https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/17639c5740d5d325df831162763bc737.pdf 9c4f3dfe9158d11e0c3140a9d18ee9ed PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Documeritdivulgue en- vertu.de.lalo/ sur I'acces a I'information External Affairs Canada o fs,'r Affaires exterieures Canada File/ Dossier CONFIOENTIEL Align first characterof Security Classification under this arrow Alignez le premier caractere de la Securite sous cette fleche SECURITY SECURITE FM/DE MGTC/JOURNAL/CIRC/DOSSIER Accession/Reference 22SEP87 ?f) Z & z ^ : jy.u 12 C 0 N F I 0 E N T I FM EXTOTT ESN1841 A L (BY FACSIMILE) 22SEP87 TO/A INFO DISTR REF TO UpffDC PCOOTT/MORDEN NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/jDGSPOL/ INFO LDN PARIS PMOOTT/BURf DGCPOL/DGPOL SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA USS IFB IDD IDR UGB URD URR RGB J FB JCD JLEj TFB TDD ESE -^-CANA^AN SSN PROGRAMME:NON-PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS QUESTIONS i ATTACHED ARE SERIES OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE i i NON-PROLIFERATION IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACQUISITION BY CANADJA OF i. NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES.ANSWERS CAN BE DRAWN UPON IN RESPONDING i TO OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC ENQUIRIES REGARDING THIS ASPECT OF JCANADIAN i SUBMARINE ACQUISITION i • PROGRAMME .ADDTL POINT TO NOTE FOR OFJFICIALS IS i THAT THIS SUBJECT WILL BE DISCUSSED AT NEXT ROUND OF CDA/LJSA NUCLEAR i i CONSULTATIONS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 28/290CT IN OTT TCj WHICH i i AMB KENNEDY WILL LEAD USA DEL. j i 2.FYI,REVIEW OF NON-PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS IMPLICATIONS » OF ACQUISITION BY CDA OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINES IS ON-GOING EXERCISE HERE.THERE ARE A NUMBER OF LEGAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS; INVOLVED r IN THIS REVIEW WHICH HAVE YET TO BE RESOLVED. HOWEVER/CLEAFJER I i PICTURE SHOULD BE AVAILABLE BY TIME OF CDA/USA NUCLEAR CONSULTS IN i OCT.WE WILL ATTEMPT TO EXPAND ON ATTACHED DOCUMENT AS SITUATION DRAFTER/REDACTEUR B.E.BURTON/lh SIG EXT 518-1 (83M1I DIVISION/DIRECTION ESN g TELEPHONE "95-7546 PPROUVE RJ RO SIG 001098 / �fljfef O T fcxlonml Affairs Canada A1 (aires nxteneures Canada Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL CONFIBENTIEL Align first character of word "PAGE" under this-««©w-~- "~. ;• Alignez le premier caractere du mot "PAGE" sous cette fleche •. 12| PAGE TWO EVOLVES ESN1841 SUBMARINE NON-PROLIFERATION 10 CONFD IN ORDER TO A S S I S T YOU IN R E S P O N D I N G 0»V N U C L E A R VL ACQUISITION AND S A F E G U A R D S (COMCENTRE P R O G R A M ME TO USA Q (A¤S TXOrJS R E L A T E D TO ISSUES. PLS FAX A T T A C H E D 4/4 PAGES PLUS COV ER) L EXT 518-2 001099 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information CQ^FSDE^TIAL CONF&DENTIEU : V6 The acquisition by C J nada of nuc ]• oar-powered submari nos a s notconsistent with Canadian non-proli fe.ration policy. The acquisition by Canada of nuclear-powered submarines is fully consistent with the objectives and provisions of Canada's non-proliferation policy. Canada's non-proliferation policy as formulated in 1974 and reconfirmed in 1976 and 1981 is aimed at ensuring that nuclear material, material, equipment and technology subject to Canada's nuclear exports policy are not used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive purposes. Canadian non-proliferation policy does not preclude the use for non-proscribed (i.e. non nuclear explosive) military activities of nuclear material subject to that policy. The acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines is not consistent with Canada's commitment under the NPT. The objective of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The Treaty contains no prohibition of military use per se. fact, the safeguards system associated with the NPT In (NPT-Type full-scope safeguards) specifically provides for the possible use of material subject to these safeguards in a military activity. 001100 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgueenvertudela Loi sur I'acces a I'informatio CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIEL - "4 --. U It is thus clear that the acquisition by Canada of nuclear-powered submarines is consistent with the terms of the NPT and Canada's obligations under the Treaty. The acquisition by Canada of nuclear submarines will violate the terms of certain of Canada's bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. While it is true that a number of Canada's nuclear cooperation agreements contain a prohibition of military use, it is important to note that a) those agreements concern nuclear cooperation in the civil application of nuclear energy and b) that Canadian non-proliferation policy- as I pointed out earlier - does not preclude military use of nuclear material. The negotiaton of separate arrangements or agreements to make the transfer of nuclear material possible would therefore be quite in order. The acquisition by Canada of nuclear submarines and the resulting fact that there will be unsafeguarded nuclear material under Canadian control will create a bad precedent. Canada's strong commitment to non-proliferation and its strong support for an international non-proliferation regime based on the NPT would in no way be diminished by its acquisition of nuclear submarines. 001101 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 'CONFIDENTIAL COEMFIDENTIEL - 3 -. y(* In acquiring these submarines, and having nuclear material under its control in a military application, Canada would be exercising its right under the NPT. Furthermore it seems fitting that such a gesture must be posed by a country with impeccable non-proliferation credentials, such as Canada. Is Canada not concerned that such a move will weaken the international non-proliferation regime? Canada has-and will continue to promote an international non-proliferation regime based on the NPT, as the regime providing the strongest assurances that nuclear material, technology and equipment will not be mis-used. An international regime based on the NPT and the comprehensive commitment to non-proliferation it entails offers very strong guarantees that the nuclear material sbuject to the regime cannot be used for nuclear explosive purposes. Is Canada not concerned that it might be setting a precendent that other countries might wish to follow for less acceptable reasons? No. As noted earlier, ratification of the NPT entails a strong commitment to non-proliferation verified by a comprehensive system of safeguards. An international non-proliferation regime 001102 l �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information o CONFIDENTIAL CONFiDENTIEL r - 4 - »b based on this Treaty is thus a very effective regime which makes it extremely unlikely that a country wishing to proliferate would choose this route. 001103 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18570 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 6, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG