https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e4202b098f219024d70b1836bf7d243f.pdf 20de53a71689fb7ebf9a433527f9ffc3 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to infOfrmo£ipn Act Docurrtent divulgue en vertuve^&UfiidJi"Vm^^pmfortnatfon^ SECRET • 4 June 2 1, I960, MEMORANDUM FOR PILE: ; Storage of Nuclear Weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon •••* ''./. On June 9 Willoughby, Director of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, passed to us on an informal basis two suggested amendments (flagged) to the Canadian draft of the Harmon-Goose Bay Storage Agreement (flagged). These amendments would delete the reference to n ownership" in paragraph 2 of the Canadian draft and would insert a reference to the Atomic Energy Act in paragraph 3(a). 2. The sense of these amendments were outlined to Barton on the telephone on June 10, Following discussion with Ritchie,,Barton reiterated the view which he had previously expressed to Willoughby on a private basis at the last PJBD meeting that an attempt to amend the Canadian draft would be unlikely to meet xfith success. He also thought that the proposed amendments in theaselves were open to objection (see paragraphs 5 and 6 of the memorandum of June 13). Barton suggested that we have a private word with Willoughby to ingress upon him that any atterapt to amend the draft, might prejudice the whole arrangement. 3. Following this conversation, the Ambassador spoke to Willoughby on June 13 and urged upon hia strongly that the United Statea should not -put these, or any other, changes to us but accept the • draft as is. in the meantime, however, "Willoughby had arranged an informal meeting for the • purpose of explaining the United States situation. k* Accordingly, on June 111 Nutt attended a meeting at the State Department for the" purpose of further exploration of the United States difficulties in connection with our proposed draft for the Agreement. He was accoB^sanied by Air Vice Marshal Hendri6k*and Colonel MacDonald, Executive Staff Officer. .United States offieials at the meeting were Woodie Willoughbyj Carlson and Burgess {Canadian peek)* Rutter (Atomic Energy Section, Department of StateJ, Pender (Legal.Department, Itepartaent of.State), Murray Gomarow (Air Fca-cel^gal.Counsel) and Raymond Brownez (Departnserit of Defense). 1 'j ' -•'•'• • ?r .' -.* . ••<» • . ' '• y ..--:. - . '. . '-.'•'•'• ' ' -.'•••-•"••''•., . • .-•'•/ . '. ...2 001420 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - r. Documentdiuuigui-gU vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a % . '.•'•: " * ' I'information y $. Gomarow led off with an ea*-planation of the reasons for the two suggested amendments. Ho said both were concerned ."with, the same problem— "custody". Ihe United States desired to delete" "ownership?* because, with our deletion of "custody", paragraph 2, they contended, implied that the United States would -not have- custdo^.E the reason for inserting In paragraph 3(a) tee-reference to >theAtomic Energy Aet was'to identify-the criteria which would govern storage," In other wordsj what the United States officials wanted to achieve was acknowledgement by us of United States E, requirements;and an indication that theae requirements are in turn consistent with the Goose Bay and Harmon teases. * 6. Gomarow said, that as we no doubt realized, very little flexibility was allowed to the Executive,in matters of this*kind. "Custody and control" was a legal requirement which* though not specified in so many words in the Atomic Energy: Act, had.grown outE,6f;legislative practice. Absence of provisions clearly indicating that this! legal requirement was being met would alao create a political problea. He conceded that, while it might be possible* in bur terms, to get around the legal problem, the political difficulty was much gre&iet, ytheCongressionalcommittee was demanding. In all other agreements therie was a clear-provision for f custody". Nor was it Just a question of what appeared in the Agreement. The law went to the factual situation* and so would the Committee counsel, fhe reason for their present proposed amendments was not- technical.$•• the Air. Force would like to be able to accept our draft. But they feared that the Joint Committee would feel it could hot* -; ''•-.,..-. •- ''''"•••'•'. ?* We pointed put that the Canadian Government had come a long way towards facilitating the storageEof weapons at Harmon and Goose Bay, Surely Congress, as well as the Administration, was anxious that agreement be reached. We thought, therefore, that it should bV urged upon Congress that the Agreement as it stood accomplished its purpose without prejudicing •Une United States legal requirement. We pressed again the argument that, because of the Base Agreements, the problea of custody really'did not arise. Gomarow seemed prepared to accept this, argument in respect of Harmon but pointed out that, under the Goose Bay Agreement, the Canadian commander was granted free access to the United- States leased area* This was the real stumbling block to the argument that the question of custody did not arise. * * # J& 001421 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a/'information • ' . - " " • SECRET' - iiiiiii II in' iriiii % • • . ' * ' : 7 8. One or two alternative, suggestions to the amendments already put forward to paragraphs .2 and 3(a) of the draft were put forward. The first (and this was the favoured one) was that the specific reference to the United States Atomic Energy Act be dropped and that there be substituted the words "its legal requirements" or just "its laws". There was some suggestion that, if this formula,could be accepted, paragraph 2 might stand as it is now^ although Gomarow clearly preferred to see specific reference to n o-«mership,,ii deleted* Another suggestion was that there might be a Bminuten which would indicate that the question of custody and control did not arise because, under the existing Bases Agreements, the United States already would have custody and control. In effect, by this means the Canadian Government would be inferring that it would not construe the Goose Bay Agreement in such a fashion as to encroach upon United States custody and control of nuclear weapons stored at Goose Bay. We said we thought that the same objection would apply to this suggestion as to that of a letter which had been broached earlier by United States officials. let another suggestion was that Ganadian Ministers might be asked to approve detailed United States security arrangements which would include an indication of how our inspectors would fit into the scheme of things. Such approval would imply an intention by Canada not to invoke the omnibus rights of access under the GooseBay Agreement. There might then be a possibility of the Administration presenting a case to. Congress on the basis that, except for the one point in the Goose Bay Agreement, the question of custody and control did not arise and that, as regards the Goose Bay Agreement, the Canadian Government had approved rules and regulations regarding security of the storage site which clearly indicated its intention not to invoke its full rights Under the Goose Bay Agreement, at least insofar as they might impinge upon Ifaited States requirements for custody and control. 9» In conclusion, we agreed to consider at the official level the views that had been expressed but wo again urged United States officials to reconsider earnestly the possibility of accepting the draft agreement as it stood. If further United States changes were put before Ministers, there would be real difficulties and certainly more delays* ...It �» * • . ' ' t . . ''• ;m^;;rr;;^'• •- r ; ; . : r v " / ; : ' r '• ""• y Document disclosedunder the Access to Information Act Document divulgue ^ ^ J f | ^ D a Loi sur I'acces a I'information • : v • ; : " ' ' ' - ' • : : ' ; ; ; ; ; : : : " r : . : : - b : : : ^ " ^ ^ : 10, 'E (It should be mentioned that Brownez of the Department of .Defense also queried the Canadian Government's intention in connection with paragraphs E ••6 and 7* The United States had previously expressed concern that the Canadian '.';• requirement for approval Of removal Of the weapons for operational use could E Seriously impair the ability of CINCNORAD to act rapidly in situations of grave . emergency. Ws had informed the State Department that our new draft dealt with this problem by specifying that the approval of the Canadian Government "will be given" in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to , paragraph 6, I.e. the procedures spelled out in the MB-1 Overflight Agreement ; of June 30, 1959 and in the exchange of letters of September 30/0etober 2, 1959 between the Ambassador and Mr, Herter concerning NORAD's state of readiness, Brownez's specific question was whether the expression, "will be given", inferred an intention on the part of the Canadian Government that there should be consultation regarding removal for possible use of the weapons in addition to the procedures already established* We replied that our understanding was that the clarification offdred was intended,to dispel doubts on .this point and that the situation envisaged was that existing procedures would govern, Brownez also asked whether it would be our understanding that, if in accordance with the MB-1 Agreement United States interceptors based in the United States were overflying Canada,,interceptors stationed at Harmon and Goose Bay would, under the ^Storage" Agreement plus the, MB-1 Agreement, be permitted to become airborne. We replied that in our own opinion this would be a logical interpretation.) 11. We were informed by Burgess (Canadian Desk) on June 1$ that Willoughby was urging acceptance of our draft of the Agreement as it stands, E 12* On June 17 Willoughby raised the matter again and emphasized that in his view it was important to get a final reaction from officials in Ottawa as Boon as possible. He feared that if the matter were not settled one way or the other before the Ministerial Meeting next month, it would ho doubt come up before the Committee with undesirable repercussions. He therefore hoped that we . would be able to say as soon as possible whether we thought that some further accommodation of the United States difficulties might have promise of acceptance or, alternatively, whether we thought they would not. In the latter event, it would be for the United States to determine whether it would accept the offer of storage on our terms or whether they would demur, *••? 001423 •* �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue eh ©J^pHtefJapo/ sur I'acces a I'information «• p ** % 13, In view of the foregoing, it was decided that instead of reporting on the meeting of June 1U in a personal letter we would report by telephone to officials In Ottawa. Consequently, Nutt spoke, to Barton along the lines of paragraphs $ to.9 of this memorandum. Later, after having spoken to Ritchie, Barton returned the call to; say that they were both of the opinion that suggested amendments would be unlikely to be accepted. Barton even thought that Canadian Ministers might feel that they had gone really further than they wanted in agreeing to storage at Goose Bay and Harmon and that they might welcome an occasion to reconsider this view. He pointed out that Canadian Ministers have preoccupations regarding this matter just.as United States Congress doesf that we had already cbae a long way in meeting the United States requirements ,and that the United States should accept what was proffered unless they wanted to risk prejudicing the whole arrangement, lii» Subsequently the same day.(June 17) the Ambassador spoke to Willoughby, pointing'out that officials in Ottawa had given serious and urgent consideration to the-United States difficulties as presented at the meeting of June llu The Ambassador said that the consensus of purely official opinion, in which he shared, was that any new proposals would be turned down and that this would have generally^adverseresults, Ihe Ambassador reiterated Canadian officials' feeling that the Canadian Government had come a long way in accoiasiiodating the United States desire to store nuclear weapons at Goose Bay and.Harmon. While in theory the letter of United States law mightriothave been met, there would-, r he ^thought, be no problem in the actual practical implementation of the Agreement as proposed by Canada. He said that Willoughby might say that the judgement of senior Canadian officials was categorical regarding the chances of getting acceptance of amendments Of riders to the Agreement as proffeVed. Willoughby undertook to canvass United States officials concerned and to indicate'to us as soon as possible what the United States contemplated doing by way of a formal reply to the Canadian proposal of June, 1959* J.S.N. 001424 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16956 Title A name given to the resource "Storage of Nuclear Weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon," memorandum for file Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 21-Jun-60 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Continental defence - Atomic capability, RG25-A-3-b, Volume number: 5931, File number: 50210-F-40, File part: 5.2