https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/fc713c6a0d35d9b1ad9137acaecca165.pdf 34dec6b8f495e82258b9cc2dd41f02c6 PDF Text Text n e m o?>2/o~F pr 7X\y sP* e*M*~* n IM rjipcces a Tinformation vTSTGo May 6 , I960 SECRET sad MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER Q us s MB-1 FEB 2 2 1985 You will recall that last year the Cabinet approved an exchange of Notes with the United States Government setting out the conditions under which United States interceptor aircraft under the operational control of NORAD may overfly Canada carrying nuclear air-to-air defence weapons. This exchange of Notes (copy attached) permits USAF aircraft armed with these weapons to "enter Canadian air space whenever a condition of-air defence readiness, or a higher state of alert, is declared by CINCNORAD." These are NORAD's two highest states of readiness and in practice would only be declared in a situation of grave emergency when an attack on North America is deemed either to be imminent or is actually mjf in progress. It also provides that the weapons m a y b e " "* used in accordance with the rules for interception and engagement of hostile aircraft over Canadian territory established by the Canadian Government for Canadian military aircraft or by CINCNORAD^ A copy of NORAD's rules of engagement which are now in force is attached. Paragraph 3 of these rules lists the criteria which must be met before any invading airborne object is to be attacked. In addition to the safeguards provided in the overflights agreement itself, we also have an agreement with the United States, a copy of which is attached, which calls for consultation in both the military and diplomatic channel between the two Governments prior to CINCNORAD being authorized to increase his state of readiness in a period of international tension.x In the course of negotiating this agreement it was recognized that it would be unrealistic to make such consultation mandatory in a situation of grave emergency should a surprise attack be launched on North America without any prior build-up of international tension. In such a situation consultation would clearly be impossible. In all other circumstances, however, there would be consultation. Although the United States had originally asked that the MB-1 overflight agreement should continue in force for the same length of time as NORAD, the Cabinet decided that the authority should be granted for one year only at the end of which time the agreement would be reviewed. The agreement will therefore expire at midnight, June 30, unless it is continued in force by a further exchange of Notes. Although the United States authorities have not yet approached us for a renewal of the agreement, I have no doubt that they will do so in the near future. • • • fc f.r-tt/os) t �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'jacces a I'information i^J^INlV. 001452 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - -2- WRQBOST'TO'SecRCr REBU1T A SECRET FEB l i 1985 So far as the Canadian position with respect to renewal of the agreement is concerned, there are three comments I should like to make. The first is that in my opinion the overflight agreement, in conjunction with the consultation agreement, provides all possible assurance of Canadian control over the use of nuclear weapons for air defence in Canadian air space consistent with the need for CINCNORAD to react rapidly in event of an actual attack. The only conceivable alternative would be to devise some system whereby an appropriate Canadian Minister could be reached on a moment's notice at any time of the day or night to authorize the use of the weapons. The second point to which I wish to draw your attention is that these agreements, in addition to covering the operations of United States-based interceptors in Canada, will, if the Goose Bay - Harmon agreement is concluded, also cover the operations of USAF squadrons at those bases, since those operations will be subject to the same requirement for control by the Canadian Government, coupled with the need to react rapidly in event of an actual emergency. You may recall that this point was dealt with in a telegram (No. DL-337 of March 25) approved by you for despatch to Washington. The State Department had criticized the first draft of the Goose-Harmon agreement on the grounds that the requirement of Canadian approval for removal of the weapons for operational use could seriously impair the ability of NORAD to aet rapidly in situations of grave emergency. Our telegram commented on this point in the following terms: 1 "Our new draft (of the Goose-Harmon agreement) deals with this by specifying that the approval of the Canadian Government will be in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to Paragraph 6. As you will appreciate, these procedures are spelled out in the MB-1 overflight agreement of June 30, 1959 and in the exchange of letters of September 30/0ctober 2, 1959 between Mr. Heeney and Mr. Herter concerning states of readiness. The Canadian Government regards the measure of control which it exercises through these agreements as essential." The third comment I should like to make is that if the agreement is to be renewed, Cabinet may wish to consider modifying the termination clause so as to read: -*H "The terms of this agreement will be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such a review may be terminated by either Government on six months' notice." n fiA ^ .. .3 001453 �mr Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue divulgue enu en^niL^iaLois^^<Mesa^'^f9niation Document . SECRET -3- This is the same language which we have proposed to'vaer ' '**»5 United States in our second draft of the proposed exchange of Notes on the storage of the same weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon. Under such a condition the Government would be free to request any change at any time rather than at the end of a one-year period and thus could seek to alter any part of it as might be necessary in the light of some future development such as in the event that RCAF aircraft be equipped with these weapons and are required to use them in United States air space. I i If you concur, I propose to consult with the I Department of National Defence on the preparation of a f submission to Cabinet covering the points dealt with in this memorandum with a view to obtaining a decision with respect to the renewal of the MB-1 overflight agreement prior to its termination on June 30. Any action with regard to the MB-1 agreemenfflollla.," of course, have a bearing on the agreement concerning storage at Goose and Harmon. ^ yt *** -*** N. A. R. 001454 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16943 Title A name given to the resource "MB-1 Overflight Agreement," Memorandum for the Minister Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 06-May-60 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Continental defence - Atomic capability, RG25-A-3-b, Volume number: 5931, File number: 50210-F-40, File part: 5.2