https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7ae317f1f435c9966efc33f30933d8ae.pdf 2967a2948fea4efddbdbc8ef5a035766 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act DocurJ^t6ivulg3e)*WB®tK4*te»P4/1yces a I'information AZr //- / ^ ECONOMIC DIVISI01I , - ^ ^ P,Tp DIVISIONAL DIARY S E C R E T Eirch 31* 1964 Defence Liaison (1) Division Your Esmorandun for tbe Minister of Karen 11 Application of IAEA Safeguards to Canadian nuclear Programme tie have examined with interest the imaginative and tie Unprepared proposal on this subject set out in your memorandum. He would endorse the objectives of the proposal and the arguments which you have advanced in favour of It. It is the purpose of this memorandum to enlarge upon various points union you have mentioned and which could require careful and detailed examination before a decision could be taken to proceed with the proposal. DISARRAHBtff DIVISION 2. In your memorandum you have commented on various points concerning tbe defence implications of tho proposal and we have no quarrel with your comments as far as they go. nevertheless, it seems to us that the proposal does have defence Implications for both the Immediate and the long-term future which will require very thorough study with regard to their Indirect as well as their direct effects. 3. Some of tbe points which we have in mind as deserving of very detailed study nay perhaps be best brought out by questions either rhetorical or factual. Would the proposed course of action have the Incidental effect of focusing additional and undesirable attention upon Canada«s acceptance of U.S. fabricated nuclear weapons? Could we, despite •/2 000670 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET - 2 - our acceptance of nuclear weapons under joint control, convincingly present the proposed action ao a significant stop in tho direction of restricting the spread of nuclear weapons? Is it In fact tho case, as your memorandum suggests, that our possession of nuclear weapons under joint control would not give rise to complications following a request to the IAEA to apply inspection to "all Canadian nuclear facilities"? 4. The points suggested by these questions are more or less political in nature. There are othor more practical questions which have also occurred to us. Among thoso are the followingi 1) The imposition of international Inspection would expose not only potential military secrets but also processes of undoubted commercial value. While the IAEA, in developing its safeguards programme, must have developed methods for dealing with this problem, can we be sure that its arrangements would provide satisfactory protection of Canadian commercial interests involved? 2) Apart from establishments accommodating nuclear weapons under joint control and tbe lease of facilities at chalk River for U.S. and U.K. use, are there not other nuclear activities either present or which might be undertaken on Canadian territory by other powers? (We have in mind, for example, the possibility of U.S. use of "portable" nuclear pouer plants in tbe Arctic.) 3} Would there be difficulties concerning reception in Canadian ports of vessels either nuclear powered or equipped with nuclear weapons? Would there be problems about overflight of Canadian territory or landing at Canadian air fields of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons? /3 000671 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T 3 - 4) ttilltary applications of nuclear science are not limited to weapons as such, i.e. devices designed either to produce an explosion or to disseminate radio activity, nuclear propulsion units for ships are already in sorvice and nuclear reaction engines are under examination for aircraft and missiles. It is indeed suggested in tbe recent White Paper on Dafenco that Canada might undertake the construction of nuclear propulsion units for submarines. These activities are and will presumably remain classified. To what extent would this create a problem, in view of the fact tbat development and construction of propulsion units for military purposes would probably be carried out by Canada Independently? 5. With regard to the precise text of your memorandum, It appears to be implied In paragraphs 11 and 13 that Canada does not at present require In connection with exports of nuclear equipment and materials safeguards "equivalent to an IAEA standard"• It was our impression that, apart perhaps from some uncertainty about equivalents of standards,Canada does In fact require safeguards in connection with such exports except to tbe U.S. and the U.K., and that it Is for this reason that earlier French feelers concerning tbe supply of uranium did not lead to agreement. If our Impression Is correct tho course of action proposed, except as applied to exports to the United States and tho United Kingdom, would represent a continuation of present policy rather than an innovation. 6. You have suggested that a logical forum for further examination of those ideas would be tho Advisory Panel on Atoaic Energy. While we do not know how active the Panel has been in recent years, our understanding of its membership and terms of reference would lead us to support . . . /4 000672 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T • 4 - this suggestion. In this connection we assume that the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Defence Reaearcb Board continue to be members of this Panel, as they were some years ago. Defence Liaison (1) Division 000673 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18108 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG