https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/712d793bcee3bad539c905a04c6b8d07.pdf 58db92eef1ced04b28c950af0abec474 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri’acces a I’information O 20. 6 OP 6 COrz.O QI/NVL/ngm WISER - TOP SBCRET RBPOR 00 KEEISQ DETULEN REPRWSENTATTVZS CP 2H0 CANADIAN AMD UIEBD STATES GOVNRTRTSMS CO CONSIDER PROGEDUNES POR T2E CLEARAEC] OP U.S. S.A.. PLICIITS - . * NARCH 10th, 1952, ..... . .... . .. . The tooting, which took place in the office, of tho 1. Secretary of State, was.attended by Doan Acheson, Fr. Chomas Pinlotter, Secretary for Air, .... Mr. Preomen Fatthets, Gonoral Fathen T. Tuining (formerly ViceChief of Air Staff trnnofered to Comandor v -of Strategio Air Force) . Goneral Ualsh, and Fr. le Cordon Arnopon . for tho United States, ’and by . ' ' Con. L. 3. Pearson, LLP., $r, H. Ze Erong, ■ Air Vico Marshal Prank 12ller, • *r. George Iaatieff, sad ■ ■ ’ Fr. Douglas Leran - ' for the Canadian Government. lr. Achoson, loading off the discussion, auggestod 2. that the meeting should consider what ndifications might be acceptable to' tho. Canadian Govornent ■ in the Hinuto agreed to at the meeting attended by k f * Pearson in the Secrotary’s office • on June 14th, 1951, which hadrecordod the procedures to be ■ followed in dealing with requesto from the 0.S. Covernmont for the use of facilittcs in Canadian territory or the overf light of Canada by the Unitod States Air Porce la tho doploymont of special weapons, tr. Acboson suggested that as a means of clarifying the problon of requests which might be forthcoming from the U.S. S.A.C. for the uso of bases in Canadian territory or the overflight of. Canadian. territory* those might be considered under three categories of flighbo: (1) in-transit flights not involving strikes of . aircraft carrying non-nuoloar components of atomic , weapons t (2) doployment of U.3. D.4.C. aircraft to Canadian bases in preparation for a otriko, carrying * either nuclear or non-nuolear components of ' atonic weapons, and ■ ~ (3) actual atrikes from Canadian basos or overflight of Canadian torritory on route to strike missions. ... (Mr. Acheson wan evidontly using the catogories of flights set out in Secretary Lovett’s lottor to hin of last Bovenbor as rocorded in Wiser nessage No. IL from Washington of Eovenbor 18th, ■ 1951.) ory, MPe Acheson suggested As records the first G 3e that the United States authorities ould like to have the Canadian Covernmont acroo to ablankotprior approval being given for all such in-transit flichte, subject only to notification being given /in advance 00083 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge-en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a /’information 2 • in advance of such flights through Sopvicc-to-3rvico channels. ■ As. regards the fecond catogory, Mr. Acheson asked whether the Canadian Governmont might agroo in advance to permitting -th© •■• doploymont of 0.A,C. aircraft to Canadian bases in-preparation : •■ for a strike, with aircraft carrying either- nucloar or non* nuclear compononts, subject to ouch notification as the Canadian Government my deer desirable (1.6. uoin either the Sorvices to-Sorvice channel, or .notification through tho Canadian Mossy in lechington, if this wore rogarded as prof erablo) • With respect to strike oporations, hr. Acheson said that on the U.S. side, it was recognised that no overflight of Canadian torri- ‘ tory for strike missions, or the use of'bases in Canada for this - purpose could bo undertaken by the U.S. S.A.C. without approval ■ by the Canadian Government in oach case. 4e ' ' Mr. Pearson askod whothor, ■ undor -ths first category montionod by Mr. Acheson (1.0., in-transit flights not involving strikes) tho U.S. authorities had in mind routine flights not connoctod with any apodal omorgency, but related to the general progperio of preparedness being carried on by the U.S. S.A.C. Mrs Aeboson confirnod' that Mr. Pearson’s understanding of the : typos of flights ■ included undor the first catogory was corroct. b. Pearson said that on the Canadian sido thorewns ■ S. overy wish to avoid putting any.unnocossary obstacles in the programs of preparodnoss of the U.S. 8.40., having in mind the mutunl socurity interests of Caneda for horisphero dofondo and under the North Atlantic Treaty in particular, le uishod. it understood that everything that he said at the meeting was subject to reference to the Primo Binistor and the Minister of National Defenco, who would have to be consulted. He indicated - • . that he was prepared to recommend that for th© purpose of ins . transit flights related to tho gonoral preparadnoss program of the U.S. 3.2.0. and not involving strikes, favourable coneidora■' ‘ tion should be given in Ottawa to modifying the procedures as - proposed subject to such conditions as-my bo agrood between the ' twoSorviood. Veme n wosto t .ecus — -= e Vorule taz.npanrr 6. Mr. f©arson went on to mho the general observation that in the view of the Canadian Government any modification in the Minute agrood to on June 14th, 1951, should not take the form of an intor-governcontal agreecont. The Canadian Covern■ mat would feol under obligation to ■ inform Parliament of any inter-governmontal agreemont which uight be nezotlated, which would be undesirable from the security standpoint. Considoration ■ w being given by the Government to the formulation of procedures, under the authority of the Hinistor of National Defonco, acting in accordance with oxisting statutes^ it might be necossary to seek a specific Ordersin-Counoil. . 7. I. Pearson said that it was his understanding that - certain conditions normally applied to the notification of U.S. S,A.C, flights to bases in Canada, or Involving overflight of Canadian torritory. For instanco, the Canadian Government would expect to be informod through Sorvice-to-Sorvico channels ■ of the genoral programme of such flishts ■periodically in advance. .. Foreover, if a particularly largo noverent of aircraft were in AY, prospect, spocial arrangements should be made to inform the , Canadian ovorment ■ through Sezvicesto-Sorvice channels of the U" arrangemonts contomplatod. “r. Pinlottor readily agreed that if an oxtraordinary flight of U.8. S.A.C. aircraft were foreseen, arrangemonts would be made to inform the Canadian Govornmont in advance through Sorvice=to-Service chamois. a “r, Poarson askod whether it had boen cloarly under■ . . /stood :— ' 00084 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a /'information ■ w 3 • stood that tho catogory of flights undor discussion up to this point related to the general programmo of proparedness carried ' on by the U.S. S.A.C. and nob to flights. connected with any apocific emergency or occasionod by a specific political bitunin, tion or dovoloprent. At this understanding was conourrod in. Mr. Pearson then wont on to the second category of flight, which .involved the deployment to banes in Canada or the overflight . of Canadian territory of U.S. U.A.C. aircraft carrying nuclear or non-nuclear components of atomic, weapons* ho asked whothor he could rocelyo goto clarification as to the various types of deployment flights for which requests by the U.S. B..C. sight arise* Mr. Pinlot ter explained’that he" could foresee three . different typos of deployments; (a) the doployment of U.S. S.A.C. airoraft, not . involving the movement of special weapons and their nuclear or non-nucloar compononts, • (b) the deployment of U.S* S.A.O. airoraft, cerrying nuclear or non-nuclear components for the purposes of storage of these weapons either in Canada or at some destination requiring ovorflight of Canadian territory, and (c) the doploymont of U.S. S.A.C. aircraft in tho event of an omorgency, carrying special weapon, including either nuclear or non-nuclear conpononta. Mr. -Pearson asked whether it was possible that in the event of deployments of U.S. 8.4.0. aircraft in normal circustances for purposes of storage, rather than connected with somc specific political situation or dovolopmont, nuclear cores of atorio weapons would be moved. Mr. Pinletter ropliod that the probability was that except on occasions of omorgonoy, nuclear cores would not be moved in deployment flights, although he could Inagino certain circumstances which micht roquire the. movement of nuoloar cores for purposes of storage. Mr. Pinlotter ouphasised the importanco of utmost speed in obtaining consent in deployment of U.S. S.A.C. aircraft and their special weapons in the event of an omergoncy. tr. Pearson said that the Canadian authorities fully 9* appreciated the importance of formlating procedures which would permit of speedy implementation of U.S. S.A,C. plans, but did not see that this necessarily required blanket authorisation being given in advance for deployments which would inevitably have important political .significance to Canada • hr* Pearson asked whether he was correct, In assuring that presidential . authority was required in oach case whon the nuclear components ' “of atomic weapons were released from the custody of the United States Atomic Energy Commission to the United States Air Pordo: He also asked whether his understanding was correct that prosi- . dontial authorisation was not required for the release of nonnuclear components to the United States Air Porce• le Achoson and l. Finlotter confirmed that presidential authority, given ■ ’. with th© advice of the Sooreteries . of stated and Defense and the Chairan of 'the A.B.Gss was required before any nuclear cores were released to the United States Air Parce. This was not necessary for the movement of non-nuclcar compononts. • F7. Pcarson then suggested that the problors of 10. deplomnont flights might be oonsiderod under throo separate categories: (a) doploysent of aircraft carrying non-nucloar oomponentsg (b) 00085 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surl'acces a /'information - 4 (b) deploymont ■ of aircraft carrying nucloar components, being deployed eyexeeption ■ for purposes of etorngo, otc. (not connested with an orergenoy), ■ and D (c) doploynent of afroraft carrying nlear components in the ovent of an eergodey, . i.0., preparatory to a strike. tr. Pearson said that ee to category (a), he thought that the Canadian Government zught be willing to consider prior blanket authorization of such doployont s, subject to Sorviee-to-Sorvice ■ notification and rostrictions applicable to U.S. S.A.0. la*' transit flights consicered previously. ■ The doployment of nuelenr component, particularly under conditions of omorgency occasioned 2-by omo specific political situation or deployment, soomed to ■ ■ Mn of an entirely different chareeter. le thought it would be impossible for the Canadian Government to give blanket authorisation for such flights, but it would be possiblo to. work out sone special procedures which would pormit of rapld consultation to obtain authorization from the Canadian Governmont for the use of Canadian airspace for overt light or the use of bases in Canadian territory. Binco the authorlzation of the President .■ was in any case required in the United States for the rolease of nuclear cores of atoie weapons, would it not be possible# Mr, Pearson askod, for an approach to be nade concurrently to the Canadian Governont at the sano timo as the President was boing consultod? No serious delay should result from such eon* sultation, which would cloarly bo rolated only to the use of Canadian airspace or facilittos. ' ■ Mr. Acheson said that ho did not soo any roason why 11. the United States should -not rko such an approach to the Canadian Covernment, if thoy contemplabod roving nuclear caponents ovor • or into Canadian territory, while applying at the sore timo the proceduros required under Unitod States lat for scouring prosi' denial authorisation. Roforring to the possibility that nuclear cempononts 12. . might on some occasions be movod over or into Canadian torritory oven if no emorgency were involved, Mre 2 carson said, that the approval of the Canadian Government would have to be sought for such flights as well. He assumed that the necessity of seeking such approval from the Canadian Government would cause no diffloulty, sinco in such casos apood would not be of great importanes. llowever, Mr. Pearson Was w1lling to assure the United States authorities that requests of this kind would also ■ be considered swiftly by the Cunadian Government, which would Achoson agreed that in these make a decision without delay. cases the approval of the Canadian Covernont would be sought through governmont channels. Jurming up this part of the discushion regarding the deploymont of U.S. S.A.C. aircraft carrying ■ nuclear components of atomic weapons, Fr. Finletter said that • there were two types of doploymonts involved: (a) doployont for storage, for which the time . factor was not so urgent, .and (b) emergency deployments, in which decisions bad to bo made in a- mettor of hour. Fr. Pearson said that he fully understood tills distinction and ‘ that in the ovent of an omorgoney occasloned by a spocific situation ordovelopnont, ho felt sure that tho Canadion Governamt would bo able to inform the Unitod States Govermmont of ■ ■ /ito decision 00086 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a /’information 5 its decision within a matter of hours. 13. With rospect to deployments to Canadian bascs or the overflight of Canadian territory for the purpose of actual strike missions, Mr. Pearson said thet he wns glad to have the assurance from the United States Qovernmont that such flights would not be carried out - without the oxpress permission of the Canadian Government. Nr, Acheson then repeated that assurance. ; 1, Hr. Pearson went on to say that so far no question had boon raised in public u® to whothor the Canadian Governuont had M any commitmonts which might permit the use ’of Canadian territory or airapace Tor purposes of atoric warfare by a foroign ‘ governtont. llowevon, it was not to be oxeluded that such & question night arso, and ho would l1ke to bo in a pocition to t. Acheson and Mr. •■ mho a public statoment on this question, Pr. Matthews recalled that an undergtanding had been ronohed with . the British Government with regard to the torrs of a statement which might be used in she event that the Tritish Goveramont . had to bake a ststomont of this kind. Hr. Acheson expressed ■ the hope, however, that the question would not ariso, since in respeat of certain bases in countries othor than Canada and the ■ United Kingdom, no parallel understanding had yet bean reached. W* Pearson said that he would like to be able to say, if necessary, that no use of Canadian territory or airspace for purposes of atomio warfare would be permittod without the prior approval of the Canadian Government, le would not contemplate making any roferenco to the types of flights not involving strikes or doploymont of nuclonr oompononts for which authorisation in advance may bo given by th© Canadian Governmont. Mr. Areson suggested that if a. statement were made, it might be' advisable ■ to have it in very general terms to the offeat that no Canadian . ■ facilities would to used by any foreign governmont for offensive operations ozcept with the oxproes consent of the Canadian Governmont. Mr. Acheson suggested that somo language might be agreed botween the United States and Canadian reprosentatives which night be. kopt availablo for use by the Canadian Govornnont in the event that' a. publie statement had to be made. 15. -In concluding the discussion, Tr. Pearson undertook to conault the Prine Miniator and the Minister of lational Defence on the formulation of revised procedures governing the clearing of flights of U,S. S.A,C, airoralt into or over Canadian territory, whepe tho movement of atomic Menpons word involvod, along the lings which had been discussod at the nooting. As the next step, the draft, of-th® outline of procedures accoptablo to the Canadian Coverrent would be shown to the U.3. authorities, and, if acceptable to both sides, would be regarded as an anendmont to the Agreed Minute of June llth, 1953 • 00087 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16895 Title A name given to the resource "Report of Meeting Between Representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments to Consider Procedures for the Clearance of U.S. S.A.C. Flights" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 10-Mar-52 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wiser Consultations, RG25-B-2, Volume number: 3095