https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/258249f727135a166b173abe6c8a806e.pdf 7e72156b73a53a6568dd832010cb664e PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project LAC ATIP A-2018-00088 LAC RG24 Vol. 20855 File 7-26-9 Part 10 JIC Assessment The Soviet Threat to North America, 1959-1971 CANUS-59 59-05-14 Note: There are no pages numbered 42 and 43 in this document, but it does not appear that any text is missing. Paragraph 95 on p. 41 is followed by paragraph 96 on p. 45 (p. 44 is blank). �I Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi ur P cc"—Sb Pinformation n TOP SECRET CANADA- UNITED TATE• INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE r A003684711 I �cumen . ivu gue i• TOP SECRET THE SOVIET THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA 1959-1971 CANADA-UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (U) (CANUS-59) NOTE: The Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee and the U. S., Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the attached estimate for use by appropriate authorities of Canada and the United States. Final approval was recorded on 14 May 1959. TOP SECRET A0036847117-000855 I �Document disclosed under the Access to information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformation i 1 i TOP SECRET TABLE OF CONTENTS THE SOVIET THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA 1959-1971 Page OBJECT 1 SCOPE 1 CONCLUSIONS 3 SECTION I - GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 7 SECTION II THREAT FROM AIRCRAFT 11' SECTION III THREAT FROM MISSILES 29 SECTION IV ELECTRONIC WARFARE 45 SECTION V - SECTION VI SECTION VII - SECTION VIII - 49 OTHER THREATS 55 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformation TOP SECRET THE SOVIET THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA 1959-1971 OBJECT 1. To assess the Soviet Threat to North America during the period 1959 to 1971. SCOPE 2.. This estimate covers three time periods as follows: the short-range period (mid- 1959 to mid- 1960); the mid- range period ( mid- 1960 to 1963-1964); and the long-range period ( 1963-1964 through 1971). The forms and scales of attack are provided for the years 1959-1960 and 1963 to 1964 and to the extent practicable for the long-range period. TOP SECRET A0036847119-000857 �Document disclosed under the Access to information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformation TOP SECRET CONCLUSIONS A. GENERAL 3. An attack against North America involving Soviet military forces can be expected only in a general war, or as an attempted surprise attack that would initiate general war. 4. The Soviet leaders might decide to initiate general war during the progress of a limited war, during a period of intense international crisis or in a period of comparative international calm, although the last possibility is considered the least likely. They are making a gigantic effort to bring about conditions under which general war could occur without the USSR's receiving unacceptable damage, and it is not inconceivable that at some time during the period of this estimate they may conclude-- rightly or wrongly--that they have attained such a position of decisive military superiority. However, the Soviet leaders do not, in our view, intend deliberately to initiate general war; they wish, on the contrary, to avoid serious risk of such war. Despite the acquisition of long-range missiles capable of striking the United States, the Soviets probably believe that the scale, of damage they would suffer in a general nuclear war would be too risky to accept. ( This judgment presumes, among other things, the continued maintenance and improvement of Allied armed strength and the absence of an unforeseen Soviet technological breakthrough of major military significance. ) Moreover, they appear to be confident that the final victory of communism which they are determined to achieve is inevitable, and to be accomplished through political and economic forms of struggle, and through types of ;military action which they consider as posing no great risks to themselves. The Soviet leaders would almost ,certainly not decide to precipitate general war unless they concluded that conceding a position to the West would sooner or later threaten the survival of their regime. They would undoubtedly initiate a general war, however, if they were convinced that the United States was irrevocably committed to the early launching of an all-out nuclear attack against the USSR. , 5. In planning for general war, the Soviet leaders must relate strategically desirable objectives to what is tactically feasible with forces at their disposal. They probably would adopt as far as possible the following general course of action for the Bloc: a. As the highest priority, initially to employ its strengths to attempt the destruction or neutralization of Allied forces capable of causing immediate and significant damage to Bloc warmaking strengths. .b. To employ its strengths, as appropriate, to destroy, neutralize, or reduce the effectiveness of other Allied forces- in- being by ground, air and naval action. c. ' To employ its strengths, as appropriate, to destroy, neutralize or capture Allied war- supporting strengths. TOP SECRET 3 i A0036847120-000858 �Document disclosed under t a Access t o information Act - ---Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pocces it Pinformotion TOP SECRET TOP -SECRET d. To employ the strengths considered necessary to ensure the continued security • of the Bloc and especially of the USSR.' 6. In planning for an attack against the North American contin ent, th e Soviets undoubtedly would seek to maximize their chance of securiii'g surprise, consistent with the necessary weight o fatt ac k. Th e Sov iet planners would probably select as objectives for attack the following ( not necessarily listed in order of selection for attack): a. Nuclear retaliatory forces -and facilities. b. Control centers from which direction is provided for governmental actions, continental defense and retaliatory offensive operations. c. B. Population, transportation and communication centers. 12. The USSR has developed an operational pattern with their'submarine force which would allow them to have stationed off the East and West coast of North America a small number of submarines for use in the initial stages of general war. It is estimated that this force would be composed primarily of such guided missile` submarineq as are available, used in conjunction with air- craft in the initial attack. There would -also be at sea in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans a significant number of torpedo attack submarines capable of attacking- naval forces and shipping soon after the initial attack is accomplished. AIRCRAFT, MISSILE AND SUBMARINE THREATS 1963-1964 1959-1960 13. .7. The USSR would place. chief reliance for attacks against North America upon aircraft carrying nuc lear wea pons supp lemente d by such ballistic missiles and guided missile submarines as are available. Guided missile submarines' would probably be employed to launch missiles with nuclear warheads against targets along the coast, with the Atlantic seaboard receiving the bulk of the attack: Ballistic missiles would probably be directed against area targets in North America. 8. It is believed that the whole of th e ava il a bl e heavy bomber force p lus a substantial portion of the medium bomber forc e o fLong -Range A v iat ion wouldbe employed against North American targets. As an example for planning purposes, it is estimat ed th a t ( di sregar di ng combat attrition); the USSR in mid- 1959 could put a combination of about 500 heavy- and medium bombers over continental North America in an attack designed to achieve' surprise. A majority of the strike aircraft launched would necessarily be on one-way missions. i 9. Soviet employment of a small surprise bomber-force ( sneak attack) to be followed by the main body of the assault is regarded as a possible but relatively unlikely course of action. Should a sneak attack be detected enroute or fail- to any significant de gr ee , Nor th A mer ican de fenses would be at! a maxi- ' mum alert for combatting additional Soviet forces and attacks on the USSR by retaliatory forces would be set in motion. 10. While so me heavy bomber operat ions could be- mounted from home bases, the USSR would have to use forward bases in Kola, the Central Arctic, Chukotski and Kamchatka for mounting most initial medium and heavy bomber attacks against North America. Additional-bases elsewhere in the.Bhoc could be used after the initial considerations. of surprise no- longer ekisted.' 4 11. The USSR would probably plan to the maximum extent possible to penetrate all Allied radar screens simultaneously, and to take the greatest advantage of the hours of darkness for their missions against North America. Some portion of the aircraft would probably be employed as specialized ECM aircraft for diversi on an d deco y purposes. I T'Of -SEC R-E-T By mid- 1963, So v iet gu id e d m iss il e capa biliti es w ill pro ba bl y allow extensive reliance on ICBM's for the delivery of nuclear weapons against North American targets. Manned bombers would be available in sizeable numbers, however, and would probably be employed to , supplement missile attacks. Submarine- launched missiles will probably contribute significantly to the Soviet assault. In spite of reliability and accuracy factors, the inherent speed of delivery- and relative invulnerability of the ICBM render this weapon a most likely choice for initiating the assault on North America. The timing of the diversified operations likely to make up the Soviet attack would pose extremely complex problems to Soviet planners. To the extent practicable, however, they probably would plan to place ICBM's on target at the time Soviet bombers were penetrating Allied radar screens. By such tactics, the USSR would hope to pin down Allied defenses and retaliatory forces until the bomber attack arrived over its targets. Soviet bombers would probably utilize air- to- surface missiles against the more heavily defended targets. Soviet guided missile submarines would probably be•employed in both the Atlantic and Pacific against North American land targets within missile range._ Limited numbers of submarine- launched missiles could also be directed against the Gulf coast. The effectiveness of USSR submarine attacks, including those on shipping and naval forces in North American waters, will be increased by the advances made in nuclear propulsion and advanced weapons. 1964-1971 14. During this period, the Soviet long-range weapons system inventory will probably come to include ample numbers of improved ICBM's and other advanced missiles including submarine- launched types, manned bombers, and large numbers of nuclear weapons for all purposes and with a wide variety of. yields. It could also include advanced- performance manned winged vehicles capable of hypersonic speeds, with ranges of from -6,'000 n. m. ' to global, and possibly capable of weapons delivery, and/or other radically new weapon systems. The Soviets will have markedly improved capabilities in communications, TOP SECRET 5 A0036847121-000859 �Document disclosed under the Access to In)ormotion Act- -Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'occes it Pinformotion TOP -SE-CRET TOP SECRET and in electronic warfare including many types of decoys and jamming techniques. The likely form and' scale of a Soviet attack.on North America during the latter part of this period may be generally described as involving the launching of large numbers of improved ICBM's as the- primary means of attack'$ supplemented by advanced guided missile submarines and advanced bomber and air- launched missile attacks. Nuclear submarines with advanced weapons will probably be on stations in North American waters from the outset: C. OTHER THREATS .15.. It is estimated that the initial_ attack on North America would en tail little threat of -am..hibious operations beyond commando- type raid s aga i ns t selected targets in the Aleutians, the coast of.Alaska north of Bristol Bay, and even possibly against -parts of Canada and continental United States. These raids would most probably be launched from submarines. 16:.- It is considered unlikely that the .Soviet Union would attempt sizeable airborne operations against North America at'least in the early stages of a nuclear war"', although airborne operations on a small scale against isolated... points in Alaska and the Aleutians would be a probable course of action. Airborne operations against Northern Canada, Greenland and Iceland are considered improbable. 17. Sabotage and subversion both by known and anonymous local Commu nists, and sympathizers and by trained saboteurs are probable -after the out_' break of war. The means of sabotage could include BW and CW agents, and limited numbers of nuclear weapons. Espionage would be carried out by trained and integrated " illegal res id en ts ". Th e sca le o fa ll these operations would, however, be limited by countermeasures, . fear of prejudicing surprise, and by'the effects of the nuclear exchange itself. SECTION I GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS A. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH WAR INVOLVING ATTACK ON.NORTH AMERICA MAY COMMENCE 18. An attack against North America involving Soviet military forces can be expected only in a general war, or as an attempted surprise attack that would initiate general war. :19,. The Soviet leaders might decide to initiate general war during the progress of a limited war, during a period of intense international crisis or in a period of comparative international calm, although the last possibility is considered the least likely. They are making a gigantic effort to bring about conditions under which general war could occur without the USSR's receiving unacceptable damage, and it is not inconceivable that at some time during the period of this estimate they may conclude-- rightly or wrongly-- that they- have attained such a position of decisive military superiority. However, the Soviet leaders do not, in our view, intend deliberately to initiate general war; they wish, on the. contrary, to avoid serious risk of suc h war . Despite the acquisition of long-range missiles capable of striking the Unit e d Stat es , th e Sov iets probably believe that the scale of damage they would suffer'in a general nuclear war would be too risky to accept. ( This judgment presumes, among other things, the continued maintenance and improvement of Allied armed strength and the absence of an unforeseen Soviet technological breakthrough of major military significance. ) Moreover, they appear to be confident that the final victory of communism which they are determined to achieve is inevitable, . and to be accomplished through political an d economic forms o f struggle, and through types of military action which they consider as posing. no great risks to themselves. The Soviet leaders would almost certainly not. decide to precipitate general war unless they concluded that conceding a position to the West would sooner or later threaten the survival of their regime. They would undoubtedly initiate a general war, however, if they were convinced that the United States was irrevocably committed to the early launching of an all-out nuclear attack against the USSR. 20. It is considered almost certain, once the Soviet leaders had decided to initiate general war, that they would initiate it by surprise nuclear attacks with the primary objective of destroying or neutralizing Western nuclear retaliatory capabilities both in North America and overseas. With foreseeable Bloc air defense capabilities, the Soviet leaders would probably estimate that only by achieving surprise with a significant force could they hope to reduce to acceptable proportions the nuclear retaliation which would be launched against the USSR by Western forces. Consequently, preparations and redeployment of forces which, in the Soviet leaders' judgment, might give warning of their' decision to proceed to general war, would have to be held to a minimum in order to avoid premature disclosure of their intentions. However, their high degree of internal security and the international situation at the time might lead the Soviets to believe that they could carry out a considerable amount of 6 ' TOP_ -SEC RET TOP..SECRET 7 A0036847122-000860 �Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces it Pinformotion TOP SECRET TOP SECRET preparation and redeployment without; vitiatiiig their attempts to achieve surprise. Over a period of time, such activities could also be built into the patterns of routine military ac ti v ity for the purpose of disguising Bloc intentions. However, it is probable that, immediately prior to initiation of general war, they would feel obliged to hold to an absolute minimum any further preparations or redeployments they considered might disclose that decision. Thus, the outbreak of general war would probably find the USSR at a state of military readiness beyond that of ordinary peacetime, but ° short• -of what Soviet planners might believe best for the most rapid exertion of their total military effort. B. _(2) Allied lines of communications, especially to prevent the projection overseas of warmaking strengths located in North America. C. To employ its st ren gths, as appropriate, to des tor y, neu t ra li ze or capture Allied war- supporting strengths including: Economic and industrial resources. Political and governmental control resources. SOVIET WORLD-WIDE STRATEGY Scientific and technological resources. 21. Whatever the conditions which exist at the time of a Soviet decision to initiate general war, it is estimated they will attempt to minimize warning time for an atomic attack on North Americs. and upon Allied nuclear retaliatory forces and bases wherever located. The d•gree of warning afforded will depend in large measure upon the existing stalte of international relations and the Western state of . readiness and reaction to the deployments of forces which might have occurred previously. 22. Soviet leaders probably believe that the leaders of the United States and its Allies do not intend deliberately to initiate general war. They probably now consider that general war would most likely grow out of miscalculations by either side, neither of which originally intended its respective actions to result in general war. Therefore, even though they now almost certainly desire to avoid such a war, they cannot ignore the possibility that it might de= velop, and their planners must prepare for it. 23. In planning for general war, the Soviet leaders must relate strategically desirable objectives to what is tactically feasible with forces at their disposal. They probably would adopt as far as possible the following general course of action for the Bloc: a. As the highest priority, initially to employ its strengths to attempt the destruction or neutralization of Allied forces capable of causing immediate' and significant damage to Bloc warmaking strengths. More specifically to: (1) Launch attacks designed to destroy Allied nuclear attack forces using all appropriate forces, weapons and delivery systems. (2) Defend the Bloc territory against nuclear attack. b. To employ its strengths, as appropriate, to destroy, neutralize, or reduce the effectiveness of other Allied forces- in- being by ground, air and naval action. Such actions probably would be planned for initiation as soon ,as possible consistent with an attempt to achieve surprise in initial Soviet assaults on Allied. retaliatory forces. As appropriate, they would be launched against: I (1) Allied military strengths in Europe, the United Kingdom, the Middle East and the Far East. 8 I TOP SECR'ET- Psychological resources. d. To employ the strengths considered necessary to ensure the continued security of the Bloc and especially of the USSR. C. SOVIET STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES IN RELATION TO ATTACK ON NORTH AMERICA AS OPPOSED TO ATTACK ON OTHER AREAS (GENERAL TARGET CONSIDERATIONS) 24. In planning for an attack against the North American continent, the Soviets undoubtedly would seek to maximize their chance of securing surprise, consistent with the necessary weight of attack. - It is believed that further preparations and deployment of Bloc forces beyond that which had already occurred as a result of the international situation would be kept to a minimum to avoid compromising the initial attacks, and in addition, the Soviets might even take steps designed to reduce the fears and apprehensions of the West. 25. For an operation against the North American Continent, the Soviet planners would probably select as objectives for attack the following (not necessarily listed in order of selection for attack): a. Nuclear retaliatory forces and facilities. b. Control centers from which direction is provided for governmental actions, continental defense and retaliatory offensive operations. c. Population, transportation and communication centers. Soviet planning would probably seek to achieve the maximum effect on targets listed in b and c above as bonu's effect from attack of nuclear retaliatory forces and facilities.' However, some of the control centers and population and communications centers probably would be prime targets in the initial phase because of the psychological effect which the Soviets might expect to achieve, as well as to further the disruption and destruction of nuclear capabilities and other warmaking strengths located in North America. 26. Against Nuclear Attack Capabilities. The nuclear attack capabilities of the U. S. and its Allies are such that in reaching their decision to initiate TOP SECRET 9 A0036847123-000861 �Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'occes it Pinformotion TOP SECRET TOP SECRET general war, the Soviet leaders must surely feel compelled to assess the possibilities of their initial attack reducing the Allied nuclear retaliation to an extent which could prevent unacceptable damage to the USSR. It is reasonable to assume that the Soviet planners would consider their most important objective to be the destruction of U. S. and other Western nuclear retaliatory ca= pabilities. It can be assumed that the Soviets are adequately informed as to the location of nuclear retaliatory facilities in North America. Furthermore, the Soviets probably estimate that the number and types of such facilities will increase substantially during the -period of this Estimate: They would, therefore, have to assess carefully the probable effectiveness of: a. Initial Bloc offensive operations against Allied nuclear forces wherever located. b. The Bloc air defense system. 27. Against Industrial, Population and Political Centers. The Soviets probably believe that attacks on governmental and military control centers would so seriously disrupt governmental and military activities as to justify primary attack against some of-these targets. It may well be that the Soviet planners would expect to achieve significant results leading to a reduction of U: S. and Canadian warmaking strenghts, including the ability to apply military force overseas, by attacking population concentrations and communication and transportation centers. They might also conclude that the psychological reaction to tremendous casualties and widespread destruction inherent in such attacks would greatly weaken the U. S. and Canadian will to resist. The number of area targets the Soviet leaders may attack will depend upon the forces they have- available after the requirements of retaliatory targets have been met and upon the level of destruction which they consider necessary. - They would probably appreciate that attacks on 50-60 area targets would bring under attack nearly 50 percent of North American population and about 60 percent of North American industry and communications facilities. 28. Outside North America. The Soviet leaders would probably select as objectives western nuclear retaliatory capabilities throughout the world (including naval forces with nuclear capabilities); control centers from which direction is provided for governmental and military action; and industrial and population centers. Most of these targets will be within range of " Soviet shortrange weapons systems and will not compete 'for weapons with the campaign against North America. However, the Soviet leaders probably will allot some of their medium- range systems to attacks on these targets. SECTION II THREAT FROM . AIRCRAFT A. LONG-RANGE AVIATION 29. Soviet Long- Range Aviation ( LRA) ( Dalnyaya Aviatsiya) is composed of Long- Range Aviation headquarters, three long-range air armies, an independent bomber corps and units of undetermined subordination in Western USSR. Long- Range Aviation is primarily a medium bomber force, best suited for operations against targets in and peripheral to Eurasia and is currently capable of large-scale attacks against North America only through extensive use of one-way missions. About four- fifths of LRA aircraft are based in the area, west of Moscow between Leningrad and the Black Sea; most of the remainder are in the southern portion of the Soviet Far East; a few are in the Caucasus. 30. Eurasian and Peripheral Operations a. Base locations and normal pattern of activity of LRA would facilitate bombing missions launched directly from home bases to targets in Eurasia and its periphery. Most important Allied targets outside North America-- including overseas air bases, potential IRBM sites, allied ports, naval operating areas ; and industrial, military, governmental and communications centers-fall within the combat radii of Soviet medium bombers operating directly from home bases. The Soviets have adequate facilities forlaunching simultaneously a high proportion of LRA against targets in Eurasia and its periphery. Certain BADGER units have been trained and equipped to employ air to- surface missiles of about 55 nautical mile range, probably designed primarily for anti ship use but also suitable for attacking well-defined radar targets on land.. b. Some elements of Long- R ange . Aviation ( LRA) could be used in attacks against naval targets, but such participation at the outset of a war. presumably would be limited to missions of the highest priority. The range, speed and weapons capability of LRA aircraft make them particularly useful for certain types of air-sea operations. LRA aircraft might be used for reconnaissance, antishipping operations, aerial mining, and antisubmarine warfare in cooperation with naval forces; however, such operations would . normally be the responsibility of Soviet Naval Aviation. Long- Range Aviation could also be used, if deemed desirable, to supplement tactical aviation in direct support of front operations, although such employment is unlikely during the initial stages of a general war.. LRA un it s al mos t certainly have received training in such support with simulated use of both nuclear and high explosive weapons. 31. Intercontinental Operations a. The BEARS of LRA are capable of two-way operations against Canada and the whole of the United States. BEARS operating from present home bases would require staging in most cases. In the case of the staged 1 10 TO P-SECRET TOP SECRET 1i A0036847124-000862 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformation M TOP SECRET BISON, operating from the Chukotski. area*., all but the southeastern portion of the United States could be covered in two-way missions with one refueling. Operational BISON units have conducted only a relatively small amount of training in Arctic staging and inflight refueling, both of which would be essential for two-way operations against most North American targets. b, The Soviets have taken measures to prepare medium bomber elements for the type of operations necessary for attack on North American targets. Training activities over the past several years have included more realistic, larger scale exercises and long-range flights. More recently, there has almost certainly been an increasing number of flights -to potential staging bases in the Soviet Arctic, though far fewer than would be expected for a fully combat- ready capability against the United States. By staging through Chukotski bases",BADGERS could reach: Alaska, Greenland and part of Canada on unrefueled two-way missions; more of Canada and a small portion of the United States on refueled two-way missions; all of Canada and much of the United States on unrefueled one-way missions; all United States targets on refueled one-way missions. c. At present a substantial inflight refueling capability is lacking and -there is no evidence to indicate the development of an aircraft specifi cally for use as a tanker. However, more than one-fourth of the BISON and BADGER regiments in Long- Range- Aviation have some BISONS and BADGERS which are convertible tanker- bombers. Inflight refueling techniques will probably be improved and extended to a larger part of this force. 32. Maintenance and Training maintenance facilities demanded by Western air forces; for example, most maintenance is done in the open even in cold weather. Further, the Soviet airforces may accept reduced safety factors in order to maintain higher serviceability rates. However, we consider that Long- Range Aviation is able to maintain a serviceability rate of about 60 percent during peacetime operations, and that this could be raised to 90 percent after standdown. Roughly similar figures are likely to apply even after the introduction of more complex aircraft and equipment. In general, we conside r th a t th e pro fi c iency of Long- Range Avia- tion -crews is such that they can, in training but under adverse conditions, See Subsection I for appraisal of air facilities in the Chukotski area 12 navigate to an assigned target and bomb with the accuracies shown in the table below. Under combat conditions these figures would suffer degradation. CEP's in Feet ALTITUDE Fe et VISUAL BOMBING 40,000 30,000 20,000 2, 100 1,400 900 33. TOP SECRET . Current Strength Estimate. BLIND BOMBING, WITH RADAR PoorlyWellDefined Defined Targets Targets 2, 000 1,700 1,400 2,700 2, 300 2, 100 Aircraft now available that could be em- ployed by the Soviet Union for attacks on North America are BADGER, BISON, BEAR and BULL. It is estimated that on 1 January 1959, the .operational strength of Soviet medium and heavy bombers and tankers totalled slightly over 1, 900 aircraft ( 1, 385 BADGERS, 100-125 BEARS and BISONS, and 425 BULLS). Except for some 300 BADGERS in Naval Aviation and at least 100 BADGERS in Tactical Aviation, these aircraft belong to Soviet Long- Range Aviation. There are no aircraft specifically designed as tankers, although BADGER and BISON aircraft can be modified to serve as tankers to refuel their bomber counterparts. Some 3, 000 jet light bombers are also available in the Soviet air forces for attacks on targets within range. 34. a. Soviet capabilities to carry out maintenance of aircraft and equipment in Long- Range Aviation appear to be comparable withthose of similarlyequipped Western air forces, although there are significant differences in approach to the maintenance problem between the Soviet Union and the West. The average Soviet technician may be somewhat less well qualified than his Western counterpart, but Soviet equipment is relatively more simple to- maintain. The Soviet air forces do not appear to consider essential the elaborate ' b. TOP SECRET Significant Future Developments and Trends h. Future projections of the strength and composition of Soviet LongRange Aviation are complicated by the fact that at present the entire Soviet medium and heavy bomber program is in a state of transition, involving considerably less current production than a year or two ago. The U. S. view is that production at BADGER plants now appears to be tapering off, although it will probably be sufficient to provide moderate further increases in the jet medium bomber force. The Canadian view is that BADGER production, if it continues at all, will not be sufficient to do more than replace wastage. The one identified BISON plant, at Moscow, has continued to produce aircraft of this type at a low and uneven rate, while its design bureau has been working to develop a new type of large bomber. A total of about a dozen BISONS have been'completed since April 1958, bringing cumulative production to about 100 aircraft. There is still insufficient evidence to state categorically that BEAR production has ceased entirely; however, we believe it unlikely that any new ,BEAR bombers have been produced for well over a year, or that more than 50 to 60 were produced altogether. The one identified producer has probably been overhauling existing BEARS modifying some aircraft of this type for transport use, and building a few new transports of the CLEAT type ( similar to the BEAR). Despite the decline in long-range bomber production, the USSR's plant capacity suitable for production of large aircraft has been considerably enlarged over the last few years, and there is some evidence to suggest that several plants are preparing to produce large bombers and/or transports. TOP SECRET 13 A0036847125-000863 �Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'occes it Pinformotion TOP SECRET TOP SECRET b. Research and development in new bomber types has continued, and we believe that it will be intensively pursued throughout.the period of this estimate. Considering the demonstrated level of Soviet technology in such fields as aircraft propulsion and aerodynamics, and the normal development of these capabilities, we have estimated that within the next few years the USSR could probably produce: ( 1) improved versions ofth e BISON an d BADGER, at any time; (2) a new subsonic heavy bomber with range and other performance characteristics somewhat better than those of an improved BISON, in 1959 or 1960; ( 3) a new medium bomber with supersonic " dash" capabilities and a range approximating that of an improved BADGER, in 1960 or 1961. c. Since- none of these aircraft types would add substantially to Soviet capabilities for two-way intercontinental operations, we have reasoned that the USSR might have proceeded directly to the development of more advanced types; such as a heavy bomber powered by high-energy chemicalfuel, capable of supersonic speed and high altitude, or possibly a subsonic nuclearpowered aircraft capable of long endurance, even at low atlitudes. We continue to estimate that some aircraft of either or boththese types could probably. be in operational units by mid- 1963. We also believe that within the next few years ( 1959-1961)•the USSR could fly an airborne nuclear testbed, with at least one nuclear power unit providing useful thrust during some phase of the flight. The attainment of a nuclear propulsion system for operational use in supersonic aircraft would probably require a long test and development program -extending beyond 1963. d. Recent evidence of Soviet developmental efforts includes the observationat Moscow of a new bomber, designated BOUNDER, o flarge si ze and heavy weight, with a modified delta- wing configuration- apparently designed for supersonic flight. With the limited information available, it has not been possible- to determine the BOUNDER's intended mission, but we believe it could represent a significant step forward in Soviet bomber design. Preliminary analysis indicates BOUNDER to be powered by four turbojet engines. The use of conventional fuels would give it a r ange marginal for intercontinental bombing. The possibility for development of BOUNDER with a more advanced propulsion system exists and the design intent for a nuclear powered vehicle cannot be - excluded at this time. However, present information is inadequate to permit an estimate of BOUNDER's probable development. e. Our evidence also continues to support the possible existence of one or more other prototypes of new or improved long-range bombers. Past experience indicates that existing prototypes may represent competitive designs. The Soviets may not yet have evaluated such prototypes in relation to each other or to their missile programs. Such evaluation will have an important bearing on the future strength and composition of Long- Range Aviation. Evidence indicates that the USSR is continuing its intensive program in aeronautical research and development. However, Soviet aircraft developed to date indicate aerodynamic, - structural and propulsion capabilities somewhat less than those of the United States. . Fabrication techniques are five to ten years behind the U. S. , resulting in higher structural weights and performance I 14 TOP SECRET penalties. Inits theoretical aspects Soviet aeronautical research is considered generally equal to that of the U. S. ; in particular, there is some evidence indicating a high capability in transonic and supersonic aerodynamics. In experimental or applied fields, Soviet capability is difficult to assess because _ of lack of information, but the display of several new interceptors and a high speed bomber in 1956 followed by another bomber and five new transport aircraft in 1957 and " BOUNDER" in 1958 attest to both the diversity and magnitude of the Soviet aeronautical research and development effort. There - is evidence that some of these aircraft have poor stability and have been delayed in becoming operational. f - Future Strength Estimate. The USSR is continuing to strive for technological superiority over the Western Allies in intercontinental weapons systems. It is believed that the Soviets will rely increasingly on missiles as long-range delivery systems as the period advances. There is no question that by mid- 1963 the Soviets could produce and put into operational units five or six hundred subsonic heavy bombers and tankers, should they desire this large a force of subsonic aircraft, augmented by -small numbers of advanced types. It appears more likely, however, that the Soviet heavy bomber .and tanker force will remain considerably smaller than this-- say about 150 to 300. The actual size of the force in 1963 and thereafter will depend upon the interplay of many fact ors , suc h as Sov iet requirements and technological. developments. Meaningful strength estimates cannot be provided for the post 1963 period. The number of medium bombers in LRA will probably decrease during the mid- range period. BULLS will probably have phased out entirely shortly after mid- 1960. Supersonic " dash" medium bombers may become an important element in the force by mid- 1963 but BADGERS will .probably have continuing utility. ( See Table 1, which follows paragraph 38. ) B. TACTICAL AVIATION 35. Soviet Tactical Aviation is composed of 14 air armies, four military district air forces ( MDAFs)., and three separate air divisions in Hungary. Soviet Tactical Aviation has demonstrated the capability to operate throughout the year under Arctic conditions. Operations can be conducted from frozen surfaces and from packed snow runways. Although limited by logistic considerations and forced acceptance of lower serviceability, past Arctic training has been sufficient to qualify a considerable number of aviation personnel of the tactical forces in Arctic operations. Tactical Aviation is not expected to be involved in an attack on North America, except Alaska. C. NAVAL AVIATION 36. Soviet Naval Aviation has a considerable strike capability which includes nuclear bombs and air- to- surface missiles. Both the medium and light jet bombers of Naval Aviation can carry nuclear bombs. The medium bombers are equipped to deliver air- to- surface missiles against naval units and other well defined targets. Soviet Naval Aviation, which is wholly land based, is located for the most part in the vicinity of the major fleet operating bases. Soviet Naval Aviation is organized to operate with naval forces in the TOP SECRET 15 A0036847126-000864 �Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'occes it Pinformotio TOP:SECR.ET •4l TOP SECRET accomplishment of other missions such,as -ASW, reconnaissance, mining, etc. 37. During an attack on North America, Soviet Naval Aviation fighter units will probably be employed to defend the.Soviet fleet areas and na v al units against air att ac k by Alli e d forces. The medium and light bombers will be employed to attack Allied .naval forces which immediately threaten the GrSSR. Although.Naval Aviation BADGERS could be utilized to supplement Long- Range Aviation attacks or in independent ope.rations against Alaska, it is considered that Naval A v iati on wou ld be use d aga i nst Allied naval task forces, sea communications, and other targets outside North America. It is estimated that the USSR will not employ Naval Aviation to attack targets in North America. 38. Naval Aviation je t me di um bomber in Table 1, Sub- Section D, following:. strength estimates are contained ESTIMATED SOVIET MEDIUM AND HEAVY BOMBER STRENGTH MID-- 1959 Long- Range Aviation (includes tankers) PIST ON MEDIUM BOMBERS TABLE 1 - ESTIMATED SOVIET MEDIUM AND HEAVY BOMBER STRENGTH - ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT JET HEAVY MEDIUM BOMBERS BOMBERS U. S. View Canadian View 1,025 300 Naval Aviation 350 Tactical Aviation 100 MID- 1960 D. TABLES TABLE 2 TABLE 1 Long- Range Aviation (includes tankers) 100-150 1,400 U.S. View 150 1,100 ) ( Tactical Aviation TABLE 4 - ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT MID- i963 Long- Range Aviation (includes tankers) Naval Aviation .Tactical Aviation NOTE 1: 100-200 1,350 Naval Aviation TABLE 3 - ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE LIGHT BOMBERS Canadian View 575* ) 800 ( ( (includes supersonic " dash" types) 150-300, 675* ( In estimating the operational strength and composition of Soviet Long- Range Aviation, heavy bomber and tanker figures for 1959 and 1960 have been projected as lying within a range. The low side reflects a Soviet option to forego further build-up of their heavy bomber force through 1960. The high side reflects a Soviet option to produce some additional aircraft of BISON and/or BEAR types, and to introduce a new subsonic heavy bomber into operational units before mid1960. The figures given above take into account an observed trend toward an increase in the number of BADGERS being assigned to Naval and Tactical Aviation. Further an is required be fore an accurate assessment , of the allocation of BADGERS to each of these forces can be made. 16 TOP ­S ECRET .