https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e46c60d99345ba5fddf40deefa6d7281.pdf 1e871f9a6528fef2435a99575bd52f35 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project LAC RG24 Vol. 8088 File 1274-10-5 JIC Assessment Strategic Appreciation of the Capabilities of the USSR to Attack the North American Continent 46-08-15 �YNIVY COUNCIL CANADA VL . TAduoI? r - - ., ya! . rtrw-,t r .%,r, . II _.,: I J.t , - . 1i ,I . - • . ULU -• t I /, A.Grp.R. // - 1 .V : " k;u:.t cd Fes. 1. ui"'d e. T s:•ul•:,:,e har•,..,?.;,h svr int..r ti __,.. of ".• 1.r ,,ie•le .' Iroc° .. Of t T'mp' d • • • • :. Ci & V, Ot• i,•eA fc, r-. a so a t4itt r'Jy t 1I'l i - 1 . /' 'C l ,' ti. •: "rt•• My• • 4 ilk . 1'S,!i red its kk 00rt---L oo .tl L^ LC0jdS..t. t'a•tSt p" :•,;. = c7•1i 141_:0"'u300 Cct. co Y • 4t Cl t :. 7 : • 4 10 aa'd Is QAXA' 4 rvtara:_• • L s c.i+• ,•••::+ t°•.. • T u d C•: ° l I �NO: JLCI••,T TOP STRATi.. A" JF•1• IAl J d CIF TO-J' CAPA•B L1 •` M •' 'i[Irtj 7` + AT TACO, Y T1 T. M FC; nf ' ` ] it l 1 • Tho ai ri is t• Clot"rMint: thO forms, e- al .Rcalr s of st.# acc f, (thin the 1 i ,, i lts of !-' uv ntinl 1 v rfare, by a hostile vl;i , a 1)n a -nett d on Canadian torr itor . 2s ASS-LIMPT-IMS, a) it can 1,,a al m that 1,ho atom.e bonil wt1'.1 he SLY&I1able to of pr coon rirs by Ir) 50 ILI , the possibili ty teat rwli o active by-nroducts of atomi c research wJ.11 be available befo re V tat date 1 TacbnJ. cal arull s iontilic progre . -a in for i,r ; c !i race w1th Cwiadlan and r: lur +.c devel onmf- ts. wil l FAC'S a ine [ 1xi1 pd U.S 6S aRp ELrp- tic only ) a-,claim t flni t, d S•tatC s o f A !r za • an! w tl 4, pry e cr:-inr From ` Y rld Irlar 11 Wits, ar- u forces and Iiiduotr'1- l ;., oteLa i al a0abl i war the. j of •,•;• ft " ra•; 1.1 1 n $ Major for a .. ray tors years. -) ri od of b Tkn fa - r of spree uad di wile i...-1rjt 1a r elet,ion t o ' j.e m-i 7e -, esi ion or t.',-Jc centre or:ravitirid urst j arli t.l -Jp, ceritro j" r Tjo rt), T'.icai -1 1u6' ue-tT, ,' Arnr cif rl ,n. Green T, ps . few Tngl n-m-1 na&V. o r . The sl i nrtt. nt h ,. tto - - c : I Vic3e two hr( -.es l rse acmes t.1- n Po lar ce-) unc Rn .ro c"Ec e Czvq& a '' r , f a i • V_ rj d it i 'r •'• tl• cit * t• jop i la+ i * t tack iris t•je PACIr 1C ba s,..Q f,;rr T- -, r nk-& # r, ply s 4-r 4 ro EP ry V'',1' . rs, 14,1 , or ri , 7 uts—,i•1o I1 y ) x'. 14 1..r 1 { aiiil fOT .fl L k,•+• ill AF ItL of tl . n rw O. rl nti- '' tr-xt# of Una •'Ii:1 •' th - -jjor :• • •. • fr•,•.• wo it I 'y•,.• ..•( ari•. 8 ,0 utth(A •• • • • ••• Ck r •. r Lj• x l nv1r•:t. '. - 11 V-j- f•, f i ►' r M •y },.x in •-s !;,' c" s', -. 1yi •,• r1 ', Ct3rinda wn .,1' , y l i 4 L .• w IAll' • u -r- ! �-s amphibious operations aro unlikely during the next ton years, anO t''at the main Kaval threat consists of submarine attack on our sea com -ini cations toCetl,cr with possible shore bombardment from submazines with new and improved reasons . The use of subwarinca for the iranaoortation of sabotage and raiding forces also cannot be overlooked. (d) Soviet Air Force The assessment of nroaont and future capabilities of Y,e Soviet Air Force with respect to operations against Ca.,adia :, turritir;! Is included in Anpandix "B" attached. From this assessment it will be seen that the threat of Soviet air attack nnnetltutes the nrimery factor to determinJnC tF,e forms and scales of Soviet attack during th,o next ter, years. Capabilities for t.be present are limited attacks a;;ainst Alaeka and bases in the extreme Nest on two way conventional ml - lions or suicL-a one. way : 13ai , is covering all of t.estorn Canadaa3 far as tLe Ontario bordo r incrcasir,L; to more concentrated attacks includin., the atrimic bomb aid oiler scientific develooments by 1950. By 11)56 the Soviet air ,• orce capable of a'taekinys all vulnerable areas in Canada ML the USA wltl, guided mifisiles and very long ran- e air bombardment. from, ra-+ture4 bases in the: Canadian Arctic Arehinelaao. (e) Soviet Army The assessment of present and future capabilities of ti:e Soviet Army with regmect to o erations af.aln3t Canadiani te:rritor.- is includod in A nendix " C" attacked. At the . resent tine ai,d in the next f.ve years, the Soviet Army is capable of over-runnlr,G the whole of Fur-me, Incl.udine t.l:e UK and almost any Dart of Asia, but it could not . pope to acl!icve mnre tLe.n a few commando raids in the Arctic areas of L( ,.is crntinent. Aft rr 1950 and i.n the fo_ - seeable future the ). u:siezns mi.•ht be ca-, able cf carrying out - ore r rious air- borne operations if tf ,ey ea:: seeurc sufficient advance eases. (f) Internal Security The assessment of d,, capabilities of the L.onununi^ts w respect to a tL.reat to Canedf.an internal securit_i Is Annendix "D". included in Soviet control p direct or indirect, over the communist Party continues and It is considered therefore that initiall% a proportion of the Canadian population Weill(' be: a nnathrt]r t.. t':e ' erfet on the outbreak of war . Such a situation would have lsq,.orta . t re• .• rcuaaions in the fields of sahots, ,o and eubvk rsive+ aetfvlt•. (-) Snvirt Intentinns It is ennsluered that t.ro Soviet flulou does , wt wish to unda ,; e in a major war in f.l,e• next ten pars. r It ! e qui is possible: that h, r , , went efforts to , rrtr . 0 intcresta b , political a,ul other prensurc. may involvo hor ii , a r,■ j•- r r:nr with the Western Powers thr -YuCi, somr, misjudgment of toeJ r to .pc•r. If such a war developt• a the MAR eight we 1 attar :. Ca : r, a with CAS following objectivese (l) to , yin dow, , Cal uliaei OS war _.tr .., 1 (It is streeecd that tills is . sly likely if uS fi,terventi ri to c>. I or is c nsi( nrt-d by tije Sovivts to 1v incvi lab)*). (.1) 1'o MCC- ," rn for lat. r.r attacks against o•, r populated afuo industrial centres. �4. CONGIA 51ONS (a) in case war breaks out in t.a next ten years involving Canada and the USA, the following conclusions are madot (i) The USSR is the only conceivable enemy, but may have satellite powers in alliance. (ii) For the period 1946-50 attacks w1ll be limited in nature aga'nst our Northern fringen accomoanied by auhmarine activity on loci, Coasts. Th , as attacks coulu be undertaken on a small scale without warning but would be harassin6 rather than decisive. (iii) for the period 1950 on, attacks of a more serious proportion are likely, involving the atomic bomb and other new develonme—ts and accompanied by more serious chore bombardments. (iv) Subversive activities and aabotago will be extensively used. (v) The caoabiliti(a of Russian air power will increase fr -),m harassing attacks for ttje neriod 1946-50 to the likelihood of overwhelming guided missile and very lon6 ran,,,e air bombardment a,, the use of large airborne forces by 1956. The followis; t•.nea of attack may be < xpectedo Suicide one way missions Uae of the at%:mic bomb Use of guided missiles with atomic warhead Bacteriological warfare Radio-active substance warfare �TOP STCRTT A. , 1.NBIS " Am (LU391A 13 MAUI, OA",RILITITS Rusr' ia is at the nresent time the world's third rackia,; sea power . Her surface fleet, however, compared with either the British or American fleets is not impoeln , , and it I and are,.t that hor prosent ability to protect any significant. overseas i•nvement f troops and s»nnlios is quite Baited. HerAMerchant Fleet tonnage Is small (about 2J million tons). I'[1 1''.. Y 2. What little i.ntellt enoi we haveLadLnat. _ ts thatYn Soviet Gorernment is making great efforts to build uo tier shipya ape t.or Merchant Marine . There are indications also that as soon as kursia can afford to divert the necessar•; sunnlirs and manpower from indust.r 0 she will turn her attention to the development of the air and surface components of sea power. 3. The threat to the tilnstern Hemisphere from such ■ develo— sent close not annear to be immediate ) any important buildtn ,; nro7rar. will take at least three years to of under wad, and it may be . on years possibly lonCer before Russia can develon Naval Forces which would be at all comparable to the British or Amtrioan fleets. Any ai,nific a,nt reduction inihe British or American fleets would, of course , reduce this time factor in favour of Russia. 4, The only lmmcdiate threat to Canadian and United :', totes aea communisations is Russia's submarine force wr. ich ao,ia1sts of at least 20n units. ''ins hundred of these arc modern ocean -Zoine sutmarinoa fitted with all the latest equipment . The oth ,r Inn while ol.er cannot be considered in any way obsol to alnee tLe_ were all built since 1^35 and would still be quite effective from an onc. raV -• al point of view . then you rehembe• r that in 1939 Germany had only sixty U-boats anc! that in spite of concentrated Allied Bombl :. • she added 10M tc that total durinL the war, Ruseiale ca ,abilitiea of wa4' effective submarine warfare against our overseas still a i,i,; aumt •,ot under -n at1mat ad. C. Russia's submarines would have b«en elatl dip ins:rvet.ire against t':ie anti-submarine measures develone-d by tue Allifs ; t, t!e latter rta t ;es of the war . However , the husaians are now in a ­ rITI—i to benefit ;-,neatly from German experience and develonmrnts. At t e, end of the war the Germans had developed vastly improved t, -' es of U-boats . Type Tx7 had a submerged speed of lu knots ,j;rest s, ,ib cr ed endurance and- ability to charge oatterics in a few hours witLo•it surfac j ig or expo-sin ;, anithing more than the cota)arativo%• ,.rirtc.ous Schuorkel• It would be extremely dtffio it if not imposnihlr to deal effectively with this tie with the anti-submarine eq 1t Lai nt sr thnda and escort vessels now available. By ure of a new type of fuel sub& , r;• d speeds of well over 20 kt , ots and an alnost Ind»finite subarrCed rave* are an immediate possibility and way already have -* on developed by the hureians . Tte present effiective Asdio epe•d is lf, .. dots air+ effective ranL* 5rK1 to 3000 yards ( spending on watc,r o• ,nn iti ons . 'Iy­ s % X1 suhearin4s wRre to have bbei, t,,rned out In ,g"st numhere by a system of soctional prefabrication and asm ,mblLit , Gut fort u.stely only one vea"W1 cnaa into service before the Gorwans surrendered . IL a,,tl .+ note►• incidentally , that tiro rehnnrk. el rentl . y rtduees t.e effeetil - as of radar and ab ost complet. el., eount.hre the ure of shore based r a-ip baaad aircraft in anti-Submarine u;,erntions. This, wren airersJ sf beaomie our tru .o card tr.rt " the U- pat, In a west arrl- , us hln, ►, ai neeonsitates c,. g0otely new dsvel ., p.a.uts Ln anti-submarine a mI' .' r and squL.nent. �-2- •. At the tine of the German surreader stahmcarine deal •tie Avon more advanct4d t•Gan Us Type XXI were i,, nroductio), and in addition aagy technical improve tents in submarine tore does w«,ra being develo;-red. IY Than Runrians have obtained inn modcrn Oerman ' : Oats including at-least_lxae-c lasted Tyne XXT. Irurther-ors, they control sevrral flerman sLdnyards which ware assombl irk i?-boe-ts of the latect class ve well as factories nrodtjolnC nearly all tl.e narts and which went into then. As reparations, the tussians tsave also obtained from elsewhere in Germany nachincry used ir. t..e mmfacture of auoh G-boats a,•Kd Ln additl ,,, , the;; have ' n their ;was: a Gorwan sciontitic personnel both Neval arm civ !lien familtar wit), all nhases of t1a orastr+.ct.' on and opc rat k , a of TI-boats. It -ust be er,et^d •e , thesrefere , thet F:usria will c:evvtc e ,nsiderable effort to the de" Irrene_tb of h,r uubmarir e foroo. It t}:s knowledge of ' orman esporie:nce arici devclo:+ment.s w..icu Las cc;: acquired arc: the asaistanoo fro. G^roan -,ersonnel which is availr' ••lc,, husela wwild be able to c:arrL- sit vc r • effoctive s:hraai ' :.. o, wry ,t' -,.a adaiast our overmma and coastal rhinntaC, and her subswsrlr:c: fo^.re ,a^ be erected to increase ranidly. °. Another nosaibility in the forsseeablo f+it;,ire ! e tLc apnlioation by the i•ussians of atonio enerZv to tine nronulp:nn of submarinea . German researc ;: into the uees of nucloar enrr[:y -aas directed towar(ie tGe •. se of •+uoh energ,7 for . -) ower nroc:uctlnn rnt..*•r than; ox— nlos.ive mriores , and the rrte its of this researca .are, now ' -, `.c.•! r:.an hanc:s . :%vAar'ree probably offer th o "o t suitable+ field fr r ' : e early a-,A * Catip.n of this fir:: o: un•ra. , acid v:oh a , evalan.e r;t ,<, le uu:ouhtedly ) rodues a , reatly increastd spso-: d avid ran'o with r_-6t1 rod iced vAasrability. 10. Certain otter. r c'"vela7-x nts of submarine: war 'sr. ovnrloolmd r oa. ot. ` t Ti.e u.no of suhmarin ,s for tlt• tmar)ortatin.n of sn'.o.: t it and ratdlr,;; forces . Tts Junanose 1-4'0 class wide ! uxi a disnlacement of about `,, 5•ul tons c led ca" %, +. s rL 314i troops in ackiitlon t,% the r,;; ,l! r c,vriloa-A. (h) The lsumhin,,: fr,-: ,Ixubwarinc s of ,;uliiod vi • aitt+s w :rrnride a satinfactorj ae•ena err dirIA".rtn• rr lnr.i • atn­,to or otherwise, ae;ai.,mt twr,.uta ! n 1. , t' asst Cosvt industrial areas &:AJ with, little or :to da.,kor ^f (: ote,ctl o, ( +rrtre neeffective a wAaor-scr~-v l **+ -r=-x'tUa9 at ..t.a -WrW..aut L"O. There is ttnthi,,, new i;. equi , 5,:, subwir , 4a rite an rvrttritish sibmar!rv_s were an ey : i - .Al *, 1,, vo I' V 10 4 f- ,, .ia'Nnnaso 1-4u0 class aarriod tt.r.s . lanes . Any , s. vv 1 of this t; -, a of s bmartne warfare l,as tra-wj'soeres esf•: ! nossi hi litios w1 ti, the new wourrons w!.i yr ,a aar•, airoraft. t 11. A last oe-ibllity *;,Loh 0,­ lc; not r,a overlook ,, of ord , r,wry arroiant s,cirs fir la, u,ol.ty" atroraft an,ci 4. W*<`: 12. T,, rem cup r;:miia'n naval oanabilltioe r aurt t. a :., r »rchant mari.;a are: salt ta:t if 9101 at .. t.s t .e 1Mw • 1 t .. hant war ate In a <, +. tr . ! ee.va leas. Lu g a :,.tat rte, t s,c hear' 1,, t ajgpa_rWt w:Aot: .' a ,eM. r a,u: t,.e .! r , itad tatty woul, r' :.1 1t cafe,,d the it eN C: _:: runiewLi-t„s. i �TOP SECRET ESTIMATED STRENGTH U. S. S. R. NAVY PERSONNEL: 10200.000 (1-945) N. B. There has been little or no Demobiliprion of Navy Personnel. SHIPS: OLD NEW TOTAL Battleships 3 — 3 Cruisers 3 6 9 Flotilla Leaders — 5 5 Destroyers 14 29 43 Submarines (approx) 100 100 200 TOTAL 260 �CAPABILITIES of GERMAN S/M's TYPE TONS RANGE VII- IX ( 750) 15,000 CI•R••unra•t SUB RANGE SURFACE SUD SPEED SPEED(MAN) 16-8 100 IS XXI ( 1200) 12,000 100@3KTS . 16 16 XXIII ( 450) 4,000 SOp 3Krs. 12 1. 12 XXVI ( 800) 8,000 240 @ 20KTS - I l 24 XV11 (400) 4,000 120@ 20KTS. 16 24 XXVIII ( 1500) 18,000 240 v 20 Krs 18 24 �TnP SECRI.T A?erx.riII " B" CAPATMITI="S T}1F FMSIAP' AIr ' ORCE 1. FU7SIAN ATP FORCE (a) Present Porer of the Russian Air Force At the present time the Russian Air Force comprises At first line aircraft operationally assigned to combat units. the end of World Aar II there were 82,000 aircraft of all types on ro of American and 4vf hand, including anProximately 14,0 C1 00 o British manufacture. Current stock of new aircraft in stored reserves stands at 18,000, among which are to be found most of 2,1.00 P-63 fighters which are not known to have been used in combat d.:r' f the war. Total.air force strengto is divided as follows, 4,3:0 bombers , 7,850 fighters, and 3,8 0 0 ground attack planes. The 4,350 bomber aircraft include 2,000 TU-2 and FE-4, o'_%tr2 twin-engine aircraft of ,modern design. The FR -4 is nowered by diesel engines which give it a range of 3,000 miles with a tX'* pound load . Two now four -engine bombers , the ER -6 and TU-4, are in process of development but are not known to t•e in • ,roc:uct_or. ayet. Althou h norformnnce figures arenot known , there ,. ave I"n indications that ranges of 5,00'1 miles with 9 - 11,000 r,ouar, "' s may be erected . In addition , the Twasians possess 3 - 5 kmcr•'can B-2ns, at least one of wt:ich has been observed in flight rece,.t1., and several R- 17s and B-249. It is estimated that with the asaiatance of Cerman technicians, hucr:ia could place Us t-29 in !aeo production within five years. Although not equal to performance characteristics of tl,e newest Allied fighters , the Fusnian fighters are coepletv1y soderr and renresent the most effective non-Allied fighter force at t::e Present time. Its 7,850 planes are all in the 4 ' n-mile -per-ho : r class and overate most efficiently at medium altitudes . T,.! f to force includes some Spitfire No as well as American P- 39s , and i-63s. The Eround attack strenl; t`, f 3,800 aircraft c-' lists 'lost)' of the famous Stormovik. A new ver3inn, the IL- I, whie), is development, is thought to be jet nropeiled. The civil Air Fleet, whic}, nnrf••rms ti,s f„net:o,u of a trot, carrier , oomnrises 5,OnO Lrn,-,lam-tyr o t.ranarorts. flvt, l,ror r •f tbt.se arc American C-47s with a carne tty of 22 Apo rtmaiuin;; 4,500 are Friesian with a osnacity Fleet ties, Lbercfore , a total lift -oaoacity of '; , tax : ■«:. raaius of 5a)-700 miles. Production of transncrt t ua 1 , ia ecc r, 1944, was estimated at 200 per month. It is estimated t'Ll" flL ,ire will rise to 1,000 per month by September, 19J.Ai Th. axnerlence of the hessian Air Force hap h.. r,t. tactical and ; ,round support o%,eratious, howevor, tin: ldt tl,o :', treteElc Air rorce located in t1a Moscow arena, is v.urriargoi,y; 1„tenelve trainln4 It, all haws of strata c.ic it. , Oprrctir,nal ran, a of current - 1salan homhers is etmtou at 3000 miles . The T(l-2 can carry 0,600 pa nda o1 bnebs 1, 11. s, and ti,o CF-4 can carry $,,too p,,umis of bemts 1,(yk• wil•a, ra . e increases to 3,($)0 riles 11' th« ioab load Is out to 4,4 :-' o , e. �-2 (b) F,itipre Powf ,r of thw Nesnian Air Force A Lonr -3anje Force has been in existence in Russia for a number of years , but it has never been adequate as a strategio bombardment force. Its inefficiency was due to a number of factors, such as 1-•ck ;,. lorij; -range aircraft , lack of modern navigatlrnal equinment , and weakness In training . Crises, such as tt. e Battle - f Stalingrad , required its use an a tactical force , and witb few excentions , it a-ntinuod to onerate as a short-range bombardment f-• r-o tur- ,u-bout the war. The Staff of t, a LonV -" anf;e Force ties always been considered high above the level of that of the hod hrr..: Air 'Force as a whole, aiui when t.,e Long -r.an.0 Force was converted int . t c 13th Air Army of tl,e Fed Army Air Force, nersonuiel was rate, vre ir.tact. This staff has never abandoneed tl,e concept of ) urely str4tc,_1 oper ,•ti -ns, but only postponed its application . That concept hoe been strenCti , oned by the lessons learned from the success cf ti.f ' and Fritisl ,strategic air forces during the war, by tl:e geck-rn :' cal • considerations of the US3R, and b• the comnarative deficienc, , of Soviet sea no:rer .. Quantitatively, Russia probably could, i_,iitia 'ly at 1.-8.•t, match any first rate air po ; wcr in 195C , Inclauia,; buavy ,, ombt rs -, f the B-29 t: -)r. -Qualitativoly , however, Ensile will ern able•• fall short of a maximum goal. A li:.,itin,; factor in q ) alltutive proa.j - t would be the loss in continued research devc?lopment, and er',cr_-.ci,tation during the huild -up nerlod which woul,. tie necessar;i f'-, r t• c Russians to acquire a quantitative air force . It shout. ; e mind , nwever, that if Russia intends to expand by force a to c.pil:n to attack the Unitcd States and Canaua would necessarily ,, ava, tc have been made by now in order to insure a qualitatively 1'!ra. rate air arm. In the n•A ten years , Russian aircraft enjineere ,rill ...• ,.+ edly have assimilated and adapted to their own req.irc-- cents all technical knr+wledge acquired from the Allies and Gc: reagy d,iri war and will have made some imorovements of their owe. , ) wevrr, ?t.ouch ev ,, ry effort will have been made to close the Ca. Let►c•c. Russlar: aircraft develoomr-nts and thons of tree V.S. am Grfr,t the ' enters r'omers will maintain a marEiu of suncriority. - c atl^n in resnect to long range fighters will be substantiall same. R"Psian equinment other than aircraft will nrobabl • n •,f wide nar:ir of inferiority , particularly in radar , navi at a-nd " irhtiniy devices when compared wtih like U.S. an( ,i:r•t i . Every effort will be made to keep the trair ,)nt ,ro_ra Per' Air Force in * ten with the develonment of new euui,a•nt. too low standards in Russia will be a limiting factor t' c of crow on-' gr • wend ncrsonnel to man a strategic air force. It is hl.Zhly improbable that duri; -„ Ox next ten yeas Russian Air Iorce will attain , unites nraoeti ! e on,xlitiors, valuable exoerie^ nee acquired b; the U.:3. and 1)ritian in al I Ar, of hfev , bomber operrtion durinj; VFo war. In 1856, hussis will orobahly have flora than 5,..M trans ­ -rt aircraft with at least C-/ ,9 ( Lnnetel lat.i o, ,) charseterieties. , C-"' has a ran.•e of onnroxisutoly 4,frin oils with a Asxia-.e 1O abort 50 men or 20,000 ll s. of car s­,. ,i Ihe so airarafl. 00. will nosseas a large notential troop lit • t f•. on•r ,tioas a,,^ t Ale?ettans , Alaska , Ioel,uul u,e' • ,nasibly Greenland. Airhorim trmor operr-• tinr,s ak: ainnt any of these nlecns in tips face or str •,,; r. , .r ,trracti,„t w, ,.ld, however , present, su>,nly , reierforoosant , wui au• art ciffic,iltive whicu wo-ild i-Larr ultimate suoosss unlJirel• . Turt ,frmoro , by 1956 the r:iajorlty of U.S. bar ,a ■ 1I1 sti11 irolahl: • t of ran .o for airborne troop o urrtions from hasua in territory owned or coni r%l l.00 by l.ussia. �-3- lrxosot for bases on Stritzhergen , which might be employed for attacka on Greenland , Iceland , and the northern and eastern parts of the Continental United States , the bases employed in air attacks w,)uld probably all be on the ma!nland of Eurornn ane Asia . SnitaborCen would be v„lnernble to attack by air or see , and tr . oAnsr, ortatlon difficult'es involvod in nroviding ground sunnort or renlecln ;; cestr -, yrd or oamalwd facilities and material might make banes i„ I'tortheastern oiberta v.1lnerable to air attack . The other bases likely to to emal. oypd do not annear to possess any notably v,lnerable features. (c) Futu ret of G»ided Missiles and Atomic Weanone AlthouEh the field of guides missiles was almost a mnnololy by Germany during the war, the can ture o f German sc ien ti sts and equinnent by the Allies has opened the entire field to all . ±' here is reas-in to believer that as early as 1941 Fuesia was enCa ed in researc.,.ar•r calculat•one on this subject. With the henefit of .erman ex erinw ntat'on and nersnnnei , Fussia should to abreast of Allied nations wi c,rrpnt. develonment of these weapons. German scientific thought on Lrul ded miseil• s c- ,an in ti,e nineteen -twenties. In 1043 there were 48 different t;nrs in v"t•rrs stages of development. In that year all but 12 were elisinstrr: ac, as to hermit uancentration of effort. The majority of these were defensive in nature. Most notent of the offensive tyroe was the • A" aeries of sunpraonic missiles which au(cooded the subsonic V-1, ; e notorious "buzz- bomb ". This comparatively - rimi. tive weanon rhie, carried annroximately one ton of explosive to a ceiling of 4,00^ feet at 350 -400 miles per hour was still sufficiently lethal to cause heavy damage in the United Kingdom. The 1,115 V-1 bombs to land in t_-e U.K. cost Germany about 463,00, 000 man -hours to nrouace . The cost to the Allies in terms of damage repair, absenteeism , offennsy* a,ic defeneive countermeasures , amounted to about 1,753, 00 ,000 fan-::pore. !text major weanon to be employed offensively leas the A- I which came to he known as the V-2 or "Viper ". This was a e!n rg e rocket -ty-)a weapon which included a 2,150 pound warhead Ii i its " C,rV­ round total launching weight. It t,ad a ran,o of 00 miles rt miles nor hour . The limit of (jevelonment for this ea,ouis conai.:er x4 to he a maximum range of 350 miles with a 3-milc circ • ilar err r in deflection. At war's enu , wort. was in prot, resa on the A= witch -a,r ;epi , for time with the A-10 rocket propulsion ,., nit. To , weight wets 21),000 -sound s an d it s exnec te d range was 3, m0 mil ls a t ncr : our. Several of these were constricted , h,,t their hav ing been test -fired. 1•ussle is in control of a!- ,roximately $it net there a A- 1 ailr s 9t 10 is n, of ee , t of soinni . ifie nerannnel formerly rn,a ,, ed in t ntlard tuivelI - n r.- enro. and nre ,•. 1rs snme of Germany's treat( at renaa2r. h ovr itr rar Flnrr'l;aufie,, Cavenhagon , Leto, and Hresla. . Altl,nu,,i. s.,ar egrri ». 1)t was removed from Peenesnnd a and ;. ordts usa ., by Asrricrn forces hefnrw tit'. arrival of the PuRrians , there can he nn ., ouht that curre.,tly Rnafiis noneesnas all ey Ainsert , m^terlkla, caloulut r ..:so, ai"i ^ ere necesenry f, com•rl ete gavel enment of s1) extenei re g,, load mi sm il • a gre-r, Brent. , at aeterrants to • termau seoosnlinhm +.i ts were , ost+le br-htn[r, find lack of industrial t, thane ohstacles. ro-ordlnatino. L ot ro- tussia will '•e ! ar^une Any dincnsalnu of Ganadien -ANr rioar , v:l:,, rat,ilit , t.r „ IAed mIRrl 10 attack fr• , m rene tit Ius&Ia., has( a r ; In I. oevolva iut o a • at 1 . Nt a an t. +, he , t.imc which kusnla will nosfiess b . arhfar explosive of P,ffieir , t nower to justi fy ex,,en,l iture ,f theat J„e a) -,, l ttre ti « P. ,r A-4 or a s im il ar carrier shall have ,.rf•ated . Iuesia ma, he exAt is, pected to poI sea s feels exnlost.., at name rise after 11) 5 0 and rnbably rior to le}`•. Completi , r n opersilo,ul st.stus of a V-0 ta••+a �— /l — carrier Is more problematical . Estimates of German rrersonnel now in our hands ranee from one to fifteen years. The utilization of German scientists and German nrodnetlon facilities erectly enhances Russian canabilitica to produce atomic nn :- Ar anc: wranons. > iren atomic production has been achieved , it will immediately curse a great increase in the strategic air car abilities of Rnsaia, esnectally for making surprise attacks. The develonment of an atonic weanon may be divided Int. phasest (1) obtaining sufficient g,iarntities of tasic ore sn.+ develoninf- the ernlosive constiVrent., and ( 2) constructing a n,itehl.. weapon in sufficient quantities. In the attainment of the first, radioactive dust or an is ) reduced as a by-product. There Jr, tr^,, the ­) saibility of developing not only exoloelve wea+ons, hut. ,, lac weanons to disnorse radioactive dusts or ba*ra of extrer , toxicit-;. The practicality of the bomb has been demonstrated to i':iosin bdevclon^rcnts in the linit•,d States, and Russian scientists no ., r,, : Ypeeted to devote great efforts in this dirvetio;.. Although there to no s•ech nrecedent for building a weapon amnloying radi•activeti + ,ator ;, aegis , efforts by Euesian scientists alone this line erp cnrcelvabie and might result in tho develonment of such a we- anon 1 10fA. lt,:ssia is nrobahly capable of develoning a supersonic .rilcled misr1le with a 300 Tile ran•e and a sati^factory degree of se- r•f at thnt ranee and probably will be capable of develoninC a wee- n,. with a 3010 mile ranee. It is reasonably certain that they r,ow , nossess the latter weapon, developed by the Gerrans. 41thi. 5 years thereafter nissia may be able t develop e;rrams-to- men.'. subsonic rnisoiles ( such as automatically controlled bombers) of reasonable accuracy with sufficient ran,e to reach outly:ne '. . '', , s in the Pacific from launehi ij ; sites in territory on the Asietic ,a, land n-rw enntrolled by Lussia. This requires a ran,c of 10'ln - ilea - r more. By IP56, Ausaia may have succeeded to anolying atomic eyplosive chances to their loa f; range guided missiles. The an astarr_e of other natlona particularly Sweden and France, it available to Russia may he of " neat assistance in the develonment of Ion g»ided missiles. 2. r 'Q'i1FR FACT•FS G(1V liil i:0 TI:' (a) SiXGFnS rF' A AV ATTA( 1K Gl an e x:01 Ti. A ' 1' r. Runsir.n Trn+ustrial Tar Potential Although current industrial orituut is iAlow pre-aar, a,,: remain below for a few years , Russian industry to r,ow roba)1 • hic tithe largest in tt:e world, followin- thai. of ilia l+nitcd _; tat. a a,*. thr, firltish innire. Trorst rrouuction ehorta„ca are now to ■ vita+- , netrol, non-ferrous me talc, and electr-,i,lcs sy+iiomeut. she I;• rely , a dar,t.r,d..-d in their Allies for •- 0 percent of their high octane av1at1 spirit, a 1ar•e proportion of their rubber and axoloslves an,` tic . resrnrrcee would nrobahly constitute serinns bottlenecks at ti. ,.- sent time . 'them, are only a v, ry few sbortagt + s 1n critical ,­t, r,,.lr. Furthermort+, having suffvr-t.d r)urmanerit military eaeunitie s ant fit- e at U V21jr) ,( 00 1n L►; e recent war, of whom 6,2()(),001 were fatal, + f,• l.ua -ti all Ana: ,- owor notvntlal may 1,i c +„ dll.e;rtin 2% trainod ?r, v? , o f t.- e Ir+menotr task of relib bilitot• tou at111 to be nerf-rmed. ' •osy`r. rail ►rno road com uaieativ,r havu fe vca strar : iud l'or ycaro a Nr• it' e ") Jiti nu to e- j! , J.y a major new effort without Opus • t ,habi litbti rite eurd ex ,+ar,sion. Ae ,y c:atimate of the near notvntlal of lussia iu 5 r 1 •, • 4 rmist bee I.Ltrgel ,rc rrject oral. It . * 111 lar L t • 1 _, de f-n . pro;)ort.lor, nt' th e nnti„ual. efl'or•t wirlcl, la a-, lied to we,r • —, «. frpm r) n now the esaumntion that a large •, ro ,ortion wi11 be No a­ 11 ,d, r• �-5- w:)uld probably have removed entirely their bottlenecks in aviation aoirit , rubber, and explosives within 5 years. lout their industrial technique and communications will not have reached British anu American atandrrde . On tho ntbf r hand tue + roblen of rehabili`.ation sho+ild hove been solved within 10 years and thereto e, the manaower sit%katton will have been eased considerably and tl. e Fusion air force wonle t bo hocked by a formidable Industry ,. eared to total war. (b) Cnnnrtien - American Vnlnerethility A stud y of the war making ability of %he United States axi Canada shows that the most imnortant objectives arc inuustrial , star., and administrative areas grouped in two major reginns . Region one is the North Atlantic Coastal 'lain extending from Halifax on the •' orth to Norfolk on the South , and from the Atlantic Ocean on the East to tt.e Annalachisns on the Kest. Region two is the Great Lakes , Ohio) river Valley , St. Lawrence Valley. The vital regions of the U.S. and Canada contain a nrennn ,'erenee of administrative centers ; urban centers; communications egtri•ment centers ; shinbuil. dinC and ronair yards ; Pevy yards; atomic bomb facilities - mining , oroceosine, and assembly nlants; electric newer, eynthotic rubber slants, Petroleum refining, coke, ir in, an , stef'l industries ; strategic metals - reO acing refining auc fabricatirZ -lasts. At the nroaent time , given a ran ,;e of 3Mr) mi lr s, a t•plar attack would not hnvo serious consequences because of the relat;vel, small area accessible . Within nreeent ranCe are the Alaskan Earri ann , Western Canada to Us Ontario border, and the west cast of the+ united States to Los An„relss. This area c-Wains the uranium ore mine at Fliiorads, tLe nlutoniun plant at Pasco, a:w - he princinel cities of Vancouver , WinnineG , leglna , Seattle, an Francisco , and Los An ;eles . This area in 10 44 rtrot•ucud 11 nere:ort of all airframes , 12 percent of all merchant shin I -, 41 - Frcent of the naval base * and chinyards, and 15 nercent of oil, avlstinn n«•r-1 and nynthptle ribber. F:esulta of maximum imnlemuntatiou of ru --, % o"fersivc canabilitles at this time world • e hmrarst b..t 1-0 c:. P In 190 a ranZe increase to 4,' 1' 10 miles will t^ ri • i,; e"1 of , anst a and 4R nrreent of American ir,castrial capacity wltl:i - a., a of • e ; a bos"o . In at:dition to the areas listed above , these .Ciditt•nal areas would - ecnme subject to at.tecki the North Atlantic industrial co eentrmtione centpring about Boatnn , 1; ew York , ' hilacial •• ala, : altivar%. and Norfolk ; the Great l.akrs - Ohio Uiver Va ley t Lawrence ; Ivor Valley area from Pittsburg throibh (;:Aca`o and ietr •. ,it to • cr :, t., a:.< Ann' real. Inelud.d in this area are the uranium ore refiner of art Hrme aril the atomic explosives plrnta at Oak Iit!pe a:td lot Alamns. 14arimtus emnlolosent of Lusela :. offensives eanabilittrs at t:1s ties would not aeeomnlish decisive aanta ;b to any lanortant icufuste ,.. Lowever, ■orinves dnesee to a 1lmitud numher of ti e, e ■ i.ht he affected. r thrt aesumntion that 1u 1952 hu. eia • 111 have . tn:3'ir wop -- a anti aircraft witl: a 50nO milt ran e, tth( rote lo•iusl toriets will • c: .^thtnt.d drhan -lndnntrtal areas rat- ,, r titan i. 11vidual tar,&to. A s; r; `. h riW attack upon the admit tetrative centers nf' i4ts•a are at. ,i ton t ,i ;, ht narallrl a alwiler attack -n the at — bovb ) sots, Now Yo-• k, letrnit -rirwisor , 0t..tshurg, Lhlek s r ,, 1-0ut.., Montreal, I' • r nto, 3fto Francisco , acrd Lo:. A.•t elwa . tea ama, • tray ' w , r-* t , ] ,•■ nf• lif r t.rearnsi —i m, wer indn +tr klyd a - idatr•t ' a at,ht 60 r)6-mliRed , and s ( 1 •cteion in fav -ir of )usn'a wnul, to s Gsflntto to"Ri hi ] tfey, �-6- 3. PAT I" , M (a) Irr';InR Tfrn ; fA9' AIR ATTACKS ARATNCT nt "' A`P ,rICA Direction of buesian Air Attacks From examination of a man o the flq,thcr:. flemis hare, it is at mere obvi us that tLo sLortust annroach t ttic i ,ort: Auerlcen Coatinent from Aus&ia is via tl a .' Olar Can . It is fr tt.ia dlrrction thr,t the major air effort, incl -.,,;I ; a - 1 miles attack, would probably come.. This wr ,;1d autnrrutieally inv,l•rr Canaria, =vviet canabilitics are r1mitod to two mrtt,n, s of orf•cnsive. i'he first is frim bae.•e cu hvr Arctic iron'-ier. She is fi rm ly established at Uclen and Anadyn to ; i.F. SiberiaShe has established meteorological stations and airfields acromF ihrrta to Archangel. Consldoreble tlrnueh, , money, and effort }. eve nut, into the development of her Arctic frontltr. Toe other e,thlf. concent of attackvnuld l.e to establish refueling point■ anO na ea down through Spitabbr i;en, Pearyland and the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. (b) Present Caneb'_litiP9 of the Pusslan Air Force mini; the TU-2 and is2-4 on two way ennventionai missions from their press„t Arctic bases, the Russians we ,ild have - nly Alaska and bases In the extreme west "acific uithIn rvn•e . : nicl<e one-may missions cnu lr' 2• 4cI -,as far as the ^. n tar ir, bor, er and almost as far South us Lo^ Angeles. The nascn nl:.rt­,nium nlant would be with!:, r&nZe. It is doubtful that attacks of this t,-. e coulc' really damaging, Oven if com'lote surnrine CruL he schi(vee. flowrvcr, the nnaribility of such a carnnalgr: court not Le dins-, -- tfw by aeclde;,tal concontions of exnenuability. For exa: le, r ,_ e•s might be trained in sabotage, esnionage, and to erf:)r!a services, such as joining subversive movements wi,ieh w-,,old more !liar, them for the loss r,f materiel and mannower . An attack at the ,resent v,o,iL_ bo harassin; r thrr than serious. (c) Futnre Ceha' ,ilittts of the F; ,,ss'an Lir rorce R, jmcia cnulc •r exnectmd to cTtnbl lnh bases or,, refuel' points down through S"ttzr ,er l;cn, Pearyland an, t, o : ,, acliau w,.. ! inela o. !.at only wo-ild these ialandm provide bases for Lurnials Strp-+c I-to Air rorce, and the protection of it, but they roult! be , sed r,s a : r fr-,m wL1ch to 1&lncb guided misci.lr s aLa t.nmt tl:e 1:eart of art if r • ca. It will be scan that ? ilham.re Island is very nFnrl, as close to Rueefain main bases at Archangel am ' IIram#re is fro..+ e Civilized heart of Canada . Lart,e airborne forces w,vli he , sed to make the Initi a l se izure o f such bases. Assumi „g that Russla by 1p56 will have atomic we■nu , e • a can ex ;eot att ack w•tL gulded minsil«s , rockets err aircraft lau.ched from suhmnrines , anu very long; ran,. •e air b,mhard • uEnt f rain• r,,h e areas In Canada and fi.S . Frumsi a will et tetimt t• + rt a. f rrt ' • r ot­ Jretives ir, tht sub-aretio regions -If Canada , Alaska , arul Ls 'rsu. r r the establishment of further offensive bases, u can exnc ,ot a a • 1;,. rlnL attack unnn adu'uimtratlor, centers t,, uttewa a ' eshl" t -pth• ' to t r with attacks on at•inio bomb slants, a.,i tie lrr.,rr - rh. , r manui'acturing centers such as sew rori , ietr-.It- irwis "r, • lrrah,rf, Ghioago , Duluth , Montreal, T,• r it, , Jarr Frauoisr • o, Lox A, , 41op, tr. Alto-io homb damage a,w lone, of indnstriaa am ad■1: ,lstrrti ., r,,ul, Cnntluent polltlevily, i'urstrlat li 1nof'ff:^tI vf,. 1 r tire a . td ire . e;u'•,a. ar to i,arallsod a-, t.'•,o , art' A t ies., u,r ec . r,,, lea't : liji to r. ,roreA �Jc-op S¢cref r. PRESENT ORDER Jo BATTLE 16000 FRONT LINE AIRCRAFT 4350 BOMBERS 7850 FIGHTERS 3800 GROUND ATTACK PLANES All MODERN DESIGN zINCLUDES 2000 TU-?. • ER- 4 RANGE 3000 MILES 3INCLUDES 3-5 B- 29's 4SEVERAL B-175 AND B-24's NOT EQUAL TO PERFORMANCE OF NEWEST ALLIED 2COMPLETELY MODERN MOSTLY STORMOVIKS 11 -2 • I1-10 3 LAG MAIL 400 MPI•I t INCLASS 4SOME SPIT EK's P39. P40. P47. P635 NOTE - 82000 ALL TYPES AT END OF WAR - STORED RESERVE 18000 - AMERICAN 14000 ( INCLUDING 2400 R6 3s) BRITISH 4000 CIVIL AIR FLEET 5000 DOUGLAS TYPE TRANSPORTS 4500 Li-2 • Ps 84 ICAPACITY 15 500 C47s CAPACITY ZE NOTE - TOTAL LIFT CAPACITY 78500 RADIUS 500-700 MILES ESTIMATED PROGRESS I TUE Fr?9 COULD H IN MASS PRODUCTION BY 1951 TWO NEW 4 ENhIIJED 6OMbLPS IN PRODUCTION ED- 6 Tu 4 WITH WDO MILE RANGE 11000 Lb LOAD BY 194 B 3 ESTIMATED CIVIL AIR FEEL f PRODUCT ION 1000 MONT NL) P.( IiLY,T 5EPT jET PROPELLED TI 6 GROUND ATTACK Ak IN KWUCTIL'''i I01S SUMMER 5TL?ATEGIC AIR FOPCE-LOCATED MOSCOW ARFA UIIDER ( j01NG ALL UNASL S IN STCATEOIC VJ•RFA['L �DISPOSITION OF THE AIR FORCES OF THE LOCATION U.S.S.R• N° OF A/C OUTSIDE U.S.S.R. GERMANY BULGARIA RUMANIA POLAND AUSTRIA HUNGARY MANCHURIA KOREA 1100 380 1700 3000 300 450 400 500 TOTAL OUTSIDE U.S. S. R. 7890 INSIDE U.S.5.R FAR EAST MD MARITIME MD TRANSBAIKAL-AMUR MD BALTIC REGION N.WEST RUSSIA (WHITE SEA MD) TRANSCAUCASUS TAURIC AND ODESSA MD's TURKESTAN MD MOSCOW-OMSk- 5TALINGRAD TRIANGLE NOVOSIBIRSV. -I(GLASNOYARSK-IRICUTSKTOTAL IN51DE U.S.S.R. 750 450 550 1500 ( 0100 110 0 900 250 1250 700 8110 GRAND TOTAL - I(o000 A/C, 2000 ASSIGNED TO THE RED NAV{ L AIR FORCE. PERSONNEL STRENGTH - 575000 OF WHICH 60000 ARE RED NAVAL AIR FORCE. nio rE , 7hese f•gureS do i•of ir•c /ude Me All,l) Cllr ,force U4h/ch is corn ll-•ecf 0/ 400 11c a/Id 0,oerso1717el SZ1017W Il of Sono. .7he M liD (711 .:7ov-ce /S eVS6 1 22i A )IL1,• ,oafro/ Qn• for i•fe•w; 'coir,•;•✓• c, •• •• of fhe A/ I-D �VC5UIDED MISSILES REASON TO BELIEVE RUSSIA /ABREAST OF ALLIED NATIONS ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENT DUE TO i 6rtgaged icy NWd Aissft Research early as io)4i zQf yr¢s¢at controls 50% ,•ernian guided misstle sci¢aafic ,p¢rsonn¢l,_ 3Control of Tafleututide , Xordha5ca, Naclstag¢n. Ceba aid brestau., Olawrch is aid Will be immune from hOsttte attack due to catCoocdinatiott • dtspersat of ltidi•strjj. (b) Secr¢cy GUIDED MISSILES I 1 V-1 buzz bomb V. 2 I ITON EXPLOSIVE 124000 L5 TOTAL WT 1 29000 L6 2. 60-70 MILES 3. 1000 M P.H. 2 3000 MILES Z4.000 3 350 MPH 4 A.9 WITH A.1O Pwr UNIT 3 5870 MPH �r co w p secret ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES BEGINNING ABOUT 1951 a&aa idiMi • . q o va d missiles, roafels or aircraft lainchPd . fr0rrl Su•maruzes . Z. WNI Tony rangeair faorr AmalrneRl o,/ 71ulneraMP areas Elie 11 S_ Q and Canada ,pnssi61J .orn4s. alith Clfotnic .l3 3 ,Se•ure o ojecflves in the szMarc&c reyiqns pf Canada, le'!Q rol •a•rador f r__,,v•lles 0 Ca> taur. aftaMs ehuz9 • r •u•ded•srles, mcAefs or arccra• ay•f •lllnPra•IP areas or aerral tmutelayny m CI>) arr6erne o . , oeraZzoMs aoalnsl z/ifal sfrale,9rc fasces. ., a smof11ej%jy c•cA z rt adrn•trisfrafrr/r centres • Offa!l,•i ,1•sfllrlQfoa, foyefhPr u>rlh slmllar aftochs or! &,e Cj1OITl1C ArjMj plat one>•lerg, . •fm•f • 1111rta•'nr, ,•Iff,l•rlrQ, •hr•a•o 7ulufh , .••DIIfl •a1, C10MVlfo, --1. ,•s al•l•s l r':.., �OP STCMT APrt'tirIX ", " GA^Arli,T"173 nr 11T '•' rIA' AW:Y 1. Sovift Army (a) "rr,nn t ` frnn,-th 0 ) nn 1 Ju1y lo46 the entimateu total strergt::, of tic Zro•ind forces of the U,."..9 . r. wac 4,' 1001 1 OO distributed as follows, Tinl. ,d Oerz•aoy Pnland Czr••hoslovakia Auntria 1o, 000 600,000 ?nn, non 5,000 7; , ,X10 )lun_ary Yrtroslovia nu rani a Oulgar1a Itanctniria and Korea - 0 ry 0o 1o,000 450, OOO loo,000 22'. , 010 Total lutsidr Russia Total witlan : oasis 1,.-•25,000 2,175,000 GRAND TOTAL 4,000,0,^,:, Thin r:stimate can not be ennsidered in any way firm as ver; ' ittle ralial,lu evidence on the st.rnn^th and movrmrnt or demobi lienti •) n of F.use.isn forces has been received since the end of hnatiliti a. The veri.ous nources dleaLroe within wine mvrg'r,s as t•• •. e strenCth of the Runrian garrisons in aaeh conntri. s no r 'olen, rd Loumanla and the fitnires we have accented are based or , arbitrr­Y aEsunpti no. (11 ) The stmngth and disposition of hussian forces within the . . . are even more problematic than tho^e in the ocospif-d areas ahriau. Transcrltcania in the oal r • rglnn ahrnit which information is avrtila , l.r, It is rstimat(.d that a total of 230,000 trnaps are disnosr ;! (iii) Stf,te of a.;,, re. Tralnirr and 0-i ani,ttnti on Therh i4 conaidcrable evidence that dlsci ,01 n, thrnu,in„f I—Rr, ; rmy its l,f in;- ti.i;htened - in, 4ut so far thrre is no c, :!'` rms t . ,v of rumour' of a widusr,reao shakers) in Army. ti,f+ high cnm•;t , u. t: Ttie annual doss which yoidle an entlm„t.:d 1, 01),lYk1 r cr ties celled nn an ntroul In 1045 and will +, ndrrubti.o1 j :, e cfrll..i f colours in 1941,. There in efidoner that th,ne reer ttr, arr• rein 1nt, r,sivw trains nC of t1,e l ast war. both at some and ahroa,i on ihf hams is V,. t' ' t , 'here is some rvldenro that conwicernhle reor,,s„Szat taking - lace to the establish men ts n r trd Arty fnronfl ns, h t • f,,r ef-cntial — tails er• lacking. It is ntobahle , t,owwver, st t. •f sasl l • rmoured brlEailes rave neon renliv ed bu nrrnurwrl r, ; m- nts wr ; are r,ow t..,rouned into ar r-ur•ed o1vislnrs. Tt 1; One .) rohab1 a t.hnt. a drat. r nrci• rtinr uivis'ions I,rva , - en mot.nriued, ' tvin t the led irmy than it. Lad at the rru! of Lnettitt.l&a. of tnfp; ,-r . restfr " rility t, �(iv) iien•ona and rgvi ment In the artillery field the Sovirts are as far nrlvanced an the ratern ' owura in high velocity guns , but at the moment are behind somewhat in the development of hollow chrtrfe shells. 1'"wever, with xn , rt ,: ermsn ald and cantured German stocks the , will in the very near future be at least as for auvanced in this ltne as were the Grrmane. As for V.T. runes since hui:u stocks o1' th«ne were left by th , rIS forme in tho nonsession of the French Army, there is every reason to heltevu that thr- 'ovicis aru In ­ nsessI ,. n of name ; f not all o f' tine manufacturing tccrets of this wean -)rt. In the heavy tank fi eld it i6 known that at tue end of i iontll itles the snvirts were no far advanced if net, ahead of th- is-! tern Fowcra and thero is no reason to believe tk,nt 1f they havr nest a!ready c.ono so, then in the very near future , they will holve ueveloned time light eirborne armoured fighting vehicle to a very blh ue,ree. It is helieved that Russian industr^ will be r•ble in tier near future } if not now, to nroruce efficient onion of scientific irnlements of wer received from the USA and the UK'unurr Lend lease such as radar and tjn more advanced morels of communicatione eq+.lp ,.,t. In the lonZ range rockets and Gnidrd (missile s ii<.lci it, ; a , c.i that the :r,vtets are hard at work on research and it is : el I. vec with thr, German knowledLe they now have in their oonsesslnn am +.:. the aid of German scientists they have taken hack to huaele fr-•:the Soviet r=upis:,d zones that in probably three years they will be able to nroLuce these weapons iu quantity capable of reacrtin- tar ets at rangos tin to 3000 miles. Lt.Ltle is known of "ussian nro.ross in the field of btolo;ical warfere, hnwover , USA and UK scientists learned ao much abort ( rm, warfare driring '„ orld war II that any enemy thiakinr about attacking thin cnntirent with B.t. is likely to consider what he would et in ret•irn. As far as in kAlown the J:•a^lt does not today iosr ess the at. el bomb. hn^revar, it is believed that it may req ,iire 3 to 10 years for the U.MR to nroduce -ttomic weanons beeauen of the tea,,; nitude of • ae proceastng retablishments required and special techniques used. The utilization of German scientists and German production faoiliti&s `neatly enf,aneme the iloviet capabilities to rrr ('. ice atonle oirrr a,•A. weanons. (v) TJwi(Amr, Factors for Assoolt on ' firth Amnrica ,raw The U`' ; F. is at nresent cansble of mobilising and eq rini arny of R to ln ,Qnn,nn n men . in weanorts , eq•iinmcnt arts tral woi,l,' be equal to any army in the wnrlrf Loday . however it m well heh ind An:lo-Amrrleaa rtamlerr ,s in mobility acct it.w•:1 , the aunoort of an efficient etrateaio air force and navy. an t ft would also lack the hitokitw of the At- 3 -.l( b).mh • tx. t',u i menee winerlority of the combined ; nungtrlal carscity tr . t rJ,C impi re and the I1"A. Thr Ftiesian military roe-urcas w• -,nlo be indoiibtwdly wif , ioleat for then to overrun tho whol- of Arune , exce•-t the ' K, an no , an tl,e Greater hart of Asia . It 1s it, , oosibl% t< , forunes how In n,oh operntione would take arui what nronortions of their ,roand forces wr ,, rl < i be available for nn, ruttons a,•ainet :+ortt, AM, rica . Nuwev.u•, it is aw ,,ly clear that the limiting factor will not be man-nower 11- it air ar,d naval nower. �-3 - The Rod Army co+, ld accept casualties at the rate of about 1,5p0 ,000 por year without its size beln• serinualy affboted but it, is probable that shorteu;oa with regard to cartaln vital rear materials world develop within a year of the L , agi„n1 ,C. of bn stllitien. TlAs is particularly trim of Lich octane outrnl, exolosives and rubber. In view of this it is lmnrobable that the Russians , within the next five years, could conLeaillats auyt„iol; ,. ore than airborne commando raids aimed at ninning down the maximum American war notential in defence of North America and destroyiry; vital targets. (b) Future Gtrenr+th (1) ,+en- rower By 1956 Russia will have a military man-pow , r pool of over at least 40 million men. The tralneo res-rvcs should amoluit to 20 million men. (ii) Limiting FActors within 10 Years From the noint of view of r, sources of trained man-noscr, standards of trainln,,, oqui - ment, weapons a:,,l air- lies of munitloan and other resources of war thu 11:1C,R al osld nosaese witbii, ter, y( ars a most formidable military machine with canabillties ' united by factors which do not primarily concern ti-e ground forces. It is •- robablo that by this timo tl,e ;. usaians will have trained and eq,:lnned sufficient airborne forces for -aajor oncrutions even in forth America. 2. nTli h i,.CT'IJ (a) I,nsian A1rh ,, rne Forces (i) General The Soriet Union was the first country in the world to develop an eirborne arm and to accont the idea that parachutists cn.)ld ' Ie b•,nloyud nn a large scule in modern warfare. Acconitrkt.ly, the neglig- ible nee by tto lied Army of parachute tropns in an airbo rne r^l. dur'iig l.orld t-ar 11 In surprising. The followut, k; rectors provide a nKrtial exilanation: (a) ' rhe necessity for using trained narae ., utiste as elite infantry in a nprely ! rou„d role at crlti.cal - olnts war r"_ar to Vj". (b) the loss, prior to 1944„ of traln•d or chute r. ,:re-,nnel Lo oti, r ormd , r:arl ioularly to Lhe a„tial narsthe + niantr . (c) I-,. a„ortb t; e nl' aircraft , w`,l--- ,. re n..u.< ,.i tu utt, r urnoe .: s, anc: ti,u t.na„equate ,. ratat:i,_ A aircrb +n, nartlr . furl' u uavlyatin ,. nt ,,,, ti,wr ,Wr s ., i,Ll, , ,orlJ ,1.r 11 Old 1 - a •. r„orn& arm hove its ,wn airern , L a:,art ! l•,. r wall trat „ it • force. lh.- , lj major alrborw or, , rpt. l1.1 u,-•.•rtak— b; tl,o L,- c, itsus, of 1943) wen a Comnlct, f,.i lure, Jo 1.1, , Lim , „, tbla failure hwl been a,,11 ,,,:, au, the aLnv , Knt.lnn• , 1 .,' *, ,f;. , xt,.:it ma,'e gono, the not ,aracl,uto- wurrant the use of state , f ol,,,r were however uacu to ouco,y ke.,; a'nort• cevr-sign against Jaoan. Li ,;,a ati ,al„et. fors , s r•y ,> i.,la iu tiro ; i , r b,,, t1- ..,• Array, LLV ant. Itrr r •; 1n lcr. -1-1s of ct n tv io irn' ,; , e V t:,r �-4 It is however important not to lone ell;ht of the fact that a considerable nronortlon of the resources which lght have Teen used for airborne op,,rations by the Red Army (Bach as trained r,arachutiets , trained saboteurs and transnort aircraft ) were In fact used by the Russians to reinforce and sup>ly tits lar,,e scale partisan movement. (ii) St"n!7th rarrinq Past War In May 1n41 the formation of several airborne corps was begun. These suffered heavily when being used as infantry in a - rnnr"i role during the initial German offensive . Shortly after the German attack, Stalin ordered the creation of ten three -brigade airborne corns, which were conpl•ted about six m•riths later. They received little training in parachute -jumnin.m , since insufficient aircraft and narachutes were available . fine of the difficulties of this period was that there warn defects in the rogistration of the tra!nr.l parachutists of are-war days and, on general mobilisation , many hb(' been called un for other arms of the orrvice. The airborne fnrces thus lacked as lar,,e a nucleus of trained personnel as mi,;l,t hfti P been expected . For the defence of Stalinerad (AuOint 191, 2), these airborne corps were hastily converted into guards rifle anc artill r•• formations , which suffered very heavy losses . To compensate far t,,is conversion , further new airborne corps were immediatel , formed ti: t they &fain were used as Eround infantry in 1943 and were lar:-sly c .eetrc;ed. By this time , the majority of the airborne p'.rsonnel. had '.. c,-* infantry and were lost to the airborne arm. Only nersonne•i wi:c :: n;' hannened to he in hosnital eud a few selected senior officer * r" a at. These remnants were incorporated into new airborne brigades. Theme new airborne brigades were called guards airbcrne hr!a•.es from the moment of their creation . The title of " Luards " was t, , t, ns in the case of most other guard' s formation , earned as a !:attic : r. The first of some twenty such brigades was formed in kcril 1043 vxa the remainder came into existence by July of the ea.Te year. ,', e n,rsonnel were at first costly crown from the 1924 and 192. classes (i.e. aged 19 - 20) but the later brigades incluc'od nersun.:el 1913 - 10 23 classes . The officers were in many cocoa olcer. t , Many of these brigades were still in existence at the e:.., World War II . of The brigades anpear to be tndenendunt and scanty re- ports suggfsting a divisional oreaniaation of thre r bri,;ados tieve ° nr the nreeent been discounted. The guards airborne brigades hr.vi their formation been urn or the Supreme Comman ,' er of Airborne Tw , tniards airborne brigade s took cart Fctrres. L, cr sirb-r"e n•.• r­ tion 1n 3entemher 43 which was part of a concerted atte:nt. t Firer a ernnairy, of the river linlepr (known as tits rrtev o• •crati• ,n). Tf•c two brigades in quvetlon w, re wined out and ti,e o-iermtion '• ai i• - nletrly. 'rho Germans anr,raciat,d that this was due to tl:e ra:t L.:t the -ucrachutists were too li,;htl•, armhcl ai,u to the lneuffici e :! tra , of pilots and their lack of iractice in cooneration with the "rnr it ,•,ts. 'rho nest time that airborne formations were nand was i ­ 10 45 for the virtually uno,, osu( occunati­)n ., f le"ortant lases Manchuria and Korea, (iii) ♦irborne Troo;,e and the disarming -, f the Janan .oe tr• ,`na. in Partisan , Narfare It is lu,nern thtit earl,., the onr witl, ': rrwa; V, t.,o Come, e,nri mece consiturahle , so of narachutiate as a »wans t f r#Ll•,- forcing nartteans . 1'hume operatlnns ran_,rd free the small • r r-araChuti mi, de ' , ollti ' ,n eneelolists to l.,,s et,y_l. recor.to ce ,, . entire bri ,; ads, Smolensk t which was tir ;• ,. a1 h.5hird i uthe airman of lr',1,1. t,J* (; tr• an llur•e Many of the •) eroonr , rl scar w, rc. ,f �-5 clothes . The brig&Le cooperated in nartiaan warfare and sent information back to the Tied Army by wirelces . Some useful exnerience in the use of narachute troons was no c.oubt Calped in this way by the Soviet High Command. (iv) Pnrachutists in an Intelll ;-once Role Small parachutist reconnaissance units are normally attached to armies and fronts . Their duties incluue sabotage and eanionat;e. They anpear to have constituted a very important source of intelligence during World War II. (v) Cliderborne Troons No information is available about the existence or history of gliderb ^rne troops , beyond the fact that twrj air regiments for glider training were thought to have existed in 1943. In theory, the Red Army probably contemnlatrd the use of gliders mainly n order to sunnly a successful landing by narachute troops ( The view of the Gorman Commander -in-Chi(f is that there was little to fear from Russian naratr000 gliders ). It Is however noteworthy that gliders did play a nart in sun,lying the partisan movement. (vi) Politicnl Factor From its earliest history , nrrsonnel for the airborne a?-have bran selected only from nolitically reliable elements. Tire percentage of Communist narty members amongst airborne ners rael is very high in c,moarison with the rest of too Red Army. (vii) nrpanizntion (,ce Appendix) The guards airborne brigades are all under the ccntr -1 - f t.>o Sunreme Commander of Airborne Troops . He has a Chief of % taff ww a comnrebensive staff , including reoresentativees of other arms. Tie Deputy Lhief of Staff is also Inspector -Gentral of Airborne Tr- one. The Sunrome Comman<er of Airborne Troons also con! r• ,ls asae air rrtgiments for training nornosee only. Aircraft for airborne oneretione hnve to be furnished by tho tactical or strate ilca' rtr forces or teen by the civil air fleet. Under the Sunrome Commander of Airb ,,rae Tr,o+ ,s are als" a number of schools a. rd i)ractice areas. (viii ) Fut+iro Strength It must be accented that during tiro olosin ` stai rs of lie past war the husnians hart organised and trainod at leant 20 6ux nu Airborne @ril•adcs of 4t200 men each . J "L'' • of these formation were later dinsinatHd in a grounC role- Irut the fact remains that ,- tr KO,r'lln men and a ht&d quartors staff provice a formidable nuclaus for buildin t; n,, alrb-erne forces. The l.im ]tin i fecturs will a orj;mniaat. iousl ability t field of tralning, sun - lyin l and maint. ai..ir% large airbor)a C- 1rctts over ennsiderablu distajrnes ratior ti,an any ai,orta,:e _ r man — nwtr, spr:cialised equi,mrnt, aircraft or Mearwrl ls• , (b) Runeien Tnrhrnt.rial o•otential In gn,iging kunsiau military oanahiliti,s in any Man nvnI. , world domi. natlnu it is eeaentlal tr, Lake into aconuut.the rtletiv• industrial 1otuntial of tht IISSR and nth .r leading ? rowers. �-6Below in tabular form are shown the relative production figures of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the rr Sn. The goals not by Stalin for the Five Ycar Plan ar , shown um:er the year 1950 for the USSR. Production in millions of tons ' r.S.A. 1941 Coal 556.6 Pie Iron U U.K. 1941 1941 206 191 50 7 is Steel 73 12 22 Oil 229.8 12.5(E=ire) 38 ,t . 1950 250 19 25 35 From these fieurce it is evident that even without includln„ ti,e other members of the British Commonwealth or nossible A111 ,d overs, the USA and UK together are overwhelmingly superior in industrial notential. Furthermore , not only are the Soviet Vale for their industry in 1950 very modest bat indicate a definitely pessimistic outlook for their oil industry . It is also well to bear in mind that the foals set In a five-year plan usually indicate a maximum which is seldom acbieved in nractice. With regard to production of weapons the iussians reached eytraordinar ,' volume during the east war, but tliia was achieved of ccnsidprnblo strain and sacrifice to the civilian oonulation. Thus tanks wore produced at the rate of over 2,500 a, r month and gone at the rate of 10,000 of all calibres. Within ten years the luesians will probably have overcn -,e el c bottle-necks as shortage of explosives , synthetic rubber, arid hli:'!octane netrol. (e) Canadian - American V,rl.nnrabillty (I) Present Position In view of all the evidence available it is clear hat a nresent time and for at least the next five years the ''­ slana will have neither the industrial war potential or the teci.nical . A-ans fir a saulting the North American Continent in force anu trw,s ,, orttn, ar,d maintaining larCe armies on thin ennttnent. However the hussiano have available suffiole ; it airb orne forces and may be technically cenuLle of eandinu raldine amrtiaa i ,rnfftcient strength to seize and hnlei temnorartly advnuea bases in t'e Arctic area or ouch targets as tl,e I,adi ,im and Uranium mltu-e on Crest : leer Lake. (11 ) F'ut,urn •• oeition Within ten years the ,' 33H may have available fro::: 2 t 4 AM men trained in airborne onerntiono nn-' have the trahnical faeilt'ie:s to transport such forces by air arui water. B,rt It is obvious that before the t.usslans c­11 ,1 ho e t r'10. s,a- h vast farces they wnula have Viso to a,ni trate ar•. sq c•it` n ear,• for nneretione as far south as the nnr -thr rn nratri. a iu Al ,e'rt. , , eat Sasketcr,awan , tLe open country imm#diatel) sort r :' in ire lieaeriecilt. ural anu industrial To achicvs such ucen area of eouthbr : , ienetration one or uterlo ufbd ­thee. ,ii , f' ', t'olI �-7 - factors must obtains (a) Overwhelming P.useian sunerlority in tte air. (b) Comolete strategic surnrine which would have Orawn away a large proportion of the American war notential to another theatre or caught N. Am-rica cosenletely off guard. (c) A successful Fifth Column wr.ich would interfere effectively with V. American mobilization nlans eu,E war production. Conclusions In examininz Soviet capabilities for assaulting the ' o-ti , American Continent , even though one must recognize the inadesgiate state of our information , it is quite clear that tussian limi u tions will not lie in the s'bere of available man-powFr or _? o,,nd forces but in such factors as industrial war potential for a long -drawn out war, scientific and technical achievement arc tre-snort organization by Bea and air. At the present time and in the next five years ti , e Fed Ar my is probably ca- able of over -running the whole of t<urone , excl_r in the UK and almost any part of Asia, but, it could not hole to acni(VL more than a few commando raids in the Arctic areas of this c-rsti:.­a. After 1950 and in the foreseeable future the Russians -I.nt capable of carrying out more serious air-borne:operations if trey can secure aufficiont advance bases. But unless ti,ey rase s^-.e soectac•slar advance in the science of war, -. ore clestrictive t-.&. the atomic bomb, or succeed in undermining the nolitical sta^ili•__ of this continent , the E:uaaians will not be in a position t• er,,;a•e in en active striggl. e for world dovinaCion d»e to the sFrio.•s dienronortion in their industrial capacity whicl, can not be •^ aterlally altered in the foreseeable future. �I a Z!Alt ns tirbcmF © PS ( 42C, man oFPr `: 1 aa¢ a W ?twos coy (116 or 160 a0a) N+rt Pn cnd str unkne-,p) PY Arty flu (-;0 man) ,L (9 Lms ) ?1 vne ! —tarn) l2, . ).? .?irt. ( L z ' S i:::: 1. Ti (o—: i,.... (27 A tk rifles) , P 4 :: •;Lin A TT) �Top SECrF.T APK'a)IX " D" TI[WAT TO i,- r ► 1fAL 3RCUL(ITX 1. FACTM5 (a) Communism is international and knows no boundaries of creed or religion. (b) As the only world newer under this system of Eovernment, Russia dominates the nolioy of the International Communist Party. (c) In turn , the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dominates fiussia. It is the State Party and the controlling organ of ti.e country as all matters of national policy must have the anrroval -f the Political Bureau of the Party before being passed to government machinery for attention. (d) Communism is found in Canada . The following figures ae to strcni;th are considered substantially accurate: 1939 1939 1939 1946 Communist Party statement of strength .satellite organisations Estimate of sympathisers on basis of 10 per Party member LPP Estimate Strength of membership v 000 41,000 130 'r ' m 16,000 to 1R,n00 The Labour Pro.- resolve 'arty is by its own nublic avowal Communist in doctrine and intention. (e) The influence of the Communist Party must not be Judged by numb «rs alone as on account of their political exnerl unce and methods its leaders exercise more ,owes than indicated by th-ir numerical strength. (f) The nractice of the Gommuniat Party and its satellite organizations is to infiltrate leaders into positions of nro-wlnence in bona fide and sincere organizations, such ce youth move-icnts, study clubs , labour unions and the (' anadian Legion , then to rauually attemnt to sway the policy of such organisations alonj Prominent and natriette Party lines or to Party objectives. pennlc• frequently lend their su -)port iutknowin,;l.y to a nroject ti.at, is subject tr, Communist Influence end has a ca-i ufla„od Nut well -defined Communist objeotivo . This oraotice Las hoei and ; e %wing followed in Cin —l a. i. C, AW-Il;ilnM (a) The nlans and policies of Internatiunal Communise ar• nlans and policies of the Soviet Union ant • vice vtrsa. the (b) 9ovirt fiuesia already has are active Fifth Geluan in this country which in the event of hostilities coula a:xl avuld he usec immr,diately to influence politics ' tj owlet., to create wn. nt anti internal dIeeonsion , to font , r esninna;e and enbot. age, mae by ver, means in its ,, over to advance the cause of t.Lr " ovi•t. ap-: -if int-:vaetinnal Communism. �LAC RG24 Vol. 6169 File 15-24-51 Another copy of the full appreciation is in the file noted above. Only the map has been copied here. �L, J• + • • r '•- ' rs r r 1 r 7 r a ,I 4!' / '1 IIn i:Lr HC i / °'^ 1 r ••4 Y 71 • 1 •i f, / •l CONFIDENTIA L .r ✓z "7 , •• •••- r -.-'. l• i /}7+•• P F '•'` AIR FIELDS 0 HARBOURS r .J•,.. _ MOTOR ROADS DIRT ROADS (SOMETIMES , MOTORABLE) MI' ti RAILROADS r ......•••• ARCTIC SEA ROUTE """••+ APPROXIMATE OPEN WATER LIMIT IN OF SUMMER rr ti 1 slr• eC.. i • • yr Y I •fir •'•+•' • r `4) NAVIGABLE RIVERS , IN SUMMER - ..•. • - AIR FIELDS(EL.G.) HARD SURFACE ••••j_ oo V Fc o !Is LEGEND i Jr-? i re• T o,.Y`4••' �t _ s y• - t J i n \ r ti •4 -R ; 4 . w y r y �i } / k r' S max ` •r .h Ile a l s I -• ' IY 1 rft • ... t IJP•, y • - •y I -` • r 1J tf•• \ ,r• • •I .1 r. i .[-r .• •S °•'f •. ,.• t o •• 0 •. ,,, d•` acv • *`•. . yr Ar .. b b•„ . i ° • / d F.. 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IiY l � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIA00002 Title A name given to the resource JIC Assessment, “Strategic Appreciation of the Capabilities of the USSR to Attack the North American Continent" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 15-Aug-46 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived LAC RG24 Vol. 8088 File 1274-10-5 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Intelligence Assessment Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource EN