https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ee938f20931b3e5b14ec2862b15ced69.pdf 868eea6ba8c4ca578277004ba87f4bb8 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information ,J DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. C• TO: . NUMBERED LETTER UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA,CANADA. ~ FROM: .Of.'J:.G~ . .Q '.. nM .. t:I.Ci.QP) •ty ................................. Ui~CLSSI 'I .tID Se:cur1 No: ......... /.b.31....... . ........... Date, ...... ~th ' $.S.+P.lj#i.~~- ... F.nclosures: ..... Aeference:. ur .. 1. tt r .. 1 13. o.f:.20t . P.e;i::lt uo.~r•. . . , .?.e.pMllll:JIll'., . J 9;i' Q µ,;r ........ Air or Surface Mail: ... , .... , .... . .:i.:r ........ , .. . ..f--,J... Poat File No,........................... Ott••• File No, ............~: ...~~, ............... .. $7)2bo c/o Subject, ... ur.g(;t. . ~e,=; ..~y ·~~:T.~~~r:~~~~~······ . II n... fleferences \. -, • (c--r-- -~ \~~J/JJ>.I~ p.J.... 6---0 /~ .,_,1....-~ii~ 0 ~.:.1 ro .,_._. -¥Jo ,.,-_~ ,- };.~ . The p :ication of the Government s eport Concerning the Disappearance of Two Former Foreign Office ·officialst~ (six copies of which are attached) has had anything but an enthusiastic reception by the press, and has apparently served to increase rather than aiminish the demands for a full debate when Parliament reconvenes in about a month's time. 'I I t Internal Circulation Distribution to Posts 2. Editorials under such headings as "Too Late and Too Little" (The Times) anCi.u uestions Unanswered" of the Jress reactions. (Sunday Times) givea an inuication '.fhe : hi te aper left itself wide open by introducing the concluding paragraphs with the statement that "Two poi'1ts call for comment: first, howl aclean and Burgess remained in the Foreign Office for so long, ana second, why they l:!.ditorial writers were not slow were able to get away". 0 to pick this up, ana as The Times puts it: There are not two, but a dozen points that call for co.liltnent and the new light upon them". In the hite Paper throws little it "does not really words of the 11lvlanchester Guardian", add much to the story as the diligence of the newspapers have built it up over the last four years". In fact, about all that is conceded to be new information is the revelation that Burgess had been asked to resign shortly before his disappearance, and that, on the day before the flight, authority had been granted by the Foreign Secretary ~ven this information, for the questioning of Maclean. cti.ticism on the grounds that however, has led to further it is oifficult to see any reason why these facts could It has also been not have been made public ~ong ago. was noted that the request for Burgess 1 resignation apparently not on security grounds but for reasons of personal conauct and unreliability only, and this has given rise to speculation as to whether the Foreign Office would in fact have discovered that Burgess was involved if he had not chosen to escape. 3. .part from the general question of the adequacy of the Foreign Office's security system, both in terms of ~he measures taken in the investigation ana surveillance procedures which the of }aclean and of the clearance Jhite - aper states wer~ adopted in 1952 as a result of this case, the two focal points of editorial criticism replies to have been the 11reticence 11 of Ministerial questions on this subject in the past and the question why, 000109 fat.182A (Rev. 2/52) . �,. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loi sur /'occes a /'information ~ ~· ·- ~ - 2 - even apart from t.q,e· element of espionage, these two men, but particularly Burgess, should have been P3 rmitted to remain in _the Foreign Service as long as they did .. On neither point does tJ:ie White f'aper appear to have been very successful in satisfying the critics. 4. Another aspect of the case which has caught the public imagination is the suggestion in the White Paper that there may have been a uthird man,." who was responsible for warning Maclean of· the security investigation, with its implication that if such a person did exist he may still be in the ranks of the Foreign Service. • 5. The se·cond instalment of the Petrov articles, dealing with the·rdle of Mrs. Ma~lean, also appeared in 11The .People 11 ·yesterday.. Copies are attached, together with editorials from The Quardian and The Times. (It would be interesting to.know whether the placing of the advertisement in the Guardian for Burgess~Mattresses and Divans was deliberate or not.) .Q 'f: &rl~ CANADAHOUSE. 000110 �Docur,:ient divulgue en vertu de la Lai sur /'acces DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL DATE Oct. SECURITY a/'information AFFAIRS 5, 1955. UIICLASSIFI D FROM:J . L • ( 2) J . [l For Signature D For Action ll For Comments [l For Approval For Information File and 5<j Destroy COMMENTS: (This [l space is not permanent character formally recorded rIr \ E!JCLO:HIBL FILE: 502 Ext. 252 (Rev. 11/52) Return [l for comments of a which should be in a memorandum) .~rn 011 Jd ♦ �Document disclose un er t e Access to n ormat1on ct Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information ' • ' • • l 000112 �Document disclosed under the Access to Inform Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loi sur /'occes a I' - • ol �D7'ic'J'm°'i?ntd°irclos;d °i1nderth"tA"tce'"ss foTfJformotfon4.acf Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loisur /'occes a /'information O , I =9 I , .,. We -coop ~he world again today! No. 3851 74th Year 2½D• MORE SECRETS FROMPETROV Petrov has put the Foreign Office in a panic. \ What the White Paper did not tell you NO newspaper has staggered the world on the scale 'The People' did last Sunday. Our publication of the facts concerning the missing British diplomats, Maclean and Burgess, by Vl~dimir Petrov, the former •Russian agent, has had amazing repercussions. It forced the Government to publish a White Paper. BUT the document did not tell ALL the facts, and· today we publish new disclosures from· Petrov-who ran out on the Russians in Australia-that will add to the outcry. For Petrov reveals that after Maclean and Burgess escaped, the Foreign Office we re fooled by Mrs. Maclean as well. ' ifhey ·were fooled by-Mrs. Maclea By VLADIMIR PETROV TODAY I can disclose the most astounding secret of the entire Maclean and Burgess affair-the part played in it by that remarkable woman Mrs. Melinda Maclean. This wife and mother, who earned widespread sympathy when her husband, the Soviet spy Donald Maclean, fled to Moscow, was herself, I am now sure, piece of duplicity. guilty of a staggering She fooled the Secret Service chiefs of Britain, and then those of France and Switzerland, in a series of that few master spies can match. cunning manceuvres It was my comrade Kislytsin who placed me in possession of the Burgess and Maclean secrets. He was my assistant in Canberra, the Australian capital, where I was chief of the M.V.D., the Soviet spy network. ~ From 1945 to 1948 Kislytsln was stationed in London, where he was hi personal touch with the two diplomats. Afterwards he worked at M.V.D. headquarters in Moscow in the department handling the Maclean and Burgess operation. The truth of the disclosures he made to me have now been confirmed by the British Foreign Office. Since I broke with Moscow and was given refuge in Australia last year I have studied the published documents in the case of the missing diplomats. Fitting together all that Kislytsin told me with these publicly known facts, I can now complete my dossier on Burgess, Maclean-and Mrs. Melinda Maclean. Urgent conference in Moscow As I disclosed last week, Maclean and Burgess spied elgn Office information for transmission by code to Moscow. In the Soviet capital he later had charge of the secret library, consisting entirely of documents supplied by the two diplomats. Kislytsin was never allowed to meet the two men whose highly valuable information w e n t through his hands. Only on their arrival In . Moscow did he greet Maclean and Burgess for the first time. And Kislytsin was given three men were well known to me personally. The conference quickly decided that Burgess and Maclean were agents of such value, that at all costs they must be saved from arrest and brought to sanctuary in Russia. How to stage the escape itself was a much tougher problem. Plan after plan was discussed, or,., to be rejected. Everyon'i at the conference was obsessed with the perils of whisking away from London two spy suspects holdmg Important, Foreign Office posts. At last the route Maclean and Burgess are now known to ....__ ..__.....,...,...,_ ·- ate notes and placed money to her account in a Swiss bank. And so the M.V.D. had started to plan the final operation in the missing diplomats s~iting away of affair-the Mrs. Maclean and her children. It was even more daring than th~ coup by which Burgess and Maclean themselves w er e snatched from under the noses of the British Security services. Kislytsin was in it from the beginning, though he was not in Moscow to see its final outcome-. By this time he had joined me in Australia. But when he read the reports in Australian newspapers of Mrs. Maclean's disappearance he recognised some of the details of the escape plan to which he had devoted so much of his • skilled attention. And the most breathtaking feature of the scheme was the part assigned to that attractive, enigmatic, American • born mother and wife of a top Soviet spy, Mrs. Melinda Maclean. the job of looking after the He told her precious pair. He became. indeed, their welhis plans fare supervisor. He saw them installed in a comfortable house I am now convinced, though on the outskirts of Moscow. He conclusive evidence is lacking, signed the chits for all their that she knew all about her food, clothing and personal husband's plan to flee. necessities. At any rate, she began to play And he prepared plans for a willing and highly astute part exploiting their diplomatic in her own successful disapknowledge and skill in the S<!r- pearance very soon after Donald vice of the Kremlin. Maclean passed behind the Iron Curtain. Wh_en ner husband vamshed 'Supplied with on May 25 1951,the birth of her baby Melmda was only a month the best' ahead Yet on the mornmg Obviously, Burgess and Mac- after Donald's disappearance lean would best be used as she was reported cheerful. advisers to th~ Soviet Ministry Maclean isn't here," she of Foreign Affairs, especially on is "Mr said to have told her housequestions affecting Russia's rela- keeper with the utmost calm. tions with Britain and America. ,n private she was, of course---And that was the job which closely mterrogated by men o 000114 Kislytsin arranged for them. the British security services.__ __ _. They were engaged in it when She told them she knew nothing. Kislrtsi:1 left .. Mo~ow to join ShP. so ftrmlv ~nnvmr<>rl th., ♦ �Document di~ulg~i;~ vert~ de la Loi sur racces a MORE SECRETS FROMPETROV Petrov has put the Foreign Office in a panic. What the ·White Paper did not tell you NO newspaper has staggered the world on the scale 'The People' did last Sunday. Our publication of the facts concerning the missing British diplomats, Maclean and Burgess, by Vl~dimir Petrov, the former •Russian agent, has had amazing repercussions. It forced the Government to publish a White Paper. BUT the document did not tell ALL the facts, and today we publish new disclosures from Petrov-who ran out on the Russians in Australia-that will add to the outcry. For Petrov reveals that after Maclean and Burgess escaped, the Foreign Office we re fooled by Mrs. Maclean as well. They ·were fooled ·by -Mrs. M·acle By VLADIMIR PETROV TODAY I can disclose the most astounding secret of the entire Maclean and Burgess affair-the part played in it by that remarkable woman Mrs. Melinda Maclean. This wife and mother, who earned widespread sympathy when her husband, the Soviet spy Donald Maclean, fled to Moscow, was herself, I am now sure, guilty of a staggermg piece of duplicity. She fooled the Secret Service chiefs of Britain, and then those of France and Switzerland, in a series of cunning manreuvres that few master spies can match. It was my comrade Kislytsin who placed me in possession ' of the Burgess and Maclean secrets. He was my assistant in Canberra, the Australian cap! tal, where I was chief of the M.V.D., the Soviet spy network. • From 1945 to 1948 Kislyt-, stn was stationed In London, where he was iri personal touch with the two diplomats. Afterwards he worked at M.V.D. headquarters in Moscow in the department handling the Maclean and Burgess operation. The truth of the disclosures he made to me have now been confirmed by the British Foreign Office. Since I broke with Moscow and was given refuge in Australia last year I have studied the published documents In the case of the missing diplomats. Fitting together all that Kislytsih told me with these publicly known facts, I can now complete my dossier on Burgess, Maclean-and Mrs. Melinda Maclean. Urgent conference in Moscow As I disclosed last week, Maclean and Burgess spied for Russia over a period of many years before the suspicions of the British Security Services were aroused. Then came catastrophe. The two men discovered that they were under Investigation. Terrified, they reported to their Soviet contact In London. At once, Kislytsin revealed to me. the full resources of the M.V.D were mobilised to snatch them from danger In Moscow an urgent conference of top M.V.D. agents was called. Chief of those present was Colonel Raina. head of the First Directorate. which is responsible for intelligence work in Britain and America His deputy, Gorsky. since dismissed from his post. was there. So was Kislytsin himself. All eign Office Information for transmission by code to Moscow. In the Soviet capital he later had charge of the secret library, consisting entirely of documents supplied by the two diplomat.s. Kislyts!n was never allowed to meet the two men whose highly valuable information we n t through his hands. Only on their arrival in . Moscow did he greet Maclean and Burgess for the first time. And Kislytsin was given the job of looking after the precious pair. three men were well known to me personally. The conference quickly decided that Burgess and Maclean were agents of such value, that at all costs they must be saved from arrest and brought to sanctuary in Russia. He became. indeed, their welfare supervisor. He saw them installed in a comfortable house on the outskirts of Moscow. He signed the chits for all their food, clothing and personal necessities. And he prepared plans for exploiting their diplomatic knowledge and skill in the service of the Kremlin. 'Supplied with the best' How to stage the escape itself was a much tougher problem. Obviously, Burgess and MacPlan after plan was discussed, lean would best be used as or,., to be rejected. advisers to th" Soviet Ministry Everyon(j at the conference Foreign Affairs, especially on was obsessed with the perils of of affecting Russia's relawhisking away from London questions tions with Britain and America. two spy suspects holding Im- And that was the job which portant. Foreign Office posts. Kislytsin arranged for them At last the route Maclean They were engaged in it when and Burgess are now known to Kislytsln left Moscow to join have taken from London to me •in Australia. They are; no Paris was plotted In Paris doubt. doing it now. ., M.V.D agents took complete Kislytsin reported to me that charge. 1A Soviet or Czech he had left Burgess and Maclean plane-K1slytsm was not sure in excellent health, leading a which-flew them to Prague.] most comfortable existence and supplied with the best of everyThe joy and relief with which thing. the M.V.D. chiefs received them Life for the two rescued in Moscow can well be imagined. spies was idyllic-but for one Though he had been in intimate contact with them for thing. They missed their families. years, the rules of the spy game had prevented Kislytsin from Maclean especially was no actually meeting Maclean and • doubt concerned about his wife Burgess. and three children, one of whom As cypher clerk to the London was born only a few weeks after branch of the Soviet spy nethis flight across the Iron Curwork Klslytsin had handled tain. large Quantities of secret. ForHe had sent Melinda affection- ate notes and placed money to her account m a Swiss bank. And so the M.V.D. had started to plan the final operation in the missing diplomats affair-the si#fiting away of Mrs. Maclean and her children. It was even more daring than th~ coup by which Burgess and Maclean themselves w er e snatched from under the noses of the British Security services. Kislytsin was in it from the beginning, though he was not in Moscow to see !ts final outcome. By this time he had joined me in Australia. But when he read the reports in Australian newspapers of Mrs. Maclean's disappearance he recognised some of the details of the escape plan to which he had devoted so much of his skilled attention. • And the most breathtaking feature of the scheme was the part assigned to that attractive, enigmatic, American • born mother and wife of a top Soviet spy, Mrs. Melinda Maclean. 'He told her his plans I am now convinced, though conclusive evidence is lacking, that she knew all about her husband's plan to flee. At any rate, she began to play a willing and highly astute part in her own successful disappearance very soon after Donald Maclean passed behind the Iron Curtain. When her husband vanished on May 25 1951, the birth of her baby Melmda was only a month ahead. Yet on the mornmg after Donald's disappearance she was reported cheerful. "Mr Maclean isn't here," she ls said to have told her housekeeper with the utmost calm. ~n private she was, of course, closely mterrogated by men of the Bnt1sh security services. She told them she knew nothing. She so firmly convinced the British authorities of her entire ignorance of her husband's secret life as a spy and runaway that the Foreign Office made no objection when she took her children on holiday to France only three months after Donald Maclean's flight. l'.et it now seems certain that in France she made contact with an M.V.D. agent and finally igreed to take part in the plof' that led to her own flight across the Curtain to Moscow. For Kia!ytsin made It clear to me that the M.V.D. was seeking an opportunity to contact her 000115 �- - •• -- ·- •• - ···~---...,......,.--,.---,,-.,.....,..,..,.._,,_~~--~---:~~-:-:-:----:-......,.--..,...,...,..----~~ Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loi sur /'occes a /'information ■ Continued #tom Page 1 immediately after her husband's get-away. It was even intended that an official of the Soviet Embassy should approach her in London or at her house in ;feent! But the M.V.D. chiefs decided it would be too risky. She must be contacted in a spot where British security agents could be evaded. On her Riviera holiday, agents of the French security service kept the Maclean family under constant watch in the villa they occupied. Yet Mrs. Maclean managed to slip away for two whole days. This may have been the occasion for her fateful rendezvous with the M.V.D. But the eyes of the Western counter-spy agents were still upon her. It was too soon for flight. She returned with her children to England. There she at once began to play a game of incredible duplicity. She spoke of 'divorce' \ She unburdened herself to her friends about her broken home. Tragically she spoke of the " fa<;ade" of her marriage. She annoul"~ed her intention of divorcing Donald. This was a sheer blind to throw British security' off the scent. I have no doubt that her story of a forthcoming divorce was part of a " cover " plan in which she was co• operating with the M.V.D. In July, 1952, Mrs. Maclean announced that she was leaving Britain to live in Switzerland with her children. The vigilance of British security had by now completely relaxed. " Surely," they must have argued, " a woman who has finished with her husband will make no move to rejoin him." • The S~iss Intelligence organisation did, however, maintain some sort of surveillance over Peirov on the woman who lied Mrs. Maclean's new home In Geneva. She clearly fooled the Swiss agents, too. For Kislytsin reported to me that in Geneva a M.V.D. representative arranged with Mrs. Maclean the final details of her journey to Moscow. On Friday, September 11, 1952, two years and four months after her husband's disappearance, Mrs. Maclean drove off with her children in her black Chevrolet car, ostensibly on a visit to friends. Their movements were traced to the Austrian border. There the trail ended. Mrs. Melinda Maclean had triumphed over the security services of three countries. The part she had played as an abandoned wife, disillusioned in her traitor husband, was crowned with success. Now she 1s living with her husband in Moscow as he secretly continues with his work for the Soviet Foreign Ministry alongside his fellow spy Guy. Burgess. Burgess and Maclean were undoubtedly prize " catches" for the M.V.D. But it is certain that the Soviet spy network has recruited informers of greater or l e s s e r usefulness in every country with which Moscow maintains diplomatic relations. .1These time-honoured diplomatic contacts b e t w e en States a.re vital for the working of the Russian secret service. Almost irwariably the hea.d of the Soviet spy ring in any country is to be found sa.fely installed in the Soviet Embassy itself. That was the pattern in Australia when I headed the M.V.D. organisation. It was the same when I was stationed in Sweden from 1943 to 1947. And the pattern is duplicated in every capital of the world. Each head of an M.V.D. TOO! is the block of ABOVE buildings in which Mrs. Donald Maclean lived in Geneva. And in the picture on the right she is seen at London Airport with her son, as she walks out to join the plane which brought her on the first leg of her escape. No wonder she smiles! * branch is known as a " Resident." He holds military rank in the M.V.D. that corresponds with the importance of the country in which he works. Whe~ I was sent to Australia, then beginning to assume great importance politically as a Pacific power and militarily as the centre of secret rocket experiments, I held the rank of Lieut.-Col. of State Security. Later I was promoted full Colonel. But my rank and the nature of my work wen; kept secret from everybody in our Canberra Embassy save the Ambassador himself. M.V.D. headquarters in Moscow appointed me and my assistants. We were responsible to the M.V.D., not to the Foreign Ministry: AP the same, we spies had .>::u jobs in the Embassy. I was Third Secretary and Consul. My wife Evdokia, who held the rank of Captain in the M.V.D. and acted as my cypher clerk, was Embassy accountant. There were two reasons for this arrangement. It kept our colleagues in ignorance of our real function. And it gave us, as diploma-ts, immunity from arrest by the Australian counter-spy organisation should we be unmasked. Their agent was safe If I were caught in espionage work the Australian Government could only ask Moscow to withdraw me from Canberra. Moscow would have to comply, but tb,eir agent would be safe. And, more important still, the M.V.D. could send out another "diplomat "-in the guise of a new Counsellor or Press Attache or $.econd Secretary - and the spy ring would carry on. Besides, by doing a real diplomatic job, the Soviet spy has many opportunities for worming out the secrets of the country to which he is accredited. As Consul in Australia it was my duty to look after the interests of Soviet citizens all over the country. That meant travelling and meeting people who might be enlisted to supply secret information. The approach to prospective informers is the crucial point of a Soviet agent's work. One false move a.nd he frightens off his conta.ct or exposes himself as a spy. Moscow's standing instruction to all its agents abroad is never to approach a possible source of infprmation without asking permission from headquarters. Even when pertnission is given, the agent proceeds with the utmost caution. There is first a period of " study," to discover the suitability of the contact. It has so,r.e:~1 mes taken me weeks to cc,mplete even this preliminary s'.,a~e. I had to weigh up how sympathetic my contact was to the Soviet system. Could he be useful to us? Did he have access to Government information? Did he have any weakne,ss on which we could play to enlist him in our cause? Knowledge of a contact's income is important, for we might be_able:to tempt him with money. His rellg10us beliefs, any associations with women, especially outside marriage, whether he drank-all these were included in my " study " of a victim. I reported to Moscow the results of my inquiries. •Then, if they agreed that I had a likely recruit m tow, I was allowed to go ahead and delicately probe for the secret information he possessed. Some contacts did not know they were divulging anything of importance. They were our unwitting helpers. Others became conscious agents-and sometimes received payment. Messages from M.V.D. headquarters were sent to us in the di\)lomatic bag. I knew which letters to pick out because the Pnvelopes bore the initial letters of three Russian words meaning "Office of Weights and Measures." The messages inside were on undeveloped film wra.pped in light-proof paper. I developed and printed the films myself, then passed them to my wife to be decoded. I burned the negatives. One print of each message was kept in my safe. After 12 months the print was destroyed. Afraid of discovery Moscow was morbidly afraid of our secret documents-some of them with names and addresses of informants-being discovered by the Australian Security Service. At one stage they asked me to find a hiding place for them outside the Embassy. I chose a spot underneath a bridge on a road outside Canberra. But Moscow told me it was unsuitable. They refused to approve of two other suggested hiding places. Before I could propose a fourth, the crisis that brought about my breach with the M.V.D. had come to a head. When I was given refuge in Austral!a and diploma.tic relations were broken between Moscow and Canberra. my spy-ring collapsed. But let rio one imagine that a smashed Soviet spy network cannot be rebuilt. I saw the way this was done in Sweden. WORLD. COPYRIGHT RESERVED Next week Petrov reports on his spying assignment in Sweden-an investigation into the private life of his own amba.ssador ! 'I blame the·diplomat THE revelations about Maclean and Burgess in our columns a week ago resulted in general attacks on our Whitehall " diplomats " that were more unrestrained than any launched against any Government department during -my half-century in politics. " People shouldn't blame our civil servants," pleaded Lord John Hope, a raw junior Minister. " Blame us Ministers! " Fancy the Government putting up an office-boy to answer the Press! The plain truth is that our for the resolute spirit with entire "diplomatic" system needs which he had imbued the nation, overhauling-the Foreign Office, Maugham declared: our Embassies and the consular " The only persons who seemed service. to me unchanged were the officials of the Foreign Office. A warning in 1941 " I met them sometimes at S long ago as May, 1941, i dinner and I was amazed to in mu f"nl11mn • utter.ed in an hour of crisis, did no good. The old school tie was pulled a little tighter; that was all. So we lost the- peace o it was that, after the war, S saysHANNEN SWAFFER. we lost the peace. In Rome, our diplomats palled up again with their pre-war friends, the nobles and the wealthy ones, who owned the best polo ponies and had the best booze. The views of the workers were never heard. (Incidentally, it was from our Embassy in Rome that two chests of secret doc 000116 e stolen.) Wanted: the n:i.....~-...., 1 l THO was the Whitehall diolo- �kept the Maclean family under constant watch in the villa they occupied. Yet Mrs. Maclean managed to slip away for two whole days. This may have been the occasion for her fateful rendezvous with the M.V.D. But the eyes of the Western counter-spy agents were still upon her. It was too soon for flight. She returned with her children to England. There she at once began to play a. game of incredible duplicity. She spoke of 'divorce' ' on woman who lied ' Mrs. Maclean's new home In Geneva. She unburdened herself to her She clearly fooled the Swiss friends about her broken home. agents, too. For Kislytsin reTragically she spoke of the ported to me that in Geneva a " fac;ade " of her marriage. She M.V.D. representative arranged annouri.i:ed her intention of with Mrs. Maclean the final dedivorcing Donald. tails of her journey to Moscow. This was a sheer blind to On Friday, September 11, 1952, throw British security" off the two years and four months after scent. I have no doubt that her husband's disappearance, her story of a forthcoming Mrs. Maclean drove off with her divorce was part of a "cover" children in her black Chevrolet car, ostensibly on a visit to plan in which she was cofriends. operating with the M.V.D. Their moveme"nts were traced In July, 1952, Mrs. Maclean to the Austrian border. There announced that she was leaving the trail ended. Britain to live in Switzerland Mrs. Melinda Maclean had with her children. triumphed over the security serThe vigilance of British l!ecurity had by now completely vices of three countries. The relaxed. " Surely," they must part she had played as an abanhave argued, "a woman who doned wife, disillusioned in her has finished with her husband traitor husband, was crowned will make no move to rejoin with success. him." Now she 1s living with her The S~iss Intelligence organhusband in Moscow as he isation did, however, maintain secretly continues with his work some sort of surveillance over for the Soviet Foreign Ministry alongside his fellow spy Guy Burgess. Burgess and Maclean were undoubtedly prize " catches" for the M.V.D. But it is certain that the Soviet spy network has recruited informers of greater or 1 es s er usefulness in every country with which Moscow maintains diplomatic relations. .,These time-honoured diplobetween matic contacts States are vital for the working of the Russian secret service. Almost iqvariably the heacl of the Soviet spy ring in any country is to be found safely imtalled in the Soviet Embassy itself. That was the pattern in Australia when I headed the M.V.D. organisation. It was the same when I was stationed in Sweden from 1943 to 1947. And the pattern is duplicated in every capital of the world. Each head of an M. V.D. TOO! is the block of ABOVE buildings in which .Mrs. Donald .Maclean lived in Geneva. And in the picture on the right she is seen at London Airport with her son, as she walks out to join the plane which brought her on the first leg of her escape. No wonder she smiles! * branch is known as a. " Resident." He holds military rank in the M.V.D. that eorre5ponds with the importance of the country in which he works. Whel). I was sent to Australia, , then beginning to assume great importance politically as a Pacific pow'er and militarily as the centre of secret rocket experiments, I held the rank of Lieut.-Col. of State Security. Later I was promoted full Colonel. But my rank and the nature of my work wer~ kept secret from everybody in our Canberra Embassy save the Ambassador himself. M.V.D. headquarters in Moscow appointed me and my assistants. We wel'e responsiple to the M.V.D., fflrt to the Foreign Ministry; Al' the same, we spies had .•::ii jobs in the Embassy. I was Third Secretary and Consul. My wife Evdokia, who held the rank of Captain in the M.V.D. and acted as my cypher clerk, was Embassy accountant. There were two reasons for It kept our this arrangement. colleagues in ignorance of our real function. And it gave us, as diplomats, immunity from a r r es t by the Australian counter-spy organisation should we be unmasked. Their agent was safe If I were caught in espionage work the Australian Government could only ask Moscow to withdraw me from Canberra. Moscow would have to comply, but tb,eir agent would be safe. And, more important still, the M.V.D. could send out another "diplomat "-in the guise of a new Counsellor or Press Attache or $.econd Secretary - and the spy ring would carry on. Besides, by doing a real diploma tic job, the Soviet spy has many opportunities for worming out lhe secrets of the country to which he is accredited. As Consul in Australia it was my duty to look after the interests of Soviet citizens all over the country. That meant travelling and meeting people who might be enlisted to supply secret information. The approach to prospective informers is the crucial point of a Soviet agent's work, One false move and he frightens off his contact or exposes himself as a spy, Moscow·s standing instruction to all its agents abroad is never to approach a possible source of infprmation without asking permission from headquarters.. Even when conscious agents-and sometimes received payment. Messages from M.V.D. headquarters were sent to us in the dl'plomatic bag. I knew which letters to pick out because the Pnvelopes bore the initial letters of three Russian words meaning "Office of Weights and Measures." The messages inside were on undeveloped film wrapped in light-proof paper. I developed and printed the films myself, then passed them to my wife to be decoded. I burned the negatives. One print of each message was kept in my safe. After 12 months the print was destroyed. Afraid pertnission is given, the agent proceeds with the utmost caution. There is first a period of " study," to discover the suitability of the contact. It has so,u:~•mes taken me weeks to c0mplete even this preliminary s'..a\(1o. I had to· weigh up how sympathetic my contact was to the Soviet system. Could he be useful to us? Did he have access to Government information? Did he have any weakness on which we could play to enlist him in our cause? Knowledge of a contact's income is important, for we might be able to tempt him with money. His religious beliefs, any associations with women, especially outside • marriage, whether he drank-all these were included in my ·• study " of a victim. I reported to Moscow the results of my inquiries. •Then, if they agreed that I had a likely recruit in tow, I was allowed to go ahead and delicately probe for the secret information he possessed. Some contacts did not know they were divulging anything of importance. They were our unwitting helpers. Others became of discovery Moscow was morbidly afraid of our secret documents-some of them with names and addresses of informants-being discovered by the Australian Security Service. At one stage they asketl me to flnd a hiding place for them outside the Embassy. I chose a spot underneath a bridge on a road outside Canberra. But Moscow told me it was unsuitable. They refused to approve of two other suggested hiding places. Before I could propose a ' fourth, the crisis that brought about my breach with the M.V.D. had come to a head. When I was given refuge in Austraha and diplomatic relations were broken between Moscow and Canberra, my spy-ring collapsed. But let no one imagine that a smashed Soviet spy network cannot be rebuilt. I saw the way this was done in Sweden. WORLD COPYRIGHT RESERVED Next week Petrov reports on assignment in his spying investigation into Sweden-an the private life of his own ambassador ! ' I blamethe·diplomats THE revelations about Maclean and Burgess in our columns a week ago resulted in general attacks on our Whitehall " diplomats " that were more unrestrained than any launched against any Government department during -my half-century in politics. .. People shouldn't blame our civil servants," pleaded Lord John Hope, a raw junior Minister. .. Blame us Ministers!" Fancy the Government pu~ ting up an office-boy to answer the Press! The plain truth is that our for the resolute spirit with entire "diplomatic" system needs which he had imbued the nation, overhauling-the Foreign Office, Maugham declared: our Embassies and the consular " The only persons who seemed to me unchanged were the officials of the Foreign Office.. A warning in 1941 " I met them sometimes at S long ago as May, 1941, i. dinner and I was amazed to wrote in my column: " Sooner or later-and the hear the casual, ironical way in sooner the better-we must re- which they spoke of the situation. form the Foreign Office." In proof of that, I quoted "You would have thought the Somerset Maugham, the distin- war was a game of chess; if your guished novelist, who had opponent made a move that enescaped from France on a coal- dangered your queen, you parried it, of course, but had to boat. admire his nimble strategy; and After a tribute to Churchill if, in the end, he beat you-well, after all, it was only a game, a very interesting one, and, next time, perhaps you would beat this week's word puzzle, set bl/ H. C. G. Stevens, him." you have to find the missing Our diplomats, added letters of four words meaning Maugham. " led lives so shut (a) retract, (b) ZUmps, (Cl off from ordinary human intergap and (d) frets. These letests that they ai·e incapable of ters spell, in their right order, a name prominent in sporttaking serious things seriously." ing circles. He saw them having long (a) * E C * • T lunches at the Dorchester, disS (b) • • L * 0 cussing Ming china or Water(c) * I A • • S ford glass. Meanwhile the * " world was crashing! Solution at root of Paire Fh e. Even this terrible criticism, utter.ed in an hour of crisis, did no good. The old school tie was pulled a little tighter; that was all. So we lost