https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ddc4140011b2837aac95671b1fb798d7.pdf ca3ccf68b8727a8472fb3b1168a2cc02 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces g/'Information <t& M' House Republican Policy Committee Rooo-1040 Hew House Office Building JV3121, ext. fiL68 ' BEST ORIGINAL AVAILABLE MEJlLEUfi ORIGINAL Subcommittee on apedal Projects m Back Farce on HftTO Unity .• First Report '.•*% • • • :. "» The Tstk Force on HATO Unity, appointed early In tha first session of tho 66th Congress by Rep, John J. Rhodes, Chairman of the Policy Cosmlttee'a Sutteconlttee on Special Projects, operates under the Chairmanship of Rep. Albert Hirotate of Minnesota. p It Is the function of this task force to conduct a thorough study of the condition of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with particular emphasis on the state of unity that prevails within the organisation. Further, the Task Force has the responsibility Jto make recommendationa, concerning: means Jby which the Alliance can be strengthened and mads more effective. Serving as cambers' of the Task Force are the foiaewing-Republican members of the House: Ross Adair, John Baldwin, James Cleveland, Thomas B. Curtis, Robert Ellsworth, Gerald R. Ford, Charles Ooodell, Hastings Keith, Rogers Morten, Alexander Plrnle and Paul Flndley. - #• Ibc Task Force has been meeting with experts In various areas that touch heavily upon NATO. Admiral Arlelgh Burke, USH (ref), former Chief of fiavnl Operations and General Laurls Norstad, USAF'(ret*), former NATO Commander discussed both Military and Political problems in NATO. Officials of the Embassy of the German Federal Republic provided the Task Farce with a valuable Insight Into.the thinking of a HATO partner. Former Secretary of State, Christian Herter,. now chief trade negotiator of the Administration discussed at great length the eccsoaic aspects of the problems facing the Alliance. This aspect of the problem woo also examined before the Task Force by Hon* Gabriel- Hauge, former chief economic advisor to President Elsenhower. Clarence Streit, the distinguished Editor of Freedom and Union, and the leading proponent of Atlantic Union generously gave his ties far a discussion of the Atlantic Union proposal as it applies to SATO* •=•- **.-2fie Stack Force culmlfSatea^its Current study with a? lengthy discussion* s with .'farcer President Elsenhower. General Eisenhower, tt NATO's First cozaander, sucked.NATO end forged lt into a tightly unified weapon In the cold war. His views and opinions, freely expressed to the Task Force, gave us an understanding of the cany problexs that today plague NATO that no other American could hove offered. * '* •• •••».. Oat of ell of these diverse consultations has come a dearer underctnndirig of the problems that beset the Alliance, although much work remain* to be torn before the Teak Farce will consider itself qualified to Issue a final report* • Aeons the conclusions already reached by the Task Farce is that sicet bcaie fact that the Alliance is in a_gtate of dangerous djsajxsy. Every single expert oon*wlt*d prefaced hi* renarka~to~tAe '.Cask Faroe vith a recognition of this- fact* *^x!?*^~^ 000633 �g# BEST ORIGINAL AVMlLABLt Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act- U n i \ £tlft ORiu^WMr Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information The Task Force, as a r e s u l t of t h i s f a c t , has sought I n i t i a l l y t o 1. 2. The basic causes of t h i s d i s a r r a y Methods by vhich the problem of d i s u n i t y can he overcome The Task Force has made two s p e c i f i c reccEmendations in l i n e with objective #2, The f i r s t of these recommendations d e a l t with the establishment of t h e "hot l i n e " between the United S t a t e s and Moscow. - 'nl . I t wa6 the conclusion of the Task Force t h a t the b i - l a t e r a l (and s e c r e t ) negotiations between the United S t a t e s and the Soviet Union have cont r i b u t e d g r e a t l y t o disunity i n NATO, lhere are many i n d i c a t i o ns t b a t our a l l i e s look askance upon these negotiations which, a t the very l e a s t , provide fuel for suspicion and sow the seeds of t h a t alliance-deadening a t t i t u d e among the several NATO p a r t n e r s . < • • • ' * • ' <-9 * «? The "hot line" to Moscow, providing as It does a direct means of secret communication between tbe two great protagonists of the cold war can only serve to exacerbate the tensions that already exist between the U. S. and its NATO partners. £) k^A S^&t^vu, <&> ^U^t^t? - 7^^<. fak^u*-t/S •?<- O-SSZ. U ^ < w ^ The Task Force therefore recommended to President Kennedy that our NATO allies he "cut-In" on the "hot line." Under this arrangement all communications wheeled over the "hot line" would be simultaneously received in the several NATO capitals thus eliminating any cause for suspicion among the NATO nations. co^Zie^- ditaUAT^^-C, "SZL O-S&U^C »r ~tC^L*'UoT U^ut," u-c^-Z-a-i^ 7KL-£/£•££.. The Task Force received a reply to this suggestion from the Secretary of State. In the opinion of the Task Force the reply was not entirely responsive to the proposal and failed to change our attitude on this matter. We therefore reiterate cur proposal that all NATO member-nations be "cut-in" on the "hot line" between Washington and Mo6COw.<&)<&J^^i'2K^' tseuCTZTln i*zr't/J"Zy-t/*^<^Zl ^ ^icM^,^. JJT^*- a Jet* Ifa- 7-^o-^de^T tW-e/*^ /hAA<J~<!^*t*f^ The second of our recommendations came on the eve of the/Presidential announcement that the United States was prepared to sell surplus American wheat to the Soviet Union and the Soviet-bloc nations. It was, and remains, our opinion*that this act lnvb3?ved* the matter of1 * economic warfare and thus, that it involved all of our NATO partners. The President however, has ostensibly made his decision to sell this commodity strictly en a unilateral basis. And this despite the fact that the very charter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization recognizes quite clearly the need for consultation and cooperation In matters economic in recognition of the fact that such matters play a vital part in the cold war. We therefore recommended that President Kennedy call for the establish" ment of a committee within NATO to study the matter of economic warfare and to act as a regulatory body empowered to restrict trade between NATO and the Soviet Bloc (when such restrictions appear to be to the advantage of NATO in the cold P _ ~*fc~6s£un*~ • ~t& {Ci6Tdf//cAA~. VZuZyz aZCLtv •***• <£*™~«- - We are gratified to note that this recomnendation has been partially implemented through the medium of the current NATO conference now taking place In Paris on this very subject. It is our hope that this conference will produce 000634 �Docum^lglfsqJJfl^iW^rA^e'AASi^fo'/n/ormof/o/i Act \ j , Document div^g^e t ^^erf^gf|4^/sur/'occescr I'information -3- 7J^^ a firm agreement on the subject of trade with the Soviet Bloc Which will set forth necessary guidelines that will as far as possible eliminate any Bast-West trade that could prove beneficial to the Soviet Union In its never-ending drive to conquer all mankind. Aside from the above-mentioned recommendations the Task Force has reached certain conclusions. They are: 1, One of the paramount causes of disunity in NATO at this time appears to arise from the efforts of the Administration to secure a "detente," or an "accommodation" between the United States and the Soviet-Union. NATO is, after all, primarily a military alliance. Like all such alliances itJ Unrooted in a cauie common to all of 1 % members. In this case the common cause that united the members of NATO was the recognition of the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union towards Western Europe. Whenever the cold war gives the appearance of "thawing? the apparent danger from the Soviets seems to abate. Whenever this happens the common cause Is correspondingly diminished. "72v^ySr£- <^<ii«^/*^M."^z / ( ^ t K ^ w / A / w ^ At-^^vK^ t%° dLA#ytot><-*- a/t&w^ u~ i* t&y/rc^J«y7~7 ' At this time the United States is embarked unilaterally upon a nearcrusade to alleviate the "tensions" which -exist between ourselves and the Soviets, In order to Justify this effort-Justification being politically necessary since the public knows -full well that similar efforts in the past have all come to disastrous ends—officials of the Kennedy Administration have given widespread publicity to their belief that Soviet dedication to the goal of world conquest is rapidly fading away. -As a result of this fact it is only natural that our allies should relax somewhat In their attitudes vis-a-vis the Soviet threat. After all, NATO exists only because of the Soviet threat. If that threat seems to have diminished substantially then the apparent need for NATO seems to diminish correspondingly. It Is not beyond reason to believe therefore, that any outward signs the Soviets might permit the free world to behold that a "mellowing" process is underway In the heartland of communism might be deliberately put on display with the sole purpose of causing disarray within NATO. 2. Another cause of disunity In NATO has been the methods by which we have, In the past two and one-half years, dealt with our allies. Time and again, by thoughtless and insensitive actions we have offended and even injured HATO partners. " S W ^ ^ E * ^ <*. c&t***^ olas.*JfeZub± t/ctA/^y^A <J°~6Z*STQ*, A*^y The case of the Skybolt controversy is an 'excellent example of the sort of thing we are discussing. In this Instance we took what most experts assure ua was a necessary action but we took that action in a manner that almost seemed calculated to produce the damaging effects it had upon the political fortunes of the British Government and upon the state of British-American relationships. ^- �sfS |f£S* s,^ ^^ p Docgfcglt QiBcfosltf underJJjaVlccett to Information Act Documentri>rUl|j<yfti QsmJ'aela Loi sur I'acces a I'information y^i>' " During our recent consultations with various experts In the f i e l d \9fy word-—"lnsensitivity" cropped up time and again. I t i s the most u n a t t r a c t i v e aspect of our method of diplomacy and u n t i l the Administration recognizes the need for honesty and open and above-board dealings with our a l l i e s i t w i l l remain so. NATO was founded as a partnership of equals. I n i t i a l l y most of i t s member-nations, crippled and worn by years of warfare, were forced t o depend upon the United States for both m i l i t a r y and economic support. But even In t h i s period every effort was made by the United States t o respect the independence of i t s partners and t h e i r r i g h t s t o hold t h e i r own opinions. Now, when Western Europe has undergone a near-miraculous recovery and i s capable of standing upon i t s cvn f e e t , we have suddenly begun t o act i n a manner t h a t suggests t h a t we do not regard our NATO a l l i e s as equal partners but instead as 'mirnfons who should*do our bidding Withou^questlon. /*Zc*> ^CoU**^ ti, __ Before NATO can be restored t o i t s former s t a t e of unity we must once *^*again recognize the equality of our partnership and act accordingly. This would preclude petty and peevish complaints by United States o f f i c i a l s voiced publicly against one or another of our a l l i e s . I t would require patient negot i a t i o n of differences designed t o a l l e v i a t e those tensions t h a t are bound t o crop up among even the closest of a s s o c i a t e s . 3. The question of the possession and control of nuclear weapons i s e s s e n t i a l l y a p o l i t i c a l one because of the fact t h a t i t has become a -symbol of National sovereignty. I t must be d e a l t with therefore within t h i s context. %k^ On the subject of large retalllatory nuclear weapons-the heart of the Western deterrence-we are of the opinion that patient and careful negotiations could bring about an arrangement that would satisfy the desires and needs of our HATO partners. Such an arrangement might well Include a provision whereby the full NATO council would set forth the broad situational outlines that would govern the use of these weapons, A small executive coinnittee composed of the present nuclear powers (U.S., Britain and France) would have the function of deciding whether or not any immediate situation fell within these outlines. We/are of the opinion that smaller tactical (or so-calSed "battle- '"' 9 ' field") nuclear weapons have a strategic value of a magnitude which would tadicate that they should be thought of in terms of conventional weaponry and not as weapons of retslliatlen for massive nuclear *attack. We therefore recommend that weapons of this type be made available to our NATO partners as part of the NATO force to be kept within their care, custody and control. We believe that this recomtaendation is of prime importance in view of the considered withdrawal of substantial numbers of U.S. trooos now stationed In Europe, Indeed, we are convinced that no significant withdrawal should be contemplated until such a step is taken, O^ zfcts c^Z^Z <hu>d- «_ ' We can find no reason why such an arrangement could not be loade. ^ <*>*** After all, the keystone In the NATO arch is and must continue to be mutual trust and good faith. Sharing tactical nuclear weapons with our partners would be a ' clear recognition of our trust and faith In them and go a long way towards strengthening the alliance. 000636 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - .f ^ Document divggg^ena&rtu,de la Lpisuflaaes a I'information j 5 "_ miBiR ORIGINAL h* Economic tensions between NATO nations which are caused by factors outside the framework of NATO exert serious strains upon the Alliance. Trade disagreements arising out of the normal give and take of free world. commerce become more serious in the light of the fact that the econcnicallydisagreelng nations are militarily inter-dependent in the NATO alliance. It is therefore of paramount importance that every effort be exerted by all NATO member states to avoid whenever possible disputes of this nature. In line with our earlier recoinnendaticn that a committee on economic warfare be established it might be well to consider endowing such a committee with the additional responsibility of preventing econcmic disputes between member nations whenever possible. Of all of the above conclusions perhaps the^most important is that contained in number one above. We believe that every effort must be made to keep in focus at all times the fact that Soviet attempts to conquer the world have not abated and will not abate as long as the Soviet Union remains wedded to communism. As long as this factor remains uppermost in the minds of the NATO nations the need for close cohesion within NATO will do much towards diminishing the importance of the differences which periodically arise between the NATo states. In the words of Gabriel Hauge, "Tbe strength of NATO waxes and wanes with the changes of attitude towards the West by the Soviets." When the Soviets smile NATO disintegrates; when they sneer NATO draws closer together. • ^ «!~ «—- . . . . . . . „ .... .„». 4 .. ^j. . _ - -~«- tf -«• 4»- 000637 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW18092 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Defence - Conventional and Nuclear Armaments - Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RG25-A-3-c, File number: 27-11-1, File part: 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP A-2017-00249 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Crown Copyright Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource ENG