https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7281766635806ce79d38530a28aaa62f.pdf 95f754106381e66ea201e33b2e433254 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project DND DHH 112.009 (D31) JIC Assessment Forms and Scales of Soviet Attack Against North America, 1 July 1954 ACAI 16 51-02-19 �CO PY No. XA-SVIDa t 3Jiddp rai.D CM 7F{yg VUH 112. oo AC:J 1; d/19 Fej 51: 1Cdn TTS est;-Le ° r ••• sca ssic e 1or rs q es of 7uss an attack on ' north in I TOP SECRET A.C.A.I. 19 February 16 1951 1 13ECL115 , F-• *.trf*ypitffY- 'D fop •• t2 •FOA ONMT rUM0 PETE . CAN UVIS) �TOP SEU TOP SECRET A.C.z.T. COPY NO. 16 19 February 1951 U.S.--CANADIA•4 T T LLIGENCE CONFERENCE Note By The Secretaries The enclosed draft revision of A.C.A.I. wor'••_ns committees, 10, prepared by the is circulated to the Conference to serve as a basis for the revision of 12. TOP SECRET A,C.A.-I. 16 TOP SECRET �TOP SEC. TOP SECRET FORMS AND Safi LES OF SOVIET ATTI'XK A1-`j NST NORTr AM1ERICA --- 1 JULY 1954 SUMMARY THE PROBLEM 1. To prepare an agreed U. .Df the forms and scales S.- Canadian intelligence estimate of Soviet attack against North America in major war commencing on 1 July 195+ . ASSTMPTION - THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 2. it is assumed that there would be little or no warning prior to t._o actual initiation of hostilities. POLITICAL FACTORS POL-T:f CAL ALIGNMENT Soviet 'floc 3. ;' gland Rumania Czechoslovakia ulgaria Hungary The above Outer :Mongolia Albania Communist China Eastern Germany countries will be aligned with the Soviet Union. Soviet Occupied Areas and Base Rights It . 1orkalla ( Finland) Port Arthur ( China) The Sov-et Union will have of the control occupied areas and the use of the tern-tory and resources of the base rights. roTeste•°n Bloc 5. United Kingdom Italy Greece France Norway Turkey Western Germany Denmark Australia Belgium Iceland Ja-. pan The Netherlands Portugal Nov Zealand Luxembourg Spain South Africa Latin America The above countries, to- ether with their dependent territories, will be allied or aligned with the United States and Canada. LOP SECRET 'ICAI to 1 Enclosure TOP SECRET �TOP SECRETIti TOP SECRET Western Occupied Ares.s and Base Rights 6. Trieste Jordan Ceylon Libya Iraq The Egypt Liberia The Western Bloc will have access, territory and resources in the of the at least Philippines initially, occupied county -'_ es, to the and to bases other countries listed below. Other States 7. Finland The Lebanon Pakistan Sweden Israel India Switzerland Saudi Arabia. Burma Treland Yemen Siam Austria Ethiopia Indonesia Yugoslavia Iran Indo-China Syria Afghanistan Nationalist countries attitudes in this list re present a wide range impossible to categorize China of situations and satisfactorily. The greatest common denominator is that all ( except Nationalist China.) would be d_,_soosed to remain neutral unless themselves attacked. however, would be in some degree All, sympathetic with the Western Powers and would look to them for assistance in the event of Soviet or Soviet- satellite attack. GEOGR110 IC , LOGISTIC AND ECONOMIC 8. The size and location of Soviet- controlled territory enable the Soviet Union to threaten many strategic Allied areas while its own vital centers are remote in terms territory. severe At the climate pose tion which will Q. It is able to of ground attack from Allied same time the large area serious problems, continue to be a major drain on the support a prolonged war. - country and its particularly in transporta- considered that by mid-- 195+ the TOP SECRET ACA I 1 of the Soviet economy. Soviet economy will be Soviet heavy industry will be 2 Enclosure TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET 1 TOP SECRET 0 ca ••. h1c of su,pDorting a considerably exp! nded armaments and stocl•s of armaments will no doubt be Soviet forces for a lengthy period. It production sufficient to maintain seems likely that by mid- 195 1!- tae Soviet Union will have been able to acquire stocks of stratec-ic materials . course, and shortages may emerge, of a long war ; the most of machine ment, Some tools, some types industrial diamonds, 00ssibly , tin. significant being special sv.')-Qort types certain ferro-alloys of the expected impprovement in the Soviet economic position by mid- 1954, for in the of electronic and precision equip- natural rubber, In spite however, the Allied economic of a major global war will of the Soviet Union and its still be satellites. It potential superior to that cannot be Dredicted whether at the: beginning of hostilities Soviet armaments production will continue to be greater then combined Allied production. SCIENTIE:L C 10. 10 Scientific Potential. The efforts of the Soviet Union to increase its scientific potential have resulted in a large increase in the number of training institutions and in students rece_ving higher education. The Soviets have many first scientists whose work compares favorably with the best Allied countries. shortage However, in the there is a marked of really good research workers and technicians. Soviet Union will continue to increase the be a. below the top level, class significant output to expand its training facilities and of scientists and technicians. improvement in the junior technical particularly as to the The Soviets have attached a high 1 )Pi_ority to research and development. vast effort energy ?grogram has reduced the research and development TOP SECRET ACAI It of the people. 11. Research and Development. littl'-: doubt that the There will scientific potential Soviet Union between now and mi.d- 195+, number of The However, there is concentrated in the nuclear scientific resources available for in other fields. These capabilities must 3 Enclosure TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET INTOP SECRET be assessed within thy_ which is not adequate frameworlf of the total to permit with the Allied Powers the Soviets to achieve it to equal the total research and development improbable submarine parity that the Soviet Union will be able Allied Y'owers in atomic warfare, airc -,naf t and potential, in many fields of research and development. By mid-- 1.954, is scientific capability of the guided missiles, electronics, development. ENET.1Y CAPABILITIES GROUTTHD FORCES 12. By mid- 195+, the standing Soviet Army will contain at least 2,500,000 men organized into 175 line divisions. tion, the armies of the; Euro ) ean Satellites will matel;h 860,000 mer_ in 78 1_J_no divisions. In addi- contain approxi- Communist China now has ground forces totalling 3,500,000 men organ3_zed into 220 divisions. 13. The Soviet Army is tne most powerful and effective ground comb^t force in being in the world today. Postwar reorganization has stressed mechanization and improved organic logistic As =n ,ared to Wjstern tables defici-ent ment, fire of equipment in the more intricate types support. the Soviet Army is of communications equip- control devices (__ ncluding radar) and heavy calibe r antia4_rcraft guns. 1-'!-. While the moray, Euro l_%ean Satellite armies training and equi_oncnt is but fair, status of the reorganization and re- equipriont program of the Soviet Union is expected to cause Bulgarian, Hungarian and Polish divisions, the at least, to reach standard of Soviet formations by mid- 1954. 15. Despite the weakness of tho Chinese Communist Army in supporting arms and administrative effective fighting force of all the services, it is the most indigenous armies of the Par East and Southeast Asia. TOP SECRET ACAI_ - l5 _ - 4 Enclosure TOP SECRET �TOP SECU 41OP SECRET NAVAL FORCES 16. By mid 1954 the surface force of the Sov:j_ct Navy will have increased particularly in cruiser and destroyer subm^'P---nc strength of the Soviet Navy will strength. in all The likelihood have increased greatly. 17. Their combat efficiency will be below that and Canadian naval forces. Their of the U.S. submarine force, const_tutc a great danger to the Allied sea lines however, will of communication. AIR FORCES 13. It is estimated that J_n July 1954 the Soviet air forces will have 20,000 first line aircraft and about 19. It is 800,000 personnel. considered that the Soviet aircraft and associated industries will provide the Soviet Air Forces between now and mid- 1954 with a steady supply of new and modern aircraft and equi;Dracnt, including large numbers of numbers jet-enginod light and piston-engined medium bombers, of some -Di_ston-engined heavy and possibly small numbers jet fighters and considerable jet-engined medium bombers and of rockett-propelled fighters. It is est!U7,• tcd that aircraft resorvcs will be at least equal to first line strength, 20. but not necessarily identical as to type. The Soviet air forces will in general have the initial advantage of numerical superiority in aircraft. small -proportion of the against North America, Aviation will be entire Soviet While only a total aircraft could be used in operations the ca -0abilities of the Long Range sufficient to warrant an attempt to deliver the stock pile of atomic bombs on this continent. INTERNAL THREAT 21. The Communist Party, U.S.A, and the Canadian Labor Progres- sive ( Communist) Party will be available for employment by the Soviet Union for TOP SECRET ACAf- --f5 subversion, sabotage and psychological warfare. - 5 Enclosure TOP SECRET �TOP SECR'f 1. TOP SECRET MOST PR03ABLE COURSE Or ACT -10-1\T AGAI1+1ST NORTH AMERICA 22. It is estimated that the most probable cou.rsc against, North Americ-- of action initially will be as follo ws: a. Atomic attacks, em-Dloying a substantial _portion of the Soviet Union's atomic stock Pilo. Though some atomic bon"Ds may be laid as mines ' ,n key harbors by merchant or submarines, it ships is believed that the majority of the bombs allocated to North America will be delivered by aircraft. b. Strategic air attacks including: (1) One-way atomic attacks by TU- 4' s 1_n -the Murmansk area and Northeast Siberia against any target United States in the or Canada. (2) Two-way attacks by TU- 4's cmplo•-ing atomic conventional bombs from bases that segment or in Northeast Siberia against of North America bounded by a general line ;gassing through San Francisco, Billings, Mon ta na , Wi nn ip eg. (3) Ti-,o- way attacks by heavy bombers which could reach most major targets in the United States. (4) Possibly two-way attacks with one aerial refueling by TU--4's or modiulil jet bombers from bases in Northeast S`bcria against that segment of North Ai:ierica bounded by a general line passing through Dallas, Gulf of St. Lawronco Calgary in the (5) case in the case Cincinnati and of TU- 4's, and Hanford of mediun jet bombers. Possibly two-way attacks with one aerial refueling by TU-4's from bases segment in the Murmansk area. nglainst that of North America bounded by a general line passing through Philadelphia-Clcveland-Calgary. C. Small scale air attacks against Wcstern and Central Alaska by light bombers and fighter aircraft. d. and The mining of ports and approaches by merchant ships submarines before and on D-day and by submarines after D-day, possibly including the use TOP SECRET ALAI 15 - of some atom-'LC weapon. 6 _ Enclosure TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET e. tiint Submarine. attacks limited niL.iburs of on shipping. It is most submarines will be probable on station in North Ar:; rican coastal waters before D-day. f. of Small amphibious operations against military importance employing sabotage sub.:iarines up to a raaximu;_1 of installations on the Aleutians and the coast (1) operations Operations on a minor Possibly a few scale against troops. installations in Western Alaska. operations by very of four-cngined aircraft against importance 500 assault including: of military importance (2) of military of Alaska north from B»__stol B^.y ranging in strength from 150 to h. Airborne teams from 50 men p-, r boat . c ,- . Amphibious raids against i..)ortance isolated targets small numbers installations in isolated areas within the radius of military of action of these aircraft. i. Attacks against the North Atlantic in the form of air and n^val )oss"_bly including the forces on D-day, operations against Iceland, landing of political small assault subversion and air attacks against Greenland; on the; Island approaches and the or sabotage sabotage; limited seizure of Spitzbergen outbrcalc of hostil _ ties . .j. Attempts to cause; dissension and disaffection through psychological warfare and subversion. k. Attempts to cncourago slowdowns and incite labor unrest w_th a view to causing strikes in critical industries, addition physical explosives and sabotage abrasives and on a limited TOP SECRET AC^ I 1• employing fire, and in scale employing BW and CW. - Enclosure TOP SECREI �TOP SECRET I 0 TOP SECRET FORMS AND SCALES OF SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST NORTH AMERICA - 1 JULY 195+ DETAILED ESTIMATE THE PROBLEM 1. To prepare an agreed U.S.-Canadian intelligence estimate of the forms and scales of Soviet attack against North America in a major war commencing 1 July 195+. ASSUMPTIONS - THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 2. The Allied capabilities for early detection of Soviet military preparations, both inside the Soviet Union and in Soviet- occu,Died Europe, and for positive evaluation as to whether preparations are in connection with forthcoming maneuvers such or possible aggressive hostile action are inadequate and will not improve to the extent probably of affording positive indications during the period under consideration. If air or ground forces appreciabl - larger than those now positioned for initial employment were intended for early commitment, on a considerable redeployment and build-up activities scale would be necessary and might period of warning. However, the Soviet Union might plan to attack with forces already positioned, warning at all. Therefore, provide a in which case there might be no it is necessary to assume that there would be little or no warning prior to the actual initiation of hostilities. POLITICAL FACTORS POLITICAL ALIGNMENT Soviet Bloc 3. Poland Hungary Albania Czechoslovakia Rumania Outer Mongolia Eastern Germany Bulgaria Communist China The above countries will be aligned with the Soviet Union. If by mid -- 1954 there has been no agreement between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers over Germany, TOP SECRET ACAI 1G - the division of Germany will still g TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET fa exist. The status of Eastern Germany will probably have from an occupied area to a Soviet changed satellite. Soviet Occupied Areas and Base Rights 4. Porkalla ( Finland) j Port Arthur ( China) Soviet base rights at Port Arthur expire at appropriate arrangements will the end of 1952, but doubtless be made to keep Soviet forces there. Western Bloc 5. United Kingdom Italy Australia Greece France Norway New Zealand Turkey Belgium Denmark South Africa Western Germany The Netherlands Iceland Latin America Japan Luxembourg Portugal Spain The above countries, together with their dependent territories, will be allied or aligned with the United States and Canada. Latin American Republics will degrees of effective support By mtd-195;-, it the United States in varying cooperation under the Rio Treaty. military assistance may be available is likely that The in some Active cases ( e.g., Brazil). Spain, Greece and Turkey will be def-initely aligned with the Western Powers. If by mid- 195+ there has been no agreement between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers over Germany, the division of Germany will still exist. In this case Western Germany will probably have advanced from an occupied status to definite alignment with the Western Powers. By mid-- 10154 the occupation of Japan will probably have ended but Jal.Mn will doubtless be aligned with the Western Powers. Western Occupied Areas and Base Rights S. Trieste Jordan Ceylon Libya Iraq The Philippines Egypt Liberia TOP SECRET ACA I lb 9 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 The Western Bloc will havr territory and resources in the access, of the at least initially, occupied