https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2592d91d7fefcc61703ec3adecfcd3e5.pdf e19b5266e8f62dbca9c5fab322822b38 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project DND DHH 112.009 (D20) JIC Assessment Forms and Scales of Soviet Attack against North America, 1 July 1952 ACAI 15 51-02-16 (incorporating 51-05-25 revisions) �ti N...0-4 Al9 . n0J+ds ] JIdAO FOLD ON THIS LINE 51: 1112-00" ( D20 ) 11C,'_1 15, 0-s - 'ca es on / es ima e of rorrr_ sca o Russian attack against ` forth hmerica as of 1 Ju1 52 TOP SECRET A.C.A.I. 15 16 February 1951 DECL ASS'""- D AUTHORITY: it•i By DF:7E' P ,r% F - I I Vj3T -!A..-•, ... I VI) D H D i4' { a • oit DWsT 14DH0 �TOP SECRET I • • lk TOP SECRET FORMS AND SCALES OF SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST NORTH AMERICA-- 1 JULY 1052 SUMMARY THE PROBLEM 1. To prepare an agreed U. of the forms and scales S.- Canadian intelligence estimate of Soviet attack against North America in a major war commencing on 1 July 1952. ASSUMPTION - THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 2. It is assumed that there would be little or no warning prior to the actual initiat-ion of hostilities. POLITICAL FACTORS POLIT ICAL ALIGNMENT Soviet Bloc 3. Poland Rumania Outer Mongolia Czechoslovakia Bulgaria Communist HLingary Albania The above countries will be aligned with the China Soviet Union. I Soviet Occupied Areas and Base Rights 4. Eastern Germany Porkalla ( Finland) Eastern Austria The Port Arthur ( China) Soviet Union will have control of the occupied areas and the use of the territory and resources of the base rights. Western Bloc 5. United Kingdom Italy Australia France Norway New Zealand Belgium Denmark South Africa The Netherlands Iceland Latin America Luxembourg Portugal The above countries, together with their dependent territories, will be allied or aligned with the United States and Canada. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 - 1 TOP SECRETJ �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET W,, Western Occupied Areas and Base Rights 6. Western Germany Libya Iraq The Philippines Western Austria Egypt Liberia. Japan Trieste Jordan Ceylon The Western Bloc will have access, at least initially, terrtory and resources of the occupied countries, to the and to bases in other countries listed above. Other States Greece Yemen Burma, Sweden Turkey Ethiopia Siam Switzerland' Syria Iran Indonesia Ireland Lebanon Afghanistan Indo-China Spain Israel Pakistan Nationalist China Yugoslavia Saudi Arabia India 7. Finland The (.. ovntries in this list represent a wide range of situations and attitudes impossible to categorize satisfactorily. The greates - common denominator is that all ( excep% Nationalist China, aiZ? Turkey S,:ain) would be disposed to remain neutral unless themselves atta.(.'__ed. Both Turkey and Spain are strongly anti-Communist and have already made determined efforts to Sov.et aggresssion. join an alliance opposing All, however, would be in some degree sympa- theti.c with the Western Powers and would look to them for assistarre in the event of Soviet or Soviet- satellite attack. GEOGZ'•PHIC, 8. The LOGISTIC AND ECONOMIC size and location of Soviet- controlled territory enable the Soviet Union to threaten many stategic Allied areas while its own v_i_tal centers are remote in terms of ground attack from Allied territory. At the same time the large area sever,-, climate pose serious problems, of the country and its particularly in transportatin n -•This; . will continue to be a major drain on the Soviet economy. •'. The heavy industry of the Soviet Union is now supporting a. armaments industry. 21P ST,0CRET AC, 1 l This industry could be expanded to meet - 2 (Page revised by Decision On 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �1. TOP SECRET wartime demands without economy as a whole. evident that the causing great dislocation to the Soviet While exact details are lacking, is Soviet Union has established stock piles strategic materials and continues to add to them. is thought that it stocks of armaments will of In addition, suffice at least until expanded production permits replacement of combat The Soviet Union will have an abundance of manpower and adequate food supplies. However, in the course economy is likely to experience become progressively more are special types it consumption. of a long war, the Soviet certain shortages which might serious. The most significant among these of machine tools and production equipment, some types of electronic and precision equipment and instruments, industrial diamonds, natural rubber, certain types certain ferro-alloys and skilled workers. is also a possibility that aviation fuel and There shortages in tin and high octane special lubricants may develop. the Soviet economy as a whole war on a large of ball and roller bearings, should be able to combat In mid- 1952 support a major scale although the Allies will possess or have at their command a preponderance in resources and production in practically every basic strategic commodity. SCIE\TTIFIC 10. Scientific Potential. increase its The efforts of the Soviet Union to scientific potential have resulted in a large increase in the number of training institutions and in students receiving higher education. The Soviets have many first class scientists whose work compares favorably with the best Allied countries. However, below the top level, of really good research workers and technicians. will continue the output shortage The Soviet Union of scientists and technicians. The Soviets have attached a high priority to research and development. I there is a. to expand its training facilities and to increase 11. Research and Development. TOP SECRET ACL L 15 in the 3 However, there is �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET "?A little doubt that the vast effort concentrated in the nuclear ener`;y program has reduced the scientific resources available for research and development in other fields. nificcnt progress is to be Nevertheless, sig- expected in several lines of endeavor. The Soviet Union possesses rather extensive capabilities, which must, however, be assessed within the framework of total scien- tific potential, the limitations of which will preclude the Soviets from achieving parity with the Western Powers in many fields of research and development. It is estimated that the Soviet Union will be unable by mid- 1952 to equal the total research capability of tie Western Powers in atomic warfare, tron_cs, guided missiles, elec- aircraft and submarine development. ENEMY CAPABILITIES GROUND FORCES 12. By mid- 1952, the standing Soviet Army will contain at least. 2,500,000 men organized into 175 line divisions. addit . on, In the armies of the European Satellites will contain at least 800,000 men in 73 line divisions. Communist China now has ground forces totalling 3,500,,000 men organized into 220 divisions. 13. The Soviet Army is the most pc-,gerful and effective ground combat force in being in the world today. has Postwar reorganization stressed mechanization and improved organic logistic support. As corii)ared to Western tables of equipment the Soviet Army is defic_'l_ent in the more intricate types of communications equipment, fire control devices ( including radar) and heavy caliber antiaircraft guns. 14. While the morale, training rind equipment Euro •_,ean Satellite armies is but fair, status df the reorganization and ro-equipment program of the Soviet Union is expected to cause Bulga.ria.n, Hungarian and Polish divisions, at least, the to approach standard of Soviet formations by mid- 1952. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 - 4 (Page revised by Decision On 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET W TOP SECRET 1.5. • D•rspit ,• th. .,, - of -. tho._Chines. sup,:oi•ting arms and adminstrative Communist Army in services, it is the most effective fighting force of all the indigenous armies of the F^.r East and Southoast Asi' . NAVAL FORCES 16. By mid- 1952 the Soviets will possess a surfaco fleet greatly inferior in numbers to t] ", t of the Allies but their submarine strength will consist of 104 ocean patrol*, ran ,,o and 172 coastal patrol submarines. 94 medium The present disposition of t; -io Soviet Navy would require only minor changes in the event of hostilities. 17. Their combat efficiency will be below that of the U. and. Canadian naval forces. S. Their st,?Dma.rine force, however, will constitute a great danger to the Allied sea lines of communication. AIR FORCES 18. It is estimated that in July 1952 the Soviet air forces will have 20,000 first line aircraft and at least 600,000 men. 19. It is considered that the Soviet aircraft and associated industries will provide the Soviet Air Forces between now and mid-- 1952 with a steady supply of new and modern aircraft and equipment, including large numbers of able numbers of jet fighters and consid6r- jet-engined light and piston-ongined medium bombers. It is estimated that aircraft reserves will be at least equal to first line strength, but not necessarily identical as to type. 20. The Soviet air forces will in general have the initial advantage of numerical superiority in aircraft. While only a small proportion of the total aircraft could be used in operations against North America, will be Sovt_e•c the capabilities of the Long Range Aviation sufficient to warrant an attempt to deliver the entire stock pile of atomic bombs on this continent. See footnote to paragraph 77. TOP SECRET ACA 15 (Page revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET 1 �TOP SECRET 0 TOP SECRET INTERNAL THREAT 21. The Communist Party, U.S.A. and the Canadian Labor Progressive ( Communist) Party will be available for employment by the Soviet Union for subversion, sabotage and psychological warfare. MOST PROBABJ,F COURSE OF ACTION AGAINST NORTH AMERICA 22. It is estimated that the most probablo course of action against North America will initially be as follows: a. Atomic attacks, Soviet Union's atomic employing a substantial portion of the stock pile. Though some atomic bombs may be laid as mines in key harbors by merchant submarines, it ships or is believed that the majority of the bombs allocated to North America will be delivered by aircraft. b. Strategic air attacks employing TU-4 aircraft and including: (1) One-way atomic attacks from bases in the Murmansk area and Northeast United States Siberia against any target in the or Canada. (2) Two-- way attacks employing atomic or conventional bombs from bases segment in Northeast Siberia against that of North America bounded by a general line passing through Seattle, (3) Calgary, Churchill. Possible two- may attacks with one aerial refueling employing atomic or conventional bombs from bases in Northeast Siberia against that segment of North America bounded by a general line passing through Los Angeles, Denver and Fort William. c. Small scale air attacks against Western and Central Alaska by light bombers and fighter aircraft. d. The mining of ports and approaches by merchant ships and submarines before and on D-day and by submarines after D-day, possibly including the use of some atomic weapon. TOP SECRET ALAI 15 - G TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET e. Submarine attacks on shipping. that limited numbers of It is most probable submarines will be on station in No,°th American coastal eaters before D-day. f. Small amphibious operations against isolated targets of prime military importance employing sabotage teams from sv''-Marines up to a maximum of . Amphibious and airborne 50 men per boat. operations against installa- t:_ons of military importance in the Aleutians, and along the coast of Alaska, or against other important areas Nome-Fairbanks-Anchorage areas. the form of amphibious, to division size, airborne, such as the These attacks could be in or combined operations up depending upon the area attacked. Any air- "t borne operations against Canada would probably be confined to -e a few operations by very small_ numbers of TU-4's against installations of military importance in isolated areas within the radius of action of that aircraft. h_. Attacks against the North Atlantic island approaches in tI.t) form of air and naval operations against Iceland, possibly including the landing of small assault or sabotage forces on D-day, political subversion and sabotage; a`;ainst Greenland; and the seizure limited air attacks of Spitzbergen on the outbreak of hostilities. i. Attempts to cause dissension and disaffection through 1-sychologica.l warfare and subversion. ,j. Attempts to encourage slowdowns and incite labor unrest with a. view to causing strikes in critical industries, and j.n addition physical sabotage employing fire, explosives and abrasives and on a limited scale employing BW and CW. TOr SECRET AOX 15 - 7 (Page revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET J �6 • TOP SECRET 0 TO? SECRET 1 FORMS AND SCALES OF SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST NORTH AMERICA - 1 JULY 1952 DETAILED ESTIMATE THE PROBLEM 1. of To prepare an agreed U.S.-Canadian intelligence the forms and scales of in a major war commencing estimate Soviet attack against North America 1 July 1952. ASSUMPTIONS - THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 2. The Allied capabilities military preparations, occupied Europe, for early detection of both inside the Soviet Soviet Union and and for positive evaluation as in Soviet- to whether such preparations are in connection with forthcoming maneuvers or possible aggressive hostile action are probably not improve tions the period under consideration. forces during to the appreciably larger employment were extent Inadequate and will than of affording positive If air or ground those now positioned for intended for early commitment, build-up activities indica- initial redeployment and on a considerable -scale would be necessary and might provide a period of warning. However, the Soviet Union might plan to attack with forces already positioned, there might be no warnin g ; at all. Therefore, assume that there would be or no warning prior actual initiation of hostilities. little it in which case is necessary to to the POLITICAL FACTORS POLITICAL ALIGNMENT Soviet Bloc 3. Poland Hungary Albania Czechoslovalcia Rumania Outer Mongolia Bulgaria Communist China The above countries will be aligned with the Soviet Union. TOP SECRET EAI 15 11 TOP SECRET low �• TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Soviet Occupied Areas and Base Rights 4. The Bas tern Germany Porkalla ( Finland) Eastern Austria Port Arthur ( China) Soviet Union will have control of resources of the occupied areas and Western . United Bloc Kingdom the the use the bases Portugal France Italy Aus tral a Belgium Norway New Zealand The Netherlands Denmark South Africa Iceland Latin America will be allied together with or aligned with varying degrees their dependent the United States may territories, and Canada. the United States of effective cooperation under military assistance listed. i The Latin American Republics will support (e.g. of Luxembourg The above countries, Act ive territory and be available in the Rio Treaty. in - ome cases Brazil). Western Occupied Areas and Base Rights •. Western Germany Libya Iraq The Western Austria Egypt Liberia Japan Trieste Jordan Ceylon The Wes tern Bloc will have access, territory and resources in the other countries of the at least Philippines i_ni tially, occupied countriec, and to the to bases listed above. Ot'ner States T. . 1 7 inland Greece Yemen Burma Sweden Tur!=ey Ethiopia Thailand Switzerland Syria Iran Indonesia Ire land Lebanon Afghanistan Indo-China Spain Israel Pakistan Nationalist Ch'_na Yugoslavia Saudi Arabia India The countries in and attitudes impocsible TOP SEC RET ALAI l this list represent a wide to categorize range of situations satisfactorily. The _ S _ TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET greatest coruiion denominator is that all except Nationalist China, Turkey and Spain would be disposed to remain neutral unless selves attacked. Both Turkey and Spain are and have already made determined efforts Sovict a"gression. All, them- strongly anti-Cori—munist to join an alliance opposing however, w•ald be in some degree syi=rpathetic with the Western Powers and would look to them for assistance in the event of Soviet or Soviet- satellite attack. Some are stro rigly anti- Soviet but are prevented from allying themselves with the West by special circur;istances. Some are neutral for fear of provoking Soviet attack, while others are; influenced toward neutralism by a balance of anti-Western and anti-Soviet sentiments. vigorously if attacked, threat of attack. Some would resist while others mi[rht well succumb to mere Each being a special case, those or particular interest are discussed briefly below: a. Finland is bound by a Soviet- imposed treaty to assist the Soviet Union if the latter is menaced through Finnish territory. The Finns will not willingly give any military assistance to the Soviet Union; they will try to avoid giving permission to Soviet troops to move into Finland, and they will fight if Soviet forces enter Finnish territory without express permission. b. Sweden will remain neutral unless attacked. c. Ireland, while remaining nonbelligerent, might cooperate with the Western Bloc after the outbreak of war. d. Spain. anti-Soviet. The Spanish government and peoples are strongly For political reasons, Spain is not a r7iember of tho North Atlantic Treaty Organizat-ion. The present government prefers a defense agreement with the United States but probably would accept membership in the Treaty organization if political barriers were removed. e. Yugoslavia under the Tito regime will be anti-Soviet in orientation. It will doubtless try to remain neutral unless attacked and will not initiate hostilities against the SovietThe regime will fight if attacked. In the event of an East-West conflict in Europe, Yugoslavia, despite Satellite groups. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 - 10 (Page revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET its efforts currstancas to reraa_-n n(,utv,Ll, probably will bu to support the W:)st. internal opposition and is This regime susceptible forc(,d b., cir- can control any to overthrow only by forei- n invasion. Grcock-.. Greece will be entirely syl.ipathetic to the We••tern Bloc but would be reluctant to take action which might provol:o attack. g. Turkey. Under the Treaty of Mutual Assistance (whhich expires are in October 195 +) the United Kingdom and France obliged to go to the assistance attached, but Turkey is not war a"a_nst the of 1939 of Turkey if Turkey is obliged to assist her allies Soviet Union. in a Although the Turks are likely to fight rather than submit to any major Soviet demands, they would not otherwise necessarily join the Western Powers in war. h. Israel would endeavor to remain neutral. presently disposed to favor the Western Powers, Although Israel, in accordance with the pressures and inducements which may exist at th- tinLe, will follow the course she then deems most expedient. i. Arab States. Apart from treaty obligations, all the Arab governments will probably be di•posed to favor the Western Powers and to make available and territories, to them their economic resources although they may be reluctant to assist any active cooperation, dispatch of forces particularly if this outside involves their own territories. would expect the United States in the Ibn Saud to defend Dhahran. Iran will attempt to re.nain neutral. k. India, Indonesia and Plakistan. India and Indonesia will probably remain neutral unless attacked. more sympathetic to the Western Powers, remain neutral because 1. The Korea, Formosa, china, but would also probably of fear of Indian designs. Indo-China situation in Korea, be determined. Pakistan would be Burma, Thailand and Malaya. Forriosa and Indo-China by mid- 1952 cannot If the Viet Minh forces secure power in Indo- i3urma and Thailand would probably come under Communist TOP SECRET ACAI 15(Page revised by Decision on May 25, 1951) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET control, and the United KinSd.oW s position in Malaya would be directly threatened. ENEMY GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPTRS Soviet Union 3. The Soviet Union is a dictatorship of the Communist Party, exercised through both party and government organs. faces various internal problems The regime of which three of the most per- sistent are: a. The inherent strains of any dictatorship which rules by repression. b. The deficiencies of an autarchic economy. c. Friction between the Great Russians and the major national minorities. The death of Stalin will also raise of power. the question of the transfer The potential sources of disaffection are kept well under control through the Cozmmunist monopoly of political power and propaganda, isolation of the Soviet people from foreign contacts and police action. The government is now and will remain in full control of the country. 9. In time of war, the potential opposition in the Soviet Union could reduce the war effort seriously only if the mechanism of control were thoroughly disrupted or if effective Allied support for disaffected groups were immediately at hand. Satellites 10. The governments under Soviet auspices, of the and there is now thorough Soviet infiltration and supervision of the party, country. satellite countries came to power police and armed forces This firm Soviet control over the of each satellite governments will continue until mid- 1952. 11. Although there is evidence of the hostility of the peoples of the satellite countries to their communist regimes, there are TOP SECRET ALAI 15 -• 12 (Pate revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET awl TOP SlCRLT no appreciable signs communist methods effective 12. its of Continued improvement control will ljrevent the in development of opposition. In time of war the control over the of the of resistance. satellite Soviet Union will be satellite governments. peoples will not be high, form of effective resistance Western rowers are able to the to provide able to maintain Although the morale this will not take Soviet war effort unless assistance the the and direction from a nearby area. Communist China 11. that Communist the Chinese own efforts. China differs from the European Satellites Communists acquired power largely through their As a result, Moscow is less able to exert direct pressure on Peiping than on its Zuropean Satellites. however, there are no indications policies of Communist China and the Communist Chinese in Thus far, of any divergencies between the Soviet Union. intervention in Korea has Indeed, the served to embroil the Peiping regime with the Western Powers and consequently to align it even more closely with the Soviet Union. possibility of a cleavage between the China in the long run, Although there is a Soviet Union and Communist their present community of interests and their mutual involvement with the Western Powers will keep them aligned until at lit. least mid- 1952. The Nationalist Chinese forces ing point for opposition to the communist guerrilla forces particularly in the may be south. in Formosa provide a rally- communist regime. There are operating on the mainland of The stability of the anti- China, Communist regime affected by an unpopular reaction to her agrarian policies and to measures taken against Communist China by the United States.* Nevertheless, by mid-. 1952 the communists are not control of any important part of the ,f The Canadian Joint Intelligence support this sentence. likely to lose territory they now hold. Committee has no evidence to TOP SECRET ALAI 15 (Page • 1• - revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET ,e TOP SECRET 1•-. In the event of war the will continue to cooperate their objectives hel», but it in Asia. could provoke Soviet Union and Communist against the Western Powers The Nationalist Chinese, insurrections is unlikely that the in various parts regime could be China in pursuing with Western of the country, overthrown in this way. TOP SFCRI,T ACAI lr -- 11 a -- (Page added by Decision on 2; May 19 F 1) TOP SECRET �• • TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 INTERNATIONAL COMPTUN ISi,l 1.5. Soviet policy is simultaneously motivated by Marxist- Lenini st-Stalinis t doctrine and by considerations position of the Soviet Union as a great understanding of the developing world influenced by communist doctrine . , the limited by doctrinal considerations of action. As a result with communism, attractions nat ',. oval 17. the Soviet situation Soviet is strongly leaders are not in their choice identification of leaders are able their of courses the Soviet Union to e.--Iploit the of communism to enlist foreign support for Soviet Soviet Union commands communist parties, the world.. These employed in this way legal or underground, parties liamentary activities armed the While the interests. The also be of power. affecting advance Soviet and propaganda. in subversion, the allegiance in most countries interests of through par- Communist members sabotage, of can espionage and even insurrection. 1S._ A variety of national and operate as a further have developed instrument or infiltrated organizations in most parts in this is field through this international front of Soviet policy. trade of unions the world. Western defense plans. In to undermine time Communists and women's and youth The chief recent eff oi't the World Peace Movement. movement see!.s organizations The Soviet Union popular support for of crisis the movement might be a means of direct mass action against preparations Me thDds of for war. Political At tacit General 19. No evidence is available regarding sabotage and subversive activities but by 1952 no marked changes in policy of these the Soviet Union in in the the details of future the United States and Canada, objectives and fundamental fields are anticiapted. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET to 2.0. The Soviet Union has fecting its world-wide tacti.es to achieve shown great versatility in per- subversive apparatus and in devising new its objectives. As a result, bil '_ ties in this field have been enhanced.. tage Soviet ca,pa- In the field of sabo- Soviet capability may be increased by the development of such vieapons as chemical and biological agents. 21. The Soviet Union is now engaged in psychological warfare im,?Ic-lented through political and economic actions. The Soviet Union is engaged in espionage and subversion within the United States and Canada. It is also encouraging sabotage which currently takes the form of strikes and slowdowns in United States and Canadian industry. SUB`S +,RSION 22. Communists in the United States and Canada have as one of their.? major and constant tasks the subversion of United States and Canadian citizens-- both as individuals and groups-- and concurrently the ,promotion of Soviet propaganda themes. of local issues, They make full use which are distorted to suit their own purposes, and they can?ouflage their work by a facade of front organizations, which frequently are not recognized by the public. SABOTAGE 23. There is no evidence to the existence of a Soviet- directed physical sabotage campaign under way in the United States and Canada at the present time. Should it later suit the Sov_T_ct purpose to open such a campaign, this weapon may be ex- pected to be used to the fullest extent. the Communist Parties, both U. effowts to penetrate industry, Indu.-cries S. It is significant that and Canadian, continue their particularly the basic industries. served by Communist- dominated unions would be particu- larly vulnerable to the threat of Communist sabotage. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 - 15 (Page revised by Decision On 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �• • TOP SECRET TOP SDC RET 0 The 2.. probable effectiveness sabotage will depend measures largely in the fields would be from the on of the efficiency threatened. opening of the Soviet•- directed physical The with mi-1 , efforts. campaign will achieve phase and It its most cri tjcal period sabotage campaign until time when security arragnement s are warning; can be expected, in full force. Little sabotage would probably be is expected that greatest success the the timed sabotage during the initial of hostilities. The 2 17- . Soviet Union will possess an increasing capability for employing chemical and biological agents operations may of security between now and prevent or delay this 192. type The fear of for sabotage retaliation, however, of attack. Psychological Warfare 25. the Canada. medium of Progressive Trib-arie, At its the the Communist Party organization of legal expression, Party ( LPP) and the time present Pacific its Tribune, open Party and Press, the Labor the Canadian the National Affairs Monthly together with the many foreign language newspapers an incessant propaganda campaign designed is carrying on to create disaffection, £a.cti-onal disagreement and general dissatisfaction in of through the minds the Canadian people with duly constituted Government and its leadership. 27. United through its States. At open Party the present press, the New York Daily Worker and San Francisco Daily People's World, publication Political Affairs, front organizations, designed is and as well as to create disaffection, its through monthly its numerous factional disagreement, minds of the duly constituted Government and TOP SD- ORET AC!iI 15 through the conducting an incessant propaganda campaign general dissatisfaction in the with the Communist Party, USA, - 1 the Uni ted its States and populace leadership. - TOP SECRET �• • TOR SECRET TOP SECRET 0 23. In the event both countries, organizations 1 as well as of the declared illegal an(f, an evert the the practice malicious be some o£ the Communist Parties the more rad%cal and extremist foreign language groups, would probably be their respective presses banned. In such to of distribution of clandestinely printed newspapers pamphlets. Communist elements to foment discord, to LnclLide terrorist activities. would be employed for the purpose production as well as generally may be expected dissatisfaction and confusion by rumor and whispering campaigns and expected of underground movement would undoubtedly revert and mimeographed to endeavor• of general war, of their tactics Similar methods slowing down of lecsening the may industrial peoplelo will to Srin. TOP SECRET ALAI 15 - 17 - TOP-SECRET �• • TOP SECRET TOP SFC!`_,T y • G- OG-11APHIC• 29. Topopraphy. The LOGISTIC AND CONOMIC FACTORS frontier of the length of approximately 35,000 miles, coastline. Soviet Union has a total two-thirds Only in a few areas, however, of which is is this easily traversable by land or accessible by sea. in Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang, mountains and deserts. To frontier To the south Afghanistan and Iran are high the north and northeast are Ocean and other cold seas which, with few exceptions, the Arctic are frozen for the greater part of the year. Plain, the Baltic Coast and the P , larman the Black Sea Coast, Only the North LLuropean Coast and the maritime Far fast provide avenues to the areas in which are of the economic resources and population of the In contrast to the Soviet concentrated approximately three- fourths remoteness, in terms of Tlestern E=urope and the and oil of the Middle -'ast are limits '..0. miles) Soviet Union. of land attac'Z, strategic areas from Allied territory, population centers of approach the of industries and transportation links all relatively close to the of Soviet- controlled territory. The large area of the country ( about imposes a heavy burden on the paragraphs below). a flexible defense 3.5 million square transportation system ( see It also makes an integrated economy and plan difficult to achieve, permit the Soviet Union to trade space although it does for time when invaded. 31. The extremely rigorous winter which is experienced throughout most of the country poses further problems, transportation but not only in in almost every other economic and military activity. 72. The Soviet Union has a broader longitudinal perimeter around the Arctic basin than has North America and its location is therefore, transpolar in relation to this attach considerable TOP SCR= ALAI l; importance continent. It must, to northern bases, particularly --18- TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET dA in Northeast Siberia, the Murmansk area and Spitzbergen. the aiurmansk area there is now at least medium bombers. one base suitublt; for There are bases in Northeast Siberia for tvin-engine aircraft and it is believed that In suitable some may be im.-o-ooved by 1952 to the standard required by the Soviet Union for medium bombers. In an 7,-, case, The field at Anadyr may now be adequate. adequate airfields could be prepared fairly quickly in both of these areas, given the necessary construction materials. Although there are considerable logistic and seasonal difficultou_es in providing these facilities for Northeast Siberia, the Soviet Union has the advantage of a quarter century of experience in developing and maintaining air communications in the North. 33. There is a general program of airfie;l.d improvement afid devel_oyDment in the western part of the Soviet Union, ellite States and in the Communist Far East. the Sat- The program appears to em)hasize construction of permanent runways with lengths and curfaces capable of cra,fU. sup-,porting medium bombers and jet air- There are indications of improvement of some airfields in No:_,then st Siberia. 34. Many of the seas upon which the Soviet Union has established naval bases have narrow outlets. Black Sea, parts This is true of the the Baltic and the Sea of Japan; the Murman coast and of the Pacific coast are the only exceptions. 35. Communications and Transportation. It is estimated that the Manned 1950 distribution of total traffic burden will prevail :i-n mid- 1D52. Railways will carry about 86 per cent of all inland freight traffic . Inland water transport, will carry about 12 per cent of the total, and incre,nse in importance. which is expanding, : Ls likely to Motor transport will account for about 2 pep cent and civil air transport for less than 1 per cent. While the Soviet railway facilities will not be coml,)arable with those of North America in the TOP SECRET A CAI 1' 5 ' service they provide to industry, - it is 19 - (Page revised by Decision On 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOY SECRET bel.eved that Soviet railroads will be able to handle the increased traffic burden occasioned by J.ndustr:Lal expansion. •There may be a shortage of freight cars but it is unlikely that this ,gill cause a serious bottleneck in the Soviet economy. Moto:°, inland water and air transport are not expected to provide any s-ignificant relief to the railroads by this time. 3C. The present total Soviet merchant fleet, together with that pro?onion of the fleets of the European Satellites of which the Soviet Union could probably make use, 2.25 million gross tons, tons or more. The including all is thought to be about seagoing vessels of 1,000 ships in the merchant fleets of the Soviet Bloc are smaller than those of the Western nations. Of the total tonna`;e about three quarters is made up of vessels between 1,000 and n,000 tons and only about 125,000 tons are contributed by vessels of over 10,000 tons. The merchant fleet of Communist China has about 106,000 tons, all of which is made up of vessels of less than 5,000 tons. 3;. The consideration which overshadows all others in its effects on the military and economic aspects of transportation is the concentration of Soviet and satellite territories into one cont_nuous land mass of enormous size. The resultant strength of their' systems is that they are contiguous and possess interior connecting lines. However, the enormous distance between the east and west of Soviet- controlled territory and the lack of a sat_isa.ctory Soviet- controlled sea route between them pose ser:-_ous problems. Except in north and northeast Siberia, are dependent on seasonal shipping, which reliance must be placed almost of enormous ent.'_ , ,--ly on rail transport which involves the use quant:sties of rolling- stock, fuel and skilled labor, supplies of which are critically balanced or short or are likely to become so in the war. In peace or war, the operation and expansion of the transportation system will be an irreducible drain on Soviet economic resources. TOY SECRET ACA1 15 - 20 (Yage revised by Decision On 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET ≥•. The poor distribution of land transport facilities in sout:•e-•stern Europe is a strategic weakness which is only parc,_a.11y offset by Soviet control of the Black Sea and the Danu , 3•. In the Balkans north- south lines are too sparse by themselves to support large movements directed at the Bosphorus or into Greece. The road network, impa?ovements, sparse and poorly aligned for the is moreover, possible Soviet military operations. despite certain support of Another weakness of the .Sovi._•t orbit land transportation system is the problem of gauge diffu—i ,ence, The which has long been a source telecommunications of difficulty. system is efficient and extensive and forms an important part of the mechanism by which the Soviet gov:=ment controls all important aspects of national life. STRATEGIC C ECONOMIC POTENTIAL Strategic Industries 40. The new Five-Year Plan which is about to start is expected to aim at the continued development of transportation and heavy industry and at the same time allow for expa.ns3_on of other indust,- -1_es. This latter expansion will, by 1952, increase in potential for military production, result in some both in quantity and cvality. 41. The satellites will be in a position to make a consider- able contribution to a Soviet war effort in 1952. Since 19+8 the ;) olicy of the Soviet Union has been designed to channel satellite industrial effort into lines best the Soviet economy. vaki , suited to support The heavy equipment industry of Czechoslo- the elctronics industry of Hungary, of Eastern Germany, are for example, the instrument industry producin,, critical items ; the major share of which is destined for the Soviet Union. TOP SECRET ACAT 15 L - 21 (Page rovised by Decision On 25 Mdy,1951) TOP SECRET �• • TOP SECRET TOP SECRT'T V 42. In trade with countries will continue equipment, wool, its efforts to its orbit the obtain industrial machinery and copper and other materials which the does not produce to be offered by the Soviets as means for paring for such imports. to obtain those of allied export which such controls are 43. its require- the principal Soviet exports to Western Europe, will probably continue Soviet efforts rubber, Soviet orbit in the quantity and quality to meet Grain and timber, extent Soviet Union replacement parts and components, bearings, lead, ments. outside The success of imports will depend upon the controls and the effectiveness with enforced. The production of special steel is likely to be hampered by a shortage molybdenum), of certain ferro-alloys ( for example, and that of high-grade petroleum products ( such as aviation fuel and lubricants) by a shortage equipment. There will still be a shortage machine tools, cobalt and precision instruments, of specialized of high-grade production testing equipment, purpose bearings and replacement parts. Emphasis special on the production_ of synthetic rubber and on its quality will probably be intensified. wale In 1D52 the electronics to produce industry will not be radar and communications equipment on a scale comparable with that of the United Kingdom and the United States. Production. of Selected Millterry Items 44. 1950 Aircraft. is figure Production of aircraft by the Soviet Union in considered to have been about could be supplies are available. production_ is of materials, 1 to increase i Only about half of the total aircraft of combat aircraft. years in output number of so particularly The potential capacity in 1952 might be about 40,000 modern aircraft per year. take This increased by 1952 if the Soviet Government desired since adequate aluminum, 10,000 to 12,000. to reach this capacity, It would although a considerable could be effected rapidly by increasing the shifts worked. Projection of what is known about current production rates gives a minimum cumulative total of TOP SfCPET ALAI , 5 -- 22 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET 4* about 1,4_. 5u, cur.:ulative 10,000. ess 1̀ -nts by 1 • n!7 1057. rdnirnr :_-_ are for e ronuction of jet fighters by this catt is a,..out Evidence about t?z prOuction of light jet bombers is f _ rr. _', To-- ever, it 7_' thon , Jit tivt about 15- 30 a month are beinc yro.ucen at present and that IroSuction is on the increase. roduction of Insufficient evidence is available to e timate ;she four- engine. transports but trin-snginer transports (IL-1- Is or improved type) could a 4 1 5. Mor Vehicles. proaucaj as rea...ireC . T?re 1;'50 target of 500,000 units ( of which 90 per cent arc trucks and buses) was not rka.cheo . It is estimates that 4 ; .20,000 vehicles ( of which 4 ; 00,000 were trucks) were : ro . uses: in 1;'50. 500,000. By 1052 proc_uction Ml be at least Satellites are expected to pros uce more than 50,000 motor vehicles in 1?5?. 46. Armoure FORK Vehicles. The eotimat& rate of _: ro- action for 1;50, of 6,000 tanks anj self- propeller! guns could., if desired, be in_:rea en bz 195s to the potential capacity of aproximately 40,000. arnoare. year. The peak Soviet proc_nction rate of fighting vehicles durinC `: orY lar II was 32,000 per Cf the satellites, only Czechoslovakia and Hungary have at present the capacity to pro;:uce armovr..d righting vehicles . 4 ; 7. Shipbuil'.inr. War damage in the shipyards on the Black Sea and at Leningrad has been largely restored, Yhile L"olotovsk on the 1hite Sea and Far Eastern shipyards have been ex nr_ded. The post-ar output of Soviet shipyards has been concentrated on naval craft, naval auxiliaries, and small river and fishing craft. As a result, the Soviet Union is not building apDreci.a.ble numbers of ocean-going merchant ships of over 1000 GAT and it is estimated that its annual output of Bach vessels toes not nor exceed 25,000 GIRT. The combine:' output of the satellites is probably at about the same level. -23TCP WE C T ACAI 15 (Page revises' by Decision Cn 25 Lay 1951) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Except in the F',,,r East construction of naval vessels was 1 ; held t,1, by the war, and it is only recently that vessels plhnned for construction during; the war are reaching completion. are now becoming available for the Yards construction of postwar ships. Ca;Ya , . ty for building submarines has increased since the war. It is !:ci.ovn that the Soviet Union received 4 HSS Type XXI and parts for additional boats from the Germans. on No evidence is available the production of additi-onal Type XXI or of Walther type XXVI submarines*. 4,1 , . ( Not used) Mana,c,,ement and Labor 50. will It is estimated that the population of the Soviet Union total approximately 205 million in June 1952, near]--,r 50 million will be males in the 17 -49 mobj_:l,_.zation does not begin before mid 1952, of which age group. If the Soviet armed forces would number 4 million men. * See footnote to paragraph 77. TOP SECRET AA - 2.4 - (Page revised by Decision On 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �• • TOP SECRET The total civilian labor force of the Soviet Union in TOP SLCR-'T 51. June 1952, assuming no increased mobilization by that time, is estimated at about 100 million worlrers, The agricultural labor force w _ 11 be including workers somewhat under •- 0 million, Statc farms and machine tractor stations. on The non-agricultural labor force will equal -- bout ;= 2 million workers in mid- 1952, including ;9-40 million in state 3 million artisans. institutions and enterprises and The number of wortzers in corrective labor institutions, who are engaged primarily in non-agricultural occupations, probably currently amounts to no more than 10 million persons. 52. "he countries total civilian labor force in the European satellite in 1952 will equal approximately of a total population of 92 -97 million) for war is not undertaken; 45 -50 million ( out if active preparation the non-agricultural section will account for slightly less than half of this total. Of the anticipated 26 17 million persons engaged in civilian employment in Communist China ( with an estimated total population of x+75 million), about 40 million will be in the non-agricultural labor force. -' ven this latter figure overstates the productive capacitor of Chinese labor, however, because only about 1-2 million of the 40 million are employed in modern industrial plants •end factories. 53 . Shortage of skilled labor, especially in the engineering industry, and shortage of trained managers in industr•r will persist in 19172 in spite shortages are, however, of intensive training programs. less likely to affect industry engaged on military projects to which high priority is attached. of s'_:illed labor and equipment the These In view shortages and baclniard technology, industrial efficiency of the Soviet Union as a whole will remain well below that of North America. 'T'0P S„ 01sT ACAI 15 - 25 -- TOP SECRET �• • TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 Raw materials 54. There which are are no shortages liy--ely to cripple a nuriber of commodities The most important diamonds. The of raw materials its war effort. of which the in the Soviet Union There are, supply is critically balanced. of these are natural rubber and industrial rubber stock pile is now sufficient for about years and is being augmented by supplies from Malaya. is a potential source unlikely- to be an effective in short tin, is supply, in 1952 unless the Both lead and scarce and supplies are unlikely to Tungsten, it source during the period under review. Soviet Union begins now to build up a reserve. greatly. two Indo-China of supply for the Soviet Bloc but Industrial diamonds will be molybdenum are however, and cobalt, improve although not plentiful, are probably adequate for minim mi requirements. A-ricultural Production 55. If harvests are normal the continue rates to be Soviet orbit as a whole will self-sufficient in foodstuffs in 1952 at present of consuption. Strategic Significance of Soviet ,conom•r 56. The basic economic strength of the Soviet Union lies in the fact that it has resources of nearly all important raw materials within its boundaries and at the resources of manpower and adequate of the shortness of the of the resources same time verb- large sources of food. industrial experience of the As a result country, mangy. by mid- 1952 have been only partially developed and not enough skilled workers and managers will have been trained. The emphasis in industrial development has been on heave industry at the expense and the standard of living of the of the consumer goods industries ordinary citizen. industry forms the basis for an armaments maintained at a high level in peacetime expanded in 1952 to meet dislocation to the TOP SECRBT ALAI 1_5 wartime This heavy industry, which is and which could be demands without causing great Soviet economy as a whole. While exact 26 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP 37---T details are lacking, it is evident established stock piles to add to there. The that the Soviet Union has of strategic materials and continues stocks of armaments will suffice at least until expanded production permits replacement of combat consumption. However, in the course is likely to experience progressively- riore special t lies types The most significant among these tools and production equipment of electronic and precision equipment, certain tsroes of ball and roller bearings, certain ferro-alloys and some possibilit;- that shortages chemicals. of tin, econori'- as a whole will be able to ever= basic TOP ST'C'T riCl I IF- sor.le natural rubber and There is also a combat aviation In mid -1952 the Soviet support a major war on a large althou h the Allies will possess a preponderance are industrial diamonds, high octane fuel and special lubricants clay develop. scale, Soviet economy certain shortages which might become serious. of machine of a long war the or have at their corm-,and in resources and production in practically strategic cor_uiodity. 27 TOP SECRET �0 • TROP SECRET TOP SECRET SCIEi•:TIFIC FACTORQ 5?. Scienti fD.c increase its zoten -•._al. scientific in the number of The whose work comparez the output have resulted institutions and S:)viets below the to expand its to level, However, ficant progress expected the limitations unable, by mid -1952, Western Powers is to increase there is li ttle of endeavor. capabilit-es, of whit=m will preclude estimated to equal the in atomic warfare, signi- which framework of total scientific achieving parity with the Western Powers It and in several lines must however be assessed with- n the and development. of The Soviet Union Nevertheless, The Soviet Union possesses rather extensive potential, a shortage scientific resources available for in other fields. to be is in the nuclear energy research and development is there The Soviets have attached a high doubt that the vast effort concentrated the in t'_,e Allied technic;ans. priority to researcl- and development. reduced scientists technicians. 5F,. Research and Development. program has increase in students receiving training faci 11t3 es of scientists and in a large have many first-class really good research workers and will con:,inue of the Soviet Union to favorably with the best However, countrle . efforts potential training hig . er education. The the Soviets in many fields from of research that the Soviet Union will be total research capability of the guided missiles, electronics, aircraft and submarine development. MILITARY FACTORS GROUND FORCES Strength 59. Soviet Un:on. the It is estimated that, as of 1-February standing Soviet Army contained at least 2,500,000 men. addition, the x+00,000 men. internal security forces T•.ere ACAI 15 In of an estimated is no evidence pointing toward an increase these figures by 1 July TOP SECRET consisted 1951, in 10,52. -- 23 - TOP SECRET 1 �• TOP SECRET 60. Eur ' pea.n Satell . tes . A::. of 1 Febrl{ary 1;51, the Lul_ropean 3ateilites ( excluding East Germany) '(•'D0,000 men. By 1 July will have :. ncreased 51. 1 - 52, , t is consisted and The contained at least tliat their strength C:::_nese Communist forces, Mil!- tart' District troops, of appr•oximate_ly 3,500,000 .yen. evidence available of to approximately 800,000 men. Coi:.runtuzist Ch-na. F-eld Farces estimated the armies to est , -mate as of 1 February 1951, There the extent lneludino is insufficient - of any increase by 1 July 19/52. Comuos _ lion 52. Sov let Union. a. The Sov.Let Army is which 105 are rifle; cavalry divisions. organized into 175 35 are mechanized; In addition, line divisions, 25 are tank; there are an estimated artillery and antiaircraft artillery divisions. in this strength will probably result rifle divisions even if of hostilities. On the to suggest diviss.ons that the the and increase other hand, of 10 are 45 Any increase in a greater proportion of occurs there is Soviets may plan that shall be tank or mechanized. before the beginning limited evidence one-third Accordingly, of their the or medium term mob-li.zat-on of Soviet forces may result long in only a slightly lower proport J_on of tank and mechanized divisions b. than at present. There are no farm indications tion of Sov:et airborne forces. on the basis place, of the extensive i_t have received is estimated estimated, however, training known to have taken that large numbers of line In troops elementary air transportability train=ng. Principal limitations TOP SECRET ACAI 15 It is organiza- that at least 100,000 paratroops are available. addition, will be of the size and on the employment of airborne forces the availability of transport lift. — 29 — TOP-SECRET �TOP SECRET • • TOP SECRET • ',D3. Euro --:ean Satellites. There- aj. e a.p j-•roxi.mately 60 European Satellite divisions at- presents that theme may be as many a4 divls:_ons, o'+. By 1 J--.21y 1952, it = s estimated 73 established satellite line including 12 to 15 tank or mechanized divisions. Co.• . un yst China. As Communist ground forces 220 divisions, of 1 February 1951, were organized the Chinese into 75 armies and approximately 2,059,000 men. totaling In addition, there were approximately 1, 450, 000 mea_ in the various military districts. There is no evidence to indicate to what extent this organization will change by 1 July 1952. Status of Supply 65. Soviet Union. stocks of clothing, weapons for Lcs trans -,ort and that these It arrears that the army possesses adequate personal accountrements, present size. Restz;acted use constmi_otion of petrol, items are ammunition and oil and in short supply. It is of iecilanized lubricants indicates probable that a considerable effort is being made to build up stock piles the foregoing commodities against the 1952, it is likely that no serious 66. European Satellites. outbrea-._ of war. shortages Sizable t In quantities particular, of all types the armies Rumania and Bulgaria have received large medium tanks and artillery. sizable quantities There are indications where large quantities stoci>-piled! :Ic to improve of war material at the present pace -e expected the capabilities forces by the rove-lion -,? of equipment and TOP SECRET ALAI 15 of Soviet of supply in all satellite particularly in Bulgaria, Soviet union will continue to all of Poland, shipments of Soviet heavy armor. of war material are being of The Hungarian Army has received of stock- piling of critical items countries and By 1 July of these will exist. Soviet war material and equipment have been provided satellite countries: of all that the of satellite the build-up of stocks until mid- 1952. - 30 TOP SECRET �7 • • TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 67. C. rLm gin. st Ch_na . British, U.S. as well as and Equipment is a mixture some native Sov-Let equn.pment type. -..derable Japanese, of World War Aithou3h recent reports by the Soviet Union to supply quantities ;ommvr.._st Ch.na, of II design, assert agreement of Sov1_et equipment to there have been no reliable reports amount of su ,.relies have been turned that a con- over to the Chinese Communist forces. Disposition 6 Soviet ini:•n. divisions The preeent disposition of the is bel_-_eved to be as Location Divis:•ons Germany- Poland 24 e Western USSR 73 Caucasus 21 Middle Asia lv Far Eastern USSR 31 Far East Outside USSR 4 TOTAL 175 6y. European Satellites. satellite divisions The Nresent dis)osition of the 60 is believed to be as Country follows: Divisions Albania 4 Bulgaria 13 Rumania 11 Eun•ary v Czechoslovak.a 10 Poland 16 TOTAL TOP SECRET 15 line follows: Aus tr _ a -Hungar -Ruriiania ACA! 175 60 _ 31 TOP SECRET �• • UP SECRET TOP SECRET 4 9 Mobi_1 . za 70. on P^tents! al Soviet a. It Jnion is estimated- that the Soviet 40 million manes between the ages 30 million are fn- -' U - Union has well over of 19-5,0, foi' :nil- Lary service. of whom well over Of these apr:ro.;imately 12 million have had war experience and of these, are either sidered b. as 8 million are age 35 o.° or training; About 7 million in the Army or have had Army service and are to be immediately available Potential speeds con- on mobilization. of mobil_zation are estimated to be follows: Line Divsions Total Line Divisions* Strength of Ground Forces M - Day 175, 175, 2,5,00,000 M 30 days 320 345, 8,000,000 M 180 days 320 470 10,5,00,000 M 365, days 470 5,20 12,000,000 Period This -) otental exceeds 71. less. latter, European Satellites. estimated requirements. The number of line divisions which the satellites will have by 1 July 1,5,2 is believed to be as follows: Country Divisions Albania 4 Bulgaria l5, Rumania 14 Hungary 10 Czechoslovakia 12 Poland 18 TOTAL Satellite armies are unli';7-ely to be expanded beyond 73 on mobilization the above figures. # Total line divisions includes those undergoin training. TOP SECRET ACAI l5, 72 TOP SECRET �N. • • TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 11 2t Ch., na . J:;T il;i it s cony idered that Communist Ch•_na is .aobilized at ) l°esont. Combat Efficiency 3. 3tren,; -ch and Wla:messcs a. Soviet Union (1) The senior• command of the Soviet Army is ruthless, energetic and ex.:erienced. of the caliber e ecute orders of the The junior senior command, faithfully. is (2) Since in war. Army is (3) individual possesses lQ46 the S-•viet Army has been progressively Soviet divisions are same The leaders without question. reorganized along more modern lines. the to of young manpower courageous and deeply patriotic, ph•-sical stamina and follows his while not may be expected A great .mass is available for military service soldier officers, type. By expected Soviet comi:)a.ra.ble The newer tyI Des to Western divisions of of thle r•eoroa.nization of the Soviet to be largely completed. staff or-anization is simple and effective, out Soviet headquarters are liriely to react more slowly to unexpected changes than hose of Western Commander`. (4) An extensive , roE;ram of pre-military and military training has lace: of trade been in progress since 1945 to correct a technical personnel and officeps and considerable NCOs . schooled middle and By mid- 101 2 it is lower likely that over-all improvement will have been effected. (5) in general, S:)viet equipment .qualitatively and quantitatively. the refinement is adequate both While of Western equipment, whole considered some they are to be equally effective types lack on the in combat, and in some respects--notably armor and heavy mortars-- possess superior combat characteristics types. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 As compared over. current IXestern to Western tables of equipment the -33_ TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Soviet Army is dicfic::._•nt in the more: communications equi.p;Aont, radar) fire of control devices ( including and heavy caliber antiaircraft guns. (6) Soviet training Discipline high. s chedules is rigid and, in event are intensive and adequa te. of war, morale will be Any latent disaffection is repressed by an efficient :.nt•.rnLl .: c;curit'y sy3tulil: be intricate types caj. desertions can expected as long as the Soviet Army suffers no major reverses b. in the field. European Satellites (1) Purges of politically unreliable caused a. lack of experienced, armies. fair. officers have trained officers in satellite Morale and training of troops in general is but The subsoruLncy to Moscow of the national govern- ments and a dislike in get numbers of of communist methods has instilled soldiers a latent unreliability which could be exploited in certain circumstances. (2) Satollite armies are being reorganized along Soviet lines. It is estimated that by 1952 reorganization and re- equipment of these forces will be approximately 80-90 per cent complete. (3) The supply of Soviet equipment to has been accelerated in recent months. unsatisfactory equipment status satUllit,_: forces If continued, the should b,e substantially improved by mid- 1952. c. Communist China (1) A wealth of manpower dominated by police methods nd headed by experienced, fanatical officers is the chief strength of the Chinese Communist Army. (2) It is expected, due to Soviet influence, that the Chinese Communist Army will be reorganized along Soviet lines. At present, by Western standards, units are weak in supporting arms. their combat The administrative services are virtually nonexistent. TC P SECRET AC'V ,'. 15 - 34 -( Page revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �• • fOP SECRET TOP SECRET 14. Relative a_. Effic,ency The Soviet Arm - . The Sov _ et Army is the most powerful and effective ground combat force an being in the world Postwar reorganization has and improved noticeable organic logistic This is particularly estimated the Hobilization and re§lacement stocks and armored vehicles sent support. times as much mechanical transport as type division. divisions stressed mechanization and mobility in the new rifle division which is contain four today. exist in ample quantity and to old of artillery quality. of the peacetime Soviet Army are believed The to repre- the highest level of potential combat effectiveness which the Soviet Army is b_. likely to attain. European Satellite Armies. In event of war, European Satellite forces may be expected to fight with varying degrees of enthusiasm and effectiveness. They will be more effective if employed against traditional enemies. domination of the satellite armed increase their effectiveness Hungarian and the standard c. Soviet forces will progressively so that, by 192, Bulgarian, Polish divisions at least will be approaching of Soviet formations. Chinese Communist Army. Chinese Continued Despite the weakness of the Communist Army in supporting arms and administrative services, it is the most effective fighting force indigenous armies of all the of the Far East and Southeast Asia. 75. Para- Military Capabilities a_. DOSAV, Soviet Union. and DOSFLOT, The three Para-military societies, operate under DOSARM, the auspices of the Soviet Armed Forces and have about 15 million members of both sexes. They provide preinduction training of draft- eligible youths in such military wills as marksmanship, parachute jumping, and a useful framework for in time TOP SECRET of war, skiing. The anti -- gas measures, training societies provide organization of the Zone particularly with regard - of the Interior to passive air defenso jF ALAI 15 TOP SECRU �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET personnel and auxiliary units for support of the armed forces. The security police number x+00,000. rather than a paramilitary force, largely of a paramilitary nature. They constitute a military although their missions are In mid -1952 it is likely that the Soviet government can supplement its regular forces with local popular levies for operations on Russian soil. b. European Satellites. All satellite nations support specially selected and trained security police forces. of war, In event they can be expected to support the regimes effectively. It is estL;,ated that the security police of each country have the capability of dealing effectively with any disaffected groups of the population unless the Western Powers are able to provide assistance:: and direction to the disaffected elements froi,i a nearby area. c. Coruuunist China, The People's Public Security Force has recently been organized. strength, One detachrient, probably of regimental is loeatod in Peiping. Some 300,000 anti-Communist guerrillas are believed to be operating on the mainland. These and other disaffected groups would doubtless exploit the engagement of Communist troops elsewhere to their ewn advantage, but present indications are that the Chinese Coruuunist Field Forces, with the assistance of the Military District Troops and the People's Public Security Force, have the capability to maintain internal security. 76. Tactics and Techniques a. Soviet Army. Soviet ground operations in the past have been characterized by thorough planning rigidly adhered to, mass infantry attacks tions and air attacks, units, supported by heavy artillery concentraexploitation of penetrations by tank and careful consolidation oz' gains. Partisan operations in rear areas have been coordinated with the attach:. commanders have exhibited a disregard for losses Soviet in achieving TOP SECRET ALAI 15 - 36 -- (Page revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �• • TOP SECRET V TOP SECRET objectives, ability to o-.erate effectively w.th lo` -_ stic sup- port below Western standards, to meet tactical needs. Array io and a fla-- r for There is lmlprovisation evidence that the Soviet stressing improvement in river- crossing and amphibious tec ,n:_ques and airborne operations ( see paragraph 62b). tactical concept of employment of forces be continued increase The en masse will probably despite reorganization of the divisions so as to their potential capabJlity for employment in a more flel;ible manner than L.revailed in World ' tar II. The employment of large masses of artillery and armor can be expected in the future. b. armies Euro ,_!ean Satellite Armies. Under Soviet influence the of the European Satellites are ex ,Dected to conform to Soviet doctrine and -, ractices . c. relies Chinese Communist Army. upon massed The Chinese Commnunist Army infantry attacks when the objective warrants the expenditure of manpower. always maintained. The mobility of their forces They are well trained Infiltration of the enemy is exploited. little artillery or armored su•)port is is in guerrilla tactics. Due to lack of materiel, furnished although mortars are used effectively. It can be expected aid will eventually sup . ply Chinese Communist forces with artillery, armor, the and vehicles. that Soviet Soviet influence will prob- ably cause an increasing adoption of Soviet tactical concerts. However, for some years to come at least, the Chinese Communist Army will remain essentially an infantry force. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 -37- TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 40 NAVAL FORCES Strength 77• It is estimated that by 1 Jule 1952 the strength of the Soviet fleet will be as follow0: Increase Fleet Units Total Old Battloships 3 Monitors 1 Heavy Cruisers 6 Old Heavy Cruisers 1 Light Cruisers 16 Old Light Cruisers 8 l Destroyers 79 Old Destroyers 11 Destroyers, 36 Coastal Old Destroyers, from 1951 Coastal Ocean Escorts 17 4 13 Patrol Vessels 1,200 300 Mine Vessels x-50 50 Amphibious Vessels 265 50 Submarines HSS ( XXI) 4* Ocean Patrol - 100 9)f Medium Range Coastal 1 72 # Althou,_•,h coLiplete evidence is not available on the state or di sposition of the twenty- odd ox- German, scmicompleted Mk 21- type submarines, the possibility of some of this "roup being av•a.i.]_able for service, in addition to the 4. Imown to have been recei.ved in an operational state, cannot be discounted, though there are nany difficult if not insurmountable technical problems connected with these boats. In addition, it is strongly believed that the Soviets have been making every effort to produce a HSS vessel of their own design. It is further considered that the prototype trials and tooling- up process for the production of such a vessel raa;yT now hav-: been completed. In such a case it is considered that the Soviets would undoubtedly concentrate their submarine construction efforts in this direction and could produce at least forty boats durin{; the first year of production and an annual output of approximately eighty thereafter, TOP SECRET ALAI 1 - jv (Paue revised by Docision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �r0 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 78. Naval ,_,e-s•-nnel otrength by mid-1;•2 Ls estimated as follows : 32a,,000 Forces Afloat Coast Defense. Units Iar::.nes Iv al Aviat=ion* LE'-'" 000 '.6,000 ' .0' 000 Total 580,000 Composition The Sov le -c Navy is air forces com o`ed located :In four :aa, or sea approaches of six fleets sea areas to the Soviet Union. Fleet Number Northern supported b77 fleet wi.ich . nclude all the The fleets are as follows : Adriinistrative Base Unnumbered Murmans1L North Baltic E•t"-_ Tallinn. South Baltic 4th Baltii Black Sea Unnumbered k Sevastopol North Pacific 7th Sovetskaya Gavan South Pacific 5th Vladivostok In addition there are four Caspean Sea, Danube River, Status 80. located in the Dnieper River and Amur River. of Sup.-)ly The wide physical separation of tae maritime frontiers Soviet Union and these areas overseas bases to its of the inadequate Soviet controlled water routes between compel the maintenance a decentralized fleets independent flotillas system of log-.stic tends to tie each of separate forces eupnort. The present lack of of the separate naval forces respective maritime frontier area. thus handicapped, lacks the Under present conditions, together with or The Soviet Navy, strategic mobility of other navies. it would be virtually imDoss:ble to effect a rapid wartime concentration of Soviet Naval Forces, drawn from the various G1. The fleets, Soviet navy has in any given area. attempted to offset this strategic- dis-advantage primarily by building up fleet strength and carrying out base development on a. planned priority basis * See paragraljhs • Od, TOP SECRET ACAI 155 corresponding wit!. 92'd and yC. _3 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Iris" strategic interests. It is estimated that during 1952 the following major combatant units will be under cistruction ( in addition to numerous MTB's, patrol and coastal ar4ft) : 19 cruisers, of which 6 will probably be complete; 30 :Vlpq• ostroyers, half should become available durizjg thQ year; Secondly, of which about and 35 submarines. the Soviet Union is developing inland and coastal water- ways in areas under its control. Destroyers and large submarines can move between the Arctic and Baltic via the Stalin Canal during the six months navigation season. The Caspian Sea is connected with the Baltic and Arctic by a series of canals and inland waterways, which can handle craft up to 10 feet in draft, coastal submarines with the aid of transporters. including It is possible that the Volga-Don Canal may be in operation by mid- 1952. The com- pletion of this canal project will join the Black Sea with the inland water route which at present connects the White, Baltic and Caspian Seas. Disposition 82. Soviet Union. It is estimated that the combatant strength of the Soviet Navy on 1 July 1952, by fleets, will be as follows: Surface Fleet Northern Baltic Old Battleships Monitors Heavy Cruisers Old Heavy Cruisers Light Cruisers Old Light Cruisers Destroyers 18 Old Destroyers 5 Destroyers Coastal 3 Old Destroyers Coastal -Ocean Escorts - 1 1 2 10 27 11 4 9 Black 2 2 1 5 1 13 3 Pacific Total 2 1 -21 3 1 6 1 16 1 3 79 11 7 2 15 36 2 13 10 10 19 100 Submarines HSS ( XXI) Ocean Patrol Medium Range Coastal 33 5 7 4 38 41 8o 47 38 38 4 94 172 Midgets are no longer carried in tabulation since they are considered as a weapon and not a ship. There is insufficient evidence to estimate the probably; whereabouts of amphibious, patrol or mine vessels. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 -4 0(Page revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 83. European Satellites. and three With the exception of one old submarines in the Polish Navy, old destroyer the European Satellite nations have virtually no naval forces. 84. Cormunist China. principally of ex-U. The Chinese Cormunist Navy is composed S. and Japanese vessels. The effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Navy is negligible. Mobilization Potential 85. Since the Soviet Navy does not maintain a large reserve fleet, but maintains its ships in operational readiness, of the Navy would not be a major problem. the mobilization It is estimated that by M / 30 days the Soviet Navy could be increased to a total of 800,000 personnel ( exclusive of Naval Aviation), which would include 90,000 additional men for the Marine and Coast defense units and 110,000 additional men for the forces afloat. Combat Efficiency 86. Strength and Weaknesses. The main strength of the Soviet Navy lies in its large numbers of ships, aircraft and men. have large numbers of mines stockpiled and there indicate that there They is no evidence to is a shortage of torpedoes or amriunition. The main weakness of the Soviet Navy is its lack of trained and combat experienced personnel. ciency. However, This is reflected in its operational effi- intensive training since 1946 has done much to reduce this weal-mess. The standard of the submarine force must now be considered equal to that of the German Navy in the early phases of World War II, 87. Relative Efficiency. The efficiency of the Soviet Navy is below but approaching U.S.-Canadiah standards. 88. Tactics and Techniques. Very little is known of the tactics likely to be employed by the Soviet Naval Forces. instances where the There have been Soviets were known to ignore aids to gunnery control and navigation as they were distrustful of them. It is ex- pected that there will be good cooperation between the sea and air forces. Mines will probably be used extensively for both offense and defense. Amphibious operations will probably be carried out in a reasonably efficient manner. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 - 41 (Page revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �• • TOP 4 TOP SECRET SECRET AIR FORCES Strength 89. It is estimated that the total establishment Force - for aircraft in combat units present figure ent vary as Soviet Air in mid- 1952 will remain at the of about 20,000 aircraft. to percentage of the While combat units at pres- of authorized strength in aircraft, there is no apparent reason why this establishment should not be filled by mid-- 1952. The aircraft establishments Soviet Air Force of the major components are estimated for 1952 as FiFhter Attack Bomber Air Forces of the Soviet Army 6,000 2,800 3,000 Fighter Aviation of Air Defense 1,800 Long Range Aviation TOTAL 1,50C 200 9,500 3,000 combat effectiveness by U. crease S. 900 150 350 3,100 5,400 1,000 1,100 20,000 small and have relatively low and Canadian standards at is 650 aircraft. in- In the Far East, of transfer. which are believed to be The aggregate strength This force will probably increase pro- gressively at a rate consistent with CCAF capabilities and Soviet assistance but it is too early to estimate bilities the not including 200-250 air- craft under control of the Soviet Air Force, either on loan or in process some currently estimated to have an strength of about 400-450 aircraft, about the present they could exercise an in the next few years. Chinese Communist Air Force ( CCAF) totals 1,800 It is anticipated that there will be in effectiveness organic 13,300 100 but against weak neighboring states appreciable effect. 750 1,500 The European Satellite air forces are time, 750 Total 1,300 200 Naval Aviation follows: Transport Recce of the its mid- 1952 size, capa- or efficiency. C'ompcsition 90. The major components continue of the to be the Air Forces Range Aviation ( DA), Naval Aviation ( MVF), Soviet Air Force will probably of the Soviet Army ( VVS SA), Long ... Fighter Aviation of Air Defense ( JA PVO), and to which in the event of war would be added Aviation of Airborne Troops ( AVDV). TOP SECRET ACAI 15 42 TOP SECRET �• 0 TOP SECRET •0 P SECRET a. Air Forces consist of 15 of the This force will probably tactical air armies and various air units assigned to military districts. attack, Soviet Army. Each air army is light bomber and other units main tasl, of this force is to could also be made available composed of fightor, of a specilalized role. support the to land forces. su-pplement the in their particular roles as required. The It other air forces It is expected that all the attack and transport airci aft and the greater number of light bomber aircraft will still be piston-enUined types. substantial proportion_ of the fighters will be b. Long Range Aviation. three air armies, each normally composed of bomber, that present estimates training, The primary role of escort, of this air of a strategic bomber force. Considering of production and allowing for a war reserve, other reserves and wastage, it is estimated that about 750*- 1,200** TU-4's will be in op erational It is jet-engined. This force will probably consist fighter and transport units. force will be A units by mid- 1952. considered that in mid- 1952 the TU-4 will be the only bomber in general use in the Soviet Air Force capable of carrying a Nagasaki type atomic bomb. c. Fighter Avi ation_ of Air Defense. This force arm of the Anti-Aircraft Defense Force ( PVO) is which also controls ground antiaircraft units and early warning systems. is the strategic air defense of the Soviet homeland, It is the air Its role concentrat- ing or, the defense of vital areas. considered that by 1952 this force will be completely equipped with jet-en•in_ed fighters. * Canadian View. -*t U. S. View. The U. S. and Canada are in general agreement that a irinimum cumulative total of about 1, x+50 TU' 4s will have been produced by mid1952 . The difference in the estimates of TU-4`s in units results principally from the U. S. view that the majority of these aircraft will go directly into units as contrasted with the Canadian view that about 375 would be allotted to war reserve and about 175 to training. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 - 43 - TOP SECRET �• • TOP SECRET d. Naval Aviation. Naval Aviation as an arm of the Navy will probably continue of the six fleets, attack, transport, TOP SECS to be Soviet organized into the air forces each composed of fighter mire- torpedo- bomber, and sea reconnaissance units. This air force will be responsible for coastal defense and cooperation with the naval fleets, close and will also be capable support for the land forces on their seaward flanks. aircraft of this force will correspond to those Forces of providing The of the Air of the Soviet Army ( with the exception of a few catapult aircraft and flying boats) and will still be land-based. e. Aviation of Airborne Troops. quarters element As far as is known, a head- of the Aviation of Airborne Troops now exists as an separate from the It is likely that other air forces. this component would be responsible for planning and directing the air side of major airborne operations, necessary transport forces will be for which the temporarily allotted to it from other air forces and the Civil Air Fleet. Status 91. of Supply It is considered that the industries will provide Soviet aircraft and associated the Soviet Air Force between now and mid- 1952 with a steady supply of new and modern aircraft and equipment, including large numbers of jet fighters and considerable numbers jet-er_gined light and piston-engined medium bombers. of It is esti- mated that aircraft reserves will be at least equal to front-line strength, but not necessarily identical as to type. Disposition 92. It is thought that the allocation of the Soviet Air Force for mid -1952 will be with minor variations, the same as the present disposition which is estimated to be as follows: TOP SECRET ALAI 15 - 44 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TaP SECRET a. Air Forcos of tYie Soviet Armor .Eastern Europe & Southern We ; tern USSR MidUSSR dle East Far East Interior Total Fighter 2,700 1,700 1,300 400 0,100 Attack 1,260 640 600 300 2,800 Light Bomber 1,350 800 750 - 2,900 60 270 320 100 75 0 380 144 130 100 750 5,75 0 3,55 0 3,100 goo 13,300 Transport Reconnaissance TOTAL b. Long; Range Aviation West and Middle East Areas Far East Area Total Fighters 150 50 200 Bombers 900 600 1,500 Transport - 100 100 TOTAL 1,050 750 1,800 c. Fighter Aviation of Air Defense. The bulk of this force will probably be located in the western Soviet Union and concentrated in vital areas for the defense of centers of industry, administration and population. d. Naval Aviation -" Northern Fleet North and South Baltic Fleets Black Sea Fleet North and South Pacific Fleets Total 300 550 1,400 -- 140 Fighter 150 400 Attack 30 110 120 x+30 160 350 1, 060 Transport - 40 30 80 150 Recce 40 80 6o 170 350 34o l,o6o 550 1,150 3,100 Lt. Bomber TOTAL -- Mobilization Potential 93. It is thought that the personnel strength of the Soviet air forces will remain at its present figure By mobilization of the reserve, this of not less than 600,000. could be increased to 1,200,000 by M 4 180 days. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 " 45 (Page revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �0 TOP SECRET 0 TOP SECRET Combat Efficiency 94. Strength and Weaknesses. general, have aircraft. the The Soviet air forces will, initial advantae in of numerical superiority in Maintenance and training will probably be below U. and Canadian standards, the acceptance but this will be of lower standards compensated in part by of safety. proportion of the Soviet air forces' obsolescent by U. S. S. Although a large equipment will still be and Canadian standards, the new equipment which is being introduced is expected to be highly effective. Relative Efficiency 95. Air Forces organized, of the Soviet Army. This force has been equipped and continuously trained with the Ground Forces as a tactical air arm with the benefit of combat experience gained in World War support operations II. Present aircraft equipment for ground is adequate and the tactical units will have increased capabilities as numbers of additional light jet bombers and greater jet fighters are introduced. of fighter, attack, The maximum combat radii transport and light 'comber aircraft of this force will probably not exceed 550, 200, 500 and 650 nautical miles respectively. 96. Long Range Aviation: It is believed that the operations of this air force may include night and bad weather missions employing pathfinder methods and blind bombing techniques. is estimated that It the Long Range Aviation will be capable of carrying out the following long-range operations with TU-4 type aircraft carrying a bomb load of 10,000 pounds; aj_•T ,,m way missions to a maximum combat radius of 2,150 nautical miles. b. fueling Two-way missions, carrying out a single to a maximum combat radius nautical miles refueling. outward re:- of action of 3,000 or 3,750 nautical miles with double aerial However, it is considered that navigational and other difficulties would make missions using a double air refueling extremely difficult and hazardous and therefore improbable. TOP SECRET ALAI 15 - 46 - TOP SECRET �c. to a maximum eom'oat range of 3,960 One-way missions nautical miles, carrying a load of 10,000 pounds the entire distance. Because the Long Range Aviation has no background of combat experience and in spite of an intensive training program to overcome weaknesses flying, in long-- range navigation, it is instrument and 'nigh altitude considered that the over-all efficiency will be inferior to U. S. standards. 97. Fighter Aviation of Air Defense. The Soviets now possess good day interceptors and by mid -- 1952 the Fighter Aviation of Air Defense will be completely equipped with jet-engined types. light and good visibility, In day- the fighter defenses would have some effectiveness against attacking bombers but would be handicapped by the lack of an effective ground control intercept system. The Soviets are expected to develop more effective ground- controlled intercept (GOI) by 1952. GCI units will be generally concentrated in the areas of critical targets resulting in a higher capability for -;roundcontrolled interception in those areas. It is considered that the fighter defenses would be handicapped at night and in bad visibility due to the nonavailability of suitable airborne interception equip- ment for high altitudes. 98. Naval Aviation. Soviet Naval Aviation is an effective coastal complement to the Soviet Navy, to have any value although it is not conceded in long-range operations. Naval Aviation units could carry out antishipping strikes within short distances from their bases; they would also be capable of antisubmarine patrol, using search radar approximately equivalent to the ASV. Aircraft designated for reconnaissance are of the.light bomber type. There has been no perceptible accentuation of straining in long-range search missions or of assignment of specific units to this and associated tasks. There is increasing evidence that some assign- ment of jet fighter aircraft to naval aviation units is being made. The combat efficiency of this force should be materially increased by raid -1952 because of re- equipment and continued emphasis upon training in maritime operations. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 - 47 - (Page revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET '0 99. Aviation of Airborne Troops. 1,000 medium transport aircraft, It is estiriated that, initially, and for a vital operation up to 1,x-00 medium transport aircraft could bo made available to this force from the other air forces and this basis, From the Civil Air Fleet. On for a single airlift using both LI-2 and IL-- 12 aircraft without gliders at a combat radius of x-50 to 525 nautical miles the airlift capacity would be 15,000 troops or approximately two airborne divisions ( 7,200 fully- equipped and supported - troops per division) using 1,000 aircraft, and 21,000 troops or approximately three divisions using 1,400 aircraft. The Soviets have been experi- menting with large gliders, but it is not lmown whether they regard them as operationally practicable. However, if each transport air- craft towed one YZ-20 glider ( 10 fully- equipped airborne the total airlift capacity, troops), at a combat raidus of about 400 nauti- cal miles, would be about three airborne divisions using 1,000 aircraft or about four divisions using 1, 1600 aircraft. There are an additional 1,000 i:iodiuri transport aircraft in the estimated stored reserve which are a factor in considering airlift operations. Paramilitar. Capabilities 100. In addition to the air forces discussed above, semimilitary air organization, there is a the Civil Air Fleet, which could be mobilized in time of war to supply aircraft and crews to augment the military airlift capacity. It is considered that this force will be operating 1,700 to 2,000 medium transports in mid- 1952 in addition to considerable numbers of light coi.munications types, possibly small numbers of four-engined transports. and A considerable proportion of these medium transports ( included in the figure listed in paragraph 99 above), could be made available for airlift operations by curtailing the normal civil transport functions the Civil Air Fleet. of This would only be done for vital operations and campaigns. "Supported" implies sufficient crew served weapons, ammunition and supplies to sustain a brigade for a period of 3 days. TOP SECRET - 48 ACAI 15 ( page revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �0 TOP SECRET 0 • TOP SECRET WEkPON S OF MASS DESTRUCTION Atomic Warfare ( AW) to The 101. It is the Soviet Union will be: present estimated that the atomic bomb suck pile available Mid -1951 50 MLd-1952 120 Soviet weapon vtoc k pile probably consists essentially NagasakL-type weapons. Improvements stock; pile weapon designs the the requirements e:"pec ted, to raise in of the initial kilotonnAge yield or reduce of fissionable material per weapon may be but no radical changes without additional in stoc!, pile weapons are likLly tests. 102. The present Soviet heavy water program will provide certain raw materials Howaver, there essential for is no thermonuclear research and development. information which indicates are developing a thermonuclear weapon and It is such development will not be a factor in a war that the Soviets estimated Ln that mid- 19 5 2. Radiological Warfare ( R1-T) . 103. Although the Soviet Union has producing small quantities is believed However, the basic facilities for of radiological warfare agents, it these will not be a factor between noiT and mid- 1952. the employment of an atomic bomb to neutralize harbor installations with the residual radiations from an underwater bomb burst must be considered as within Soviet capabilities. BLoloULcal Warfare ( BW) 104. At present, the Soviets are capable of BW agents for use agaLns t personnel, sufficient quantities for sabotage 1952 at the latest, the Soviets production of BW agents. Union is of producing a variety animals, and plants or small-scale employment. probably will be capable There are In indications that the By of mass Soviet experimenting with various devices for disseminating BW agents a-rid adequate, It is estimated although not agents available T0P SECRET AC AI l5 to that the Soviets can have reasonably optimum weapons for disseminating the BW them by mid- 1952. - 4 c: - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET "'eL•hemical Warfare ( w) 105. The Soviet Union is now capable of large-scale ei_mloyrient of standard CW agents. the The available intelligence suggests that Soviets have been producing at least one of the nerve gases since 19+9. Hence, it is estimated that by mid- 1952 the Soviets will be capable of sustained extensive employment of nerve gases. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WELPONS Guided Missiles 106. General. It is believed that the guided missiles which the Soviet Union is capable of having in operational use by mid- 1952 would be Soviets improved copies of the German .V . 2 qnd_ - 2 types. The could also have in quantity production guided bombs copied from the German FX-1400 and HS- 293. Guidance and control systems will continue to be a basic limiting factor, although it is possible that infrared homing devices may prove to be reasonably adequate for some missiles. 107. Surf ace- to-Air ( SAM) . Schmetterling type, German type subsonic missiles of the employing the Burgund guidance system which employs optical observation and radio control along the line of flight, could be available for limited use in mid- 1952. guidance system is limited to fair weather, The Burgund daylight operations and the Schmetterling missile would have very limited operational utility against aircraft flying above 30,000 feet at speeds excess of 350 knots. in It is not considered possible for the Soviets to develop the Eleass radar observation, radio- controlled guidance system, for operational use by mid- 1952. 108. Air- to-Surface (ASM). There is evidence of satellite activities and Soviet interest in the German air- to-- surface missiles ---the HS -293 , a rocket--powered, visually from an aircraft; radio- controlled missile and guided and the Fritz ( FX-1400), a radio- ontrollod glide bomb guided visually from an aircraft. ceivable that these missiles could now be It is con- in production and that the production would be on a scale large enough to meet. Soviet air-- sea warfare requirements. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 -- 50 (Pag-e revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET v*- 100. Surface- to-Surface; ( GSM} . of V-1 ( FZG ~76) and V-2 ( A-4) which would provide in range and accuracy. available The Soviets may now have designs some irrprovement In addition, manufacturing facilities are in which limited production has been reported. could be launched from submarines, and reports V- 1's of low reliability indicate that the Soviets have been experimenting with such launchings. Large scale production of V-1 can be attained at any time the Soviet Union considers it to be required. Soviet Union have decided to reproduce the Should the standard German V-2, this could noi• be in mass production, but as an alternative to production of the improved version. 110. Air--to-Air It is believed that the Soviets are not capable of developing and producing an effective native air-to-air guided missiles by mid- 1952. Aircraft Development 111. Bo?:iuers . Before mid- 1952 it is possible that an itiiproved TU-4 possessing the greater power, could be demonstrated. range and endurance of the B-50 Also there is some possibility that a heavy bomber with the range characteristics of the B-36 could be developed to prototype stage by 1952. Two Soviet four- engine jet bomber prototypes ( type 10) have been observed in the Moscow area as early as 19;-7. This indicates that the Soviets are developing a medium jet borlber and it is quite possible that the development of this type of aircraft will have been completed prior to raid- 1952. 112. Fighters. It is considered that the Soviet Union is probably developing an all-weather jet fighter and a jet penetration fighter. developed. Improved versions of present jet fighters may be In addition, the Soviet Union is believed to be actively engaged in the development of supersonic fighter aircraft. U. S. view, in 1951 and an all-weather jet fighter during 1952. view In the a jet penetration fighter may be introduced into service In the Canadian neither an all-weather jet fighter nor a penetration jet fighter could be put into production rauch before 1952 at the earliest; significant numbers appear therefore by mid- 1952. of either of these are unlikely to No estimate can be made on the super- sonic fighter. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 ~ 51 ~ ( Page revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 'w' 113. Aircraft Weapons . Standard aircraft weapons will be the 12.7mm ( 50 caliber) machine gun with AP, API, and APIT ammunition and 20 a , 23mri and 37mm aircraft cannon employing high explosive and incendiary al:ununition. one In additlop, type of Soviet aircraft, the MIG-9, cannon for ;round attack purposes. will probably range it is known t'-at at least is equipped with a 53mm Air- to- ground unguided rockets in size from 82mm to 132mm. Unguided air-to- air rockets will probably be high on the priority list and their operational use before mid- 1952 should be expected. optical computingunsi;tita, similar to the TT. S. The use of K-14, the British Mark II and comparable German sights, will become more extensive. There is no positive intelligence pertaining to the present state of Soviet activities in radar gnuisights, but it is estimated that radar ranging devices will have been incorporated in improved versions of the optical computing sights by 1952. It is known that the Soviet Union is interested in the application of infrared. Soviet Union probably now has The sufficient blind bombing and naviga- tion radars to warrant an attempt to execute long-range bombing missions. Electronics 114. The state of development, quality of mass production, and maintenance of electronic equipment may well be the lLnitinS factors in the effectiveness of Soviet weapons. The requirements of the nuclear energy program for research and development of electronic equipment may have been largely fulfilled thereby increasing scientific resources available for other priority fields air defense. such as Steady advances must be expected in many fields of electronics between now and mid- 1952. a. JaTmning of Radio Conrilunicat ions and Navigation Sys•- ems . U. S. V.LEW CANADIAN VIEW The Soviets are rapidly achieving At the present time the Soviet the capability of launching an Union is engaged in extensive effective all-out electromagnetic jamming of radio communications war. at lower It is estimated that even TOP SECRET ACAI 15 - 52 -(Page revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �• TOP SECRET TOP SECRET with present facilities and frequent i es. exper=once, both of which are been confined almost entirely increasing, the to Soviets can This the Voice jamming has of America nd effect complete disruption at British Broadcasting Corporat7_on any broadcasts. brie of intercontinental However, point-t,o-point and long distance experience gained by mobile radio communications Union in this systems that of all types, including field serious systems communications The the military services. Soviets are also caioable of the is Soviet such jamming could become a critical strategic communications of the obstruction is believed to radio in general. that the It Soviets jamming radio navigation systems, will be capable particularly communications traffic at £ requenc ies least as hiCh those operating below 30 megacycles. at o£ jamming as WT. 'b. Jamming of Radar. in the past. The Soviet Union has used " window" This and similar reflection devices will almost certainly be encountered in the future. In addition, elec tr,onic jamming will probably be encountered at all frequencies 3,000 me range by mid- 1952. raid- 1952, the However, it is believed Soviets will not be capable of up to that by jamming BTO (."Bombing Through Overcast") radar which operates at frequencies c. in the 10, 000 me s band. Proximity Fuzes. currently do not have an artillery VT fuze would be dangerous other the other hand, is believed than limited to assume it it that the test quantities operable under high accelerations, ,operational quantities On While of that the Soviets of it Soviets will be without an artillery VT fuze beyond mid- 1952. is estimated that the Soviets are now capable of producinr; o , perational quantities of proximity fuzes for low acceleration missiles less because engineering requirements. 3P SECRET ,AI l• _ F3 _ of the exacting �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Walther Type Submarine 115. There are indications that Soviet development has pro- gressed to the point where they might be able to construct a submarine in which to install the Walther engine. the prototype might have reached the trial mediulii-high submerged speed submarine, propulsion, stage. By mid- 1952, A high or using another type of could possibly be perfected by mid- 1952. Inf lu_­nce Mines llb. Large quantities of the latest German types of mines and their components together with leading German mine experts were captured by the Soviet Union. In addition it is known that the Soviets have produced a very sensitive mine By m_d-1952, of native design. the Soviets may have further improved this mine and it is probable that by that date they will have unit presently fitted, mechanism, combined the magnetic with either an acoustic possibly both. or a. pressure It is probable that elaborate delay- armin;- and ship- counter ( PDM) mechanism will be encountered. Tor • cdoes 117. By mid- 1952 the Soviets can have operational quantities of most of the types of torpedoes which were in use during the Second World War. These will include air, propulsion units. At the present evidence to indicate the types time, oxygen, or electric there is no available of torpedoes upon which the Soviets are concentrating their efforts, nor is there any evidence avail- able which would indicate that they may adopt torpedoes of foreign type in preference to those 113. Influence of strictly Soviet design. or contact exploder mechanisms and highly effica_ent pattern- running devices may be fitted in any one these types of torpedoes. of Active and/or passive acoustic homing heads can be produced for use in electrically driven torpedoes only. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 - 54 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET •. ENEMY CAPABILITIES STR.%TEGIC CONCEPTS Over-all 119. ment The ultimate objective of Soviet policy is the establish- throughout the world of communist regimes directed from Moscow. In a major war commencing in 1952 the military objectives of the Soviet Union would be: a. To establish Soviet control over the Eurasian land mass, including the United Kingdom and the island chain of the Far East; b. To defend the USSR against enemy attacks; c. To disrupt the war effort and of the United States and Cana da ; wit, view to pr...otcctin-CA_ , th ,. U>SR rind s.:curin; r..n ir-apr';gn'lblc position from which to achieve ultimate Soviet 120. objectives. These objectives would be attempted by campaigns Far E^st, West Europe and the Near and Middle East, in the together with sea and air offensives against the United Kingdom and North America and tale 121_. occupation or neutralization of other vital areas. The Soviet Union will not be invasion of North America in 1.952, capable of launching an except Alaska. Neither could the Soviet Union launch a suitably scaled invasion of the United Kingdom, even after an atomic attack, an adequate base area the until it had established in Western Europe and gained control of sea and air. 10 .2. In event of war the Soviet leaders would realize, however, that the Western Powers would not permit areas to be overrun sincly but, the conflict as world-wide, Soviet Union from wherever possible. therefore, war regarding the The Soviet leaders, would probably decide that their entry into a major should be by full-scale simultaneously, the Soviet bloc. offensives in a number of areas possibly without any prior military action by However, such action might be preceded by Sovi-et-inspired diversionary action by one TOP SECRET ACA1 •- 5 would attack or more sa.tollites . _ 55 _ TOP SECRET 1 �• TOP • TOP SECRET SECRET. 123. It follows that the from, the above concept of Soviet strategy Soviet plan of operations would include a. attacks North America. campaigns against: The Soviet Union would undertake against the North American Continent, and the Aleutian Islands, the war effort of including Alaska with the ob 4ectives of disrupting Canada and the United States, the retention of more of their military forces and causing than are neces- sary for continental defense particularly during the initial stages of mobilization. b. Western Europe will wish to and United Kingdom. The Soviet leaders complete a campaign against Western Europe as early as possible in order to enhance their offensive and de- fensive capabilities. However, they may first attempt a psycho- lonical neutralization of Western Europe by threat of atomic attack. Either concurrently with or immediately prior to action in Western Europe they will launch a heavy attack against the United Kingdom with the object of destroying British war potential and military installations, tenable as an Allied base. , ?s and rendering the island un- soon as possible after the occupation of the Channel Port areas the Soviets will launnh a full-scale sea and air offensive against the United Kingdom, including an attempted invasion. c. Near and Middle East. The Soviet leaders will appreciate that the Near and Middle East oil resources are a valuable part of oil areas the Allied war potential. in the Caucasus and Rumania, of their industries, would be would give them very great with the effort expended. ACAI 15 as well as a large part A campaign there, strategic gains if success- in comparison Offensives against Turkey and Greece Mould form an essential part of TOP SECRET their own susceptible to attack from air bases in the Near and Middle East. ful, Moreover, such a campaign. - 56 - TOP SECRET �• TOP SECRET TOP SECRET d. Balkans. A Balkan campaign, with thrusts through Yugoslavia and Greece, would protect flanks of Soviet forces engaged in other operations. Overrunning Greek Macedonia and Thrace would be an adjunct of the campaign against European Turkey. Control of Northern Yugoslavia would uncover the approaches to Italy. Seizure of bases in southern Greece would pose a threat to Allied LOCts e. Italy. A successful campaign in Italy and Sicily would protect the flanks of forces the Balkans in the Eastern Mediterranean. operating in Western Europe and and would provide important sea and air bases for attacks on Allied lines of communications in the Mediterranean and against !-- lied bases f. Scandinavia. have the objectives in North P.frica. I, campaign against Scandinavia would of securing complete control of the Baltic to provide naval and air bases routes and Allied bases for operations against trade in the North Atlantic, to the air defense of the Soviet Union, of air and naval bases would be •. to of adding depth and of denying the use the Allied Powers. This campaign subsidiary to that in Western Europe. Spain. A successfully completed campaign against Western Europe would permit an attack against Spain. of the Iberian Peninsula would provide of Control the most certain means severing Allied sea lines of communications into the Mediterranean. Soviet Union, In addition, while providing a base for the it would also deny one to the Allies. consolidation of the Peninsula and Gibraltar, it is possible that attacks would be launched against North Africa, in conjunction with similar attacks h. India and Pakistan. Upon the possibly from Sicily. An attack on Pakistan and India would be of a purely preventive nature and would be unlikely unless the Soviet Union were convinced of the Allied intention of using bases in those countries. difficulties of land attack, be limited to air attacks Owing to the logistical military measures would probably on those bases being used by the Allies. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 -57- TOP SECRET �t • w TOP SECRET TOP SECRET i. Far East. The Soviet objectives in the Far East will be to neutralize Japan and other Allied advance bases contain as theater. and to large an Allied force as possible in the Far East The Soviet Union, any additional forces however, is, unlikely to allocate to the Far East, although bases in this theater might be used on occasion by medium bomber units of the Long Range Aviation. operations Chinese forces probably will conduct against neighboring countries in Southeast Asia and take measures to gain control of Hong King, rlacao, Korea, Indo-China and Burma. 1. Defense of the Soviet Union. appreciate the necessity of defending; hostile attack. There are governmental, 124. Atomic the home base against 35 air .regiments of defensive some fighters now deployed in the The Soviet rulers static air defense of vital urban, and industrial areas. Campaigns, 4Tith the estj.matel stoc1 , pile atomic bombs available to the Soviets by mid- 1952, of 120 they may attempt, by psychological exploitation of the threat of retaliation, to forestall U. attack is S. use of On the other hand, atomic the principal means by which the Soviet Union can achieve maxi- mum results Therefore, in the reduction of the North 1''_merican war effort. it appears more probable that the Soviets would decide that a number of bombs at the bomb. the outset. could be utilized best in surprise attacks Consequently, it is estimated that atomic weapons will be used from the outset and that a substantial portion of the atomic stock pile will be employed against North America. It is unlikely that any significant number of atomic bombs would be allocated to targets North Imerica. elsewhere than in the United Kingdom and These atomic attacks may be supplemented by biological warfare and chemical warfare attacks. TOP SECRET ACA! 15 - 3 I TOP SECRET J �• TOP TOP SECRET SECRET 125. Strategic Air Operations. 1952 there will be Aviation, Union. It is estimated that by 1 July 750*- 1,200** TU -4 aircraft in the Long Range with the bulk located in the western part of the Soviet It is considered unlikely that the strategic bombing effort of this force would be diverted from operations Kingdom, United States, against the United and Canada except against bases from which a considerable weight of Allied retaliatory bombing was being mounted or against isolated targets of vital importance to the Allies. 125. Considering that initially the main strategic air operations will be against the United Kingdom and North America and that atomic attack will be the principal method employed against the latter, it is estimated that a^ many as half** to two-thirds* of the available TU -4's might be allocated initially against the United Kingdom and the remainder principally against the United States. The Soviets will have crews and necessary bases deliver their entire 127. to stock pile of atomic bombs. will be directed towards to trained of operation to warrant an attempt Naval Operations. communication. the aircraft, The main Soviet naval offensive effort interdiction of The areas and routes of the Allied sea lines of the greatest importance the successful prosecution of the war b7 the Allies sea approaches are: a. The to the United Kingdom. b. North America - Europe. c. North ..merican coastal routes d. Mediterranean - Red Sea - Arabian Sea - Persian Gulf including Caribbean. Bay of Bengal. e. North America - Orient. # Canadian estimate. U. S. estimate. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 - 59 TOP SECRET �• • TOP SECRE TOP SECRET 40 128. Soviet attacks on these lines of communication will initially take the following forms: a. The mining of ports and approaches, particularly those of the United Kingdom, Western Europe and North America by submarine and merchant ship before, and on D-day, and, by submarine and aircraft after D-day. b. Submarine and raider attacks be expected that the long-range on shipping. It is to Soviet submarines will be on station before D-day and that possibly some raiders will be on station in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. (1) Initially, the available trade routes it is expected that the majority of submarines will be deployed along principal in order to take full advantage of After the initial assault it is (2 ) surprise. expected that it will normally be possible to maintain 25 per cent on patrol at any one time. Based on this estimate and the 195 2 estimate of strength and disposition of Soviet submarine fleets be the following numbers of submarines could sustained on patrol in the areas designated: Type No. on Patrol HSS ( Y, — I ) 1 Ocean Patrol No. on Patrol Atlantic Area Pacific Area- West to Central irmerica and South to the equator 0 18 To 50 0 West and South to the Azores and Canaries 5 South to Australia and West to India Medium Range 11 Coastal waters of Norway, U.K. and Northern France 9 Coastal waters of Soviet Union China, Korea and Japan Coastal 21 Coastal waters of Soviet Union 9 Coastal waters of Soviet Union and Japan (3) It must be anticipated that the first wave of the patrol submarines will be on station on D-day. the Skagerrak be blocked the TOP SECRET ACAI 15 Should submarines on patrol in the -6o- TOP SECRET �• • TOP TOP SECRET SECRET Atlantic could return to such a case, the Northern Fleet bases. In although initially handicapped by the distance around the Scandinavian Peninsula, the medium- range sub- marines have sufficient endurance to carry out normal patrols in the North Sea, English Charu,el, Biscay and the Western approaches the Bay of to th--• United Kingdom, leaving the long range boats available for operations in other areas. c. Small amphibious operations from submarines d. to land sabotage teams up to a i:iaximl.um of 50 men per boat. Attacks by naval aircraft on shipp::ng within range of Soviet- controlled shore bases. e. Attacks on ports in the form of special operations on a limited scale which may include attacks by submarinelaunched guided missiles with conventional warheads, weapons introduced by submarines or merchant ships before or on D-day and midget submarine attacks 129. It is probable that the majority on shipping. of the surface forces and the Naval aviation forces would be employed to protect the seaward flanks of surface forces paigns the land forces. support and Retention of in the Baltic would be necessary- until the crmi- in Scandinavia had been successfully concluded and the Scandinavian fleets neutralized. campaigns, Upon the completion of these units would be available for use in other areas but it is not believed that Soviet surface forces with the exception of raiders would operate outside the range of 130. atomic Internal Threat to Allied Interests the World. Communists and their sympathizers their own air cover. in all Parts of constitute a great potential for sabotage and subversive activity including ps;,Tchological warfare throughout the world. appreciate the magnitude of this will fully exploit it. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 The Soviets thoroughly threat to Allied interests and Covert attack with the better known - 61 - TOP SECRET �0 • TOP SECRET TOP SECRET sabotage agents used. such as fire, In addition, atomic, explosives and abrasives biological, a high potential of effectiveness. and chemical weapons the methods of delivery could be used prior as delivery would cost the Soviets prise. On the other hand, is improbable, just prior to, to D-day. enemy action, the Many of However, of such pre D-da;; complete loss of strategic sur- under present internal security measures, detection of certain methods key harbors or overt military operations. detection and identif ication, offer Sabotage will be particularli' effective when employed concurrently with, initiation of conventional, could be as of is introducing atomic weapons the identification of into certain types of biological agents. 131. Summary. a. It is estimated that Soviet strategy will include: A campaign against Wes tern Europe. b. An aerial campaign against the British Isles. c. A Balkan campaign. d. Campaigns e. Campaigns in the Far East. f. Attacks against the Near and Middle East. against Canada, the United States and .laska. ,E. A sea and air offensive against Allied sea communications. h. Subversive activity and sabotage against P_llied interests in all parts i. of the world. A campaign against Italy, subsequent to gaining control of Northern Yugoslavia. j. A campaign against Norway, and if necessary, Sweden. k. Air attacks against Allied bases. 1. Subsequently, a campaign to overrun the Iberian Peninsula and secure the Straits m. of Gibraltar. Defense of the Soviet Union against hostile attack. TOP SECRET ACAI 15 - 62 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET %q#Relat::J_ve to Separate Areas 132. North America. The Soviet Union wouLd undertake attacks against the North American Continent including Alaska and the Aleucian Islands with the objectives of disrupting the war effort of Canada and the United States, and causing the retention of more of their military forces than are necessary for continental defense particularly during the initial Additional objectives stages of mobilization. of Soviet operations against Alaska would be the neutralization of base areas from which the Soviet Union could be attacked, cation, the disruption of Allied sea line of communi- and possibly the temporary seizure of air bases to support limited attacks on other North American areas. 133. North Atlantic Island Approaches. The Soviet Union will appreciate the strategic value of Spitzbergen, Iceland, and Greenland and may attack them with the object of interdicting Allied lines of communication in the North Atlantic area and so isolate Allied forces in combat and base areas from overseas support . TOP SECRET ALAI l•' - 63 TOP SECRET �• • TOP SECRET TOP SFC12T 0 POSSIBTL CCUIIS_''S OF ACTION AGAINST INORTH A11 RICA Atonic Attac',1-4. Atomic attack is the principal military means b; the Soviet Union can reduce Because of the the North American war effort. great dependence the United States and the of Canadian industr;- on that of small war potential of Canada as pared with that of the United States, sider targets which the com- Soviet Union will con- in the former country- comparatively unprofitable. Therefore, most, if not all, North America will be of the atonic bombs delivered on directed against the United States. atonic atta cl-s could be These supplemented b;;- biological warfare and chemical warfare attaclLs . 1 77 -. Atomic weapons could be delivered by the following methods: Shipment of atomic borib effects or supplies, Shipment components as household under cover of diplomatic immunity. of an assembled atonic bor_zb bar this riethod is also possible. b. As "yin transit" commercial shipments, allowing substitution or " switching" customs en route thereb -r since inspection is not usually made at the port of entr,-. c. Covertly- by `.I'U -4 bomber and commercial type transport aircraft disguised with Canadian or U. markings, or major com ercial air carriers S. of foreign registrar. d . Snuggled by Soviet agents with U. tugs, ;yachts, fishing schooners S. or Canadian or other srlall sea- going vessels. e. V-1 type guided missiles with atomic warheads launched from merchant L. f shims or submarines. Torpedoes with atomic warheads fired into lmly harbors from submarines. TOP S_,C.137T ACi^.T 1r - 64 - TOP SECRET �MP SECRET • • TOP STCPCT E. As boribs detonated in the hold of a merchant ship while h. in a ?:ear harbor. As mines laid in key harbors b,,r merchant (not necessarily of Soviet registry) i. technical difficulties adjustr.ent and the size probable and weight an asseribicd bomb, and f, bzr the complete there shortage of bomb assembly and of specialized personnel, of the package necessary for introducing it would appear that methods o_ to d are not likely to be eriployed. Soviets submarines. By bomber aircraft. Considering the and the or loss In addition, of strategic is no evidence Soviets .and in the that case are presented which discou rage detection would cost the surprise. but would not be As for methods e such missiles have been developed of nethod f operational problems their selection. not involve any special engineering problems Method, . • does or unususal shills as effective as an underwater burst which would result from the employr_ient of nethod h. sidered that the the pore- likely of the as most type ships latter is Therefore, of the targets are either inland or not of att^c!