https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/8031b97b4e87110d579d312bc8a97468.pdf 13758358b896adae3ce3b5e55f6550dc PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project DND DHH 2002/17 Box 76 File 6 JIC Assessment Probable Soviet Courses of Action Against Canada, the United States, and the Areas Adjacent Thereto, 1 Jan 1957 ACAI 5/2 49-06-24 �COPY NO. as*-- TOF,US•F • • • y •- •` A. C.A.I oA 5/2 24 June 1949 DECLASSIFIED 1 ce C AUTHO h TY: D H D 3 - 12i•A A, A American-Canaaian Agreed Intelligence PAf WI? I!r QED 4.C.A.I. 5/2 13Cot) �f L A.C.A.I. 5/2 24 June 1949 COPY N0.° ,AN AGREED CANADA-UNITED STATES ESTIV TE ENTITLED PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF .ACTION .AGAINST C.::N ^DA B ^tHE UNITED STATES, AND THE AREAS ADJ-10EN1' THERETO, 1 JAN 1957 Pre- area by The U.S. Joint Intelligence Group and The C,.n^dian Joint Intelligence Staff cT Qpi i D .A.C• A.1. 5/2 �A.C.A.I. 5/2 24 June, 1949 TaP SE•REZ PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE AREAS ADJACENT THERETO, 1 JAN 195"7 THE ? ROF?LFZ1 1. the To prepare, as a bas 4_s for the current revision of Canada- United States ecu_Ity Flan, «_ ic Canadian- United States est.f.•:,ate action against Canada, the United States, thereto, of probable an agreed Soviet courses of and areas adjacent in a war commencing 1 Jan 1957. INTRODUCTION 2. This estimate is based on intelligence as 1949 unless i 3. of 1 May otherwise stated. The effects Western Powers to on Soviet strategy of the efforts of the counter- balance Soviet capabilities have not been taken into consideration. 4. The areas adjacent to Canada and the United States are defined as including Greenland, Alaska, Islands, the Aleutian , the Atlantic and Pacific high seas, but excluding the Panama Canal. 5. Production estimates studies made by individual possible that the aggregate of war materials are based on intelligence agencies. of these estimates It is exceeds the total economic and technological capacity of Soviet industry, when the demands of the civilian economy are Q account, •L n rr i r r.RFTLQ A.C.A.I,s 5/2 1 taken into �TOP SECRET ASSUMPTIONS 6. It is assumed for the purpose of this (a) estimate the Soviet Union and satellites are the bination of powers that: only com- that constitute a threat to the security of Canada and the United States; (b) there will be no significant modification of the form of government, aims (c) economic system or ultimate of the Soviet Union; there will be no expansion of Soviet- controlled territory prior to the commencement of hostilities that will materially affect Soviet capabilities against Canada and the United States; (d) Soviet aggression will be planned in advance and Soviet mobilization, to the extent required by initial plans, will be practically completed before D-Day. BASIC 7. CONCEPT OF SOVIET STRATEGY It is believed that the most important military factors in the world situation which would determine Soviet strategy in the event of war in 1957 are as follows: (a) allied superiority in atomic weapons; (b) allied superiority in strategic air capabilities; (c) allied superiority at sea; (d) initial Soviet superiority in ground and air forces as (e ) compared with opposing Allied Forces in Eurasia. Soviet inability to bring the main effort of its armed forces to bear against the principal Allied base - Canada and the United States. TOP SECRET A.C.A . I. 5/2 - 2 - �TOP SECRET 8. It is considered that Soviet strategy, by the above factors, would as influenced conform to the following general pattern: (a) Initially, the neutralize important areas Kingdom, Allies object would be or the United and certain key islands from which the atomic bombing, invasion. conventional Any direct action, subversive, Soviet territory by strategic bombing and either military or against Canada and the United States would be designed to cause retention of large forces countries and to hamper counteroffensive operations and reduce (b) in Eurasia, could strike at vital in those to quickly_ seize Subsequently, solidate its offensive capabilities. the Soviet Union would seek to congains in Eurasia into an impregnable defensive position. (c ) Ultimately,, the object would be the defeat of Canada and the United States, possible to foresee Soviet Union might ever, the although it is exact means by which the seek to achieve this aim. How- in the event of Soviet inability to attain a military victory, the possibility of a Soviet attempt to negotiate peace,on its have im- own terms would to be borne in mind. CO CLJS IONS O Widespread strikes will be attempted immediately before hostilities and intensified during its against key war industries, :' •.P SECRET A.0 . x. 1. 5/2 communications - 3- initial phases and transportation �TOP IFIECP-:T facilities. Physical sabotage against vulnerable points industrial installations will be prior to and after the 10. carried out immediately co=cncenent- Attempts will be made of hostilii:ies. to neutralize Alaskan and Aleutian bases by corrrand> airborne Air attacks seize type raids and limited against Is,_portant urban and industrial in Canada and the Unit--_ c States will be :Wade, employing atomic as well as conventional bombs, and chemical weapons. to or attacks 11. areas and cause and possibly biological The objectives serious material damage of such attacks will be to Canadian and U.S. potential and to compel a disproportionate military forces for defensive purposes. bomber and fighter attacks will be installations 12. sea lines important to ports of allocation of Sustained light carried out against military in Alaska and the Aleutians. The most approaches war naval threat. lh:ill be and naval bases, and the the mining of interdiction of communication, F A C T 0 R S POLITICAL Soviet Policy of Expansion 13, The Soviet leaders may be policy of devel•)pino in the socialism which they believe history, the Soviet orbit a system of Soviet is bound, to expand into a world-wide C*n_rnunism. TOP expected to continue SECRET 4 in the system of course Soviet of �TOP SECRET 14. The by 1957 success which the Soviet Union may have in promoting this policy will depend largely on other than military factors. to be intensified. places achieved Psychological warfare may be expected It will exploit at appropriate times and the popular demand for peace and economic security in order to gain the maximum sympathy abroad for the Soviet Union. Soviet tactics are in fact encouraging hostility towards Vilest in the Soviet sphere s and promoting conditions and political chaos 15. in countries In its progress the Soviet Union may be economy of force. as outside Soviet towards the goal of economic influence. of world Communism expected to employ the principle War is the of probably regarded by Soviet leaders the most expensive and least desirable method of achieving their aim but they will continue alternative as a last- resort. to be willing to accept this By 1957, the intense Soviet concentration on maintaining and increasing its military power may, depending on the of the world, make state of defence preparations the alternative of war less hazardous from the point of view of Soviet 16. The leaders. Soviet Union will continue to assess economic and trade policies from the point of view - of effect. At present there are indications Soviet Union will continue to oppose like permit its their political that although the economic aid in anything the form of a European Recovery Programme, and perhaps its anxious increase it is willing to expand trade with the West, satellites control over in the rest them. and to to do so provided this does not jeopardize An expansion of trade i%o uld serve to the industrialization and consequently the military TOP SECRET A.0 . A.I. 5/2 - 5 �TOP cEC,p T potential of the Soviet bloc and would at likely to improve the standards political stability of the same time be of living and therefore the the peoples within the Soviet orbit, In the Soviet Union itself, the standard of living is and probably in its likely to be satellites, somei.,rhat higher in 1957 than at present, Morale in the Soviet Union. 17. The morale of the Soviet people would not become a decisive consideration to the Soviet Union in the event of war until such time as a drastic deterioration of the Soviet military position took place. of the INhile certain elements Soviet population, particularly ethnic groups states, Ukraine, in the Baltic the Caucasus and Central Asia, are dissatisfied with Soviet rule and hostile to domination by the Russians, the Soviet Government, police network, would be able effective through its to keep control in the early stages protracted the war, the more subversive influences, to manifest the these groups under of the ware already present The more in the Soviet Union, themselves and take a more active part in inter- Effective resistance or could be expected to occur only when the Western Allies are able assure efficient security chance there would be for these fering with the Soviet war effort s uprisings Great to give material support and leadership, and dissident elements early liberation from the Soviet yoke. 18. The people of the Soviet Union are psychological warfare. Soviet Union, in this susceptible to The most significant weakness regard, is TOP _S7CRET 6 of the its policy of keeping its �TOP SECRET people in complete side and outside %lloral.e ignorance the of the true conditions both in- Soviet Union. in. the Satellite States. L9, A majority of the native populations satellite countries a. e intensely nationalistic, resent Soviet donination and the present with which they are burdened,, in the and communist regimes The problem of satellite nationalism rebelling against Soviet, imperialism as by Tito ls Yugoslavia, will probably ' continue "ovie t Union for dominant several years, attitude among the satellite exemplified to beset the In the Event of war, nonconnunist population of states initially would be one the the of increased non- cooperation and passive resistance toward their communist ;_Wasters. This might. result ;.ultural, industrial and military contribution of the satellites to the in some reduction of the agri- LQ-_v . et war effort. More effective resistance. 'r nwever, in the fu:nm of organized sabotage and activity, would be they were assured of guidance and support from the 'Vest. unlikely to develop significantly until view of the probable peoples of the susceptible to guerrilla continuance of these conditions, In the satellite area.in 1957 would still prove readily psychological appeals, if means were found to reach them. Soviet Political Strengths and lWeaknesses in War. 20. in An examination of the Soviet Union, capabilities in the 41 fol lowing the domestic political insofar as it would affect military event of hostilities, shows that the strengths would constitute an advantage '-"0? SECRET K• C.A.I.5/2 7 situation to the �TOP SECRET Soviet Union during the early part of a war: (a) The proven ability of the highly organized and integrated Soviet state under circumstances (b) The ideological system to carry on a war of extreme disorganization. appeal of theoretical communism. ruthless' - machinery of state security by means of which the Kremlin ensures compliance with its directives. (d) T'_ze .native courage, stamina, and patriotism of th ; Scj?iet population, and the ability of the regime ; by propaganda, to mobilize this patriotism behind a Soviet war effort. 21t. The following weaknesses, 1at-ed to certain of paragraph, tu'za some of strengths mentioned in the previous eppear '. o 'D• ._. gnificant, t:L_".y would produce them closely re- but it is unlikely that serious ; or_sequences until it became that the Soviet Union was faced with inevitable clear defeat: (a) The discouragement of popular initiative by extreme concentration of power in the Communist Politburo of the Partty. (b) Disillusionment among certain elements of the population regarding the'results Soviet of communism in practice. (c) The fear pervading all elements satellite society, which tends thinking and paralyze certain ethnic and religious especially in the satellite Soviet and communist rule. SECRET 1 ..,C].A.I. 5/2 to lessen independent initiative. . (d) Traditional hostility of groups, of Soviet and 8 countries, to �TOP SECRET (e) Hostility of the countries which might be by Soviet armies could be toward the imposed on them, overrun communist regimes which and toward the Soviet Union and the Soviet occupation forces. (r '. , , -moralization of Soviet Armed Forces which would from military and occupation duties outside their own country. (g) Att ,.zction of ;Western civil liberties and high standards of living for many persons in orbit. 2?" 0_-t '.; al •Lce, believed that in the event of war the Soviet Government's in 1957, it is control over the peoples its orbit prccba'G•.y would remain at least as effective a• it is at present-, until 'it- became clear that the Soviet 7:.).` on was faced with inevitable defeat. E 1̀_) CMIC' Basic Resources and Industrial Development. ?3. The Soviet Union has a wealth of raw raterials.. including the largest known irol'a ore reserves world and coal reserves Sta es. second in the Dnly to those of the United In 1947 it has proven petroleum reserves , of eight bi'y.1ion barrels. it is self-sufficient in food and most text,:ile raw materials. On the debit side, Soviet Union and satellites are deficient in•tin, copper, lead and to a lesser degree, tin a_zd tungsten, TnP SECRET ,; , 4.I. 5/2 China, cobalt. tungsten, In the case if properly exploited, g the could �TOP SECRET supply the needs of copper and lead, Yugoslavia could largely make up the deficiency, the Soviet Union. In the case of assuming either Soviet control over Yugoslavia or sDtisfactory trade relations between the two countries, ..F j.ther of l—ach nolu exists. Following on the present d^.velupment of the basic heavy industries, expected that the end of the some it is next Five Year Plan ending _r_ 1955 will see expansion of the .,ndustries. There will be a consequent increase rapacity for armament manufacture Soviet manufacturing in the if the Soviet Union cn d satellites are permitted to import necessary machinery and equipment. will continue The capacity of the transport system to retard i_aeLstrial development. spite of the advances made in all fields development, Soviet industrial In of industrial efficiency, technical ability and productivity in 1957 will still be considerably lower than that of the Western Powers. 24. All the satellite countries have ambitious economic plans. - However . , it is likely that by 1957 only Poland and Czechoslovakia will have developed sufficiently for their economic assist=ance war conditions to the Soviet Union under to be a significant factor. TOP SECRET A,C.S.I. 5/2 - 10 - �TOP SECRET Industrial Mianpotaer. 25• It is estimated that by 1957, will have risen to 220,000,000, 90, 000, 000. The the including a•labour force labour force will include agric, aitural workers total population of 49, 000, 000 and a non-agricultural force of ?:_.. coo, 000. 2G, , rr.11 The present drive nave begun to worrr_rs show results and is likely to be extensive to improve the technical education shortage of skilled less acute with the result that an call-up of industrial ,irorkers in 1957 would have less effect on industrial productivity than would be the case in 1949. The supply of unskilled workers will remain sufficient. Dependence 27. on Foreign Sources for Key Cormodities. It is considered that by 1957 the Soviet Union will not be critically deficient in any of the more important strategic materials. In cases, industrial diamonds, where its productive capacity will fall short of war requirements, such as n.atural rubber and it will have made every effort to build up stockpiles but success in doing so will be to some extent dependent on the willingness of countries outside TOF SECRET 11.C.k.I. 5/2 - 11- the �TOP SECRET Soviet orbit The to meet its requirements satellites will continue from Sweden, in the interim period. to require high-grade and if this were denied to them, LUr l.on would have iron ore the Soviet considerable difficulty in making good "p -i s deficiency. 7•,ansport. ^.8. Railroads. It is considered that the railway mileage will have been considerably increased'by ' 1957 and that ^ystem will be :seeds. somewhat more flexible Although the Soviets system it will still be the and adaptable to war could develop a strong railroad insufficient to meet all the needs greatly increased traffic and there will continue shortage the of locomotives and freight cars. of to be a Operating effic- iency will remain low by Western standards. 29. Motor Transport. at present, Development of long distance routes concentrated on five main roads radiating from IMoscow and on two lateral routes. 1957 all is, these routes are Progress is slow but by likely to have approached j , -estern European standards and long distance haulage will afford some relief to rail transport in the western part of the Sov iet Union. (;Ivil Air GL =i::r Transport. means of internal reliance In spite of the transport on civil air transport is TOP SECRET A. C.A.I. 5/2 -12- improvement in it is considered the present likely to continue. �TOP SECRET 31. Inland Waterways. Rehabilitation will have been completed toget'aPr ti,;ith the reconstruction and enlargement cq.nals and Gan,, : .I., the completion of new projects T e.3e factors, of some such as the Volga- Don together with the mass production of and concrete barges and cf cargo candling facilities, the increasing mechanization will allow the inland waterways t-; carry an increased percentage of the total traffic and afFord some further relief to the railways. 0• Coastal Shipping. ping in certain areas The degree of reliance on coastal ship- is likely to persist and an overall increase in coastal tonnage is foreseen in_the,existing Five Year Plan, Estimated Production of Selected Military 33. No figures *are available for Items. combined Soviet and satellite production of military items in 1957, but present production is believed to be as follows:(a) Aircraft. It is estimated that in 1948 the Soviets produced about 12,000 aircraft with a structural weight of 66 million pounds. Factory capacity to build aircraft is probably about four times present production, so that a substantial increase put is possible. the However, % 5/2 in 1949 much more when retooling for new types account. TOP SE^RET it is not likely that Soviet Union will produce °n 1948, -13- in out- is than taken into �TOP SECRET (b) Motor Vehicles. Soviet planned production for 1950 includes 42£3,000 trucks, 0.400 buses. production States 'c) 65,600 passenger cars and The proportion of trucks to total is very much higher than in the United or the United Kingdom. Armoured Combat Vehicles. 1949 production is esti- mated at 6,210 tanks and SP guns. production of about 500 This rate tanks and SP guns, of while only one- fifth of the war- time peak of 2,700, is nevertheless nearly sufficient to re- equip two tank divisions each month, create adequate reserves carry out modernization and of the armoured forces by 1957. (d) Merchant Shipping. 100,000 gross Soviet Economic 34. The Production is expected to be tons during 1949. Strengths and Weaknesses. Soviet Union and satellite interior lines of communications and countries possess the ability to move economic and military traffic without resort Although great efforts will be made ca}ic:rh_; C•r.ci in particular change :..". fficulties, continue the to improve to overcome Soviet railway The industrial of the Soviet Union will have advanced •r le de?ree beyond 1; ;,.:,ue the 1949 level. -14- to a cons idw This will be particu- in the manufacturing industries, IC.= SECRET .I. 512 communi- inadequate and one of the major '0s-oblems of the Soviet Union. cauac:L7.y these some of the gauge capacity of the to be to sea routes. thus enhancing �TOP SECRET Soviet potential for production of Ipjge quva.ntities of armanezits. i"ost of the strategic deficiencies prevalent in 1949, in transportation, where will have been overcome. except In many instances, productive capacity still lags behind war requirements, stock- piles will have been accumulated. 35. Assuming that economic plans of the Soviet Union have been successfully implemented, the economy of the Soviet Union it is- considered that is adequate to_support-her in a major war for a prolonged period. SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSION General 36. No evidence -is available future sabotage and subversive activities United States, are anticipated. sabotage and Most in the sabotage to achieve its subversive apparatus and in devising objectives. As a result, In Soviet the field Soviet capability will be affected by the develchemical or biological agents or atomic bomb. TOP SECRET A.C.A.I. 5/2 the Soviet Union has shown great versatility in opment of such weapons as the surveys in these countries at present. capabilities in this field have been enhanced. of objectives in these fields of this section therefore perfecting its world-wide new tactics Soviet Union, subversive picture The in Canada and the but in 1957 no marked changes and fundamental policy of the 37. regarding the details of -15- �TOP SECRET 38. The warfare The Soviet Union is now engaged in psychological implemented through political and Soviet Union is engaged within Canada and economic actions. in espionage and the United States. sabotage which currently takes subversion It is also encouraging the form of strikes and showdowns in Canadian and United States industry. Communism in the United States. 39. The Communist Party, USA. The primary mission of the Communist Party is to carry out a program of subversion and propaganda leading to the production of a crisis --conomy of the United States and political institutions. to the In addition, in the overthrow of U.S. the Party serves as a proving ground from which some espionage agents for the various Soviet networks are strength is recruited. The actual party currently estimated to be 59,000 members. If peace continues and there is no severe economic depression within the United States, it is believed that the strength of the party will not increase materially beyond its present strength by 1957. 40. Infiltration and Penetration of the Armed Forces. At present there is no apparent communist influence within the Armed Forces which seriously threatens conduct of the affairs nor is it believed of the the National - i'Jilitary Establishment, that by- 1957 any significant infiltration will have been effected. TOP SECRET A.C.A.I. 5/2 or influences -16- �41. Infiltr. ation and Penetration c munists presents at Gove rnm:•nt. th_e }iG.7a strength nor the ne: -e TOD' SECRi' T The Com- s'3r 7r 8 ' ec•tGral c f ar po'•n •. va pc site _ ons within the Government, -. o p•'1 .'• _ :_n mental policy. _Sor<: ,•eY _ _ e : F, .. •_ e•°iz.11y govern- ;n s„m`, nra._:.b.es G" ; he C-o -•err_men' have been infiltrated by Comr anis,c Party agents and sympathizers. It is likely that sorne to keep the U.S. of thew individuals are Soviet Union informed, activities, to 4 limited degree, 42. USA, of labour and 43. in the fields Their occupying of mining and lumbering, manufacturing and proces- trade and professional. Major events of recent months have decrease communist influence aithin the present, organizations. have been concentrated on those unions transportation and communications, sing, The has maintained as a primary objective infiltration and control strategic positions tended to labour field. At the Communists are not strong enough to create a general strike. They are capable, curtailing production and and labour 44. to exert some Infiltration and Penetration of Economic Life. efforts or and on policy framers. Communist Party, the of particularly with regard to policy decisions and matters relating to foreign affairs, influence in positions disturbances influence i.;ithin the however, of materially transportation by creating strikes through the unions which they control strategic industries described above. It is believed that communist influence will not materially i - ncrease TOP SECRET a.C.A.I. 5/2 in the labour field by 1957 unless -17- the �TOT- SECRET country experiences a severe economic depression. circumstances should arise, conditions favourable throughout U.S. If such it would undoubtedly provide to a regrowth of communist strength economic life particularly within the labour field. 45. Subversion. Communist Party, One of the principal functions USA, aims and objectives has been to promote the of the Soviet Union. of the subversive There is a broad communist movement in the United States in the form of front organizations. These organizations are media for dissemina- tion of propaganda, political manoeuvres, cover for espionage and other illegal activities. 46. Sabotage. Sabotage effective weapons in the can be • and possibly as a is one of the most important and communist arsenal. The expected to use both physical sabotage, destruction by explosives, sabotage, and what may be as exemplified in the decrease ity through strikes and members, sympathizers, adherents, slowdowns. Soviet Union such as called psychological of productive capac- Many Communist Party and agents are now in strate- gic positions within industry and labour organizations accomplish this mission. At present there is no evidence any active foreign- directed physical sabotage the 47. to of situation in United States. The highly integrated but decentralized industries of the United States are acutely vulnerable left unprotected. In many instances the to sabotage stoppage of produc- Lion of one plant will result in the shutdown of dozens other factories. TOP SECRET A.C.A.I. 5/2 This enhances -18- if of the possible effectiveness of �acts of sabn -, a' -'e, 1. Union •• - _ Would-• Actually, t'j., 5 ,• 7'. ` ar,oil nt of downs. ;' the Sov:-ct 7 o.. :• t...„er J,iiich t•al_es rest:'_ _ n; in CnS the perforriIrg a certain fci•m of strikes and slow- of the United States industrial efficiency, 49. The Scv ie ., ;?n:, on can e.t.p•-,y chemical and biological agents as ar, e ; onor,ic vrc a.po.1in :--Iandest_ne United States ix. dest • c••i:•.g h_1,1 ,) r _,_ ife, ^ cod, animals and pr,D perry in Union Will be operations capable increased scale. iao:.a ,, e:• cases. in the crops ; domestic By 1=57 the Soviet cf el.lp2.o -,ring such a Weapon on a greatly Its use would be contingent principally upon consideration of possible reta1.1a 50. Py 1957 there will be ment of cargo vessels, as atonic bomb carriers. atomic bombs a possi'aility of Soviet employ- could be ports a!_ong both coasts, It is conceivable clandestinely introduced into the United States prior to the general att::Lck, ated assembled, in accordance with a preconceived. plan. of u-sing the from a single atonic that unassem`oled and then deton- These methods bomb might assure maxir;.um effectiveness explosion. Cor.,nn'u -' sm in Canada. 51. Th- Cor.-,mur.ist Party of Canada { The Par's :,r•) The most recent suf.`'-'red a severe set.)ack survey shows Labour Progressive that the tart-, has and the mne, , mbe rship has dwindled to a pro:,•-. - ately 15,000 from an all-time high of 23,000 in the TO-P SECRET 1 > %,r , 1. 5/2 -- 19 •-• �TOP SECRET latter part of 1946. largely to the The drop in the membership was due reduction in the popularity of the Soviet Union and to a lessening of enthusiasm regarding communism in general. Notwithstanding this falling off in membership, Party still constitutes a formidablo social life of the 52. factor in the economic and country. Infiltration and Penetration of ' the :armed Forces. present there threatens or the At is no apparent communist influence which seriously influences Armed Forces nor is the conduct of the affairs of the it believed that by 195'7 any significant infiltration will have been effected. 53. Infiltration and Penetration of Government. been some penetration. are The communists in the forbidden to acl, =wledge publicly. There has civil service their association with the This presents a real and difficult problem. is no communist representation The Party has, two in however, Ontario and one Party There in the Parliament of Canada. members in the provincial legislature, in 1,4Ianitoba, and on various municipal councils. 54. Infiltration and Penetration of Economic Life. ity with general Party strategy, In conform- penetration and control of labour organizations in Canada has always been one principal tasks of Canadian co.,.unists. of the Within the past year a vigorous campaign has been waged by the moderates unions against, the communist influence. important unions In a number of communists have been dislodged from their executive positions and it may be definitely on in labour the defensive. TOP SECRET A.C.A.I. 5/2 - 20 - stated that the Party is �TOP SECR= 55. Communist Party growth in the labour field is now static. Its future expansion depends economic conditions. to a large degree on A severe depression during the next few years would allow its further development and increase its capability for control of industry. 56. Subversion. Canadian communists have as major and constant tasks the one of their subversion of Canadian citizens - both as individuals and groups - and concurrently the promotion of Soviet propaganda local issues, and which are they camouflage tions, schemes. distorted their colours. 57. Sabotage. There in their is no Soviet directed physical sabotage Should to open such a campaign, significant that in past years the it later suit the this weapon may be expected to be used to the fullest extent. efforts of of front organiza- recognized by the public campaign under way in Canada now. Soviet purpose full use to suit their own purposes, work by a facade which usually are not true They make It is perhaps Party has pressed its to penetrate vital labour fields, involving inland waterways and mine, such as rill and There would be an especial threat to sabotage those smelter workers. in the industries where labour is dominated by communist influence. 56. The probable effectiveness of Soviet depend largely on the fields the threatened. sabotage will efficiency of security measures The most critical period would be opening of the sabotage campaign until the security arrangements are TOP SECRET A.C.A.I. 5/2 in full force. - 21 - in the from time when Little warning can �TOP SECRET be expected, and sabotage would probably be timed with military efforts. 59. The agents in sabotage and 1957. type Soviet Union can employ them- cal and biological The operations on a growing scale between now threat of relatiation may prevent or delay this of attack. The atomic bo:.1b may be used as an internal sabotage weapon subject to the limi Cation of availability. Communism in Alaska. 60. that, Communist activity is negligible. by 1957, bilities It is believed there will be no material change in the capa- of the Soviet Union to affect the Alaskan population by subversion. Soviet capabilities to affect be _ proportionall TT greater as the area is - ly and militarily. sabotage will developed industrial- The International Longshorenen's and liare- housemen's Union ( ILMJ) and the American Comrl.unicati ons Assoc- iation ( ACA), Communist dominated unions of the CIO, not only control shipping in Alaska points, , .but also an the entire American Pacific coast. Through these two unions the Com- munist can effectively interfere with the economy and defense of Alaska by strikes, ances in either Alaska TOP SECRET A.C.A.I. 5/2 slowdowns, or labour disturb- or any continental port. - 22 - �TOP SECRET NILITpM 61. The Satellite Armed Forces are not discussed in detail in this estimate, as it is considered that they do not materially affect Soviet capabilities against Canada and the United States. Soviet Ground Forces 62. It is estimated that the present the Soviet .army is 2,500,000 A strength of organized into 175 line divisions of which 105 are rifle, 35 mechanized, 20 tank ;•.nd 15 cavalry. These totals are not expected to alter L•:i.,astantially by 1957 . It is . expected that the Army's -_:sent reorgrnniza.tion and re- equipment programme of a large -oroportion of its divisions up - to Western st.snndards and motorizing most of the horse-drawn formations will be completed by that time. It will be clear from' the air and naval varagr•aphs below that the main strength of Soviet ground forces cannot be employed against Canada and the United States. Details of these forces have therefore been disregarded. 63. Soviet r%irborne Forces. There are no indications as to the ultimate size of the Soviet Zirborne Forces, but it is oossible that by 1957 they may comprise 200,000 men. .. large number of line troops will probably have been given airborne training by that time. The airborne forces will be reasonably well trained and adequate in number to meet operational requirements. A - Not including 400,000 security troops. TOP SECRET .C.A.T, 5/2 - 23 - �TOP SECRET Soviet Air Forces 64. The present aircraft establishment in operational units is estimated at 17,000, of which 15,200 are combat types, 700 are transports and 1,100 are miscellaneous. This force includes 15 Tactical Air Armies, Defence Force, Force.' a Long Range Air Force, a Fighter and a Naval Air It is estimated that personnel strength of the Soviet . Air Forces is approximately 600,000. air arms are 65 , .•_-_r. The military sup -Dlemented by a Civil Air Fleet. A. Military Lir Force. The strength of the Tactical Armies of the Military .Air Force is estimated to be =t-0,000 aircraft, designed, sunnort of ground armies. TU-2, for the most part, for close The basic light bomber, the has a combat radius of 500 miles.`" Attack aircraft have a combat radius of 150 to 200 miles. The longer range fighter aircraft have a combat radius of approximately 500 miles. 66 . Fighter Defence Force. Protection of the Soviet Union against air attack is the responsibility of Defence Force ( PVO) . the Air It includes antiaircraft units and early warning systems in addition to an estimated 2,100 intercentor'aircr,-;ft in the Fighter Defence Force. 67. Long Range .Air Force. The strength of the Long Range Air Force is estimated at 1,800 aircraft in operational & See Am Paragraph 68, Page 25. Nautical miles used throughout TOP SECRET A.`i.i.2. 5/2 24 — T this estimate. �TOP SECRET units, consisting of approximately 1,560 multi-engined bombers, including 120 of the B-29 type, and 240 major transports (C -47 type or larger).• The present radius of action of Soviet B- 29's is estimated to be 1,800 miles carrying' 10,000 pounds of bombs. The combat radius could be extended to 2,150 miles by removing all defensive armament except the tail turret, and the reduction of the crew by one member, addition of an extra 520 gallons of fuel. research and development, aircraft could have, as specially As a result of equipped B-29 type early as 1951-52, a combat radius of 2,400 miles and a combat range of 4,500 miles. There been some indications that the Soviets are experimenting with aerial refuelling operations. 68. Civil Air Fleet. already mentioned, In addition to the :fir Forces the Soviet Union h=)s a semi- military orga.ni z^tion - the Civil tYir Fleet - containing about 3,000 major transports. 69. It is believed that the estimated overall strength of the Soviet A l .ir Forces will be the same in 1957 as at present, could be changed. Bomber aircraft will probably be com- narable in type but Canadian and U.S. but the composition of its four elements somewhat inferior in performance to aircraft. The Soviets will probably be capable of producing a conventional long range bomber having a combat range of about 10,000 miles with a 10,000 pound bomb load. The Soviets should also be capable of A C-47 type or larger TOP SECRET A.C.A.Y. 5/2 - 25 - �F- TOP producing a medium jet bomber. SECRET The use of limited numbers of such new type aircraft along with gre^ter numbers of B-29 types will greatly increase the effectiveness of the Long Range .fir Force. The IL- 18 and TU-70 transports will have replaced many of the older types. The main equipment of the fighter regiments will probably be jet aircraft. 70. Airlift Cana.city. In the event of an emergency at the present time 1,500 major transports of the Civil Air Fleet could be made immediately available for C.ssignment to military duty. An additional 1,000 aircraft could be made available after a short time. s.ircra.ft, the minimum number believed to be necess=.ry for the operation of the most passenger, This would leave 500 important regularly mail and light c.rgo routes. scheduled The 2,500 aircraft -va.ilable from the Civil Air Fleet plus 200 aircraft from the Long Range Air Force, would provide a total of 2,700 major transports available for planned airborne operations. Assuming a 90 per cent initial serviceability, this force would be capacc- of -n airlift of 34,000 airborne troops with supporting weapons ( eight airborne brigades less light tanks) to a, range of 1,280 miles or a combat radius of 500 miles. The total of 1,500 transports immediately available for sustained military operations will probrbly not increase by 1957, but the use of IL- 18's and TU-70's will considerably improve the effectiveness and the combat radius of this force. 71. Efficiency. Although it a.ppe^.rs that the Soviet Union ha.s a shortage of trained technical and maintenance TOP SECRET A- C.. — 1- 5/2 -- 2.6 - �TOP personnel, there are SECRET firm indications that the Soviets are making strenuous efforts to correct these deficiencies. It is reasonable to suppose that by 1 957 the difference in efficiency between the Canndian and United States Air Forces and the Soviet sir Forces will be less than it was during World War II, as a result of the development of the Soviet aviation industry, assisted by German technicians. Soviet Naval Forces 72. The personnel (less naval Air Force) strength of the Soviet Naval Forces is estimc.ted at the present time to be -600,000 manning ships, establishments. ships, 1 monitor, destroyers. obsolete. marine forces and shore The surface fleet is com{oosed of 3 battle— 11 cruisers, 64 destroyers and 38 escort The majority of the heavier units are old and New construction will add 1 he-,ivy cruiser and 4 destroyer escorts by the end of does not possess any aircraft 1949. carriers, The Soviet Union nor is there any indication of new construction of this type Consequently, the Naval Air Force is all shore—based, consisting of approximately 3,100 aircraft to those o£ the Mi.lit,•ry Air Force. of ship. similar -in type It is incapable of taking part in long—range naval operations. 73. It is significant that the Soviet Naval Forces Include at least 281 submarines. Of these,,15 are high submerged— speed type with a maximum submerged speed of ?pproximately 17 knots for short periods of time and a maximum endurance of 15,000 miles. In addition there are an estimated 11 conventional ocean—patrol types with an TOP SECRET •.C.A•.I. 5/2 — 27 -. �T OP endurance SECRET of 15,000 miles and 48 ocean-patrol types with an endurance of approximately 10,000 miles. estimated to be 87 ocean- patrol There are submarines with endurance ranging from 4,000 to 9,000 miles, and 111 coastal defence types with endurance between 2,000 and 4,300 miles. There axe also 9 obsolete submarines of various types that could be used for limited missions. _ It is estimated that by the end of 1949 the submarine force will have increased by 8 high submerged- speed type submarines, type, and 18 coastal type. 12 ocean-patrol It is known that all Soviet submarines ? re capable of carrying torpedo tube mines, and about 45 of the longer- range type are carry conventional type mines. strength at present is: 5 coastal defence; equipped to Distribution of submarine Northern Fleet: Baltic Fleet: 33 ocean-petrol, 15 high submerged- speed, 51 ocean-patrol, 39 coastal defence; Black Sera Fleet: 12 ocean-patrol, 48 co^stal defence; and Pacific Fleet: 50 ocea,n-prtrol, 74. 28 coastal defence. The combined Soviet and satellite ( Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Roumania and Yugoslavia) merchant fleets are estimated to consist of approximately 608 ships of more than 1,000 gross tons, 2,198,400 gross tons. merchant fleet, totalling approximately It is doubtful whether the Finnish consisting of 171 ships totalling 429,000 gross tons, will be available to the Soviet Union. 75. By 1957 the overall strength of the Soviet Naval Force is expected to reach 865,000. The surface fleet, is estimated, will consist of about- 26 cruisers, TOP SECRET -.C..:i.I. 5/2 - 28 - 130 it �TOP SECRET destroyers and 140 escort destroyers, together with a large.number of all types of minor combat=ant and landing craft. It is unlikely that the Soviets will possess any modern battleships or aircraft carriers. There is no indication that the Soviet Naval .fir Force will be increased in size. 76. most The submarine fleet will -continue to .remain the effective arm and it is estimated -it will consist of 300 -350 ocean- patrol type submarines, are expected to be high submerged- speed.' •2 which will be overage. In addition, defence type may be in olDeration, 77. Training. on - operational This total includes 200 to •'300 coastal 51 of which will be overage. The Soviet Navy has placed special emphasis training in long-range submarines. German technicians at their dispos"a, progress of which half ste^diiy. With training should It may be expected that, by 1957, the fleet will have much better sea- going qualities than at present. 78. Morale and Efficiency. Morale in the Soviet Navy is high and is expected to remain so. will Operational efficiency steadily .increase as more modern units become available and the lessons of World War II are assimilated. Weapons Development 79-. The Soviet Urii,on is carrying out any extensive programme of research and development, not only on new weapons of unconventional types but also on conventional weapons. Few and improved tanks, TOP SECRET A- C- A— I. 5/2 ., 29 -- artillery and automatic �1 TOP SE:`R T weapons have been demonstrated. development of s•*:bmarines, ics, and guided missiles 80. Atomic Foi:rs, the continues in the conventional aircraft, Ii; is believed that not have atomic bombs ro,,r, (a) Progress It is electron- the Soviet Union does estimated that: earliest date by which the Soviets may have exploded their first test borrio is mid- 1950; (b) the probable date by which the exploded their first Soviets will have test bomb is mid- 1953; (c) based on a mid- 1950 test explosion the greatest possible number of bombs pile in the Soviet stock in mid- 1955 is about 50; (d) based on a raid- 1953 test explosion the probable number of bombs in the pile 81. now capable few BW agents. It is estimated that'the of producing limited amounts This production would be tensive subversive use but inadequate warfare on a significant scale. It is Union by 1957 of a adequate for ex- for methods of mass production of Bit agents the Soviet Soviet stock in mid- 1955 is about 20. Biological Warfare ( BIN). Soviets are greatest open biological considered that can be developed in sufficient for the support of open biological warfare. 82. Chemical Warfare ( C;N). The Soviet Union is believed to be presently capable of large employment of a number whether little this of chemical agents. capability applies question but TOP SECRET A.C.A.I. 5/2 scale production and that by 1957 to the r G series. stock piles -- 30 - It is doubtful of There chemical is �TOP SECRET agents including the G series could be created that would permit extensive *; hena-cal ,.: a­fa»e 83. Guided Misci, service as in itial. Soviet goal is soon as : 3 ive guided rissi 1_es, to get into selection of reasonably effect- n.,.or. it.y is g4 er. to surface-to- air and surf ace - LC-Sli'`••: .:1j- - •.1es, 'out at present it is impossible to dist ingul-sn betw•zn priorities assigned th ese two types. It is cons_-V`ered highly un-likely that any Soviet designed missile Will appear in service use before 1954. Thus, missiles apt to 1)6 encountered in quantity will be essentially variations of the German types discussed below; (a) Surface -to- Surface Missiles U) Large-scale production of V-1 ( exact copy of German model) no could be attained any time with serious effect on other industrial (ii)- Improved V-1 model ( high subsonic demands. speed, and accuracy substantially unchanged) range could be in production in 1952. (iii) (iv) Pilot production of A-4 ( V-2) is now complete. Pilot production of an improved A-4 or V-2 (range about 300 miles with other features essentially unchanged) .(v) A- 4b ( A-4 wi th wings) could begin in 1952.. could reach operational service before 1952 provided the Soviet with this increase type missile have- indicated that an in range by the possible. TOP SECRET A.C._-1.T_ 5 /2 tests - 31 - addition of wings is �TOP SECRET (b) Surface- to- Air Missiles (i) Complete the information on Soviet progress in surface-to-air guided missile field is lacking. At present there that there is an established defence employ- ing even such missiles as fall, is no indication Schmetterling, the German Wasser Rheintochter III, and/ or Enzian E-50 (ii) Initial service use of Schmetterling ( subsoni® with optidal control) could begin at the end of 1952. (iii) Initial service use tochter of Wasserfall or Rhein- III ( supersonic with radar could begin by . the control) end of 1954. (iv) Large-scale production of any of the above missiles would curtail large-scale production of other missiles and would undoubtedly have an adverse effect on the supply of electronics equipment for other military purposes for the next five years. (c) Air- to- Surface Missiles (i) Copies of the guided bomb, Fritz- X, HS 293 air- to- surface missile, production at present, (ii) exists that such is the There is no evidence of and the could be in although no evidence case. any development work in this field. (iii) Although the V=1's as TOP SECRET A.C.A.I. 5/2 Germans abandoned the use an air- to- surface missile, - 32 - it of is �TOP SECRET nonetheless a weapon that could be employed in operational numbers as an air- to- surface missile in 1952. (d) Air- to-Air Missiles (i ) Even with further refinements, to-air models are German air- considered obsolete- and would be ineffective against aircraft to be developed during the next five years. It is unlikely that the Soviets would consider use of (ii) German missiles. It is considered that the Soviet Union could not begin development of an effective air-to-air missile before supersonic 1950 and that com- pletion of such a'missile would require not less than five years. 84. Electronics. present have There are indications that the Soviets at achieved a level of development in electronics research and production techniques which =mould permit native design and series production of effective radar Enough native Soviet equipment has been located to support the inference that the Soviet Union does not have completely on foreign production or copies ment for equipment. radar defence. However, interceptors, the problem of guided missiles, antiaircraft artillery fire will be considerable, entire system in any principal area will be TOP SECRET A.C.A.I. 5/2 it could have moderately efficient control system for interceptors and antiaircraft artillery fire. electronic control of of foreign equip- At the principal defence areas, is possible that the Soviets operating electronic to rely .. 33 and and the subject to �Z CTp hfif electronic cour_termeasures. Proximity fuzes may be a-v-e.ilable but it is unlike 1 ,y they be 85. fully effective Althcug?: the preceding pa.ragrapLlc Union with rather eX;?r_si;•e ^ apzb., •:_ties discussed, a ver-Y assessment; this considered that fa_,tni, iru in By apportionment of effort of credit the all fields Soviet in ea•h of the fields t; , . , n.• f- '-",e overall So-;-I_et Union does nc • ha-;-e t- he of achieving parity the fields or jam-proof. s tL-..c ;, .; al ,;:,= cnti.;' c potential, the a of scientllfic. It is capability devel^pment. to minimum defensive measures in atomic warfare ; guided missiles and electronics they might by 195'7 achieve some superiority in production of either or both of biological warfare and chemical warfare. It is considered improbable able to equal warfare, the that the capabilities guided missiles Soviet Union will be of the Western powers in atomic or electronics. CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION Capabilities 86. Sabotage and Subversion. These activities could be centrally controlled and organized on the same general lines in both the United States and Canada and could be on a large to its scale damage in support of overt military action prior initiation and during its early phases. the form of to vulnerable points and the use 'is believed that very little subverting members of success of physical of chemical and on a large the armed forces. is possible in scale. It success will. be achieved in However, a greater in minor civil government positions and in- industry. •••••{ T,0 , SRGRETA.C.A.I. 5/2 Sabotage strikes in key integrated industries, biological weapons would be possible degree carried out - 34 �Z 87. Amphibious and Airborne. the Soviet Union could mount a large-scale amphibious borne It is operation against Canada prospect of success. Against considered unlikely that or air- or the United States with any the forces now Soviet Union probably would have in being, the capability of securing or destroying bases in Alaska utilize to a limited extent for operations these bases and the Aleutians. against Canada and the United States. use of the area would be Union will be operations, 88. Air. capable but of seizing bases logistic They could In any event, seriously affected. the Allied The Soviet in Greenland by airborne support would be difficult. Soviet B-29 type aircraft could reach any important urban area or industrial concentration in the United States and Canada on one-way missions. techniques, any vital By using aerial refuelling target in Canada and the United States could be brought under two-way attack on a considerable The Soviets will also have the scale. capability of conducting two- way attacks'on a limited scale against any important urban and industrial area -using new improved type long-range bombers. Light bomber and fighter attacks could be made on United States military installations within combat radius of staging bases 89. Naval. in Northeastern Siberia. The Soviet Navy could conduct submarine attacks on shipping on coastal routes and the high seas in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Mining operations on the approaches prior to and after the could be undertaken. on mining, CT0•jR'.S'MT- r A.C.A.I. 5/2 commencement of hostilities The Soviet Navy is known to lay and possesses submarines of - 3.5 - sea stress sufficient range to �permit such operations coasts . Attacks co-.ld be atte:r.,t-ca on s`l+_p,•i:..=; in po_;;s and naval bases. operations. at any point on the Norte Nrerican Sn.a.11 pay°ties Coastal with guided missiles targets cou'.I.d be cou,1•1 be landod fcr special s1ielled and att-a:,ked lun.cnF d from spec --ia.11y eq ,ai:pped sub- marines, 90, Special Xca,cons employing atomic bombs The The Soviet Union will be targets 600 miles The use of of and biological and chemical ,weapons.` Soviets will also be capable against capable of launching guided missiles in Western Alaska within a range launching sites of 400 to on the Chukotski Peninsula. of missiles in connection with submarines is mentioned in the previous paragraph. Probable 91. Courses of Action Sabotage and Subversion. Widespread strikes will be attempted immediately before hostilities and intensified during its initial phases against key war industries, communications , and transportation facilities. Physical sabotage against vulnerable points and industrial installations will be carried out iirmaediately prior to and after the cotanence- ment of hostilities, 92. Amphibious neutralize and Airborne. areas Air. to or seize Alaskan and Aleutian bases by commando type raids and limited airborne 93. Atternipts will be made Attacks against attacks. important urban and industrial in Canada and the United States will be made , employing atomic as well as conventional bombs, and chemical weapons. MNzNrF I • 5/2 The objectives - 36 - and possibly biological of such attacks will �U. Q be to cause serious material_ damage to Canadian a,:,d i; , •ra.r potential and to corpel a •?.• pr;•r a:c : i.•••r `• •a.:'_ military frorcos for f • n,I _- c pJ bomber and fighver at-1 -s-. 1--s .tai::. military installations 94. Naval. pc-., es _ be S,,s : aired 1_ get carrj.eC, out- a ; s. -nst in rlaska and the Aleutians, The most important naval_ threat will. be mining of approaches to ports and naval bases, interdiction of sea lines LLL 5/2 c: • t3.c:: ; f of communication. -- 37 -- the and the � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIA00007 Title A name given to the resource ACAI 5/2, “Probable Soviet Courses of Action against Canada, the United States, and the Areas Adjacent Thereto, 1 Jan 1957" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 24-Jun-49 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived DND DHH 2002/17 Box 76 File 6 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource DND Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Intelligence Assessment Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource EN