https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/009d3be39dd78377530ca3aa533224d1.pdf e4e70779ed80939707bd7a5b2e9795d1 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL BEST ORIGINAL AVAILABLE MEfLLEUR- ORIGINAL ENGLISH EXEMPLAJRE COPY N* OTTT.V Embargo: 1+th O c t o b e r , 12 o f c l o c k Address by Hr. H a n l l o 1965 B r o s i o S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l of NATO t o t h e NATO m i P Q ^ M s CONPEREI.CE New Y o r k , l i o n d a y , h t h O c t o b e r , 1 965 000133 36 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information _3- BEST ORIGINAL AVAILABLE ftfBLLEUR ORIGINAL > Mr. Chairman, (Ladies and) Gentlemen, .* J For the second time, I have the honour and pleasure of addressing you; and I am delighted to be doing so in the United States, where for over six unforgettable years, I represented my country and made so many friends. The world in general and the Atlantic Alliance in particular present us with so many problems to discuss and so many causes for concern, that I will spare you any further words of introduction and plungO straight into my subject. ..I Nevertheless, it is fitting that I should recall that His Holiness Pope Paul the Sixth is here today in this city of . New York on a mission of peace and goodwill which all of us, I am sure, support, and in which all of us wish him every good success. . We too in rLiTO are working for peace and the defence of a civilisation founded on the ideals and aspirations of which he, •* for millions all over the world, is the living symbol arid • embodiment. And this defence demands on the one hand goodwill, charity and tolerance, and on the other, firmness and courage in facing the difficulties and dangers of this imperfect world. In the Western world, it is universally accepted by the Allied Governments that the P.tlantic Alliance is today as necessary as ever. At the same time, all of us are agreed that the world has changed since 1949, and that the Alliance may have to change with it, though here, of course, is where the divergences start, . in that all of us have our own ideas on why lt should change ana. in what directions, " First of all, I think we should get our minds clear on one point; why, and for what purposes, is the Alliance still • '• necessary? Only thus.can we assess the effects of new situations on the Alliance itself and determine whether changes are necessary, .^ and, if so, in what direction they should be. - * '. ,* The Alliance came Into being owing.to the imperative need to defend Y/e stern Europe against Soviet threats and pressure. The. 0 Prague coup and the Berlin crisis were at once the determining *" cause of its establishment and the Justification for it,. , T!he -*,". Intention was to restore the balance of forces between the free world and Soviet communism; and this was achieved. *.*' Europe was . -•*"' not able to bring this about on her own. She needed the support of North America, and this support was decisive. At that time," the United States had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and- this in J itself was sufficient to check Soviet expansionism. '"-' "*"'",'- •-> L It is true that American nuclear monopoly has been i < succeeded by a nuclear balance deterring both the Soviet Union, and, * the United States from resorting to force. A Chinese nuclear capability has emerged. The commitments of the United'States in Asia and South America have expanded, the outstanding example being.* . -> 000134 �m ORIGINAL AVMILASLE •MEILLEUR ORIGINAL _ -*- Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information the war in Vietnam, Europe has achieved a remarkable economic and political recovery, and has also made considerable progress in the military sphere. But none of these changes have affected the basic realities that made and still make the Alliance a political and military necessity. A balance of forces is still necessary. Soviet threats and Soviet pressure are still with us. Prom a military point of view, it is clear that if Soviet aggression, or threatened aggression, has been averted, this is due directly and entirely to American military support for Europe. If this support were to be removed, the danger would at once revive. V.'e must face the fact that the recovery of Europe, remarkable though it may be as a political and economic achievement, has not reduced the disparity between the military strength, nuclear or conventional, of Europe, and that of the United States or for that matter the Soviet Union. The gap, if anything, has increasod, for the complication and cost of modern weapons have . made it impossible for European nations to compete with America . or the Soviets. The balance of forces, thorefare, both now and for an indefinite future, can be maintained only if the United States remain firmly committed at Europe's side, ;r But if the threat of military aggression has been averted by the balance of forces, political pressure continues, and tho Soviet political danger to Europe is as strong as ever, though it . may assume more subtle forms. The Soviet Union is still involved in a great political and diplomatic struggle with Western Europe, aimed at dividing, weakening, and if possible, destroying the " Atlantic Alliance, Any disturbance of the military balance would have an immediate effect on the course of this great Struggle, ' It is not that the free institutions of v/estern Europe rest on " armed force. On tho contrary, lt is tlie Communists who have never dared to expose their system to the free expression of the public will. The normal processes of democracy play no part in their 'n calculations. Their weapons arc political and military pressure frorn^ outside, coupled with subversion and penetration from within," demfgagy, and violence. •' -The policy of tho Soviet Union therefore may no longer .be openly threatening, but it remains an aggressive one and offensive, in tho sonsc that it supports and exploits every opportunity to * extend Soviet authority over Europe by undermining and'dividing the v' Atlantic countries. Convincing evidence of Soviet intentions is, afforded by their refusal to allow a solution of tho political probloms of Europe and in particular of the key issue of Germany,. : +The allegation that the Soviet Union will not allow German . • reunification because it fears a war of revenge by Germany .will not hold water. On the contrary, it is the Soviet Union's "' ' deliberate intention to exploit the persistent and understandable resentment Ttfiich the war loft behind it in order to keep Germany weak and divided, and foment discord and doubt in Europe-over the **'*' German problem. Responsible Soviet leaders are too intelligent and t:>o well informed not to know that cvon a reunited Germany could ,s never be strong enough to threaten the Soviet Union Whose population, economic resources and military capability arc so much ""^" 000135 �BEST ORIGINAL AVAILABLE MEiLLEUR ORIGINAL Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -5greatcr. Thoy also know perfectly well that it is pure fantasy to _ pretend that Germany, even if she wished to do so, could drag, t '/?.' Europe,or the,Waited States into war against the Soviet Union*^ '^V No' state in Europe or America would be prepared to 'countenance/T K'.**' still less to support, any such supposed German revanchism.' ' On " the other hand, it should be easy for the Soviets to understand r°* 1 that tlie best possible guarantee against any possibility; however ^ V hypothetical, of an isolated, lunatic, single-handed * venture .!$•", '"' t Germany against them would be to encourage Germany either to merge ,, into a united Europe or to strengthen still further her Atlantic.,, ties, 'in oither event, the influence of the Alliance; and,above?"* all that of the US, would be a guarantee of restraint,' .But the **.;''," Soviets will have none of this - in public anyway, though I. would *, not Insult their Intelligence by implying that they do not recognise it in private. They want a weak Germany. They want to divide,J ' ' and ultimately to control, Europe; and they find, propaganda about German revanchism and an illusory German threat extremely, useful .v.^ i *_ T V r for the purpose. "'• * ** • , *• . . • . • . • * In this situation two main tasks are incumbent * on" the * * y* Alliance and will continue to be so for a long time toicome. < Oner''* is to maintain the'military balance, which has deterred'and: will 1 : ' continue to deter aggression and blackmail; and the other is* to * **" preserve unity of political action between the European states themselves and between Europe, the United States and Canada. If„ it fails in these, Soviet political manoeuvring will in the lcng^.( * ' run find a, weak spot of which it can take advantage in'order tb "*,/' ^ divide and ultimately to control us. • • ' ''••;•-; •*- - '."*?, '|J Of course, many people think this an oversimplified ;;^J& f: argument. They forget, however, that one of the. essential' virtuesr ' 4 of political analysis is precisely to go to the heart ofproblems'L:y '* and'reduce'them'to their simplest expression. in politics ~ t subtlety may engender doubt and inaction; and the analysis of a problem is not necessarily superficial because it is simple. There* are; however, objections to my analysis and I; refer to • onlyJ<*** one of them; It is said that quite apart from the 'ivtiantie ~p r : Alliance and its-military forces, the sino-SovieV conflict'is*In * f itself sufficient to inhibit the Soviet Union from.p^suing ^' " '" \ policy of expansion in Europe. The conclusion Is drawn from this x' that a roduction in American commitments in Europe might reduce Soviet hostility or even bring about tacit co-operation in Asia. This is, however, a dangerous illusion for it implies that immediate rosultB may be expected from a development which, if it comes at all, can only be a very long term one. The Soviet Union is too strong to need to fear China; and it will remain so for many years to come. In the meantime it is to the Soviets1 interest to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the Tfest and they have plenty of time to do so. If the Soviet Union is resisted in Europe, lt will have to come to a reasonable settlement sooner or later. If on the contrary it finds weakness and disunion these will be exploited. If the Soviet Union finds the way wide open before it in Europe, this will strengthen its position on the Western front, and give it a stronger posture in confronting China in Asia. But if tho Soviets find a solid Europe planted firmly in their path, they will have to come to an agreement with Europe 000136 in order to deal with China. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information BEST ORIGINAL AVAILABLE MEILLEUR ORIGINAL -6- There.ie an equally dangerous illusion in some.European countries which believe that under the protection of the SovietAmerican nuolear stalemate, they can pursue a policy ahtirely^y^^ ^ / ^ ^ Independent of, and indeed contrary to, that of the 3»i4?cd (HaYoo^ In some cases, some of the policies they adopt indeed happen to be coincidental with those of the adversaries of the United States and the Alliance. There is no doubt that the Atlantic Allianoe is, an a Alliance of sovereign and independent states, and it must remain so; but the policy of those states must take account of the fact that the Alliance exists. If the Alliance is not animated by a oommon' spirit, it is in danger of becoming a dead letter. Moreover, no state in the Alliance as it is today, and certainly no European' state, is any longer in a position to conduct a world policy on its own and to act alone as a oounter weight to the power of the Soviet Union - or, looking twenty years ahead, the