https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4a9f44056ae4dea666e9e1436a62b141.pdf 86678e6f229ebbd4bc3fc508b4393979 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence Hi8story Project DND DHH 112.009 (D18) JIC Assessment Forms and Scales of Soviet Attack Against North America, 1 July 1951 ACAI 11 50-05-16 Revisions 50-08-08 Note: This is the edited version of ACAI 9 for distribution to NATO. �COPY NO a 30 27 1980 ee M.Od k,-,V, 73d3 371d.30 ,CLO ON THIS LIH5 hli+ 50 D18) Amendments d/ ►112 . 00,: t J hCr•l 11 ; Cdn L• estimates of forTrr s scales of ussian attack against 1o•ht-=—yn•;er=s•f 1 T •1 1 TOP SECRET DECISION ON A.C.A.I. 11 3 August 195 0 =• o9 L p — _RdjRT �TOP SECRET COPY NO TOP S2 CRET it A.C.A.I. 11 3 August 19,• 0 Al2-RICAT'-CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE D12CISIOTI OPd A.C.A.I. 11 (Forms and Scales of Soviet Attack against North Arierica-1 July 1951) Memorandum by the U. 1. On Q August 195-0, S. Secretaries the Canadian and the U.S. Joint Intelligence Co=ittees agreed to certain amendments to A.C.A.I. 11 and approved that estimate as thus anended. 2. Holders of A.C.A.I. 11 are requested to substitute the attached revised pages 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 13, 19, 21, 23, 25, 25, 27, 23, 29, and 30, which reflect the agreed amendments; and to destroy the 3. superseded pages by burning. This decision now becomes a part of A.C.A.I. 11 and shall be attached as the top .page thereof. C. R. PECK G. R. HE,UER Joint Secretariat TOP SEC=-,T Dec On ACAI 11 TOP SECRET �74 TOP SECRET COPY NO 0 TOP SECRET A,C.A.I. 11 16 May 1950 .POP SECRET TTC..i iI U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 888211 i TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SFCiIFT FORMS AND SCALES OF SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST NORTH AMERICA. - 1 JULY 1951 THE PROBLIPM 1. To prepare an agreed U.S. - Canadian intelligence estimate of the forms and scales of Soviet attack against North America assuming that a major war begins on 1 July 1991, U.S. for the Canada- Regional Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. POLITICAL FACTORS POLITICAL ALIGNMENT Soviet Bloc 2. the The following countries will be definitely aligned with Soviet Union: Poland Bulgaria Eastern Germany Eastern Austria Czechoslovakia China Hungary Outer Mongolia Rumania Northern Korea . The position of Albania, which is at present definitely aligned. with the Soviet Union, is precarious, and there possibility that Albania may be detached from the is a Soviet bloc by mid- 19 1--l. Western Bloc 4. The following countries, together with their dependent territories, will be allied or definitely aligned with the United States and Canada: TOP SECM1 T O. S. GOVERNMENT PAINTING OFFICE 808211 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP S2C•L'T United Kingdom Luxembourg Iceland Frence Italy Portugal Belgium Norway Australia The Netherlands Denmark South Africa New Zealand 5. The nations allied or definitely aligned as members of the Western bloc will have access, at least initially, to the territovy and resources of the following countries. Western Germany Jordan Philippines Western Austria Saudi Arabia Indonesia Iraq Japan Ceylon Frey. t South Korea Latin America Neutral or Precarious 6. The following countries probably will attempt to remain neutral, at least initially, unless attacked: Switzerland Lebanon Yugoslavia S ,)ain Pakistan Turkey Finland Siam Syria Greece Sweden Afghanistan Iran Ireland India Israel 1• there Tae position of Indo-China and Burma is precarious, and is a possibility that they may be attached to the Soviet bloc by mid- 1951. T0P S_C 7T A.CAT 11 O. S. SOVERNMEIIT PRINTING OFFICE 358211 2 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP S-'Ci` FT SOVIET UNION Political and Psychological Readiness for War S. The present government of the of the Soviet Union is 1951. country and will remain so throughout recent experience to dread war, of the people of the Although the Soviet Union has led them they have been taught to expect capitalist attack, and are prepared to resist. In the event of war in mid -1951 the Soviet leaders will present the war as a defense against capitalist will not have in full control imperialism. complete the true nature of the success, While of the homeland this propaganda effort the existence of doubts as to conflict will initially have little material effect on Soviet capabilities. Political Sources of Disaffection 9. In addition to the reluctance of the Soviet people to undergo the rigors of a new war, three- principal bases of potential disaffection exist in the Soviet Union. a. Disillusionment and resentment resulting from the exactions, repressions, of the Soviet b. and personal insecurity characteristic state. Peasant resentment of collectivization. found, in the areas which it overran, The German Army that a substantial propor- tion of the rural population would initially support a foreign invader, anticipating that he would abolish the faniis and distribute c. land on a basis of private ownership. The hostility of minority nationalities toward Great Russian domination. are the collective The main areas of potential disaffection the Baltic States, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Soviet Central Asia. TOP SEECRT A.CAI 11 U. t. GOVERNMENT ► RINTIN. OFFICE eeest 3 I TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECHET Vulnerabilit7 to Psychological Warfare 10. these potential sources undo:., effective of disaffection normally are kept control through isolation of the Soviet people, internal propaganda, economic coercion, communist monopoly of po7_ _ tica*1 power, terrorism. and, above all, ult _ne,te dependence of the potential weakness. police Soviet system on police Should the mechanism of close be broken, by atomic bombardment, for instance, However, the coercion is a state control governmental authority might rapidly disintegrate. 11. So long as the internal security mechanism remained intact, no sepious hindrance the latent disaffection within the particularly true to the Soviet war effort would result from Soviet Union. This would be so long as Soviet military operations were meeting with success. If, however, Soviet internal propaganda were disproved by events-- especially if Allied capabilities proved greater than expected, and Soviet capabilities less-- Soviet morale would be adversely affected, but the effect would not be decisive. The latent disaffection existing within the Soviet Union could bring about a crippling disintegration of the only if the Soviet control mechanism were Soviet war effort thoroughly disrupted and i.f effective Allied support of disaffected groups were immedi- ately at hand. Soviet Capabilities for Political and Subversive Warfare 12. The Soviet leaders regard political and psychological warfare as integral and basic, military operations. strument is the the rather than incidental to the In these fields conduct of the Kremlin's primary in- international communist movement. Through it Soviet Union would seen to impair the North American war effort by sabotage of military and industrial installations and propaganda designed to foment labor unrest, promote pacifism and create political division. TOP SECRET A.C!-•I IA U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 858.11 •+ TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET i lam. The agencies of Soviet propaganda and communist agitation would try to spread disillusionment and disaffection in the Western bloc, discredit Western governments and create antagonisms among tlie , :i, and undermine the will and capacity of Western peoples to resist in the event of war. the invincible The Soviet Union would claim to be champion of the peace- loving and oppressed masses, conr_pelled by the machinations of capitalist warmongers to act in self-defense for the secure establishment of peace and democracy. The Soviet Union would seek to paralyze Western resistance by inciting labor disturbances, desertion, mutiny, and rebellion. Its particular targets would be industrial labor, intelligentsia, self-conscious minorities, the idealistic colonial populations, and the armed forces. 14. The Soviet Union would also seek to cripple resistance through sabotage of military installations, coru:iunications facilities, transportation and other public utilities, war industries, and stocks of essential commodities. Communist penetration of industrial labor has been conducted with this end in view and, despite all precautions , would present a serious threat. Satellite Countries in Europe 15. The governr_ients of Poland, Eastern Germany. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, P,umania, Bulgaria, and Albania are completely subservient to that of the Soviet Union. There is every reason to believe that, vith the possible exception of Albania, these nations will continue through 1951. trol will J. except perhaps in Albania, be Soviet control over If anything, such con- stronger and any communist leaders who show signs of wishing to emulate Tito will be ruthlessly and quickly dealt with. In the case of Albania, because of its physical separation from the Soviet Union its susceptibility to Yugoslav influence, there i,4oscow control by mid- 1951. is a possibility of detachment from Eastern Germany in mid -1951 will still be under Soviet control and probably will still be occupied by Soviet forces. TOP S•7 CFT'T .A.CAI 1:17---- U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE assail TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SIDCF ' T 0 FCONOMIC FACTORS Industrial Development and Efficiency 16. A new Five- Year Plan will probably be announced by the end of logo. It is likely to aim at the continued development of transportation and heavy industry ( possibly with greater emphasis on quality and a continued emphasis on quantity), time and at the same to allow for expansion in the manufacturing industries. latter expansion will not have advanced far by 1 July This 1951, so that its effect on potential military production will be small by that date. 17. Progress will have been made by 1 July integration of the economies of the the Soviet Union. available to the The satellites with that of resources of China are Soviet Union, 1951 in the likely to be at least to the extent that it is frilling to pay for them with goods and services. 13. The industrial efficiency of the Soviet Union in will be below that of North America because skilled labor, of a shortage 7 industrial waste and continued dislocation of industry and population. which are of lack of machinery and equipment, backward tech- nolog - , bureaucratic methods of management, exceptions are 1951 likely, however, Important to occur in those undertakings given the highest priority, particularly those engaged in certain military projects. Manpower 19. The total population of the Soviet Union in 1951 is estimated at 202 million. This figure will include 4- pillion males aged 17 to 49. There will be about million makes in the armed forces and about and wo .ien) workers including those TOP SECRET AC!1I 11 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 856111 about 4 to 5 36.5 million ( men in industry, trade and 6 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET transport, office workers and skilled workers on State Farms. Artisans will number about 3 million and agricultural laborers about 50.0 million. In addition, the number of forced laborers is estimated at 10 -15 million. Agricultural Production 20. If harvests are normal, continue to be the Soviet orbit as a whole will self-sufficient in foodstuffs in 1951 at present low rates of consumption. Industrial Production 21. Much depends on the priorities established by the new Five-Year Plan, but there are likely to be few changes in the content and the rate of industrial production by 1951. power, Electric petroleum and coal should meet all normal requirements, aluminum production will be more than adequate for estimated consumption including likely requirements of the aviation industry. It is thought that production of raw steel will meet normal requirements ( including those for the armed forces at peacetime rates of consumption) and possibly leave a small surplus. 22. If there should be a drive for quality, it is likely to be hampered in the case of steel by shortage of certain ferroalloys ( for example cobalt and molybdenum), in the case of high grade petroleum products ( such as aviation fuel and lubricants) by shortage of specialized equipment. There will still be a shortage of high production machine tools. Emphasis on the production of synthetic rubber and on its quality will probably be intensified, but reliance on southeast Asia for natural rubber will still be considerable. In industry as a whole there may be an increased attempt to develop supporting factories to produce parts and components for main factories. TOP SECRET ACAI 11 In 1951, the electronics - 7- (Page revised by Decision on - 8 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SFCR-T r industry will not be capable of meeting wartime rad.ap and communication equipment on a scale requirements of comparable with that of the: United States and the United Kingdom. Limitations, Dependence 2". on Foreign Sources and Stock- piling Shortages of natural rubber, to a lesser extent, exist. industrial diamonds, shortages of lead, Supplies of tungsten, tin, and, cobalt and molybdenum will and to some extent, tin may be available from China. 24. The Soviet Union will still require natural rubber, industrial diamonds, tin, specialized equipment and parts, (es ecially for the electronics and petroleum industries), countries outside its orbit. The from Soviet Union is unlikely to remain indifferent to the gap between its own and North American technical skill and is likely to continue its attempt to obtain up-to-date factory equipment from Western Europe and North America perhaps by indirect means. will continue 25-. stoclL to require Czechoslovakia and Poland Swedish iron ore. The present efforts to acquire uranium will continue. of aluminum will be available. , bile The success of the Soviet Union in accumulating sock piles of natural rubber, etc., will depend on the willingness of countries outside orbit to trade with it. It seems reasonable A tin, its that the Soviet Union Z , rould also attempt to stock- pile aviation fuel or its components . Transportation 26. By 1 July 195-1, carry about it is expected that the railways will 33 per cent of all inland freight traffic. water transport will carry about TOP S'E'CRET ACAI 11 O. S. GOVERNMENT FAINTING OFFICE seal 11 Inland 3 per cent of the total and 8 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECREZ 0 motor transport about 4 per cent. for less than 1 per cent. Civil air transport accounts Soviet railway facilities will not be comparable with those of North America in the vide to industry, because although railroad construction and improvement will continue, at the service they pro- same rate. industry will be expanding at least Motor inland water and air transport are not expected to provide any significant relief to the railroads by this time. 27. The consideration which overshadows all others in its effects on the military and economic aspects of transportation is the concentration of Soviet and Satellite territories into one continuous land mass of enormous strength of their size. The resultant systems is that they are contiguous and possess interior connecting lines. In peace or war, the operation and expansion of the transportation system will be a major drain on the Soviet economy. 28. An additional strategic weakness arises from the enormous distance between the east and west of Soviet- controlled territory, and the lack of a satisfactory Soviet- controlled sea route between them. Except in north and northeast Siberia, dependent on seasonal shipping, which are reliance must be placed almost entirely on rail transport which involves the use of enormous quantities of rolling- stock, fuel, and skilled labor, of which are critically balanced or short become supplies or are likely to so in war. 29. An added strategic weakness results from poor distribution of land communications in eastern Europe. rail lines in the Balkans, for example, North- south are too sparse by them- selves to support large movements directed at the Bosphorus into Greece. The road network, TOP SECRET ACAI 11 moreover, or despite certain - 9- (Page revised by Decision on - 8 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET improvements, is sparse and poorly aligned for the support possible Soviet military operations. Soviet of Another weakness of the orbit land transportation system is the problem of gauge differences, which has long been a source of difficulty. Economic Potential of Allied Powers 30. The following main conclusions emerge from consideration of the salient features of the economic potential of the Allies: a. With some reorientation of their established patterns of trade, and provided sea communications are maintained, Allies can be the self-sufficient in most of the chief commodities, such as foodstuffs, coal, steel, petroleum, aluminum, sulphuric acid and fertilizers. b. For a few important commodities, however, the Allies as a whole are dependent upon resources situated at great distances from the main consuming centers. The United Kingdom in particular is dependent for many commodities upon overseas supplies, and the Allies in general are dependent for most of their natural rubber and a very large part of their tin on British and Dutch dependencies in the Far East. c. There are a number of cases in which certain of the Allies depend to a considerable degree on supplies from territories which, though not as distant as the Far East, are nevertheless a great distance away. Africa is an important Thus, supplier of uranium, for example, copper and bauxite. d. The United Kingdom and Western European Allies normally draw large supplies of certain commodities from countries situated on the European Continent, and, such supplies are subject to denial. is an important source of iron ore, iron ore and mercury ore, TOP SECRET 1-, ,CA_I 11 Sweden, therefore, for example, Spain of pyrites, potash, and Western Germany of coal. - 10- (Page revised by Decision on - 8 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 MILITARY FACTORS SOVIET ARMED FORCES 31. Paragraph not used. GROUIM FORCES 32. Strength and Composition. uary 1950, million. that the It is estimated, as of 1 Jan- standing Soviet Army numbered about 2.5 However this strength may increase temporarily to approximately three million men due to overlapping classes but there is no reason to believe that a proportional increase in divisions will occur by July 1951. The army is organized into 105 rifle ( more than 50 per cent of which are motorized), 35 mechanized, 25 tank and 10 cavalry divisions. The armored component is greater than that considered necessary to maintain a proper balance between the basic arms in battle. Thus, war- time mobilization will be concentrated mainly on unarmored forces which require less training and equipment to bring them to an efficient combat level. The present disposition of the 175 line 33. Disposition. divisions is estimated to be as follows: Number Divisions Location 25 Germany- Poland Austria-Hungary-Rumania 6 Western USSR ( W.of Urals) 72 Caucasus 21 Turkestan 8 Interior 11 Far East ( E. of Baikal) Total TOP SECRET ACAI 11 32 175 - 11- (Page revised by Decision on - 8 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 34. Combat Efficiency. 46 The Soviet Army is a powerful and effective military establishment. It is endeavoring to develop greater mobility and tactical flexibility than it possessed in World War II. The Soviet Army has been changed since World War II by a reorganization which has placed emphasis on motorization and mechanization, with a resultant higher proportion of arnor to infantry. This reorganization has probably produced an army whose combat effectiveness is on a par with or above that of World War II. . Mcbilization Potential. It is estimated that r..iaxiriun Soviet ground force mobilization capabilities are as follows: Li-:ie Divisions Total Divisions Strength Ground Forces M Dad- 175 175 2,500,000 M / 5 days 175 200 4,500,000 Psi / 30 days 320 345 3, 000, 000 M f 130 days 320 x+70 11,000,000 M / 365 days x+70 520 12,000,000 This mobilization potential exceeds the estimated requirements for ground force expansion. 36. Soviet Airborne Forces. • There are no firrl indications as to the size and organization of the Soviet Airborne Forces. However, a large number of line troops have been given airborne training. The main limitation on the employment of airborne forces will be the availability of airlift. NAVAL FORCES 37. Fleet Organization. The Soviet Navy is conposed of six fleets supported by fleet air forces located in four najor sea areas which include all the sea approaches to the Soviet Union. These fleets are as follows: * Line divisions including those TOP SECRET ACAI 11 in training. - 12 - (Page revised by Decision On - August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Fleet Administrative Base Number Northern Unnumbered Murmansk North Baltic 8th Tallinn South Baltic 4th Baltiisk Black Sea Unnumbered Sevastopol North Pacific 7th Sovetskaya Gavan South Pacific 5th Vladivostok In addition there are four independent flotillas located in the following rivers and seas: Caspian Sea, Danube River, Dneiper River, and Amur River. 38. Strength and Disposition. It is estimated that the com- batant strength o+ the Soviet Navy on 1 July 1951, by fleets, will be r,s follows: Surface Fleet Arctic Old Battleships Moni* o:, 2s Heavy Cruisers 1 Old Hoavy Cruisers Ligh"; Cruisers Old Light Cruisers Destroyers 21 Old Destroyers 2 Destroyers, Coastal 15 Destroyers, Escort - Baltic Black Sea 1 1 4/6 1 1 - 17 2 7 1 Far East Total Increase from 1 Jan 1950 2 3 1 1 11 3 9 - 3/4 1 21 3 11 2 3 1 11/14 1 3 1 70 10 42 3 2/3 15 4 - 15 38 3 18 10 39 24 45 10 15 37 56 25 20 86 75 145 8o 16 16 11 36 - Submarines HSS ( XXI) Ocean Patrol Medium Range Coastal Midget Landing Craft, 5 30 10 26 - 250 - whereabouts unknown but presumed to be in the Baltic and Black Seas. M.T.B.'s - 250 39• Naval personnel strength by mid- 1951 is estimated as follows follows : Forces afloat 325,000 Coast defense units 185,000 Marines 90,000 Naval Air Force Total 8o, 0o0* 68o,000 * Also included in Soviet Air Force personnel total. TOP SECRET ACAI 11 - 13(Page revised by Decision on - 8 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 40. New Construction. The Soviet shipbuilding yards are known to be concentrating on naval vessels and it is considered prob:.ble that they are making progress with the latest German developments, There will be at least two cruisers under construction during 1951 as well ^. s destroyers, submarines and landing craft. The Soviet Union is continuing to turn out motor torpedo boats and other coastal craft. 41. Combat Efficiency. Materiel maintenance and operational efficiency are considered to be relatively low in the Soviet Navy. Soviet policy to date has been to concentrate training effort on the submarine forces and it is thought that efficiency is improving in this branch of the service, U. although it is still below that of S. - Canadian standards. 42. Mobiliz,tJon Potential. Since the Soviet Navy does not maintain a large reserve fleet, but maintains its ships in operational readiness, major problem. the mobilization of the Navy would not be a It is estimated that by M / 30 days the Soviet Navy could be increased to a total of 800,000 personnel ( exclusive of Naval Air Force), Marine and Coast which would incZjde 90,000 additional men for the defense units and 110,000 additional men for the forces C.float. 43. Mobility. frontiers The wide physical separation of the maritime of the Soviet Union and inadequate Soviet- controlled water routes between these areas compels the maintenance of the separate forces together with a support. decentralized system of logistic The present lack of overseas bases tends to tie each of the separate navel forces frontier c.rea. or fleets to its respective maritime The Soviet Navy, thus handicapped, strategic mobility of other navies. lacks the Under present conditions, it would be virtually impossible to effect a rapid wartime concentration of Soviet Navl Forces, drawn from the various fleets, in any given critical area. TOP SECRET TcKr -1 U. E. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE . 0.111 - 14 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 44. The Soviet Union has attempted to offset this strategic 0 disadvantage by building up fleet strength on a planned priority basis corresponding with strategic inland and coastal waterways interests, in areas and large submarines can move between the Stalin canal during Caspian Sea is of canals and 10 feet and by developing under its control. Destroyers the Arctic and Baltic the six months navigation season. connected with the Baltic and Arctic The by a series inland waterways, which can handle craft up in draft via to including- coastal submarines with the aid of tran , 3 )or ters. 45. Naval Air Force. See paragraphs '+6; is In a war commencing 1 July 191 it beli-cved that operations would be confined in w:.ich the lifts are and , , T"iere the condl.;-IL..n-s, aca - 63 - 66 below. short, the coasts relatively undefended, Soviets could control it is believed to areas that the a merchant shipping and all the sea and air. Under Soviets would employ types these the of small craft and would not, dorpnnd upon sepcialized amphibious craft. )L'7, the Under the above circumstances Sovio;,s will have effective amphibious the Baltic Sea, it is estimated sufficient shipping of all operations that in 1951 types to conduct using six infantry divisions four in the Black Sea and four in in the Far East. 48. In view of the adverse weather conditions, navigational difficulties and the distance from Soviet staging areas, capability against equipped of it is the Aleutian Islands and Alaska estimated that the total lift these areas will not exceed 4,000 fully troops. AIR FORCES 49. Establishment and Composition. of the Soviet air forces are Range Air Force, The major combat componente the Military Air Force, the Fighter Defense Force and TOP SECRET ALAI 11 - the Long the Naval Air Force. 15 - (Page revised by Decision On - 8 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET •, It is ted that tho total aircraft establishment* cs of cstim 1 Ju1;; r 1951 will be about 20 3000 .aircraft* of the major components are 50. The aircraft establishments estimated as follows: Fiohtcrs Ground Attack Bombers Transport Military Air Force 6,100 2,800 3,100 800 Fighter Defense Force 1,800 Long-Range Air Force Reconn Total 600 13,x+00 1,800 1,700 100 - 1,500 100 Naval Air Force 11500 200 1,100 100 200 TOTAL 9,500 3,000 5,70 0 1,000 800 3,100 20,000 Military Air Force 51. Organization and Strength. The Military Air Force is composed of 15 tactical air armies and vixious '• ir units assigned to Military Districts* corps, the air divsions The air armies are orgc:inzed into. air. and air regir:ents . It is estimated that the allocation of the Military Air Force by establishment is approximately as follows: Northern and Western Area Middle East Area Far East Area Total Fighter 3,300 1,700 1,100 6,100 Ground Attack 1,500 700 600 2,800 Light Bomber 1, 344 74 0 1,020 3,100 200 270 330 800 340 6,680 140 12 0 600 3,550 3,170 13,x+00 Transport Reconnaissance TOTAL * The aircraft establishment is the planned organization and size for units with respect to equipment as reflected in th e Tables of Equipment. This is authorized strength and does not nec e ss aril y ref lcct the actual aircraft strength in being. Sovi e t a ir re giments are estimated at 85 to 90 percent of authorize d a ircraft strength. Personnel strength is currently estimated at not less than 600,000. TOP SECRET ACAI 11 - 16 - TOP SECRET U. S. GOVERNMENT FAINTING OFFICE ! 063/1 �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 52. Equipment. It is estimated that some 3,000 jet fighters will be in operational units in the Air Forces as a whole by mid -1951. There is no indication as to the number which will be in the Military Air Force at that time. ground attack and transport aircraft, bombers will be conventional types. It is expected that all and most of the light The combat range of its fighters will probably not exceed 950 nautical miles for pistonengined types and 700 nautical miles for Combat ranges of ground attack, jet-engined types. transports and practically all light bombers will probably not exceed 360, nautical miles respectively. A number of 1,050 and 1,400 jet-engined light bombers will probably be in operational units. Maximum combat range of this new type is estimated at about 1,600 nautical miles. 53. Role. close support The main task of the Military Air Force will be the of the land forces. In an emergency it is probable that fighter units may be diverted from the close support role to assist the Fighter Defense Force. Transport units might on occasion be concentrated to augment the scale of airlift for particularly vital airborne operations. Bomber units may be made available under suitable circumstance for strategic bombing purposes. 54. Combat Efficiency. The Military Air Force will be operat- ing large number of obsolete aircraft, gram of re- equipping with new types. despite a continuing proIt would have the advantage of initial numerical superiority over opposing tactical air forces. Equipment, maintenance and training will be below United States and Canadian standards. Considerable emphasis will be placed upon mobility and flexibility. Long Range Air Force 55. Organization and Strength. The Long Range Air Force will probably consist of three air armies, two of which will be dis- posed in the western Soviet Union and one in the Far East. TOP SECRET ACAI 11 - 17- (Page revised by Decision on - 8 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET East air army would normally be composed of bomber, fighter, and transport units. escort These air armies will be opera- tionally subordinated to a central authority. It is estimated that the allocation of aircraft by establishment on 1 July 1951 will be approximately as follows: West & Middle East Areas Far East Area Total Fighters 100 Bombers 800 700 1,500 70 30 100 Transport 56. Equipment. 100 Present estimates of production indicate that a maximum of 900 TU-4 type aircraft by mid -1951. could be in operational units Allowance has been made for limited war reserve (approximately 250), training, other reserves and wastage. It is not expected that a piston-engined bomber superior to the TU -4 or a medium jet bomber will be in service in the Long Range Air Force. The remainder of the bombers and transports of the Long Range Air Force will be short range types. It is believed that the escort fighter units will be equipped only with pistonengined aircraft suitable for the close escort of day bomber or airborne operations carried out at 57. Role. short range. The primary role of the Long Range Air Force will be that of a strategic bomber force. Operations may include night and bad weather missions employing pathfinder methods and blind bombing techniques. It is estimated that the Long Range Air Force will be capable of carrying out the following longrange bombing operations with TU-4 type aircraft: a. Two-way missions to a maximum combat radius of action of 2,150 nautical miles, b. Two-way missions, ing, carrying a load of 10,000 pounds. carrying out a single outward refuel- to a maximum combat radius of action of 3,000 nautical miles, TOP SECRET ACAI 11 carrying a load of 10,000 pounds. ( It is considered -18- (Page revised by Decision on - 8 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 that navigational and other difficulties would make missions using a double air refueling difficult of accomplishment). c. One-way missions to a maximum combat range of 3,960 nautical miles carrying a load of 10,000 pounds the entire distance. 58. Combat Efficiency. It is believed that the Soviet Union intends that the Long Range Air Force eventually will be capable of undertaking strategic bombing missions by day or night in any weather. Units of the Long Range Air Force are undergoing con- centrated training to overcome weaknesses in long range navigation, instrument and high altitude flying. being taught extensively. Radar theory is It is possible that elementary radar blind bombing and navigational devices will be in service by 1951. mid - Nevertheless, it is considered that the over-all efficiency of the Long Range Air Force will still be inferior to U.S. and Canadian standards. Fighter Defense Forco 59. Organization and Strength. The Fighter Defense Force will be the air arm of the Air Defense Force ( PVO). The latter also controls ground antiaircraft units and early warning systems. Its strength is estimated at 1,800 fighters. The bulk of this force will probably be located in the western Soviet Union. 60. Equipment. It is considered that the Fighter Defense Force will be almost entirely equipped with jet fighters. The combat range of its aircraft, without external fuel tanks,' will probably not exceed 700 nautical miles for jet-engined types and 950 nautical mJtles for piston-engined types. Uso of external fuel tanks could increase ranges perhaps 50 per cent or more. TOP SECRET ALAI 11 -19- (Page revised by Decision on - 8 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 61, Role. It is considered that the Fighter Defense Force will 0 not be capable of providing adequate air defense for ALL areas of the Soviet Union. It probably will be concentrated in vital areas for the defense of centers of industry, administration and population. 62. Combat Efficiency. control of this standards. It is believed that the operational force will be poor by United States - Canadian It will be handicapped by lack of experience with fighter control systems and by inadequate radar equipment. main night defensive numbers effort will probably be in the The use of large of day fighters assisted by searchlights and a form of ground control. NAVAL AIR FORCE 63. Organization and Strength. into the air forces The Naval Air Force is of the six fleets and has an establishment of 3,100 aircraft consisting of fighter, mine- torpedo- bomber, attack, organized transport and sea reconnaissuneo elenentu•. , ground It' is estas_iated that these aircraft will be allocated by establishment as follows: Black Northern North & South Sea North &, South Aircraft Fleet Baltic Fleets Fleet Pacific Fleets Total Fighter 150 Ground Attack CFO Light Boriber 120 440 - Transport Reconnaissance TOTAL 64, Equipment. 450 300 boo 1,500 - 200 160 380 1,100 30 30 4o 100 30 30 60 80 200 344 1,110 550 1,l00 3,100 160 The aircraft - of the Naval Air Force correspond to those of the Military Air Force with the exception of a few catapult aircraft and obsolete flying boats. -she nLatfoca:° of It is expected that jet fighters in the Naval Air Force by mid -1951 will probably be small. SOP SECRET CAI 11 U. G. GOVERNMENT • RINTING OFFICE 858211 - 20 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET W 65. Role. The Naval Air Force will be responsible for coastal defense and cooperation with the naval fleets in coastal waters. It is also capable of providing close forces, support for the land particularly on its seaward flanks, merchant shipping and mine laying. and for attacks on The transport units might be made available for airlift purposes, but only at the expense of interfering with the normal operation and mobility of the fleet air forces. 66. Combat Efficiency. Although the Naval Air Force lacks experience in maritime operations, it is considered that there will be reasonably efficient coordination between it and the submarine and surface forces. This force will have no value in long range operations and in general its combat efficiency will be below U.S. and Canadian standards. Training 67. The Soviets, through the training directorate, are making determined efforts to raise the standards of training in the Soviet air forces. Emphasis has been placed on night formation and high altitude flying, gunnery, and bombing. Limited flying tends to offset many of the improved training techniques, however, althov-g gh much stress is given to the theoretical training. It is possible that the supply of trained manpower may be a critical factor in the expansion of the air forces in the event of war. War Reserves 68. There is no direct evidence as to the number of aircraft that will be allocated to war reserves in the Soviet Union in 1951. It may be assumed that these reserves will be at least equal to first line strength, but not necessarily identical as to type. Mobilization 69. It is estimated that the Soviet Union could mobilize its air forces to a personnel strength of 1,200,000 men by M- day plus TOP SECRET ACAI 11 - 21(Page revised by Decision on - 8 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET six months. 0 Aircraft strength could be brought up to establishment in a very short time. Civil Air Fleet 70. In addition to the air forces discussed above, semi-military air organization, there is a the Civil Air Fleet, which has approximately 1,500 medium transports ( LI-2, scheduled and nonscheduled operations. IL- 12 types) for Considering its growing importance as a component of the Soviet transportation system, it is likely that the Civil Air Fleet will be expanded during the next year, possibly to a strength of 2,000 medium transports, in addition to considerable numbers of light com..iunication types. It is possible that small numbers of four-engined transports will be in service. Airlift Capabilities 71. The total number of medium transports which initially could be made available for airborne operations is estimated to be 1,000 frori the Civil Air Fleet, plus possibly x+00 fron the air forces for a vital operation. This would be at the expense of regular transport functions. 72. It is estimated that the capacity for single airlift using LI-2's without gliders at a combat radius of 525 nautical miles would be three airborne brigades ( 4,200 fully equipped and supported* troops per brigade) using 1,000 aircraft, and for a vital cperation, craft. approxinately five brigades using 1,400 air- If each transport towed one KZ- 20 glider ( 10 fully equipped and supported troops), the total airlift capacity, at a combat radius of about 400 nautical miles, would be about five to seven brigades. Using IL- 12 1s, the lift would be increased by five ''Supported" implies sufficient crew served weapons, ammunition and supplies to sustain a brigade for a period of 3 days. TOP SECRET ACAT 1-i Y. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 8.8211 - 22 - TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET airborne troops per aircraft, but the 16 to 450 nautical miles. co::ibat radius would be reduced Airfields 73. Fron the point of view of proximity, the Chukotsli Peninsula and Murnansk areas are the most United States and Canada. suitable for operations against the TU -4's and IL 4's operating against . Alaska would probably use bases in the Sorie suitable bases little in that area are available for the is known of actual bases there which would be the TU -4. area, Chukotski Peninsula area. The field at Anadyr may be adequate. there is at least one base IL- 4, suitable for In the Murmansk suitable for TU -,4's. However, adequate air strips could be prepared in both of these areas relatively short time, possibly in 90 days, material were rude available. in a providing construction From a logistic point of view, Murmansk bases would be preferable Peninsula area. but to bases in the There are a number of bases the Chukotski in the Minsk area which are adequate for sustained TU -4 operations over the United Kingdom, Europe, and the Middle Last. These could also serve as main bases for staging through Murriansl.. 74. Available evidence suggests a general program of airfield improvement and develop-ment in the western part of the Soviet Union, the satellite states and possibly in the rlaritime Far east. problem appears to emphasize construction of perr.anent runways with lengths and surfaces capable aircraft. There are The of supporting TU-4 ts and jet slight indications of improvement of some airfields in Northeast Siberia. W APOITS DEVLLOPMENT 75. Atomic Bombs. It is estimated that a small atomic bomb stock pile will have been accumulated by mid- 1951. 76. Biolopical Warfare ( BI-1). Soviet capacity for producing biological agents for use against personnel, animals and plants will be adequate for sabotage and probably for small-scale military operations. However, there is no intelligence of the necessary military equipment and techniques. whether the Soviet production capability is scale BW. on development It is unknown sufficient for large- Facilities and trained scientists now available will permit an extensive BW research program. TOP SE'CITT ACAI 11 - 2'7 - (Page revised by Decision On - 3 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRETR 77, Chemical Warfare ( CW). 0 The Soviet Union is believed to be capable of large-scale production and employment of the wellknown chemical agents at present, and probably could achieve within one year similar proficiency with regard to at least one moniber of the German- developed nerve gases ( series agents). Suitable means of dissemination can readily be developed. 78. Guided Missiles a. Surface- to-Air ( SAM) . Germany had no surface-to-air missiles in operational use but was developing Schmetterling (a visually guided radio- controlled subsonic aircraft), Wasserfall ( a radio- controlled supersonic rocket Y, Rheintochter III (a visually guided radio- controlled subsonic rocket) and Enzian (a visually guided radio- controlled subsonic missile). Proximity fuzes and radar tracking were planned for each of these missiles. The first three missiles were quite promising in their World War II test forms. If reproduction of German type surface-to- air guided missiles was emphasized at an early date, quantities would be available in 1951. factor, limited The basic limiting qualitatively and quantitatively, would be guidance and control not the the missiles or the fuels. b. Air- to- Surface ( ASM). The Soviets probably have the cap- ability of producing the HIS 293 ( a radio controlled glide bomb, rocket powered and visually guided from an airc aft) and the Fritz X ( a radio-contolled bomb guided visually from an aircraft). c. Surface- to- Surface ( SSM). Germany had two operational weapons in this class-- the V-1 ( FZG -76) and the V-2 ( A-4). was also a program to develop the A- 4b, A-4, with increased range. There a winged version o.i the The Soviet Union acquired enough material and experienced German scientific talent to reconstruct these missiles as they existed at the end of the war. The TOP SECRET ACAI 11 - 24 U. S. GOVERNMENT PAINTING OFFICE 658211 TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 0 Soviets also acquired sufficient testing facilities, and experienced personnel to enable them to equipment establish a first class proving ground for these missiles. (1) V-1. Depending largely on the priority assigned, bhe Soviets by mid -1951 could employ, copies of the V-1 somewhat (2) V-2. on a large scale, improved in range and accuracy. By mid 1951 ; it is estimated that the Soviet Union could employ limited numbers of the V-2 unchanged in range and accuracy. 79. Electronic Countermeasures a. Jamming of Radio Communications. the Soviet Union is engaged in extensive communications at lower frequencies. At the present time jamming of radio This jamming has been confined almost entirely to the Voice of America and British Broadcasting Company broadcasts. However, gained by the Soviet Union in this field is the experience such that jamming could become a serious obstruction to radio communications in general. of It is believed that the Soviets will be capable jamming communications traffic at frequencies at least as high as VHF. b. Jamming; of Radar. in the past. The Soviet Union has used " window" This and similar reflection devices will amost certainly be encountered in the future. electronic In addition, jamming will probably be encountered at all fre- quencies up to the 1,000- me range by mid 1951. However, it is believed that by mid 1951, the Soviets will not be capable of jamming BTO ("Bombing Thru Overcast") radar which operates at frequencies in excess of 3,000-mc. 80. Proximity Fuzes. It is considered that the Soviet Union may have limited quantities of proximity fuzes of questionable efficiency for use in antiaircraft and field artillery. TOP SECRET ALAI 11 -2 5- (Page revised by Decision on - 8 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET o 81. Submarine Characteristics. It is improbable that the Walther or other closed- cycle propulsion processes will be developed beyond the trial stage by mid 1951. It is not probable that the Soviets will have operational submarines with deeperdiving characteristics than the German Type XXI by that date. 82. Influence Mines. It is estimated that from 1950 onwards the Soviet Union will possess pressure and pressure/acoustic/ magnetic combination mines for operational use. SOVIET STRATEGY 83. In a major war commencing in 1951 the immediate objectives of the Soviet Union would be to destroy the alliance of the West, to subject Europe and the Near and Middle East to Soviet domination and to disrupt the war effort and Canada. of the United States A corollary objective would be to integrate the economic and industrial resources of the Eurasian land mass, to place the Soviet Union in an impregnable position from which North America could be weakened by communist infiltration, economic warfare and continued military action. 84. It follows from the factors that offensive operations designed to defeat the major Allied Powers must be coupled with strategic defense of the Soviet Union's homeland. The principal military means of achieving these two things will be by sea and air offensives against the United Kingdom and the United States and the occupation or neutralization of vital base areas by Soviet forces. 85. The Soviets would realize that the Western Powers would not permit areas to be overrun singly but, regarding the conflict as world-wide, would attack the Soviet Union from wherever possible. The Soviet leaders therefore would probably decide to launch full-- scale offensives in a number of areas simultaneously. TOP SECRET ACAI 11 - 26- (Page revised by Decision on - 8 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 86. Soviet General Plan of Operations. The Soviet plan of operations will include: a. Attacks against Canada, the United States and Alaska. The Soviet Union would undertake attacks against the North American Continent with the objectives of disrupting the war effort of Canada and the United States, and causing the retention of more of their military forces than are necessary for continental defense particularly during the initial stages of mobilization. b. A campaign against Western Europe. c. An aerial bombardment against the British Isles. d. A Balkan campaign. e. Campaigns against the Near and Middle East. f. Campaigns with limited objectives in the Far East. g. Attacks on Allied Sea Communications. In view of the dependence of the Allies on sea communications, the Soviet Union would attack Allied shipping and ports throughout the world wherever possible. h. Sabotage and Subversion. Communists and their sympathizers constitute a great potential for sabotage and subversive activity throughout the world. The Soviets thoroughly appreciate the magnitude of this threat to Allied interests and will fully exploit it. i. A campaign against Italy, subsequent to gaining control of Northern Yugoslavia. _j_. A campaign against Norway, k. Subsequently, and if necessary, Sweden. a campaign to overrun the Iberian Peninsula and secure the Straits of Gibraltar. 1. Air attacks against Allied bases. It is considered that the Soviet Union would have sufficient armed forces to undertake all the operations listed above and still have adequate reserves. TOP SECRET ACAI 11 - 27- (Page revised by Decision on - 8 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET T0P SECRET 87. Chinese forces probably will conduct operations against neighboring countries control in Southeast Asia and take measures to gain of Hong Kong and Macao. SOVIET CAMPAIGNS 33. This estimate does not take into consideration opposition by any Allied Forces. Canada and the United States 89. With the limited stock pile of atomic bombs available to the Soviet Union by mid- 191, exploitation of of the bomb. the they may attempt, threat of retaliation, On the other hand by psychological to forestall U. the Soviets may decide relatively small number of atomic to produce a mass such a decision, it is shock effect. means the In addition, by which If the atomic attack is a surprise attack, the United the principal military in to employ its atomic bombs an air offensive would be launched against North America prior to or simultaneously with Operated from potential bases Chulcotski Peninsula, and from bases important target other campaigns. in the Murmansk area, they in either country on one-way of bombs. Velkal could be carried out against bounded by a general line passing Two-way attacks from that segment of North America through Seattle, These capabilities would be the Dossible emDlcvment the in such as Anadyr and Velkal on the missions carrying 10,000 pounds Churchill. of the United States and Canadian war effort. Soviet Union decides could reach any in In the event the Soviet Union can achieve maximum results reduction of 90. that a that a limited atomic and a heavy conventional bombing attack will be made against Kingdom. use bombs could be utilized best surprise attacks estimated S. Calgary and increased materially by of aerial ref uelina. One refueling over �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET attack against any target within an area passing Denver and Fort William. missions in the Murmansk area, through James Bay, Gaspe and Cape Breton Island. The frequency and scale United States will be limitations of of air attacks influenced on Canada and to a great extent by the TU- 4 , by logistical and climatic by requirements for operations against Soviets do not have the means war effort. factors, selected the United Kingdom. on one-way missions. to a limited extent. of large scale, to our employing On the other hand, to expend aircraft and crews the Soviets to deliver Air refueling could probably be The trained crews and necessary bases delivery The although limited attacks against targets are a possibility. bombs employed on any Luil,hely, would probably be willing and of delivering a conventional air One-way missions, conventional weapons are the the range attack in sufficient strength to be an effective deterrent atomic two-way using a single air refueling could cover an area bounded by a line 91. From bases through Los Angles, Soviets will have of their entire stock pile operation, o£ atomic the aircraft, to attempt the bombs. 92. The sea offensive against the United States and Canada may be expected a to include: The mining of ports and approaches submarine before and b. on D-day and by submarine after D-day. Submarine and raider attacks expected that the long-range station before D-day and Small amphibious submarines on ports limited scale which may is to be on Pacific Oceans. operations teams from in the form of special operations on a 50 to land sabotage men per boat. include attacks by submarine- launched guided missiles with conventional warheads, TOP SECRET ACAI 11 It that possibly some raiders will be up to a maximum of d. Attacks on shipping. Soviet submarine will be on station in both the Atlantic and c; by merchant ship and atomic bombs -29(Page Revised by Docisiorn On - 3 August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET introduced by merchant submarine attacks Although the attacks the before and midget Soviet Union is given the capability of submarine on shipping along the North American coast and it on a limited scale is considered 19F1. in Soviet Union will expect the early stages in that However, the United disproportionate countermeasures, war effort or on D-day, on shipping. of ports and approaches, will be ships these it is the mining, operations believed States and Canada that to ta4;e thereby diverting considerable of hostilities to Continental defense. 93. Sabotage and subversion, utilizing native communists acting according to a well- developed plan, threat against both Canada and constitute a great potential the United States. resultLng in strikes and governmental delays could disrupt the national economies. successful at Subversion temporarily Sabotage may be expected least until full security measures can be to be Lmplemented. Alaska 94. The objectives of Soviet the neutralization of base areas operations against Alaska would be from which the Soviet Union could be attacked, the diversion of excessive Allied military resources to and the area, the disruption of Allied sea lines of communications. 95. In view of a combat force conditions the logistic difficulties in Northeastern Siberia, that exist, it plus is considered the effectiveness longest range the TU-4. the United States would cause heavier attacks with the 'Objective United the of all but the Er,tens Lve use of these Soviet Union to launch of neutralizing such bases. States counter air operations even heavier air attacks ranges of Soviet aircraft. out of range bases by the adverse weather Furthermore, Anchorage and Fairbanks will be light bombers and in maintaining that any air campaign against Alaska would be minor in scope. involved would limit involved from Alaska would result on that area by the in Soviet Union. 95. It is estimated that resources available to the Soviets in the Far East will pormLt a maximum sealif t of 4,000 only under optimum conditions. troops and then A consideration of limitations TOP SECRET _ ACAI 11 ( Page Rev ise d by Decision On - August 1950) TOP SECRET �TOP SECRET TOP SECRET imposed by climatic conditions, shortages of suitable landing craft, logistic and air support indicate that small scale amphibious raids would probably be conducted but would be confined to the Aleutian Islands and the coast of Alaska north from Bristol Bay. Climatic conditions will limit amphibious operations in this area to the period July to November. Raids against Alaska would probably have as their immediate tactical objectives the destruction of costal weather stations and port facilities. It is impossible to forecast the exact number of raids and the strength of each one, but it is considered that they will range from 150 to 500 assault troops and that a series of raids will be attempted. One at least may be con- ducted in conjunction with an airborne drop. 97. The Soviets might employ airborne operations to seize lightlyheld airfields, to destroy military installations and to otherwise create a situation requiring considerable countereffort to destroy or dislodge the invaders. Existing base facilities in the Chukotski Peninsula would place some limitation on the employment of transport aircraft in conjunction with.the other tactical aircraft, bombers and fighters, which would also be using the airfields. of gliders in this area is considered impracticable. tions The use Range limita of present Soviet transports would prevent two-way airborne operations against the most important areas Anchorage. of Fairbanks and Considering the estimated Soviet strategy in the Far East as a whole, as well as the various limiting factors in regard to operations out of Chukotske Peninsula, Soviet airborne attacks would probably be very small in size and directed as a harassing and propaganda measure against lightly-held targets in Western Alaska. 98 . Communist activity in Alaska is negligible. However, through the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union TOP SECRET ACAI 11 U. S. " VERMM[NT PRINTING OPPICC assail - •l TOP SECRET �r .. • Gs. } TOP SECRET I' (ILWU) and the American Con iunications Association ( ACA), cormaunist 0 CorlinLtee,.unions of the CIO, the communists cc.n effectively interfere with the oconorly Lnd defense of Alcskc• by strikes, or 1cbor disturbances. El,,.E I- • NTING OFFICE ! Goals D - 32 slowc1owns, � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIA00008 Title A name given to the resource ACAI 11, “Forms and Scales of Soviet Attack against North America, 1 July 1951" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 16-May-50 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived DND DHH 112.009 (D18) Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource DND Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Intelligence Assessment Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource EN