https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/0fbd1d25c9be2dd5ca69b96055e10666.pdf 0bd27364a7b3c2c0b989d8738eeee72f PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ■ Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri'acces a /'information J #* WISER Minute Sheet TQP SECRET. November 26th, 1951. The Ambassador. Conversation with Joseph Chase at the State Department, Monday, November 26th. . & In accordance with your request, I informed Chase that the State Department should expect some delay before we are in a position to comment on the proposals of the Department of Defense, submitted to us on November 8th. Chase said that the State Department would send an interim acknowledgement of Mr. Lovett’s letter explaining that the proposals of the Department of Defense had been transmitted informally to the Canadian Government, and that a delay was now to be expected before a reply could be expected from the Canadian Government, owing to the absence from Ottawa of a number of Ministers directly concerned at NATO and U.N. meetings. He added the comment, that if we were to put forward any counter-proposals at this time, there would be a delay before we would get any official U.S. reaction because of the absence of senior U.S. officials from Washington. The conversation which followed brought out a number of points of interest, some of which you may think are worth reporting to Ottawa. The Defense Department’s Proposals for Drawing ■■ a Distinction between S.A.C. Requests of Political Significance and Others* Chase said that he had had a visit from an officer in General Walsh’s office for the apparent purpose of finding out how the State . Department viewed the "apparent change in the position taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff" in again seeking to obtain a written agreement between the Canadian and U.S. Governments on the handling of U.S. S.A.C. requests. Chase told me that he had tried to explain to the officer, from the Pentagon that.the reaction which really mattered was not that of the State Department but that of the Canadian Government. He said that the State Department had become accustomed over the years to rely upon the mutual confidence which exists between the two governments in handling matters of 'importance rather than upon written agreements. He had recalled that all requests submitted on behalf of the S.A.C. to date had been dealt with without any undue delay from the Canadian end, and suggested that the request by the Defense Department now to define in writing the kind of requests requiring political decision from the Canadian Government as distinct from requests for which there' would be "blanket authorizations" obviously required very careful consideration. Chase then gave me the impression that he did not expect that we would be able to come to a decision in /a hurry 00326 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri'acces a /'information 7 . Minute Sheet 2 a hurry on the Lovett proposals. He was anxious that the. State Department should not be blamed by the Defense Department for any delay, but he was also clearly sympathetic to our taking bur time in dealing with the difficult problems, which’had been posed in Mr. Lovett’s proposals* • While Chase questioned me as to my impressions of General Walsh’s understandings of the .results gained from the Service-to-Service talks on. this question, I was careful to avoid any. comment, except what-I had already said to Arneson, that. . General Walsh’s interpretation of Canadian views derived from these talks seemed to be rather,, optimistic. ' . Tactical Uses of Atomic Weapons in Relation'to NATO Military Planning. sy ) 7 ! ! ” ■ Chase said that the ticker-tape of the ’ State Department had carried.a story to the ; effect that General Eisenhower had announced / in.Rome,that from now on NATO.military planning . could take into.account the fact that atomic weapons would be available for tactical use in' the field for the defence of Western Europe, but that this would not reduce his military /.requirements* Chase said that this was not unexpected, but-that the State Department was . seeking clarification from Rome of the exact language which General Eisenhower had used in . his statement. Chase .said that it would be a . pity if the impression grew that some kind of new "tactical weapons" had been produced.. It was much more accurate to say that experiments are constantly going on to improve the atomic weapon by deriving a.greater force ofexplosion from a,given amount of fissionable’material. It was' safe to assume that while the critical mass required for the explosion had not been substantially altered, a number of variants could be changed, such as the.kilowatt tonnage, the casing of the bomb and the detonation arrangements. He recalled that even the Nagasaki or Hiroshima weapon might have been,used tactically . on the Western front against major concentrations of troops*. He then went on to say...that while, the U.S. Commanders would no doubt be able .to share some information about the uses.of tactical weapons with, the British and Canadian military . . planners, the question- of.consultation with other NATO members in this.field, would present serious problems. Churchill Talks. - ’. We. went on to discuss briefly the question of the possible subjects-relating to atomic energy which might come up during Mr. Churchill’s visit to Washington. Chase said that he had not been able to obtain any indication about Mr. /Churchill’s 00327 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a /'information Minute Sheet - 3 Churchill’s intentions from the British Embassy. They were apparently as much in the dark as the U.S. authorities. Chase had written to Gordon Arneson suggesting that he might take the opportunity of his visit to Paris to see Sir Roger Makins to find out what Mr. Churchill might have in mind. Chase said that judging from previous form, Mr. Churchill might be reluctant to reduce any of the subjects he wished to discuss to a formal list in advance. However, the State Department had to go ahead on certain assumptions, and Chase had therefore undertaken to review existing U.S. position papers with other officials concerned preparatory to Mr. Churchill’s visit.. He recognized that there would be some very difficult questions which Mr. Churchill might pose in regard to the Quebec Agreement. For instance, he might raise the question of consent of the two governments being necessary before weapons were used against third countries. He might also raise the whole question of the post-war sharing of atomic information. Chas.e confirmed the information we already have that the main obstacle to progress in U.S.-U.K. discussion on the.sharing of information on a technical level at the moment is the absence of "Q" clearances of personnel engaged in atomic work in the U.K. Apparently the Home Secretary under the Labour administration had been reluctant to impose the field,investigations required in "Q" clearances, and the matter had been left in abeyance until after the election. Mr. Churchill’s Administration had made no decision on this question so far as the U.S. authorities were aware. The question of sharing information in the atomic field under the terms of the amended U.S. Atomic Energy Act would no doubt come up. Also Mr. Chase expected that the question of a test of the first U.K. atomic weapon would be discussed. There had been no official reaction from the U.K. to the U.S. counter proposals which Penney, during his visit to Washington, had judged to be reasonably acceptable. The U.S.S.R. Counter Proposals on Disarmament Chase said that he had been engaged during the weekend in examining the counter proposals on disarmament put forward by the U.S.S.R., particularly as they relate to atomic weapons. These had been contained in the amendment moved by Vishinsky in the Political Committee of the General Assembly last Saturday. Chase had reached the preliminary conclusion that the U.S.S.R. position showed some retrogression. It seemed from Vishinsky’s proposals, that the Soviet Government was only prepared to undertake the cessation of production of /atomic 00328 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulge en vertu de la Loi suri'acces a I'information t Minute Sheet - 4 atomic weapons and their stockpiling, and was not prepared even to discuss control over the production of fissionable materials. Vishinsky’s proposals, moreover, placed principal emphasis on the prohibition of atomic weapons and had included the curious phrase that "existing atomic weapons would be put to civilian uses". Chase had suggested that a series of detailed questions should be put to Vishinsky to clarify the Soviet proposals. It was, however, his definite impression that the Soviet Government was showing an even more intransigent position on the question of disarmament than hitherto. GI :mgm 4 00329 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16702 Title A name given to the resource Minute Sheet to the Ambassador from Ignatieff Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 26-Nov-51 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Wiser Consultations, RG25-B-2, Volume number: 3094