https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/baad553474a09d76046dbb6f2b265cf5.pdf 5908592d60092320488bd21cf6e03bda PDF Text Text • J . Document disclosed under XtyAAccess tolrfprmation Act • Docu/enV8lvulgue(en vertu t»\aldjsCir^c^sJl(iAafeiatk Defence LiaisoL^X-_~EbeE±a/gc_ BWWSRADEa TO SECRET ffiOUtT A SECRElr^C N #«x November 20, 1950 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HEENEY Items Nos. 2 a n d 5L o n C.S.C. Agenda for November 21. 1950. (7) (9) 1. XT CUSRPG- Short Term Plan - draft Appendix "G« (SAC Bases in N.E. Canada) Clearance of postingfof SAC bomber u n i t s to Goose. These two items are of some importance. ITEM ( 7 ) . 2. Attached is Smith's letter of November 6 (Annex A)," enclosing copy of External's letter of October 25 to Mr. Wrong: (a) outlining the proposals Washington is expected to make at a high level for use of Goose (and more limited use of Harmon and Gander) as the principal advance,,assault base for Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers; (b) indicating approval of Immediate construction of » certain storage, personnel and warehouse buildings I that will be required by SAC at Goose; and (c) commenting that the final arrangements regarding use of Goose and other North-Eastern bases by SAC bombers in peace and war will doubtless have to be clearly set forth In an exchange of documents, so that there may be no room for misunderstanding. 3. I understand that Mr. Claxton and the P.M. are prepared to give very sympathetic consideration to Washington's proposals for SAC bases when they are received. You will recall that Mr. Claxton recently obtained from Cabinet advance approval in principle for such extension of U.S. activities in the vicinity of Goose as proves necessary. I*. The attached draft Appendix "G" £0 the CUSRPG Short Term Plan (Annex B), which C.S.C.fefe'sasked to consider, states that "the CUS Region must prepare for and support ... the bases and base facilities necessary for the execution oJ_Jjhe strategic air offensive" (para, l); that "the principal bases"""in Canada "which will be required prior to D-Day" are Ooflee, Harmon and Gander (para. 3 ) ; that "within the CUS Region, bales, facilities, and logistic support will be furnished in accordance with existing arrangements and operational procedures. The requirements for bases in addition to those listed above will be given cognizance at appropriate governmental level at such time as these requirements are presented" (para. 6 ) ; and that "the subsidiary tasks to be accomplished in support of the strategic air offensive" include: "maintenance, operation and defence" of the three bases mentioned and "establishment, maintenance and operation of telecpmmunications systems required in base areas" (para. 7 ) . """""*" 000200 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2- 5. When in October the PJBD was given a very frank briefing on the subject by the S.A.C. General in charge of plans, the whole emphasis was on SAC's need for Goose, although he mentioned that Harmon would be used for tanker aircraft supporting the bombers. When asked whether SAC was Interested in Gander with a view to dispersal of its aircraft> he did not appear to have given any thought to Gander, although he said that this field deserved consideration in this connection. 6. The above quoted words "in accordance with existing arrangements and operational procedures" are obscure. Under present arrangements it is necessary for the U.S. to obtain permission, through diplomatic^channels, for the use of Goose and Gander for any Service project. Harmon is of course leased, and the U.S. Forces do not normally have to ask permission to conduct any activities there. It is open to debate whether, under the Bases agreement, this normal situation would be applicable to the storage of special bombs at Harmon or the conduct of warlike operations from Harmon. As regards the above-quoted reference to the need for the defence of any SAC bases in Canada, we should perhaps j try to assume the responsibility of providing any _3_2Uii& forces (e.g. A/A units) necessary for the defence of SAC bombers and installations at Goose or Gander. 7. The draft Appendix is so brief that it is difficult to Judge what Canada's commitments would be if it were approved bfTn fi r-Go~v s e^mm^ to make detailed proposals for the use of these bases by SAC, Chiefs should presumably not go beyond approving Appendix "G" subject to the understanding that actual use of the bases for the deployment of bombers and weapons in peace»and as advance assault bases in war,is a matter for negotiations on a Government to Government basis. 8. ' At the October PJBD meeting, the U.S. Section indicated that, when Washington puts forward proposals for use of bases by SAC, it will probably be asking for something like the following blanket authorization: (1) in peace, to deploy SAC bomber units to Goose, etc. and send them on training flights from there; (2) in war, to launch attacks with bombers stationed at Goose, etc., and also to stage bombers through there for attacks on Soviet targets (the staging of bombers might entail carrying live bombs over an uninhabited Canadian route between the U.S. border and Goose;; Canada would presumably determine, in an emergency, the timing of the initiation of attacks from bases in Canada, and also when such attacks must cease towards the end of hostilities); (3) in peace and war, to store all types of bombs at Goose, etc. (presumably the bombs would be introduced by sea as a safety precaution in peace, and whenever possible in war); (k) in peace and war, to deploy bomber units and bombs to Goose, etc. subject only to advance notification j to the RCAF (so that any necessary housekeeping f arrangements can be made). 000201 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information _ 3- ITEM (9). •';., '.." 9. At thev Oc.t'oher PJBD meeting, the U.S. Section indicated that, pending conclusion of an overall understanding"^ the type just outlined, the USAF would want to deploy bombers to Goose, from time to time as a precautionary measure. As the greatest importance is attached to keeping information on the whereabouts of SAC bombers in the smallest number of hands, the U.S. Section enquired whether the Canadian authorities would be agreeable to permission for such deployments being sought through Service rather than diplomatic 'channels. Full information would be provided with each request. It is expected that SAC will ask permission to send a bomber group to Goose about December 1. I 10. This enquiry was brought to the attention of Brigadier Smith in paragraph (c) of the attached letter of October 11 (Annex C), and is the point C.S.C. will, be discussing under the heading of Item (9). While I think it is most desirable to keep U.S. Service requests in diplomatic channels as a general rule, I think this request to handle clearance of SAC deployments through Service channels is a reasonable one^ In view of the importance of the security consideration, provided this Department is consulted by N.D.H.Q, and given full information whenever such a request is received - pending any blanket authority that may be worked out later on a Government to Government basis. Defence Liaison Division. 000202 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Memorandum for Mr. Heeney Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 20-Nov-50 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-b, File number: 50195-40, pt 1 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDAC01847