power of China. In quite another direction, there are those who fear the expansion of the commitments and responsibilities of the United. States in Asia, Latin America and elsewhere. These 6ritics hope that the United States will not extend their commitments any further, but that they will, on the contrary, withdraw from their , existing commitments a3 soon as possible, in order to conserve their strength for the vital Atlantic and European sectors. , ,, , Ify answer to this is that it is true that the Atlantie' * sector should be for all of us, including the Americana, tlie decisive sector in the situation as it is today and is likely to be for some time to oome. But it is also true that a-setback for the United States in Asia, for example, in Vietnam, would also be ' a grave setback for the whole of the West. Hot only this, but an American retreat or a humiliating compromise in Vietnam, far.from, .„ ending US commitments in Asia, would extend them on an even greater scale to all sorts of other areas, from Thailand to the Philippines. All these causes for concern, all these subtleties of-" . analysis, do not affect the validity of the essential argument,^, that the Soviet Union must continue to be held in'check in Europe by the balance of armed force and by political solidarity.. Thesetwo concepts remain the "raieon d'etre" and the essential/fuabtibn" of the Atlantic Alliance. . '.'?:„/y ' , -" - '. .- r*... ,n .' at..,..' "• .J, r a ? r -.; v aw,.- !• i « *" — D — • k * * • • * - < M ' ' * "_; 000137 - • T J . �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information WBUJEUR -7PART I I Mr. Chairman, -. ' •• . . . . • . ' - ... >J •; I t h i n k t h e s e o b s e r v a t i o n s of mine may s e r v e a s a u s e f u l s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a problem- w i t h which you a r e c l o s e l y concerned and which you have d i s c u s s e d v e r y '* <? i khowledgeably and v e r y s e r i o u s l y , I r e f e r t o . what, h a s become i '•'known a s t h e problem of t h e - r e f o r m o f t h e - A l l i a n c e . . T h e r o .has b e e n a g r e a t d e a l of t a l k about t h i s - p e r h a p s too.much* p.^That X have c t o s ay i s t h i s ; i f we o r e r e a l l y agreed an .the n e c e s s i t y of the*>A l l i a n c e on t h o t e r m s and f o r t h e p u r p o s e s I have o u t l i n e d , ' t h e n . v> t h e r e i s no danger i n t a l k i n g about r e f o r m . - I n t h a t . c a s e , reform means m o d i f i c a t i o n o r improvement i n order t h e more; e f f e c t i v e l y .to/ p u r s u e a g r e ed a l m s . Sometimes, however, t a l k of reform d e r i v e s ; ;from a c e r t a i n d e g r e e of m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e s i t u a t i o n . . It. Is s a i d , f o r example, t h a t t h e p o l i c y of b l o c s i s o b s o l e t e and t h a t we must t h i n k of something e l s e . Such c r i t i c s f or g o t pbhat: I t i s p r o c l s o l y t h e p o l i c y of b l o c s , or r a t h o r A l l i a r a c e a , which h a s k o p t ' t h e p e a c e u n t i l now and may have t o keop i t i n t h e . f u t u r e ; . : . * ' I n d e e d , t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e Western b l o c would once morct .throw t h e e . ^2 at i n t e r n a t i o n a l - s i t u a t i o n i n t o a n a r c h y , t h u s endangeringppeace*? cvt/*t I d e a s of p t h i s n a t u r e l e a d t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n . t h a t t&e> idJLianccrtahbuld no l o n g e r concern i t s e l f w i t h t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t b u t .should do i : r v something d i f f e r e n t . I t s h o u l d , f o r example, d i r e c t i t s a t t e n t i o n t o C h i n a , o r t h e uncommitted world and i t s problems or . t r y t o s o l v e economic and s o c i a l problems a l l over t h e w o r l d , orjdfcransfbrm' * i >-*; i t s e l f i n t o a gonuine community, i n which c a a e . l t --is s u g g o s t e a y a l t ' wouldj.bej abld f ".to-do a l l t h o s e t h i n g s a t o n c e . , A H .these lines;'of* argument, a r c g r e e t e d i n r e a l i t y n o t t o t h e r e f o r m of t h e , A l l i a n c e f • b u t - t o w a r d s t u r n i n g , i t i n t o something which jaay- bey ant A l l i a n c e r> which "may.be ; an passociati on, but which would certainly bp>vary1 different* from what i t i s at present. My own feeling-is thetpsome of. these ideas are based,! as I have said, on a failure torpreaiise: the -faetss Others may^be admirable in themselves, butithe>.tlme ,for. themThasar, probably; hot arrived? yet* „ But a l l of them, i* seems: to mey? are ««t symptomatic of a state of uneasiness; and? i n .some eases ,, theyi. even" contribute to the uneasiness i t s e l f . Prom .time to'time: they p-..'> T receive "encouragement; from tho, act ion ofr allied-states whoj for one reason or another, take unilateral oction.nottin^ oonaonanoa; with the HATO system of p o l i t i c a l or military organisation-^ ^ll.^jf.* thesevare effects^ of the changes in the political-scene toawfliich I have P . - * referred and of an inadequate and sometimes te^entijpi^.analysiB<; c of the nature"of those changes.' - !;">? Ja £} ^•-.L "*• p • a . - . , r.t *->~^ , > if. ; / . : / -, ,- For a l l these reasons, when I speak ef^the reform-jof-i the-. Alliance, I do ao with great caution, not because I am frightened of either words or,, action; on the contrary,-jl am stimulated and ehcour(agcd by:'.' any attempt to bring about • progress* 6K,Improvement, . end "in this" I know Is'am entirely i n agrsoment/wi'th-.you* •''' fhQffaett, ife;'howeveri.;tnat there i s c o n s i d e r a b l e " ^ Q ^ ^ t ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^ p ^ t ^ s r ^ ^ of tne Alliar^e and i t i s incumbent on.us^to.-dis^rse^thls disquiet ,,-•»', • * . z *• 'T \;sz?£t> " M' '^r-'t -7- Si. 3 A* 000138 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information BEST D^CGJi^L A V / t l A S U t mum?, ORIGINAL ~8- with clear and p r e c i s e i d e a s . Let us then welcome without r e s e r v e the discussion of any modification which might improve the Alliance and i t s organization, while t r e a t i n g with more caution any proposals for r a d i c a l reform which might jeopardise what we have a l r e a d y , without s t a t i n g i n p r e c i s e terms what should be put i n i t s p l a c e . I have no i n t e n t i o n , even i f I had the time, of discussing here the various proposals for reform which have been ;put' forward. There are a g r e a t many of t h e n , and thoy merit s e r i o us c o n s i d e r a t i o n , covering as they- do not only the m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , economic and s c i e n t i f i c f i e l d s , b u t a l s o tho problem of co-ordinating fell these a c t i v i t i e s within NATO. You have given seriou s and intone'ivo•-. " ' consideration t o a grea t many of then with concrete and i n s t r u c t i v e a n a l y s i s ; and I can only thank you for your e f f o r t s . Today> I " w i l l confine myself to a few observations on tho main catogorie s of reform proposals and on t h e i r p o l i t i c a l o r i g i n s and e f f e c t s . Iri/ t h i s way, I hope I s h a l l be able to help c l a r i f y some e f bur i d e a s , Heform hns been discussed i n • a number > of c o n t e x t s ; .the"" recovery and p o l i t i c a l future of Europe; the m i l i t a r y * p o l:iit i c a l ] . a n d organizational s t r u c t u r e of NATO; nuclear arms and tho -a *-•* n e c e s s i t y for b e t t e r arrangements for sharing control-arid'; ^ "* r}t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; . f i n a l l y , the geographical area* i n whiehMiho • ' ?t f, v Alliance operates and the p o s s i b i l i t y of extending* i t to feope w i ^ L world t a s k s end world problems. - ,: -' !n '' ~-l~ > «•* .'i .." .*' " i l I V : - - i t w Xi-fl 4 In regard t o Europe, I have already said t h ' a t ^ t h e ' ^ - -' * p o l i t i c a l and economic-recovery of our continent has been"bothp l r ^'r admirable and s u r p r i s i n g . Here, we should give f u l l recognition^-to t h e i n i t i a l Impetus given by the Marshall p l a n . However,-'it> cannot^~ 3 ; be, s a i d t h a t ' t h e gap'between tho m i l i t a r y oapaDi!it^-o^ l$u7 ojc«j's$iut^ rsr. t h a t of. the United S t a t e s has i n azxy way narrowed. 1 ;-Oh t h e c o n t r a r y , i t has incroosed. No doubt European m i l i t a r y forces,feave; incre'oiaed absolutely both in" q u a n t i ty and q u a l i t y . ^ I 1 need' only mention i&fef considerable e f f o r t s prance has made t o develop a;forc©;'de frappS;^ which, maybe, a subject of controvery but i s , ' n e v e r thelesB^*apfajc^tttf t o bo-reckoned with <- and t h e 12 d i v i s i o n s of '.1^eSundeswehrV'^ ;,7''' iu R e l a t i v e l y , , however, American advances i n the f i e l d : o f n u c l S a r j - ^0 weapons* m i s s i l e s and space t r a v e l have been on suohr a s c a l1 e t h a t the d i s p a r i t y between America and Europe has lhcreasedaaiiA i a s t i l l i Increasing. The s t a t e s of Europe havo not «uceoe6£d r i n ' a c h i e v i n g ! v.-any-measure'"of p o l i t i c a l ' S o l i d a r i t y i n regard t o t h e i r ; e x t e r nljra l p:';p o l i c y and wo cannot > t h e r e f o r e , regard them as^ in mxy-tray a" "'•' :if c o l l e c t i v e u n i t w i t h i n the A l l i a n c e . The AlHance^ remains ] a n , ^ Alliance of 15 s t a t e s of varying m i l i t a r y and-economic'-* ~ J " !l * - ' ^ f~ p o t e n t i a l i t i e s , each t r y i n g to pursue i t s own p o l i c i e s and t o ao^brdlnato thorn with those of others f o r "the^commbri'' defence* Of course , thero would be a profound* and; indeed;* ^ ^ *** automatic change i n t h e Allianco i f Europe d r ' e v e n ' a cbfesioeraoib T ' modification t o the s t r u c t u r e of the ,'J.liance, I firmly b e l i e v e t h a t i t would.be a change f o r the b e t t e r and, indeed, perhaps the ^8- 000139 �BF^T « ' fc OD VRlGlUftl Document Access to Document disclosed disclosed under under the ine Mccess to Information mjuimunuii Act «•..• Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information AVAILABLE b e s t change of a l l . I have already said many times i n my^speeches t h a t I see no i n c o m p a t i b i l i ty between p o l i t i c a l union ""in'Eur operand* the A l l i a n c e , I have never shared, and do not share nbwj. the*".' * r,~;' doubts of those who fear t h a t a united. Europe may have a .divisive^ V effect in'.that u n i t e d Europe may go i t s own v/ay and/break the \r* ,K. p o l i t i c a l s o l i d a r i t y with the United S t a t e s , 'This f e a r h a s ' made - >'\ some observers anxious t o come t o soae c l e a r - c u t d e f i n i t i o n of the}.,Xf. l i m i t s of a p o s s i b l e p a r t n e r ship between Europe and the l l h i ted'•"*-""S,~/\ S t a t e s . ' I t has also given r i s e t o t h e theory of t h e ^dumb-b'ellf,.# . Now a•• dumb-bell •-has two equal spheres a t e i t h e r end, - b u t . i t cannot. e x i s t without a strong r i g i d handle t o keep the two t o g e t h e r . ^ , y Great h i s t o r i c a l i s s u es l i k e t h i s "should "be approacho'd with l e s s ,.,,-,/. apprehension and more f l e x i b i l i t y , l e s s t i m i d i t y and *morew • ."".^ J^ confidence. '-. « t*t'~ • •* T-hatj i n such s i t u a t i o n s , r e a l l y helps t o ^ i n t a i n ( t h e ,\ ., y e x i s t i n g l i n k s and s o l i d a r i t y ? I n my view, i t i s not so~,Ejuch .the, ^ existence of formal'Commitments and of w r i t t e n Obligationsi L&B. \tti^^j u\ f a c t t h a t the basio objectives and, indeed, t h e i h t e r e s t s ~ a r e ' t h e w same. lly..own profound conviction i s t h a t even a .united Europe w i l l ' n e e d the support of North America for a long time'^ta'come,, , .< . not*only In order t o acquire m i l i t a r y power commensurate with.'fits^,-*^' area and i t s - economic p o t e n t i a l but even more bocauserambiigJall.yV, v : ^ tho dangers of a world i n ferment the f u l l and combined^ s t r e n g t h v"*^* of botti Europe tsnd America w i l l bo b a r e l y suffici'eiitvto^ e^siure^'the;^ ? p r e s e r v a t i o n of our c i v i l i s a t i o n and tho extension,of i t s . benefit^;;; • i t o the r e s t of a changing p l a n e t . . ' "•" ^*"~~~p ^r.--Cy-'- * •* '* I do not b e l i e v e t h at a " t h i r d f o r c e " , h c u t r a l l s t i c ) j C y ^ "»tr., Europe,"-is a likel$r development, on the o t h e r h a n d . I t j- i s MoJv.mo^V probahle t h a t individua l European s t a t e s I n a divided* Eur ope* .mlghil5r,^ y i e l d to*the temptation of taking up a p o s i t i o n of,would-be* X t J;.«j 0 ^U independchcb a n d - n e u t r a l i t y , "Whether i n s i d e o r : o u t s i d e ^the^'jLiiance.^^ For»me,-'therefore,'-Eur ope an u n i t y and the Atlantic.V,^lXance~'OTe -not*" J «omy>hot>incompatible but w i l l remain complementary, ioTpne' anotherf "31 and i f one day t h e : S o v i e t danger were f i n a l l y Oliiainatea^byTpeacefuljjf mearis^ fagreement between Europe and America might be "jDxtbnded.and*r/^.t r a n s f o r m e d ' s t i l j f u r t h e r , assuming l a r g e r t a s k s 'on^wcttl'd-widel''+„.,•*> • • • A ^ , * < ~ " • • * * • > ' , * . 1 i * ' - f •( T - * * T > * - ^ « » » i j J - i ^ f - v * t ft 1 - ' * • * * • * • • £ • 3£J'J$ *ll B u t - t h e ' h a r d ^ r c a l i t y of the moment i s , t h a t ttgi'ftyo p r p s e n t , ^ t h e r e i s no Europe^*c p o l i t i c a l u n i t y end hd. com^bn s J2urb^ wi t h i n ilk) ^Alliances ' .There i s ther cfor o.. no b a s i s t or t a^rcf oria^of ^v j the ^ l l i a n c b p r e d i c a t e d ' o n assumption of Eur6pean/recove$y77*a6 j%J\r£ ,p r a t e until'.£uropean s t a t e s come t o an agreement,for the..jjursuitv ^otjejnJ a coimbn^imrpoao within the A l l i a n c e , This se*ems 1 ^nlp:cly}-in J ,' UiV; j wC e i t h er r tho -Immediate'- or *the .foreseeable future,'a^r6flectibn"*which q c i r t . i s a tpalnful r e a l i s a t i o n for .convinced Europbana; *V..tftth^aamc^ 'Jxisi^r> time pa i t ' i m p l i e s ^both'a warning and a c a l l to ;tia to^assuTao -qur v ,-^xZ'^n r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ' i n Matters 'of European p o l i t i c a l j u n i ^ . ^ - * t / e i h a v e ? r ' : talked; too much and^done too l i t t l e . Tills i s . c l e a r l y an* issue where,.; r e s p o n s i b i l i t y l i e s ,with the\governmonts .end^people-of ^jEuTogb.'. So - , f a r the Americans'- have always enbouraged European u n i t y ^ b u t ^ t ^ S o i s . p i for Europe i t s e l f t o i n d i c a t e the l i n o s on which i t should be pursued or the s t a g es by which i t should develop. -s- *• 0 0 0 1 4 0 �"'""**S Document d i s c l o s f l f 3 f > m ^ ( i m s m W S l t k ' " ^ o c u m e n , divulgue en ^ ^ j f ^ f f i A "' * " * " " " * t* _ Hhilo reform through European unity Gannot bo -considered^ as'a livo issue j there are a number of proposals, for ..structural reforms, taking as their storting point tho reality of~the present situation in which we havo 15 separate allies. These ore reforms of the organization of the Alliance, political and military.;.?of. the organs of decision, the commands and forces, relations between_ all these and the co-ordination of tho economic, productive, and' \\ -k scientific activities of member countries. There is plenty"of V-; scope hero for sonsible, responsible proposals. But I will not <detain you over this. There is indeed a "question prealable" which' makes it difficult at present to put any of these proposals into kt effect in the absence of agreement, in .principle. So we are"still ^ concerned here with improving tlie organization, end making it" . r operate more effectively, rationally and fairly. This may-involve: adding something here or subtracting and simplifying there;"but if we begin to draw theoretioal distinctions between the Alliance and the organization whioh has come into being to implement it; if we begin to argue about such abstractions as organization, integration .and .« subordination, the dialogue will become difficult. , •- . • The fact of the matter is that, under modern conditions*, ; you cannot have an effective military Alliance without some kind of organization in peacetime. The material and strategic problems . involved arc too big. You cannot devise a nuclear strategy, ah L early warning system, or a pipeline network, overnight. Europe.^ ~ , itself is too small. r/e cannot afford in any future war ,to bulf .K.:1 time by soiling space. If we do not prepare for the momenta of* _ • danger, there can bo no effective defence when and "if it"*o6meS« Not only tills, but since our defences must not only bo affective, but be scon to be soi tjierc can bo no credible deterrent, to provide which is tho Alliance's essential function in time^ of peace* * .,.Xf ~'^ there arc no allied troops in Germany or elsewhere in Europe* in* •• pt peacetime, the.credibility of tho dotorront is gravely diminished. *t On* the other hand, if Allied troops arc stationed oh, European soil, -" there must be some sort of organization for commands and'?oommunJLcat Ions. It is quite illogical to argue in one breath that alliances are no ' longer valid'in'tho nuclear ago because no country" is'going to risk ~ annihilation to defend another, and in the next to-refuse to_accept -i* that very military organization which, for more than any written,.!r* r. agreement, guarantees that defence commitments will bo honoured. If ^this is correct, we should try to keep the questionpon a practidal fboting ^leaving aside theoretical discussiens^on\'tt ;•£ -*i- '* integration-and sub ordination. If some of us doclerod£against ~any« **. form - of integration and others for more and better' integration j * the - f result will'ho a hat tie„ of words from which agreement Is highly. . ^ unlikbly to emerge. % if, however, we take the line.that equality,, between allies 1$, the basis of tho Alliance,, and that wo oa*Q^l *Z*?i concerned only with'finding the beet organization .for citf agreement could be reached. what we have all got to, do is',to,"admit ~that;in\„ ; ? modern conditions a unified command must he j^e^ared in-time tof", --\..,peace;)" * if this ia acceptedlwc can always discuss^ an^^lf^neeesaary,* review tho "ways and means of ensuring respect. for^thbTabveraiglaty-or .1, all' the: allies and a rational distribution-'of 'authority*and . " r ^ W * functions. " . *-'•'-- '- ;"'*p ^;';.i;"" »" " * - - „ •. r? -- **? e;Ji tv &^.-'C'*-.- -10000141 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information -11- I am convinced that comnon sense will prevail and that dispute over words will five vaxy to a practical discussion on the beet course of action. If this does not happen, the consequences are difficult to foresee. '.That is certain is that all our" countries consider the Alliance necessary, and that most of them consider lt necessary to have a command organization, albeit' withmajor units remaining under national control and available if noed be for the defence of vital national interests. This being so we have only to wait to hear the proposals of anybody who wishes to change the existing state of affairs, Pny such proposals would certainly bo considered with the seriousness, respect and goodwill that they deserve. Thereafter, each of us will have to assume responsibility for whatever action he may take, Coptainly, if on the one hand European unity is not realised and on the other there is no General agreement on the organization of the Atlantic Alliance, a number of European states would aim at even closer links with the United States. In that event, those who aspire to a greater degree of autonomy of Europe within the Atlantic framework -. and there are not a few: of them - would bo disappointed and the net result would be exactly the opposite of v;hat they had hoped. The third aspect of the proposal for the reform of NATO derives from the necessity to improve our nuclear defence. This ' Involves major issues of strategy, strategic planning, command, •• and the creation and organization of national or collective forcea* J-' * 4 T * In essence the problem is one of satisfying the aspirations of certain European states; Germany in particular, but:* Itoly, the Netherlands and Belgium as well, who are not:asking for u :.? national nuclear weapons, but wish to take part in tho nuclear ,?•>..* defence of tho Alliance. Here again, I do not intend to discuss a .} the ideas and plans put forward by various parties. I..will >, confine myself to emphasising certain basic points. . j ?. •; The first one on which I think all the allies can and .<• will agree, is that any nuclear understanding must be reached ,. between allios themselves in a spirit of full equality .without any ... ' discrimination and without any suspicion towards anyone* ; This . a <r condition applies primarily to Germany, whieh entered the V.,111 ancO under the handicap that her status after the second worlds war was? -.< < still undecided. The Federal Government has repeatedly stated *\ c that it docs not intend to obtain national nuclear, weapons. .On '.rathe basis.of this statement, the way is open for an understanding' between the allies which will meet not only the Interests, of the ? Alliance - which is the most important consideration - but also the * need for peace and. on honourable solution of. the German-problem with the Soviet Union and other interested countries. Had Eurojpe >. achieved political unity, which \?ould in time have 'enabled;her to • • -: produce axi European deterrent, a solution might have.hbeh found on tho European plane. In the absence of such a solution,"the —r • •* alternative-of an Atlantic solution remains. We must sbek to' 1 bring about one or tho other, putting our trust in the new "Germany <-> J and its democratic loaders and in the spirit of moderation and''* 'i.peace which nowadays animates the German people and -its^responsibleJ loaders. The solution of today must, not be overshadowed 'by tragic" memories and understandable resentment at the events of former years. 000142 -11- �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information V EH*! -^ 2 ~ Above all, the Allies oust not allow themselves to be intimidated by the pressure and threats by which the Soviet Union * is attempting at all costs to prevent any agreement permitting Germany to participate in Atlantic nuclear strategy or forces. Clearly, any such agreements must be inspired by a spirit of moderation' and the desire not to close the door on an eventual agreement on Germany with the Communist countries. But' the allies, including Germany herself, must remain the judges of what is , necessary in the way of agreements and for their own defence* If we had heeded the Soviet Union and its threats, there would never have been on Atlantic Alliance in 19h9; Greece and Turkey would not have been admitted in 1951 > or Germany in 195^? and there would never even have been on European Economic Community, /.greements between the Atlantic pov/ers on nuclear matters should therefore have political priority over any agreement with the- - -' Soviet Union, It is for the allies or those of them who consider themselves directly concerned to decide on the. expediency, the timing and the limits of such agreements, having regard to the j requirements of the defence of the Alliance and of peace. Any \ other method carries the risk of reviving and reinforcing any -.nationalist or neutralist tendencies which may exist in Germany or * elsewhere in the Alliance. This would be serious,' not, of course, t because Germany represents a real military threat, but because a • \ nationalist or neutralist Germany would be a hotr-bed of;agitation, < unrest and disorder in Europe. Not even the Communist'Countries j would derive any real benefit from such a situation, but they might j contribute to its creation. In tho past, nazism, the professed adversary of. communism, became the involuntary instrument of * i; j ComimihlstLdomination over a great part of Europe. Todays communism, f which paved the way- for the advent of nazism by refusing- to 1 support — German democracy and encouraged Hitler on the p ath-of-adventure'-* • i with the Pacts of 1939, might contribute to the revival of f o nationalist and neutralist agitation with its campaign of hate and*•? calumny. YJe must prevent this with a policy of firmness and moderation, refusing any form of support to any supposed>German revonchism,'but defending to the last the right of the Germans ' --" people to choose freely their destiny. These'principles must be ! reflected in the nuclear policy of the Alliance and thoaaiiiebV j } nations;. In the long run, the Soviet Union will*acquiesce in-this '•> policy ofafirmness'and peace, for as 1 said'at-the beginning; the' Soviet'leaders have too much sense not to realise that"l^i s-lh J- :*' Vv> i their; country's interest to keep Germany committed • to^the-' other •*• " Western countries whose peaceful intentions ere'obvibub] and this • '* will happen, provided that the allies remember that-they" imist '• ' remain united; in other words, that thoy must maintain^solidarity throughout the Alliance including Germany, - Today,^the"danger comes not .from Germany but from Communist Russia, The reversal of '•' ' * alliances which come about in 19U9 and was consecrated-'by *the agreements of 195U remains a fact. To,make any otherpassumption would be in contradiction of one of the essential purposes"of the Alliance. . ..There is room,for many opinions on itfie besfway^of improving:nuoloar defence within the'Alliance, but unless these essential basic assumptions .ore established, wo shall ^flnd^ourselves discussing-not questions of organization, but /the very ^substance JO .3, andispirit of tho Alliance* . ;•;» „ „,ip Tr * u . •' -5. . ~ * • - .s'.-i^^s-r ,f. * v t <v ~12 - 000143 f �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information B£ST % -13- U. t . wl .. /lt A\,MBLE UE1LLWR QHIQinfik Uy second observation on the theme of nuclear problems in the Alliance is that any proposed new agreement must be essentially positive in character. By that I mean that it should not be based primarily on a system of vetos but on a positive system for the control and use of nuclear forces. Clearly, as long as the United States have an enormous proponderance of nuclear forces and that is likely to be for a long time to come - It will be difficult to deny them on independent capability of decision, both positive and negative. But a multiplicity of national vetos would diminish the effectiveness of the Atlantic nuclear deterrent, and convince the Soviets that it would never be used. Even this would in the last resort be a system founded more on suspicion than-on confidence, and It would, in consequence, not be a constructive one.' The states of the Alliance have enough sense of history and politics, end are responsible enough, to be able to collaborate . positively in nuelear decisions in whatever manner they may in due course decide. It is for the states concerned to discuss and decide on the nature of these agreements - whother they will deal with the creation of new forces, the organization of existing ones or co-operation in nuclear strategy, or all these things at once. * Even a partial agreement between a certain number of states without" the participation of others, con only strengthen allied defence to .r the extent that it adds new forces or improves existing ones, ' ' Naturally, as I told you last year, it will be necessary for these forces to be linked to the Alliance through the allied chain of .' command. They must also be linked to tlie political organs of NATO. '• The best moans of doing this is open to discussion, but provided f ' that there.ia a common political will to maintain and strengthen the Alliance, this is essentially a technical problem. without such a political will, no problem can be solved; but I am convinced that .it will not be found wanting. I would not wish to neglect the fourth and last aspect 'of- * reform in tho Alliance, namely, its evolution towards a'genuine a*!'. •Atlantic community which would supersede and absorb the puroly defensive Alliance. I had some opportunity of discussing 'this with you last year, and I have thought about It a great deal since." The* more I do eo, the more I realise that the issue is an extremely, important one. Obviously, tlie problem has not yet been clearly defined. In a sense, the Atlantic Community already exists as a • *>' community of history, civilisation, ethics and basic political ''\t ideas. Community in this sense is the whole basis and' " r * - **i;,t* justification of the Alliance; and without such a community , the Alliance would never have como into existence. But fideaS differ widely on the concept of a community when it is regarded not as a r • * starting point, but as a developing concept and a-goal UO be '- -+ attained. . Some conceive of lt as. a full-blown political - -'-' ^ 5 federation. That, as you know, is an idea which has'been"- a vigorously advocated here in tho United States, • Others again speak -* of partnership and association; but the• character of vthe . "*'• '*" J partnership and the .conditions of the association remain vague. >* ^ -2 000144 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document div^hj$# eMMOfuJfe If &>/iiftBttcfa a ^information ^ u„ MPLLEUH ORIGINAL My own view is that when people spook of a community thoy mean jeofail. association of states capable of facing all the great political problems.of the world in common; defending Western civilisation wherever it is threatened even outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. In this sense, the idea of a community joins up with that of the extension of the Alliance's responsibilities beyond the area at present laid down in the Treaty; and in this sense, the prospect of a community remains a noble, responsible and reasonable concept. All the same, I think it remains a distant one. For the time being, the .'.lliance remains what it was created to be - namely, an agreement between sovereign states for the military and political defence of the North Atlantic Area.- ••'• To extend the scope - geographically and otherwise --of the obligations the allied countries undertook in 19U9 would.not be easy. . It would have to bo very carefully considered.and the '-" pros and cons very cautiously weighed. In any event we must beware, lest in seeking to improve the Alliance and strengthen our. * ties, we bring about precisely the opposite result and cause a split in it. In particular, we must at all costs avoid creating the impression that there is any conflict or competition between. the idea of a European community and the idea of an Atlantic community; for this would be most dangerous to the unity and solidarity of the Western world. The idea of an Atlantic community must remain, as I am sure it can, on the one hand, an -* expression of a common civilisation which is the very foundation-' of our Alliance,..and, on the other, a possibility of further '- •- '•' development springing from the association of Europe and North "* America when and if Europe has achieved unity. It might, indeed',- ' be a substitute for European unity, but only when and if Europe • ^ -*"* has tried every other means of obtaining unity, and failed, .•.*.* Fortunately, the moment for this has not yet come, and it does hot *' look:as if it is coming* *-!•' ' *•'*'"' t [ t j [ * . X. .. • • . " I n conclusion", i t might bo said t h a t the improvement, or t h e reform i f you l i k e , to c a l l i t t h a t , of NATO'S o r g a n i z a t i on and % defences depends more than anything e l s e on c l e a r ideas and; firm*- ~ •'"• conviction regarding the n e c e s s i t y of the Alliance and-'It a - " " "* objectives i n the face of Soviet p o l i t i c a l power and p o l i t i c a l * • '' pressure.. I f t h i s clea r concept and t h i s firm determination<exist, . any improvements which may bo necessary become relatively-; e a s y ; i f they are l a c k i n g , improvements w i l l be extremely d i f f i c u l t ^ * ' * • ' ' The years through which we are about t o pass w i l l show whether*the w i l l and t h e conviction e x i s t . I am convinced t h a t they.ido,"and t h a t frank discussio n and objective a n a l y s i s of our various opinions and proposals w i l l only strengthen them. To.obtain t h i a r e s u l t ^ - 1 r... t we must go forward i n a p r a c t i c a l s p i r i t and without preconceived - '• i d e a s , avoiding t h e o r e t i c a l questions of p r i n c i p l e about \'.~ '". - I' i n t e g r a t i o n and n o n - i n t e g r a t i o n , subordination and'non-sttbordinatlori, end seeking together t o e s t a b l i s h what changes or ex necessary vtb make NATO s t r o n g e r , simpler and more e q u i t a b l e . VVe .must-therefore make '• &rox>y e f f o r t t o ensure .that t h i s exchange of i d e a s i s lueefni'end ~< >v* positive. Only i f i t proves manifestly impossible t o proceed *6n t h i s b a s i s , should we r e s i g n ourselves t o proceeding on any-other*"" -1k- 000145 < �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ?* • * BEST ORIGINAL AVAILABLEMEILLEUR ORIGINAL^ _13„ The great majority of allied countries are convinced that the Alliance should go on even if we should have to take such a course. I understand this, but it is my task to prevent us from being faced with the choice, and I fervently hope that I shall succeed in doing so. '.7e must get ourselves past the present moment of uncertainty and uneasiness; for the Alliance remains as necessary:as ever in the sense I have attempted to explain to you. I would add that, while the Alliance depends on a realistic policy of firmness towards the Soviet Union and the 'Communist countries, this docs not in any way imply a position of rigid hostility. Still less does it imply an aggressive or bellicose attitude. The function of the Aliionce.remains defensive and peaceful. Its hand must remain outstretched towards the fioviet Union, always provided that the Soviet Union is genuinely willing to grasp it and embark on a frank and honest discussion of mutual interests. It is no part of the mission of our Alliance to prevent agreement. On the contrary, its task is to promote agreement, and to achieve it in allied unity. Only thus can there be a just settlement serving the interests of all tho parties concerned. This policy of union is, if you will, a policy of strength, but it is not, as communist polemics misrepresent it, a policy of bullying and compulsion. A policy of strength in our Atlantic language means only one thing; the opposite of a policy of weakness. The strength we seek is the strength deriving from union for defence and the search for a just peace. Outside this union, there is no salvation for the free world. If we can maintain our unity, agreement with tho Soviet Union will be less difficult; and peace will be secured.. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18196 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG