https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d47a5873b49a20b8487bd82e031ea209.pdf a23abfab3def1169566b7ab203f2c621 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information BY U N C L A S S I F I E D PAX RECEIVED IN GAA FROM WSHDC P O L - 1 4 6 0 05NOV93 TO GAF ACC DISTR GGB IDA IDS EEN FILE ^ ^ , DATE NOV 8 INFO PRET A4#£ SOUTH AFRICA: NUCLEAR PLANS 1993 BOSSIER to^'rt.r\.. ATTACHED ARTICLE FROM WSHDC TIMES OF 4 NOV, ON SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND FUTURE INTENTIONS, MAY BE OF INTEREST. YOU WILL NOTE THAT IT IS AN EXCERPT FROM A LONGER ARTICLE IN "FOREIGN AFFAIRS" OF NOV/DEC 93. THIS FAX HAS A TOTAL OF + / L\ PAGES, INCLUDING COVER. <l BARBARA GIBSON 7782 POL f>T> P , MEYER 001021 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act THE WASHINGTON TIMES, T f t U R ^ ^ r f o M A ^ f t S B e J a ^ A u r I'acces a I'infotLtion Africa nuclear plan is Future use of uranium Questioned. le major issue By J . W d e Villiers, R o g e r J a r d i n e •> a n d Mitchell Relss- :-•••<.••' :::t\ COUNOUONFOftEiaMBEuTKJNS •• j NUCLEAR LEGACY , , ' David Albright, president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security, discusses the secret nuclear weapons program conducted at Advena In several recent editions of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. South Africa's six completed nuclear devices were assembled and stored at the facility, which employed about 300 people when the program ended In 1989. A Roswrcri reactors FTvlUronlgm mining Liiland processing Nuclear a nrlchment • /j\ faclllltles facilities tf Nuclanr power Un(Jergr0und AFRICA ZIMBABWE a nwclea r t c s , ^ elt«s <y reactors MOZAMBIQUE K mu\t BOTSWANA KB I ah arI NAMIBIA a Pretoria Bay Johannesburg :-if.W; 5 SWAZILAND ^.Desert ', ...-' •••'•J.i 'i.. Ms J. :,Vi '"''•.-•*,'..•-i-; •yyyy '.•i'-,-VgS;'v" -,'••> LESOTHO SOUTH yy&i '^oiyj',f-;.\ AFRICA ® >;::«';': Advena nuclea Port Elizabeth mmd: ,.y^myyy, | mis-Mi ^yifiy4i$% vmponu • '• ... .r "•',••••";, ,, » ' ^WIUi « JAqiw»llno.. H j ^ % W * W * ^ 4 ? ^ '•::!*;'.• ' * ! ' , , iSiwtlt* ; •• -— n " ,'r ' ' • •.•%••• t*>»WJ>r,» .. ^ 4 0 6 ,'-.a: • a l t # m i n i £ 7 s / >^ • .';6n1l1h, WM^1«wPr*«»yft ^rf "H'r i'. . - a ••-•'"' Al»» Oonz»(82/Th« Wiifcimien Tm«s 001022 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information South; Africa is the world's first s t a r ) W e initiated its own "nuc)eaW>liback" It is the first nation in the world to have voluntarily dismantled a fully mature nuclear arsenal. "At one stage, South Africa did develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability," President EW dc Klerk told a special joint session of the South African parliament on March 24. 1993. But "early in 1990 final effect was given to decisions that all the nuclear devices should be dismantled and destroyed." Mr. dc Klerk's speech was the first official confirmation of what long had been suspected: Pretoria had actually developed nuclear weapons. . Despite Mr de Klerk's exhortations about opening a new chapter of "international cooperation and trust," South Africa's nuclear past casts a long shadow. For some, Mr. de Klerk's announcement resurrected old questions about the country's nuclear behavior and new concerns about plans for the highly enriched uranium taken from its nuclcer devices. It also raised questions about South Africa's future adherence to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the prospects for an African nuclear weapon-free zone. As the country moves toward its first nonracial elections in April, these issues have direct implications not only for South Africa, butalsofor its new government's relations with neighbors and the West, The African National Congress (ANC), the United States and other key members of the international non-proliferation community continue to look for reassurance about Pretoria's future intentions. Following Mr. de Klerk's announcement on March 24, the International Atomic Energy Association was avowed to inspect all the facilities previously used in the nuclear program. While the ANC, which is likely to dominate South Africa's government after the elections, welcomed Mr. de Klerk's speech, the tardiness and incompleteness of the government's revelations, combined with its past policy of nuclear ambiguity, left many unanswered questions. Did South Africa ever intend to detonate a nuclear device? Did Pretoria's nuclear weapons program receive any foreign assistance? Has the government accurately accounted for all the highly enriched uranium that was produced? It is known that the United States, France and other countries provided South Africa with assistance and technology for civilian nuclearenergy projects that did not directly abet the bomb program. But this cooperation nonetheless increased the technical competence of South Africa's nuclear engineers, scientiatsand technician?. More important, during the past two, decades, various news reports have linked South Africa and Israel as partners in military and nuclear matters. Sou th Africa has also allegedly received German assistance with the complex technology needed to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium. When Mr. dc Klerk was questioned about his government's past failure to be fully candid about the nuclear program, he characterized previous official responses as "neither lies nor the full truth." Right now, the future of the country's uranium stockpile is the most pressing nuclear issue facing South AfricaThe debate over the future of the weapons-grade uranium takes place within the context of a larger dispute over Pretoria's transfer from the public to the private sector of many governmental and quasi-governmental institutions. The ANC believes a major objective of this restructuring by the apartheid regime, which is occurring prior to the elections, is to place these institutions beyond the reach of an ANC-led government. Heading off this restructuring is high on the ANC's domestic agenda. Any decision by the current administration regarding the future of tbe highly enriched uranium would qualify as a type of unilateral reorganization. It would be strongly opposed by the ANC, There have been reports of South Africa's Atomic Energy Corp. trying to sell the uranium to foreign powers btfore next April's election. lb ensure that the uranium and other weapons-related technologies arc not misused to serve any group's narrow interests, the ANC insists that a government of national unity be involved in future decisionmaking on matters of such strategic importance. Any foreign government that Signs an agreement with Pretoria regarding the enriched uranium stockpile, without the prior knowledge and approval of the ANC, wilt jeopardize future peaceful nuclear activities of a democratic South Africa. Some foreign governments interpret the ANC'S opposition to the present government's selling or otherwise removing the uranium stockpile from the country as an abdic a t i o n of a l o n g - s t a n d i n g commitment to nuclear non-pro liferation. These doubts about the ANC's fitness as a nuclear custodian are not new. They most recently surfaced in December 1992. At that time, the ANC criticized the apartheid government's continued refusal to publicize its nuclear policy, a refusal that was undermining the confidence of the majority in the democratic process then under way — the negotiations of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa. At an international press conference in Johannesburg, the ANC warned that continued government secrecy would amount to holding the country hostage to a nuclear threat. It was during this period of sustained ANC pressure that foreign news reports suggested an ANC-led government would sell the highly enriched uranium and nuclear technology to Cuba and the Pale Stine Liberation Organization to pay off old political debts. The ANC dismissed these reports as mischief-making by Pretoria's in tclligencc apparatus and as an attempt to confuse the issues. The ANC said the minority government was trying to stoke fear of the ANC's stewardship in order to justify unilateral restructuring of the nuclear program. The minority government may also have sought to strengthen its bin-gaining position in the sale of the uranium to foreign .joveffiments afraid of proliferation. Fortunately, the current administration and the ANC now appear to have reached consensus on what should be done with the uranium stockpile. In July, at a meeting of senior ANC: ond Atomic Energy Corp, officials, Waldo Srumpf. the corporation's chief executive, assured the ANC that his firm had no intention of selling the uranium during the transitional period. In addition, because the Atomic Energy Corp. intends; to become a commercially viable enterprise, he argued, it will need to retain all the uranium for medical isotope production. Mr. Stumpf claims that South Africa could become one of the world's top three producers of. these, isotopes, yielding much-needed export trade and exchange of foreign currency. The picture painted by Mr Stmnpf and the energy company is obviously appealing, but the commercial potential of isotope pmduc tion for export is still unclear. Very clear, however, is the potential of the uranium !ror proliferation should the material fall into the wrong hands. This adds a special dimension to dealing with isotope production. Indeed, a purely economic decision may not be possible. For the ANC, the options regarding the future of the uranium are: • Sell it to a foreign government. • Blend it into low-enriched uranium for use in nuclear-power reactors. . • U6e it to produce medical i60topes. • Sell it to a foreign government for safekeeping and repurchase it as needed for the medical isotope program. If this last option is economically viable, South Africa will be able to �h'OV' OS v.. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act • 01U8PN 202 632 7792 CDN EMB POL/Er??f um * nt ^wiilgue en vertu detaWtsur I'acces aTinformt assuage international concerns over proliferation and still realize the economic potential of isotope production. South Africa will need to decide a •'host of other non-proliferation issues during the next few years, but it has already taken some reassuring 6teps..: .'••,'• Pretoria has accepted membership in the Zangger Committee, which lists nuclear exports that require special safeguards. It has clready applied for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime is under discussion. ANC President Nelson Mandela has declared that South Africa must never again allow its resources, scientists and engineers to produce weapons of mass destruction. Mr, Mandela indicates that South Africa's nuclear policies will seek to make the country a responsible member of, the. international nonproliferation community. ; In' May 1993, the SoJth African parliament1 enacted non-prolifera tion legislation that prohibits South African citizens from assisting in any program related to the construction of nuclear weapons. The government has also adopted export policies commensurate with established non-proliferation guidelines, which include restrictions on dual-use technologies. Regulations and enforcement procedures to ensure compliance with these laws are being developed. ', Following next year's elections, the ANC will seek full participation for South Africa in the International Atomic Energy Commission. South Africa also intend9 to cooperate fully with its neighbors to establish an African nuclear weaponfree zone. The ANC is disinclined to support further uranium enrichment, given the massive, investment of public funds this undertaking would require. The danger of proliferation also merits consideration in the decision whether to continue uranism enrichment. ,i Regardless of how the uranium enrichment issue is, decided,, an ANC-led government will share the expertise of South Africa in peaceful applications of nuclear technology with other African states through applied training and.scientific cooperation. ;,. Moreover, Pretoria's action in voluntarily renouncing its own nuclear apparatus establishes the precedent of rollback for other states on the •'threshold" of being able to produce nuclear weapons. The careful and responsible man; ner in which South Africa dismantled its weapons, joined the NonProLiferationTreaty and cooperated fully with the international Atomic Energy Commission may serve as a useful model.' ,,.' , Pretoria's awareness that its nuclear weapons are not only superfluous but actually counterproductive to South Africa's political, military and economic objectives may ha the most important lesson of all. g, ,.,! J.W. de VilHers is chairman of the Atomic Energy Corp. ofSouthAfrica. Roger. Jardine is national coordinator of science and technology policy for the African National Congress,Mitchell Reiss is guest scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. Research far this article was funded by Thomas W. Graham and the Roch efeller Foundation. Adapted from, the November/December issue of the journal Foreign Affairs. * Distributed by New York Times y 001024 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. 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