https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4c8f1871df9b159b7f2e33bff1b29882.pdf dfe40991db2aeab7101d1e1f6cb2c5b3 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu dl>l'13(,1~}1cces /'information a s.15(1) OTTAWA No ........•.. SECURITY J'~c:Y .. l9.,. l 95Z............ Date ..... FILE , .. , ......... 0 . CLASS . FROM:iANADIANAJ.1BASSADU1"1., CANADlAN EMBASSY,BOirn, GermE\ny. ___ S __, 1___.....,.---1 TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA Reference ..... Xou:r:.-~Jel..;:~rePl. ho .....129 .. of .. t~y .. 15.. ano ..r: ¥-. t.el.e _r.run............ Subject: .... No. 107 of :r.1ay 1°, 1952 ·.; ~i tua.t.iAO . .:l.u.. .l3~rJ..io..,................................................. • . . Prior to the receipt of your telegram 129, I had arranged to spend the weekend in Berb n and flew thereto on F'riday. I spent all day Saturday in Berlin and returned tlerefrom yesterday, Sunday afternoon. I attended the American Army Day Military Parade on the Saturday morning and had the opportunity of a few words with some of the Americans att.endin.e: the parade. lfo. ,. 2. I sensed a feeling of tenseness in Berlin and I think it is safe to say that there is more or less a general acceptance of the fact that Berlin is in for another period of difficult times. Naturally, no one knows what the future holds but there is a general feeljng that something is going to happen. It may well be that what does ha pen consists mostly of threats, pin pricks and prods but over-hanging all one senses a feeling that more dra.stic action may be forthcoming. Copies Referred 1• 1.... To.. ) ..!,..!.J.J. . .... Tai:-i.~ .... . ...... h1 uss.els . . . . . . . l'.O. .... J. It is naturally impossible for anyone to forecast the future. All one can do is to state the facts and state pos~ibilities and draw conclusions therefrom. Naturally such conclusions may be right or wrong and I only hope that none of the serious possibilities herein envisaged become actualities. No. of Enclosures 4. Let me preface this despatch by saying that I doubt very much if there is going to be any Four Power meetings or negotiations aimed at ascertaining whether or not conditions exist which will permit of free elections and I doubt very much if any type of meeting is held which aims at the creation of a united Germany with a freely elected government emere;ing tharef'rom. I am becoming mo.reand more convinced that Russia was never sincere in her approach and that the whole objective was to create propaganda and to try and saddle the responsibility upon the lest for the continued disunity of Gennany. I think that they are either going to unduly drag out the negotiations by exchange of Notes or seize upon the signature of the contracts as an excuse for an arbitrary breaking off of further negotiations. The minute Russia is in the position where she feels that she has a chance of blaming the West for failure of the negotiations, then at such minute she \•rill break them off. I Post File No............... . 5. ( Assuming that negotiatione are broken • off, then what is likely to transpire. Various a venues seem to lie open to the iiussians. They can take the stand that Western action has completely prevented unification and tnat the Western contracts are . . • 2 000110 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lai sur l'acces a /'information r - 2 - in effect peace treaties, entered into by the Three Occupying Powers ~nd the German rlepublic. Accepting this as a fact, they c~n announce the complete termination of Four Power control. 'i'he)' could then enter into some sort of a peace treaty i·Tith the so-called Republic of hast GeLmany and they could at the same time enter into a non-aggression and mutual defense pact with such goverBment. They could also enter into an agreement with the government of the DDRfor the continued stationing of their·troops in .t:ast Germany just as the Americans have entered i .1to a simj lar agreement with Japan. They could then take the stand that they have no further control of the domestic or for~ign affairs of l!iast Germany and that the West German Government will have to negotiate all issues \',~the ~as'5,J::1: German Government. The East German Goverrunen~, 1n turn ~ffiat they would have noth·ng to do with any foreign power unless such power recognizes the ~ast German Republic as a state. 6. This would leave the Allies in a strange position in Berlin. The ~ast German Republic would likely require them to remove themselves therefrom as unacceptable residents within the bounds of the ~ast German Republic. Ki th the denunciation of the Four Power control, the :.!last Germans would likely state that all of Berlin was within the jurisdiction of the ~ast German Government. Following up this line of reasoning they would naturally state that no one had the right to fly over ~ast German soil and that no one had the right to traverse the same by water, road or rail. In effect, the ~ast German Republic could threaten another blockade. ?. I would be rather dubious if they would arbitrarily announce any such blockade because they are ~ware of tne fact that the occupation powers have announced their intention of remaining in Berlin and preserving their rights therein and their rights of access thereto. The mere declaration of intent to enforce such a blockade is bound to have s~rlous effects upon the morale of the people of Berlin. 'To sum up this view of the situation there therefore exists a possibility of Russia signing a peace treaty with the DOR denouncing all continued Four Fower control and walking out of any still existing Four Fower organizations, entering into a treaty of non-aggression and mutual assistance and a treaty for the ma·nt~nance of Russian forces within l!-ast Germany. This wo1ld involve, insofar as Russia is concerned, compl~te sovereignty, subject to these treaties. 8. If this development takes place, naturally we are going to find ourselves in a very difficult situation. 1s stated above, the Fest will state that they are there by virtue of the unconditional surrender end until th¤. 1--Jest voluntarily relinquishes its rights thet trey propose to stay there. Int is case the struegle will b~gin. 9If Russic does not pursue this co,1rse but maintains the status quo, then, of course, short of a bloc} ade, she can meke our position in Berl'n very very unco fortable. :i th respt•ct to t '1e shooting u. of the French airliner, t ere was always a possibi11..ity t1at. this was an over-zealous act . . . 3 000111 �• -------------------------------,D~oc::;;:um;;:;:e~nt,;;d~isc-;:i;.lo~se":;id-;;;un~de;;rththe~Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loi sur l'acces o /'information - 3 of t·1e pilots but it has become evi 'ent that this was a IJ1atter of policy although the actual shoot·ng mi.__ht not have been such. Since th~t shooting another French airliner which apparently had dri.fted out of the corridor was forced back onto the corrjdor by threatening jets and the Russians have furthermore protested about a third infraction. They can create a very herassing situation by constant patrolling of these whol~ corridors ~nd threatening offensive actjon against planes in flight on same. I .forgot to mention in speaking of Four Power controJs that the 4 ng in the Hussian& are still participat air control policy and if tney denounce Four Power control, they will walk out therefrom l'r.i ~1.1 possibly serious consequences. .. :J'ith respect to the roads, the rlussians have lately been dropping the hint that the autobahn will have to be closed in order that they may repair the bridge over the Elbe which they maiHtain is unsafe and if they pursue harassing tactics, unquestionably the autobahn will be closed. They have consistently over the last few months been slowing down the traffic thereon. The Western Powers have been using the autobahn except for the period of the blockade, since the end of the war ana throughout they have maintained military ratrols up anct down the autobahn every day to render aid to persons experiencing trouble thereon. There has never been any written agreement entitling the iPst to this privilege but there has never been any restriction imposed on it until within the last ten days when, as you know, the patrols were banned and there has been intermittent banning in the op~ration thereof ever since. At first it was thought that this was just an administrative mistake but it is now clear that it is a matter of policy because the Russians have blandly stated that these patrols never existed before and were just started on May 8 and that the West has no right to maintain armed patrols thereon. 10. You will have seen that out of the blue, a rnattElr of a week or so ago, 3.ussia announced that traffic into Berlin would be permitted over a road from Hamburg. This is a secondary road in comparison with the autobahn and provides a long,_slo~ cir~uitous route from Berlin.to the ~est. The mere use of it mll tie up and slow down traffic and will make for infinite inconvenience. On top of this it is a parently a fact that there are several bridges on this road which are incapable of carrying heavy loads and heavy laden trucks and these will naturally not be able to cross the~. The result therefore may be that when the autobahn wilt:46• closed and the traffic permitted on this road that traffic will be considerably limited because of the physical difficulties above-mentioned. 1 have a feeling that the banning of the patrols is part of a move to prevent them from operating on this possible alternative road. 11. 12. I have discussed the first possibility of a peace and other treaties between Rnssia and the tast Zone and in the last section hereof I have been discussing the alternative thereto, viz., the conditions of the status quo and pin pricks and pressure. Now let me consider for a moment what would happen if such peace trea~ies were signed. I would be very dubious, as stated above, if East Germany would attempt . . . 4 000112 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information • - 4 - at the outset a complete blockade. Withdrawal of Russia from the air control board and Russian manoeuvres in the area of the corridors would make air traffic in and out a very dangerous thing. Military trains would possibly be allowed to c utinue as they are and possibly military sur1lies could be brought in by military train as is prewently done. Trai'fic on the highway cou.d be very limited and by these processes a gr~dual squeeze c:..nd pressure would be applied to Western Berlin and to the iestern powers. I would tr1~1 that either the Russians or the ~ast German Republic would go·as far as they could in disagreeable acts but always holding 't.'1eir hand in the coIJ1.mission of acts which might result in war. ' 13, llien these thin~s take place, if they do, is another contingency. Something may be done i_mmeaiately at tis weekend when the signature of these contracts is announced or hussia may shout and scream and delay action unt~l the contracts are ratified and ~he may either sign a ueace treaty with the suggested concessions or maintain the status quo and pin pricks, or if she signs a treaty let the German Republic do a bit of pin pricking. 14. I doubt if there is going to be any blockade like the last one but I feel rather positive there is going to be no unity pf Germany nor free elactj~ 1s and a breaking off of negotiations t'!ith rtussia. 12. I only wish that some way could be found or our getting out of Berlin with good grace but this· seems to be impossible. If we could, then the actual dc).nger point would be removed and a definite line drawn between Russia and her satellites on the one side and Germany on the other and we could sit and wait even if it took years for a peaceful solution of our pr~blem, all the while doing the one thing we must do, viz., build up military strength and maintain the s3.me. 16. Finally, speaking of Berl n, I would be very doubtful if you could get any NATOcountry on thiz continent to agree to use force to maintain our position there, as in my opinion they are not prepared to go to war to maintain the same. AMBASSADOR. 000113 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBC00331 Title A name given to the resource "Situation to Berlin," Canadian Ambassador, Bonn, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Despatch no. 431 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 19-May-52 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "BERLIN. Political Situation. Relations between West and East Berlin," RG25-A-3-c, Volume 4072, File number: 10937-40, File part: 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2024-01457 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Berlin Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English