countries, By mid- 1954, other countries listed above. to the and to bases the Allied forces may have withdrawn i'rom Trieste. Other States 7. Finland Syria Iran Indonesia Sweden Lebanor; Afghanistan Indo-China Switzerland Israel Pakistan Nationalist China Ireland Saud--.Arabia India Austria Yemer Burma Yugoslavia Etri .);. i_a Thailand The countries in this li:.t represent a wide range and attitudes impossible greatest to categorize common denominator is of situations satisfactorily. The that all except Nationalist China would be disposed to remain neutral unless themselves attacked. All, however, would be in some degree sympathetic with the Western Powers and would look to them for assistance in the event of Soviet or Soviet- satellite attack. Some are strongly anti-Soviet but are prevented from allying themselves with the West by special circumstances. Some are neutral for fear of provoking Soviet attack, while others are influenced toward neutralism by a balance of anti-Western and anti-Soviet resist vigorously if attacked, to mere threat of attack. while sentiments. Some would others might well Each being a special case, succumb those of particular interest are discussed briefly below: a. Finland is bound by a Soviet- imposed treaty to assist the Soviet Union if the latter is menaced through Finnish territory. The Finns will not willingly give any military assistance to the Soviet Union; permission to aoviet troops will fight they will to move try to avoid giving into Finland, and they if Soviet forces enter Finnish territory without ex-. Dress permission. TOP SECRET A C• I` 16 - 10 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET b. Sweden will remain neutral unless attacked. c. Ireland, while remaining nonbelligerent, vith the Western Bloc after the d. Austria. that a peace e. Austria f. outbreak of war. is included on this on the assumptic the Tito regime will be in orientation but will probably remain neutral This regime susceptible to can control any internal overthrow favor the Western Powers, pressure, E,. Arab States. and, may assist Apart but would be disposed to as a result of political or them. from treaty obligations, governments will probably be opposition only by foreign invasion. Israel would remain neutral, economic list Yugoslavia under unless attacked. and is cooperate treaty will have been concluded by mid -1954. Yugoslavia. anti-Soviet might all the Arab disposed to favor the Western Powers and to make available to them their economic resources and territories, any active although they may be reluctant to assist cooperation, d-spatch of forces would expect particularly if this involves the outside their the United States h. Iran will attempt •_. India, to own territories. to remain neutral. Indonesia and Pakistan. sympathetic India and Indonesia will to the Western Powers, remain neutral because J. The Korea, Formosa, Pakistan would be but would also probably of fear of Indian designs. Indo-China, Burma, Thailand and Malaya. situation in Korea, Formosa and Indo-China by mid 195+ cannot be determined. i.n Ibn Saud defend Dhahran. ipobably remain neutral unless attacked. more in Indo-China, communist would be If the Viet Minh forces Burma and Thailand would. control, secure power probably come under and the United Kingdom's position in Malaya directly threatened. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 40 ENEMV GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES Soviet Union 8. The Soviet Union is a dictatorship of the exercised through both party and government fac s various internal Communist Party, organs. problems of which three The regime of the most persi-stent are: a. The inherent strains of any dictatorship which rules by regression and fails to !.Dr. ovide its people with a satisfactory standard of living. b. The deficiencies of an autarchic economy. c. Friction between the Great Russians and the major national minorities. The death of Stalin will also raise the question of the transfer of power. The potential sources of disaffection are kept well under control through the communist monopoly of political power and ',)PoT.aganda, isolation of the Soviet people from foreign con- tacts and police action. in full control . In time of the of war, The government is now .and will remain country. the -,potential Union could reduce the war effort op .)osition in the Soviet seriously only if the mechanism of control were thoroughly disrupted or if effective Allied support for disaffected groups were immediately at hand. Satellites 10. The governments under Soviet auspices, of the and there and supervision of the party, country. will satellite countries came to power is now thorough Soviet police and armed forces This firm Soviet control over the infiltratior_ of each satellite governments continue until mid- 1954. 11. Although there of the satellite no appreciable effective of the hostility of the peoples countries to their communist regimes, signs communist methods is evidence of resistance. there are Continued improvement of control will prevent the development in of opposition. TO P SECRET T ALAI _ 1•_ - 12 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 12. its In time control of tho of war the Soviet Union will be able; to maintain over the satellite satellite governments. peoples will not be high, Although the morale this will not take the form of effective resistance: to the Soviet war effort unless the Western Powers are able to *0rovide assistance and direction from a nearby area. Communist China 13. Communist China differs from the European Satellites in that the Chinese own efforts. Communists acquired power largely through their As a result, Moscow is less able to exert direct pressure in Peiping than on its European Satellites. however, there indic are no ations of any divorcncies between the policies of Communist Communist Thus far, ID China and the Soviet Union. Chinese intervention in Korea has Indeed, the served to embroil the Pei-»-ng regime with the Western Powers and consequently to align it even more closely with the Soviet Union. 14. While there is a possibility of cleavage:; between the Soviet Union and Communist China in the long run, their present community of :_ merest and mutual involvement with the Western Powers will tend to keep them aligned. 11 - . It is impossible to foretell Chinese forces in mid- 1954. the strength of the Nationalist It is likely, however, Communist Chinese regime will remain in control 16. In the event that the of the country. of war in mid 195+ the Soviet Union and Com- munist China are likely to be aligned and to cooperate against the Western Powers in pursuing their objectives in Asia. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 17. Soviet policy is simultaneously motivated by Marxist- LenJ-nisi-Stalinist doctrine and by considerations affecting the position of the Soviet Union as a great TOP SECRET A( '7A1 T6 - — power. While their •3 _ TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET 0 TOP SECRET understanding of the developing world situation is influenced by communist doctrine, Soviet leaders are not the strongly lim -'Lted by doctrinal considerations in their choice of courses of action. of the As a result cortmmuzism, identification of the Soviet Union wit? the Soviet leaders are able to exploit the attractions of communism to enlist foreign support for Soviet national interest 18. The Soviet Union commands communist parties, world. legal in this way the allegiance or underground, in most countries of of the These parties advance Soviet interests through parliamentar activities and propaganda. in subversion, sabotage, Communist members can also be employed espionage and even armed insurrection. 1, . A variety of national and international front operate as a further instrument of Soviet policy. organizations Communists have developed or infiltrated trade unions and women's and youth organizations in most parts of the world. in this field is the World Peace Movement. through this movement Urestern defense ) lans. a means The chief recent effort The Soviet Union seeks to undermine popular support for In time of crisis the movement might be of direct mass action against TOP SECRET ACA_ -IT _ preparations for war. 14 _ TOP SECS �TOP SECRET s TOP SECRET Methods of Political Attack General 20. No evidence is available regarding the details sabotage and subversive activities Canada, of future in the United States and but by 195+ no marked changes in the objectives and fundamental policy of the Soviet Union in these fields are anticipated. 21. The Soviet Union has shown great versatility in perfect- ing its world-wide subversive apparatus and in devising new tactics to achieve its objectives. bilities in this As a result, field have been enhanced. Soviet capa- In the field of sabotage Soviet capability may be increased by the development of such weapons as chemical and biological agents. 22. The Soviet Union is row engaged in psychological warfare implemented through political and economic actions. The Soviet Union is engaged in espionage and subversion within the United States and Canada. rently takes It is also encouraging sabotage which cur- the form of strikes and slowdowns in United States and Canadian industry. It is anticipated that these activities will continue in accordance with Soviet directions. Subversion 23. of Communists in the United States and Canada have as one their major and constant tasks the subversion of United States and Canadian citizens-- both as individuals and groups-- and concurrently the promotion of Soviet propaganda themes. full use of local issues, which are distorted to purposes, They make suit their own and they camouflage their work by a facade of front organizations, This tactic which frequently are not recognized by the public. can be expected to continue for the foreseeable future TOP SECRET ACAI 16 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Sabotage 24. There is no evidence to directed physical and Canada at purpose to the present time. open such a campaign, munist Parties, both U.S. to penetrate industry, Should it later suit the Soviet this weapon may be expected to It is significant that the Com- and Canadian, continue their efforts particularly the basic industries. In- served by Communist- dominated unions would be particularl, vulnerable 25. of a Soviet- sabotage campaign under way in the United States be used to the fullest extent. dustries show the existence to the threat of Communist sabotage. The probable effectiveness of Soviet- directed physical sabotage will depend largely on the efficiency of measures in the fields threatened. security The most critical period would be from the opening of the sabotage campaign until the time when security arrangements are in full force. warning can be expected, with military efforts. Little and sabotage would probably be timed It is expected that the campaign will achieve its greatest sabotage success during the initial phase of hostilities. 26. The Soviet Union will possess an increasing capability for employing chemical and biological agents operations between now and ever, 195+. may prevent or delay this for sabotage The fear of retaliation, how- type of attack. Psychological Warfare 27. Canada. At the present time the Communist Party through the medium of its organization of legal expression, Progressive Party ( LPP) Tribune, and its open Party Press, the Pacific Tribune, the Labor the Canadian and the National Affairs Monthly together with the many foreign language newspapers is carrying on an incessant propaganda campaign designed to treat disaffection, Factional disagroementand general dissatisfaction in the minds of the Canadian people with duly constituted Government and its leadership. TOP SECRET ACAI 16 - 16 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET • TOP SECRET 28. United States. through its At the present the Communist Party, open Party press, the New York Daily Worker and the San Francisco Daily People's World, publication Political Aff airs, and through its monthly as well as front organizations, is campaign designed to create disaffection, through its numerous conducting an incessant propaganda and general dissatisfaction in the minds factional disagreement, of the United States populace with the duly constituted Government and its 29. In the event of general war, both countries, USA, as well as some of leadership. the Communist Parties of the more r,-4 ical and extremist organizations of the foreign language groups, would probably declared illegal and their respective presses banned. be In such an event the underground movement would undoubtedly revert to the practice of distribution of clandestinely printed newspapers and mimeographed pamphlets. to endeavor to foment Communist elements may be expected discord, dissatisfaction and confusion by malicious rumor and whispering campaigns and their tactics may be expected to include terrorist activities. Similar methods would be employed for the purpose of slowing down of industrial production as well as generally lessening the people's will to win. GEOGRAPHIC, 30. Topography. LOGISTIC AND ECONOMIC FACTORS The frontier of the Soviet Union has a total length of approximately 38,000 miles, coastline. Only in a few areas, two-thirds of which is however, is this frontier easily traversable by land or accessible by sea. To the south in Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang, Afghanistan and Iran are high mountains and deserts. To the north and northeast are the Arctic Ocean and other cold seas which, with few exceptions, greater part of the year. Black Sea Coast, TOP SECRET ACAI 16 are frozen for the Only the North European Plain, the Baltic Coast, the the Murman Coast and the 17 TOP SECRET �TOP SEEREf 40 TOP SECRET maritime Far East provide avenues of approach to the areas where approximately three- fourths centrated. of Soviet of population and resources are con- In contrast to the remoteness, strategic in terms of land attack, areas from Allied territory, and population centers the industries of Western Europe and the transportation links and oil of the Middle East are all relatively close to the limits of Soviet- controlled territory. 31. miles) The large area of the country ( about 8.5 million square imposes a heavy burden on the transportation system ( see paragraphs 35-37 below). It also mares an integrated economy and a flexible defense plan difficult to achieve, permit the Soviet Union to trade 32. although it does space for time when invaded. The extremely rigorous winter which is experienced through- out most of the country poses further problems, not only in transportation but in almost every other economic and military activity. 33. The Soviet Union has a broader longitudinal perimeter around the Arctic basin than has North America and its location is therefore, transpolar in relation to this continent. attach considerable It must, importance to northern bases, in Northeast Siberia, particularly the Murmansk area and Spitzbergen. Air- fields in Soviet- controlled territory are considered adequate for fighter defense, tactical and strategic air operations, with the exception of those in Northeast Siberia opposite Alaska and along the Arctic coast. By new airfields probably will 195+, have been constructed in numbers as employment of air forces. considered necessary for the Although there are considerable logistic and seasonal difficulties in providing these facilities east Siberia, the Soviet Union has for North- the advantage of a quarter century of experience in developing and maintaining air communications could be in the North. The existing airfields in northern regions supplemented during the winter months by the use of frozen strips which have been known to accommodate aircraft up to the medium bomber weight class. a problem. TOP SECRET ACAI lE Supplying - 18 - such bases would remain TOP RUN' �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 40 34. Many of the seas upon which the Soviet Union has estab- lished naval bases have narrow Sea, outlets. the Baltic and the Sea of Japan; This is true of the Black the Murman coast and parts of the Pacific coast are the only exceptions. 