- TOP SECRET 17 A0036847127-000865 �Iri M (n Ln 00 Ln U') .-1 N oo O fr 10 C) O cc .0 Ln • N 0 0 00 M to 0 00 10 fT 10 00 O M O O O O O O m d cn C> O O H 6 x W a a O O o In N [• d' Ln o 0 O O o 0 44 .o 0 0 0 0 O, 10 •D to 0 t 1- 0 M Ln 0 00 l- O O .O N O O O in 0o -.O N M O 1f1 fT N O O IM 0 0 0 0 0 0 o O O O in M 1 0 In M N O M O O 00 N N W \ C, O 0 o M O N fb 1 O M d1 O O O a Z O 00 1• .r M Ln W U) 00 O Ln o O H w Ln 10 N fb d 0 0 ao In 18 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET O O d O o 0 o O O In Ln 0o O l• Speed/Altitude ( Kts/ft) Combat Radius/Range ( nm) 0 o d \ If) M l- O 350/30,000 (D (D 00 to 7 _:11 110 10 o o o o O O N 0 o dl o O 0 C. 00 3 0 0 00 1 1 0 0 dl O N O rl Irn to O O .O 00 c+l 00 O N M to O O C) \ O 00 dl '- O M d 00 V 00 N c- Oo 530/18,000 fT rn N M \ 0o ! O Ln 550/13,200 O M 0 0 0o 0 0 0 0 o 495/21,600 Ln!in! CO 00 0 01 . o O o 0 0 0 N a0 M , I, M 'D u1 In In Y w m d O 1 O O Y cd O 1 0 0 3 t` - • M N-d LL•1 to ID O N N rn o O C) O N N CD O O Cd _ o_ . 00 d n In n t d i a CD 0 0 C) 0 0 o O o 0 w \ O O In H dl d d' N d d Irn Ln In o N 00 U ,a N ., 00 O \ 1- O O 1 0 1 O O _ n o Ln O O CD O M \ O ,-i M Y O O to F O w m a • w O O tf1 _ 1 0 0 1 0 0 1f1 O . M 'j, W N b0 rd \ W d n3 Id O 0 pp 0 O O 0 O 0 to O N '-1 Id. 4 U See footnotes 0 0 O O O l O 0 0 Terminal Target Altitude ( ft) 9/ 00! Combat Ceiling ( ft) POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 1/ There is no question that Iyi ­ iiid-1963 the Soviets could produce and put into operational units five or six hundred heavy bombers and tankers, should they desire this large a force of such subsonic aircraft, augmented- by small numbers of advanced types. It seems more likely, however, that the Soviet heavy bomber and tanker force will remain smaller than this. -. The actual size of the force in 1963 and thereafter will depend upon the interplay of many factors, such as Soviet requirements and technological developments. fuel reserves are NOTE 2: .TOP SECRET WV 3, 300 lb bombload TOP SECRET -19 ,. �O H W U) a Z O H 6 x W a O a W O M C) O cc .0 Ln • N O M O fT rn M N O O N O Ln o Ln!in! 0 0 0 0 O O CO (n Ln N U') 00! O 0 0 Iri M 00 0 01 . 0 0 o c- .O 00 0 oo O 0 0 0o c+l fr 10 .-1 00 Ln 0 0 Oo 0 dl 00 10 fT 00 \ 0o ! O C) rl Irn w to o o \ O 7 to 0 C. 00 0 _:11 M 110 10 a0 o 0 O 3 Y cd n t d i a N U ,a ., Y F O w m rd N b0 d \ W -19 3 .TOP SECRET 1 1 N o O o 0 0 0 , I, M 'D 1 0 1 O u1 In In M • M Y w m d O t` O O N-d LL•1 to O ID - N \ l- \ If) M O C) O N N _ o_ . 00 d n In H w N Cd o 00 0 0 o O o 0 Id U w • a O O to O CD In O 0 C) o O O o 0 'j, W 1 0 0 1 0 0 1f1 O . Ln 1 0 1 O O N 0 d O N d d Irn Ln In 00 O \ _ n M O O tf1 _ O O CD 1- N \ O d' CD dl rn O d1 o o dl d 10 0 O O 00 M to O O 0 0 fb 0 0 o O 00 0 0 O Speed/Altitude ( Kts/ft) O Ln O O cn 00 m d C> O 00 O N M to C, o O 00 dl '- O M d O O N 00 00 V 00 N O O fb O o 0 O Ln 10 N O 00 O o In O N [• d' Ln to N O 0 0 0 0 O 44 .o 1• .r M Ln 0 00 lO O in M 1 o 0 0 M Ln O O IM O O .O N 1 0 In O 1f1 fT N d O O O O O in 0o -.O N M O M N 0 0 ao In 0 t 1- 0 0 O, 10 •D M N O 0 o M l• O O o O O 0 o (D (D 00 d O In Ln O 0 o 0o O M \ O ,-i M O n3 0 O 0 pp 0 O O 4 to O N '-1 Id. See footnotes O TOP SECRET 3, 300 lb bombload WV SECRET Terminal Target Altitude ( ft) 9/ There is no question that Iyi ­ iiid-1963 the Soviets could produce and put into operational units five or six hundred heavy bombers and tankers, should they desire this large a force of such subsonic aircraft, augmented- by small numbers of advanced types. It seems more likely, however, that the Soviet heavy bomber and tanker force will remain smaller than this. -. The actual size of the force in 1963 and thereafter will depend upon the interplay of many factors, such as Soviet requirements and technological developments. l TOP Combat Ceiling ( ft) TOP SECRET NOTE 2: 18 495/21,600 530/18,000 550/13,200 350/30,000 fuel reserves are POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 1/ Combat Radius/Range ( nm) ,. �Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'occes it Pinformotion TABLE 2 - Footnotes O O Additional possible developments during the period of this estimate, for which no detailed performance characteristics have been estimated, are mentioned in the Discussion, Section II A, para. 6. H r'r1 C7 T Refueling estimates based upon uses of compatible tankers which provide approximately 30-40 percent increase in radius/range. 3'/ Future improvements of BISON and BADGER aircraft are based on normal expected improvements through the 1960 period; in particular, replacement of the present 18, 000 lb, thrust engines with those having a thrust of about 20, 500 lbs. 4/ Jet medium bomber with supersonic " dash" capability. 5/ Capable of carrying 100 nm range ASM, of approximately 11, 000 lb. gross weight. 6/ Includes 500 nm " dash" at Mach 1.5. 7/ For 10, 000 lb bombload unless otherwise indicated. 8/ For 3, 300 lb bombload. 9/ Service ceiling at maximum power with one hour fuel reserves plus bombload aboard. with this altitude. No range figure is associated O '0 C/7 m n r-n 1 z TABLE 3 --q O y ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET LIGHT BOMBER AIRCRAFT* m n (Optimum Mission Profile) t'n --1 Combat Radius/ 1954 1951 1959 MADGE MADGE — BEAGLE BOSUN ( Turboprop) 735/1,400 580/1,450 745/1,400 765/1,510 950/2,200 4,400 3,000 4,400 4,400 4,400 1950 1951 BEAGLE 1/ SUPERSONIC 4/ , Tactical 900//1,600 3/ Range ( nm) Bombload ( lbs) Maximum Speed at 460/15,000 165/SL 480/9,000 475/15,000 385/39,000 11,0/5,000 395/42,200 400/35,.100 43,800 20,200 46,900 39,500 270/5,000 6,600 705/Ml.23/35,000 Optimum Altitude ( Kts/ft) Target Speed/Target 610/M1.06/43, 300 Altitude ( Kts/ft) Combat Ceiling ( ft) 22,000 49,400 (57, 300 with afterburning) 1/ May also be used in antisubmarine warfare 2/ Includes 50 nm supersonic dash 3/ Includes 100 nm supersonic dash 4/ Expected to become operational in the 1958-1963 period O -a. C/) M C7 *From NIE 11-4-58, dated 23 December 1958 m A0036847129-000867 �W ai U I a a 0 0 a z 6 F b Wy 0 0 W u o z b d a O A W U • W'v a Q N W H w ti 0. H w 7 0 M \ o 0 A 0 \ 0 > a v ,o a v T 0w 0 0 O o 0 o as O ob M F m H O N M M N • 0 O O O • C b O H E. O z W x 0 6 o o N C O M M \ ui 1 O N o N N 0 0 O M H M v mi N o- y as • 2 O N 0 M fn - N i+ N1 O O N " a N 0 O 0 o y O o O 0 M P O 0 0 N o M \ o M N 0 o m O N 0 0 m w o 0 0 0 n 0 o n M a w o H 0 0 0 0 F o' x N •• •n \ r m •" 0 0 O O m 0 r O ti N C O o O O .00 N m N M m 0 0 M O .o \ M o \ N H a 0 H p F a 0 w E a a v A O v . o 0 x• N N A, . 0 ]' N o C 0 O U F U a,• P F. N U • P H O • • a U w .-I H •^ U o G U • b x P 0 U •MI U • w H 6 F A w a 90 a U • aH Q 6 a w a 0 198/10000 F TOP SECRET 22 140/10000 230/15000 500/20000 280/17000 410/27000 231/10000 Service Ce 730/1440 Normal rated power Constant altitude mission 'From NIE 11-4-58, dated 23 December 1958 TOP SECRET E. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Art- Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformatio TOP SECRET ALLOCATIONS OF AIRCRAFT FOR ATTACK ON NORTH AMERICA 39. Long- Range Aviation. The magnitude of the long-range force which the Soviet Union might launch in an initial surprise attack would not only vary according to the types of missions undertaken but would depend upon such factors as base capacity, aircraft performance, crew proficiency, operating conditions, the availability and destructiveness of nuclear weapons, and upon the Soviet assessment of North American defense capabilities. Because intelligence on some of the above factors is limited, only generalized allocation estimates can be provided. 40. It is believed that the whole of the available heavy bomber force plus a substantial portion of the medium bomber force of Long- Range Aviation would be employed in operations against North America. It is believed that the USSR would employ convertible bomber- tankers in the tanker role as a range extension measure. Those medium and heavy jet bombers not intended for utilization in the tanker role would be allocated to strike forces against North American and peripheral targets according to relative target priority. In addition to planning for operations against nuclear attack forces and facilities located on the North American Continent, the Soviet leaders would certainly plan attacks on Allied nuclear delivery forces, including carrier task forces, and their associated bases located outside North America. The USSR would probably attempt to ensure that sufficient weight in the initial attack is allocated to operations aimed at the neutralization of these bases. 41. D4ring the period mid- 1959 to mid- 1963, the ICBM will assume increasing impbrtance as an intercontinental delivery vehicle. Soviet long-range striking capabilities will lie primarily in a mixed force of manned bombers (probably equipped increasingly with air- to- surface missiles) and ballistic missiles. It appears likely that the total medium and heavy bomber strength of Soviet Long- Range Ayiation will have declined by mid- 1963. In the post1963 period, allocations of long-range aircraft for operations against North America would be influenced by a variety of factors including: Soviet success with newer aircraft capable of striking this continent; availability, reliability and accuracy of ICBM's and other advanced weapon systems; the numbers, types, and vulnerability of North American target objectives; the capabilities of existing air defense systems; and Soviet progress in space flight programs. 23 42. Tactical Aviation (Against Alaska). While substantial Tactical Aviation strength is estimated to be stationed in the Soviet Far East, it is believed that there is only a small number of fighter aircraft in the Chukotski area. Soviet jet lightbombers andfighters could be staged through Chukotski for attacks against Alaska. However, considering the logistic limitations of Northern Siberia, the probable utilization of that area for long-range bomber staging, and the relatively few Alaskan targets of probable significance to the Soviets, it is estimated that the number of Tactical Aviation jet light bombers and fighters likely to be employed against Alaska would be quite small. It is also possible that limited numbers of BADGER aircraft assigned to Tactical Aviation units in the Soviet Far East would be employed against Alaskan targets. TOP SECRET A0036847130-000868 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information ArtDocument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformatio TOP SECRET TOP SECRET H 0 0 0 o 0 w 7 M \ o 0 0 0 o o M M o O 0w M N N • O N as N H 0 o m N \ O n n o o 1 v . o 0 0 0 0 0 0 N m M \ \ M M \ O O O N N N C C 0 O U H O o C •" r •n o N •• N U F . 0 F 6 Wy H O • • P O O m 0 r a 0 ]' w E O 0 a 0 a O 0 0 O a z b d ti a b 0 N C o u M o W'v a A W • Q U N O M o " 0 x A N O y i+ N1 O N 2 W m .00 v mi a M H M O O N N fn - O O P y O O U H •^ .-I U x U • 0 P U G o b N M O m o 0 0 •MI M O O O M o .o 90 Q 6 a w a 0 Service Ce H 6 F A w a a U • as N o- 0 w aH • 0 \ M U • H E. 0 N 22 41. D4ring the period mid- 1959 to mid- 1963, the ICBM will assume increasing impbrtance as an intercontinental delivery vehicle. Soviet long-range striking capabilities will lie primarily in a mixed force of manned bombers (probably equipped increasingly with air- to- surface missiles) and ballistic missiles. It appears likely that the total medium and heavy bomber strength of Soviet Long- Range Ayiation will have declined by mid- 1963. In the post1963 period, allocations of long-range aircraft for operations against North America would be influenced by a variety of factors including: Soviet success with newer aircraft capable of striking this continent; availability, reliability and accuracy of ICBM's and other advanced weapon systems; the numbers, types, and vulnerability of North American target objectives; the capabilities of existing air defense systems; and Soviet progress in space flight programs. b v w N W O 140/10000 W 40. It is believed that the whole of the available heavy bomber force plus a substantial portion of the medium bomber force of Long- Range Aviation would be employed in operations against North America. It is believed that the USSR would employ convertible bomber- tankers in the tanker role as a range extension measure. Those medium and heavy jet bombers not intended for utilization in the tanker role would be allocated to strike forces against North American and peripheral targets according to relative target priority. In addition to planning for operations against nuclear attack forces and facilities located on the North American Continent, the Soviet leaders would certainly plan attacks on Allied nuclear delivery forces, including carrier task forces, and their associated bases located outside North America. The USSR would probably attempt to ensure that sufficient weight in the initial attack is allocated to operations aimed at the neutralization of these bases. 'From NIE 11-4-58, dated 23 December 1958 I ob M F 231/10000 F O Constant altitude mission z U • p A, m Normal rated power a a 0 0 a N 0 0 280/17000 F. N H 410/27000 a 0 a,• P 730/1440 W ai ui • z 0 6 500/20000 F U 39. Long- Range Aviation. The magnitude of the long-range force which the Soviet Union might launch in an initial surprise attack would not only vary according to the types of missions undertaken but would depend upon such factors as base capacity, aircraft performance, crew proficiency, operating conditions, the availability and destructiveness of nuclear weapons, and upon the Soviet assessment of North American defense capabilities. Because intelligence on some of the above factors is limited, only generalized allocation estimates can be provided. H 0 0 N H x• o 0 o m A x 0 0 0 0 ALLOCATIONS OF AIRCRAFT FOR ATTACK ON NORTH AMERICA > O w a w o T 230/15000 F o' E. a v ,o a v \ 198/10000 w ti 0. 42. Tactical Aviation (Against Alaska). While substantial Tactical Aviation strength is estimated to be stationed in the Soviet Far East, it is believed that there is only a small number of fighter aircraft in the Chukotski area. Soviet jet lightbombers andfighters could be staged through Chukotski for attacks against Alaska. However, considering the logistic limitations of Northern Siberia, the probable utilization of that area for long-range bomber staging, and the relatively few Alaskan targets of probable significance to the Soviets, it is estimated that the number of Tactical Aviation jet light bombers and fighters likely to be employed against Alaska would be quite small. It is also possible that limited numbers of BADGER aircraft assigned to Tactical Aviation units in the Soviet Far East would be employed against Alaskan targets. TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 23 A0036847130-000868 �Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'occes it Pinformotio (00 TOP SECRET F. OPERATIONAL ATTRITION FACTORB 43.. It is estimated that the Soviets have the capability to launch the following percentages of their Long- Range Aviation aircraft committed on initial operations against North America: a• Ninety percent ( and possibly more in 1962) of aircraft at home bases will be in commission after stand- down. b• Eighty-five percent ( 90 percent by mid- 1961) of these aircraft in commission at home bases will be launched from staging bases ( includes attrition en route to, and while at staging bases). c• Eighty percent ( 85 percent in 1962) of those launched from staging bases and conducting unrefueled missions will arrive in target area ( excluding combat attrition). d. Seventy-five percent ( 80 percentin 1962) of those aircraft launched from home bases conducting refueled missions will arrive in target areas ( excluding combat attrition). Most of the aircraft denied to the initial attack by operational attrition would be available for subsequent attacks or for attacks in the Eurasian area. 44. Extremes in weather conditions at different staging areas would seriously complicate the coordinated launching of a large-scale intercontinental strike force from widely separated areas within the USSR. G. ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS 45. Penetration Aids. It is estimated that the USSR probably is developing, and may have in an operational status now, an air- launched decoy to simulate medium or heavy bombers. These decoys could use radar corner reflectors and/or echo simulators to increase their radar reflectivity and a relatively simple guidance system preset to a programmed flight pattern. They probably utilize'turbojet engines to give them flight performance comparable to that of the bombers which they are intended to simulate. No estimate is available as to their size; therefore, no accurate estimate can be made of the numbers of decoys which could be carried by the various types of aircraft. On subsonic bombers, the decoys could be carried externally, with some degradation to aircraft performance. Internal storage, probably a necessity for supersonic bombers, would result in a reduction in the bomber's weapon carrying capability, depending upon the decoys' sizes. 46. Navigational Aids a. The Soviets employ automatic radio compasses capable of providing bearings accurate to three degrees or better onfairly strong signals. Their airborne ILS components are: ( 1) a localizer receiver; ( 2) glide path receiver; (3) marker beacon receiver; (4) distance measuring equipment and ( 5) airborne 24 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET radar. Additional equipment includes radio altimeters, both highandlow. For bombing at short-range there is a system comparable to the U. S. SHORAN. They also employ RENDEZVOUS beacons and a VHF homing/DME system. GCA techniques are in widespread use. For long-range navigation, it is estimated the Soviets have operational the MOON system, with coverage over most of the European continent. This is a low frequency, pulse type, hyperbolic system, which employs an airborne receiver and three or more ground stations. Improvements in this long-range navigation system may take the form of a more refined phase comparison system at a lower frequency during the period of this Estimate. For navigation beyond the range of Soviet radio aids, celestial and inertial techniques will be used. b. During the mid- range period to 1963, the Soviets are expected to . use existing or improved versions of present navigational equipment. Of primary importance will be radio and radar beacons, hyperbolic systems, radio direction finding, ground- to- air data link control systems, SHORAN type equipment, and radar sighting techniques. During this period, it is estimated that efforts will be concentrated upon outfitting deficient areas and aircraft with auxiliary aids such as radar beacons, ground control approach radar, distance measuring equipment, and improved instrument landing systems. Such a program appears vitally necessary in order to improve their allweather operational capability. c. During the period 1963-1968, th e Sovie t a ir forces are expecte d to develop new equipment and techniques such as improved azimuth references, Doppler/Inertial Ground Position Indicators, and improved ground- air data link systems. It is'further expected that currently known devices will continue in use by aircraft of limited mission requirements. 