https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b4757aad67ef11f468946e824bf7c4d4.pdf a1db370122e8ffedbd8aac782d25657b PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence Hi8story Project DND DHH 122.009 (D19) JIC Assessment Forms and Scales of Soviet Attack Against North America, 1 July 1954 ACAI 12 50-05-16 Note: This is the edited version of ACAI 10 for distribution to NATO. �TOP Stn 0 fM• Me -mob 111 2.00•p (') 1,p 411 Vi"J3dP $• IddO FOLD ON TN1Y LINE AC.•I n • es jI) lia 12 ) x/16 •'ay• 90: =cu, sign attack °• orms sca es O f' a ai•st orth =LMeri . a TOP SECRET A.C.A.I. 12 16 May 19r-0 Ar • • • 1 •••D i . t_ oe WtMt Nom° • 0 of •a ►• pETf-* I i two U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE L rsslsl 858211 d,ACIO JO , SE ET . P C R ' �TOP SECRET COPY NO TOP SECRET 74 FORMS AND SCALES OF SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST 16 NORTH AMERICA - 1 July 195+ THE PROBLEM 1. To prepare an agreed U. S. - Canadian intelligence estimate of the forms and scales of Soviet attack against North America assuming that a major war begins on 1 July U. S. 1954, for the Canada Regional Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Or`an.ization. POLITICAL FACTORS Political Alignment Soviet Bloc 2. the The following countries will be definitely aligned with Soviet Union: 1. Poland Bulgaria Eastern Germany Eastern Austria Czechoslovakia China Hungary Outer Mongolia Rumania Northern Korea The position of Albania, which is at present definitely aligned with the Soviet Union, is precarious, and there ;)clssibility that Albania may be detached from the is a Soviet bloc b: - mice. -1951. Western Bloc 4. The following countries, together with their dependent territories, will be Allied or definitely aligned with the United States and Canada: United Kingdom Luxcnibourg Iceland France Ital -T Portugal BclID Norway Australia T11c Netherlands Dcnmark South Africa New Zealand TO_' SFCh' T A.CA.1 12 U. 9. GOV-."T PPINTING OFFICE 888211 1 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET I TOP SECRET The nations allied or definitely aligned as members Western bloc will have access, at least initially, to the of the territory and resources of the following countries: Western Germany Jordan Philippines Western Austria Saudi Arabia Indonesia Iraq Japan Ceylon 3•,—Ypt South Korea Latin America Neutral or Precarious u. The following countries probably will try to remain neutral, at least initially, unless attacked: Svlitzerland Pakistan Yugoslavia SyDain Siam Turkey Finland Israel Syria Greece Sweden Afghanistan Lebanon Ireland India 7. The position of Indo-China, Burma and Iran is precarious, and there is a possibility that they may be attached to the Soviet bloc by mid -1954. 11, , T_Let Union zolitical and Psychological Readiness for War 3. The present government of the the Soviet Union is in full control country and will remain so throughout 195+. Between now and riid. -1054 there will be a gradual improvement in the stab _ lity of the Soviet regime. This internal increased stability will be achieved partly through an intensification of police controls and partly through a gradual improvement in living conditions. The Soviet people have been taught to expect capitalist attack, and are prepared to resist. In the event of war in mid -195+ the leaders will present the war as a defense TO? S ' Cl'IET LCA C 12 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OIEICE 888Yt i Soviet of the homeland against 2 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 capitalist imperialism. have complete nature of the While success, this propaganda effort will not the existence of doubts as to the conflict will initially have true little material effect on Soviet capabilities. Political Sources of Disaffection 9. In addition to the reluctance of the Soviet people to undergo the rigors of a new war, three principal bases of potential disaffection will continue to exist in the Soviet Union in a. Disillusionment and resentment resulting from the exactions, of the 'o. The repressions, and personal insecurity characteristic Soviet state. Peasant resentment over governmental agricultural policy. German Army found in the areas which it overran, substantial proportion of the support a foreign invader, the collective private c. that a rural population would initially anticipating that he would abolish farms and distribute the land on a basis of ownership. The hostility of minority nationalities toward Great Russian domination. The main areas of potential disaffection will in 195+ continue the 1954. Caucasus, to be the Baltic States, the Ukraine, and Soviet Central Asia. Vulnerability to Psychological Warfare 10. These potential sources of disaffection will, in 195+ re- main under effective control through isolation of the Soviet people, internal propaganda, economic coercion, political power, ultimate and, dependence above all, of the communist monopoly of police terrorism. Soviet system on police rema:_n a potential weakness. However, coercion will Should the mechanism of close control be broken, by atomic bombardment, the for instance, state govern- mental authority might rapidly disintegrate. TOP SDCItrT iCAT _12 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE Baez 11 - 3 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SFCR7'T 11. So long as the internal security mechanism remains intact, no serious hindrance to the Soviet war effort will result from the latent disaffection within the particularly true Soviet Union. This will be so long as Soviet military operations are rieetinS with. success. If, however, Soviet internal propaganda is disproved by events ( especially if Allied capabilities prove greater than expected, and Soviet capabilities less) Soviet morale will be adversely affected, but the effect will not be decisive. The latent disaffection existing within the Soviet Union could brin about a crippling disintegration of the Soviet war effort only if the Soviet control mechanism is thoroughly disrupted and if effective Allied support of disaffected groups is immediately at hand. Soviet Capabilities for Political and Subversive Warfare 12. The Soviet leaders regard political and psychological warfare as integral and basic, rather than incidental, military operations. In these to the conduct of fields the Kremlin's primary instrument is the international communist movement. the Through it Soviet Union will seek to impair the war effort of the United States and Canada by sabotage of military and industrial installations and propaganda designed to foment labor unrest, promote pacifism and create political division. 11 4 . The agencies of Soviet propaganda and communist agitation will try to spread disillusionment and disaffection in the Western bloc, discredit Western governments and create antagonisms among them, and undermine the will and capacity of Western peoples to resist in the event of war. the The Soviet Union will claim to be invincible champion of the peace- loving and oppressed masses, compelled by the machinations of capitalist warmongers to act in self-defense for the secure establishment of peace and democracy. The Soviet Union will seek to paralyze Western resistance by TOP STCI T xCA.I 12 0... GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 860211 •+ TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP STICRET inciting; labor disturbances, desertion, mutiny, Its particular targets will be intelligentsia, and rebellion. industrial labor, self-conscious minorities, the idealistic colonial populations, and. the armed forces. 14. The Soviet Union will also seek to cripple resistance through sabotage of military installations, communications facilities, transportation and other public utilities, war industries, anc' stocks of essential commodities. Communist penetration of industrial labor has been conducted with this end in view and, des -pite all precautions, will present a serious threat. Satellite Countries in Europe 15. The governments of Poland, Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania are to that of the Soviet Union. that, with the possible exception of Albania, these nations will continue will, There completely subservient, is every reason to believe through 1954. except perhaps in Albania, be Soviet control over If anything, such control stronger and any conmiunist leaders who show signs of wishing to emulate Tito will be and quickly dealt with. position, Albania, because is particularly susceptible Therefore, should Tito, as now seems taining his independence a ?possibility that the Albania before Germany will be satellites. of its geographic to Yugoslav influence. likely, succeed in main- of the Kremlin through 1954, Soviet Union would lose that time. ruthlessl, In mid -1954 the there is control over status of Eastern virtually identical with that of the other Soviet Kremlin control will be assured through Soviet domination of East German governmental and police machinery and, if necessary, by the continued presence of Soviet troops. Yugoslavia 16. regime Soviet efforts to overthrow Tito and to bring a Stalinist to power in Yugoslavia will continue, but probably without TOP SECRET ACA.1: 12 O. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE sea.I I — F — TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOI' SECI•ET resort to direct military aggression. efforts succeed, Yugoslavia would, dace as a Soviet satellite. aggression, however, Should these of course, its former Excluding direct Soviet military the probability is that Tito will succeed in maintaining and consolidating his position. hostilities in resume subversive In the event of 195+, Tito will remain neutral unless attacked. China 17. By mid -195+ the control over Manchuria, Soviet Union will have established effective Sinkiang, and possibly Inner Mongolia, and will probably have predominant influence without absolute over the rest of China. In this case will remain aligned with the ally in the event of war. Chinese Communist regime Soviet Union and will prove a reliable The would therefore be available the control resources and facilities of China to the Soviet Union and China would become a belligerent ally of the Soviet Union if Soviet policy required it. there On the other hand, is a possibility that by ln;;4 the Soviet Union may have conducted its relations with China in such a manner as to arouse a strong nationalistic reaction against participation in the war as a Soviet ally. these circumstances, Manchuria, the Even under Soviet Union would retain control over Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia, and so would have an adequate position confronting Japan. The Far Eastern Satellites l•. Outer Mongolia and Northern Korea are outside pressure secure against any short of clearly impending Soviet defeat. In that extremity, Korean nationalism might assert itself, but only under the protection of Allied forces. ECONOMIC FACTORS Industrial Development and Efficiency 19. The new Five- Year Plan is likely to begin in 19-5 1. It is liT_iely to aim at the continued development of transportation and TOP S-7CMT ACS1 12 U. 9. GOY[RNM[NT PRINTING OFFIC[ 659211 G TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET T0P S''CRET • heavy industry ( possibly with a greater emphasis on quality and a continued emphasis on quantity) and at the same for e,Lpansion in the manufacturing industries. pansion will. result in an increase production by mid- 1954. still be tegically, however, by -the The general level of production, despite The in- considerable lower than that of the Allied nations. these handicaps will be Stra- offset to some degree to military production and heavy industry as Soviet Union opposed to consumer industries of Poland and Czechoslovakia and those that remain in the Soviet Zone materiall,r to assist the of Germany will be in a position Soviet Union in a war beginning in mid- 19 1-4. Pro pess will have been made of the This latter ex- relatively greater emphasis assigned in the goods. to allow in potential for military dustrial efficiency and technical skill will, advances, time in the satellites with that of the integration of the economies Soviet Union, and an effective system of economic co-ordination may have been set up in the Far Fast. 20. The present drive had some effect, and the to be less acute. to improve shortage technical education will have of skilled workers The ability of the is likely Soviet Union to catch up with and keep pace with Western developments in industrial techniques will continue the ability of the and to reproduce to depend to a considerable extent on Soviet Union to obtain from outside its orbit specialized equipment. Manpower 21. It is tentatively estimated that the total population of the Soviet Union in 195+ will be about 210 million, FO million will be males aged 17 - 49. 5 million males women) workers There will be about in the armed forces and about including those in industry, U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OPPICE 656111 4 to 41 million ( men and trade and transport, office workers and skilled workers on State Farms. TOP SZCRET AGAI 7.2 of whom about Artisans will - 7 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SfCF T about In addition, 3 million and e.-ricultural labors about 48 mill there will be icn . 10 million or more fart :tea ZRror•rs The population of the European Satellites is estimated at 9J rnillion. A_Cricultural Production 22. If harvests are normal, continue to be the Soviet orbit as a whole will self-sufficient in foodstuffs in 1954 at present rates of consumption. Industrial Production 27. Certain ferro-alloys may still be th, as affecting the quality of the in short supply in 1954, steel produced. specialized equipment is likely to continue extent the Shortage of to affect to some output of aviation fuel and lubricants. of high- production machine tools will persist. The shortage Production of synthetic rubber will have made progress, but supplies of natural rubber will still be required from southeast Asia. whet'ler the electronics industry will be It is doubtful able to produce in sufficient quantity the up-to-date equipment required by the armc-c. forces. Key Limitations, Dependencies on Foreign Sources and Stock- Piling 24, In the period of preparation for a war in wea]alesses are likely to emerge 1954 a few in the following items: some specialized equipment ( especially for the electronics and petroleum industries), natural rubber and, tin, tungsten, of war, these some machine tools and precision equipment, possibly, high-octane combat aviation fuel, copper and some ferro-alloys. increase After the in consumption and wastage are shortages and produce outbreak likely to increase others. 21 - . It is considered that by 19 F4 the Soviet Union will be 44-n 1' 4+ all-nrl iae nfMA rmria.l s �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET of which it is short, continue to pursue or substitutes for them. the supply from outside current policy of denial, sources If the Allies the Soviet Union's of industrial diamonds, some machine tools and precision equipment will be affected adversely, it may still have access to some Soviet shortage sources of natural rubber and tin. of tungsten and, possibly, supplies from China. although of tin may be eased by Czechoslovakia and Poland, will, in 195+, still wish to obtain Swedish iron ore. 25. It is certain that the Soviet Union will continue every effort in 195+ to acquire uranium. A stock pile It is possible to make the greatest possible amount of of aluminum will have been accumulated. that by strict limitation of supplies to nonmilitary and nonessential users, tin and high-octane could be built up by substantial stock piles of natural rubber, combat aviation fuel or components thereof 195+. Transportation 27. It is expected that the new Five- Year Plan will incluCe continued development of all means of transportation. damar-e resulting from the the recent war will have been repaired before start of this plan and emphasis will probably be railway construction and improvement in the tion and in the Most of the on new rolling- stock posi- turn- round and handling of rolling- sock, the construction of a number of major trunk roads and numerous feeder roads and the continued improvement of the inland water transport system and coastal shipping. 23. It is expected that about 33 per cent of all inland freiht traffic will be carried by the railways, nearly 3 per cent by inland water transport and 4 per cent by motor transport. volume of civil air transport will have The increased by 19 5 4 but will still account for less than 1 per cent of inland freight traffic. The expansion of Soviet industry will tend to offset the expansion TOP SECR.CT ACA:C 12 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 668111 9 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET 6 TOP SECRET of the transport system, and it is highly doubtful whether the service provided to industry will be in North America. comparable to that provided to assume that difficulties It would be unwise in freight transport will be a serious bottleneck in the economy in 195+, Soviet although certain shortages of rolling- stock and skilled labor will probably continue and may have some adverse effect in wartime. 29. Transport will continue and therefore less susceptible cations, but it will continue to be by inland and coastal means to attack than Allied sea communito be a drain on the Soviet economy and to absorb a very large effort in manpower and materials. Reliance on rail transport and possibly some stocic and skilled labor will continue, communications shortage of rolling- and the weakness in land in the Balkans and the need for railroae. trans- shipment at various points in eastern Europe will still be strategic weaknesses. MILITARY FACTORS* GROUND FORCES 30. Strength and Composition. The Soviet Army, in general size and composition, will probably remain approximately the same as at present, with 2.5 million troops, excluding those of internal security forces, organized into about 175 line divisions; rifle ( approximately 40 per cent motorized); tank; and 10 cavalry. 105 35 mechanized; 21-- The armored component is greater than that considered necessary to maintain a proper balance between the basic arias in battle. Thus wartime mobilization will be concentrated mainly on unarmored forces which require less ,raining and equipment to bring them to an efficient combat level. 3l. Disposition. The present disposition of the 175 line divisions is estimated to be as follows: The satellite armed forces are omitted inasmuch as their employment asainst North America is most unlikely. TOP SLCRd21 T ACAI 12 U... GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 850211 - 10 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET Nun,be r Divisions Location Germany- Poland r , Austria- Hungary- Rumania 7 Western USSR ( W of Urals) 71 Caucasus 21 Turkestan 3 Interior 11 Far Last ( E. There of Baikal) 32 Total 175 is no reason to expect any major change disposition of the Soviet ground forces by mid- 195+. 32. Combat Efficiency. The Soviet Army is a powerful and effective military establishment. ness in the present The peak of combat effective- of Soviet divisions is considered to be present forces in being. This state represented by the of combat effectiveness will be maintained by continued emphasis on small and large unit training. the The Soviet high command will continue to emphasize development of a highly professional officer corps. Soviet equipment will be adequate both qualitatively and quantitatively. While some types will lack the refinements of Western equipment, they will on the whole be equally effective in combat and in sorie respects-- notably armored vehicles, heavy mortars and towed anti+ -ank guns-- have superior combat characteristics. Mobilization Potent=- al. It is estimated that maximum Soviet Ground Force mobilization capabilities are as follows: M Day Total Divisions* 175 175 2)500,000 M 5 days 175 200 4,500,000 M 30 days 3 20 7 , 45 81 000 ,000 M { 180 days 320 x+70 11,000,000 365 days x+7 0 520 12, QC , , 000 M * Strength Ground F'o-,ces Line Divisions Line divisions including those in training. TOP S1 CM-= T ACA! 12 U... GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE . 00.11 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 This mobilization potential_ exceeds the estimated requirements for ground force expansion. 74. Soviet Airborne Forces. airborne These The Soviets might have 100,000 troops organized into brigades or divisions or both. troops will probably be well- trained, well-equipped and well- led. The main limitations forces will be the on the employment of airborne availability of airlift*. NAVAL FORCES •. Fleet Organization. The Soviet Navy is at present composed of six fleets supported by fleet air forces located in four major sea areas which include all the No major change sea approaches to the Soviet Union. in this organization is expected by 195+. The six fleets are as follows: Fleet Number Administrative Base Northern Unnumbered Murmansk North Baltic 8th Tallinn South Baltic 4th Baltiisk Black Sea Unnumbered Sevastopol North Pacific 7th Sovetskaya Gavan South Pacific 5th Vladivostok In addition there are four independent flotillas located as ?ollows : Caspian Sea, Danube River, Dnepr River and the Amur River. ,5. Strength. The Soviet Union is expected to make a consider- able effort to develop naval forces in all maritime areas. Soviet naval strength as of 1 July 195+ is estimated to be as follows : See paragraph 53 below for airlift capacity. TOP SECRET ACAT 12 U. S. GOVWRNN[NT PRINTING OFFICE 858XII - 12 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP S _' CR"T Surface Fleet 0 195+ 1 July Increase from 1 Januar', 1950 1 Battleships Old Battleships Monitors He av- Cruisers O1.'_ keavy Cruisers Cruisers Old Light Cruisers De stro ;,,re f s Olc_ Destroyers Destroyer Fscorts Destroyer, Coastal 1 3 1 - 16/19 7/8 1 1 93 35 10 7 Submarine s Ali Submerged Speed (Type Ocean Patrol Medium Ran ,e Coastal ( M• XXI) - 87 49 50 46 2 8 3 22 19 5 150 7. It is expected that the over-all personnel strength of the Soviet Navy will remain approximately the which is estimated to be 600,000, in the T4aval Air Force. marine and base This exclusive same as at present of 35,000 personnel total includes coast defense, personnel as well as those assigned to the forces afloat. 73. New Construction. believed to be The Soviet shipbuilding yards are concentrating on naval vessels and it is con- sidered that they are making progress with the developments. There will be struction during landing craft. the latest German at least two cruisers under con- 195+ as well as destroyers, submarines and In addition, the Soviets have the capacity for construction of large numbers of small auxiliary and minor cor_:'Datant craft including midget submarines. large nwibers of these types available submarines of.' the future will be mance. There is no evidence- in There will be 195+. The ocean-going of improved underwater perfor- of the construction of an aircraft carrier, nor does there appear to be any development of aircraft t,rpes suitable for carrier operations. TOP S`_'CIMT ACAI 12 U. 1. 60VEINYENT FtINTIN00FFICt EO.tlt - 13 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SCPIFT 79. Combat Efficiency. eff icienc:, r have the Materiel maintenance and operational in the past been considered relatively low in Soviet Navy. Emphasis on training of surface and submarine fo: ce s will result in an increase forces. There in the efficiency of those is already evidence standards of materiel maintenance. that of gradually improving It is considered, however, standards will remain below that of the U.S. Navy. 40. Mobilization Potential. Since the Soviet Navy does not maintain a large reserve fleet, but maintains its operational readiness, ships in the mobilization of the Navy would not be a major problem. It is estimated that by M Soviet Navy could be increased to a total of 300,000 personnel, which would include 30 days the 90,000 additional men for the Marine and Coast defense units and 110,000 men for the forces afloat. 41. Mobility. have During time of emergency the Soviet Fleet would onl , limited freedom of movement between the Arctic, Baltic and Pacific via Soviet- controlled waters. sub...arines Destroyers and large can move between the'Arctic and Baltic via the canal during the six months ice- free season. Only a small number of ships could be moved from the western Arctic to the via the Northern Sea Route during the The Caspian Sea is Pacific six weeks navigation season. connected with the Baltic and Arctic by a series of canals and inland waterways, which can handle up to 10 feet in draft. (probably by Stalin When the Volga-Don Canal is craft completed 1954) the Black Sea will be joined to this system. The wide physical separation of Soviet naval forces compels them to Decentralize their logistics systems of support. systems and maintain separate This factor together with their lack of overseas bases handicaps the Soviet Navy and prevents enjoying the TOP S:'CRE,T ACS 12 S. GOVERNMENT . RINTINO Of/ICE 654211 it from strategic mobility of Allied navies. - 14 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SFCRLT 42. Naval Air Force. See paragraphs 43. Amphibious . Operations. the Soviet Union should have amphibious life: Sea, In a war commencing 1 July sufficient craft operations to be able three divisions 53-61 below. suitable 195+, for to attempt the following sea in the Baltic, two divisions in the Black and one division for operations against Alaska and the Aleutians. AIR FORCES 44. Establishment and Corilposition. Soviet air forces in mid -195- will be ents of the Air Force, The major combat compon- the Long Range Air Force, and the Naval Air Force. the Military the Fighter Defense Force I-t is estimated that the total air- craft establishment- will still be about 20,000 aircraft. Actual strength may be up to authorized establishment figures by that date. 49. The aircraft establishments of the major components will probably vary somewhat between now and mid- 195+. The present estimated breakdown by types, which will serve as a guide, is as follows: Fighter Ground Attack MAF 6,100 2,300 FDF 1,300 LRAF N.AF 100 Bomber Transport Re connaissance Total 100 300 600 1;,x+00 7 .9 1,300 - 1,500 100 1,700 1'500 .200 1,100 100 200 3,100 9,5oo 3,000 5,700 1,000 300 20,000 The aircraft establishment is the planned organization and size for units with respect to equipment as reflected in the Table of Eauipment. At present Soviet air regiment s are estimated at 35 to 90 per cent of authorized aircraft strength. Personnel strength is currently estimated at not less than 500,000. TOP SECRET ACAI 12 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 658211 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECT T 0 Military Air Force 4'. Organization and Strength. tary Air Force will be It is expected that the Mili- organized, as at present, into 15 Tac- tical Air Armies and several Military District Air Forces. establishment will probably be about The 13,400 aircraft. It is- estimated that by mid -1994 at least 47. Equipment. two-thirds of the fighter strength and a substantial proportion of the light bombers could be and perhaps all, 48. Role. the close jet-engined types. The majority, of the medium transports will probably be IL- 12 1s. The main task of the Military Air Force will remain support of the ground forces. cumstances, however, the fighter, be diverted to fighter defense, Under suitable cir- transport and bomber units may airborne and strategic bombing purposes respectively. 49. Combat Efficiency. Coribat efficiency is expected to have increased significantly by 19r-4 as a result of improved training and the continuing introduction of improved equipment. considered that the Military Air Force will be providing adequate It is capable of tactical air support to the ground forces. Long Range Air Force g0. Organization and Strength. will probably still be composed of three air armies, in western Soviet Union and one ment will probably be of the Fl. Equipment. The Long Range Air Force in the Far East. two located Total establish- order of 1,700 aircraft. On the basis of production estimates, considered that the bomber element of this force will be it is com- posed of 1,000-1,100 TU -4' s augmented by possibly 100 heavy bombers and 300-400 medium jet bombers. It is expected that transport units will be equipped with IL- 12 and four-engined transports. TOP SECRET ACA'1' 12 U. !. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 88.211 16 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRLT 52. Role. 0 The primary role be as a strategic bomber force. of the Long- Range Air Force will Operations will probably include night and bad weather missions employing pathfinder methods and blind bombing techniques. 53. Combat Efficiency. The effectiveness of the Long Range Air Force as a strategic bomber force probably will have greatly increased by 195}. Training in long - range very operations with aircraft equipped with navigational and blind bombing radar aids should have been extensive and combat efficiency should therefore be high. Fighter Defense Force 94. OrZ anization and Strength. The Fighter Defense Force will be the air arm of the Air Defense Force ( PVO), which also controls ground antiaircraft units and early warning systems. It is estimated that its 1,500 fighters, strength in mid -195+ will be about the bulk of which will be located in the western Soviet Union. 55. Equipment. The Fighter Defense Force will probably be completely re- equipped with jet fighters by 195+. 56. Role. It is considered that the Fighter Defense Force will not be able to fulfill its role of providing adequate air defense for all areas of the Soviet Union. be It will probably concentrated in vital areas for the defense industr•r, of centers of administration and population. 57. Combat Efficiency. It is expected that the efficiency of the Fighter Defense Force will have combat significantly increased by 195+ as a result of better methods of control and improved airborne and ground radar apparatus. TOP SFCRFT CAI 12 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE .. 9.11 17 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SiCRE'T 0 Naval Air Force r ,Q. Organization and Strength. probably still be The Naval Air Force will organized in the air forces of the six fleets with an establishment of about 3,100 aircraft consisting of fighter, mine- torpedo bomber, ground attack, transport and sea reconnaissance elements. gig. Equipment. It is estimated that up to two-thirds of the fighter strength of the Naval Air Force will be Few if any jet-engined light bombers are service with this force. jet types. likely to be The majority of the in transport units will probably be equipped with IL- 12's. 60. Role. The Naval Air Force will be responsible for coastal defense and co-operation with the naval fleets in coastal waters. to the It may be called upon to provide close land forces particularly on their seaward flanks, attack and to shipping provide vital airborne 61. capable to transport airlift for particularly operations. Combat Efficiency. Force may be support Combat efficiency of the Naval Air slightly increased by 195+. of providing adequate It will still be air support to the naval fleets only within the combat radius limitations of its aircraft operating from land bases. Al1_ocation of Tactical Aircraft 62. It is estimated that the allocation of the aircraft of the military and Naval Air Forces within Soviet- controlled territories will probably be about 3,000 in the northern and western areas, about 4,000 in the Middle East area and about 4,500 in the Far East area. Training J Current effective operational strength is believed to be 11 affected in part by a shortage of qualified personnel, especially TOP SECRET A.CAI I2 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE • 08211 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP STCRET 0 technicians. Gradual improvement can be expected and it is likely than these personnel deficiencies will have been eliminated for the most part by 1954. Air crew proficiency and standards of maintenance and training will have improved. War Reserves 64. It may be assumed that war reserves will be at least equal to first line pe. strength, but not necessarily indentical as to ty- Mobilization 65. It is estimated that the Soviet Union could mobilize its air forces to a personnel strength of 1.,200,000 within a period of six months after M- day. Trends in Aircraft Development 66. The fighter aircraft in use in 1954 will be considerably improved over present types. improved engines, The main advancement will be in allowing higher ceilings and greater speeds. The main reliance for interceptors will be roc?c.et powered types. on turbo- jet and/or Major developments will probably center around improvements in the pressurization systems and more reliable operation of engines at high altitudes. 67. It is estimated that by 1954 the Soviets will have night and all-weather fighters in use. capable These night fighters will probably be of carrying AI equipment. 63. Considering all factors, it is anticipated that an improved TU -4 will still be operations the principal vehicle for Soviet long range air in 1954. It is estimated that operating techniques will have improved engines and increased the aircraft to about 2,500 nautical miles. combat radius of this The Soviets have the bility of developing a bomber with performance superior to the TU -4, capa- characteristics if willing to invest the resources required. It is considered that in planning for new bomber- type aircraft, major emphasis may be directed toward fast light and medium types, probably jet powered. TOP SECTET ACAI 12 U. S. GOVERNMENT . HINTING OFFICE • 68211 - 19 TOP SECRET �1 TOP SECRET TOP SFCRFT 0 59. The Soviet Union must be given the capability of developing refueling techniques to increase the craft. range of its long-range air- Experience has indicated that there are no insurmountable difficulties. One refueling would increase the combat radius of the TU-4 from 2,00 nautical miles to about 3,00 nautical miles. Two refuelings could increase the combat radius about 75 percent but it is considered that navigational and other problems would limit the use of this type of operatin. Civil Air Fleet 70. In addition to the air forces discussed above, semimilitary air organization, the IL- 12 types). present transport aircraft production estimates, mid- 195+, is a Civil Air Fleet, which contains about 1,r-00 medium transports ( LI-2, strength of the there Civil Air Fleet could be According to the present considerably increased by If much of the production effort is devoted to four- engined transports rather than IL- 12's, apparent increase there may be little in numbers of aircraft operated by the Civil Air Fleet. Airlift Capacity 71. It is estimated that there may be as many as 4,000 medium transports in service in the Soviet air forces and the Air Fleet by mid- 195+, most of which will be IL- 12's. this total would be in numbers, reduced. the Civil Although considerably less if IL- 13's were produced total airlift capacity would not be significantly Assuming that some 2,000 medium transports ( IL -12's) could be made available for airborne operations, an airlift capacity of approximately nine airborne brigades ( 4,200 men per brigade plus supporting weapons) could be provided. The use of gliders with each aircraft could increase the airlift approximately forty per cent, but would reduce the action from x+50 to about 350 nautical miles. TOP SECRET ACAI 12 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE OBS211 combat radius of - 20 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 Airfields 72. Airfields in Soviet- controlled territory are adequate for fighter defense and tactical and strategic air operations, with the exception of those in Northeast Siberia opposite Alaska and along the Arctic coast line. new airfields could be absence the By 1954, constructed in numbers as considered necessary for the employment of the air forces. Siberia, however, considered rigorous climate., of land transportation and the In Northeast difficult terrain, restricted shipping season would increase the effort involved in any construction work. WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT 77. Atomic Bombs. It is estimated that an appreciable atomic bomb stock pile will have been accumulated by mid -1954. 74. Biological Warfare ( BW). Although it is known that the Soviet Union is conducting research in the field of BW, there no information as to the types of agents which have been, being developed. The Soviet Union should be scale production of BW agents by mid -1954. equipment and techniques for military use capable is or are of large It is probable that of BW will have been developed sufficiently to permit rather extensive employment in support of military operations. 75. Chemical Warfare ( CW). with the The Soviets have standard CW agents and complete long been familiar information regarding the extremely toxic German nerve gases ( G- series agents) has been acquired together with extensive German plant facilities for the production of some of those agents. By 1945 the Soviets had accumulated a stock pile of toxic chemical agents quite adequate for retaliatory use warfare. in the event of the initiation of chemical Subsequently this stock pile has been retained and is thought to have been very considerably increased. Soviet Union will be capable the use of series- G agents) TOP SECHET ACAS 12 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 666211 In 1954 the of waging chemical warfare ( including on a large scale. - 21 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 76. Guided Missiles a. Surface- to- Air ( SAM). Missiles available to the Soviet Union in mid 1954 will probably be based upon utilization of the most promising of the German missiles which was Wasserfall. The basic limiting factor, qualitatively and quantatively, will continue fuels. to be guidance and control, While not the missiles or the the necessity of relying upon optical or other suboptimum means for guidance and control will not deter the Soviets from maximum utilization of these weapons, probable that missiles available it is in mid- 19F4 will be supported by an electronic guidance and control system. b. Air- to- Surface ( ASM). of Soviet development, Soviet Union is While there it is reasonable interested in the is no direct evidence to believe that the German air- to- surface missiles-- the HS 293 ( a radio- controlled glide bomb, rocket po?iered and guided visually from an aircraft) and the Fritz X (FX-1400) which was a radio- controlled bomb guided visually from an aircraft. Prior to mid- lgr-4, the Soviets could have produced and stock- piled a planned operational quantity of improved versions that the of these missiles. There is no assurance Soviets could not develop prior to mid -195+ a native missile better suited to modern high-speed, high- altitude bombers than the German World War II missiles. e. Surface- to- Surface ( SSM). Germany had two operational weapons in this class-- the V-1 ( FZG -76) and the V-2 ( A-4). There was also a program to develop the A-4b, a winged version of the A-4, with increased range. enough components, The Soviet Union acquired testing facilities and equipment and experienced personnel to reconstruct these missiles and establish a proving ground for them. (1) V-1 Type. By mid- 1954, the Soviet Union could have in large-scale production improved versions of V-1 missiles. TOP SECRET ACAZ 12 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 858911 - 22 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Depending upon the priority accorded this weapon, ments could include high subsonic increases, improve- speeds, moderate range possibly automatic weaving, and substantial increases in accuracy through mid- course correction and homing devices. (2) V-2. By mid- 195+, 300 miles could be an improved V-2 with a range in production. have been developed, but it of A winged version may is unlikely that more than a limited quantity will be available by mid- 195+. 77. Electronic Countermeasures a. Jamming of radio communications. the Soviet Union is engaged in extensive communications. This At the present time jamming of radio jamming has been confined almost entirely to the Voice of America and British Broadcasting Company broadcasts. However, in this field is the experience such that jamming could become a serious obstruction to radio coru:munications that the Soviets will have gained. by the Soviet Union in general. It is believed capabilities for extensive jamming of radio communications at frequencies at least as high as VHF by mid- 19 1-4. b. Jamming_ of Radar. the past. The Soviets have used " window" in This and similar reflection devices will almost certainly be encountered in the future. In addition, electronic jamming will probably be encountered at all frequencies up to the 3,000-mc range by mid- 195+. However, the Soviets will not be of Overcast") capable it is believed that jamming B`FO ( Bombing Thru radar which operates at frequencies in excess of 3,000-mc. 73. Proximity Fuzes. It is considered that the Soviet Union �TOP SECRET TOP SECF, _'T 7J. Walther Type Submarine. type submarines may have By mid- 195+, reached the the first Walther sea trial stage. depths and speeds of conventional type creased noticeably to make the Operating submarines will have in- Soviet submarine fleet a much more difficult weapon to combat than at present. 1 50. By mid- 1954, Influence Mines. produced quantities of German type magnetic mines of native design. the Soviets can have influence mines as well as It is probable that any combina- tion of pressure, magnetic and acoustic actuated mine incorpo- rating elaborate delay- arming and ship- counter mechanisms will be in ?production. SOVIET STRATEGY 81. of t'zc In a major war commencing in 19P4 the immediate objectives Soviet Union would be to destroy the alliance of the West, to subject Europe and the Near and Middle East to Soviet domination, to blunt the retaliatory capabilities States and to cripple of Canada and the United their war- making potential. A corollary objective would be to integrate the economic and industrial resources of the Eurasian land mass in order to place the Soviet Union in an impregnable position from which the United States and Canada could be further weakened by communist infiltration, economic warfare S2. and continued military action. It follows from the factors that offensive operations designed to defeat the major Allied Powers must be coupled with strategic defense The principal of the Soviet Union's homeland. military means of achieving these two things will be by air and sea offensives against the United States and the United Kingdom and the occu''.aation of vital base areas by Soviet forces. leaders would realize areas to be TOP ST_ICI ACA1 12 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE T D..R 11 The Soviet that the Western Powers would not permit overrun singly but, regarding the conflict as world- - 24 - TOP SECRET I �TOP SECRET T0P S ' CR•2T wide, 11ould attack the Soviet Union from wherever possible. fore, they would probably decide There- to launch surprise atomic attacks on North America and the United Kingdom, and launch land offensives in a number of areas. Soviet General Plan of Operations S7. The Soviet plan of operations would include: a. Attacks against Canada, Attacks against the United States and Alaska. Canada and the United States would have objectives of blunting the retaliatory capabilities, the war potential and causing the the crippling retention of larger forces than necessary for continental defense. Soviet objectives against Alaska and the Aleutians would be to neutralize U.S. air rases and possibly to gain bases from which to mount attacks against Canada and the United States. b. A campaign against the British Isles. c. A campaign against Western Europe. d. A Balkan campaign. e. Campaigns against the Near and Middle East. f. Campaigns with limited objectives in the Far East. .E. Attacks on Sea Communications. of the Allies on sea communications, In view of the the dependence Soviet Union would attack Allied shipping and ports throughout the world wherever possible . h. Air attacks against Allied bases. i. Sabotage and subversion. constitute a great potential for'sabotage and subversive ac- tivity throughout the world.. appreciate Communists and their sympathizers the magnitude The Soviet leaders thoroughly of this threat to Allied interests and will fully exploit it. j. A campaign against Italy subsequent to gaining control. of Northern Yugoslavia. k. A campaign against Norway and, if necessary, Sweden. TOP ST'CRLT ACAI 12 U... GOVERNMENT PAINTING OFFICE ! Oast 1 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SFCR7--T 1. Subsequently a campaign to overrun the and secure It is the Iberian Peninsula Straits of Gibraltar. considered that the Soviet Union would have forces to undertake all the sufficient armed operations listed above and still have adeque.te reserves. Chinese forces probably will conduct operations against any countpies in Southeast Asia remaining outside if necessary, the Soviet bloc and, take measures to gain control of Hong Kong and Macao. SOVIET CAMPAIGNS 3;;. This estimate does not take into consideration opposition by any Allied forces. U.S, and Canada 35. Prior to or simultaneously with major Soviet military action elsewhere in the world, attacks would be undertaken against the United States and Canada using atomic and conventional type bombs, with the objectives of blunting the retaliatory capabilities of 'che United States and Canada, causing maximum disruption of governmental functions and the mobilization of manpower and industry and damaging their war- making potential to a critical degree. is believed that the Soviets would attempt to select specific target systems for destruction. dustr: 1 the munitions industries, ing, population centers, all be Governmental centers, basic inincluding aircraft and shipbuild- ports and military installations would carefully analyzed to determine for the expenditure It the most profitable return of the appreciable number of atomic bombs which may be expected against North America. 37. Operated from bases developed on the Chukotski Peninsula, and from bases in the Murmansk area, TU-4's could reach any target in either Canada or the United States on one-way missions carrying 10,000 pounds of bombs. TOP SFCRL7T ALAI 12 U. 9..OVE.NMENT PRINTING OFFICE 884111 Two-way attacks, without air refueling, 26 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP S-ECRL?T from the Chukotski Peninsula could reach a general line Francisco-Billings, the Montana-Winnipeg. One San refueling would extend radius of action to reach that segment of North America bounced by a general line Lawrence. through Dallas, Cincinnati and the Gulf of St. From the Murmansk area two-way missions using a single air refueling could cover an area bounded by a line Winni•?eg, Kingston and Boston. through Employing two-refuelings this line woule. be advanced to Oklahoma City- Jacksonville. It is probable that all Soviet heavy bombers will operate fro'ra European bases eastern seaboard to a point south o1 NOrlui-&. - would have no capabilities against North America except the Alas?can and Yukon area. K. The Soviets will have yore than enough aircraft, trained crews and bases of operation to attempt the delivery of their full stock ;0ile of atomic bombs. Other weapons of mass destruction, such as BW and CW might be erlployed in conjunction with atomic bombs. In addition the Soviets will have the capability of de- livering a considerable weight of conventional bombs. it is estimated that the Soviet Union will utilize However, conventional attacl.: against the United States and Canada only on a fairly limited basis and as an auxiliary to atomic attacks. 89. The naval offensive against the United States and Canada may, be expected to include: a. Attacks on ports by means of atomic bombs introduced by merchant ships before and on D-day. normally be limited to major ports, are also large Such attacks would particularly those which centers of population. b. Mining of ports and approaches by merchant ship and su,Dnarine before and on D-day and by TOP S7CRCT ACAI 7 - U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 608211 subm arine after D-day. -27- TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP 37-, C=.T c. Submarine and raider attacks on shipping. expected that the some long-range cruisers will be It is to be Soviet submarines and possibly on station on D-day in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. d. Attacks on ports and coastal targets by submarine- launched guided missiles. e. Amphibious operations to land sabotaSe teams or raiding parties from submarines. 90. By 195+ the Soviet submarine strength will constitute a major threat to North America, as considerable progress may be expected in operational efficiency and equipment. There will be a sufficiently large number of boats of the high submerged speed and ocean patrol type scattered patrols to maintain numerically strong and widely in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. mining capabilities also will have 91. increased. Sabotage and subversion, utilizing native according to a well- developed plan, Soviet communists acting constitute a great potential threat". against both Canada and the United States. Subversion, resulting in strikes and governmental delays could temporarily disru -pt the national economies. Sabotage may be expected to be successful at least until full security measures can be Serious damage could be done implemented. to the United States and Canadian industrial mobilization. Alaska 92. It can be expected that Soviet attacks against Alaska and the Aleutians will have as their objectives the neutralization of U.S. air bases, theater, retention of Allied forces within the American and possibly the gaining of bases from which to mount attacks against the United States. 9 In spite lations in the of the possible Chukotski Peninsula by mid -1954 maintenance TOP SEC!CE T ACAI •i2 . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE •. 8111 development of military instal- - of a 28 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET T0P S72C RE. T a combat force in that area would be somewhat of a problem. and • 7eatlhcr factcrs would tend to limit operations, Logistic although the Soviets could probably bring a considerable effort to bear upon Alas'-:an targets if they considered Allied use tuted a serious threat to the mission basis light Soviet Union. of the area consti- On a normal two-way jet bombers could operate from Velkal and knaclyr as far as Tanana and light conventional bombers as far as west- cent-pal Alaska. Ancho _image area. Neither type could reach the Fairbanks- Jet meditlyi bombers could reach as far south as Juneau and east into the Yukon. All-weather fighters could reach the Fairbanks- Anchorage area if potential airfields east of Vell..al were used. It is estimated that the Soviets would have about 45-500 tactical aircraft in the Far East area upon which to draw for operations against Alaska. 94. Soviet submarines could be expected to harass Alaskan supply lines and mine the approaches to ports. It is considered that small concentrations of submarines might operate in Alaskan waters. Soviet surface units are intermittently capable of commerce raids in small force. 9•. It is estimated that resources which will be available to the Soviets in the Far East will permit a maximum sealift of approl;inately 10,000 troops but only under optimum conditions. A consideration of limitations and logistic and air support, raids would probably be Aleutlian Islands and the imposed by climatic conditions indicates that small amphibious conducted, but would be confined to the coast of Alaska north from Bristol Bay. Climatic conditions will restrict amphibious operations in this area to a period from July to November. 96. The Soviets could probably mount an airborne operation of sufficient size to seize any military installation although it is unlikely that the TOP S! CRET A.CAI 12 U 5 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 868111 troops involved could be supported or 29 TOP SECRET �TOP S ICE maintained for a considerable period. that the Soviets would limit such airborne anc! harassing missions. general the However, The it is probable operations to demolition lack of land communications and the solated position of Alaska would make Soviets to capture and utilize it possible for airfields in Western Alaska for a short period. Communist activity in Alaska will probably be negligible. Hojrcver, through the International Longshoreman's and Warehouse- man 3s Union ( ILWU) and the American Communications Union ( ACU), co=,vai'i_st dominated unions of the CIO, the communists might effectively interfere with the economy and defense strikes, slowdowns, or labor disturbances. jp I LLEU U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 668211 70 of Alaska by � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIA00009 Title A name given to the resource ACAI 12, “Forms and Scales of Soviet Attack against North America, 1 July 1954" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 16-May-50 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived DND DHH 122.009 (D19) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource DND Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Intelligence Assessment Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource EN