https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/0ad761f8ab9d48efbe420420f024eea5.pdf a1a3bbf378cd5cfa5328d204bddcbcf7 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET NATO NUCLEAR ARRANGEMENTS The communique following the December Ministerial meeting noted that Ministers had examined problems confronting the Alliance in the fields of conventional and nuclear weapons and that a thorough exchange of views had taken place and would be continued. The Canadian Aide Memoire circulated on January 8 to governments of other NATO countries followed up the position taken by the Canadian delegation in December and urged that discussions of the nuclear arrangements of the Alliance should take place in future on a NATOwide basis* 2# To carry forward discussion of this vital question, a distinction can be made between strategic and tactical weapons, although it must be recognized that strike aircraft (Canadian F—104s) and longer range ndssiles coming available to SACEUR (Pershings) blur this distinction; it will become even less tenable as technology permits the inclusion of more powerful warheads in smaller carriers. 3. With the lo9s by the United States of a monopoly in strategic nuclear forces and the bankruptcy of the doctrine of massive retaliation, the United States has recognized that it must share with its allies some of the nuclear forces at its disposal so as to assure European countries that United States strategic nuclear forces would be used in support of essential European interests; and at the same time to discourage the further development of national nuclear forces by ***uropean countries, particularly Germany. The problem is to provide for a meaningful sharing in the nuclear field without proliferation; i.e., without taking the ultimate decision on the release of strategic weapons 000722 out of the hands of the United States President, �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - 4. The limiting fact©sc6mett4toiflgT!i£gftSeft£ d^m^Suim^^s a I'information on the fact that even now the United States owns most of the nuclear weapons of all kinds in the Alliance and still has a monopoly of secondstrike retaliatory weapons of the Polaris and Minute Man category even though the United Kingdom and France have plans to acquire such weapons. Thus any participation by non-nuclear members of the Alliance in consultation about the employment of the strategic power available to the Alliance has to take into account the problem of participation in the control of the second-strike retaliatory nuclear weapons as well as the tactical or field nuclear weapons committed to SACEUR. 5. The MLF proposals were intended to provide the basis for participation in the control of at least a fraction of the American strategic power in the form of second-strike weapons by permitting a certain amount of consultation in direct proportion to the degree of participation by the -Ally concerned. The British proposals (ANF) have widened the possible basis of participation by moving the focus from weapons of the Polaris type yet to be built to weapons now in being as well. This has the effect of opening the door to a greater number of allies to consult on the control of the strategic nuclear power without having to commit themselves to participating in or contributing to United States second-strike retaliatory weapons. The problem, however, still remains to be resolved and is of special concern to Canada since ICBMs or by Canadian physical security can only be threatened by/missiles launched by aircraft or submarine and is protected mainly by United States strategic power. The problem of having a voice in the control of United States strategic power therefore is an important Canadian interest, 6. At present solutions on ANF await United Kingdom-German discussion. Problems to be considered include: (a) Will the United Kingdom get away with mixing first-strike weapons such as the V-bombers or land-based missiles of the Pershing typ^ 000723 with the second-strike weapons l i k e t h e Polaris submarines? �(b) Will the Germans, bearing jjiDjaEiidielritelip*cis««lii^^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informati i n control be proportionate t o contributions , i n s i s t on the B r i t i s h having a share i n a mixed-manned form of Polaris-equipped vessels? (c) What form of contribution to second—strike nuclear weapons might be considered for Canada consistent vdth the principle of influences in proportion to contributions and also with the principle of non-proliferation; for instance, is a contribution to research development and production in the field of second-strike weapons ruled out? 7. As regards nuclear weapons already available to the Allies and to SACEUR, the United States has already shown a willingness to solve the problem through such steps as (a) agreement on general guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons (The Athens guidelines); (b) its agreement at the Ottawa meeting in the spring of 19&3 ^° an interallied nuclear force xifhich, among other things, set up a nuclear Deputy to SACEUR and provided for consultation through Omaha in targeting; and (c) agreeing to a Nuclear Committee for the exchange of information. The problem here is how and when to reactivate discussion on the control of nuclear weapons already available to the Alliance, based on the Athens guidelines and the Ottawa agreement, 8, There is a Canadian interest involved in pursuing this discussion because of the nuclear weapons already available to the Canadian forces, such as the warheads available to the 104's and the Honest Johns. '•L'he desirability of doing so is enhanced by the existence of ADMs in Germany and th e German Defence Minister having raised this problem at the Ministerial meeting. Further, and perhaps more important, since it has become increasingly clear that the greatest danger of a nuclear holocaust arises from escalation, the importance of the control of tactical weapons so as to limit the dangers of escalation is extremely important. The control of these weapons must be viewed against the background of the inability of NATO forces to defend NATO Europe with conventional forces 000724 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - and the likely request by SACEUR fffccfcftelhi^liWerm early stage in any conflict to support the conventional forces. General guidelines were agreed in Athens in 1963 for the control of nuclear weapons but thus far practical arrangements have not been finalized for the role of the Council for purposes of consultation in the event of an emergency. Because of the importance of nuclear policy to the Alliance, it seems clear that the Alliance should focus its attention and resolve any outstanding practical questions relating to the control of nuclear forces assigned to SACEUR irrespective of whether or not an important member of the Alliance has domestic difficulties (for example, an election), or because bilateral discussions are in train in respect of strategic weapons which may or may not be assigned to the Alliance, 9. The importance to Canada of playing a significant part in the process of decision-making is obvious. It should be borne in mind, however, that Canadian participation in the nuclear deterrent and nuclear strategy may require a different form than present interdiction aircraft vdth the growing reliance on missiles of the type of the sea-borne Polaris, the land-based Minute Man and the gradual phasing out of defepdence on aircraft. Moreover, Canadian participation in air defence against aircraft through the interceptor role in continental defence will gradually assume less importance as the threat to North America becomes increasingly based on nuclear-powered missile-firing submarines and ICBMs, 10. Canada's role in continental defence in surveillance and early warning, however, is likewise subject to attrition because of technological developments, particularly the growing reliance by the United States and presumably the USSR, on unmanned satellites that maintain constant surveillance from varying altitudes with the aid of modern photographic techniques. In the interests of preserving Canada's vol ce in deciding on any possible strategic response to aggression with nuclear weapons, Canadian participation may have to take the form of having some share in the second—strike nuclear weapons on which the main deterrent forces of the United States and of the Alliance are increasingly based. 000725 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Alternatively, or concurrently, atftei^i^miliugJIiJuebenpaBtu d&a^tkdrt5d&6&&dDT>informat in possible improved defence systems against nuclear attack. Such defence systems may well involve nuclear warheads. Finally, Canada could have an important role to play in research and development looking to obtaining more reliable systems to defend against nuclear missiles (if this is considered economically feasible) which in the years ahead are likely to become increasingly the sole threat to North America. 11. J If it could be agreed in NATO that on the basis of the Athens guidelines discussions should take place within the iilliance in respect of control of the forces now assigned to SACEUR with a view to developing means of continuous consultation in NATO on nuclear matters, then a first step might be to convene the Council and suggest that the decisions taken at the Ottawa meeting of 1963 might serve as a suitable starting—point for discussions. Such discussions might be aided by a preparatory committee consisting of high-level experts which might study and prepare a paper in respect of the nuclear weapons assigned to SACEUR. This study would include a detailed statement of what decisions the Council would likely have to take in the event of hostilities less than general war including the effect ADMs vrould have on the Council's role* It is for decision whether this committee need consist of representatives of all NATO countries or only of those participating with the United States in tactical nuclear weapons systems. The advantage of the approach suggested is that it could follow up the views contained in your telegram DL-2290 o f November 17 as well as in the Aide Memoire of January 8, 1965. 12, '^'he position of France in all of this is at best uncertain. Would we be prepared to agree to accommodate France in the way Spaak has suggested (Foreign Affairs, January 1965),i.e», to agree to the establishment of a Nuclear Directorate within the Alliance (as distinct from a Political Directorate) of United States, Britain and France? Could such an arrangement be made without prejudicing an agreement for full con— sultation in the Council on the basis of the Athens guidelines for con- 000726 trolling nuclear weapons assigned to SACEUR? � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18124 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG