https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3a64d125993e855d12bd3152caa98d3c.pdf 2fb69fe15dc41566414e2234af4a8cda PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information a - o M. Kergin Defence Relations Division 2-7921 SECRET February 5, 19 85 ACC IDR-04 Tilt ~~~ DOSSlfR Memorandum for: The Secretary of State for External Affairs! cc: Minister for International Trade cc: Minister for External Relations SUBJECT: North American Defence Related Issues This memorandum transmits a paper which summarizes current government policy on certain sensitive defence issues and recommends interim action regarding public communication in each case. The paper is also being forwarded to the Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence by their officials as background for discussion at the meeting of Priorities and Planning scheduled for February 6. The Prime Minister has expressed concern that there be a harmonized and consistent position on these questions. It is possible that Priorities and Planning will request more developed and sophisticated communications plans for some of these issues. / _yzy Jy Jd I. cr y(U^C^^?\J2d^x. Michael Shenstone Assistant Deputy Minister Political and International Security Affairs Gordon S. Smith (yi.^yCS^ 1/U+- 000954 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET O NORTH AMERICAN? DEFENCE) RELATED ISSUES Canada is a member of an alliance and has been»£or 35 years, which relies to a major extent on nuclear weapons to deter aggression and to prevent war. Canada" "is "part of a continent, North America, against which the principal if not the only threat, is the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union. Against that threat there is, at present, no defence and we must, therefore, rely to counter it on deterrence) provided by the strategic nuclear retaliatory forces of ""the TUSA7> A summary of the more sensitive questions and recommended public communications actions follow: A. NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT INTO CANADA The relevant facts and their security classification are: 1. There are at present no nuclear weapons stored on Canadian territory nor are there any active agreements to permit Storage!(unclassified). storage 2. med Forces] Force at present No element of the Canadian Armed has a nuclear role (unclassified). 3. The Canadian Government at present has no plans to station nuclear weapons on Canadian territory or to equip any element of the Canadian Armed Forces with nuclear weapons (unclassified). 4. Under standing arrangements the huclear powered or nuclear armed s'hips of the USA, the UK and~France are authorized to transit Canadian territorial waters and to use designated ports subject to clearance by Canadian military authorities. Such visits occur at least on a monthly basis. Special provisions relating to safety and liability have been established (unclassified) sj 5. Under a bilateral agreement with the USA, US Submarines, including those^ that may be nuclear_,p,owered and nuclear armed, are entitled to use the ^torpedo range at Nanoose*, ;•• -, •, :,..a. -B.C. None of the torpedoes used on this "range "are '." .?'•?' armed with warheads, conventional or nuclear (unclassified). . . . /2 000955 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - SECRET 6. Under standing Canada-USA arrangements,, and in consultation with the Government_of _Canada, certain USA nuclear-armed military ^^rcT^t-lnay^Over-fX^ and/or land in Canada in times of crisis (unclassified). 7. Under standing NATO arrangements, and after consultation with and agreement by the Government of Canada (either within NATO or bilaterally with the USA) certain forces of allied nations equipped with nuclear weapons, may be deployed to designated ibase^in Canada in the event of war or in-ternationai-v VrTsi*s (SECRET) . * * -There have been no major inconsistencies in public TSfatements^by Ministers on these issues. The Secretary of State for - External Affairs (SSEA) and the Minister of National Defence (MND) have stressed different aspects. M r . Clark has said that there a r e , at present, no nuclear weapons on Canadian soil and that there will be none in the future. M r . Coates has stated that there are no plans for nuclear deployment in Canada. Neither of these statements, as is evident from the foregoing,tells the whole picture. Ambassador Gotlieb has been given assurances by the US Assistant Secretary of Defence Ikle that there are no plans for deployment of nuclear weapons in Canada despite continuing assertions to the contrary by the defence analyst, Arkin. The Prime Minister h a s said that it was a Liberal Government which first introduced nuclear weapons in Canada. It w a s , however, the previous government of M r . Diefenbaker which acquired the weapons systems (e.g. CF-104, BOMARC, Honest John rocket system) which required nuclear warheads to be effective in their roles. The Liberal Government subsequently acquired the nuclear weapons but then decided to divest Canada of these weapons in the 1970s and 1980s. A comprehensive public line is recommended along the lines of the following: "There are now no nuclear weapons stored on Canadian soil and no Canadian forces have nuclear roles in Canada or anywhere else. Nuclear weapons cannot be brought into Canada by our allies without prior consultation and the consent of the Canadian Government either given through NATO or bilaterally." B. SUBMERGED TRANSITg3XJJ.SA NUCLEAR SUBMARINES_TRRO.UGH_, _ CANADIAN INTERNAL WATERS OF THE ISTRAIT OF JUAN DE F U C ^ While the request by the USA has not been made public, leaks are always possible. The Priorities and Planning Committee (P & P) decided to defer consideration at least until after March 1 7 . The SSEA has told the US Ambassador that he anticipated that a positive decision would be announced after the March 17 Summit. The decision by P & P w a s to defer consideration of the issue until after the Summit without agreeing to the approval requested by the SSEA and M N D . 000956 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information C. 3 - SECRET "THE--STRATEGIC. DEFENCE" I N I T I A T I V E ! ( S D I ) Mr. Clark's statement of January 21 represents the public position of the Government of Canada. There have been no inconsistencies in Ministers' responses to queries. Questions in the House and from the media have implied that Canada has embraced the SDI in its entirety, and have not focussed on the cautious approval of research and the other elements of the statement. It is recommended that when referring to the SDI, the other elements of the SSEA's statement receive due attention, i.e. the research does not contravene the provisions of the 197 2 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Canada strongly supports but that actual development and deployment of an ABM system by either side would transgress the ABM.Treaty as it is currently constituted. Speculation which goes beyond the research phase would raise a situation which is at present hypothetical and could not appropriately be addressed. Canada shares the US objective at Geneva to prevent an arms race in outer space. A Memorandum to Cabinet which addresses issues such as a possible line which Canada might take in private discussions of SDI with the USA and a suggested policy on Canadian participation (which the US has invited) in SDI-related research is nearing completion and will be submitted to Ministers for consideration shortly. D. NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE MODERNIZATION (NAADM) There have been suggestions in the House of Commons and in the press in recent weeks that NAADM is related to the SDI. In fact the modernization program is independent of the SDI. It is a defined, joint Canada-USA program to modernize the obsolete systems which provide warning of air attack on North America. It is hence totally different in concept and practice from SDI which is at present only a res.ear.ch^endeawou-r—-exploring the feasibility of a possible defence Against ballistic missiles. No consideration of any kind is being given to the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system in the Canadian north. The Satellite Early Warning System and Ballistic Early Warning System exist as passive surveillance systems to provide warning of ballistic missile""attackr " ?y r: .a ..,.., _..... Completion of NAADM will enhance both Canadian sovereignty and -security both by giving Canada a major role dh providing the-.^•. aNorth Warning Systems and by giving the responsibility "for yyg-gg'V.g .operation.and maintenance .to Canada.___ It might be stressed that _ ' Canada will co-man and co-manage the system with the USA because the air defence of North America is geographically indivisible. . ../4 000957 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces.a I'information - 4 - • SECRET This will increase Canadian sovereignty through an enhanced role in the managing of the system and through the information necessary for maintenance which the more comprehensive aerospace surveillance system provides. The objectives and proposed configuration of the modernized systems do not differ in any substantive respect from those approved by the previous government. Virtually all speculation on cost-sharing has been inaccurate. The negotiating objective is a 60% US, 401 Canadian sharing for facilities in Canada. A memorandum to Cabinet on this question wll be discussed at the Priorities and Planning meeting of February 6. It is recommended that the preceding themes constitute the core of public response on the issue pending approval by Cabinet and the completion of negotiations with the USA. Should the issue of potential unemployment relating to CADIN-Pinetree phasedown be raised, Ministers might say that arrangements are being made which will mitigate the adverse consequences. This issue is still under negotiation with the USA. A provisional communications plan is being prepared to explain the modernization program to Parliament and to the public once Priorities and Planning has approved the negotiative mandate contained in the document currently before it. E. NUCEEAR~BA'TTERY-SYSTEM FOR NORTH-WARNING. SYSTEM (NWS) The press is aware that discussions between AECL and the US Department of Energy aimed at a research project to develop a nuclear battery to power certain NWS radar units have been underway for some time. Some Ministers have stressed the possible civilian application of this technology. Nevertheless the only interest of the US Air Force is to power the NWS. There seems to be no reason to deny research into the military application of this technology or, provided that all safety and regulatory concerns can be met, that the technology, if possible, be applied as power sources to the NWS. This determination, however, is several years into the future. F. WORAD RENEWAL The press and some opposition members have suggested that the North Warning System (NWS) and the NORAD Agreement, . which falls due for a further five-year renewal in early. 19'86, g".: are linked in a secret plan for Canada-USA cooperation in an ABM system. The debate hinges on a clause introduced during the NORAD renewal in 1968 and dropped at the time of the 1981 renewal. It made clear that Canada was not committed to . ../5 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 5 - SECRET participate in any US ABM system which might be considered. The clause was initially inserted in 1968 at Prime Minister Pearson's insistence to make it clear that Canada would not participate in the USA Safeguard system then under consideration to protect ICBM sites in the Midwest. In 19 73 and 1978 ABM was not at issue because of the ABM Treaty which was signed in 19 7 2 by both superpowers, coupled with the USA decision to forego in 1976 the Safeguard system (although it would have been permitted by the Treaty). At the time of the 19 81 NORAD renewal, it was mutually agreed that the ABM Canadian exclusion clause be dropped because it was unnecessary. Most importantly, Canada was conscious that the exclusion clause might be taken to imply a Canadian expectation that the USA planned to deploy an. ABM system in violation of the Treaty. In responding to public queries, the foregoing history and rationale could be provided in its entirety. In addressing the question relating to the renewal of the Agreement which is due in 1986, it might be stressed that the NORAD Agreement, at present, deals exclusively with early warning of missile attack and defence against bomber attack. The subject of active ballistic missile defence lies outside the terms of the present NORAD Agreement and could not be brought within its terms without the agreement of both governments. G. A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE CANADA S.ome_opposi,tion_member.s-have suggested that Canada pursue a nuclear-weapons-free-zone -Itatus since there are now no nuclear weapons on Canadian soil and no future plans to deploy them. Nevertheless, a nuclear-weapons-free status would be inconsistent with our treaty obligations in NATOr, inter alia, it would deny access to our ports to warships of NATO allies. It would also invalidate NORAD contingency plans for which Canada has provided prior authorization in exchanges of Notes (subject to consultation in time of crisis) and which permit USA nuclear capable aircraft to overfly and deploy into Canada in time of crisis (as outlined in A ) . It would also be inconsistent with the risk and burden-sharing arrangements of the Alliance. The public response recommended is that although nuclear weapons are no longer deployed in Canada, declaration of nuclear-weapons-free status would be inconsistent with membership in NATO, an alliance which depends on strategic . stability through the deployment of a nuclear deterrent. ,H. ' '-. TNUCLE AR' WINT ER . ," J ..•' -g--'::---a—"_ . ' _• Former ~Environment_MinisJber_.Caccia commissioned a [study's in 1984 by the 'Royal Society.of Cshada on the consequences for Canada of multiple nuclear explosions, i.e. the "Nuclear Winter" scenario. The Society is expected to present its . ../6 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 6 - SECRET report to the Minister of the Environment on February 7. The study goes beyond the scientific analysis of the phenomenon and raises questions of a strategic defence and foreign policy character such as the whole basis of nuclear deterrence. It is these aspects, all of which have a nuclear flavour, which are expected to provoke controversy. The report confirms in graphic manner what has long been suspected - the tremendous destruction of nuclear war. There is no dispute on this. The Government has as a primary objective the prevention of all war including nuclear war by radical reductions of nuclear weapons through negotiation. This not obtainable, however, through the abandonment of NATO's collective defence system based on nuclear deterrence. I. CANADA~U"S^TEST'AND'*EVAL'UATrON~AGREEMBlNT (CRUISE MISSILE TESTING) " Canada agreed to testing of the unarmed air-launched cruise missile under the terms of the T & E Agreement (exchange of Notes on 10 February 1983). In accordance with the project arrangement submitted by the US, not more than six tests are to be effected per year during the five-year term of the agreement and testing is to be done during the January - March period. The first of three tests scheduled for 1985 took place on January 15. It elicited restrained public protest. Two further "free flight" tests are scheduled for the final two weeks of February. Muted protests are anticipated. As with cruise testing, all other weapons systems testing in Canada under the T & E is subject to prior consultation and approval. Tests cannot include nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. The USA has not resubmitted initial proposals to test ground-launched cruise missiles, Pershing lis or "Stealth" cruise missiles in Canada. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18488 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 5, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG