https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/01fa66ae8bb3045a26df314cb0d8c404.pdf cd7d8731187618ccafe446485c129f18 PDF Text Text W Document d i s c l o s p J f f j ^ f i j j ^ f f i & to Information Act BEST ORIGINAL AY/ DoAI&Int divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information MEILLEUR ORIGINAL September % 1964, OAU HICPOCAI, in ErjATion TO CASADIAH POMCX on oon-DicsEriniA?ioa To on au£at<*d oldo-sffisoiro l o f t with the Departrssnt on Augact 19 (attached as Asoes A), the United Arab ttojrobllo ©ave notice of i t s Inteatica, together with other atntoe nenbers of tho Organisation of African Unity* to request that GO additional ltcn bo inscribed 00 tho provisional agenda of the 19th General Aoocnbly of tho United Catlenei \&) "to approve the declaration of African stateo** - concerning their readiness te undertake, In en international treaty to bo concluded under tber auspices of tho United nations, aot to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons - which was adoptod by the Bends of African states rcetinp; at Cairo en July Z7-21f and (b) "to talto tho necessary nracuros te convene an international oonfercne© with 0 view te concluding aa intc* aatioral treaty to this effect. * The declaration in addition ealle 0 upon "all peaco-lovlrjc nations to afThoro to tho ease undertaking and uuon "all nuclear powers to rcepeet and abide by thla declaration". Tho ttMl has coueht tho reaction of tho Canadian eovernaoat to this Initiative. It ia believed that d o l l a r arpreachoe have boon naflo In other nonAfrlean on pi tele where the VAlt io represented* 2, Zt le not icaediatoly clear fron tho wording of tho operative paragraph* of tho OATJ Declaration on Atonic Woapona quoted nbevo what i t la that tho Africans ore proposing* It io our nocunption, faewoTor, that they aro preset inn tho idea of a treaty on non-acquisition of nuclear weapons to be foraulotcd and adhered te by tho non-nuclear states. The African initiative will be exaoined below on tho basis of that assumption. 3« Tho lancuaao of tho undertaking, that i o , *not 11 to can ofactum or no quire oontrol of nuoloar weapons ia tho cane as that used In tho port of tho Irish resolution (AAtcs/1665 of fccccabor $$ 1961} which dealt with the duties of ototee not pooecceins nuclear weapons. The Irish resolution was adopted unaninouely at tho 16th uTSA, I t called upon "all states, and in particular upon thestatee at present pesscccicp, nuclear weapons, to ace their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of en inter* national acrcetagnt containing provisions under which tho nuclear states would undertake to refrain fron relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and fron transmitting the inferrration nseeesary for t v e i r caaufoeturo to ctatoo not possessing such weapons, and provi iono under which states cot poosocclcj nuclear weapons would undertime net to nanufacturo or otherwise acqulro control of such weapons". h* ?ko iflea that non-nuclear ctatoo rslcht conclude thoir oca, eep-aratc, coif-denying ajjreceont io net now, via tho Cwedich oucnectien for 0 nen-nueleir club. Tho Swedish proposal Included, Vet?eve*', an un^crtnhlctt anoncot th^so concerned ttto rcfuGo to receive ntafllcar weapons In thoir territories on behalf of ca7 o" r e>actryw. I t i s an ir^ortant point in favour of t*o African Initiative that an analogous provision has not boon oflopt<ooo686 �Document disclosed under the Acc^JiminJd^aff^k-^ct • - Document divulgue en vertu W&jLUiittllr QfttQiMlnformation 5. Influenced at any one tiao by thai* ^en±leato of tho decree of comaon Sovlot-Asjorican interest and I I h o likely attitude of tho Onitod States Senate, tho Aaoricane nnvo vaeiUotod in tho course of the last three years over tho fortt which a non*dissenloation undertaking should ossuaot whether a foreal international agreesont or a declaration would bo aoro appropriate or readily attainable. Thoy and the British have* at tloee* advaneed proposals for a declaration to bo nado jointly by tho nuclear and eignifleast non-nuclear powers* and* la private* advocated n declaration to be etado unilaterally by tho USA (or together by the USA and tho other nuelear powers) and* in rosponoo thereto or spentaneouoly* a declaration te bo cade unilaterally by a non-nuclear state or by a number of ouch ataton Jointly. Finally there Is cooo evidence that early in 19w* Sachington (or at leant the Aran Control and Diearaanont Agency) had bought of encouraging tho non-nuclear powers to formtiate thoir own non-aequieition agreement* with tho aaslataneo of tho Cightccn-nation Pleargacant Coaittoo. In largo acieure the QAtJ pneposal would seen to bo consonant with tho last noted proposition as wo understood it to have boon originally intended, 6. It should perhaps be borno In oind nt this juncture that the American Idea of a non-noquieition agreement appears sobsequontly to have degenerated into an Infernal «ug» cootion for unilateral declarations by non-nuclear UATO entoe and others. That suggestion was not greeted with enthusiast* by tho Italians andttootGermane who oounsolled no action on aon-dioeenination pending establishment of the IttF* Wo wore net encouraging in our eommonts either* although for a different reason* and tho Idea was accordingly dropped* So are not aware that the Americans actually counded out any non-aligned governments on this suggestion* 7. Tho current Canadian position on non-dio* semination was established by our approval of tho Irioh resolution in 1961* At that tine wo laid particular stross on the recomcondatlon thorein that etatoo should endeavour to secure on Internatlonal nnroonont to prevent tho wider spread of nuclear weapons. As indicated in 1962 In our roply te the enquiry relating to tho Cwodieh resolution (A/!Ros/1661».\ of December 5* 1961) "no effort should bo eparod to aehlevo a looting international accord which would prohibit altogether tho wider spread of nuclear weapons* and that "it is only through such a safeguarded international agreement* binding on the powers Which poeaoso nuelear weapons ao well no these which do not* that all countries eon be assured that the further dissemination of nuclear weapons will be offoetivoly prevented*. This position was affirmed on Hoy 20* 1963* when in the Houoo the niniotcr, following upon a reference te our support of tho Irlch resolution, stated that *wc continue to share the view of ethor western governments that extension of exclusive national control over nuelear weapons should bo prohibltod as far ao possible by international agreement*. And again en Hareh fie* 196b>* at the SBDC it was stated by tho SOCA that Canada continued to support wholeheartedly tho terns of tho Irish resolution which called for tho conclusion of an agroeaont. 8. Io confidential western Pour dlcouacions and in the Dorth Atlantic Council, the Canadian position has been somewhat core flexible. Although we havo long eoneidered that 000687 cuch voluntary and temporary measures ao dcelaratiene night inhlt— �MEILLEUR ORIGINAL Me^ponso of urgency which le looked upon as providing tho c^ffo accessary to eeeuro an agreement* wo adopted an open minded attitude in 1962 and from the middle of JPobruary* 1963* wo have been prepared to recommend support of a declaration provided it was otherwise in line with the Irish resolution. The declaration concerned van fus American Initiotlvo. Drafted in . ouch a way as to require the adherence of the four nuelear powers on the one hand and of non-nuclear states en the other* it had been advanced (uneuoeessfully) in negotiations with the Russians* in connection with the problem of Germany and Berlin* aeearly ao tho spring of 1962. 9. The cultllatera! declaration made no provision for verification of compliance with its terms. At the time wo decided to support it (in OAC)* it was suggested within the Bo* partmont that this omission wao duo to tho nature of the document* i.e. a draft declaration rather than a draft treaty. In point of fact, oven though the third proambular paragraph of the Irieh resolution States a belief in the need of "on international agreement,fl.ubJo.ct.to inspection, and; control*, preliminary Ancrieon draft treaties en non-diosemination have not generally contained any substantive verification provisions (nor have Soviet bloc proposals - except In tho case of Polish ones). In tha American view* the quostion of verification as such does not arise in either a declaratory approach to or a permanent international agreement on non-dionomination since* oven under the latter* "verification had never been regarded ac feasible exeept in conjunction with ether dlcareament obligations". This accordo well with current Canadian nilitnry opinion to the effect that verification of an appropriate agreement or declaration "would be extremely difficult and possibly, from a practical point of view* impossible*. 10. It is pertinent to recall that amongst tho reasons why we did not favour the Anerlean suggostion of a unilateral non-acquisition declaration was our concern over the fact that it ferfoitod what wo have continued te regard ao on Important principle of tho Irish resolution, naooly* that nuelear and nonnuclear powers should bo bound reciprocally in undertaking to prevent dissemination. Our attachment to that principle wao reaffirmed at the g n c in tho Canadian statement on non-dissemination dellvored on July 23* 1961*. Its adoption seems te have facilitated* during the 1959-62 period a modification in tho presentation of Canadian policy on non-diosemination* Instead of having to continue to insist that the problem of tho spread of nueleer weapons could only be offoetlvely dealt with in the context of a general ^if^ajraamcnt.ftgrocmant* it becaco possible to accept the eoncopt of en agreement on nen-diceeminotien as a pro-disarmament or collateral ceacure. Canada was enabled to proeo for tho early eonelusion of cuch a non-dlecemination agreement when tho CHBo eonvenod in Harsh* 1962* and to otress that agreement on tho matter should not b* postponed pending the consideration of core far reaching and eenplex concerns of nuclear disarmament. And'this was done without prejudice to our fundamental belief - or to our defence eommitssnto and piano - that It would bo unreasonable to expect non-nuclear states te bind themselves to on undertaking not to acquire nuclear weapons or have them otatlonod on thoir 000688 soil for purposes of eolf-defenoo in abseneo of progress toward diaarrrrt-ent, nro.rrocs which depended upon tho nuelear powers. * �11* The OATjf propocalD<*wriV«ioji£ifts<ia^e^ whether wo chould not ro-csacino Deurm<toaAoii*aeorfeispettiaxoi^ undertaking eo far as tho nuelear powers are ooneernod* Is I t essential to the acMovcocnt of our aint With tho paocago of (m*y I t has bcec~o clear that tho nuolcar pewcro do not intend v^ellow their nuclear wcaponn to eontributo to tho creation of further independent nuclear capabilitlea. Tho Oovict Union has evidently no intention of providing China with ouch weapons and there in no evidence that i t i s prepared even to enter into joint eontrol arrangc..:»nto with ito v?areaw Pact a l l i e s . Circumstances havo changed. Canadian defeneo polioy with respect t e nuclear weapons has been flrcly established* After tho Cuba oriole* a distinctly new phaeo in relations with tho Ooviot Onion has begun with tho cicnatttro of tho Partial Toot Can Treaty a l i t t l e over a year ago. Tho Soviet Onion and the Ghiiod States declared last f a l l that they would not orbit weapons of mass destruction and this spring thoy, together with Britain* stated their Intention to reduce the rato of production of fissionable material for weapons progress* Admittedly/of those undertakings constitutes ^hono disarmament. Thoy are at coat aeaauros of "nen-drnanent% but eo* for that matter* would bo an undertaking not to manufacture or acquire eontrol of nuclear wooponn. A.step of tbljuoature by-the- non-nuclear etateo eodld than bo hold to bo appropriate In tho current period. Of rath«* more importance to our mind, however* i o tho procpeet of tho development of nuelear capabilities by nonnuclear states. Such a development constitutes n greater threat to peaeo today than tha remote possibility of a nuclear power handing over eontrol of i t o nuclear weapene to a state which does cot possess them in l i e own right. Thuo* i f a non-nuclear aoa-acquloltion treaty would at this stage eontributo to leoeening tho danger of an increase in tho number of military nuclear powors* l t would seem advleablo to caeo our position somewhat with respect to tho neeocolty of a fully reciprocal undertaking binding on nuelear and non-nuclear states alike* 12. The substance of such a treaty would present no problem for Canada to the extent that wo aro already on record nationally aa<* internationally ao having renounced any intention of manufacturing nuelear weepono and authoritative statemento havo been tsado that wo do not eook solo (or national) control mcr cuch weapons. It l o our official position that the Ccnada-UDA bilateral agreement* which ceto out tho Cwndltiono undor which nuclear warheado willbo cado available for Canadian forces engaged i n north Aaorlean dofeneo an&cclgricd to C\?0, conforca with tho etand Canada has taken internationally oa tho nen-dioocmlnation of nuclear weapons* 13, On tho other hand* tho Cucolons are prone t e refute t h is eloln end i t i s eonooivablo that ceao nan-nuclear states night eventually ehallengo uo too. Ooatrol ote» tho weapons io "joint* rather than °noloB cr "national" only up to tho point of their relcece by the SOA to the Canadian forces in time of crtsrgeneyi after that* ao wo ourselves have eado abundantly and publicly clear* they ean bo uoed operationally only en orders from tho Canadian government* Ulticatoly* therefore, in theory at least* eontrol i s vectert in tho Canadian government. Than i t night well be argued that our adherence to a treaty by which wo would bo bound not to acquire control of nuelear weapons weald bo rather equivocal. Cho rojoindor that an emergency of tho kind envisaged would cot bo of o£r mfcicg and that in any event the OCA would not lightly rolinquieh to their a l l i e s their deelolon-caklcg petjcr °°°689 over tho use of Amorieon-nado nuclear weapono might not be nuffielentlT convincing in tho eirew«ntvv***«. �Uj,* Whether such a tittm^f nnmih^sit^^Mttivt^ t&fh%^stion Act i t S aim* t h a t Of reducing thO libl&&ll(C«l«ivOfu&Afa%&*m&oPketelesWmformation quiring an independent or national military nuclear capability through indigeneue nauufoeture of nuclear weapons* would depend j^jarily upon the adheronce of nuelearly significant states and, tSRuise it would contain no proviolon for verification of com* pllanoo* upon tho good faith in thich they took that atop. It ie currently estimated that in the foreseeable eircumetaneeo of the next ten years those states are* Belgium* Canada* Denmark* Federal Republic of Oormany* Italy* tho Bothorlande, fforway* Csoohoolovukia* the Soviet Zone of Oernany, Hungary* Poland, Yugoslavia, Austria* India, Israel, Japan* Sweden* Oaitaerland* and (possibly) the United Arab Bepublie. We should bo obliged to advocate universal adherence but It Is these few etoteo which, are of importance and net the macs of nuelearly undeveloped onoo Which oi£bt b© oxpeeted to sign with enthusiasm. 15, Although support for the Irish resolution in 1961 woo unanimous, it would oeea most unlikely that* in the final analysis* Chechoslovakia* the Soviet Seno of Oormany, Hungary or Poland (or oven Yugoslavia) could sign a treaty In the teres proposed in the OAB declaration. Thoy are now all primarily committed to a definition of non-dleseainatien which would prevent the movement of nuelear weapons beyond the border of nuelear etatoe and to tho concept of prohibiting non-nuclear states aeeeas to nuclear weapons directly cr indirectly through military allianeoe"* Their adherence would seriously weaken the Soviet eaeo against the TWP as it would signify thoir aceeptanoe of the western position that the nuclear charing arrangers ntc entered Into by tho USA with coot of ito 0\T0 cllioe/in harmony with tho terms of the Irish resolution. It is not to be oxpeeted$ however* that they would forgo exploiting tho propaganda advantages they could dorlvo from indications that tho Federal flopublic might not bo ready to ante?? into a treaty. SkenEl* in the framework of Woo tern European Union, ie bound to its Ltaropcan allies under tho Paris Agreemsnts of 195& not to manufacture ABC weapons* Assuming current political attitudes no lltely to prevail* there Is com© doubt whether tho FCfl, in the aleenoo of assurance that it would eontributo to progress towards the reunification of Oormany* would bo prepared to place iteolf again under such a disability, this time in a wider content which included its immediate neighbours in tho Warsaw Pact, One cannot be certain but it is conceivable that Japan might prefer, in anticipation or in tho light of an early demonstration of Communist Chinoco military nuclear capability* to remain committed to a polley which advoeatoe parallel progroee towards non-diocealnatlon on the part of both nuclear and non-nuclear powers* Thus, without entering into tho even more difficult consideration of whether In<*ia* Israel and Sweden - tho three stated whieh currently oro in a position to opt for a military nuelear pregrocme would bo likely to sign tho treaty (or at any rate do so without reservations), it would appear that the prospect of ceeuring tho coherence of any appreciable number of nuelearly significant etatoo io not good. 16. The attltudo of our BATO allies towards a treaty of thio nature would bo on Important factor in our reaching a decIrion whether euoh a treaty could be o pportcd. Britain end tho United States {on the basis of paragraph 5 above) eight be oxpeeted in all logic to favour tho idea of a treaty provldod, of eoureo, ite terms were not altorod} Corway and Bonsark to bo prepared to adhero without reservation] the Foderal Republic (to a greater) and Italy (to a lesser extent) tactically dotorninod to pestpono any dcelsion until thottLFhad been brought into boine position with which Turkey and probably Oreoee would eoneurt �the Netherlands suspicious that bjbdio^A^^fcagseWhed^rriea^e^n^/i/or/nof/on Host would bo playing into the hai^d&fdr*^e%*Mftas»pi dl»^ (and iLaxcmbourg) diepoced to think i t a good idea in principle but probably not prepared to take any i n i t i a t i ve in tho matter. A l a difficult to forecast i'ortugal*e attitude - probably cBenthuciastie - and Iceland*a i e of no practical consequence. Franco could bo oxpeeted t e have a carefully shaded opinion the principal eleacnto of which would bo that France was not a non-nuclear power an* thus was not directly concerned! on the other hand Franco did cot favour dieccnlnationj but France wan fearful leot negotiation of cuch on agreement* which started eut In the direction of tho Irish resolution* would develop in that of the Cwcdirh one with tho result that a largo part of western Europe weald sooner rather than later end up as a denuclearised Bono, tho Federal Bermblie neutralised and United States forces withdrawn - just as th© Hussions havo wanted for eo cany yearn. She cons ensue* i f sought* would thus probably bo unfavourable, at least at this juncture 17, Against the discouraging factors noted in pome 13* 15 and 16 eight bo cot the notion that a treaty eoneluded by the non-nuclear etoteo eould mean that after many years of otalcm&te some eoncerted movement had become possible in tho direction of tho deslrod aim of Halting the spread of independent military nuelear capability. Tho non-nuclear states having given proof of being alive to their own rosponsib i l i t l e o i n tho matter, tho preceure would bo on the nuclear powers to fellow cult. Support of tho idea of a treaty by members of tho Corth Atlantic Alliance mi^ht in particular eorve a useful purpose in creating confidence that their major ally* tbe United States* (which has already solemnly stated that i t will not act contrary to tre irich resolution) wao committed to doing everything In i t s power to prevent eontrol of nuclear weapons passing into the *-ande of non-nuclear states. If i t wero thought politically ueeful to do eo* the proposal for a treaty could bo conetrued ao a confidence building measure and regarded as a con tri tat ion to the relaxation of world tensions not for reaovod In kind from tho entcal example set by the United States* Britain and tho Coviot Union in announcing their intention to cut back tho production of fiesionable material for weapons purposes,. (It enet be r< cognised* however* that on unverifioblo agreement can equally be erltioieod no tending to ereato a false sens© of c county*) 18.. It can perhaps bo argued that the treaty on* vlcagod by tho OAU declaration could and Indeed would need to have eoco provision or protocol whoroby the nuclear powers could register thoir Intention to rcepoet and abide by" tho self-denying ordinance adopted by the non-nuclear otatca. Thus It would be in intent* i f not in language the equivalent of a reciprocal undertaking In tho manner of tho Irish resolution. Io any event i t could bo represented as a f i r s t step towards the eorclueion of a wider agroement embracing nuelear and non-nuclear powers alike* 19* The holding of on international or world conference on a particular aspect of disarmament or a topic closely allied thereto has boon regularly resisted by the tfesterc powero> The Canadian view has boon that tho product of eush eocferenoes would be of doubtful u t i l i t y and their convening would bo bound 000691 to detract from effort© in tho EGBO to negotiate binding agreements. An international eonferonee* tho pursoeo ©f whi^H wra^n* ** �"to Conclude" a treaty on tho teoS»crte*hbc\$^ tfirttot^iatynformation Act would havo to involve i t s e l f in fcb©jnoa>atlie«i©^i*o^ i t would bceeco a negotiating forum. As a result an important new platform would have been provided the Soviet bloc to adjehpoo their views oa the settlement of tho Oeraan problem and to ^Hlsouneo A-Ksriean nueloor woapocc charing arrangements upon Which tbe effectiveness of significant Allied contributions to tho effnative Cofenec of tho HATO area depends. Because the enabling UHJA resolution sought by tho OAU states could hardly be erpeetod to provide a completely rigid conceptual frame of reference for tho negotiations* the language of the undertaking proposed by the Africans - whieh io tho attractive element as far as wo ore concerned - night not bo retained. It i s possible also that eueh a eonfcrenco could overspill it© bounds completely and enter upon eeneidcration of o number of uinoleeme rolotod erasures eueh as the Ethiopian proposal for a ban on the one of nuclear weapons. 20* Macro Is the important consideration of tho composition of tho conference. It io assumed that too African© would eontenploto participation by each Important non-nuclear non-ncabers of tho United nations ao tho Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland* Attdndonco by the Soviet 2on© of Oormany (GE3) would present an insuperable obstacle far Western participants although, on tho analogy of tho Partial Test Ban Treaty* we* et least* would bo happy enough to havo tho Sua bound not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons* It i s not clear ufeotver It io envisaged that tho nuclear powers U£A, Britain, France, and CGiTi - chould participato in the eon* for once or where Communist China would bo regarded a© fitting into tho echece. 21* Substantial difficulties which we would fore* ceo involved in tho holding of an international conference might conceivably bo overcoae i f tho drafting of the treaty war© to be entrusted to a "non-nuclear cub-ooraitteo* of tho E3BC (in centradictlnetion to tho Cub-Commit too on a Treaty for the Biecontinuane© of Cuolcar ^capons Tests which i e eocpocod of the three nuelear pewere present at Geneva), It could bo considered a hopeful prospect, noroovcr* that of tho fourteen members of cuch a cubccaaittoo at least coven (Canada* Italy* BAB* Ethiopia* Bigcrla* Kexioo ard nrasll) eight bo aacuablo to maintaining tho language of the undertaking proposed by the OAU, As there i s no voting preeecduro In tho ETTO the -ootcrn non-nuclear combers could onsaro that a proposition unaeceptablo to them was not adopted in that forum* The ultlcato object of that sort of oxereieo would bo an acceptable treaty whieh would bo signed by a number of significant non-nuclear powers (possibly a l l tho members of the sub-committee) and opened for adherence by a l l othere without tho ecnvcnln„ of an international conference for tbat purpose* 22. The procedure of having a non-nuclear sub* corraitteo, or even tho full tho CTC* deal cobctantivoly with their proporal cay well not bo acceptable to tho Afrieane. I t i s prrlnpo Instructive in thie regard thatj although tho UAB representative referred in tho 207tb plenary on August 13 to tho CAU Pecloration on Atccie 'Jcapono, i t s text has not been circa** latcd in the snsc. She Africans are* in addition* fully aware that pro;a»ealo reforrod to tho XTDC by t>a CZOA can easily drop from public eight unices thero io a general will at Geneva t© exonlne them seriously. I t ie a matt or for eonjecturo whether 000692 tho OAU proposal (an£ the rolo currently being played by the CAR with respect to it) io cot coro inticately concerned with tho �BEST ORIGINAL AVAILABLE Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information MEILLEUR ORIGINAL * - S - problem of Arab-Israeli relatione than with tho aim of advancing more widespread neasaroe c o l l a t e r a l to disarmament* Oa tho other fean-3 i t cay te r^atly KinSowdrcasing for the 19th General Acerrsbly, on African I n i t i a t i v e a f t e r tho fashion of l a s t year*© Latin Anericttn ccc (eo tbe deauelcar lent ion of Latin Ameriea)* nevertheless l t will serve to focus discussion In Plenary and in t v a F i r s t Committee en the eubjeet of non-diescmication l a possibly a nore oanet m o t i v e fashion than night otherwise have been anticipated. 000693 ©ISAttT-tt: £3 BIVIGIOB* � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18114 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG