CFHQ staff., worki_ng with Treasury Board staff, towards defining objective/activity priority relationships in the Canadian Armed Forces Program. 8. In response to observations by VCOS, CG and CP that the Canadian Forces 1 s role should include the capability to exercise armed force, following detection of an incursion, the MNO cautioned that the first reaction by the Canadian Government might well b~ diplomatic rather than military. Although the OM ... /3 CONFIDENTIAL 000399 �• CONFIDENTIAL Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information 3 suggested that an invasion of one of the Canadian Arctic islands would automatically require a military response, the MND indicated that this would not necessarily be so, but that a diplomatic interchange might first be attempted. It was agreed that the specific circumstances of each incident would dictate the nature of the reaction, but that the normal sequence of ~vents would be surveillance, detection, diplomatic activity and, in the last resort, military reaction. 9. The DMobserved that sovereignty is not solely a DND responsibility, but also involves fields in which primary responsibility rests with other departments; e.g., Fisheries and Forestry, and Energy, Mines and Resources. The MNDagreed with this observation and added that threats to Canadian sovereignty may even arise from the actions of friendly but competitive nations, in such fields as oil ~xploration. However, regardless of whether an incursion has military implications (e.g. a Russian submarine in the Canadian Arctic) or has sovereignty implications (e.g. a United States submarine in the Canadian Arctic), it is essential that the Canadian reaction be based clearly upon a position of territorial sovereignty firmly established in a body of evidence recognized in international law. 10, Mr. Smith observed that Canadian Forces involvement in sovereignty considerations may not be as great as that of other government departments; VCDS emphasized, however, that it is essential to specify the extent of military capability required to supplement the activities of otfier Departments, in order to determine equipment requirements. The MNDobserved that the act of detection itself demonstrates a certain level of military capability and that the nature of subsequent military reaction must be assessed in relation to its cost-effectiveness. CG and CP strongly advocated that effectiveness be the first consideration, followed by the cost factor. 11. In attempting to further define the relationship between the sovereignty and defence roles, the VCDS observed that if a military capability could not be substantiated in relation to the latter, it would probably not be available for application to the former. RESOURCEREQUIREMENTS 12. CG suggested that the effective approach to computing resource requirements would be to cost completely all the military activities envisaged in each of the assigned roles separately, priority by priority, and then double and tripletask force elements, as necessary, to reduce the resource requirement to a reasonable level. If, with the Canadian Forces thus structured, additional unforeseen commitments should be . undertaken for a low priority role (e.g. peacekeeping), it would be necessary either to augment the force structure to restore the planned capability to fulfill high priority tasks or, alternatively, to take a calculated risk that such tasks will not be undertaken during the period of force depletion. CONFIDENTIAL ••. / 4 000400 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • CONFIDENTIAL 4 13.. The DM suggested that an al tern a ti ve approach would be to calculate what military capability is needed for the sovereignty role and to determine whether those resources are available from the forces provided for the defence, NATO or peacekeeping roles; if not, additional resources would be added or transferred from the lower priority commitments. The VCDS suggested. that i_t would be helpful to think of the sovereignty role as a peacetime commitment and the defence role as a wartime commitment; NATO and international peac:,keeping would also be thought of in a peacetime connotation. The MNDagreed with this line of thought,• and stated that, if resources became over-taxed in aid to the civil power in Canada, troops would be returned from Europe or Cyprus to fulfil the sovereignty requirement. 14. The DM observed on the differences in equipment requirements for the four roles assigned to the Canadian Forces. ycDS and CP noted, however, that resources required for the sovereignty role were relatively easy to determine. On this point the CDS noted that the complementary nature of CF Sovereignty responsibilities to those of other government departments necessitated that the Canadian Forces have complete knowledge of the operational requirements, capabilities and deficiencies of other departments concerned. 15. Mr. Smith agreed with the CDS, noting that, although the Department of Fisheries and Forestry operates patrol boats, they do not routinely perform surveillance operations; it is normal for DND surveillance systems to detect items or activities of interest to the Department of Fisheries and Forestry and to notify that department, which then investigates and takes appropriate civil action. 16. The DM stated that this type of operational relationship had come to light in discussions with both the Minister of Transport and the Department of Fisheries and Forestry, and had been rationalized by the fact that these other departments look upon themselves as regulatory agencies. This situation supports the need for a clear definition by other departments of their responsibilities, capabilities and deficiencies in relation to such functions as the control of air traffic and the control of pollution. 17. The need for such information in relation to decisions on the acquisition of new military equipment was supported by the MND, who observed that it should be obtained through the medium of the Interdepartmental Committees already set up. VCDS replied that the other departments involved have not, so far, manifested a willingness to make known their needs for CF support. He suggested that an effective device for forcing decisions from other government departments would be to incorporate in the White Paper whatever findings are available from the interdepartmental committee proceedings; upon subrrission of the Defence White Paper to Cabinet, the other departments concerned would be forced to state firm positions in relation to DND collaboration . . . ./5 CONFIDENTIAL 000401 �• CONFIDENTIAL Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 5 AIR DEFENCE 18. CG i.ni tiated the discussi_on on Air Defence by stating that, contrary to many other opini_ons, he believed in the possibility that the Soviet Long-Range Ai_r Force might be ordered to attack North America without prior launching of ICBM's. He reasoned that the nature of the threat and the transit time involved mi_ght generate USSR/USA negotiations which would gain the Russians significant benefits, because of the reluctance of the United States to initiate a large scale nuclear exchange. He did 11consider it militarily wise to rule out thiB--··"' option simply because it appeared unlikely; it was not, in his view, "inconceivable" as suggested. 19. The CDS observed that NORAD's assessment is that ·the United Statessecond strike capability could survive a first strike by missiles but not by an unopposed bomber attack, because of the accuracy of the latter. Therefore, without adequate antibomber defence provided.by NORAD, the United States could be forced into a position in which they would have to launch an ICBM attack in response to a Russian bomber attack. Because this disturbance of the balance is not desirable, he suggested that the US will always maintain an effective anti~bomber force. He recommended the following amendments to the draft White Paper:, a. At the bottom of page 40, add the sentenc~ "It also force the US into a hair-trigger response, US missiles could not ride out a bomber attack was given a ''free ride''•·" wiuld since which b. In the middle of page 41, insert the sentences: "•·••• has now passed. It does believe however that sufficient air defence capability should be available to deny a free ride to USSR bombers. Fortunately, the kind of air defence forces required for the sovereignty role can also contribute in a substantial way to denying a free ride''. 20. The MNDpointed out that the White Paper assumes that, in the event of a nuclear war, the initial air strike would be made by missiles, with bombers in a follow-on role. Nevertheless, he warned that he expects difficulties to arise in Cabinet if the White Paper calls for continuing to equip Canadian interceptor squadrons with nuclear air-to-air armament. Noting that the BOMARCSwould be phased out, he queried the availability and effectiveness of conventional weapons for the air defence function . . . . /6' CONFIDENTIAL 000402 �• CONFIDENTIAL Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 6 21. CG replied that the Fl06 with conventional weapons has practically the same effectiveness in bomber kill terms in the interceptor role, as the CF 101 armed with nuclear weapons, but not, of course, in terms of nuclear weapon neutralization. He also stated that the non-nuclear Falcon air-to-air missile armament of the CF 101 has a relatively low bomber kill-rate, and then only from a rear qua_rter attack, as it cannot be used head on, as can the nuclear armament. This is a major tactical handicap. He added that the presence of nuclear weapons on CF Bases has a substantial impact on the force structure because of· the large number of personnel required for security, and consequently in the long run nuclear weapons are expensive even when their initial cost is borne by the United States. However, without nuclear armament the CF 101 is not really effective in the anti-bomber role.with its present conventional armament configuration. CDRB expressed the opinion that it is essential to use nuclear air-to-air weapons against USSR bombers in order to ensure the destruction not only of the aircraft but also of its nuclear bomb-load, if the destruction were to occur over populated areas. 22. The DM observed that the White Paper gives the impression that the anti-bomber air defence system will lose its significance in the near future. Mr. Smith responded that it is not the intention of the White Paper to undermine the anti-bomber system but to show its decreasing relative significance. The White Paper assumes that the US will maintain an anti-bomber capability for the foreseeable future and that Canada and the US will continue to work together in NORADi however, in Canada, the CF 101 interceptors would be redeployed with emphasis upon the interests of Canadian Sovereignty. The MNDobserved that, unfortunately, NORADhas lost much of its credibility in the eyes of the Government and in the eyes of the public; consequently, support for any large scale expenditure to enhance the anti-bomber system will be very difficult to marshal. The problem thus raised is to judge the extent to which Canada should fund new anti-bomber equipment procurement such as the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Over-the-Horizon (0TH) radars. CDRB advised that his staff are studying, in conjunction with U.S. authorities, the feasibility of siting 0TH radars in the Canadian North, to detect de-boosted low-trajectory ICBMts. 23. 24. The VCDS observed that, should the SALT talks prove fruitless, the US will probably deploy an elaborate ABM system. However, he suggested that speculation on this point would not be profitable. 25. The OM observed that our close association with the U.S. in NORADmakes it essential that we consistently co-ordinate our views on the future of air defence with their Department of Defence. Mr. Smith asked the members for their views on the probable Canadian reaction if the U.S. ceases to maintain the DEWLine Radar System and the U.S. radars in Labrador. The CDS replied that it would be necessary for DND to consult with MOT CONF.1Dl:l\JTIAL ... /7 000403 �• CONFIDENTIAL Document disclosed under the ,Accessto Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 7 as to the soverignty implications of radar coverage in these areas. If such a requirement remains, a working arrangement would have to be developed between the two departments to keep the system in operation. SUBMl'\RINE/SLBM DEFENCE 26. The OMremarked that the draft White Paper appears to derogate the current orientation of ASW activity, towaids surveillance of submarines. Mr. Smith replied that the primary submarine threat was that of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); the present CF activity would provide warning, but the timely destruction of submarines is much more difficult. In the future the orientation in the U.S. might be towards the objective of killing the missiles in flight. CDRB remarked upon the technological difficulties involved in the missile-kill requirement and suggested that our ASW force should have the capability to kill submarines, even if this were not executed prior to first SLBM launch. CTS observed that the costeffectiveness ratio of our present anti-submarine capability to locate and destroy, as distinct from detection and surveillance, is adverse; it is very expensive to equip, operate, and maintain this limited reaction capability, and it pays little dividend if it cannot attack the submarine before it launches its missiles. CANADIANFORCES EUROPE (CFE) - LANDELEMENT The DM raised the question of the equipment requirements of the Canadian Land Forces in Europe, which did not appear to be compatible with those of the land element in Canada. The MND referred to the Cabinet decision of 30 April and 20 May 1969, which approved the assignment of CFE to the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force. He questioned how, in the light of that decision, CFE had become assigned to the Central Army Group with the implied requirement for either helicopter gun-ships or new tanks. The DM explained that Mr. Cadieux, in his negotiations with NATO officials, had encountered strong opposition to the ACE Mobile Force role for CFE. He had reflected this opposition in subsequent discussions with his Cabinet colleagues, and had gained the impression that, provided the size of the force did not exceed the specified limit, the Cabinet would not object to assignment of CFE to a role different from that previously approved. On this understanding he had committed CFE to CENTAG. 27. 28. The MNDindicated that in his view, this change in assignment should have been referred formally to the Cabinet for approval, before it was accepted, and that he now anticipates difficulties within the Cabinet because this step was not taken. VCDS observed that, in view of the firm undertaking given to NATOOfficials by Mr. Cadieux, a reversal of decision at this time would necessitate reopening the negotiations. . .. /8 CONFIDENTIAL 000404 �L_ • • CONFIDENTIAL Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 8 29. The DM suggested that there might be some record of Mr. Cadieux's discussions available in the Privy Council office; Mr. Smith recalled that NATOwas not informed of the decision to assign CFE to CENTAGas a light mobile force, VCDS mentioned that General Allard might have played a significant part in this change of assignment because of his personal knowledge of the need for forces in CENTAG. He suggested that, because SACEUR's subsequent planning has taken place on the understanding that CFE would be in CENTAG, new negotiations with NATO and SACEURwould be very difficult. 30, The MNDsuggested that a force such as the German Jaeger Brigade (an air-transportable mechanized battle group, less tanks) might be acceptable to SACEUR, and, in view of the relatively minor equipment implications, would also be acceptable to the Cabinet, If on the other hand an attempt is made to secure belated approval of a commitment which will involve significant equipment expenditures, the deliberations in Cabinet will be very difficult indeed, The VCDS cautioned that the role accepted must be professionally rational, or the reputation of Canadian Land Forces Europe would be damaged, The MNDagreed, and requested that the staff work related to the role of CFE Land Force should be very thorough and should be completed as early as possible. CANADIANFORCES EUROPE (CFE) - AIR ELEMENT 31. The MNDreferred to the present plan to remove the CFE Air Element from the strike role by 1972 and to then have two attack and one RECCE squadrons. He questioned whether a conversion to three attack squadrons would be preferable. CG mentioned that the RECCE role was somewhat more expensive in manpower than the attack role, but that the RECCE squadron had developed a considerable pride in their competence in that role and that this should be taken into account. - 32. The MNDasked whether the RECCE capability achieved in CFE might not have an application to the requirement for reconnaissance of the Canadian Arctic. The CG suggested that . the range and single engine design of the CF 104 might preclude its use as a reconnaissance vehicle in northern Canada but that its intercept capability might be exploited in Air Defence Command for identification. VCDS sugges-ted that equipment decisions of this nature should not be incorporated in the White Paper until his staff have had an opportunity to study the proposition comprehensively. Mr. Smith observed that the Government had been criticized in recent months for the fact its policy pronouncements had been vague, and that he therefore wished to incorporate in the Defence White Paper as many ,specifics· as possible, to insure Government and Public acceptance. The DM agreed with this view point but urged caution that the financial _implications of specific equipment intentions should be perfectly clear before the item i3 included. . .. /9 CONFIDENTIAL 000405 �• CONFIDENTIAL Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 9 33. The MNDreferred to conversations which he had had during his visit to CFE concerning the need for a gun in the CF 104. He was informed that the gun would be suitable for air-to-air combat and for the attack role. On the other hand, if the CF 104 were brought back to Canada as an Air Defence interceptor, provision of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles should be considered. The DM·observed that the financial implications of such equipment changes should be determined at the earliest possible stage. The MNDurged.the members to realize the advantages to be gained by demonstrating to the Government and to the Public that the Canadian Forces are exploiting their present weapons system to the utmost before initiating new procurement. NATIONALDEVELOPMENT CDRB stated that in his view the draft White Paper does not adequately deal with the topic of "National Development''. The MNDresponded that the Department had indeed been directed to study its participation in this field, and that studies to this end were in progress; accordingly although the draft White Paper does not yet incorporate this topic, the need was recognized. CDRB observed that one area of advanced technology to which the Department should direct some research effort was in connection with large Surface Effect Vehicles (SEV), which appeared to have potential for both Maritime and Land Force Operations. 34. DNDORGANIZATIONAND MANAGEMENT 35. The MNDpredicted that one of his major problems in the next few months will be to withstand opposition attacks concerning the management of the DDH 280 program. CTS replied that the difficulties encountered with the DDH 280 program were fundamental in nature: • a. The operational requirement generated design problems of great complexity; this raises the basic question as to whether DND should continue to do its own ship design, there being no other warship design capability in Canada. b. The fixed-price contract arranged by DSS was a new approach to Canadian warship construction which established an adversary relationship and encouraged the builder to overcome his cost constraints through the medium of claims. The U.S. Navy was experiencing similar problems. c. The separation of contractual and design responsibilities between DND and DSS presents the contractors with obvious opportunities to establish claims in the gray area of overlapping interdepartmental responsibility. . .. -10 CONFIDENTIAL 000406 I �• Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information CONFIDENTIAL - 10 - 36. The MNDstated that he understood that a large number of expensive design changes had been authorized at a low level in the project management organization. The DM confirmed this observation, estimating that approximately 400 design changes or changes in work scope had been incorporated in the ships without being recognized as such. The MNDobserved that such excessive zeal must be carefully controlled in the future with respect to all military procurement. He also stated that contracts raised by DSS on the part of DNDmust in future carry clear obligations for the contractor to report cost~ variations. He recognized that narrow-base industries sponsored by DNDwill inevitably seize whatever opportunities appear,.to exploit their contracts for greater profit. 37. The CG queried the scope of the organizational studies that should be undertaken to prevent similar errors of management in the future. CP suggested that it would be advisable to conduct a comprehensive organization and management study of the entire Department .. CG supported this proposal and advocated that the study be done by a competent consultant with DND assistance. The MNDand the DM, however, expressed reservation over the "Public 11 nature of a study report piepared by a consultant, and suggested that it would be preferable to set up a team of Government representatives, with an outside management expert to assist them. The .consensus with respect to focussing the study on the DDH 280 experience was that its problems were too specialized to provide an appropriate "case study" from which to draw general conclusions as to organization and management improvements for the Department as a whole. 38. The deliberations terminated at 0245 hours // CONFIDENTIAL 19 January / 71 . .a>f~ A. C. Bowes Colonel 000407 - � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18660 Title A name given to the resource Summary Record of Discussions on the Draft 1971 White Paper on Defence Policy Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource January 18, 1971 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24, Acc. 1997-98/050, Box 1, File Title: White Paper (January 1971)