47. Identification. The principal IFF system in us anow is a multichannel system similar to the U. S. World W ar II M ar k III . A new, hi g h frequency, IFF system has replaced the old Mark III- type system on the modern surface of the Soviet fleet. It is probable that this or a similar system will soon be employed by ground and air forces. During the mid- range period an airto-air IFF system integrated with the AI radar is estimated. These equipments are capable of a line- of- sight operational range up to at least 150 nautic al miles. ships H. TYPICAL FLIGHT ROUTES AND PROFILES 48. Range limitations of Soviet aircraft impose substantial restrictions on the number of alternate routes open to th e Sov iets i n planning attacks on North American targets. Possible routes include Great Circle routes between staging base and target, and, principally for refueled aircraft, deviations from Great Circle routes to avoid overflight of major Allied defense and warning systems. From the Soviet Far East, for example, routes might be chosen to by-pass Alaska and penetrate the continental area from the west and from the north. From the Kola Peninsula, routes could be selected which would decrease the risk of early detection by Allied warning systems in Iceland and Greenland. Attacks from interior bases and from bases in the central Arctic TOP SECRET 25 A0036847131-000869 �Document disclosed under the Access To In)ormotion Act _ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'occes it Pinformotid TOP ,SECRET T'OP SECRET area could be routed over the Polar area. " End- run"- routes ,to clear the .DEW LINE extensions offer possible alternatives to the more- direct-routes de _ scribed above, but are consdiered- less likely due to the addition in .flight distances. Aircraft range limitations also restrict variations in flight profiles open to Soviet planners. While the range capabilities of the BEAR could permit its utilization in low.level operations, necessary sacrifices in range for jet bombers currently available to Soviet Long- Range: Aviation would militate against such tactics. The development of very long-range truly intercontinental aircraft would afford the Soviets considerably greater latitude in the selection of alternate routes and flight profiles. I. AIR FACILITIES 49. Airfield development in Soviet Bloc areas continues to be directed . primarily toward 'improving base facilities to meet the increasing requirements of modern operational aircraft. This improvement has kept pace with the development of aircraft. 50. There are approximately 25 airfields in the Soviet Union believed to be " home" bases for operational Long-. Range Aviation units equipped with bomber aircraft. All but three of these installations are located in European USSR. In addition, there is a number of airfields associated with command and/or training units, factory production and deli ve ry, an d testing- and development which must also be considered an integral part of the base structure of Soviet Long- Range Aviation. Moreover, there are many other airfields in the:Soviet Bloc areas whichhave concrete runways suitable for heavy bombers. (See para. 53). These airfields could be utilized as auxiliary bases to insure' maximum aircraft dispersal away from home bases, but the actual designation of such auxiliary fields within the Soviet Long- Range Aviation home base structure cannot be verified. 51. It is estimated that the Soviets will continue to develop their air facilities to accommodate requirements anticipated during the period of- this. Estimate. Paralleling the runway improvement in " home" base areas has been the indicated development in the Arctic peripheral areas of runways capable of handling medium and heavybombers. It is estimated that runways at major airfields throughout the Soviet Arctic, suitable for staging operations, have been improved or are undergoing improvement. 52. Maintenance facilities are available at all home bases with major repairs accomplished at central repair bases which serve several operational bases. ' POL bulk storage facilities, with equipment for rapidly dispensing it, are available at Soviet Long- Range Aviation home bases. Most of the bases have two separate fuel storage areas, usually located in fenced security zones. In general peacetime practice, the Soviets maintain a sufficient. supply of fuel on- field to satisfy requirements of at least 10 days of - sustained operations- by no deployed aircraft. Most o f- the a irfi e ld s i n th e.- f orwar d areas , w hi c h have received runway development sufficient to permit operations of long'- range aircraft ,are known to have-POL storage faciliti e s: The major airfields are believed to have bulk supplies available. Others with runways suitable for 26 1 TOP SECRET staging only medium bombers have more limited storage facilities, but it is believed that their capacity is sufficient to accommodate aircraft in.-numbers commensurate with the runway and parking facilities available. Nuclear weapons storage sites have been identified at many LRA home bases and there are possibly storage facilities at some of .the major forward staging bases.. The logistics requirements of air defense and Naval Aviation units which may be stationed on certain forward bases would not appreciably conflict with Long- Range Aviation staging requirements; ample supplies could be made' available to satisfy such dual requirements for critical periods of time. 53. There are six forward base areas within the Soviet Bloc that could be used for staging operations against the continental United States. These areas are: the Kola Peninsula area, the Leningrad area, the Central Arctic area, the - Chukotski Peninsula area, the Kamchatka Peninsula area, and the Northern European Satellite area. Each of these potential staging areas has air-' fields that are suitable* for the staging of both medium and heavy :Soviet bombers. Some of these airfields are currently supporting units of jet fighters, jet light bombers, or transport aircraft. ( See table below) Soviet Airfield Capabilities In Selected Forward Areas Area No. of Airfields Suitable for Medium and Heavy Bomber Staging Additional Airfields Suitable for Medium Bomber Staging l.. Kola - White Sea 4 13. 2. Leningrad (within 200 n. m. of city) 5 25 3. Central Arctic Coast (Including Arctic Archipelagoes) 5 ( including 2 seasonal strips) 2-6 4. Chukotski . 3 2 5. Kamchatka 1 3 about 25 about 60. 6.' ' North European Satellites Airfields considered suitable for those fields having the following known or estimated facilities; for medium jet bombers, runways of at least- 6', 000 feet; for heavy jet or turboprop bombers; runways of at least -7, 50.0 feet; minimum refueling facilities, maintenance facilities, and parking facilities at least for handling simultaneously squadron size operations : In addition,-there are estimated to be a minimum navigational facilities': ~- TOP.SECRET 27 A0036847132-000870 �Document disclosed- under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces it Pinformati TOP SECRET SECTION III THREAT FROM MISSILES* A. AIR- TO- SURFACE MISSILES 54. During the period of this estimate, the USSR will have requirements for air-to- surface missile systems to reduce bomber attrition and increase the probability of successful air attack against targets with heavy local defenses. In establishing requirements for air- to- surface missile systems -during the period of this estimate, Soviet military planners would need to consider foreseeable improvements in Western land and shipborne air defense systems. They would probably assess Western air defenses about as follows: a. From 1958 on, capabilities of Western surface-to-air guided missiles will be gradually improved from present ranges of 25-85 n.m. and altitudes of up to about 80, 000 feet. Land and shipborne interceptor aircraft will be armed with air-to-air guided missiles and unguided rockets (including some armed with nuclear warheads) which will be continuously modified and improved. b. In addition, by 1961 and throughout the, remainder of the period of the estimate, Western land- based surface-to-air guided missiles will have ranges up to 200 n.m. and possibly greater. The range of Western shipborne surface-to-air guided missiles will increase to about 100 nautical miles. c. From 1958 throughout the period of the estimate, Soviet planners would consider that they would face increasingly effective early warning radar and semi- automatic GCI equipments. 55. In 1947, the USSR began development of an air- to- surface guided missile (AS- 1) which we now believe was operational in Soviet medium bomber units in 1956-1957. The guidance system, which was developed with the assistance of German designers and designated as " Komet", employs beamriding for the first part of the trajectory and semi- active radar homing for terminal guidance. The speed of the missile is about . 8 Mach and it has a maximum range from the launching aircraft of about 55 nautical miles. Employment of this missile system requires that the launching aircraft be at . altitudes of 10, 000 to 20, 000 feet. The missile then flies at a flat angle approach. It is estimated to carry a nuclear or possibly HE payload and to attain a CEP of about 150 feet against ships at sea or other similarly welldefined radar targets. i I 'Li 56. We have estimated that the USSR also has a requirement for a general purpose 55 n.m. air-to- surface missile that would not require such welldefined targets and could be employed against a wider variety of targets, including those on land. Although there is no evidence to s.o indicate, we believe 'i For details of missiles described in this SECTION, see Tables 5 and 6 which follow paragraph 95. TOP SECRET 29 A0036847133-000871 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformati TOP SECRET TOP SECRET it well within Soviet capabilities to modify the above missile system by substitution of a radar-track/radio command guidance system attaining a CEP of 1, 500 feet. 57. The weapons systems described;in paragraphs 58 and 59 below are considered tentative proposals. Further study by the U. S. and Canada will be required before agreement can be reached as to which of these air- tosurface weapons systems the Soviets will adopt. 58. We estimate that the USSR will develop a supersonic air- to- surface missile system (AS- 2), with a range of at least 100 n. m. and with improved propulsion and guidance systems. Such a system could become available to Soviet bomber units during the 1960-1961 period. For use against general land targets, this missile could employ any one of several guidance systems, including radar or inertial types, and could probably achieve CEP's of onehalf to two .n. m. depending upon the. system chosen. Modification of this missile by the addition of terminal homing guidance would make it more accurate against well-defined radar targets such as ships. 59. It is estimated that there'is a Soviet requirement for an air- tosurface missile of 250-500 n. m. range having a megaton warhead and which would be designed primarily for employment with a supersonic dash or fully supersonic aircraft. It could have the following characteristics: Availability Date - 1962-64 problems. 62. The USSR has produced a considerable number of BADGER jet medium bombers, which we estimate are the primary carriers for the AS- 1, although larger aircraft could also be modified as missile carriers. Production of the aircraft and associated navigational and electronic equipment represent the major portion of the investment required in establishing this missile system. This investment has been made. We do not believe that the necessary modifications would seriously hinder the establishment of a significant operational capability with missile equipped aircraft. B. SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (AGAINST ALASKA) 63. The USSR is expected to have short-range missiles (less than 700 n. m. range) throughout the period of this Estimate, which almost certainly could be made available in adequate quantities for attack on suitable North American targets, such as radar stations, which might be within range. There is, however, no evidence of Soviet positioning of short-range ballistic missiles in areas within reach of North America. f Max. Altitude - 80, 000 feet C. Max. Speed - Mach 2. 5 Guidance - Inertial CEP - 2 n. m. ( at 500 mile range) inclusive of aircraft navigation error. Range - 250-500 n. m. Weight - 14, 000 lbs. Warhead - up to 2 MT (Canadian view only). Reliability - 80% 60. Equipping of any of the preceding air-to- surface missiles with guidance systems capable of homing on radiating radar transmitters is believed to be within Soviet capabilities. Development of a special type of passive seeker will be the only major development necessary to fulfill this requirement. We estimate that guidance systems of this nature could be available in 1958, although there is no evidence to support this development. 30 61. We believe that the 55 n. m. subsonic air- to- surface missile is now in series production. However, we have no direct evidence regarding the Soviet facilities engaged in this production. The problems of producing this missile are similar to those encountered in the production of aircraft. Because of the limited number of missiles carried per aircraft, and the somewhat limited operational requirement for its employment, production of the over-all quantity required by the USSR should not impose serious economic TOP SECRET. INTERMEbIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (AGAINST ALASKA) 64. As of late 1958 it is estimated that the Soviets may have had an operational capability with as many as several hundred of the 700 n. m. ballistic missiles, and with a few 1, 100 n. m. ballistic missiles. It is probable that the bulk of these missiles would be allocated for attack on other than North American targets. With such missiles-, the USSR could make supplementary attacks on the Aleutian Islands and -on all Alaska as far as Juneau. However, there is no evidence at present of missile launching sites in Chukotski. 65. It is possible that the USSR will develop during the period of this estimate an intermediate range ballistic missile system with a maximum range of at least 1, 600 n. m. , capable of being launched from Soviet territory against virtually all peripheral targets. Tentative Soviet interest in such a system was indicated as early as 1949, but there has been no'further evidence of developmental work or test firing activities to this range. Considering the target coverage achievable -with 700 and - 1, 100 n. m. mis siles , and the availability of other delivery systems for coverage of more distant peripheral targets, we believe that a nominal 1, 600 mile missile'is probably viewed by Soviet planners as having a fairly low priority at the present ,time. They might therefore have deferred developmental effort until they could expect sophisticated guidance, solid or storable liquid propellants and improved mobility to be available. TOP SECRET 31 A0036847134-000872 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformati TOP SECRET TOP SECRET In any case, the initiation of test firings would probably precede first operational capability by about two years. 66. The system could be introduced in the period 1964-65, and couldhave the following characteristics: Maximum range - 1, 600 n. m. Warhead - up to 5 MT (Canadian view only) Guidance - inertial CEP - 1. 5 n. m. Reliability - '85% Two to three years later, the CEP could be rediiced.to 0:5 n. m. and the reliability increased to 95 percent. D. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES 67. On the basis of sufficient intelligence coverage to establish with a high degree , of confidence the number of Soviet ICBM test firings, it is clear that over the past year this number has not been as great as we had antici pated*. Nevertheless, considering the Soviets' progress in the whole field-of missiles and the capabilities demonstrated in their ICBM, earth satellite, and. other ballistic missile launchings, the U. S. estimates that the USSR will probably achieve a first operational capability with 10 prototype ICBM's at sometine during the year 1959. While it is possible that a limited capability with comparatively unproven ICBM's might have been- established in 1958, the U. S. believes this to be unlikely. The Canadian view is that the USSR will probably achieve first operational capability with this missile sometime in 1960 but does not exclude the possibility that this could occur in 1959. --68. We believe that Soviet planners -intend to acquire a sizeable ICBM operational capability at the earliest practicable date. However, we have insufficient evidence to judge the magnitude and -pace of a `Soviet program to NOTE: 32 Some statements by high Soviet officials during the past year -have indicated that the USSR already possessed, or at least wished us to think it possessed, a considerable operational ICBM capability. Such a capability cannot be ruled out as impossible if the Soviets have had a test philosophy involving fewer long-range tests and more reliance upon component tests at Kapustin Yar than we think likely. Such a philosophy would run greater risks of failure and provide less assurance of accuracy and reliability but also. (if all went well) much more rapid achievement of operational capability. The Soviets may- have believed the political and psychological value of ICBM's is so great as to justify extreme measures to attain a substantial and early deployment. I TOP -SEGRET produce and deploy ICBM's. Considerable preparations for a build-up of operational ICBM capabilities could already have been made without detection by intelligence, as implied by Khrushchev's recent statement that th e pro duc tion of ICBM's has been " successfully set up". In the light of such indirect evidence as exists, we have considered those factors which would affect an operational ICBM build-up, including the Soviet capacity to produce missiles and associated equipment, and concurrently to complete launching facilities, establi.sh logistic lines, and train operational units. 69. Taking into account the complexities of the tasks which would have to be accomplished, we believe that the USSR could achieve an operational capability with 500 ICBM's* about three years after first operational capability date. With overriding priority and exceptional success in the test and production program, this capability might be achieved in as little as two years after first operational capability date. Assuming a build-.up in three years from first operational capability to a capability with 500 ICBM's, a capability with 100 ICBM's* would be achieved'in about a year and a half; assuming a two year build-up, 100 would be achieved in about a year. The achievement of operational capabilities such as these within the time periods estimated would require an extremely high order of planning and accomplishment, and would also require an increase in the average rate of ICBM firings for test and training purposes. 70. The performance of this ICBM can be expected to be improved. By 1963, its CEP will probably-be reduced from 5 to 2. 5 n, m. (**) as guidance system errors become less. Further improvement to.about 2 n. m. may be expected- by about 1966. An increase, in range, by installing a warhead of lower weight and/or improving the propulsion system, is also possible. The following three paragraphs are Canadian view only. 71. - The USSR - is considered to have a requirement for an ICBM having a fast reaction time and CEP'S approaching 1/2'n. m. The missile should have a range of at least 4., 000 n. m. and the capability of being launched from highly protected sites, or mobile launchers. 72... Suitable solid or storable liquid engines for such a missile could become available by 1962-1963. The missile itself could become available by about 1965 and-have the following -characteristics: -Maximum Range - 5, 000-7, 000 n. m. Guidance - Inertial ' These numbers of ICBM's are selected arbitrarily in order to provide some measure of the Soviet production and deployment capacity; they do not represent an estimate of the probable Soviet requirement or stockpile. Primarily range, as opposed to azimuth, error. TOP SECRET- 33 A0036847135-000873 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformati TOP SECRET TOP SECRET a system would probably find application only in a new construction submarine. Because of the problems inherent in other guidance systems, we estimate that a 1, 000 n. m. cruise- type missile system, if developed, would probably employ a combination inertial and radar map- matching guidance system and be capable of delivering about a 2, 000 pound payload with about one n. m. CEP. ' CEP - 2-3 n. m. possibly less'.if-storable liquids used Warhead - 1-5 MT, high speed re-entry type Reliability - 70% minimum 73. Towards the end of the period, perhaps as early as 1968, the accuracy of the missile could probably be improved to . 5-1 n. m. Reduction in warhead weight to achieve the same yield by that time would give a greater range capability providing a wider choice of re-entry trajectories. E. SUBMARINE LAUNCHED CRUISE TYPE AND BALLISTIC MISSILES 74. . Soviet submarines with missile associations ( including missile-like, tank- like, and launcher- like objects on deck) were first sighted in 1955, suggesting that a program to develop a submarine guided missile system was initiated sometime in 1954. Available information indicates that these initial efforts were probably undertaken with a relatively unsophisticated cruise- type missile. Whether or not this development program was successful cannot be ascertained. We believe that by 1955-1956 the USSR could have developed for operational use a cruise- type missile capable o£ a range of up to 500 n. m. at high altitude and a speed of Mach . 8 to . 9. However, the technical and operational considerations of achieving an acceptable CEP at this range would have presented various difficulties. We believe that the USSR would have been able to achieve an acceptable missile accuracy, about 2 n. m. , only with a radar-track/radio command guidance system. The guidance range of this system would be limited, by line of sight and the submarine antenna size, to about 200 n. m. This could have led the USSR to develop a missile of only about 200 n. m. range capability. On the other hand, this same guidance system could be utilized with the same degree of accuracy at missile ranges of up to 500 n. m. but only by use of an additional forward guidance. submarine stationed within 200 n. m. of the target. Such operational employment would, by approximately doubling the number of submarines required, greatly increase the risk of disclosing any intended attack but would afford the launching submarine greater physical security through increased stand-off distance. Considering these factors, we estimate that the USSR probably developed and now has operational a subsonic cruise- type missile ( SS- 7), capable of about 200 n. m. maximum range, to be guided by the launching ship. A relatively simple system of this type, which can be employed with converted submarines, is a logical fir'st step in the development of an operational submarine - launched mis sile capability. However, it does not satisfy estimated Soviet requirements. 75. In order to provide for increased range capabilities up to about I, 000 n. m. , the USSR could pursue the development of one or possibly both of two advanced missile -systems for submarine use, although there is no evidence of the development of either system. a. A 1, 000 n. m, range supersonic ( about Mach 1. 5) cruise-type system coulcT-probably be developed and become operational in 1960. Conversion of existing Soviet submarines to accommodate such a missile is impractical; such 34 TOP SECRET b. Alternatively, the USSR has the capability to develop in a fouryear development program, a submarine- launched ballistic missile and a compatible submarine. To achieve maximum operational concealment of the, submarine, such aballistic missile would probably be designed for submerged launching. Extremely accurate underwater navigation would be required. The U. S. estimates that the first operational capability for such a system (SS- 8) will probably be in the 1961-1963 time period. The missile system would probably employ solid or storable liquid propellants and inertial guidance, attaining a CEP of about 4 n. m. Warhead weight is a critical factor in determining the size and, hence, the number of missiles that can be carried on a submarine; the system would probably be designed for a low- weight payload, about 1, 000 pounds. The Canadian view is, that this missile will probably be available in the 1962-1964 time period. It will probably have a CEP of 3 n. m. including submarine navigation error and a warhead yield of 1 MT increasing to 5 MT later in the period of this Estimate. By 1965-1967, the accuracy of the missile could probably be improved to give a .CEP approaching one nautical mile. 76. In view of the very extensive Soviet experience with ballistic missiles and the guidance problems inherent in long-range cruise-. type systems, we believe that of the alternatives described above, the USSR would elect to develop the ballistic missile system. The U. S. does not, however, exclude the possibility that the USSR may develop a 1, 000 n. m. cruise- type system. The Canadian view is that the USSR will develop only the ballistic missile. '77. Operational Capabilities. We believe that two separate guide mis-, sile submarine programs of different magnitudes must be considered when assessing the potential Soviet capability with this type of weapon. The first is associated with initial Soviet efforts with a relatively short-range and unsophisticated cruise- type missile, capable of external stowage on converted submarines of.existing classes. There is some evidence that a few conversions may have already takenplace. In view of the existence of approximately 300 Soviet long-range submarines, it is clear that the USSR is potentially capable of converting .large numbers to cruise- type missile employment. However, external tank stowage is not the most desirable solution to the stowage problem, since it imposes ratlier severe limitations on speed, stability, and mane uverability'of the launching submarine. Such a conversion may be impracticable or impossible for large missiles. Internal stowage would require such extensive conversion to present submarines that a large conversion program would not be practicable. We, therefore, believe that to date the USSR has probably converted only a few conventional submarines to guided missile employment, and that it is unlikely to convert large numbers in the future. TOP SECRET 35 A0036847136-000874 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformat4 I- TOP.SECRET 78. Termination of construction in; -1957 of existing Soviet submarine types probably marked the initiation of -new submarine programs. These programs will probably include the construction of submarines specifically designed as ballistic missile submarines, and possibly some as cruise- type missile submarines with internal stowage. F. FURTHER MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS 79. a. Because of the lack of specific data on the configuration of estimated Soviet missiles, only minimum and maximum cross-sectional areas for radar frequencies in the L- and S- band, with nose- on aspect, are estimated: Over-all Missile Area ( sq meters) Min. Max. Nose Cone Area (sq meters) Min. Max. AS- 1 1 10 the radar target would be large but we have no knowledge of the effects of vaporization or other methods of tankage disposal. 80. Flight Profiles. This discussion of profiles is limited to cruisetype missiles only, specifically the AS- 1, AS- 2 and SS- 7. AS- 2 1 10 - SS- 4 5 10 . 25 . 50 SS- 5 5 10 . 25 . 50 SS- 6 5 10 . 25 . 50 .SS- 7 1 10 SS- 8 5 10 . 25 . 50 b. AS- 2: Two profiles might be possible with this missile. A high flight pro-Tile might consist of a launch at 40, 000-50, 000 feet, followed by a climb to 60, 000-70, 000 feet for mid- course flight, and finally a near- vertical terminal dive commencing approximately 10 n. m. from the target. A low flight profile might include a launch -at about 5, 000 feet, with mid- course flight at this altitude, terminating with a vertical dive into the target. For this latter flight profile, maximum range of the missile probably would be reduced from 100 n. m. to about 80 n. m. c. - b. The above figures are estimated for the time period in which the missile systems first become operational, or essentially the present time. The present state of the art appears to limit practical applications in the field of minimizing radar cross-sectional areas. However, considering the enddate of the long-range period in this estimate, it must be expected that considerable strides will be made during this period in such techniques as improved heat sinks, streamlining of nose cones without the introduction of prohibitive heating, and reduction in weight and size of warheads. It is the U. S. view that these--or other developments could result by the mid- to latter period of this estimate in a reduction in the cross-sectional values given herein by a factor of perhaps ten or more. The Canadian view is that the radar cross- sections of the nose cones of ICBM's may be reduced before reentry, to the order of. 0. 01 square metres by shaping alone for a plus or minus 60 degree aspect and to the order of 0. 001 square metres for a plus or minus 30 degree aspect: alternatively the use of radar absorbent material ( RAM) could,produce. significant reductions in cross-section areas of nose cones prior to re-entry and possibly_ after. If tankage accompanies the nose cone 36 TOP SECRET a. AS- 1: Employment of this missile system requires that launch be accomplished at between 10, 000 and 20, 000 feet altitude. The missile then flies at a relatively flat angle of approach to the target. Radar Cross- Sections Arbitrary Missile Designation 44 . TOP SECRET SS- 7: (1) This missile probably is capable of both high and low-level trajectories. The high approach would involve a boosted launch and constant rate of climb to a cruise altitude of 25, 000-35, 000 feet. The missile would enter a terminal dive approximately 5-15 n. m. from the target. The low approach likewise would include a boosted launch and constant rate of climb, but to an altitude of only 2, 0004,000 feet. The missile then would cruise at a relatively flat angle of approach to the target, with missile range reduced to 50-80 n. m. (2) These two profiles presume the use of a radar-track/radiocommand guidance system. Various combinations of range, cruise altitude, and terminal trajectory between these two extremes are possible. A self-contained guidance system, such as inertial, could decrease the low altitude . flight profile to 1, 000-1, 500 feet without correspondingly reducing the missile's range. 81. Reliability. We estimate that when they first become operational, the missile systems discussed above will have a system reliability of 40- 60 percent after launch. In general, missile reliability can be expected to improve for several years subsequent to the initial operational capability. Further increases in reliability'can be expected only if a given missile is subjected to continued improvement rather than being replaced by a second generation or completely new type. Because of the limited information available on the performance of either USSR or U.S. missile systems, there is considerable question as to the validity of any detailed figures on missile reliability which might be presented at this time. The following figures regarding Soviet missile reliabilities under operational conditions should be treated as assumptions rather than as firm estimates. - Definitions for the table below are as follows: TOP SECRET 37 A0036847137-000875 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformati TOP SECRET TOP SECRET of'missile propulsion stages, following separation of the re-entry body. Another possibility is through the use of chaff which might be widely and carefully distributed, although the problem of achieving this distribution is a difficult one at present. In both cases, however, the poor aerodynamic characteristics of the decoy material facilitate the problem of radar discrimination by the defense. While these techniques may be employed by the USSR, it is believed they would serve more as a nuisance, through the production of a. Column 4. The percentage of the missile stockpile which is considered serviceable and available fo-r use at any given time. The remainder of the stockpile is considered not available for use by reason of undergoing maintenance and modification or of being in supply pipelines. Air and submarinelaunched missiles in this latter category would not be loaded on operational craft. a certain amount of clutter, rather than as true deception means. b. Column 5. The percentage of missiles considered to be serviceable ( Column 4) which will meet prelaunch checks and actually leave the launcher when fired. c. Column 6. The percentage of missiles which leave the launcher (Column 5) and reach the vicinity of the target. For long-range ballistic missiles this is considered to be a reliability of the missile through burn- out. d. 1. Column 3. The date for which reliability is estimated. 3. 4. In Commission Missile Z. Initial Operational Capability Year M AS- 1 1956-57 1959 75 AS- 2 1960-61 1961 SS- 4 1956 5. Launch M 6. PostLaunch r• c. The more probable types of decoys the USSR might be expected to employ in conjunction with ballistic missiles are those whose characteristics are such as to make discrimination of true re-entry bodies difficult if not impossible. Possible configurations are " jacks", " darts", "balloons", and " rings". Relatively large numbers,of the lighter balloon or ring- type decoys could be carried compared to the heavier jack or dart types. In any case, decoys would be carried at the expense of the warhead weight, and there is no intelligence available to indicate Soviet thinking in this regard. This probably would depend primarily upon their estimate of the effectiveness of Allied antimissile defenses. (%) G. 90 80 95 90 85 1959 on 85 90 80 83. There is as yet insufficient evidence upon which to base a detailed estimate of the method of employment of ballistic missiles in attack on North America. In a general way, however, it appears probable that, so long as the number of missiles available can be said to be limited, the USSR would seek to achieve the simultaneous arrival of all missiles on the targets se- SS- 5 1958 1959 75 85 70 SS- 6 ( ICBM) 1959 1962 75 85 65 SS- 7 1955-56 1959 on 85 80 75 SS- 8 US: 1961-63 1963 70 80 50 , Canadian: 1962-64 82. lected. 84. The employment of 350-700 n. m. missiles against Alaska from the Chukotski Peninsula, presents the USSR with a difficult logistics problem. .This isolated area must be supplied by air or sea. Missile units garrisoned in this area would probably select and prepare a number of launching sites, and when an operational requirement for firing developed, they could move missiles by motor transport from the local storage to the launching sites, service the missiles and fire.. Because of the difficulty of resupply, missile units in this area would probably have a sufficient supply of missiles on hand to accomplish all their anticipated missions. Missile Decoys a. Little or no information is available on Soviet activities in the field of missile- carried decoys. However, it is entirely logical to assume that the USSR will exploit every opportunity to confuse and/or saturate defenses organized to counter a Soviet offensive missile attack. Due to weight, space, and time of- flight limitations it is doubted that efforts will be undertaken in this direction with other than intermediate range and interc6ntinental ballistic missiles. b. With the latter missiles several possibilities exist. Decoy material can b6provided from metal fragments obtained by the controlled destruction 38 EMPLOYMENT OF SOVIET MISSILES TOP SECRET 85. Guided missiles may be expected to play an increasingly important role in Soviet planning throughout the foreseeable future. The USSR probably plans to utilize missile delivery systems to the extent of their capability,availability, .and applicability in attacks on North America. Thus, it is believed that at least during the next several years, most of the Soviet ICBM operational inventory and most of the Soviet naval- launched SSMs would be allocated for attacks against North American targets. In the earlier -stages of their operational availability, these missiles would supplement attacks by manned bombers and it seems likely that the USSR will place increasing reliance on ICBMs for intercontinental delivery of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the role of other missile systems will probably gradually increase in importance. TOP SECRET 39 A0036847138-000876 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformati i TOP SECRET TOP SECRET For example, the threat to Alaska posed ;by 700 n. m. , 1, 100 n. m. , and per haps shorter range missiles, could b'e developed to sizeable proportions, if the USSR decided to build up the necessary launch capabilities in northeastern Siberia. 86. There is insufficient intelligence data to provide for realistic estimates of current or projected inventories of Soviet- missiles. With respect to the ICBM, however, some measure of the Soviet capacity to produce and deploy these missiles is given in paragraph 67-73, Section III D. It must be expected that gradually other missile systems will be' widely employed as normal unit equipment and that inventories will grow in accordance with over-all Soviet requirements, priorities, development and production capabilities. Thus, ASMs would be assigned in increasing quantities to bomber units and missile launching submarines would be scheduled for gradual introduction into the Soviet fleet. Employment of SSG's 87. A substantial part of the nuclear retaliatory bases in North America lie within a few hundred miles of the Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf of Mexico coastlines. Many of the largest cities and the major industrial complexes are located in coastal areas. All of these broad target systems will become increasingly vulnerable to submarine- launched missile attack as Soviet guided missile submarines are added to their fleets in larger numbers and as longer range missiles are developed. 88. If cruise- type missile submarines are in fact developed and constructed, the USSR may have about 35 submarines, , some nuclear and some conventional- powered, equipped for internal missile stowage by mid- 1963. An additional 20 long-range submarines could be converted to topside stowage for cruise- type missiles within 4 to 6 months of the decision to do so. Assuming an operational availability of 75 percent during the initial. stages of a general war the USSR could have as many as 40 missile launching submarines .in mid- 1963 capable of launching missiles armed with nuclear warheads against North American targets. In the Canadian view the creation of any of these cruise- type missile capabilities is very unlikely". Although an accurate estimate of the numbers of such submarines which the USSR might use in an initial attack cannot be made, it is believed that in order to achieve maximum weight of attack consistent with the achievement of surprise, the USSR would probably employ a significant number of their SSG's in an initial attack on North America. Those guided missile submarines scheduled for initial attack would most likely be deployed from Pacific and Northern Fleet bases on a staggered schedule over as much as a month before D-day under maximum security procedures. The submarines could take station a few hundred miles off the coast and as D=day approached proceed to predetermined launch positions at slow speed and deep submergence. 89. As ballistic missiles with ranges up to 1, 000 n. m. and nuclear propulsion for the launching submarines become available operationally, the threat will increase considerably. Nuclear propulsion will make feasible the 40 TOP SECRET stationing of such submarines in mid-Atlantic and/or other areas for extended periods. On short notice and with little risk of detection these submarines could move to launching position. Such procedures could be combined with an increase in tempo and scope of routine cold war submarine operations in order to set such operational patterns that the Allies would not find large numbers of Soviet submarines at sea sufficient cause by itself to expect imminent hostilities. Launching Sites and Logistic Support 90. System mobility appears to have been a basic consideration since the early developmental 'stages of Soviet ballistic missiles. The mobility evidenced by missiles displayed in the 7 November 1957 Moscow Parade tends to confirm this belief. 91. The shorter range missile systems, in particular, are designed for mobile operations to include full- track or wheeled- vehicle carriers, and could be deployed rapidly to forward areas for operational employment. Even in the longer range 700 and 1, 100 n. m. systems, it is probable that allinertial guidance systems will have been developed by 1960, which will increase the operational flexibility and mobility of these systems. 92. Mobility as applied to the Soviet ICBM system would comprise rail transport to previously prepared sites, some of which would have only a minimum of fixed equipment. It is believed that planning for ICBM deployment was conducted concurrently with the detailed missile system designs; as early as 1956 hardware concepts could have been sufficiently firm to permit the USSR to make basic decisions regarding projected ' ICBM deployment. Such decisions would have included the location of operational launch sites, general operational concepts, and logistic support. It is concluded that the " USSR will have ample time to complete the preparation of operational launching facilities required for ICBM deployment.' 93. Logistic support requirements for Soviet ballistic missiles will be reduced toward the end of the mid- range period through the probable development of solid and storable liquid propellants for most, if not all, Soviet surface-to-surface missi-les. 94. ), No firm information is available as to the number of cruise- type, submarine- launched missiles ( SS- 7) that can be carried by Soviet submarines. However, it is estimated that the missile- carrying capability of each submarine is limited to perhaps 2-4 missiles. No information is available on the capacity of submarines which will employ the ballistic missile ( SS- 8), but submarines designed for this specific purpose should have a resonable capacity, perhaps on the order of 4-8 missiles per submarine. 95. It is estimated that the BADGER medium bomber is the primary carrier of the currently operational air- to- surface missile, the AS- 1, although larger aircraft could be modified as missile carriers. No information is available to indicate the proposed carrier for future air- to- surface missiles, nor the number of missiles which might be carried per aircraft. TOP SECRET 41 A0036847139-000877 _ 4__ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformati TOP SECRET SECTION IV ELECTRONIC WARFARE 96. 1959 - 1960 a. The ECM equipment complement of mid- 1959 Soviet long-range bombers normally will consist of chaff dispensers and chaff, jammers for various frequency ranges, warning, search and jammer " set- on" receivers, and pos sibly infrared countermeasure s ( IR CM) flare s. The weight and volume of this equipment is such that in a nominal air defense environment, the bomber cannot carry a sufficient quantityto completely protect itself. For this reason, mutual defense tactics are used, the ECM equipment complement of a given type of bomber is not uniform and constant, and the trade-off of other capabilities for additional ECM capability is practiced. b. Chaff is believed to be an important part of the present Soviet ECM capability, but radar jammers in all frequency ranges used by the Western nations' radars are believed to exist, and VHF and UHF communication jammers have been indicated. c. The placement of the chaff chute exits as well as the construction of the chaff samples recovered indicates that the chaff- dispenser may be a chaff- cutter. The resultant chaff has relatively low reflective area per unit weight. Nevertheless, it has beenobserved to provide effective chaff corridors and false targets, indicating that the dispensing rate is sufficient to overcome the limitations of the material itself. The weight penalty, however, remains, and may amount to a factor of two compared with the operational chaff of western nations, although it must be remembered that the Soviet chaff observed and recovered may be obsolescent and used only for practice in peripheral areas. d. Operational active jamming equipments in the microwave region are probably designed around CW magnetrons, noise modulated and manually tuned, although a mechanically tuned, slow sweep mode may be available. A "fast" sweep jammer has been observed, but the frequency range of the fast sweep is unknown. It may be an electronically " wobbulated" CW magnetron. It appears.to be in at least a service test stage. Experimental carcinotron jammers -probably also exist. The X- band operational jammers are believed to have a power output of about 150 watts, and require at least three tuning heads to cover the X- band from about 8500 to 9500 Mc/ s. Equipment for other frequency ranges is probably comparable. e. The VHF and UHF jammers probably utilize conventional spacecharge control tubes. The power output is estimated at 300 watts. The tuning is probably manual, and jamming restricted to one channel at a time. f. Infra- red counter-measure flares, if used, are probably derived from the signaling flares widely used in the Soviet Air Force ( SAF).' Bombers with 30 flare ports have been observed. TOP SECRET 45 A0036847140-000878 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformati TOP SECRET 97. To 1963 - 1964 10 expected to be installed in all aircraft and will be supplemented by ECM escort aircraft in which some part of the weapon delivery capability is sacrificed for additional jammers, or chaff. By 1963, O a, a. The period between mid- 1960 and about 1963 is expected to be a Soviet ECM build-up period, during which ECM doctrines, equipment, and techniques will be developed and standardized. Operational active jamming equipment will probably be based largely on CW magnetrons, although by 1960 carcinotron jammers are expected to be available, as shown in Table 7 which follows paragraph 98. The nominal aircraft complement shown in the table is b. H N O r• ' 10 a 10 a A a H .• H .• H .• 4 U a H •• d o U s a s w to to to to to 0 N N N N N N N N O N N N O 0 N o 0 N O o N o O N N Soviet high- power carcinotron developments are ex- 0 CD N 0 N N pected to be sufficiently advanced to permit the introduction of the high- power jammers necessary to cope with the advanced radars associated with the .U. S. air defense system of that period. . Western development of radiation-homing N N W Cd En Y w d U U a M O to 14 to 1• to tin to to to N i14 •4 ° to t O 9 ow cd 4 0 N 0 a••°' r. O ° H ° O to 0 Ul H W W N O Cd a U 41 U w I O • cd O H U 9 -H -H p 4 a ° H ++ 0 0 N 0 . a 'd 5 a. It is very probable that the Soviets will exploit techniques for jamming 2000-4000 Mc/s radars such as defend SAC bases, particularly the acquisition radar. The stacked beams of the acquisition radar provide coverage at high elevation angles making the. upper beams virtually,immune to ground- based jammers unless very heavy jamming is employed to penetrate the side lobes. Such jammers may have some effect on the lower beams. Another technique which appears to be particularly promising is tropospheric scattering to accomplish main lobe jamming with ground-based jammer powers of the order of 50-100 kilowatts focused into a narrow pencil beam. Side lobe jammers dispensed by aircraft, surface vessels, or submarines may also be employed by the Soviets, along with decoy material (with or without radiating equipment) ejected from the vehicle during flight. The necessary electronic devices for such decoys could readily be provided. .D O 0 •0 o 0 •0 o 0 •0 O 0 •0 o o •0 o O N O O N O 0 o 0 M 0 0 (n o 0 M O o M O to 1-4 o to ­4 a) b U) C d Cd U) Cd 4' N 11 •. 11 3100-3300 2900-3100 M 2700-2900 1200-1300 1100-1200 c O 0 v :t• o H , :• 0 14 b. Radar camouflage material may be used on missile re-entry bodies to reduce the apparent radar cross section. w oa En 7) O •'. b (d b w M to •0 N 00 d Cd 0 U) U 4• • U N w Cd Cd Cd 3 O O rd 'O o _' •• !~ ­4 ­4 M Cd TOP SECRET M -• y° 0 a to., w• 0 a U U 0 0 N P, W y +• O O ° N 'y J O b 0 to 00 o H 4J O' • Cd O U W H Wo 0 O Si Ur U d ° y M ¢' y M U y H Cd .a go M H U W o m 4J • CD 0 o H cd • H Cd 0 C) 0 D O cd U • 0 O U) y U Cd N • 0 > .• 'b Long- Range Period TOP SECRET H .V 0 to ° cd 4• y 4 a° supplemented by ECM escort aircraft. 46 '1 4 U ri missiles will probably make Soviet barrage jamming at frequencies in the X- band, and higher, dangerous to them. Consequently, Soviet electronic countermeasures are expected to rely heavily on deceptive techniques. Soviet equipment for this purpose is expected to have many modes of operation and be based on traveling- wave tubes having about one kilowatt output. Table 8 shows the probable nominal ECM complement of typical Soviet long-range aircraft by the end of this period. The capability represented will again be 98. _ Cd to o 0 U 0 0 to 0 0 Cd b4•0 U a• to w to 0 0 M Cd di a +-3 1 O .• Should Soviet bilities. hemisphere g. The use of homing prin ciples is widely employed by the SAF and the development of a radiation homing missile is within Soviet present capa- hemisphere TOP SECRET U o H acd bw 47 A0036847141-000879 �TOP SECRET g. The use of homing prin ciples is widely employed by the SAF and the development of a radiation homing missile is within Soviet present capabilities. To 1963 - 1964 Soviet high- power carcinotron developments are ex- r• O 10 a, H N O to N N 0 0 to N N 0 0 10 a 10 a A a H .• d 4 U a H •• o U Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - 0 M ri to 0 U Y U w 0 N 4 O • t O ow 9 ° TOP SECRET Cd +-3 _ M O .• 0 1 b4•0 U a• Cd N W U H 0 to O cd 4• y En 4 Cd Cd 0 U) y U d U a cd O ° H ° O r. a••°' cd I ++ ° 0 H 9 -H Cd U y O U • w H p 4 o 'd H o Si U H H cd • . a 0 N 0 -H O to 0 Ul H W W N O Cd a U 41 U .V a a° 0 D W o H Cd cd U • O > .• 'b N 0 O H 4J O' • Cd O U Ur U d ° y M ¢' Cd 4' U) C d a) b v :t• ° 4• 14 b 0 U) M P, W (d U w -• O •'. b oa o H , :• 0 m 4J • w y y 7) N Cd .a go Cd En W H Wo U) +• N 'y J O b 0 • U Cd N w Cd H o U Cd 3 O acd bw 47 A0036847141-000879 M Cd •• !~ ­4 ­4 O rd 'O o _' d Cd y° 0 a to., w• a U U 0 0 0 '1 4 N ' Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformati 0 H .• to H .• di to w to w s to s a to a to O N O O o to ­4 O 0 to 00 00 N N N N 0 CD N N o O N N O o N N o 0 N N O 0 N o 0 N N N o O •0 o o •0 O 0 to tin to to to N i14 •4 ° o 0 •0 O to 1-4 O o M o 0 M to Should Soviet 97. a. The period between mid- 1960 and about 1963 is expected to be a Soviet ECM build-up period, during which ECM doctrines, equipment, and techniques will be developed and standardized. Operational active jamming equipment will probably be based largely on CW magnetrons, although by 1960 carcinotron jammers are expected to be available, as shown in Table 7 which follows paragraph 98. The nominal aircraft complement shown in the table is By 1963, expected to be installed in all aircraft and will be supplemented by ECM escort aircraft in which some part of the weapon delivery capability is sacrificed for additional jammers, or chaff. b. pected to be sufficiently advanced to permit the introduction of the high- power jammers necessary to cope with the advanced radars associated with the .U. S. air defense system of that period. . Western development of radiation-homing to to 1• o 0 to 14 O 0 •0 hemisphere •0 0 0 (n N 11 •. 11 supplemented by ECM escort aircraft. C) 0 o 0 M •0 3100-3300 hemisphere .D O 0 M 0 O c O 0 M M 2900-3100 missiles will probably make Soviet barrage jamming at frequencies in the X- band, and higher, dangerous to them. Consequently, Soviet electronic countermeasures are expected to rely heavily on deceptive techniques. Soviet equipment for this purpose is expected to have many modes of operation and be based on traveling- wave tubes having about one kilowatt output. Table 8 shows the probable nominal ECM complement of typical Soviet long-range aircraft by the end of this period. The capability represented will again be 5 CD 0 M N 2700-2900 Long- Range Period TOP SECRET 1200-1300 98. a. It is very probable that the Soviets will exploit techniques for jamming 2000-4000 Mc/s radars such as defend SAC bases, particularly the acquisition radar. The stacked beams of the acquisition radar provide coverage at high elevation angles making the. upper beams virtually,immune to ground- based jammers unless very heavy jamming is employed to penetrate the side lobes. Such jammers may have some effect on the lower beams. Another technique which appears to be particularly promising is tropospheric scattering to accomplish main lobe jamming with ground-based jammer powers of the order of 50-100 kilowatts focused into a narrow pencil beam. Side lobe jammers dispensed by aircraft, surface vessels, or submarines may also be employed by the Soviets, along with decoy material (with or without radiating equipment) ejected from the vehicle during flight. The necessary electronic devices for such decoys could readily be provided. TOP SECRET b. Radar camouflage material may be used on missile re-entry bodies to reduce the apparent radar cross section. 46 1100-1200 �a Cd a• Cd M O U 0 s~ • 0 41 o a N 0 Ln 0 N 0 CD to 0 0 O N i O Ln 0 a O O O 1950 20 -, cd U3 Y 3 w P. a• a • U) a a a4 o CD O o O o 0 0 Co a) o 0 o aA CARCINO TRN O O O 0 O O O CD 1700000a -, o O O z H 0 U N M oc ecial Features U O Ln I O 0 U 8, 000 - 12,500 a• d O U M 0 0 P a W PQ O 0) O •U •I hemisphere z PQ H amplification 1w-4 _ • U Fore and aft 5,000-6,000 CARCINOTRON Fast sweep U CARCINOTRON Direct noise A A. GENERAL SECTION V SUBMARINE THREAT Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'occes it Pinformoti TOP SECRET 99 . It is estimated that as of mid- 1959 the Soviets will have about 450 submarines, including about 270 modern, snorkel- equipped long-range sub- marines capable of world-wide operations. This is by far the largest fleet of submarines ever assembled during peacetime by any nation and as such poses. a serious threat to United States and Allied naval forces and sea communications throughout the. world. This threat will become more serious as advanced weapons and nuclear propulsion are incorporated. 100.. The Soviet submarine force is dispersed among four main fleet areas, which are virtually independent of each other. Only those submarines in the Northern and Pacific Fleet areas can be considered an immediate threat to the North American continent during the initial stages of a war. However, there are alternative bases in the Northern Fleet area for submarines of the Baltic Fleet and it is possible that long-range submarines of the Baltic Fleet would be moved to the Northern Fleet area before hostilities in a way which would- not prejudice surpri se . A greater threat to North America co u ld thus be developed in the early stages of a war, without gaining control of the exits from the Baltic Sea. 101. The large number of submarines in the Northern Fleet makes it possible for the USSR to maintain submarines on station off the East Coast of Operations could be conducted off the West In the Pacific, the submarine force has been increasing steadily in and quality and is now capable of prosecuting intensive submarine North America for purposes of interdiction of Allied sea communications. In addition to submarines in this area, the Northern Fleet could support continuous operations in the Norwegian Sea, the Eastern Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and other important areas. 102. numbers warfare in many vital areas. Coast of North America. submarines and 103. In addition to possible missile- launching operations ( See Section III), Soviet submarines are capable of carrying out the following operations in the ocean areas adjacent to North America: a. Torpedo attacks on naval surface vessels, merchant shipping; A0036847142-000880 49 b. Minelaying on coastal convoy routes and in approaches to ports and harbors, either as specific missions or as part of other antishipping operations. TOP . SE-CRET H Fast sweep * See footnote, Table 7 0 TOP SECRET F+ Fast sweep Fast sweep O o 0 0 0 0 o O o 0 o O O 0 0 0 Fast sweep O o O o o 0 0 0 0 ot Fast sweep 1,400-1,900 TOP SECRET 48 ESTIMATED BISON AND BEAR NOMINAL ECM EQUIPMENT COMPLEMENT IN 1963-1968 r �Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'occes it Pinformoti 48 O U cd w Fast sweep U3 Fast sweep Fast sweep Y a M aA a4 a A. a• a • marines capable of world-wide operations. This is by far the largest fleet of submarines ever assembled during peacetime by any nation and as such poses. a serious threat to United States and Allied naval forces and sea communications throughout the. world. This threat will become more serious as advanced weapons and nuclear propulsion are incorporated. 100.. The Soviet submarine force is dispersed among four main fleet areas, which are virtually independent of each other. Only those submarines in the Northern and Pacific Fleet areas can be considered an immediate threat to the North American continent during the initial stages of a war. However, there are alternative bases in the Northern Fleet area for submarines of the Baltic Fleet and it is possible that long-range submarines of the Baltic Fleet CARCINO TRN 0 would be moved to the Northern Fleet area before hostilities in a way which would- not prejudice surpri se . A greater threat to North America co u ld thus be developed in the early stages of a war, without gaining control of the exits from the Baltic Sea. N M oc O o O o o 0 0 0 0 ot 41 O o 0 0 0 0 o O o 0 o O O 0 0 0 1950 20 -, o a a 101. The large number of submarines in the Northern Fleet makes it possible for the USSR to maintain submarines on station off the East Coast of North America for purposes of interdiction of Allied sea communications. In addition to submarines in this area, the Northern Fleet could support continuous operations in the Norwegian Sea, the Eastern Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and other important areas. a• 0 Ln 0 P a W N 0 0 CD to o O O O O O o CD CD O O O o O O 0 o o 0 0 Co a) o N Ln 0 O 0 z O O z H 0 PQ H 0 1w-4 _ U U A U • U In the Pacific, the submarine force has been increasing steadily in and quality and is now capable of prosecuting intensive submarine 0 warfare in many vital areas. Coast of North America. TOP SECRET r O O N i O 102. numbers * See footnote, Table 7 O O Ln I O 8, 000 - 12,500 0) •U •I U 5,000-6,000 d U CARCINOTRON O 0 CARCINOTRON 0 0 1,400-1,900 PQ M GENERAL 99 . It is estimated that as of mid- 1959 the Soviets will have about 450 submarines, including about 270 modern, snorkel- equipped long-range sub- P. U) 1700000a -, SUBMARINE THREAT Operations could be conducted off the West 103. In addition to possible missile- launching operations ( See Section III), Soviet submarines are capable of carrying out the following operations in the ocean areas adjacent to North America: a. Torpedo attacks on naval surface vessels, merchant shipping; submarines and b. Minelaying on coastal convoy routes and in approaches to ports and harbors, either as specific missions or as part of other antishipping operations. H 0 3 F+ s~ • a Fore and aft a• Cd Fast sweep Fast sweep Fast sweep amplification SECTION V hemisphere Cd Direct noise TOP SECRET ecial Features ESTIMATED BISON AND BEAR NOMINAL ECM EQUIPMENT COMPLEMENT IN 1963-1968 TOP SECRET TOP . SE-CRET 49 A0036847142-000880 �Document disclosed under the Access to information Act - ' I • Document divulgue en ve rt ude la Loi sur Pacces oPinformatioh 1 (0 TOP SECRET 104. B. Estimates of Soviet submarine strength mid- 1959 through mid- 1963 MID 1960 MID 1961 MID 1962 CHARACTERISTICS i are set forth below: MID 1959 TOP SECRET 105.. Modern, postwar types comprise over 60 percent of the total force and are the real backbone of the Soviet submarine force. Four classes of postwar design boats have been identified to date-- the long-range " F", " Z", and " W", Classes and the Q Class medium- range submarine. The " Z", MID 1963 " Long Range New Construction " 255 255 255 255 255 Long Range New Design (Non- Nuclear) 10 20 30 40 40 Other Long Range 12 7 2 0 0 Old Long Range 39 37 32 27 23 Nuclear ( Torpedo) 1 3 5 9 14 Nuclear ( Guided Missile) 1 3 6 9 12 *Guided Missile ( Conventional Power) 2 5 11 18 22 *Guided Missile (Converted to Topside Stowage) All other submarines (medium- and short- 128 122 111 TOTAL 448 452 452 105 103 463 469 " and characteristics- is limited. It appears to be a large torpedo attack submarine with a range capability somewhat greater than the " Z" Class. The "F" Class appears to be conventionally powered and armed with conventional weapons. • It is believed that these boats are fitted with a long-range passive sonar array indicating an SSK capability. 106. Basic estimated characteristics of the " F", " Z", " W" and C. I 108. The Soviet Union has stockpiled bottom mines actuated by magnetic induction. The most probable advances in mines will be new or improved firing mechanisms, such as influence, magnetic, acoustic and pressure devices or any combination of these. While it will be possible to fit mines with nuclear charges, it is considered that this will only be done in exceptional circumstances since it might be an uneconomical use of fissionable material. TABLE 9 CHARACTERISTICS OF " F", " Z", " W" AND Q CLASSES OF SOVIET SUBMARINES " " Displacement (Tons) Surface ( Full) Submerged „F " II Z II II W II. II Q II - 1950 2290 1300 1450 400 465 240 22 15 165 17 14 Dimensions ( Ft.) Length ( OA) 310-330 Beam ( Extreme) 27-30 Draft ( Maximum) 50 TOP SECRET " 107. In addition to conventional torpedoes of the types used in the Second World War, the Soviet Union is believed to have a torpedo with hydrogen peroxide propulsion, a range of 16, 000 yards at 48 knots or 10, 000 yards at 55 knots, and equipped for passive homing or pattern running. It is thought that improvements in the immediate future will increase the range of this torpedo to more than 20, 000 yards, and that by 1960 a 1,100 pound warhead, possibly nuclear,' could be carried. An active homing torpedo may come into service early in the period of this estimate. missile submarine systems, and possibly also submarines designedfor internal stowage of cruise- type missiles. While -there is little evidence on the In the Canadian view, the provision of submarines for use with cruise- type missiles is very unlikely. Q SUBMARINE WEAPONS New Soviet submarine programs now underway will probably include ballistic progress of such programs, the figures given here take account of both possibilities. See Section III E, paragraphs 74-78, for discussionof availability of ballistic missiles for employment with submarines. " Classes are set forth in Table 9. Estimate possibly 2 ( W and/or Z Class) now converted. Whenever decision taken to do so, estimate Soviets could convert up to 20 of this type within 4 to 6 months. range) " "W", and Q Classes are conventional, diesel- powered, snorkel- equipped boats embodying sound submarine principles, and apparently compare favorably with those of nations having experience in submarine design and construction. The " F" Class is a recent development; intelligence on its details TOP SECRET 290 26 17.5 51 A0036847143-000881 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - • Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces it ('information i TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TABLE 9 ( Cont'd) TABLE 9 ( Cont ' d) 11 Armament Bow tubes Stern tubes No. -Torpedoes No. Mines F11 11 Z 11 ,T W IT 11Q11 Class Propulsion Surfaced 6-21" 4-21" -6-21" 2-21 " 24 48 4-21 11 2-21" 14 26 4-Z1" None 8 12 Diesel's 2 X 2000HP 4 Cycle Diesels 2 X 2000HP 4 Cycle Diesels 3 X 550HP 4 C ycle Diesels 4200 KW 2800 KW 1400 •KW Unknown; snorkel Direct; snorkel Direct; snorkel 3 shafts 650 650 450 360 342 308 .180 171 154 35 33 30 Submerged Drive Unknown; snorkel Diving Limit ( Ft.) Operating Fuel Capacity ( Tons) Maximum Usable ( 95%) Usable less 10% Reserve At least two diesel engines are known to be installed. Surfaced Snorkel Submerged Speed (kt s) Endurance (nm ) Speed(kts)-Endurance Speed(kts)-Endurance Available intelligence is insufficient to compute detailed performance characteristics. "Z" Maximum: Cr ui sing: 11 W 16 10 6,900 17,200 11 8 7,100 12,400 17 3 8.5 108 15 10 6,000 1Z,000 11 8" 5,100 8,'3 00 16 4 8 144 16 1,700 12 1,300 10 4,600 8 2,500 15 4 7.5 144 11 Maximum: Cruising: R adii (nm) Days on Station Somewhat greater than " Z" 1 6,600 6,300 10 6,000 17 5,000 48 4,500 1 4, 200 10 4,000 16 1,500 1 1,200 10 1,000 15 The radii presented above are based upon the following arbitrary patrol conditions: 1. Each day of transit consists of 12 hours surface running at 10 kts during twilight and darkness hours. The remaining 12 hours consists of snorkel running during the day at a speed of 8 kts. Z. D. Performance T1 F 11 Operating Radii:* Fuel consumption on station is based upon 3 knots speed of advance submerged (battery), with sufficient snorkeling to maintain the batteries. FUTURE TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 109. It is believed that the USSR will concentrate upon improving the quality of its submarine force during the next few years rather than upon an increase in numbers. It is estimated that between mid- 1959 and mid- 1963 the total numbers of submarines of the USSR will increase by only about 20. This period, however, will probably see the addition of about 30 new " F" Class attack submarines and about 25 nuclear submarines. The United States also estimates that the USSR is developing a submarine launched ballistic missile system ( SS- 8) for first operational use in 1961-1963. The Canadian view is that the first operational use will be in the period 19,62-1964. Possibly new construction cruise-type missile submarines could become operational at an earlier date. If the latter are in fact developed and constructed, the USSR ' may have about 35 submarines, some nuclear and some conventional powered, equipped for internal missile stowage by mid- 1963. We believe that to date the USSR has probably converted only a few conventional submarines to guided missile employment, and that it is unlikely to convert large numbers in the future. 11Q11 Maximum: C rui sing: 52 TOP SECRET 110. In December 1957 the USSR launched the icebreaker LENIN designed for nuclear propulsion. Three pressurized water reactors probably are being. TOP__SECRET 53 A0036847144-000882 �P Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act TOP SECRET TOP SECRET or have been installed in the LENIN. It is believed the USSR is vitally interested in the application of nuclear propulsion to submarines. Although the evidence is not firm, it is the U. S. view that the. USSR may already have commissioned one , or more nuclear- powered submarines. The Canadian JIC has no evidence that any Soviet nuclear- powered submarine is in existence. After the USSR achieves- an acceptable SSN design it is estimated that each year until mid- 1963 it will add SSN's in small numbers to its force. Beyond SECTION VI OTHER THREATS A. 111. With advances in propulsion technology it'is expected th'at' -the USSR will develop improved designs of standard submarine ordnance, such as torpedoes, and will also probably develop radic ally new types of submarine weapons. - These will probably include submerged launched missiles _capable of attacking surface and subsurface units. E. AMPHIBIOUS THREAT 115. Due to the general lack -of suitable ships and landing craft the Soviet capability to conduct amphibious assault operations is negligible in all four Fleet areas. Small raids and reconnaissance-type operations are the only amphibious assaults that could be - conducted by the Soviets. The Soviets do have the capability to sea lift large forces by utilizing merchant shipping, but the number of Liberty ships or their equivalent capable of self-' discharging heavy equipment at any off-loading area is limited. Therefore, any largescale movement of Soviet tactical units - with organic supplies . and equipment would.depend on the loading'and unloading facilities available at both ends of any sea lift. As they have in the past, the Soviets will use -any and all means available if considered necessary to conduct amphibious operations, administrative sea lifts or other types of surface naval operations by unconventional means in future wars. that time SSN's and SSGN's might replac.e conventional units at an accelerated rate. EMPLOYMENT 112. It is believed that prior to the initial air and missile attack on North America, Soviet submarine operations which would prejudice surprise attack would not' be conducted in North American waters., Immediately following'ihe initial assault, Soviet- submarines on station in North American waters can be expected to engage in such operations as torpedo attacks on merchant shipping and naval surface ships and submarines, and minelaying along coastal shipping routes and in approaches to ports and harbors.' -Concurrently with these operations, similar operations will be initiated by Soviet submarines,'on station elsewhere. Submarines not previously deployed may be expected to sortie without delay after D-day to augment the Soviet submarine effort. 116. Certain limitations will be imposed on the size and composition of any forces planned for employment against Alaska or the Aleutians by: . a. Lack of suitable ports and landing beaches in Alaska and the, Aleutians. b. The fact that in Alaska and the Aleutians logistic support of most airfie-ld sites would be extremely difficult. 113. Soviet long-range submarines except the " F" and " Z" classes have somewhat limited range and endurance. Because of this and other limitations characteristic of extra long-range operations, it is believed that the number of submarines assigned antishipping missions off the coasts of.North America will probably be limited to about 5 submarines off.each ( Pacific and Atlantic) coast during,the early period of the estimate with perhaps.-a slight increase_ by 1963, 9 c. The dependence of the bases, from.which such operations would be mountecT, on limited and vulnerable s.ea communications. d. Probable sizable requirements for Soviet Far East sea lift in. other than the Alaskan-Aleutian area. The effect of these limitations would probably be to restrict the current Soviet amphibious capability against Alaska and the Aleutians to the landing of a force of 4, 000 to 6, 000 troops. 114. Although the Soviet submarine mining capability is large, the number of minelaying submarines to be employed to North American waters will be limited'. How ev er , fr om time to time concentrated minelaying operations may be expected. Submarines can -be " expected to lay both moored and ground mines with various types and combinations of influence firing mechanisms. It is expected that submarines employed on missile'and -mining missions will carry a limited number of torpedoes.- 117. - In view of the limitations on Soviet amphibious capabilities, it is estimated that the initial attack on North'America would entail little threat of amphibious operations beyond commando-type raids against selected targets in the"Aleuiians, the coast of Alaska north of Bristol Bay, and even possibly against parts of Canada and continental United States: These raids would most probably be launched from submarines. B. AIRBORNE THREAT 118. The Soviet Union has about ten airborne divisions and ample reserves with parachute training. It is estimated that about 850 aircraft are assigned to Aviation of Airborne Troops, including some medium transports, that could be made available for airborne operations from the Soviet Far East. 54 TOP SECRET- TOP SECRET 55 A0036847145-000883 1 - ;I Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces n I'informatio �N About one-fifth of the airborne forces aircraft are helicopters and this proportion appears to be increasing which reflects an improved short-range close- support capability. At present, Soviet Aviation of Airborne Troops is not equipped with any medium or long-range transports with front or rear loading doors and capable of carrying heavy equipment. However, Soviet airborne capabilities are expected to increase during the period of this estimate by the receipt of newer type modern transport aircraft with equipment which will permit all-weather operations. 119. The Soviet Union could carry out •airborne operations against Alaska to seize airfields and to seize or to 'destroy other military installations and areas. Considering the logistic limitations of northern Siberia, and the importance of that area to long-range bomber operations, -it is estimated that a maximum scale single operation could now- employ approximately 200 trans ports for airborne assaults. These transports could lift a force of about 5, 000 troops in an initial assault with a build-up to about 13, 000 within five days. Small scale airborne operations, including parachute operations also could be carried out against Greenland, Iceland, and certain areas of Northern Canada if medium transports were used or if one-way missions with light transports were utilized. 120. Successful airborne operations in Alaska, the Aleutians, Northern Canada, Greenland and Iceland could deny bases and other important installations in the area to the United States and Canada, at least temporarily, while enabling the USSR to attempt operations from these bases. Small ground parties could facilitate operations of Soviet bombers by setting up navigational aids, and by attacking small, isolated- air defense installations and other isolated targets. 121. However, range limitations of aircraft and limitations of base facilities, together with adverse weather conditions, lack of jet fighter protection and logistic limitations would make such operations difficult. Areas seized would be difficult to hold and support. The denial of bases for our operations could be more effectively and economically achieved by missile and aircraft attack, although airborne operations would be required if it were desired to captur a and utilize our installations. 122. On balance, we consider that it is generally unlikely that the Soviet Union would attempt sizable airborne operations against North America at least ,in the early stages of a nuclear war, although airborne operations on- a small scale against isolated points in Alaska and the Aleutians would be a probable course of action. Small parties might be landed with.radio and electronic equipment to acquire intelligence or to assist the aircraft and missile attack; and small numbers of airborne troops equipped with man- pack nuclear weapons ( when they are available) could attack a few targets which -were . considered unprofitable for aircraft or missiles. Airborne operations against- Northern Canada, Greenland and Iceland are considered improbable. i TOP. SECRET C. INTERNAL THREAT Sabotage. 123. There is no evidence to indicate that Communist Parties in North America; are organizing sabotage groups. However, sabotage in wartime whether carried out as a part of a 'comprehensive Soviet plan of attack against North Azriericaor committed more or less spontaneously by local Communists and Communist sympathizers, must be assumed to be inevitable. Known and anonymous local Communists and fellow travellers could take part in .sabo ta ge attacks planned and coordinated by trained saboteurs who had entered the United States and Canada,* and who would themselves be capable of sabotage. Local Communists and Communist sympathizers could also commit undirected acts of sabotage against targets of opportunity. 124.. - Nuclear weapons and BW or CW agents could be used clandestinely to destroy or neutralize key targets and could achieve a great deal of destruction, disruption and psychological effect at relatively little cost. Considering the known limitation of the means of physical detection, the USSR could probably introduce into the United States or Canada and detonate in place a consider able number of nuclear weapons by clandestine means. Some of the components of nuclear weapons ( other than fissionable material) could be obtained locally and the remainder imported by various means or smuggled by agents,. For some weapons, highly skilled technical supervision would be required for the procurement and assembly of these components. Assembled nuclear weapons could also be introduced under cover of diplomatic immunity, as " in transit" commercial shipments, covertly by aircraft, by smugglers, as bombs to be detonated in the holds of merchant. ships, as mines to be laid in key harbors by merchant -ships, or by small parties landed from submarines or by parachute. However, to keep the risk of compromising surprise within acceptable proportions, it is estimated that the USSR would be forced to limit the number of weapons so introduced. The. USSR has the capability for clandestine BW attack against personnel in buildings or concentrated in r.elatively small areas, and for such attack against livestock and certain crops. The small amount of BW agents required could be introduced into the United States clandestinely or, in some cases, produced near the sites of their planned employment. Small scale clandestine employment of CW agents is a technical possibility. The physical means ofconventional sabotage, such as fire, explosives or abrasives could be procured from local sources 125. The main targets of any organized attempts at sabotage ' in North . America would probably be sources of electric power, transportation systems. and communications networks, sabotage of which would hamper or put out of action defense industries and installations. Sabotage by Communists or sympathizers acting on their own initiative could be directed against a wide range of targets of opportunity. 126. Because of the danger of prejudicing surprise, sabotage is unlikely to be carried out before the outbreak of hostilities. However, during and after the initial attack, sabotage committed both by trained Soviet saboteurs and by TOP SE GRE1. Y nl'informotiory TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 56 Document disclosed under the Accbss to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces 57 A0036847146-000884 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformation G" i TOP SECRET TOP SECRET local Communists and sympathizers acting 'spontaneously or under guidance is probable, although the scale of such operations would be reduced both by the effects of the initial attack and by countermeasures. Subversion SECTION VII NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS A. 127. Known and anonymous Communists and sympathizers, with access to communications media including under-ground press and radio could attempt in wartime: to undermine the confidence of the people in government policies, institutions and leaders; to exploit by rumor and other means the confusion that would exist amongst the population, . especially that -part of it subject to attack or evacuation; to impede vital industries and facilities.through strikes and slowdowns; to foster unrest; and to reduce the efficiency of the armed forces by adversely affecting morale. 128. Although Communists using underground facilities might be active from the time the first public warning of war was issued, their usefulness for subversion would-be curtailed both by countermeasures and by the effects of the nuclear attack. Depending upon Communist methods of subversion, the effort might have a reverse effect by revealing the underground apparatus of the Party and making it susceptible to countermeasures. Nevertheless, subversion, including the circulation of clandestine propaganda sheets, would probably increase after the initial stages of the war. Espionage 129. The USSR is thoroughly capable of conducting high-grade espionagein spite of the countermeasures available to the Western nations. " Legal residents'! operating under Soviet diplomatic cover in North America would be neutralized at the outbreak of war and their functions would have to be assumed by trained and integrated '' illegal residents". The latter will have -had to prepare espionage networks designed to operate during an emergency with radio equipment necessary for efficient clandestine communication with the Soviet. Union. The networks would attempt to ascertain the degree of success achieved by Soviet attacks on North America, and to furnish the Soviet Gov-' ernment with data on North American capabilities, potential and intentions. 130. In spite of- the efforts of Western counterintelligence the Soviet Union will retain a.capability to conduct espionage operations in North America. The scope of these operations would be limited., however, -by Western countermeasures and by the disruption of the networks caused- by the nuclear exchange itself. NUCLEAR 131. There is substantial evidence that the USSR is continuing the expansion of both military and nonmilitary nuclear energy programs. These programs will continue to be accorded a very high priority. The USSR has a broad scientific base in the nuclear sciences and is competent to continue important progress in fundamental research as we ll as i n i mprov in g nuc l ear weapons and integrated weapon systems. We have not been able to identify all of the factors which will limit-the expansion of the USSR military and nonmilitary nuclear energy programs. These programs are now quite substantial and are expanding due to increased efforts by the atomic energy industry of the USSR. .132. The nuclear weapon development program of the USSR is vigorous and wide in scope. Achievements thus far in the nuclear weapons field indicate that the. program is staffed by highly qualified scientific personnel. The USSR -has stockpiled a variety of nuclear weapons and is making a continuing and concerted effort to -improve thermonuclear and fission weapons. Since the beginning of the Soviet weapon test program in August 1949, at least 70 tests have been detected, of which 30 were conducted during 1958. The current stockpile in the USSR could include weapons yielding possibly as much as 20 MT for aircraft delivered weapons. It is not possible to make an accurate detailed -estimate of the Soviet weapon stockpile. Nevertheless, we estimate that on-baje nuclear weapons storage sites exist at many Soviet long-range bomber bases. Although we have been -unable to detect nuclear weapon storage sites at installations of other components of the armed forces, such sites', as well as centralized or national nuclear weapons storage sites, probably exist. For the next few years, there probably will be competition for available fissionable material between the demands of small- yield weapons for tactical use and for air defense and the demands for large- yield weapons for use against' retaliatory forces and area targets. If this competition arises, we presume that the Soviet planners would be prepared to restrict the availability of weapons for tactical use in the interests of air defense and attacks on retaliatory bases; we presume that the Soviet planners are arranging their production' schedules with this factor in mind. In any event, it is improbable that a shortage of nuclear weapons would be a limiting factor in an attack on North America, except possibly during the first two or three years of the period of this estimate. 133. For technical reasons, it is most unlikely that the Bloc would employ radiological warfare agents, except as by-products of nuclear warfare (e.g., " fall- out"). 58 TOP"SECRET TOP -SECRET 59 , A0036847147-000885 �Document disclosed under the Access to information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformation TO.P SECRET TOP SECRET B. SECTION VIII BIOLOGICAL 134. We believe that- the Soviet Union has an active BW program. It probably encompasses antipersonnel, anticr•op, and possibly antilivestock agents. Current research appears to supporrt a complete BW program including such work as stabilization of aerosols, and studies in unusual routes of infection. We estimate that the Soviet Union is -now capable of employing BW on a large scale against me,,n and animals. We believe that substantial progress will be made in the modification of the immunogenic properties of bacteria, in'the adaptation of certain viruses to BW and in the -use of toxins. Extremely virulent organisms of this type could be developed during the early part of the period of this estimate; bye about 1968 these could }fie available for filling into munitions. No estimates are available of the amounts of BW material likely to be available to the Soviet Union at any given date or of the lethality of individual agents. Delivery; of BW agents could'be accomplished by aircraft spray, aircraft bombs, : missiles, or clandestine 'means. 135. BW agents are unsuitable weapon's for attack on Western nuclear retaliatory capabilities because of the dela• between the attack and.the appearance of its effects and because physical installations would not. be destroyed. - There is a greater (chance that BW agents might be used to attack . population and industrial targets, either in-areas which -the Soviet planners did not wish to devastate or in support of an attack with nuclear weapons. C. CHEMICAL 136. We believe that the Soviet Union is now able to produce -'IV" and " G" type nerve agents in operationally significant quantities. We donot believe that major increases in toxicity could be obtained by further development of agents now known to exist; other types of chemical substances which act by a route different from the nerve agents are believed to be under consideration by the Soviets, but it is unlikely that any of these will be developed into useful CW agents during the period of this estimate unless a break-through should- occur. It is believed that during the period of this estimate that certain effective incapacitating agents may be developed. N'o firm data are available o f the _ amounts of CW material available to the Soviet Union. CW weapons are unsuitable for attack on Western retaliatory capabilities because they, would not destroy physical installations and because of the ease with which such targets could be protected from their effects. There is some chance that CW agents might be used to attack population and industrial centers, either- in areas which the Soviet union did not wish to devastate or in support of a nuclear attack. SPACE PROGRAMS 137. -It is extremely difficult at this time to separate Soviet space activities which have direct military application from the remainder of their space research effort. It appears that the Soviets' over - all research and development program has such direction that successes or breakthroughs in one area are quickly exploited in others. Likewise, . it must be expected that the USSR will not hesitate to capitalize on any military applications that may arise as a result of its space research, regardless of the initial purpose of such research. 138. It is believed that the ultimate foreseeable objective of the Soviet space program is the attainment of manned space travel on an interplanetary basis. ' Soviet space activity for specific scientific and/or military purposes probably is programmed with a planned, step-by-step progression from one achievement to the next. The following specific objectives appear likely:*. a. Unmanned Satellites. The USSR could probably orbit surveil- lance sateIIites. capable of low optical resolution ( approximately 100-200 feet) at any time within the next year, to obtain weather data and perhaps some additional data of ,military intelligence value, such as information on fleet movements.- Withinanother year or two, the USSR could develop more sophisticated, surveillance satellites, involving improved photographic or TV reconnaissance, infrared photography and/or ELIIYT. Such satellites could provide more diverse scientific and military information. The USSR could also develop a communications relay satellite early in the period- of this estimate, should they elect to do'so. b. Lunar Rockets. An important Soviet objective is to acquire scientific data on the moon. This data can be collected by unmanned rockets launched to the vicinity of the moon ( lunar probes), by unmanned lunar satellites and by soft, or hard impacts on the moon. We estimate the USSR could achieve an unmanned lunar satellite in 1959 and an unmanned lunar soft landing using retro-rockets about six months thereafter. c. Manned Earth Orbital Flights: Test flights with manned high altitude research vehicles (rockets or boost glide) probably will be required to obtain necessary data on the environment of outer space. Manned flights will probably increase in altitude and duration, prior to the orbiting' of a recoverable manned satellite. Soviet sources have stated that a manned space vehicle is feasible and is, one of the USSR's prime objectives. Sufficient scientific data could probably have been attained and recovery techniques perfected to The dates given in this paragraph represent the earliest possible time period in which each specific event could be successfully accomplished. It is unlikely that all of these objectives will be achieved within the specified time periods. 60 i TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 61 A0036847148-000886 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces it Pinformation. it ,0• TOP SECRET TOP SECRET permit the USSR to launch a manned-satellite into orbital flight and recovery by about 1959 -1960. The Canadian view is that a date one or two years later would be more probable. d. Planetary probes. Planetary probe vehicles could utilize existing Soviet ICBM propulsion units for the first stage and presently available guidance components. We believe the USSR could launch probes toward Mars and Venus with a good chance of success. More sophisticated probes _could be launched in October. 1960, when Mars will be in_ a favorable. position relative to the earth. Similarly, the first launchings toward Venus could probably occur in June 1959, January 1961. and more sophisticated probes could be launched in e. Manned circumlunar flights. Contingent upon successes with manned earth satellites, the development of a new, large booster engine, and concurrent advances in scientific -experimentations with lunar rockets, the USSR could achieve a capability for manned circumlunar flight with reasonable chance for success in about 1961-1962. The Canadian view'is that a date one or two years later would be more probable.' .f . Manned lunar landings. We believe that the USSR will not have a capability' for manned lunar landings until sometime after 1965. g. Space platforms. There is insufficient information on the problems involved in constructing platforms in space to permit us to estimate Soviet capabilities in this regard. We believe, however, that the USSR would be capable of placing a very large satellite ( say about 25, 000 pounds) into orbit in 1961-1962. Such a vehicle could serve some of the scientific functions of a space platform without the difficulties of joining and constructing such a platform in space from parts separately orbited. SECTION IX PROBABILITY OF INTELLIGENCE WARNING A. AIRCRAFT 139. Intelligence warning of a Soviet air attack would be largely dependent upon two factors: the character and level of air activity which Allied intelligence had come to consider as normal; and the ability of the Soviets to conceal air activity above that level. The higher the level of air activity considered to be normal, the greater the number of aircraft which could be deployed for attack without being considered unusual. Activities related to Soviet air operations and security, as distinguished from bomber-tanker movements, such as greatly increased radio communications activity, build-up of supplies, movement of personnel, etc. , might also provide indications of preparations for attack. It would be difficult to judge at what point the chances of receiving warning indicators would be better than even. The Canadian view is that, failing permanent deployment of BADGER aircraft to forward bases, we would expect to receive some advance warning of an impending attack on North America during the next few years while these medium bombers would have to stage. B. ICBM - IRBM 140: Possibilities of obtaining warning of the positioning and preparation for launching of ICBMs and IRBMs are not encouraging. It is hoped, however, that some essential patterns of activity may become observable over the next few years which may provide generalized warning. Soviet Long - Range Aviation activity or other operations associated with the over-all attack may of course provide indirect warning of a missile attack. C. SUBMARINES 141. During periods of low international tension, considerable numbers of Soviet submarines could probably sortie, under conditions of maximum security and deception, without Allied knowledge. The scale upon which Soviet submarine operations, including operations off North American coastlines, can be conducted without jeopardizing surprise will depend among other things upon the scale of operations which had come to be accepted as normal. By increasing the tempo and scope of submarine operations the Soviets might ' hope to set up such operational patterns that the West would not find increased numbers of Soviet submarines at sea sufficient cause to expect imminent hostilities. The degree of tactical warning that we may expect during the period of this estimate will depend upon the progress achieved in ASW and related fields. D. AIR DEFENSE PREPARATIONS 142. The chances of detecting Soviet defensive. preparations would largely depend onthe riskthe USSR wouldbe willingto accept as a result of neglecting 62 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 63 A0036847149-000887 :I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformation TOP SECRET TOP SECRET or delaying some or all of those defensive measures, including civil defense, which might normally be expected. In view of the threat posed by Allied retaliatory power, the Soviets would probably act in elementary prl, dence and undertake certain defensive preparations. Some warning indicators in this field might be obtained. E.. GROUND CAMPAIGN PREPARATIONS- . 143. In regardto warning being provided by pr-eparations for ground campaigns against Western Europe, Soviet forces in East Germany are .maintained in a high state of readiness, and no reinforcements would be necessary to initiate an attack. The period of preparation would probably not exceed two to seven days, assuming a desire to maximize the chances of attaining surprise. Warning.of unusual and threatening activity would be obtained if major elements were actually assembled in forward positions. Time to accomplish this disposition would vary seasonally, depending on whether units were at home stations or at .some field training phase of the annual training cycle. F. GENERAL 144. If abnormal activity were detected in more than one force component simultaneously, the mutually reinforcing confirmation would increase by afair amount the probability of obtaining specific advance warning. The warning actually given will depend upon the particular context of events at the time, the international situation, -the degree of mobilization which may liave occurred, and other factors, including elements of pure chance, and upon certain variables which cannot be fully anticipated or compensated for by prepared prdcedures. In the final analysis, the warning of attack given by int e lli gence must be a judgement of the probability or possibility of attack. The general effect of improving Soviet intercontinental attack capabilities over the coming years, especially in the field of guided missiles, will be to reduce Allied chances of obtaining significant and timely warning indications. The degree to which this disadvantage will be offset by improved intelligence capabilities cannot be meaningfully evaluated at this time. SECTION X' . . FORMS AND SCALES OF ATTACK A. GENERAL 145. In addition to such basic factors as geography and target characteristics, the Soviet choice of delivery vehicles would be considerably influenced by effectiveness of the various weapons systems involved, including considerations of accuracy, availability, speed, reliability, economy, vulnerability to. defense systems, and susceptibility to detection. These factors are not constant and are subject to substantial changes for given weapons systems over extended periods of time. For example, the ICBM is .expected to evolve dur ing the period of this estimate .to greatly improved effectiveness. While the ICBM will be suitable for attacking many targets from the outset, it will probably not become effective against small hardened targets until late in the period of this estimate. Moreover, while it may remain relatively invulnerable for some time to come, anti- ICBM defenses of increasing effectiveness will probably be developed during the period of this estimate. Other weapon systems will also be subject to changing advantages and disadvantages. The guided missile submarine is expected to undergo substantial improvements in terms of the accuracy, reliability, and range of its missiles. Bomber aircraft will also improve in performance and range characteristics, and will improve in effectiveness along with advancements in air-to- surface missiles; bombing accuracies will remain relatively higher than other delivery systems. On the other hand, the relatively high vulnerability of aircraft to defensive systergs will probably continue to be an important disadvantage in contrast to missile systems. 146. Any initial attack during the period of this estimate probably will consist of a coordinated operation using missiles, aircraft and submarines. The relative effectiveness of each weapon system as determined by its availability, capability and vulnerability to defensive systems will determine the extent and manner in which it is employed. B. 1959-1960 . 147. The USSR would place chief reliance for , attacks against North America upon aircraft carrying nuclear weapons supplemented by such ballistic missiles and guided missile submarines as are available. Guided missile submarines would probably be employed to launch missiles with nuclear warheads against targets along the coast, with the Atlantic seaboard receiving the bulk of the attack. Ballistic missiles would probably be directed against area targets in North America. 148. It is believed that the whole of the available heavy bomber force plus a• substantial portion of the medium bomber force of Long-Range Aviation would be employed against North American targets. The magnitude of an attack which the Soviet planners might decide'to employ against targets on the North American Continent would.vary according to the types of missions 64 .TOP SECRET TOP-SECRET 65 A0036847150-000888 r. �Document disclosed under the Access to information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformation TOP S-ECRET TOP SECRET undertaken as well as to many other:;variable factors. As an example for planning purposes, it is estimated that ( disregarding combat attrition), the Soviets in mid- 1959 could put a combination of about 500 heavy and medium bombers over continental North America in an attack designed to achieve sur= prise. In any such attack during the period mid- 1959 to mid- 1960, a majority of the strike aircraft launched would necessarily be on one -way missions. 149. Soviet employment of a small surprise bomber force ( sneak attack) to be followed by- the main body of the assault is regarded as a possible but relatively unlikely' cour se of - action. Such tactic s would entail extr emely high risks to the Soviets. Shotild a--sneak attack be detected enroute or fail to any significant degree, North American defenses would be at a maximum alert for combatting additional Soviet forces and attacks on the USSR by retali ator y forces would be set 'in motio'ii. Thus, while the possibility of a two- element Soviet attack 8annot be overlooked, it is not considered probable. .150. While some heavy:bomber operations could be mounted from home bases, the USSR would have to use forward bases in Kola, the Central Arctic, Chukotski and Kamchatka for mounting most initial medium and heavy bomber attacks 'against North America: Additional bases _elsewhere in the Bloc' could.` be used after the initial considerations of surprise -no longer existed. 151. Although they must recognize the complications of such an operation, the Soviets would probably plan to the extent possible to penetrate all Allied radar- scr- ,eens simultaneously: They probably would plan'to take the greatest advantage of th e hours of darkness for their missions against North_' America. Some portion of the aircraft would probably be employed as. ` specialized ECM aircraft for diversion and decoy purposes. 152. The Soviets have developed an.operational'pattern with their sub-' marine force which would allow them to have stationed -off the East and West _ coast of North America a small number of submarines for use in the initial stages of general war. It is estimated that .this force.- would be composed primarily of such guided missile submarines* as are available, p.sed in. conjunc-, tion with aircraft in the initial attack. It is estimated_ that along with these guided missile submarines at sea i n th e Atl anti c an d Pacific Oceans there would also be a significant number of torpedo attack submarines, capable of attacking naval forces and shipping soon after- the initial attack is accomplished. ' C. North American targets. Manned bombers would be available in sizable number's, however, and would probably be employed to-supplement missile attacks. - Submarine- launched missiles will probably contribute significantly to the Soviet assault. Each of these weapons systems would probably be utilized in a manner designed to exploit its advantages and minimize its disadvantages. In spite ' of reliability and accuracy factors, the inherent speed of delivery and relative invulnerability of the ICBM render this weapon a most likely choice for initiating the assault on North America. The timing of the diversified operations likely to make up -the Soviet attack would pose extremely, complex . problems to Soviet planners'. To the extent practicable, however, they probably would plan to place ICBM's on target at the time Soviet bombers were penetrating Allied- radar screens. By such tactics, the Soviets would hope to .pin down Allied defenses and retaliatory forces until the bomber attack arrived over its targets. Soviet bombers would probably utilize air-to-surface -missiles ✓against the more heavily defended targets. Soviet guided missile submarines would probably be employed in both the Atlantic and Pacific against North American land targets within missile range. Limited numbers of submarine- launched missiles could also be directed against the Gulf coast. The effectiveness of USSR submarine attacks, including those on shipping and naval forces in North American waters will, be increased by the - advances made in nuclear propulsion and advanced weapons. D. 1964-1971 154. During this period, the Soviet long-range weapons system inventory will probably come to include ample numbers of improved ICBM's and other advanced missiles including submarine- launched types, manned bombers, and, large nuriabers of •nuclear weapons for all purposes_ and with a'wide variety•of yields. It could also include advance d- performance manned winged vehicles capable of hypersonic speeds, ranges of from 6, 000 n. m. to global, and.possibly capable of weapons delivery, and/or other radically new weapon. systems. The Soviets will have markedly improved capabilities in communications, and in electronic'warfare including many types of decoys and jamming techniques. The likely form and scale of a Soviet attack on North America during the latter part of this period may be generally described as inv o l vi n g th e l aunc hi ng o f large numbers of improved ICBM's as the primary means of attack, supplemented by advanced guided missile submarines and advanced bomber and airlaunched -missile attacks. Nuclear submarines with advanced weapons will . probably be on -stations in North American waters from the outset. 1963-1964 153. By mid- 1963, Soviet `guided missile capabilities will probably allow extensive reliance on ICBM's for the delivery of nuclear weapons against - ' 66 In order- to be able to deploy 8-10 guided missile launching submarines off each North American coast in 1959, the . Soviets would have had to make the decision to convert conventional submarines- to guided missile submarines 4-6 months in advance. See paragraph 88, Section III G. 1 TO,P -'SECRET - TOP,- SECRET- 67 E-55692 A0036847151-000889 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Pacces it Pinformation TOP SECRET TOP SECRET A0036847152-000890 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIA00017 Title A name given to the resource CANUS-59, “The Soviet Threat to North America, 1959–1971" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 14-May-59 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived LAC RG24 Vol. 20855 File 7-26-9 Part 10, A-2018-00088 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Intelligence Assessment Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource EN