35. Communications and Transportation. The new Five Year Plan commencing in 1951 will include continued development of all means of transportation. Railways will carry about inland freight traffic. will carry more than 87 per cent of all Inland water transport, which is expandint, 8 per cent of the total, and is likely to in- crease in importance. Motor transport will account for almost 4 per cent; pipelines and civil air transport will each account for less than 1 per cent. While the Soviet railway facilities will not be comparable with those of North America in the they provide to industry, service it is believed that Soviet railroads will be able to handle the increased traffic burden occasioned by industrial expansion. it is There may be a shortage of freight taus but unlikely that this will cause a serious bottleneck in the Soviet economy. Motor, inland water and air transport nre not expected to provide any significant relief to the railroads by this time, 36. The present total Soviet merchant fleet, that proportion of the fleets together with of the European Satellites which the Soviet Union could probably make use, is thought be about 2.25 million gross tons, of 1,000 tons ships in the merchant fleets or more. Soviet Bloc are The of to including all seagoing vessels of the smaller than those of the Western nations. Of the total tonnage about one half is made up of vessels between 1,000 and 5,000 tons and only about 125,000 tons by vessels of over 10,000 tons. China has about 106,000 tons, of less than 5,000 tons. The merchant fleet of Coiiununist all of which is made up of vessels By mid- 195+, the Soviet Union and satellite merchant fleet may reach about TOP SECRET .AI CAI 16 are contributed 3.0 million tons. - 19 - TOP SECRET �0 TOP SECRET 37. Transport will continue to be mainly by inland means and therefore less susceptible to attack than Allied sea communica- tions, but reliance on land transport will continue to be a drain on the Soviet economy and to absorb a large effort in manpower and materials. Reliance on rail transport and possibly some shortages of rolling stock and skilled labor will continue, in land transport facilities and the weakness in the Balkans and the need for railroad transshipment at various points still be strategic weaknesses. 33. The telecommunications in eastern Europe will system is efficient and extensive and forms an important part of the mechanism by which the Soviet government controls all important aspects of the national life. STRATEGIC ECONOMIC POTENTIAL Strategic 39. Industries The new Five--Tear Plan which is about to start will aim at the continued development of transportation and heavy industry and at the same time allow for expansion of the other industries important to the military effort ( e.g., expansion will, by both in quantity and quality. expansion would be hampered, satellites, 40. This latter 1954, result in some increase in potential for military production, of the electronics). However, this as would the industrial contribution by effective Western export control. The satellites will be in a position to make a considerabl contribution to a Soviet war effort in 1954. Since 19+8, the policy of the Soviet Union has been designed to channel satellite industrial effort into lines best suited to economy. support the Soviet The heavy equipment industry of Czechoslovakia, electronics industry of Hungary, Eastern Germany are, for example, the instrument industry of producing critical items, major share of which is destined for the Soviet Union. TOP SECRET ACM 16 the - 20 - The the �TOP SECRET T0 7 -' SECRET production of military equipment in the satellites has increased sharply since the beginning of 19+9. Satellite conversion has reached the point where nearly every major plant is now producing under Soviet direction_ some war material or component specificall, designed for war purposes. An effective system of economic co- operation may have been set up in the Far East which would ensure for the Soviet Union a share in the output of Manchurian industry. 41. In trade with countries Union will continue its and equipment, wool, lead, outside its orbit the Soviet efforts to obtain industrial machinery replacement parts and components, bearings, rubber, copper and other materials which the Soviet orbit does not produce in the quantity and quality needed to meet its requirements. Grain and timber, the principal Soviet exports to Western Europe, will probably continue to be offered by the Soviets as means for paying for such imports. Soviet efforts to The success of obtain those imports will depend upon the extent of Allied export controls and the effectiveness with which such controls 42. are enforced. The production of stiocial steel is likely to be hampered by a shortage of certain alloys ( for example molybdenu~n), and that of high-grade petroleum products ( such as aviation fuel and lubricants) by a shortage of specialized equipment. still be some shortages There will of high-grade production machine tools, precision instruments, testing equipments, and replacement parts. Emphasis on the production of synthetic rubber and on its the electronics special purpose bearin quality will probably be intensified. In 195+ industry will not be able to produce radar and communications equipment on a scale comparable with that of the United Kingdom and the United States, but the Soviet Bloc will be able to produce most forms in quantities TOP SECRET ACT I 16 of military electronics equipment sufficient for Soviet military standards. 2y TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Production of 43. Selected Military items lircraft. Production of aircraft by the Soviet Union in 1950 is considered to have been about 10,000 to 12,000. figure could be increased by desired, since adequate aluminum, are available. production is 195+ if the Soviet Government so supplies of materials, particularly Only about half of the total aircraft of combat aircraft. The potential capacity in 1954 might be about 40,000 modern aircraft per year. take 1 to This It would 3 years to increase present production to this capacity, although a considerable increase in output could be effected rapidly by increasing the number of shifts worked. Projection of what is known about current production rates gives a minimum cumulative total of about 2,300 TU -41s by 1 July however, 195+. It is, possible that production of TU -4 aircraft may give way, at least in part, before that date to production of a heavy bomber and a jet medium bomber ( capable of carrying an atomic bomb). rates, On the basis of what is known about current production it is estimated that the curiulative total of will be at least 22,000. light In addition, jet fighters significant numbers jot bombers will have been produced. ' Twin-ongined (IL- 12 1s or improved type) of transport, could be produced as required and a small fleet of four-engined transports is a possibility. 44. Motor Vehicles. The 1950 target of 500,000 units ( of which 90 per cent are trucks and buses) was not reached. estimated x-20,000 vehicles were produced in which were trucks. have increased. It is thought that in 45. 1950, 400,000 of 195+ production will Satellites are expected to produce more 50,000 motor vehicles in It is than 195+. 1'.rmored Fighting Vehicles. The estimated rate of pro- duction for 1950 of 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns could, if desired, be considerably increased in TOP SECRET SCE*I 161 - 22 195+. Potential capacity - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP 0 SECRET for that year will exceed 40,000 but it would take years to reach peak production. of one to two The peak Soviet production rate armored fighting vehicles during Jorld War II was 32,000 per year. It is possible that in Czechoslovakia, 46. 195+ some AFV's may be produced in Hungary and the Soviet Zone of Germany. Shipbuilding. War damage in the shipyards on the BltLck Sea and at Leningrad has been largely restored, while Molotovsk on the White Sea and Far Eastern shipyards have been expanded. The postwar output of Soviet shipyards has been concentrated on naval craft, naval auxiliaries, and small river and fishing craft. .Ls a result, the USSR is not building appreciable nuambers of ocean-going merchant ships of over 1000 GRT and it is estimated that its output of such vessels does not now exceed 25,000 GRT per annum. by 195+. however, could be increased to 50,000 The combined output of the satellites about the 47. This output, is probably at same level but will increase substantially by 1954. Except in the Far East construction of naval vessels was held up b;; the war, and it is only recently that vessels planned for construction during the war are reaching completion. Yards are now becoming available for the construction of postwar ships. Capacity for building submarines has It is known that the increased since the war. Soviet Union received 4 HSS Type XXI and parts for additional boats from the Germans.* Management and Labor 48. By 1954, million persons, the population of the USSR should total 210-12 the population of the European satellites about 94-95 million, and that of Communist China about x+90 million persons. males It is estimated that there will be about 52 million in the 17 -49 age group in the Soviet Union, the armed forces mill be and of these should continue to absorb some 4 million. There 45-46 million agricultural workers and roughly 55 million in nonagricultural occupations. * See paragraph 73. TOP SECRET AC. I lb •3 �TOP SECRET 0 TOP SECRET 49. The present drive to improve technical education will continue, but requirements for skilled labor will also increase with the increases in the volume and technological complexity of industrial production. At present, it is impossible to de- 195+. terline whether the supply of skilled labor will improve by Raw Materials 50. There are no Union which are however, shortages of raw materials in the Soviet likely to cripple its war effort. a number of commodities of which the balanced. There are, supply is critically The most important of these are natural rubber and industrial diamonds. The rubber stockpile is now about two years and is being augmented by supplies Indo-China is from Malaya. a potential source of supply for the Soviet Bloc which could become effective by be in short sufficient for supply in 195+. Industrial diamonds will 1952 unless the Soviet Union begins now to build up a reserve. Lead and molybdenum are both scarce and supplies are unlikely to improve greatly. Tungsten, tin, and cobalt although not plentiful are probably adequate for minimum requirements. Supplies of tungsten and tin will become increas- ingly available from China. Agricultural Production 51. If harvests are normal the Soviet orbit as a whole will continue to be self-sufficient in foodstuffs in 195+ at present rate of consumption. Strategic 52. Significance of Soviet Economy The basic economic strength of the Soviet Union lies in the fact that it has resources of nearly all important raw materia_. within its boundaries and at the same time very large resources of manpower and adequate sources of food. As a result of the shortness of the industrial experience of the country, many of TOP SECRET ACAI 16 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET 0 TOP SECRET the resources will, by mid- 195+, have been only partially de- veloped but the new Five Year Plan siderable improvements. The emphasis in industrial development has been on heavy industry at industries and the ( 1951-1955) will make con- the expense standard of This heavy industry forms of the consumers goods living of the ordinary citizen. the basis for an armaments industry, which is maintained at a high level in peacetime and which could be expanded in 195+ to meet wartime demands ` rithout causing great dislocation to the Soviet economy as details are lacking, it is evident that the Soviet Union has tablished stockpiles of to then. The stocks a whole. While exact es- strategic materials and continues to add of armaments will suffice at least until expanded production permits replacement of conbat consumption. In 1D54 the armaments industry will be capable of supporting a considerably expanded armaments production and stocks of armaments will no doubt be sufficient to maintain Soviet forces lengthy period. It is for a therefore considered that by mid 195+ the Soviet economy will be able to support a prolonged war. in the course of a long war the Soviet economy is However, likely to ex- perience certain shortages which night become progressively more serious. The most significant among these are special types of machine tools and production equipment, and precision equipment, some types of electronic industrial diamonds, of ball and roller bearings, alloys and some chemicals. certain types natural rubber and certain ferroThere is also a possibility that shortages of tin and high octane combat aviation fuel and special lubricants nay develop. whole will be able to In mid 1954 the Soviet economy as a support a major war on a large although the Allies will possess or have at their scale, coimnand a preponderance in resources and production in practically every basic strategic commodity. TOP SECRET Acil i lr 25 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP St CPu7T 0 SCIENTIFIC FI^.CTORS 53 . Scientific Potential. to increase its The efforts of the Soviet Union scientific potential have resulted in a large increase in the number of training institutions receiving higher education. The Soviets have many first class scientists whose worn compares Allied countries. Howover, and in students favorably with the best in the below top level, there is a harked shortage of really good research workers and technicians. Soviet Union will continue to increase the output of be to expand its training facilities and scientists a si.gnficaut improvement in the Soviet Union between now number of 54. The and technicians. There will scientific potential of the and mid 1954 particularly as to the junior technical people. Research and Development. The Soviets have attached a high priority to research and development. There is little doubt that the vast effort concentrated in the nuclear energy program has reduced the scientific resources available for research and developr_ient in other fields. These capabilities rust be assessed within the framework of the total scientific potential, which is not adequate to permit the Soviets achieve parity with the Allied Powers in many fields research and development. to of By raid 195+ it is improbable that the Soviet Union will be able to equal the total research and development capability of the Allied Powers in atomic warfare, guided missiles, electronics, aircraft and submarine development. TOP SECRET 11.C•rlI 1E -25- TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SDC RET 0 MILITARY FACTORS GROJND PORCES Stren". ;ta cr , the SovLe t UnLon. stand Lng addition, the es tLmal ted that, these by figures Ls As •.p;or Dx. Li:, .a to ly 760 ,000 men, their strength wLll have Df By 1 July In an increase 1e; 1, East Gerrklny) 195+, it Ls Ln the armLes contained es tLma ted appr;,x-Tmately to troops, of approxLmc.tely j,500, 000 men. t-) es tLrla to the extent Lnc ludLng as of 1 February There is of any that 800,000 men. Tae Chinese C --mmunLc t forces, and Military District evidence avaLlable 1 51, of an estLmated toward 1 February Lncreased Co.irranis t China. consic tad 1 February 1853, . 1 Ju1•r European SatellI be FL elci Forces D•' consLsted evidence pointing no the European S2 to lli tc e ( exp ludin., 57 as least 2, 1-00,000 men. internal securLty forces There of ie SDvLe t Army contained at IL00,000 me D. r D. It 19^7 1, Lnsuff Lc Lent Lncreasc by 1 July 1954. C orio:)s ition ;3. S--, vLet Union a. The SDvLet Ar,_1y w'v_ch 105 are rifle; cavalry dLvLsi ens. Ls organized 35 are LntJ 175 1Lne dLvisLons, mechani zed; .25 are In addition, tan!:; there are an estimated e.rtLllery and antiaircraft artLllery dLvLs°_ens. i_:z thLs strength wLll probably result of rifle dLvisLorie bc;;i_nninb evidence of the of result to suggest that On the shall be the only a sligztly d vLsions then at preeent. occurs other hand, SJVLete Any 10 are 45 Lnerease in a greater proportion Lncreacc may plan before there that tan!, , or mechanLzed. or medium terra mobLlLzatLon Ln TOP SFRET the hostLlLtice. tnaLr dLvlsions long even Lf and of of Ls the 1LiLted one-third Accordingly, Soviet forces my lower proportion .: f tan!, and mechanize _2 7_ TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SEC 2E ^1 b. There are nJ z;:tL ) n Jf ,n basis t'ae i . )lace, 3-, Viet aLrb_-.rne Jf that at ^,dc:'_tiDn, Lr l LndLc^:tuns • f the it the e:> tens five least is forces. It is esti_rinted, tra. fining l.nJw l t 100,000 paratrJDps est'l_rl^ted that '_Zave received elerlent^ry, air large numberc 59. European S, tell" tes. S^t1l'_te dLvLsi,ns at that there my di_visL;ns, U0. be as present. 1'; t C ,•_•:unLs t China. By dL, tracts. There tan!- of S ta to S Soviet Union. of clDthinb, f,r present size. c _ nsu:TDt _ on iter.s a=e eff,rt is ;52.. dLvisL:"ns. the Chinese In add LtLJn, varLous t mLlLtar.y what extent this 195 4 . I and in ohDrt suppj_;. being made that the army possesses Restricted use tJ tae that no Seri ous It of mechanized lubricant~ is utbreak of war. shortages Jf TOP SEi RET taat large There are these that a considerable By all i July the foreg,Ln 195+, Sizable qlu ntitles , f all been prov L Cted the it t;; pes Ls of on to all armies , f Poland, shipments The Miga.r Lan Ar . y has Soviet heavy ardor. transport and taece will exLst. In partLcular, anc! Bulgaria have race i_ved and art `. 11ery . ineiicates pr,bable 1dcqu_ , tc ar_inunLtLon and we^pons build up stoc!c piles European Satellites. satellite countrLes. T the indicate S,,7j_et war materiLal anc,. eauLpment have of line 75 armies totaling LntJ parsDnal accoutre_ients, of petrol, cJ rLr ) di_tLes against 1LIzely t: 1 July It appears st,c?,s L'cc 1951, 1,450,000 glen in by f,rces Supply D 61. Sn.tell"i_te Dr mechanized-. 1 February is n) evidence Ji•anizatLon will change tr»pc 10riL . , Lt is estrhted and apprJx _l a tely 2,0 59, 000 r_on. there were approxLria tely Ir lift. 1 July C -)=un _ st Field fJrces were -rganLzed 220 ctivts Lens, tal.en training. airb,rne Jf 73 established 1D As have There are apprD:cir,, tely 'D0 Eurepcar, many as including however, f line transpJrtabLlLty the avaLlabi_1i.t;; , f transport Jrgan• - are avC ilable. PrLnc Lpal 1LmLtatL )ns -- n the eriplJy lent wi_11 be size and Rumania Sovi-et medium tan!.-s received sizable quantities LadicatLons : f st,c!.-pL1Ln„ Jf 28 - 1 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET crit'_cal items of supply in Bulgaria, where stocl:- LDiled. It to improve the :,3. pace e..pected capabili ties the U. the being Soviet Union will continue satellite forces stoc!;s Equipment and some as well as native of of war mater-7 al are by the provision of war material at the mid­lo_ ,z- . until S. that build-up of Communist China. British, by large quant ites is of equipment and present in all satellite countries and particularly type. the :;' ovict Union is a mixture Soviet cauipment Communist China, there have siderable amount of supplies assert agreement of Soviet equipment to been no reliable have Japanese, of Wor1f, .War II design, Although recent reports to supply quantitics of been turned reports over that a con- to the Chinese Communist forces. Disposition 64. Soviet Union. di v •_ sions is Tine present disposition of believed to be as Division,- Germany- Pc) land 24 Western USSR 73 Caucasus 21 M7_dd le Asia 1 Far Eastern USSR 31 Far Eas t Outside USSR 4 TOTAL is line 5 Austria- Hungary- Rumania satellite divisions 175 follows: Location 5; .D ropean Satellites. the The believed Country 175 present disp o si_ti on of to be as the 50 follows: Divis ions Albania 4 Bulgaria 13 Rumania 11 Hungary 6 Czoehosl•oval;i_a 10 Poland l5 TOTAL •0 TOP SU•RET Ate'=`-= _ 29 - TOP SECRE1 �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET DRAFT M.lbiliz^.tiori Pr tc_ztial 66. Soviet Union a. It is estin-atec_ that the Soviet Union has well over 40 i _ illion r,,.lcs between the -. gcs of 19-50, of who::_ well over 30 _ illion -. ro fit for r.ilitcry service. latter, , .. -;-Jroxir,atc-ly Of these 12 i.,illion have hac_ war ox-— ricnce or trail inn ; , nC. of these, 8 r_iilli on are agc: 35 or less. About 7 ,..illion are either in the Arr_,y or hc.ve ha C. Army service a;1c_ ere consiccreC on tc be irll:icC.iatoly a.vailc.blc ion. b. Potential speecs of robilizLtion are estinatec: to b(- as f,1lowl- : Line Divisions Tot,,-. 1 Line Divisions* Strength of Groun(C Forces M - Dc 1 75 1 75 2,500,000 m 320 345 8, 000, o00 cc.;rs 320 470 l0, 500, 000 ys 70 520 12, 000, 000 Pori -) c. 0 cays 14 1 80 I'1 ) ,)5 This ,) otentic1 exceec.s esti .atcC_ rcquircrients. 67. Euroy,ean S4tcllites . The nur oc r of line Divisions which the satellites will have b-.- 1 July 1954 is bclievc. to be as follows: Country Divisions Albania 4 Bulgaria 15 Rur,ani a 19 ITunEary 10 Cz©choslovalzia 12 Pol^ nc:. 18 TOTAL Satellite 78 are unlikely to be expanif ec_ on r_,obilization bey once_ the e.bovc figures. Total li_ic civisions inclu(_es those unC_cr-oing tra.inin.g. TOP SEC ZET ACA! 16 - 7p Enclosure TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRBT 68. Ca _ _u-nist China. is r_obilizc-C. c.t It is considcrcC. that Coi_xiunist Chin. ,,resent. Co.-,bat Ef- icic.nc,,6y. ;tr :, t-,z •. nc= ;•Tca.knesses .)vict Union (1) The senior corr.anc. of the Soviet J'.r...y is ruthless, c_zorrctic not a.nO cxperience-C.. The junior officers, while ol" the caliber of the senior cor_lr:und, may be c,:pectec_ to c;,ecute orders faithfully. I. grc at r_, ass of young :C _ j,ower is available for rilitary service in war. soldier is •.•csscs without coura.gcous a.n(f. Coe. ly ;)atriotic, i,hysical sta:.:.ina anc. follows his Soviet Array has been progressively room^.:iizcc_ along riore r..oC.crn lines. th(, is of of By 1954 the rej)rganiza.tion of the Sovict ox,,)ectec. to be cor , ,plctec' in accor(f.a.ncc with what- ever strc tcgic (") The nelTer types Civisions are cor:parable to Western CAvisions sa.r:e type. r:-_; lea:c crs question. (2) ;since 19+6 the S:)va_ct The concept Soviet staff they clay hole. at that ti._.e . crganiza:tion is but S,-jviet hoac.quartcrs - rc t') sii.iple unc_ Effective, likoly to react 1, ore slowly changes than those of Western Coi:L::anC'_ers. (4) Ln extensive --rogra:i of pre- military anc_ military trc:•inin; has been in progress since 1945 to correct a 1c.cL of technical personnel and schoolec_ r.ic_Gle an6_ lower grClcf.c an - " officer and NCOs. c'_cf iciencies By 1_iic_-1954 it is likely that in these cc..tegorics will have been ovcrc or e . (5) In general, Soviet equipment qul lit . tively and quantitatively. tho ro ine,:lent is c:c_equatc both While sor=e types of Western equipment, they are co:•siccrec_ to be equally effective in co bat, on the whole - nC r•esy;ccts--notably amor a.nd heavy r:ortars--1Dossess ior co. . , bat characteristics As t.r:. TOP ECi,ET kcki 1b C.eficicnt in so::.c super- over current Western types. to. Western tables is 1•a cic of equiprent the Soviet in the more intricate types of — 31 Enclosur TOP SECRET �TOP SEGR TOP SECRET coY1 .,u_•ications equip:.ent, raC-a ,) fire control C.evices ( incluC.ing a.nC heavy caliber antiaircraft guns. It will be C.ifficult to rer,eC.,r these C_cficiencics cor:pletcly by Sovict training scheC_ulcs quat_ . Discipline is rigiC an(f, brill be high. eificicnt arc, intcnsivc: ^. n(f. aC e- in event of war, ::: oralc kny 1-aten_t C_isa.ffection is represscC_ by c.n interm-1 security s;;rstci No la.rgc-scale C_c- scrti•)ns can be cxpecteC_ P.s long as the Soviet ,, r,.:Y suf crU no r.ic. jor reverses i the fie c . b_. hurol)cc.n Sa.tcllitcs (1) Purges of ,) olitica.11y unrcliabl(, a. hr:cl. of expericnccc, trEiineC. officers officcrs have ccuseC_ in satellite arr ics. Moralc: anC training of troors i:• general is but fair . The su,)OC-viency to Moscow of the national goverri..cnts anC_ a ".i_sli;_c bcrs of cc•r.•i .iunist ::: cthoC.s has instilleC. in great nu:,-, - i solC.iors a latent unreliability which coulC: be c!_ploiteC in certain circu.sta.nces . (2) Sctellite Lrr,i(,s a,re being; rcorga.nizeC_ along Soviet lines. It is rc - equi; ::. cnt •nization . nC. esti._:c_tc(7_that by 1954 reorg: •, of these forces will be (;) The supply of Sovict cqui;1r.cnt to satellite forces has 1•(,cn a.cccler atcC. in recent ._ ,;) nths. the la- satisfactory cquip,:.cnt status If continueC, shoulC. be co::,1)letcly .iull IficC by i:.iC. -l 05 , 4 c. C, _unitt China. wealth of ra.npower C_o:.iinatcC. by ,police rlothoC.s a..nC: hcaC.cC. by cxpericnccC_, fanatical officcrs is the chief stren.`,th of the Chinos(, Cor•, _nunist Ar.:iy. (2) it is expccteC., C_uc to Soviet influence, that the Chinc:sc Co:-L,unist Arny will be reorganize(, ': long Sovict line--. At present, by Western stanC.arC_s, units arc weak in suppurti.ng arr_.s . their co ,bat The aC.r.:inistrative servicus are virtually nonexistent, but arc a.c'cauato unc: Or I• siatic conC.itions . TOP SECRL`i' ACkI lb 32 Enclosure: TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 70. Relative Eff iciency a. The Soviet Army. and effective The Soviet Army is ground combat force Postwar reorganization has and improved organic in being in the world today. stressed mechanization and mobility logistic noticeable in the new rifle the most powerful support. This is particularly division which is estimated to con- tain four times as much mechanical transport as division: Mobilization and replacement stocks the old type of artillery and armored vehicles exist in ample quantity and quality. divisions of the peacetime The Soviet Army are believed to represent the highest levol of potential combat effectiveness which the Soviet Army is likely to attain. b. European Satellite Armies. Satellite forces may be In event of war, expected to fight with varying degrees of enthusiasm and effectiveness. They will be more effective if employed against traditional enemies. domination of the European Continued Soviet satellite armed forces will progressively increase their effectiveness so that, by 195+, Bulgarian, Hung garian and Polish divisions at least will have reached the standard of Soviet formations. c. Chinese Communist Army. Chinese the weakness of the Communist Army in supporting arms and administrative services, armies Despite it is the most effective ford of all the indigenous of the Far East and Southeast Asia. 71. Pare,- Military Capabilities a. DOSAV, Soviet Union. and DOSFLOT, The three para-military societies, operate under the auspices Armed Forces and have about 16 million members of the parachute jumping, and skiing. The antig4a Soviet of both sexes. They provide preinduction training of draft- eligible such military skills as marksmanship, youths Interior in time of war, in measures, training societies provide a useful framework for organization of the Zone the DOSARM, of particularly with regard to passive air defense personnel and auxiliary units for support TOP SECRET ACAI 16 - 33 - 'SAP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 of thj armed forces. The security police number 400,000. constitute a military rather than a Para- military force, their missions are mid -1954 it is largely of a pares-military nature. likely that They although In the Soviet government can supplement its regular forces with local popular levies for operations on Russian soil. b. European Satellites. All satellite nations specially selected and trained security police. support In event of war, they can be expected to support the regimes effectively. estimated that the security police of each country have It is the capability of dealing effectively with any disaffected groups of the population unless the Western Powers are able to provide assistance and direction to the disaffected elements from a nLarb.y area. c. Commvinist China. organized in 1949. strength, is ^ he People's Public Security Force was cane detachment, located in Peiping. guerrillas are believed to be probably of regimental Somc 300,000 anti-Coimmunist operating on the mainland. These and other disaffected groups would doubtless exploit the engagemen'. of Communist troops elsewhere to their ewn advantage, present but indications are that the Military District Troops plus the Peoples Uablic Security Force have the capability to maintain ,internal security. 72. Tactics and Techniques a. Soviet Army. Soviet ground operations in the past have been characterized by thorough planning rigidly adhered to, infantry attacks air attacks, supported by heavy artillery concentrations and exploitation of penetrations by tank units, careful consolidation of gains. Partisan operations areas have been coordinated with the attack. have exhibited a disregard for losses Western standards, and in rear Soviet commanders in achieving objectives, ability to operate effectively with logistic TOP SECRET ACM to mass support below and a flair for improvisation to meet -34-- TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET tactical needs. There is evidence that the Soviet Array is stressing improvement in river- crossing and amphibious and airborne 58 b). operations ( see paragraph techniques The tactical con- cept of employment of forces on masse will probably be continued despite reorganization of the divisions so as to increase their potential capability for employment in a more flexible manner than prevailed in World ; Tar II. The employment of large masses of artillery and armor can be expected in the future. b. European Satellite Arzies. armies Under Soviet influence the of the European Satellites are expected to conform to Soviet doctrine and practices. c. Chinese Communist Army. The bhinose Communist Arty relies upon massed infantry attacks when the expenditure of manpower. always maintained. objective warrants The mobility df their forces the is They are wall- trained in guerrilla tactics. Infiltration of the enemy is exploited. Due to lack; of materiel, little artillery or armored support is furnished although mortars are used effectively. It can be expected that Soviet aid will eventually supply the Chinese Communist forces with artillery, armor, and vehicles. Soviet influence will probably cause an increasing adoption of Soviet tactical concepts. mid.195+ at least, However, until the Chinese Communist Army will remain essentially an infantry force. NAVAL FORCES Strength 73. It is estimated that by 1 July 195- the strength of the; Soviet fleet will be as follows: TOP SECRET ACAI 16 - 35 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Fleet Units Increase from 1951 Total Old Battleships Monitors Heavy Cruisers Old Heavy Cruisers Light Cruisers Old Light Cruisers Destroyers Old Destroyers Destroyers, Coastal Old Destroyers, Coastal Destroyers, Escort Patrol Vessels Mine Vessels Amphibious Vessels 3 1 6 1 23 1 99 11 36 4 13 1,600 525 325 15 37 700 125 110 Submarines HSS ( x6--18 kt s ) 100 94 Ocean Patrol Medium Range Coastal Past estimates of Soviet HSS sublarine in part on what was strength have been based considered to have been a logical prograri of development and construction. There is, at present, that they are in fact constructing HSS submarines. accurate estimate can be made since there prototype. on the numbers no evidence Therefore no of HSS submarines is no firm indication that the Soviets have a successful It is strongly believed,however, that the Soviets are making every effort to produce an HSS vessel and should this be achieved by mid -1952 the Soviets will undoubtedly concentrate their SS shipbuilding resources of constructing in excess in this direction and would be capable of 100 vessels by mid- 195+. expected concentration on the HSS program, vessels have been written off. buildin l' r c numbers The Soviets have capabilit, of class. over-- all personnel strength is expected to be about 700,000 exclusive this the, but there is no firm indication of the extent to which they will try to build this The obsolete and obsolescent ol - ccaj ca- Lubriorin: s while prosecuting the concentration of HSS types, 74. In view of the of 80,000 personnel in the Naval Aviation. Of total x-05, ©00 will be absorbed in forces afloat and adminis- trative establishments ashore, include the TOP SECRET ALAI 16 and the remaining 295,000 will coast defense and marine personnel. -36- TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Composition 75. The Soviet Navy is composed of six fleets supported by fleet air forces located in four major sea areas which include all the sea approaches to the Soviet Union. Fleet The fleets are as follows; Adninistrative Base T3u•ioer Northern North Baltic South Baltic Black Sea North Pacific South Pacific Unnumbered 8th 4th Unnumbered Mur;.lar_ sk Tallinn Baltiisk Sevastopol Sovetskaya Gavan Vladivostok 7th 5th In addition there are four independent Caspian Sea, Danube River, Dnieper flotillas located in the River and Amur River. Status of Supply 76. The wide physical separation of the maritime frontiers mf the Soviet Union and inadequate Soviet- controlled water routes between these areas compel the maintenance of separate forces together with a decentralized system of logistic present lack of overseas bases naval forces or fleets The Soviet Navy, other navies. support. The tends to tie each of the separate to its respective maritime frontier area. thus handicapped, lacks Under present conditions, the strategic nobility of it would be virtuall-,- impossible to effect a rapid wartime concentration of Soviet Naval Forces, drawn from the various fleets, in any given area. 77. The Soviet Navy has attempted to offset this strategic disadvantage primarily base development on strategic interests inland and coastal and large by building up fleet strength and carrying out a planned priority basis corresponding with Secondl y, wa terways in the Soviet Union is deve lop ing areas under its control. submarines can move between the Arctic and Baltic via the Stalin Canal, during the six months navigation season. Caspian Sea is connected with the Baltic and Arctic canals and inland waterways, which can handle craft in draft, TOP SECRET ACAI 16 Destroyers including coastal submarines with the aid The by a series of up to 10 feet of transporters. --37- TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET It is estimated ta,t the Volga-Don canal will be completed before 1954 and will perr11 % the transfer of vessels from the Black Soa to the northern areas comparable to that from the Caspian. Disposition 78. Soviet Union. It is estimated that the combatant strength 1954, by fleets, will be as follows: of the soviet NNv- on 1 July Surface _; leet Northern Baltic _ 1 Old Battler hips Monitors 1 Heavy Cruisers Old Heavy Cruisers _ Light Cruisers Old Light Cruisers Destroyer: 28 Old Destroyers 5 Destroyers Coastal Old Destroyers Coastal -Destroyers Escort Submarines HSS ( 16_18 lcn.ots )* Ocean Patrol Pacific 2 _ _ Total - 3 1 2 6 2 _ 2 1 _ - 1 16 26 _ 2 _ 2 13 9 94 35 89 15 7 31 _ 3 7 11 4 9 35 41 30 3 Medium Range Coastal * Black 1 1 23 1 99 11 36 3 15 10 11 1 10 Midgets are no longer carried in tabulation since they are considered as a weapon and not a ship. There is insufficient evidence to estimate the probably whereabouts of amphibious, patrol or mine vessels. 79. European Satellites. and three old submarines With the exception of one in the Polish Navy, old destroyer the European Satellite nations have virtually no naval forces. 80. Communist China. principally of ex- U. S. The Chinese Communist Navy is and Japanese vessels. the Chinese Navy is expected to be composed The efficiency of considerably below Soviet standards. Mobilization Potential 81. fleet, Since the Soviet Navy does not maintain a large reserve but maintains its ships in operational readiness, mobilization of the Navy would not be a major problem. estimated that by M / 30 days the Soviet Navy could be to a total of 800,000 personnel ( exclusive * Soo - paragraph 1OP SECRET ACA.I Lb the It is increased of Naval Aviation), ' 73 -38_ TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET which would include 70,000 additional men for the Tlarine ana Coast defense units and 30,000 additional men for the forces afloat. Combat Efficiency 82. Strength and Weaknesses. Navy lies in its have 1^rge numbers large numbers of mines The main strength of the Soviet of ships, stock- piled and there indicate that there is a shortage main weakness of the Soviet Navy is experienced personnel. efficiency. However, This of torpedoes its The They is no evidence or ammunition. to The lack of trained and combat is reflected in its intensive to reduce this weakness. aircraft and men. training since operational 19+6 has done much standard of the submarine force in 195+ may have surpassed that of the German Navy in the early phases of World War II. 83. Relative Efficiency. below but approaching U. The efficiency of the Soviet Navy is S.- Canadian standards. 84. Tactics and Techniques. tactics Very little likely to be employed by the Soviet Naval Forces. have been instances where the they were distrustful of It is expected that there will be good cooperation between sea and air forces. Mines will probably be used extensively for both offense and defense. be There the Soviets were known to ignore aids to gunnery control and navigation as them. is known of the Amphibious operations will probably carried out in a reasonably efficient manner. TOP SECRET ACAI 16 'Z 9 TOP SECRET �TOP SECT TOP SECRET 4 AIR FORCES Strength 5. It combat is estimated units 20,000. of the that the total aircraft establishment SovT_et Air Force in July Actual strength wLJ-I probably be The aircraf t establishments Air Force at of the of 195 1 will be about up to this major components figure. of the that date are estimated Fighter Attacic 5, 000 2, 300 Air Forces of the Soviet Army Fighter Aviation of Air Defense 1Y 300 to be as follows: Trans-Bombers port Recce Soviet 3, 000 - 750 - Total 750 13,300 - 1,300 100 - 1, 300 150 350 3,100 1, 000 1,100 20, 000 - Long; Range - 1, 500 1,500 200 900 9,500 3,000 5,x+00 Aviation 200 Naval Aviation TOTAL Composition 35. The major combat components of the Soviet Air Force will probably still be the Air Forces of the Soviet Army Aviation the Fighter Aviation of Air Defense Force, to which in time of war would probably and the Naval Aviation, be added the Aviation of Airborne Troops. a. Air Forces of the will probably continue Soviet Army ( WS SSA.). to consist various air units assigned army is composed other units force is roles as to supplement required. It is light bomber anc' in their particular that virtually all fighter strength and a considerable proportion of bombers will be that jet-engined types by mid- 195-; jet-engined ground attack aircraft may be transports TOP SECRET ALAI 10 are lilcely air It could also be made other air forces expected Each air The main teskcof this land forces. the force tactical air armies and ground attacic, of a specialized role. the 15 to Military Districts. of fighter, to support available of This It the the light is possible in use. Med-lum to be all piston-engl_ned. - 4o- TOP SECRET! �TOP SECS TOP SECRET b. Long Range Aviation ( DA). air force will probably consist normelly composed units. The strategic of bomber, primary role bomber force. It of is considered three air armies escort fighter and of this It is bomber element may be composed that force will be estimated that this each transport that the of approximately of a long-range 1,000 TU- 1+ type aircraft augmented by both piston-engined heavy and jet- engined medium bombers.* c. is Fighter Aviation of Air Defense ( TA PVO). the air arm of This force the Anti--Aircraft Defense Force which also controls ground antiaircraft units and early warning systems. Its role is the concentrating that by strategic air defense on the defense of Soviet homeland, of vital areas. 1,5 1} the Fighter Defense Force equi-peed with je t-engined fighters. rocket- propelled fighters the Sri ll It is be completely The possibility being in service considered of in small numbers cannot be completely discounted. d. Naval Aviation ( MVF). of the Soviet Navy, will probably continue the fleet air forces, bomber, The Naval Aviation, ground attack;, each composed to be of fighter, as an arm organized into mine- torpedo--- transport and sea reconnaissance units. This air force will be responsible for coastal defense and co- operations with the naval fleets and will also be capable of providing close support to the land forces on its seaward the U.S. and Canada are in general agreement that the Soviet Union will have both the requirement and the capability for the production of these aircraft. Therefore some of both types could be in operational units by mid- 1 954. In the U. S. view, up to 100 heavy and 400 medium jet bombers may be in operational units. However, the Canadian view is that there is no evidence regarding Soviet intentions to makce use of tkli s capability and that it is preferabl e no t to estimate quantities at this time although it is believed the numbers would be small. TOP SECRET ACAI lb - 41 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET flan?;s. The aircraft to of those of the force will probably correspond the Air Forces of the Soviet Army ( with the exception o£ a few catapult aircraft and flying boats) will still be e. and land- based. Aviation of Airborne Troops ( AV DV). Headquarters of Aviation of Airborne Troops now exists as an element separate from the this other air forces, It command would be responsible directing the air side wizich purpose allotted to of in time of of major airborne it from the other air forces under its that war for planning and operations, the necessary aircraft would Fleet and would come Sta tuff is thought 1i1 , 1ely be and for temporarily the Civil Air operational control. Supply 37. It is considered that the Soviet aircraft and associated industries will provide the mid- 19 0 54 with a steady supply equipment. fighters, considerable numbers medium bombers, fighters. enough It estimated line include of large numbers je t-engined jet light and pis ton•- some piston-engined heavy and and possibly small numbers of jet-engined of rocliet• propelled The flow of aircraft and equipment will probably large first between now and of new and modern aircraft and These would probably engined medium bombers, is Soviet Air Forces to allow the maintenance of a large war reserve. that aircraft reserves will be at strength, be but not necessarily bast equal identical as to to type. Disposition 33. It is thought that the allocation of the Soviet Air Force for July 19 5 + will be with min or present disposition which is TOP SECRET AC AI 1-D var i ations estimated the same as the to be as follows: - 42 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECR TOP SECRET 0 a. Air Forces of the Soviet Army Eas tern Europe 8,Western USSR Southern USSR Middle East Far Eas t Interior Total Fi E;hter 2"700 1,700 1,300 400 . 9100 AttacI, 1,2D0 40 X00 300 2, 300 Light Bomber 1 •• 0 J 300 750 - 2,900 -0 270 320 100 750 33'D 144 130 100 75 0 •• 7F0 3,550 3,100 C -o0 13,300 Transport Recce TOTAL L. J Long Range Aviation West and Middle East Areas Fighters Bombers Far East Area 150 50 200 900 DOO 1, 5O 0 100 100 75 0 1.9 300 Transport TOTAL 1, 05 0 c. Fighter Defense Force. probably be located in vital areas for in Total The bulk of t_ll_s force will the Western Soviet Union and concentrated the defense of centers of industry, admi ni s- tration and population. d. Naval Aviation Northern Flee t North and South Baltic Fleets Blac !; Sea Flee t North and South Pacific Fleets Total righter 15 0 x5 ,o 300 X00 1,500 At tac lc 40 16-0 120 44o 11- 0 330 1, 100 - 30 30 40 100 30 30 5o 30 200 1,110 550 1,100 3,100 Light Bomber Transport Recce TOTAL TOP SECRET AC AI 1 • 340 200 4• TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET 8i. Mobilization Potential. s trength of the mobilization of It is Utiought that Soviet Air Forces will be about the reserve this the personnel 300, 000. could probably be By increased by 'D00,000 men by M / 130 days. Combat Efficiency Strength and Weaknesses 00. The Soviet air forces will probably have initial advantage standards of numerical superiority and any deficiencies may be compensated by is expected to be highly effective and available i.e., MIG- 15s and TU-4s, the the The improving the acceptance New and modern equipment although a substantial proportion of ment, in equipment. training will probably be of maintenance oral lower safety standards. in general of in 1954 in use in quantity Soviet Air Forces may have become equip- obsolescent by Western standards. Relative Efficiency Air Forces 91. of the Soviet Army The combat efficiency of this force is increased significantly by 1954 as a result the continuing introduction of and be assumed that expected of improved training improved equipment. it will be a highly effective force in have to It must its primary role. Lon; Range Aviation 92. The effectiveness of the Long Range Aviation as a strategic bomber force will probably have greatly will be capable the limiting factor air force will lie in any shortcomings that out 19554. It of night and bad weather missions employing path- finder methods and blind bombing that increased by in the techniques. It is considered operational capabilities in the performance of its of this equipment rather in training or techniques. It is the Long Range Aviation will probably be capable titan estimated of carrying; the following long range bombing operations with a bomb load of 10,000 pounds; T0P SECRET AC AI 1 • - 44 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 Two-way Missions Two-way Missions with one Air Refueling Piston-engined Heavy bombers 3,500 5X75 5, x+75 7, 000 Piston-engined Medium bombers 2, 500 3,500 4 375 4 300 Jet-engined Medium bombers 1, 500 2,100 2, D25 2, 300 It that navigational and is considered make missions Two-way Missions Ono-w€y with two Air Miss i_onE Ref uilings other dl_fficulties would using a double air refueling extremely difficult and hazardous and theref,)c- improbable. Fighter Aviation of Air Defense "3. The day fighter defense force will probably not be able to proviCLe air defense for all areas defense is of main expected targets that It is the Soviet Union but should be efficient probable its in good weather. its combat efficiency will have ficant 1y as a result of ment. of improved signi- improved fighter control and radar equip- that considerable numbers of radar- equipped all-weather fighters will also be available by mid- 1954, it is unlikely radar fighters Canada and that or the U. It However, the force will be completely equipped with that i_ts effectiveness will equal that of S. Aviation of Airborne Troops ( AV DV) •4. It is estimated that initially, for a vital operation, to 2,000 medium transport aircraft could be made available this air force from the Fleet, most Soir.- IL- 15's 1 of action may be Though the production of IL- 18's would number of the a greater pay load other than the same w ith in service by tend transport aircraft available, capacity would remain about the since types. 2,000 medium transports ( mostly IL- 12 1s) TOP SECRET AC AI Lb to other air forces and from the Civil Air of which will be IL- 12 s. greater combat radius up to reduce a this date. the total total airlift the IL- 13 would carry Assuring that some could be made available -I'5- TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET for airborne operations, an airlift capacity of approximately nine a trborne brigades ( 1;,200 men per brigade plus crew served weapons, for a period of ammunition and supplies as to x+50 for The use of IL- 18 1'- in airborne capabilities t,aeLr combat radius would extend compared to sustain a brigade three days) could be provided. would make a considerable change sufficient inasmuch to 900 nautical miles as the IL- 12. Navel Aviation Force 95. The efficiency increased as a result on training of this air force should be materially of re-equLpment and continued er:.phasis in maritime operations. providing adequate air support combat radius li m it a ti ons of to its It will be capable of the naval fleets within the aircraftoperating from land bases. Para-M.litary CapabLlities 5o. In addition to the air forces discussed above, semi- military air organizatLon, be mobilized augment in time in mid- 1954 Of war to supply aircraft and crews It communications aircraft, and possibly some feu= proportion of figures in paragraph 94 above) could functions vital of is considered that in addition to many A considerable airlift operations to operating approximately 2,000 medium transports on normal airline duties, listed is a the Civil Air Fleet, which could the military airlift capacity. this force will be there these by curtailing the Civil Air Fleet. engir_ed transports, ( included light transports. in the be made available for the normal cLvL1 transport This would only be done for operations and campaigns. TOP SECRET AC AI 13 - 4'5 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Weapons of M,-.ss Dostruction Ato.:.ic Wa,rf•r,; ( ZV!) 97. AVM ilaa to intelligence c , _oes not proCucc; L , very noa.ni. ]•;ful cstir:ate the of s oviot ator_lic capabilities as sii l)lo,^ t t,-y_)es explosiv(­s _,,; wor, stocic..;__le i of r,i(_-195+. SSsur.:ing of atonic wca. ions c_cvcloldng roughly 20 kilotons it is estir_ic_tec that the Soviet atonic weapon r:iC- 1D54 will bE :'.scut 315 weapons. 98. I:-_l)rovcr.cnts in the stockpile weapons c_esigns t,,-.; raise the k_i_lotonnagc; - iclC or rec.uce the requirements per wea }ion - , Iro most likely by r.iC- 1954, to define 1,recisely their offcct of fissionable r_aterial although it is not possible on the stockpile figures. 99 . The ;.resent Soviet heavy water progrz:.rn, will l)rovic,.c certain raw nateri.a.ls However, essential for ther_.onuclear research anC Ccvelop_.ent. there is no inforniation which inCicates that are c.evolo-ping a thor.-ionuclea,r weapon an.. it is the Soviets esti:-iatec. that such Cevelopr_icnt is unlikely to be a factor by Llic. -1954. Rac.iolcgic^1 Y!arfare ( P,W) 100. It is consiCorcc, that at least Curing the next three four years Soviet atonic bor._bs, or efforts will not be edvcrtoC fror: proc,uction of anc' hence ItW probably will not be a factor in a war starting ill r_iic'-1954. In any case, the e,, .:ploy•-,cnt of a.tor.ic weapons to neutralize harbor installations with resit_ual rac'iations froi-i an unC_crwater burst is within Soviet capabilities. Biological Warfare ( BW) 101. At -rroscnt, the Soviets are capable of BW agents for use against personnel, sufficient quantities for sabotage of proe.ucin[-; a, variety anir::als, anc_ 1,la.nts in or mmall-scale e.-.plo;;n.cnt. Bcforc raid- 1954 the Soviets will be c- ible of mass proCuction of BW agents for large-scale c.:iployrient. Unicn is agents, There are inC.ications that the Soviet oxDori._ienting with various an,, ' it is c_eviccs for (. isseminating BW estir.ated that before riic.-1954, the Soviets can have aCequa.to weapons for ci•sser_dnating the B41 agents avail•:bl e to then. TOP SECRET ACAI 16 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 Chemical Wc.rf Cre ( CW) 102. The Soviet Union is now capable of stanc_arc. CW agents. luy_ . ent The available intelligence suggc;sts that the Soviets h^.ve been 1%roc.ucing at least since 1919. of large-scale: one of the nerve C.-.ses Well before r.ic.-1951 the Soviets will be capable :• f sustainoc' c,:tcnsive enployn-c-i -t of nerve gases. Guic.ec_ Missiles 103. had, Suri,-_cc;-to-t.ir. CcnsiCering that antiaircraft defcnso hc,.s anC I-rill continue to have, a high priority, it is estir_1wtec. that before::i(f.- 1951 , the Sovict Union probably will be caliablc of quantity ) roCuction of a supersonic surface-to-air guided r__issile with electru_iic guic.ance anc_ control. This r- ay be an ir_y roved. version of ti-Iasserfall. 101. . lir-to-Surface. Prior to 1-tic_- 1951, the Soviets coulc_ have proc.ucec. c.nc stockpiled a planned operational quantity of iriprovec. versions of the Ger._ian air- to- surface rlissiles--the H.S. radio-eontrolloC glic'e bor_.b, from an LircrEft, a rocket-powerec. anC- guic.00 visuclly anC. the Fritz X. visually fro:-,l1-n aircraft. 293, Z, rac'io-controlloc bor_b, In adciticn, guic_cc_ there is no assurance that the Soviets could not c.evelop prior to riic_-1951, a native nissilc of greater effectiveness than the Gerr:an Worlc. Wc,r II missiles. 105. Surface- to- Surface. Well before rlid-1951 the Sovict Union will have the technical capability for large scale proc.uction of versions of the Gernan V-1 and V-2 rlissiles significantly irq,,rovec_ in range anc_ accurancy. Both these rlissiles coulc. carry atomic war- heac.s anc' V-1 is could be launchec_ fro:_i subnarines. unlikely the.t long rango, It is __lost intercontinental surface-to-surface nissiles will have been developoc. by r_.iC-1951. 106. Air -to- . ir. It is estiriatec' that a. native supersonic . it- to- air r.,issilo with electronic guidance and control could be devclopec to prototype stage by riicd -1951 . TOP SECRET ACAI 16 - 1S - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 41 Aircraft DcvoljD"ent 107. progress engines Since 19+5 the Soviet Union has r..ac_c ru!_.arl.Lh1c General. in rircraft ncvelopmcnt. in various stages In addition to aircr . ft ant of dcvelopnent, they acquires,. complctc factories as wall as several thousans. skilicf specialists fror_. Gerriany. E1:,:loitation of the Gcr:.a.n aircraft infustry has per- mittei the Sovict Union to a0vancc its technical devclopr_ent tremenJouslV. This as_vance has been assistoc_ by the availability of Ancrican an? British aircraft ans_ engines. experience in the aircraft Although Soviet industry was rather linitcd at the and of Work War II, it has now Srcatly reduced the load of the West By rid -195 - the Soviet Union will have hat in this field. an adequate loriod of tine to c„Dloit conplctcly Ge rnan reseLrch and devolo " nt . In anCition it must be a.ssuncn that the Soviets will be familiar with current foreign aircraft dcvclopnents. Nevertheless, it is consic'_cred that all capabilities in mij -195+ the Sovict's over- in aircraft dovelopr._ent will be below those of the Unitan States. 103. Fighters. The fighter aircraft Vvclopet by 195- will show considerable inprover_ent over present types. will be in improved ongines, speeds. The, c.phasis The main ac'vancanent c.11owinE higher ceilings onj greater in tevelopr.:ent for intercytors will be turbo- jet ^ nc_/or rocket powered types. probably centor around iLTrovcnents on Major dcveloDncnt s will in the pressurization systems and more reliable operation of engines at high altitudes. It is estinated that before 195+ the Soviets will have ocvclopcc. oilweather fighters equipped with aircraft interception equipmcnt (AI ravar) . 109. Bo:. bcrs . Considering all factors, it is anticipateo that an improvos_ TUA possessing the greater power, the B-50 will have been developed. It is range ant endurance cstir.ated that of ir_ proves. engines and oDcrating techniques will have increased the cor..bc.t radius of this aircraft to about 2,500 nautical rules. to the improved TU-4 1s, In addition the Soviets probably will have s.cvolopcd a heavy baDber and a jet r_iec_iin bomber. TOP SECRET ACAI 16 -49- TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 110. Lsti::•.tc t . iaxiriLu , pc rf ornance cui cbilities Soviet aircr^.ft in of the best 1954 are as follows: Max. Si)./Iat. (kn/ft ) Service Ceiling Coi _b.,.t Langc/ Frei`ht - Bor_b lca c. ITaut . Mi./ lbs. Fighters Penetration-1.11 Weather 6.L U /SL Jet Conventional x+00/30, 000 48, 000 1,500/None 1, 800/N " ne Aircraft Type Interco %t _Irs* Jet Convent i%nal Boribers Heavy Conve:n t ioI -nal 2 10, 000 610/SL 425/30,000 800/1, one 800/i, Ione 375/30,000 40 .1 000 500/SL 360/30, 000 37,000 5,000/10,000 500/SL 350/20,000 45,000 35,000 1, 800/6, boo 1, 400 /4, xOO Jet Conveliti nal x+95/SL 350/10,000 30"000 Transports Jet Conve -It ione:l 325/15,000 Mee iu?__ Jet (( LJ o f t lv c 1Lt i o na l Light Jet Convont ion. 1 43,000 7,000/10,000 2,800/10,000 n 111. 32,000 700/2,200 850/2,200 2,000/ , 000 4, 0000, 000 x+00/SL The Soviet Union must be given the cap abilit;; of (f_evelop- ing refueli_z` r, techniques to increase the range aircraft. E1.1)erience has mountable C_ifficulties. iff_icatcC of its long-range that there are no insur- One refueling woulC- increase the coi:,bat raCius of the TU-4 frori 2,500 nautical riles to rfiles . Two refuelin„s coulr. increase the cor_-bat racius about a - bout 3,500 nautical 75 per cent. Interce1)tors are laboleC. as poweroc_ or coribinations. TOP SECRET ACAI 16 jets but coulc_ be rockct- - 50 -- TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 112. Aircraft Weapons, rocket fighter aircraft It is estimated that Soviet ill utilize both conventional automatic guns and unguided air- to i1r rockets. up to 53 mm. jet and with a.mmure. - . on for The guns may be 10 to 15 fire. Unguided air-to-air rockets, fuzes, will probably range seconds of caliber of continuous with and without proximity in size from 82 mm. to 132 mm. It is probable that automatic rocket launchers installed internally will be used extensively in addition to presently developed launchers. Impi?oved optical will be available to development computing, gyro- stabilized gun and rocket in quantity. There is no intelligence pertaining of radar gun sights; however, the :Soviets are capable of developing these It sights it is assumed that sights by mid -195 4 . is known that they are interested in the application of infra- red. able It is likely that a bombing navigation radar will be availin operational quantities by mid- 195+. Electronics 113. While the duction, state of development, and maintenance to be limiting factors quality of mass pro of electronic equipment may well continue in the effectiveness of Soviet weapons, it must be assumed that there will be major advances in Soviet electronic capabilities by mid- 195+. The requirements of the nuclear energy programs for research and development of electronics equipment may have been largely fulfilled thereby increasing scientific resources available for other priority fields air defense, However, such as strategic air operations and underwater warfare. it is unlikely that the competing requirements of all of these programs can be met by mid- 195+. lj_L,L. Jamming of Radio Communication and Navigation Systems. U. S. VIEW CANADIAN VIEW The Soviets are rapidly achiev- At the present time the Soviet ing the capability of launching Union is engaged in extensive an effective all-out electro- jamming of radio communications. magnetic war. This It is estimated TOP SECRET ACA+_ 16 - 51- jamming has been confined TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET U. S. VIEW (Continued) CANADIAN VIEW (Continued) that even with present facil . ties almost entirely to the Voice and experience, both of which America and British Broad- are increasing, the Soviets casting Corporation broadcasts. effE;ct can complete disruption at any ti- me However, of intercontinental by the the experience gained Soviet Union in this point--to-point and long distance field is mobile radio communications could become a serious systems tion to radio communications of all types, critical strategic including communications such that in general. It jamming obstruc- is believed systems of the military Services. that The Soviets arc also capable of capabilities for extensive jamm=ng radio navigation systems ming of radio communications particularly those operating at frequencies at least as below 30 megacycles. high as VHF by mid 195+. 115. past. Jamming of Radar. the Soviets will have jam- The :soviets have used " window" in the This and similar reflection devices will almost certainly be encountered in the future. In addition, electronic jamming will probably be encountered at all frequencies uo to 3,000* mc. it will not be jamming BTO ( Bombing Through Overcast) capable of is believed that by mid- 195+, range by m- d-1954 . However, radar which operates at frequencies in the 10,000 mc. 115. of Proximity Fuzes. It is the Soviets band. considered that the Soviet Union will have effective and rugged proximity fuzes in quantity production. Walther Type Submarine 11?. Soviet development may now have progressed to the point where they are preparing to construct a. install the Walther engine. submarine in which to If this development is continued, it In the Canadian view, Soviet electronic jamming techniques will Possibly cover portions of the spectrum up to the 10,000 mc. b^nd by mid- 195+. TOP SECRET ACAI lb 52 J TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET is bclicved that, by mid- 1954, may h^ve reached the sea trial the first Walther type submarines stage. Influence Mines 118. By mid- 195+, the Soviets can have produced quantities of im;_)roved influence mines of both German and native design. probable that It is such improvements will include the production of mines operated by combination of pressure, magnetic and acoustic actuation mechanisms. Tor.-, edoes 119. By mid- 195+, the Soviet Union can have available in operational quantities improved copies of the German patternrunning, wire- controlled, tor.•edoes. axial_ These torpedoes may have steering, such refinements as tri- and possibly combination active and passive acoustic homers. design, active and passive acoustic homing It is also possible that a torpedo of Soviet embodying improved pattern- running or homing equipment will be available. TOP SECRET ACAI- 16- TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET i ENEMY STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES CONCEPTS Over-all 120. ment The ultimate throughout Moscow. objective the world of Soviet • ), Dlic- of communist regimes In a major war commencing objectives in .195- of the Soviet Union would a. To overrun Europe and b. To disrupt is the establish- Directed from the primary military be: the P1ear and the war effort of the Middle East, United States and and Canada, with a view to placing the from which North America action, communist 121. These could be wea1fened infiltration and objectives in Western Europe and offensives Soviet Union in an impregnable position against would The in 195+. Union launch a suitably scaled even after an atomic attack, 123. Powers the Soviet would not conflict as world-wide, that offensives their The capable Neither until it had gained to be the of areas by one or more TOP SECRET ACA! 1 United Xingdom, established an adequate of the however, leaders, therefore, sea and air. that the Western regarding Union from would probably should be by full-scale simultaneously, possibly without any prior military action by the Soviet bloc. action might be preceded the Soviet overrun singly but, entry into a major war in a number could would attack the Soviet Soviet the of launching an control would realize, permit areas wherever possible. decide leaders Forth America and invasion of in Western Europe and The together with sea, and air other vital areas. Soviet Union will not be invasion of Forth America base area be attempted ,irimarily by campaigns Kingdom and occupation or neutralization of 122. econo!iic warfare. the Middle East, the United by continued military by Soviet- inspired However, such diversionary action satellites. _ 54 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET `.POP SECRET 124. the It follows Soviet plan of from the above concept operations would a. North America. against the The Soviet Union would with the and potential the United retention of more of stakes undertake attectcs seriously disrupting States, will wish early as and causing atomic particularly during and United Kingdom. in order capabi_1it i_es . attack. to action against to enhance However, The their the initial Soviet leaders offensive and they may first attempt a Either concurrently with or in Western Europe they will the United i,ingdor,,.with war potential and military island untenable as occupation of a full-scale the the Channel sea and air by threat of Lmmediately prior launch a heavy attack object installations, an Allied base. including an attempted As of destroying Br and rendering Soon as Port areas the offensive against that the Near and Middle part of the possible after Soviets will The FFr,St Soviet leaders will appreciate oil resources are a valuable Moreover, their in the Caucasus and Rumania, as well as a large part in industries, would be the Near and Middle successful, would give comparison with the susceptible East. there, them very great strategic effort expended. own oil to attack from air A campaign gains if in Offensives against Turkey and Greece would form an essential part TOP SEC RET l,C AI -. 5 launch the United Kingdom, the Allied war potential. their ti_sh invasion. c. Near and Middle Eas t. bases the t1lian are necessary psychological neutralization of Western Europe of the war to complete a campaign against Western Europe as possible defensive areas the of mobilization. b. Western Europe the that ag.a. ins t : of blunting their military forces the Continental defense strategy including Al---t s!.a and objectives retaliatory capabil_ties of Canada and Soviet include campaigns North American Continent, the Aleutian Islands, for of of such a campaign. J J TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET d. Balkans. A Balkan campaign, Yugoslavia and Greece, engaged apprDaches to Italy. Italy. Seizure of bases of forces and would provide on Allied lines the ]astern Med Lterraneal operatin;=; important Scandinavia. have the objectives control compl e t e of air and naval bases to g. Spain. to operations Soviet Union, and the trade of adding depth This the campaign A successfully completed cama_oign against Iberian Peninsula would provide Spain. Control the most certain means of severing Allied sea lines of communications Mediterranean. while providing a base for Soviet Union, In addition, it would also deny consolidatton of one unless of India and Pakistan. the the IMLes. it is limited of in Upon the possible possibly An attack on Pa:L f_s tan and India those countries. land attack, to air attacks the from SicL1y. Soviet Union were convinced using bases TOP SECRET ACA! 1 - the of a purely preventive nature and would be difficulties be into launched against North Africa, i_n conjunction with similar attacks would be to the Peninsula. and Gibraltar, that attacks would be iZ. use in Western Europe. Western Europe would permit an attack against of the Batt Lc of denying the Al1Led Powers. that of against in the North Atlantic, the susidiary in North Africa. of se cur ing of would be Ln the Scandinavia would rDutes and Allied bases the air defense sea and air bases A campaign against to provide naval and air bases for to Sicily in Western Europe of communications Mediterranean and against Allied bases -0 the in southern Greece to Allied LOC 1 s in the flanks the Balkans for attacks the campaign against European A successful campaign in Italy and would protect and of Soviet forces of Dorthern Yugoslavia would uncover would pose a threat e. through Overrunning Gree!c Macedonia and Thrace would be an adjunct of Control thrusts would protect flant;s in other operatLons. Turkey. with of Owing tine Allied to the unlikely intention logistical military measures would probably on those bases being used by the Allie. _56_ TOP SECRET I �TAP SECRET TOP SMRET I. Far East. be to neutralize contain as theater. The Soviet Japan and objectives Soviet Union, any additional forces theater might be to the Far East will other Allied advance bases and large an Allied force as The in possible however, is the Far East, in the Far East unli !,ely to allocate although bases in this used on occasion by medium b3mber units the Long Range Aviation. to of Chinese forces prDbably will conduct operations against neighboring countries in Southeast Asia and tale measures to gain control of Hong Kong, Macao, Korea, Indo-China and Bur m , j. Defense appreciate of the Soviet Union. the necessity hos t _ le attack. urban, governmental, in and 125. Atomic Campaigns. the principal means maximum results to the estimated the Soviets Therefore . , it appears probable the outset. be used from the atomic of vital that is stool: pile by mLe-154, of 15 atomic attac!: Soviet Union can achieve the North American war effort. the Soviets would decide utilized best it estimated that in surprise attacks at that atomic weapons will the stock pile will be employed against North America. It allocated outset and of defensive that a substantial portion of unl i!;e ly is that any significant number of atomic weapons would be to targets North America. biolo be Consequently, base against industrial areas. b•7 which the could the home the static air defense in the reduction of a number of weapons Soviet rulers some 35 air reE; iments With atomic weapons available is of defending There are fighters now deployed The elsewhere than in These atomic attacks the United Kingdom and may be supplemented by ical warfare and chemical warfare attack-s. 126. Strategic Air Operations, the first line the is considered strength of TU-4 aircraft will be approximately part of It TOP SECRET ACAI 10 In add i tion, 1 July 1954 in the iong Range Aviation 1,000, with the bulk located Soviet Union. that by It in the western is considered that come - 57 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECT TOP SECRET 1 8 piston-engined combat units strategic heavy and by this date. bombing effort operations against except against bases vital importance 12'7. Considering will be against atomic it is of the to the Allies. that initially the estimated limitations, importance, important Canada. targets On the targets in in successsful prosecution of sea approaches States. or to In vT most likely against isolated the targets perhaps against Ste, tes or Western of the available two- tray attacks which cout (f, The main Soviet naval The areas and routes the in North America. w i 11 be directed towards interdiction of The that the United Kingdom the range capabilities targets a. and bombers are in extreme Northwest United Naval Operations. bar g et.s two-thirds-* of the United bombing bases the the to and with aerial refueling, important of Allied isolated the United Kingdom, reach most to half* be allocated against utilized comnun -1c ation. or against many as could best be 123. States and Canada, the main strategic air operations heavy bombers of the principal method employed against that as other hand, in be diverted from United available medium jet employed against vital that the United Kingdom and North America more accessible Allied strategic of unli!c-ely force would remainder principally against of range to be this thought being mounted the availlble TU-4 1s might and is may be from which a considerable weight attack will be latter, It the United Kingdom, re tai atory bombing was of jet-engined medium bombers of offensive the A11_ed sea the greatest the war by effort lines of importance the Allies are; the United hinr-dom. b. North America - Europe. C. North American coastal routes including Caribbean. d. Mediterranean - Red Sea - Arabian Sea Bay Persian Gulf of Bengal. e. North America - Orient. U. S. estimate. Canadian estimate. TOP SECRET A•AI 1 • TAP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 12,. Soviet attacks in i ti_a lly a. of take on these lines o£ communication will the following forms: The mining of ports and approaches, the United Kingdom, Western Europe submarine and merchant ship before, particularly those and North America and on D-day, and, by by submarine and aircraft after D-day. b. be Submarire and raider attacks expected that the long-range station before D-day and on shipping. It is to Soviet submarines will bo on that possibly some raiders will be on station in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. (1) Initially, the available trade routes (2) After it is expected that tine majority of submarines will be deployed along principal in order the to take full advantage initial assault wi_ 11 normally be possible patrol at any one time. it is expected to maintain 25 Based on this of surprise. that per cent it on estimate and the 1,54 estimate of strength and disposition of Soviet submarine fleets, the following numbers could be sustained on patrol No. on Patrol Type HSS in the areas No. Atlantic Area No estimate (15-13 knots ) on Pac i_f is Area, West to Central No estimate America and South to the equator 1S To 50 0 West and South to the Azores and Canaries Medium Range 11 Coastal waters of Norway, U. I- and Northern France No Estimate designated: Patrol Ocean Patrol Coas La I* of submarines Coastal waters Soviet Union of South to Australia. and West to India 5 Coas tai wa ters of Soviet Union China, Korea and Japan J No Estimate Coastal waters of Soviet Un on and Japan (3 ) It must be anticLapted that the first wave of the patrol submarines will be Srcagerrak be blocked could return to the on station on D-day. submarines Should the on patrol in the Atlantic the Northern Fleet bases. In such a case, * See paragraph 73. TOP SECRET ACAI 1• 5g - TOP SECM �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET although initially handicapped by Scandinavian Peninsula, sufficient endurance North Sea, the medium- range to carry English Channel, Western approaches to Small amphibious from submarines d. Attacks of up out normal patrols the Bay operations operations to have in of Discay and the the the leaving the long, in other areas. land sabotage teams to a maximum of 50 men per boat. by naval aircraft SJViet- controlled e. Attacks submarines the United Kingdom, range boats available for c. the distance around shore on ports in on shipping within range bases. the form of on a limited scale which may special operations include attack-s by submarine- launched guided missiles with conventional or atomic warheads, atomic weapons introduced by submarines or merchant or on D-day and midget submarine attacks 130. It is probable that the majority the Naval Aviation forces would be the seaward flanks of in the Blatic would the land forces. Upon be available for use Soviet outside 1_`•1. in other areas surface forces with the range of Scandinavian fleets it is not believed in all Parts their sympathizers potential for sabotage and subversive activity appreciate throughout the magnitude wi11 fully exploit sabotage agents units would except- on of raiders would to Allied Interests Communists and logical warfare forces that operate their own air cover. Internal Threat the World. the and in Scandinay._a these campal_gns, but forces to support and protect the campaigns the the completion of surface Retention of surface be necessary until before on sh *_ pp ii,.g . the employed had been successfully concluded and neutralized. of ships it. of the world. this threat The such as fire, constitute a great including psycho- Soviets to Allied Covert attack with the of thoroughly interests and better known explosives and abrasives could be used. TOP SECRE T ACAI 15 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET In addition, atomic, biological, and chemical weapons high potential of effecLiveness. Sabotage will be particularly effective when employed concurrently with, or initiation of conventional, operations. the methods overt military of delivery could be detection and ident if Lca tion, as deliver, would cost the On the under present other hand, Soviets detection of certain methods key harbors types is improbable, just prior to D-day. enemy action, complete of as used prior offer a loss to, the Many of However, of such pre D-c'ay of strategic surprise. internal security measures, introducing atomic weapons is the into identification of certain of biological agents. 132. Summary. It is estimated that Soviet strategy will inc luc'e : a. A campaign against Western Europe. b. An aerial campaign against the British Isles. A Balkan campaign. C. d. Campaigns aga i_ns t the Near and Middle East. e. Campaigns f, Attacks in the Far East. against Canada, g. A sea and air h. the United States and Alas!ca. offensive against Allied sea communications Subversive activity and sabotage against Allied in all parts of interests the world. i. A campaign against Italy, subsequent to gaining control of Northern Yugoslavia. A campaign against Norway, and if necessary, Sweden. Air attacks against Allied bases. 1. Subsequently, Peninsula and m. Defense Relative to secure of the the Straits overrun the Iberian of Gibraltar. Soviet Union against hostile attic!:. The Soviet Union would undertalce attac!>s the North American Continent with retaliatory capabilities and TOP SECRET AC I 115 1 the to Separate Areas 133. North America. against a campaign the objectives seriously disrupting of blunt-in- the war -- 01 -- TOP SECRET �TAP SECRET TOP SECRET potential of Canada and tion of more of Alas!_a would Additional objectives be of communication, and possibly to support limited att^cLv s North Atlantic appreciate the strategTo lines the reten- in+_tLal stages Soviet of operations against from which the disruption of Allied sea the temporary seizure the lines of air bases on other North American area.. value The of Spitzbergen, them with of communication isolate Allied forces the base areas Island Approaches. Greenland and will attac!c Allied o£ the neutralLzatLon of and causing than are necessary for particularly during Soviet Union could be attacked, 13 1!. States, their military forces continental defense mobilization. the United in the object Soviet Union will Iceland, of and interdicting the North Atlantic area and in combat and base areas so from oversews support. TOP SECRET ACA1 1j - 52 TOP- SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP of SECRET POSSIBT•F, COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST NORTH AMERICA Atomic Attack 135. Atomic attack is the principal military means by which the Soviet Union can reduce the North American war effort. Because of the great dependence of Canadian industry on that of the United States and the small war potential of Canada as of the United States, the Soviet Union will consider targets the former country comparatively unprofitable. if not all, Therefore, in most, of the atomic bombs delivered on North America will be directed against the United States. could be compared with that These atomic attacks supplemented by biological warfare and chemical warfare attacks. 136. Atomic weapons a. Shipment or supplies, could be delivered by the following methods: of atomic bomb components as household effects under cover of diplomatic immunity. Shipment of an assembled atomic bomb by this method is also possible. b. As " in transit" commercial shipments, substitution or " switching" en route thereby allowing since customs inspection is not usually made at the port of entry. c. Covertly by TU-4 bomber and commercial type aircraft disguised with Canadian or U. commercial air carriers d. yachts, S. markings, transport or major of foreign registry. Smuggled by Soviet agents with U. fishing schooners S. or Canadian tugs, or other small sea- going vessels. e. V-1 type guided missil--s with atomic warheads launched from merchant f. ships or submarines. Torpedoes with atomic warheads fired into key harbors from submarines. 9. As bombs detonated in the hold of a merchant ship while in a key harbor. h. As mines laid in key harbors by merchant necessarily of Soviet registry) ships ( not or submarines. i. By bomber aircraft. TOP SECRET ACAI 16 - 63 - TOP - SECRET �TOP SECRET' TOP SECRET 0 Considering the technical difficulties justment and the probable the size and weight assembled bomb, and f, complete there of s,oecializcd personnel, and of the package necessary for introducing an it would appear that methods a to d are not likely to be employed. Soviets shortage of bomb assembly and ad- loss In addition, detection would cost strategic As of is no evidence by the Soviets and in the that case surprise. the for methods c such missiles have been developed of method f operational ,problems are presented which discourage their selection. not involve any special engineering problems Method g does or unusual skills but would not be as effective as an underwater burst which would result from the employment of method h. sidered that the latter the more likely of the two. is Therefore, as most of the targets are either inland or not type of attack, it is conHot;cvcr, suited to this it is believed that the majority of the atomic bombs allotted to North America will be delivered by method i, i.e. bomber aircraft. A-Ir Operations 137. An air offensive could be launched against North Am.6rica prior to or simultaneously with any other campaigns. mated that the Soviet Union will have the It is esti- capability of carrying out the following long-range bombing operations with TU -4's carrying 10,000 pounds a. of bombs: One-way missions, from potential bases and Velkal in Northeast Siberia and from bases area, such as Anadyr in the Murmansk could reach any important target in North America. b. Two-way attacks from Velkal could be carried out against that segment of North America bounded by a general line passing through San Francisco-Billings, Montana-Winnipeg. refuelling would extend this arc to include Dallas, and the Gulf of St. c. SECRET ALAI 1:6 Cincinnati Lawrence. Two-way attacks from bases a single aerial refuelling, TOP One aerial in the Murmansk area, using could cover an area bounded by a -64 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET line through Philadelphia- Cleveland- Calgary. refuelings this Jacksonville. Employing two line would be advanced to Oklahoma CityIt is, however, considered that navigational and other difficulties would make missions using a double aerial refueling so difficult of accomplishment as to be improbable. 138. Heavy bombers Siberian areas operating from the Murmansk or Northeast could attack most major targets in the United States and Canada without aerial refueling in two-way r_iissions. jet bombers Medium could be employed against the Alasi;an and Yukon area and with aerial refueling could attack many important targets in Western Canada and the Northwest United States. 139. The Soviets do not have the means for deliverin g a con- ventional air attack against North America in sufficient to be an effectiVe deterrent to our war effort. on any large scale, although attacks a possibility, the Soviets would probably be willing to expend aircraft and crews missions. against particularly suitable for atomic attack are On the other hand, One-way missions., employing conventional weapons are unlikely, on a very limited scale vital targets not strength Therefore, to deliver atonic bombs on one-way aircraft carrying atomic bombs may attack from bases in both the Murmansk area and Northeast Siberia, aircraft carrying high explosive and incendiary bombs but are more likely to come from the Northeast Siberian area only. 140. On the basis strategic aircraft, of the estimated initial allocation of the figure 350 --500** represents the probable number of TU-4 aircraft that ,-could be available for any one attack on North America from bases within range. figure would be augmented by most, if not all, bombers and possibly some medium jet bombers. In addition, this available heavy The frequency and Canadian. View. * U. S. View. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 TOP-SECRET �r TAP SECRET TOP SECRET strength of attacks, as well as depend to a large extent on the atomic bombs, the total iaaximum effort, will size of the number of escorts employed, climatic factors and commitiaents 141. of Soviet conditions in Northeast Siberia, that exist, it is logistical and in other theaters. In view of the logistic difficulties ing a combat force stock pile involved in i_iaintain- plus the adverse weather considered that any air cai.ipaign against Alaska would be minor in scope. As a practical maximir-i, it is estimated that up to 10 air regiments ( about 42 aircraft per regiment) of all roles from the Army and Naval Aviation forces and possibly small numbers of strategic bombers might be employed against the Alaskan area. Naval Operations 142. The sea offensive against the United States and Canada could include: a. The mining of ports and approaches by merchant ships and submarines before and on D-- day and by submarines after D-day. b. Submarine and raider attacks on shipping. It is expected that the long-range Soviet submarines will be to be on station in North American coastal waters before D-day and that possibly some raiders will be Pacific c. on station in the Atlantic and Oceans. Small amphibious operations to land sabotage teams from submarines up to a naxiimu.1 of 50 i:ien per boat. d. Attacks possibly on ports in the fort of special operations including attacks by submarine-- launched guided missiles with conventional and atomic warheads and atomic weapons introduced by sub;.iarines on D-day. In addition, or rerchant ships before or midget sub;:iarine attacks could be carried out on shipping in harbors and approaches. TOP SECRET ACAI 16 TOP SECRET �MP SECRET TOP SECRET The extent of mining of ports and approaches the cumber of lonCD g- range for this attacks type subs:urines and merchant ships available of -bPeration. It is considered that the in 195+. sub;:iarine few attacks confined to a very on isolated targets of prime military ixiportance. The extent of special operations against ports casted but it is cannot be fore- considered that these would be limited to major It is unlikely, would be carried out Amphibious on a It is furthor considered that any ar:Tphib- operation employing submarines would be ports. lis.lited only by on shipping in North Ar_ierican coastal waters will be limited scale ious is however, that iaidget submarine attacks in view of the distance involved. Operations 143. It is estimated that resources available to the Soviets in the Far East will permit a maxii.ium sea,.lift then cnly under optimum conditions. imposed by climatic conditions, craft, A consideration of limitations shortages logistic and air support indicate raids would be of suitable landing that small scale a.:iphibious confined to the Aleutian Islands and they Alaska north from Bristol Bay, amphibious operations Cli.:iatic tactical objectives coast in this area to the period July to Novei:"ber. their ir.riediate the destruction of coastal installations military importance. of conditions will limit Raids against Alaska would probably have as It is that they would range from of impossible to forecast the exact number of raids and the strength of each one, Airborne if 6,000 troops and but it is considered 150 to 500 assault troops. Operations 144. The Soviets night employ airborne operations to seize lightly- held airfields, otherwise to destooy military installations and to create a situation requiring considerable countereffort to destroy or dislodge the invaders. Northeast Siberia would place Existing base facilities soi:ie li.:citation on the employment of transport aircraft in conjunction with the boi_ibers and fighters, TOP SECRET ACAI lb in. other tactical aircraft, which would also be using the airfields. - 67 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 145. Range 1. mitations of Soviet medium transport types expected to be in use would prevent two-way airborne against the Fairbanks and Anchorage areas. Considering the esti- mated Soviet strategy in the Far East as a whole, various limiting factors Siberia, operations in regard to operations as well as the out of Northeast Soviet airborne attacks would probably be very small in size and directed against lightly-held targets in Western Alaska. 146. By employing TU-4 1s, however, on airborne missions, the Soviets could launch attacks against suitable areas within the radius it is possible be in use. targets of action of that aircraft. in other In addition, that a small nuffber of four-engined transports will In any case, other strategic requirements for TU -4's and logistical difficulties encountered in mounting operations from Northeast Siberia will tend to prevent more I so being diverted for this type of operation. Operations Against North Atlantic 147. Iceland. assault or capable operations against Iceland, sabotage forces from cargo vessels on D-day although logistic cult. Island Approaches The Soviet Union will be and possibly airborne than a few aircraft of air and naval and landing small in Icelandic waters support of these forces would be diffi- Submarine attacks against Allied spa lines of communication in the area of Iceland and mining of Icelandic ports are likely. 148. Greenland, attack against The Soviet Union is sea lines capable only of submarine of communication and limited air attacks in this area. 149. Spitzbergen. Spitzbergen on the The Soviet Union is capable of seizing outbreak of hostilities. Internal Threat 150. Canada. The Labor Progressive Party and elements foreign language groups constitute While its TOP SECRET ACAI 16 of the the Communist Party of Canada. strength of card carrying members is 9,000 to 12,000 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET • the Party can depend on active or passive support from approxi- mately 75,000 persons. By 195+ these numbers will be approximately the supporters will undoubtedly remain quiescent same although some in the event of war. 151. United States. The Communist Party, reportedly had a membership of 51,700. that for every Party member there are able to do the Partyts work. in September 1950 The Communist Party boasts ten Americans willing and The membership of the Communist Party has been declining steadily, decline will continue. USA, and it is expected that this In the event of war many Communist sympathizers and supporters wi.11 undoubtedly remain quiescent. 152• The Communist Parties of both countries will seek through their propaganda organs of promoting the idea that the Western Powers forced the war upon an unwilling Soviet Union. make use of local issues distorted to suit their own purposes foment discontent and could camouflage organizations. The Parties gill be if declared illegal, because They could their work behind front capable of these actions even the presses banned and overt leaders of the existence to interned, of underground organizations. 153. The Communist Parties will seek to encourage sabotage, slowdowns, and labor unrest with a view to causing strikes critical industries, manications emphasize in particularly in the transportation and com- industries. The Communist Parties will continue to the program for infiltration of basic industries. 154. In the event of war, the better known sabotage agents such as fire, explosives and abrasives )ommunist Parties are considered capable )W for sabotage. saboteurs Attacks against a limited number of personnel by into the ventilat- of buildings and by infecting food and water supplies. of insect vectors OP SECRET CAI lb In addition the of employment of BW and could be made by introducing BW agents -ng systems 'he use could be used. to spread certain diseases is also a - D9 TOP SECRET �TO$ SECRET TOP SECRET i possibility. Rinderpest and foot and mouth disease are diseases which could be areas simultaneously. serious two animal if introduced into a number of Both spread very readily once initiated unless rigid control measures are enforced. The plant pests the effects would be lccal. or diseases Poisonous is also possible but chemicals could be used by an enemy agent although this method of attack is limited application. create havoc saboteur had access It is unlikely that such an attack The use of RW agents by saboteurs considered improbable. 155. It is expected that native commit widespread sporadic acts with the USSR. initial stage measures As gases might be used to in a hall or theater provided the could be repeated successfully. is considered to have a very The newer nerve to the ventilation system. communists and agents will of sabotage at the outset of war Sporadic efforts will be most effective of the war. is expected to progressively decrease opposed to sporadic be most effective sabotage, the communists its effectiveness could attempt a This action would if directed against vital installations and industrial complexes outbreak of war. izz the Implementation of security counter- carefully planned and controlled operation. slightly prior to or concurrent with the Such a campaign could be mounted only at the risk of losing strategic surprise. It is believed that an organized sabotage campaign later in the course be indroduction of of the war Gan coped with by alert police action. MOST PROBA.BTR COURSE OF ACTION AGAINST NORTH AMERICA 156. It is estimated that the most probable cour-ra of action against North America will initially- be as follows: a. Atomic attacks, Soviet Union's atomic employing a substantial portion of the stock pile. Though some atomic bombs may be laid as mines in key harbors by merchant ships or submarines, it is believed that the majority of the bombs allocated to North America will be delivered by aircraft. TOP SECRET ACAI ib TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET I TOP SECRET , 0 b. Strategic air attacks (1) including: one-way atomic attacks by TU -4's in the Murmansk area and Northeast Siberia against any target in the United States (2) or Canada. Two-way attacks by TU -4's employing atomic or conventional bombs from bases that in Northeast Siberia against segment of North America bounded by a general line passing through San Francisco- Billings, (3) Montana - Winnipeg. Two-way attacks by heavy bombers which could reach most major targets in the United States. (4) Possibly two-way attacks with one aerial refueling by TU -4's or medium jet bombers from bases Siberia against that segment of North America bounded by a general line passing through Dallas, Gulf of St. Lawrence in Northeast in the case Cincinnati. and of TU-SF's, and Hanford- Calgary in the case of medium jet bombers. (5) Possibly two-way attacks with one aerial refueling by TU-SF's from bases in the Murmansk area against that segment of North America bounded by a general line passing through Philadelphia- Cleveland- Calgary. c. Small scale air attacks against Western and Central Alasr,a by light bombers and fighter aircraft. d. The mining of ports and approaches by merG:hant ships and submarines before and on D-day and by submarines after D-day, possibly including the use of some atomic weapon. e. Submarine attacks on shipping. It is most probable that limited numbers of submarines will be on station in North American coastal waters before D-day. f. Small amphibious operations against isolated targets of prime military importance employing sabotage teams from submarines up to a maxi;= of 50 men per boat. g. Amphibious raids against importance installations of military on the Aleutians and the coast of Alaska north from Bristol Bay ranging in strength from 150 to 500 assault troops. TOP SECRET ACA1 16 TOP SECRET �7 TPs SECRET N LLLt h. Airborne operations (1) Operations on a minor scale against installations of military importance (2) i-ric luding: in Western Alaska. Possibly a few operations by very small numbers four-enginud aircraft against installations importance of of military in isolated areas within the radius of action of these aircraft. Attacks against the North Atlantic island approaches in the form of air and naval operations against Iceland, possibly including the landing of small assault forces on D-day, political subversion and sabotage; air attacks against Greenland; on the or sabotage and the limited seizure of Spitzbergen outbreak of hostilities. •. Attempts to cause dissension and disaffection through psychological warfare and subversion. k. Attempts to encourage with a view to causing strikes slowdowns and incite labor unrest in critical industries, addition ph ;-sical sabotage employing fir e , exp los ives and in and abrasives and on a limited scale employing BW and CW. 1 L c• - '72 - � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIA00011 Title A name given to the resource ACAI 16, “Forms and Scales of Soviet Attack against North America, 1 July 1954" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 19-Feb-51 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived DND DHH 112.009 (D31) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource DND Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Intelligence Assessment Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource EN