•:, it it is two. However, suited to this is believed that the majority of the bombs allotted to North knerica will be con- atonic delivered by nethod i, i.e... bor=ber aircraft. Air Operations 1,6. An air offensive could be launched against North America prior to or s-i_nultaneously with any other campaigns. m,-ted that the Soviet Union will have the It is esti- capability of carrying out the following long-range bombing operations with TU-4 1s carrying 10,300 pounds a. of bor_ibs : One-way missions, Anad:rr and Velkal from potential bases such as in Northeast Siberia and from buses in the Diurmansk area, could reach any important target in North Ar_ierica . TOP S_'CPi ACM 15 -65- TOP- SECRET �• • TOP SECRET TOP S]`-'CRT2T 0 b. Toro- way attacks fron Velkal could be carried out against that segment of North A ierica bounded bJ- a gener.l line passing through Seattle, Churchill. One arc to include c. Calgary and aerial refueling, would extend this Los Angeles, Denver and Fort ' lillian. Two-imy attacks from bases in the Murriansh area, using a single aerial refueling, an area bounded b., could cover a line through Janes s Ba -T, Gaspe and Cape Breton Island. d. iNim aerial refuelings, journey and one one on the outward on the return, would allow a TU--4 from Velkal to carry, out a two-way attach against any target within an arc passing through the of Lower California, is, however, southern tip San Antonio and Nashville. It considered that navigational and other difficulties would make nissions using a double aerial refueling so difficult of acconplishment as to be improbable. 177. The Soviets do not have the means for delivering a con- ventional air attaclr- against North. America in sufficient to be an effective deterrent to our war effort. on any large scale, strength One-spay missions, employing conventional weapons are unlikelT, although attacks on a very limited scale against particularly vital targets not On the other hand, suitable for atomic attack are a possibility-. the Soviets would probably- be willing to expend aircraft and crews to deliver atomic bombs on one-way nissi ons. Therefore, aircraft carrying atonic bombs may, attack from bases in both the Murmansk area and Northeast Siberia, but aircraft carrying, high explosive and incendiary bombs are more likely to come fron the Northeast Siberian area only. TOP Si'CPL T ACAI 15 - 66 - TOP SECRET �• • TOP SECRET TOP SEC=T 0 1, 0 J. On the basis strategic aircraft, of the estimated initial allocation of the figure 2"- 0*- 600 `* number of TU -4 aircraft that could be represents the maximum available for any one attack on North America from bases within range. and strength of attacks, as well as the will depend to a large extent on the of atonic bombs, total maximun effort, size of Soviet the number of escorts employed, climatic factors and comnitnents 139. The frequenc-r In view of the taining a combat force weather conditions logistical and in other theaters. logistic difficulties involved in main- in Northeastern Siberia, that exist, it is plus the adverse considered that any air campaign against Alaska would be minor in scope. ranges involved would limit Anchorage longest range it the effectiveness and Fairbanks will be stock pile out of range light bombers and the TU -4. is estimated that up to 10 air regiments Furthermore, of Soviet aircraft. of all but the As a practical maximum, of all roles from the Army and 'Laval aviation forces might be employed against the Alaskan area. Naval Operations 140. The sea offensive against the United States and Canada could include: a. The mining of ports and approaches by merchant ships and su'o__1^rimes before and on D- dad- and by submarines after D- dad. b. Submarine and raider attacl:s is to be expected that the on shipping. long-range Soviet It submarines will be on station in North American coastal wc'ters before D-day and that possibly some raiders will be on station in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Canadian view U. S. view TOP S"C ' T ACAI 1, 67 - TAP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET c. Small amphibious operations to land sabotage tearls from submarines up to a maximuri of 50 icon per boat. d. Attacks on ports in the form of special operations possibly including attacks by submarine- launched guided missiles with conventional and atomic warheads and atomic bombs introduced by submarines In addition, or merchant ships before or on D-day. midget submarine attacks could be carried out on shipping in harbors and approaches. The extent of mining of ports and approaches is limited only by the number of long-range this submarines and merchant ships available for type of operation. It is considered that only a limited number of Soviet submarines would be maintained on station in North American coastal waters in 1952. It is further considered that any amphibious operation employing submarines would be confined to a very few attacks on isolated targets The extent of of prime military importance. special operations against ports cannot be forecasted but it is considered that these would be limited to major ports. It is unlikely, however, that midget submarine attacks would be carried out in view of the distance involved. Amphibious Operations 141. It is estimated that resources available to the Soviets in the Far East will permit a maximum sealift of 4,000-6,000 troops for the assault phase and then only under optimum conditions. A consideration of limitations imposed by climatic conditions, short- ages of suitable landing craft, logistic and air support indicate that amphibious operations would be confined to the Aleutian Islands and the coast of Alaska north from Bristol Bay. Climatic conditions will limit amphibious operations in this area to the period July to November. Operations against Alaska would probably have as their immediate tactical objectives the destruction of coastal installations of military importance. Airborne Operations 142. The Soviets might employ airborne operations to seize lightly-held airfields, to destroy military installations and to otherwise create a situation requiring considerable countereffort TOP SECRET ACAI 15 -68 (Page revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET I TOP SECRET 0 o destroy op dislodge the invaders. Existing base facilities in Northeast Siberia would place some limitation on the employment of transport aircraft in conjunction with the other tactical aircraft, bombers and fighters, which would also be using the airfields. 143. Soviet operations against Alaska, could include an airborne invasion against the FAIRBANKS-ANCHORAGE-KODIAK area, initially em- ploying a maxis-mmi of about 4,000 troops with possible fighter support, in a surprise assault or following a bombing attack. mately 200 aircraft of the LI-2 type would be required. Approxi- Existing base facilities in Northeast Siberia would restrict the employment of transport aircraft because Soviet bombers and fighters would require concurrent use of these facilities. Range limitations of present Soviet transports ( IL- 12 or LI-2) would prevent airborne operations with full loads against targets as far distant as Fairbanks and Anchorage:, if return to Siberia were necessary. However, one-way missions against Fairbanks and Anchorage are possible. seizure of such facilities as Point Spencer, Mark, Galena, The or Wal- seth Air Force Bases provide airfields for use by Soviet transports returning from Fairbanks or Anchorage. periods when icing is not hazardous. Gliders could be used in Support shipping operations are limited to the favorable weather period from June to October. Although supporting aircraft can operate all year round, the solu- tion of the formidable logistical problem incident to a sizable airborne operation would be difficult. 144. By employing TU -4's on airborne missions, the Soviets could launch attacks against suitable targets in other areas within the radius of action of that aircraft. Approximately be carried in a TU -4 without modification. 8 paratroops could However, the bomb bay one TU -4 could carry approximately by planking; in 40 paratroops sub- ject to the limitations imposed by temperature and altitude. addition, In it is possible that a small nur_Zber of four--engined trans- ports would be in use. In any case, other strategic requirements for TU-4's and logistical difficulties encountered in mounting operations from Northeast Siberia will tend to prevent more than a few aircraft being diverted for this type of operation. Operations Against North Atlantic 145. Iceland. Island Approaches The Soviet Union will be capable of air and naval and possibly airborne operations against Iceland, and landing small assault or sabotage forces from cargo vessels TOP SECRET - 69 ACAI 15 ( page revised by Decision on in 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET a �1 0 TOP S2CR2T 0 Icelandic waters on D-da;; , forces would be difficult. lines although logistic sup,.')ort of these Subm-rine attac..s against Allied sea of cor_miunicat ion in the Icelandic ports are TOP SECREt • area of Iceland and mining of likely. 146. Greenland. The Soviet Union is capable only of sub- narine attac., against sea lines of cor_miunication and limited air attac.:s in this area. 147. Spitzbergen. Spitzbergen on the The Soviet Union is capable of seizing outbreak of hostilities. Internal Threat 148. Canada. The Labor Progressive Party and elements foreign language groups While the its strength of constitute r_iately persons, 75 ,000 nately the sar,c, quiescent in the 149. United States. support from approxi- supporters will undoubtedly The Communist Party, 5 1,700, its full strength. expected to continue. USA, in September 1950 but this figure undoubtedly The ner_ibership of the Cor_umnist Party has been declining steadily, may be remain of war. reportedly- had a membership of does not re present or passive is 9,000 to 12,000, By 1952 these nizribers will be approxi- although some event the Cormiunist Party of Canada. card carrying r_ienbers Parts can depend on active of the and this decline In the event of war many Cormunist s*npathizers and supporters will undoubtedly remain quiescent. 150. The Cor_miunist Parties of both countries will seek through their propaganda organs to promote the idea that the Western Powers forced the war upon an unwilling Soviet Union. could r_iake use of local issues distorted to They suit their own purposes to forzent discontent and could carioufla.ge their work behind front organizations. The actions even if declared illegal, leaders interned, because Parties will be capable of these the presses banned and overt of the existence of underground organizations. TOP "-- C=T LCI'_I 1• - 7o - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 151 . The Commun ist Party will be capable of sabotage by encovalaging slowdowns and inciting labor unrest with a view to causing strikes in critical industries, particularly in the trans -)ortation and communications industries. The Communist Party continues to emphasize its program for infiltration of basic industries. In the event of war, such as fire, the better known sabotage agents explosives and abrasives could be used. the Communist Parties are considered capable BW and CW for sabotage. In addition, of employment of Attacks against a limited number of personnel by saboteurs could be made by introducing BW agents into the ventilating systems of buildings and by infecting food and waster supplies. diseases The use of insect vectors to spread certain is also a possibility. disease are two anir_ial diseases which could be introduced into a number of areas very r•>adlly enfo7.1ccd. Rinderpest and foot and mouth serious if simultaneously. Both spread once intimated unless rigid control measures are The introduction of plant pests or diseases is also poss 2.ble but the cffocts would be local. Poisonou& chemicals could be used by an enemy agent although this method of attack is considered to have a very limited application. nerve gases might be used to create havoc provided the The newer in a. hall or theater saboteur had access to the ventilation system. is t?nlD_kely that such an It attack could be repeated successfully. The use of RW agents by saboteurs is considered improbable. 15>. It is expected that native communists will commit widespread sporadic acts of sabotage at the outset of war with the USSR. Sporadic sabotage efforts will be most effective in the in- itial stage of the war. Implementation of security counter- measures is expected progressively to decrease their effectiveness. As o.D-,Dosed to sporadic sabotage, the communists could attempt a carefully planned and controlled operation. This action would be most effective if directed against vital installations and TOP SECRET ACAI 15 - 71 (Page revised by Decision on 25 May 1951) TOP SECRET �1 TOP SECRET • • TOP Sr' CI•r,' 0 industrial cor.plexes outbrea.: of war. slightly prior to or concurrent with the Such a campaign could be mounted only at the rise of losing strategic surprise. org^_nized sabotage be It campaign later in the is believed that an course of the war can coped. with by alert police action. MOST PROBABL` COURSE_ OF ACTIOTI AGAINST NORTH Al•T-RICA 154. It is estimated that the most probable course of action against North America will initially be as follows: a. Atomic attac'rs, portion of the Sov__et Union's ator:ic stock pile, sorle atomic bombs may be by merchant employing a substantial ships laid as nines or submarines, Though in ':ey harbors it is believed that the majority of the bombs allocated to North America will be delivered by aircraft. b. Strategic air attacks eriplo-ing TU--4 aircraft and including: (1) One -way atomic attach from bases in the Murrmansi, aren and Northeast Siberia against any target (2) in the United States or Canada. Two-way employing atomic or conventional bombs from bases in Hortheast Siberia against that segment of North Anerica bounded by a general line passing through Seattle, Calgary, () Churchill. Possible ti-,,o-way attacks with one aerial refueling er_•ploying atonic or conventional boribs fro::i bases in Northeast Siberia against that segrlent of North 11merica bounded by a general line passing through Los Angeles, c. Small Denver and Fort William. scale air attacks ageinst Western and 1`entral Alaska by light bombers and fighter aircraft. d. The mining of ports and approaches by r_ie rehant ships and submarines before and on D-day and by submarines after D-da , •T, TOP, S-7C1117T AC_A possible including the use of some atomic weapon. - 72 - Top SECRET--- �TP $E ET , L E•t r• L`. e. Submarine attacks on shipping. It is most probable that limited niuibers of submarines will be on station in North American coastal waters before D-day. f. Small ariphibious operations against isolated targets of prime military importance employing sabotage tearis from submarines up to a maximum of 50 men per boat. Z. Amphibious and airborne operations against installations of military importance in the Aleutians, of Alaska, and along the coast or against other important areas such as the Nome- Fairbanks-Anchorage areas, of ariphibious, airborne, These attacks could be in the forin or combined operations up to division size, depending upon the area attacked. Any airborne operations against Canada would probably be confined to a few operations by very Small numbers of TU- 4s against installations of military importance in isolated areas within the radius of action of that aircraft. h. Attacks against the North Atlantic island approaches in the form of air and naval operation, against Iceland, possibly including the landing of small assault or sabotage forces on D-day, political subversion and sabotage; against Greenland; limited air attacks and the seizure of Spitzbergen on the outbreak of hostilities. i. Attempts to cause dissension and disaffection through psychological warfare and subversion. j. Attempts to encourage slowdowns and incite labor unrest with a view to causing strikes in critical industries, and in addition physical sabotage employing fire, explosives and abrasives mad on a limited scale employing BW and OW. ELLED _ 73 _ (Pae revised by Decision on 25 May 19 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIA00010 Title A name given to the resource ACAI 15, “Forms and Scales of Soviet Attack against North America, 1 July 1952" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 16-Feb-51 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived DND DHH 112.009 (D20) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource DND Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Intelligence Assessment Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource EN