https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5031efc44061e455dc8b5b337a678273.pdf 23b83ba41b97cde0367fd52eb0087578 PDF Text Text u Canada uaTiaua File/Ooaler $ $ l ^ * £ ^ f f a f a c t e r of Security Classification under this arrow jrtmier caractere de la S6curite* sous cette fteche ^ \%U SIFIED - BY PAX SECURITY SECURITE FM/DE FM WSHDC POL-1149 05MAR85 TO/A TO EXTOTT/IDR|URR^NDHQOTT/ADMPOL P& INFO jj^ ^fy ARKIN REPORT - CONTINGENCY OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS OP NUqLEAR WEAPON DISTR REF " ( 21PA6ES) SUBJ/SUJ \> Hf5> ^ • U o ? 6 w» 5 l :j?fc» - 4,no -*. era -*g *3 «i * .1. DRAFTER/REDACTEUR R.J. LYSYSHYN/ambj DIVISION/DIRECTION TELEPHONE APPROVED/APPROUVE POLITICAL 288 R. J t - ^ ^ S H Y N ^ * 89d f 9 : 12 9 0 / £ 0 "9^ ;. SIG EXT 5 1 8 - 1 ( 8 3 / 1 1 ) 3QHSM 000911 �,.. pocumeift disclosed under XhtoAaess to Information Act - cument d\vu\sue f^^ei^M^tLofiu^c^^sJ IJAjfofnation % ^ Contingency Overseas Deployments of Nucloar Weapons A Report MAR 1985 William M. Arkin Director, Arms Race and Nuclear Weapons Research Project Institute for Policy Studies \ 1901 Que Stroot, NW Washington, D.C. 20009 <202> 234-9382 Fabru*ry 1983 000910 33HSM * 6 9c! ^ 9 •' \ Z 9 0 / £ 0 *9£ �Document disclosed under the Access to Infpmption Act ocurrlent divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur ratte&f&rformation o ^^ The U.S. military has been given Presidential Authorization co deploy nucloar warheads to eight foroign nations that do not have nucloar weapons on their soil in peacetime The oight nations earmarked to receive these nuclear weapons aro Bermuda (a British colony), Canada, Icoland, Puerto Rico <a territory of the United States), the Azores of Portugal, tho Philippines, Spain, and the British island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. None of the governments of these eight nations was Informed of any U.S. plans or authorizations to deploy nuclear weapons in their nation. The plans and preparations to deploy nuclear weapons in Puerto Rico violate the Latin American Nucloar Free Zone Treaty ("the Treaty of Tlatelolco") which the United States signed in 1967. Plans to deploy nuclear weapons in Canada, Iceland and Spain are an affront to the non-nuclear policies of those countries. After the plans had been revealed in tho Canadian press, Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO, stated in Toronto on January 23, 1985, that the United States should consult Its allies when drawing up contingency plans for nuclear weapons deployments and not leave consultation until times of crisis. "I think it's a good idea if countries are consulted while the contingency planning is going on" he told the Toronto Globe and Mail. tl> Retired Admiral Robert Falls, former chief of Canada's dofonse staff, and chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 1980 to 1983, told the Globe and Mail that "The United States has a moral obligation to consult us when using our territory for something 3HHSM * 09^ *g:'I2 90/£0"9£ 000912 �. ' ' Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ^ as emotional oo nucloar weapons. 2 It io on immoral attitudo to make piano without consulting tho countrioo involvod." <2) > Admiral Falls also otatod that U.S. nucloar doploymant plans had novor boon discussed in tho councilo of N A T O — "tho implication i«r thoy'ro saying, 'To hell with you little guyo» Icelanders, Bormudans, Canadians, we're going to do it. anyway.'" (3) As an oditorial in Tho Globe ond Moil on January IS, 1983, stated: "Thoro could hardly bo a worse oxamplo of nucloar planning. Tho United States has devised a scenario which aooms calculated to worry its allies while it delights ito adversaries." (4) This report will discuss U.S. contingency piano for deployment of nuclear weapons and the gravo political impact ouch plans can havo. As tho public furor over thoso piano demonstrates, the excessive secrecy which hides U.S. nucloar deployment plans can injure U.S. alliances and foroign rotations. I. THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT PLAN AND CONTINGENCY DEPLOYMENTS The Nucloar Weapons Deployment Plan (also known ao tho Nuclear Weapons Doploymont Authorizations), a oocrot memorandum approved by the Prooidont ooch yoar, authorizes tho doploymont of nucloar weapons outside the United States. Tho Plan opocifios which nucloar weapons can be deployod in which countrioo during 3QHSM * T9J tQ = IZ 90/CO "9 �\ 1 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ^"""^Docuiifent divulgueenvertudela Loi sutgCacces a I'information agacotimo, "erisis" and war. ^^ Tho Plan, along with the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum, is one of two key documents tho Presldont approves each year to authorize tho composition, deployment, production, and retirement of warheads in the nuclear stockpile Contrary to the Canadian government's attempts to downplay the importance of the Plan as the product of "some junior bureaucrats in the U.S. State Department speculating on what might happen," tho Plan is tho highest-level government order for overseas woapons deployments. (S) According to a DOD briefing, the Deployment Plan io prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (after considering tho roquiromonts of the Unified and Specified Commands), transmitted to tho Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) for Secretarial approval, "coordinated" with the Stato Department, and approved by "the President." (6) (Actually, tho National Security Council staff and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs sign the authorizations for the President.) The DOD states that the Plan is "coordinated" with the State Department, but it is unclear whether the Stato Department has any input into the plan, in spite of the impact U.S. contingency planning has on foreign policy. Virtually all of the authorized deployments to theso oight nations involve anti-submarine nuclear depth bombs (deployment of other naval weapons Arm also authorized in the Philippines). (7) For each of the eight nations, deployment of the following weapons 3HHSM * Z9d *9 : I2:'"90/£Q "9E 000914 �u Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information is authorisodi Azoroo Bermuda —.Canada Diego Boreia ——- Iceland Philippines Puorto Rica —-Spain 32 nucloar depth bombs 32 nuclear depth bombs 32 nuclrmr. depth bombs 32 nucloar depth bombs 48 nucloar dopth bombs 32 nucloar dopth bombo 113 bomrs 80 naval nuclear woapono 32 nuclear dopth bombo 32 nucloar dopth bombo Tho B-37 nuclear depth bombs arc IS foot long, woigh SIO pounds and havo an cxplosivo yield of about 10 kilotons. They wore first deployed by tho Navy in 1967. Of tho 900 B-S7 warheads in the U.S. arsenal today, 560 aro doployod at basas in the U.S., and 290 aro deployed at four ovorooas baoos in Britain, Guam and Italy. The B-S7s aro to be used by land-based P-3 Orion planes, and aircraft carrier— and ship-based S-3 Viking pianos and SH-3 helicopters. The warheads deployed overseas (with tho exception of the aircraft carrier replenishment woapono otorod in Italy and tho Philippines) are to supply main P-3 Orion basos, which explains many of the island locations. II. IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS Tho rovolation of tho secret plans for deployment of those nucloar weapons has had a significant political impact in Bermuda, Canada and Iceland. Plans for deployment of nucloar weapons to Puerto Rico had already been revealed in a report by 3QHSM * C9d *Q : \Z 9 0 / C O '9C 000915 �• '"" i ' Document disclosed under the Access to InfoTFJqfion Act '^Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'ace&SZjIgfmmation the Puerto Rico Bar Association last summer, but Puerto Rico's S-olitical status has prevented wide dissemination of the report's findings and impeded legal actions to determine whothor tho plans violate tho Treaty of Tlatelolco. Similarly, bocauso Bermuda is a colony of Britain and the Bermudian government has no control over foreign affairs or dofense, it has had littlo recourse. In Iceland, where nuclear issues aro a constant source of political tension and debate, the revelations resulted in a complete re-examination of Iceland's policy on nucloar woapons. In Canada, the government has attempted to downplay the rovelations, even though many high-level Canadian officials havo questioned how such a condition of mistrust can exist with one of America's most trusted friends. The Authorization to deploy 32 nuclear depth bombs in Puerto Pico is significant because Puerto Rico is in the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. On August 28, 1984, the Puerto Rico Bar Association released the results'of a two-year investigation into possible violations of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. (8) Using military regulations released under the Freedom of Information Act'(and without knowledge of the contents of the subsequently reloasod Nucloar Weapons Deployment Plan), the Bar Association demonstrated that the U.S. planned to use the Roosevelt Roads naval baso in Puerto Rieo for nuclear operations and that there were active programs and procedures for deployment of nuclear depth bombs to Puerto Rico. The naval preparations ro4erred 3aHSM to in Navy regulations * *9dT *9 : IZ 90/eO '9£ 000916 �i ***%,** Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue^Pn vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ^ & includoi - cortificationo of naval poroonnol in Puorto Rico undor tho "poroonnol roliability program" for duties involving nucloar woapono| (9) - pro-pooitioning of "Sealed Authentication Syotomo (SAS)" material for roloaso of nucloar woapono at tho hoadquartoro of U.S. Naval Forcoo-Caribboan hoadquartoro in Puorto Ricoi (10) - preparations for activation of an "altomato command" in Puerto Rico for "Fleet Ballistic Misoiloo"; (11) and - tho oxistonco of a "Naval Station Roooovolt Roads Nucloar Woapons Security Plan," which provides "specific guidance? for tho activation of tho MAUW Ctfodified Advanced Undorwator Woapono, a ouphomism for nucloar anti-submarine warfare woapono3 oito ... to enouro adequate security for tho stowage, movement, isouo and receipt of Special Ci.e. nuclear 3 Weapons aboard U.S. Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads, P.R." (12) The U.S. authorization to deploy 48 nucloar dopth bombs at its Keflavik base in Iceland flouts Icoland's non-nucloar policies. In response to the nows of the U.S. plan in Docomber, Foreign Minister Goir Hallgrimsson stated that ho boliovod if the U.S. Prooidont had authorized doploymont of nucloar woepons to Iceland, it was a clear broach of tho 19S1 Defense Troaty between tho two countries. (13) Icelandic Prime Minister Staingrimur Hermansson stated on Docember 3 that the Icolandic government's belief is that nuclear weapons must not bo deployed in Iceland in peacotime or wartime. (14) 3QHSM ^ * 99J f9 : I2'r9'0/£0 c '90000917 c �f^J^ Document disclosed under the Access a Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la LoisurTpeces a I'information Tho 32 nucloar depth bombs earmarked for Canada would *" violate Canada's policy against nuclear deployments on its soil. (The last U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Canada wore Qonle air-to-air missiles. After these were withdrawn in July 1984 the government ef Canada proclaimed that it would not Again allow deployment of nuclear weapons in Canada.) Tho dopth bombs, which would be split between Canadian bases at Comox, British Columbia (a former storage site for U.S. nuclear weapons) and Greenwood, Nova Scotia, would serve non-NATO (Pacific Ocean) roles as well as NATO roles. These two sites are tho main operating bases for Canadian CP-140 Aurora anti-submarino warfare (ASW) planes and *rm periodic deployment bases for U.S. P-3 pianos* III. U.S. AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT REACTIONS The revelation, in the January 6 issue of the London Observer, of plans to place nuclear weapons in Bermuda led Prmmimr John Swan, who acknowledged that he knew nothing of such plans, to send a letter to the U.S. government asking for an explanation. <15) According to the Royal Gazette in Bermuda, "Mr. Swan said he is not privy te U.S.-British agreements On the doploymont of nuclear weapons." (16) The Mid-Ocean Nows« o Bermudian weekly, stated in ttn editorial on January 111 "A signal to Washington that we aro not happy with the situation would undoubtedly opon a new dialogue in which it would become cloar % 99 3 (I H B M _____——— "~ a , 8 . . u 90/eoase 00091 s �u. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi suiU'acces a I'information that Bormuda io not a pawn but a country, alboit omall. that ito own objoctivoo." (17) ha Tho Royal Gazotto, Bormuda'o moot influential daily, statod The spirit of legal and political cooperation with tho Unitod States basoo has boon ontiroly oympathotic and without major incident. That fact has manifootod itoolf in many woyo beneficial to both Bermuda and tho Unitod Statoo. Bormuda boo accepted that America protoctod it from tho Nazi oubmarino monaco and today protocto it from tho Soviot monaco which hoc not boon aboont to our south. Tho Roagan Administration, concornod ao it is by unfriendly olements in countrioo around AmoricCp should bo careful to prooervo Bormuda'o goodwill. (18) On February 8 tho Promior rocoivod a rooponoo from tho U.S. government whieh stated: It has been for many years strict NATO and U.S. policy neither to confirm or deny tho authenticity of any allogod U.S. classified documents. Further, tho U.S. govornmont cannot confirm or deny tho presence of nuclear woapons. Hor Majooty'o government fully oupports this policy. I know that you can woli understand tho vital security requirements for withholding any public comment on the possiblo deployment of nucloar woapons. (19) Premier Swan's rooponoo to this was: "I BOO no rooson to pursue the matter further. I havo an appreciation for tho content of that lottor with rospoct to tho nocessity to maintain an adequato defonso system, and that Bermuda cannot bo isolated from that intont." (20) In Iceland, the government aloo roquooted an explanation from tha U.S. government. December 17 A similar lottor was rocoivod on by tho Icelandic Foroign Minister Ao I know that you arc aware, it has boon a long standing policy of tho Atlantic Alliance and tho United Statoo noithor to confirm nor deny tho validity of documents which aro maintained to be confidential documents of tho Unitod States or tho Alliance. At tho same time I have been commissioned to roitorato that 3QHS * L9d vs • \z 90/co "ge 000919 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act 'Document divulgue en vertu de la LqAsur I'acces a I'information A- O the United States has in all mattora conformed to and will continue to conform to the provisions of the defonso agroomont with Iceland from 1951 and the resolution of tho Atlantic Allianco on the deployment of nuclear weapons which stipulates that any authorization to U.S. military forces to transfor nuclear weapons to Iceland would only bo given after having boon approved by the Icelandic government. Accordingly, I have been commissioned to give you the assurance that the United States Government will continue to keep firmly to the mutual understanding of our govornmonto with respect to nuclear weapons as stated in a letter datod 11 August 1980 to Dr. Olafur Johannesson, tho foreign minister of Iceland. (21) The letter of 11 August 1980 (from U.S. Ambassador Richard A. Ericson) read: With respect to allegations about the presence of nucloar weapons in Iceland, it is longstanding U.S. policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear woapons anywhere. However, U.S. Government policy is in accord with tho docision taken by the NATO Heads of Government in 1937 in Paris, wherein it was announced that 'tho deployment of theso stocks (referring to stocks of nuclear warheads available for the defense of tho alliance) and missiles, and arrangements for their uso, will accordingly be decided in conformity with NATO defense plans and in agreement with the states directly concerned.' The pledge is consistent with Article III of tho 1951 Keflavik Base Agreement whieh states: The national composition of forces, and the conditions under which they may enter upon and make use of facilities in Iceland pursuant to this Agreement shall be determined in agreement with Iceland. (22) The formal U.S response to the Canadian government is still unclear. The initial response ef Canadian Defence Minister Robert Coates to reporters (on January 9) was that "The U.S. can't make any decisions on that Cplans to deploy nuclear weapons in Canada} without consulting us." (23) Later, however, tho Canadian government backed down from this statemont. "It's not something they would make overtures to Canada about" until an international crisis made the deployment necessary, Richard 3HHSM * 89<I t>g:i2 9 0 / C O '9000920 �' ^ Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information „ 10 - " . • 4 3 - Logan, oxocutivo oooiotant to Dofonco Minister Coatoo told Thn Globe and Mail. "If tho Americano have scenarios, thoy cortainly aron't going to oharo them with uo." (24) Dofonco Miniotor Coatoo thon ehangod hio tuno and otatod in Parliamont on 21 January that no plans existed to doploy nucloar woapono in Canada. (2S> But tho chiof of Canada's Dofonco Staff, Gonoral Gorard C E . Thoriault, told Tho Globe and Mail that "hio aidoo cenfirmod tho oxistonco of tho U.S. plan in conversations with U.S. military officials on Thursday CJanuary 103. Until then ho had not known about it, he said in a telephone intorviow." (26) According to tho Chronical Horald of Nova Scotia, "Gen. Thoriault told reportors Friday CJanuary 113 that tho Unitod Statoo dooo havo a 'tentative contingency plan' to station anti-submarine nucloar depth charges on Canada's two coasts." (27) In tho course of the debate, the Canadian govornmont also admitted that an agreement existed from 1967 to 1970 for tho omcrgoncy doploymont of nucloar dopth bombs at Argontia in Newfoundland, but that the arrangement was controlled whon tho Argontia airbaoo was closed. (28) In addition, Dofonco Minioter Coates oaid that tho only other agroomont which oxistod with the U.S. dealing with nuclear weapons wao "for ovorf lighto by_ Strategic Air Command bombers carrying nucloar woapono, and that those flights muot have prior conoultation." (29) On January 21, Defence Minister Coates stated that Canada had "received renewed assurances that it would bo consul tod about GQHSM * 69d tg : \Z 90/CO "9 �— • /deployment plans." (30) 0 Document disclosed under the Access to Inflation Act ' Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'jpf&qlinformation This was a rostatemont of the 1957 NATO p-Sgreoment that no nuclear weapons would be deployod in any | foroign country without host nation approval. IV. NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECRECY AND THE POLICY TO NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY The practices of the U.S. government in tho aroa of nuclear weapons secrecy could be construed as harmful rathor than holpful to U.S. national security. The U.S. government has a number of standard devices to avoid dealing with the growing international disatisfaction with U.S. policies on the use and deployment of nuclear weapons. Chief among them is the policy of "neither confirming nor denying" the presence of nuclear weapons. How did the "neither confirm nor deny" policy evolve? According to one Congressional report, much of the secrecy about deployment of nuclear weapons derives from political controversy the weapons cause rather than the need to protect the information from a potential onemy: The U.S. Government security policy regarding nuclear woapons locations is that it will neither confirm nor deny the existence !?[* ?* t i o r V° * U , S * n u c l a a r weapons located anywhere. In part, this is at tho request of the nations where the weapons are deployed, since in most nations tho existence of U.S. nucloar weapons within their borders is a difficult internal political issue. Thus they generally have requested that tho United States not declassify the fact that U.S. nuclear weapons aro located in their specific nation — even though the ovidence that they *r* there is obvious and generally known by their population. (31) OQHSM * OLd V9'-\Z 90/EO "9£ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulguf go vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ,p W 0 Paul Warnko, who had boon Aooistent Socrotory of Dofonoo for International Security Affairo, ochood tho oamo viaw whpn ho tootifiod boforo Congroso in 1974 on tho "confirm nor dony" policy. CA3s I understand the policy about failing to confirm er dony tho prooonco of tactical nucloar woapono anyploco, it wao motivatod largoly by fears of poooiblo diooidont groupo in tho alliod countrioo, and it roally otommod, I think, moro from tho Navy's approhonsion than from any othor oourco. Tho Navy of couroo has to havo accoso to foreign basoo, and I think thoy feared possiblo unrest and oven oomothing clooo to robollion, particularly in Aoia, if lt wore known that tho Unitod Statoo wao bringing in naval vossols that had nucloar weapons aboard. So I suspect it was moro to try ta koop peace within alliod countrioo and to avoid dissent there than it was for any othor purpooo. (32) Morton Halperin, former Assistant Secretary of Dofonoo for •» Systems Anolysis, told Congress in 1974 that tho "confirm nor dony" policy developed initially in a period in which nuclear woapono were looked upon with kind af mysticism as oomothing vory difforent ... and in which we were not going to talk about whore theoe weapons arQ. It was a natural outgrowth of that and from tho fear, ... particularly in tho Navy, ... that if tho word got out there wore nucloar woapono in Germany or Okinawa or othor places, you might havo domestic opposition in thooo countrioo to the stationing of tho woapons which would make it impoooiblo to continue to store them thoro.... CW3hon I wao in tho Pontagon Cthc policy] was not ouscoptiblo to review....*CI3t wao woll understood that tho foolings of tho military oorvicoo CworoJ ouch that ono oponod thio subject at one's peril and without any chance of OUCCQOO in changing it. (33) Whilo tho "confirm nor dony" policy io intondod to quoll public diocuosion, nucloar oocrocy also affocto tho diocuooian within alliod governments. Whon control ovor cortain typoo of nucloar woapons information ("restricted data") was loooonod by the 1934 ammendments to tho Atomic Energy Act, and a now category 3QHSM ~ ' * ILd VS'-iZ 9 0 / G O '9o6o923 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Ac a Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'inferfi o of information ("formerly restricted data") was croatod, ono of the objectives was to increase the exehango of data with allies. When President Eisenhower, in his February 17, 1954, mossago to Congress, recommended amondments to loosen controls over information on nuclear woapons, ho complained that "Under present law, we eannot give them CU.S. allies! tactical information essential to their effective participation with us in combinod military operations and planning, and to their own dofonso against atomic attack." (34) He added that "all of thorn should become better informed in the problems of atomic warfaro and therofore better prepared to meet the contingency of such warfare. In order for the free world to be an effectivo dofonso unit, it must bo geared to tho atomic facts of this era." (35) John Foster Dulles, then Secretary of State, stated before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on June 3, 1954, that the proposed ammendments would take the U.S. "in tho direction of peace." They would increase "the deterrent factor represented by our weapons stockpile ... permitting us to integrate certain tactical woapons information into our foreign military planning Cand3 ... strengtheCnl the ties which unite the free nations by a sen-re of fellowship." (36) The Report of the Joint Committoo on Atomic Energy that accompanied the new bill to tho floor of Congress stated that, under tho old (1946) law, Cw3ith our nation the sole possessor of atomic weapons, and with those weapons husbanded for a strategic counterblow against an aggressor, there was no need for acquainting friendly nations with information concerning the effects and military employment of GQHSM * ZLd V9 : \Z 90/eO '9 000924 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulguj aft vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 2* tactical atomic woapons. Today howovor wo aro ongagod with our allioo in a common ondoavor involving common planning and combinod forcoo to dam tho tido of Rod military powor and provont it from engulfing Froo Europe.... -.So long ao our law prohibito uo from giving our partnora in thoso joint efforts for common dofonco such atomic information ao is required for roaliotic military planning, our own national security sufforo. (37) Sixteen yearo after tho revisions to tho Atomic Snorgy Act were enacted, nucloar weapons secrecy again bocamo a major oourco of tonoion, thio time between Congrooo and tho Exocutivo Branch. Senator Stuart Symington chairod a special Subcommittoo on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad which oxaminod tho role of nucloar weapons in U.S. foroign relatione. Tho final report of the Committee in 1970 concludodi The stationing of nuclear woapons in foroign countrioo roprooonts a special kind of commitment between tho Unitod Statoo and the host eountry. In almost ovory one of thoso countrioo a voil of secrecy hides the presence of such weapons. Nowhoro io thio voil of secrecy stronger than in tho Unitod States. (38) The roport wont on to call tho Executive Branch's oocrocy practices "obviously absurd;" socrecy policy wao uood "to covor up questionable policy and practice, io unconstitutional, and is against tho bost intorosts of tho United States." (38) V. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY AND ARMS CONTROL Fiftoon years after the Symington Roport, tho U.S. io still not doaling with its allies on the basis of complete information and trust. Tho revelations of tho details of tho Nucloar Woapons GQHSM * ZL-d VS'IZ 9 0 / C O 'CJ �^ Document disclosed under the Accd&/r1r\formation Act Document divulgue en vertu de la i.«fsM*/i&rfs a I'information „ Doploymont Plan show that nucloar woapono oocrocy remains an obstaclo to mutual respect in foroign relationo, Congressional \*s oversight and public understanding. Foreign governments themselves do not know what commitments thoy aro involved in. Moreover the U.S. Stato Department seomo to be in tho dark aa ' S H ^ M M WT • - - • -- i '—- - well. The nuclear woapons infrastructure is oo complex and worldwide U.S. nuclear operations and planning aro so pervasive that they thwart existing nuclear-free zone treaties and tho nuclear-free policies of sovoreign governments. Tho Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and the Caribbean is a case in point. Tho Treaty was designed to restrict the kind o-f military plans the U.S. has for Puerto Rico. Yet tho Treaty did not lead to any revision of actual U.S. military plans. The U.S. government did indicate that it had considered the Treaty's effect on military operations (it stated that "nuclear weapons transit or transport operations Cin the Treaty Zone3" were not affected by tho Treaty (40)). But it did not act as though signing the Treaty (and its protocols on Puerto Rico) had any effect on actual piano. Xn fact, the evidence collected so far indicates*that no guidance was provided to U.S. military forces, by either the £ef«ftt>t> Department or State Department, to ensure their compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. (41) "Nuclear-free" nations like Iceland, Canada, Puorto Rico and Spain face a now dilemma. ignores their policies. 3 QHSM The Nuclear Weapons Deployment ^\M The U.S. government employs socrocy as _—- ~^"~~ 000926 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue e j & r t u de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information /£> . ito dofonoo. Tho U.S. govornmont foaro that any rootrictiono on ito nucloar weapon policioo might become an opidomic? that would threaten ito freedom to oporato around tho world. Tho U.S. government'o reaction to tho Now Zoalcnd govornmont*o rofuoal ta allow a dootroyor to mako a oort vioit unleoo tho U.S. plodgod it wao not carrying nucloar woapono io indieativo of thio foar. According to tho Now York Timoo, "Tho Roagan Administration oaid a firm American rooponso wao noodod... to domonotrato that allioo could not impooo limito on tho movomonto of Amorlean military forces and got off 'coot-froe.' A sonior official oaid tho Unitod Statos, to deter othor alliod countries from following Now Zealand's oxample, was oxamining Ca number of wayo of rotaliatingS." (42) New Zoaland, in contrast to othor nominally nucloar-froo countries ouch as Denmark, Japan and Norway, io dotorminod to challenge the U.S. to roopoct tho policioo of ito hoot nation, rather than turn a blind oyo to visits of nucloar-capablo ships. Tho dobate which tho rovolation of the Nucloar Woapono Doploymont Plan has stimulated is forcing those and othor nationo to oxamine thoir nucloar commitments and U.S. policioo. In Canada, rotirod Admiral Robort Folio told Tho Globo ond Mail that "tho ioouo io a political ono which should bo decided boforo a crioio ariooo." (43) A Globo and Mail editorial on IS January 1983 concludod "Tho tormo of nucloar deploymont in Canada ohould not bo kopt fuzzy in tho interest of political expediency." (44) In Bormuda, the Royal Gazetto wrote: "No matter how uncomfortablo it may maVe 3GHSM * SLd VS- \Z 90/CO '9^, �Document disclosed under the Accttito Information Act • Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acfq/^a I'informa iformation Q o and no matter how little say wo havo in tho situation, Bormudiens have a right to know tho exact position today, regardless of a piece of paper signed Ctho U.S.-Britioh agroomont to establish an American base in Bermuda during World War 113 under the pressures of a more conventional war." (45) The now debate is not some "disease" that must bo snuffed out, but a healthy exercise. Tho only things it threatens aro the suspicion and distrust that currently weaken U.S. alliances. At a time when questions about Soviet treaty complianco and verification aro the major obstacles to successful arms eontrol, it is not in U.S. interests to continuo its deceptive practice of nuclear secrecy. Here, as is too often the case, secrecy is coneernod not with protecting U.S. security but with protecting military prerogatives which offend allies, citizens and U.S. policy-makors alike Citizens who seek to counter tho spread of nuclear weapons find that secrocy undermines their efforts. Legislators seeking to maintain democratic accountablity of the military find that secrocy thwarts their fulfilment of that responsibility. For State Department officials seeking to manage U.S. relations, secrecy masks deception and misjudgements which cannot be sustained. The time is long overdue for a public review of U.S. nuclear woapono and deployment policies. 3SHSM * QLd VS • \Z 9 0/CO '9£ 000928 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue ( r Q e r t u de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information NotOO -» (1) Patrick Martin, "U.S. Should eonoult with allioo on weapons, NATO hood says," Tho Globo and Mai^ CToronto3, 24 January 1985. (2) Ian Auston and Torry Hargroavoo, "A d«»bato chorgod with danger," Mocloon'o, Vol. 98, No. 4, 28 January 1983. (3) Paul Knox, "Moro data noodod on anti-oub bombo, rotlrod Admiral oayo," The Globo and Mail. IS January 1983. (4) "Nucloar Prooumptiono," Tho Globe and Mail. 13 January 1983. (3) Potor Goodopood, "NOP 'aghast' at U.S. plan to doploy nucloar arms horo," Toronto Star. 10 January 198S. (6) DOD, Offico of tho Socrotary of Dofonoo, "Brtofing Matorialo for Incoming Officiolo," 21 Novombor 1980, p. 33. (7) Oetailo of nucloar woapono doploymonto aro eontainod in National Socurity Council, Nucloar Woapono Doploymont Authorization for FY 7S, NSDM 274, October 8, 1974, and subsequent Nucloar Woapono Doploymont Authorizations which havo boon reviewed by tho author. Othor countrioo which havo nucloar woapono on thoir soil in poacotimo — Britain, Bolgiura, Grooco, Italy, tho Netherlands, Turkey, Woot Gormany ~ will aloo rocoivo additional nuclear woapons from U.S. otorago. (8) Puorto Rico Bar Association, Roport of tho Spoclol Commission on Nuclear Weapons and tho Trooty for the Prohibition of Nucloar Weaoons in Latin America. August 17, 1984| soo also Judith Berkan, Charles S. Hoy-Maootro and Podro J. Saade-Llorono, "Violating tho Treaty of Tlatelolco," Armn Control Today, January 1985, pp. 4-3. (9) U.S. Naval Station, Roooovolt Roads, P.R., "Identification of Poroonnol Reliability Program <PRP> Positions," NAVSTA ROOSRDS NOTICE 3310, Soptombor 11, 1983| Commander, Naval Forcos Caribboan, "Nucloar Weapon Poroonnol Reliability Program (PRP) ,B COMNAVFORCARIB Staff Inotruction SS10.19, May S, 1983. (10) "Staff Organization and Rogulationo Manual, Commander Antilloo Dofonoo Command/U.S. Naval Forcoo Caribboan/Floofc Air, Caribboon/U.S. Naval Baoo, Roosevelt Roado, Roooovolt Roado, Puorto Rico," CADC/CNFC/CFAC/CNB Staff Inotruction 3400.2, January 1, 1977, p. 2-lSji tho uoo of SAS io oxplainod in U.S. Army, "Nucloar Unit Oporationo in Combat," Fiold Manual 100-30, March 31, 1977, p. 6. (11) "Staff Organization and Rogulationo Manual," op.cit. (12) U.S. Naval Station, Roosovolt Roado, P.R., "Naval Station Roooovolt Roado Nuelear Woapono Socurity Plan," NAVSTAROOSRDSINST CS310.16A, Scptombor 17, 1979, Confidontial-Formorly Restricted Data Cpartially declassified undor tho F0IA3. (13) "Hallgrinsoon on Poooiblo U.S. Treaty Violation," FBIS Europe, 7 December 1984, p. 3. 30-HSM - '* ^ *9:IZ 90/£0 ' 9 oL 29 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act \ Bocument divulgue en vertu de la tlreurfaeces a I'information o (14) "Hormannsson Rejects U.S. Nucloar Doploymont Plan," FBI3 Europp, 6 December 1984, p. 4, H 5 ) "Premier Wants Washington bomb answer," Tho Roval Gazette, CBermuda3. 8 January 1985. (16) Ibid. (17) "Facing the Facts," Mid-Ocean News CBormuda3, 11 January 1965. — — — — — — (18) "Atomic Weapons," The Royal Gazette CBormudaJ, 11 January 1985. (19) Joe Weber, "No direct Nueloar Answer from the U.S.," Royal Gazette CBermuda!, February 9, 1985. T30T Ibid. (21)- Rough translation of Icelandic text contained in Morflunbladld CIceland3, 20 Docomber 19B4. (22) Tho 11 August 1980 lotter wao released to tho author under the Freedom of Information Act. (23) Peter Goodspeed, "NOP 'aghast' at U.S. plan to deploy nuclear arms hare," Toronto Star^ 10 January 1983* (24) Paul Knox, "Ottawa trusts U.S. to toll nueloar plans," The Globe and Mail. 12 January 1985. (25) Ron Lowman, "Coates denies Canada to tako nucloar arms," Toronto Star,, 11 January 1985. (26) Knox, 12 January 1985, op.cit. (27) Jim Meek, "Canada not obligated to deploy nucloar weapons: Theriault," Chronical Herald CNova Scotia3, 12 January 1985. (28) Knox, 12 January 1985, op.cit.% the arrangement was "Exchange of Notes on Conditions Under Which Storage of Nuelear Anti-Submarine Weapons in Canada, for uso of U.S. forcoo, Would be Permitted," dated 27 July 1967; "No nuclear woapons going to Greenwood," Chronical Herald CNova Scotia3, 11 January 1985. (29) David Miller, "Nuclear deployment plan is doniod," The Globe and Mail. 13 January 1985. (30) "Clark Seeks to learn U.S. Plans Faster," Tho Globe and Mail. 28 January 1985. (31) U.S. Congress, Development, Use, and Control of Nuclear Energy for the Common Defense and Security and for Peaceful Furposes, First Annual Report to the U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 30 June 1975. (32) U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,, Nuclear Woapons and Foreign Policy, Hearings, pp. 135-136* (33) U.S. Congress, Nuclear Woapons and Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 36.. <34) Public Papers of tho Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, p. 38. (33) Ibid. (36) U.S. Congress, JCAE, Hearings on S.3323 and HR.8862 to amend tho Atomic Energy Act of 1946, quoted in 1954 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, p. 3492-3493. (37) Senate Report No. 1699, quoted in Ibid, p. 3438. (38) U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Report, December 21, 3QHSM * QLd VS-XZ 90/GO "G^ �Document discRMj under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 4 *•>' ' • «— "2- ^ * •' - ' «^-*Z— 1970, p. I S . (39) I b i d . (40) Lottor from Michaol J. Mathooon, U.S. Dopartmont of Stato, to Podro J. Saado-Llorono, Puorto Rico Bar Aoooeiation, Docombor 21, 1983. (41) A Lottor from W.M. McDonald, Offico of tho Aooiotant Socrotary of Dofonoo, to Richard Fioldhouso, Inotituto for Policy Studioo, May 18, 1984, otatod that guidance "could not bo found" in DOD filoo. (42) Bornard Gwortzman, "U.S. Piano Actiono To Anowor Robi"f? By Now Zoalcnd," Now York Timoo, Fobruary 6, 198S. (43) Paul Knox, 13 January 1985, op.cit. (44) "Nucloar Presumptions," Tho Globo and Moil, IS January 1983. (43) "Atomic Woapons," Tho Royal Gazotto CBormudoJ, 11 January 1985. ZllIHSM * 6Ld * g : 12 9 0 / C O "gg, -'. • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18503 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 5, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG