https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f05af98a2b07a2a9e647a62867f9c454.pdf 51b04a545c6498396241a5767496283e PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu d'SE'efmacces ii /'information \ This Document is the Property of the Goventment of Canada and is on Loan from the Privy Council Office I. I I_ Nb • -2Z::.2..L Copy No. Cabinet A meeting Council Chamber, East at 10:00 a.m. Y...? 1'1inutes of the Cabinet was held in the Privy Block, on Thursday, July 15, 1971, Present The Prime 1'1inister (1'1r. Trudeau) in the Chair, The Leader of the Government in the Senate (Senator Martin), The Secretary of State for Ex:ternal Affairs (1'1r. Sharp), The 1'1inister of Public Works, (1'1ro Laing), The President of the.Treasury Board (Mr. Drury) , The Minister of Industry, Trade and_ Commerce (Mr o Pepin) , The 1'1inister of Regional Economic Eicpansion (Mr. 1'1archand), The Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources (Mr. Greene), The Minister Without Portfolio (Mr. cote), The Minister of Justice (Mr. Turner), The 1'1inister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (Mr. Chretien), The Minister of Labour (Mr o Mackasey), The Minister of National Defence (1'1r. Macdonald), The 1'1inister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. 1'1unro) , The Secretary of State (Mr. Pelletier), The Minister of Fisheries and Forestry (Mr. Davis), The Minister of Veterans Affairs (1'1r. Dube), The 1'1inister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs (Mr. Basford), The Minister Without Portfolio (1'1r. Andras), The Minister of Supply and Services. (Mr. Richardson), The Minister of 1'1anpower . and Immigration (1'1r. Lang) , The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Gray) , The 1'1inister Without Portfolio (Mr. Stanbury), The Solicitor General (Mr. Goyer). The Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, (1'1r. Crowe ) , The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Miss McDougall), The Acting Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Col. Troughton). 003428 �• Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 4 - SECRET Finance.to: The Cabinet agreed to authorize the Minister of (a) arrange for the issue and sale for cash of Government of Canada bonds in the principal amowit of $200,000,000 for the geteral purposes of the Government of Canada; and (b) ·arrange for the j_ssue and sale of $350,000,000 of Government of Canada bonrls in exchange, at par, for Government of Canada 4¾ per cent bonds due September 1, 1972. (P.C. An Order in Cowicil 1971-1461, July 15, 1971). White Paper was passed accordingly, on Defence The Minister of National Defence continued his review of the provisions and implications of the White Paper on Defence in this instance using the Report of the Committee on External Policy and Defence (Cab. Doc. 652-71) as a e;uideline to discussion. operations, In the ensuing discussion concerning ~he following points were made: maritime 1. The expansion of maritime operations in the Arctic had already begwi and the Defence Research Board had begwi a study of the need for a greater submarine detection capability in the Arctic. 2. The ARGUSlong range patrol aircraft had certain shortcomings ?or the northern surveillance role. It was designed as an anti-submarine warfare aircraft and required fitting of a new infra~red detection system to e,.1.able it to perform wider conditions of low light. Overhaul assessments would have to take this factor into consideration as well as that of air-worthiness. 3. A number of ultimate options presented themselves: continue operation of the Argus if overhaul proved economical, purchase a replacement fleet at what could be a cost of $500 million, or maintain no long range patrol aircraft fleet. It was the preliminary opinion of the Defence.Staff that Argus could be retained economically and effectively but no final opinion could b~ given until the studies as to overhaul costs and effectiveness were concluded. The Cabinet agreed that: (a) the Canadian Forces should expand maritime operations in the Arctic and should study the need for a greater submarine detection capability in the Arctic; .. -/5 003429 �- 5 - Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii l'informati n SF.CRET (b) if the results of the systems analysis concerning overhaul of the Argus indicated that it would not be cosr.-effective to carry out such an overhaul, the Minister of National Defence would return to Cabinet with his recommendation for long range patrol a:i.rcrB.ft requirements generally and Agrus replacem~nt specifically. following In di.scussion points emerged: concerning CF-5 aircraft, the 1. The problem of surplus CF-5 airaraft was considered in development of the White Paper pro_; visions. In addition to the two operational squadrons in Canada, it was intended that the obsol.escent T-33 jet trainers would be replaced by converted or newly constructed dual-configured CF-5s, conversion involving a cost of $10 million. The proposed flyover role for North Norway involved augmenting existing squadrons to NATOoperational standards as well. If the sale of single seat CF-5s to Venezuela was effected, new dual-seat aircraft would be constructed by Canadair, conversion no longer being a factor. 2o Some Ministers considered that it was undesirableto effect the CF-5 sale to Venezuela in view of that country's relationship with Guyana. It was felt that such a sale would have an adverse effect on Can&da's relationship with Commonwealth Caribbe::1n nationa and that it was desirable t.o discontinue negotiPtionso Otter Ministers, noting that the Venezuelan sale was already approved by Cabinet and .that there were possibilities that the sales negotiations would be successful, considered that it would be detrimental to Canada's commercial reputation if· sales negotiations were broken off. They did not feel that relations between Venezuela and its n~ighbors were such that a sale was precluded unde::- the criteria set out in previously agreed government policyo The final concensus was th·~re was no requirement to ~hange the provisions of the }lrevious Cabinet decisior authorizing the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce to proceed with negotiations on such a saleo The Cabinet agreed that CF-5 aircraft will be employed to provide a quick response photographic reconnaissance capability in Canada and over offshore waters in peacetime; CF-104 aircraft from the Oper&tional Training Squadron at Cold Lake, Alberta, will be used to provide Canada with its own identification and interception capability in the Prairie area; and CF-101 VOODOOaircraft operating from eastern Canada bases w::.11 carry out identification and interception tasks on the eastern approaches to Canada. ]I.iring discussion in regard to the establishment of coastal operations centres, it was pointed out that Maritime Command now ran t1rro coastal operatj 0ns centres and the White Paper proposed expansion of these to include representation by other departmental agencies in order to facilitate better co-ordination with DNDo Ministers expressed concern about the prolifer·ation of vessels and aircraft operating for their departments and agencies in a variety of maritime roles and ... /6 003430 �• Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 6 - SECRET that there appeared to be little co-ordination and information flow among these agencies. It was considered that a high risk of uneconomical duplication existed and that indeed some requirements might remain unsatisfied when another agency with its resources, if tasked, might have satisfied them. It was felt that the broad area of overall maritime operatj_ons should be looked at with a view to achieving better co-ordination and use ~f resources. ·The Cabinet agreed that: (a) the Department of National Defence should be prepared, when required, to render increased assistance to other departments in fields relating to national development, this without any degradation to their ability to respond to their basic defence roles; joint operations centres would be established on the east and west coasts to fa~ilitate better co-ordination between DNDand other departments and agencies; and that a study should be initiated to inquire into and make recommendations to Cabinet with R view to effecting greater centralized co-ordination and control over the operation of all government .vessels and aircraft belonging to those departments and agencies having coastal functions and responsibilities; (b) increased emphasis Force presence and operations will be placed in the North. on Land Dur~inJ5the discussion of the Defence policy implications of the White Paper having to do with North American Defence the following points emerged: C I. Although it is implicit in·the White Paper - that Canada intends to continue participation in the joint North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), there is no need at this time to take any decision to renew the NORADagreement following the expjry of the present agreement on May 12, 1973. This question should be considered by Cabinet when it becomes nec~ssary to deal with the renewal of the agreement. 2& The Cabinet confirmed its ment at a meeting on July 8 that: previous agree- (a) Canada will maintain the number of interceptor aircraft at the current level to contribute. simultaneously to the active antibomber defence of North-Ameri.ca and to the capability to carry out peacetime aircraft 1dentification in·and control of Canadian airspace; this contribution is to be updated only to the extent required for general control of Canadian airspace; (b) the BOf'J.ARC system will be retired; ... /7 003431 �1 - 7 - Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces ii /'information I SECRET ! .I l- l (c) the government is prepared to reach agreements to allow U.S. interceptors to disperse to selected bases in Canada in times of crisis, as determined by the Government of Canada, if this would maximize the effectiveness of the residual anti-bomber defences; the government is not prepared to agree to have such interceptors based in Canada in peacetime. The Minister of National Defence is to negotiate with the United States Government to ensure the maximum use of Canadian personnel for the servicing of these interceptors, on a cost recovery basis; (d) the government is prepared to allow U.S. Strategic Air Command refuelling tankers to continue to use Goose Bay and, should the international situation in its judgment warrant such a move, for tankers to be dispersed to other bases in Canada. The Minister of National Defence is to negotiate with the United States Governme~t the maximum use.of Canadian personnel for the servicing of these tankers on a cost recovery basis; (e) Canada will not establish the NORAD Alternate Command Post at North Bay and will not respond favourably to the U.S. proposal that this be done. Du.ring the discl:!,__ssion of Canada's weapons the following points emerged: policy on nuclear • 1. The Leader of the Government in the Senate reminded his Cabinet colleagues of the various statements_made by Mr. Pearson and Mr. Hellyer in the period between 1963 and 1965 regarding the phasing out of Canada's nuclear role. Senator Martin stated his view that the government had intended a phasing out of a nuclear arming of CF-101 VOODOO interceptors coincident with the end of the life of that interceptoro 2. In contrast to the situation in 1963, the • non-proliferation treaty is now in effect and Canada conforms to the provisions of that treaty whereby countries other than the existing nuclear powers can have nuclear weapons on their territory only under a two-key system of control. Additionally the strike aspect of our nuclear role has been complet¤-ly eliminated leaving only the defensive interceptor role. 3. The position contained corresponded with Liberal party denuclearization and supporting in NORAD. in the White Paper resolutions rejecting continued membership • 4. As long as the government still considered that there was a residual bomber threat and that Canada should maintain its interceptor contribution to the anti.-bomber defence there was justification for arming these interceptors with nuclear weapons; conventional armament would be ineffective and arming Canadian interceptors in this way would mean that bomber interception by nuclear means would be performed by United States aircraft stationed south of the border but making their interceptions over Canadian territory within normal fighter aircraft range. . .. /8 003432 �• - 8 - Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information SECRET 5. It would not be appropriate for the present government to state specifically and thus try to commit a future government to a decision regarding nuclear armament for interceptors some years ahead. 6. There might be value in drafting the White Paper in such a way as to make clear the government's eventual desire to rid itself entirely of nuclear weapons when the circumstances permit. The present wording of the Paper seemed to i_mply that government policy rather than being aimed in that direction was subject to reversal in the other direct.ion depending on the evolving strategic situation. The Cabinet agreed: (a) that the sentence on page 21 of the draft .White Paper stating that "Canadian policy on nuclear weapons will continue to be responsive to the evolving strategic situation, and in parti9ular the bomber th..reat II would be deleted and that the Minister of National Defence would redraft that section to reflect: (i) that the desirability under war conditions for any potential nuclear explosion to take place over more northerly sparsely inhabited areas rather than densely populated areas was and remains an important factor in the rationale for continuing to arm Canada's interceptor force with defensive nuclear weapons; (ii) that the question of anti-bomber defence requirements would be reviewed in the light of the results of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and (iii) an outline of government action so far in the process of denuclearization and of the ultimate national aims in this regard. . .Q9.ring disc,.1ssion of low-level training flights by unarmed bombers of SAC, the Minister of National Defence reported that there were agreements with both the United States and Britain regarding low level training flights over Canadian territory. He pointed out that about 12 per cent of SAC bomber training now took place over Canada. The routes were discussed and changed each year. There would be difficulty i:n renegotiating the low level flights agreed to for·Manitoba, for example, which had only been negotiated recently. The Minister of Supply and Services said he had no concerns about low j_evel flying anywhere except over populated areas. The President of the Treasury Board pointed out that for some forms of bomber training, flights over pure wilderness were not of much help. • • The Cabinet agreed that the continuation of low level training flights by unarmed SAC bombers on the basis of 12 per cent of such flights being flown over Canada was acceptable provided such flights in Canada would be flown over sparsely populated areas to be designated by Canadian authorities. While it was acknowledged that current arrangements were in effect until the end of ·1971, the Minister of National Defence was to attempt to bring about the required change of procedures by USAF as soon as possible . . . . /9 003433 �• I. I • " • Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act 1 Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'aci:es ii /'information I .- 9 - SECRET Submarine emerged: Durin Warfare the discussion ASW) capa ility of the Maritime Forces the following points Anti- 1. The Miriister of National Deferice stressed that a very high percentage of current naval expenditure went for purely ASW purposes. The DDH destroyers were largely designed and equipped for this role, particularly in terms of the expensive electronic Sonar equipment which is being installed. e 2,. The Prime Minister pointed out that nuclear armed submarines are generally looked upon as second strike weapons. He queried whether Canadian Forces designed to search and destroy should be seen to be aimed at destroying a second strike weapon. This was inconsistent with the deterrent theory. 3. The Minister of National Defence pointed out that the ships were a natural extension of the aircraft detection system. One should not lose sight of the fact that they were capable of detecting increases in possibly hostile forces in a particular area and were thus able to provide a measure of the nature of a prewar crisis, 4. The Secretary of State for External Affairs pointed out that this detection and attack capability was an integral part of Canada's NATOcontribution. S.- The President of the Treasury Board drew attention to the difficulty of matching existing expensive capital equipment with the Defence priorities laid down by Cabinet after that equipment had been contracted for. 6. The Prime Minister stressed his desire to ensure full understanding within the Servic0 of the government's intention to wind down the ASW role, The Cabinet decided to continue discussion of this subject at the next Cabinet meeting when the White Paper discussion resumed. • Salaries of Incumbents of Governor in Council Positions The Cabinet had for consideration a memor~ndum to the Cabinet Committee on the Public Service from the Chairman of the Public Service from the Chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials on Executive.Personnel entitled "Salaries of Incumbents of.Governor in Council Positions'', Cab. Doc. 732~71, and a Report of the Cabinet Committee on the Public Service, Cab. Doc. 750-71. . .. /10 003434 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18656 Title A name given to the resource Cabinet Minutes Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 15, 1971 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG24, Acc. 1997-98/050, Box 3, File Title: White Paper (May 1971)