the - peace it was that, after the war, we lost the peace. SInO Rome, saysHANNEN our diplomats palled up again with their pre-war friends, the nobles and the wealthy ones, who owned the best polo ponies and had the best booze. The views of the workers were never heard. (Incidentally, it was from our Embassy in Rome that two chests of secret documents were stolen.) SWAFFER. A JN * (d) • E * E S Wanted : the names HO was the Whitehall diplomat who advised Ernest W Bevin, new to the game, to back the Arab League? Because of that stupidity, we lost Israel. Who was the Whitehall diplomat who persuaded Bevin to cold-shoulder Tito-until the Labour M.P.s whom I had accompanied to Jugoslavia were proved, by events, to be right? The cocktail set LMOST all over the world our Embassies wasted small A fortunes every year on cocktail parties. inviting only "the best people." 1 Well, because of the Foreign Office's blunders and evasions and lies over the Maclean and Burgess scandal, even our boasted Security Service is suspect! It let two spies escape, right under its nose. .I do not wonder that our nation is aroused to anger. 000117 �0 000118 I J �Document di closed under the Access to Information Act. M.§.nchester Guardian, c4'thSeptember, • 6 of character, but he seemed to be overcoming them. What we do not get from the White Paper is any hint of the evidence on which the security inquiry was based. It was investigating a leakage that took place " some years " before 1949; this MATTRESSES might have been only a casual indiscretion. Clearly security had not the remotest idea that in AND the archives of Moscow was a whole Maclean-Burgess sub-departDIVANS ment under the busy Kislytsin. On the general question of the treachery are made unhurriedly of Maclean and Burgess there is not much new to say. That they had but also.take their time Communist leanings at Cambridge in the early thirties means little. Those about wearing out were the days of the Popular Front, /11spite of tbiJ theycost of Spain, of the Left Book Club. Communism was an epidemic disease and surprisingly little more. with most of its suffererS-and from all appearances with Maclean and Burgess-it quickly passed. We shall never know why, like Alger Hiss, • »»«« these two men developed the strange kink that led them in the late forties to feed documents to the Russians. We do not, for instance, know when this Makers of Bedding for particular People. spying is supposed to have begun ; we Manchester 4• shall probably find that it was during the war when the Grand Alliance was in being and everybody was prepared to think so well of our Eastern ally. This is not a case of a generation being on trial, but of two clever but " rather unbalanced persons going :.\IA CHESTER SATURDAY wrong. The new security checks SEPTEMBE~ 24 1955 adopted by the Foreign Office 'in 1951 are all very well in their way, but if a really clever man wants to be a spy THE SPIES a check on his antecedents and associates is not necessarily a sure means The Government's White Paper on of discovery. (What, for instance, of the disappearance of Maclean a nd Burgess, who played about with the Burgess does not really add much to Anglo-German Club?) No doubt the story as the diligence of the news- there is much to be said in censure of papers have built it up over the laSt the rather wild life in which Burgess four years. In the story of the flight and Maclean sometimes indulged. It the unsolved problem that remains is : should be a warning to others in the ~ Who "tipped" them off or, as th e Foreign Service. But we must Government puts it, "alerted them"? remember too that Alger Hiss was Did they just sense that the security impeccably well-conducted. There is service was on their track or did no clear moral to be drawn except someone tell them ? Burgess had that the Foreign Office must look already been asked to resign (the date /anxiously to its standards of of this is not given). Maclean was efficiency, conduct, and alertness. It about to be closely investigated and will take it a long time to recover his house searched. On May 25 the from the effects of this terrible expothen Foreign Secretary, Mr Herbert sure, and the Government will do Morrison, sanctioned a proposal that well not to ride off in any the security authorities should ques- complacency. tion Macleap. On the evening of that day Maclean and Burgess fled the country. Who, if anybody, warned him? The White Paper says on this that after searching interrogations "insufficient evidence was obtainable to form a definite conclusion or t0 warrant prosecution." But has the Foreign Office no suspicions ? And have there been any staff changes in the Foreign Office to make assurance doubly sure? Has anyone been got off on suspicion? The other point on which there has been criticism, largely in America, is that it should not havE' been possible for Maclean and Burgess to get away so easily. The White Paper. with America in mind, says rather caustically: ~=============~ THE GUARDIAN In some countries. no doubt. Maclean would have been arrc.sted first and a4es• tioned afterwards. In this countrv'" no arrest can be made without adeauate evidence. True enough, but it is also evident that the watch on Maclean was not very close. It was confined to London. Once out of London, he could do as he pleased, even to getting out of the country. The security authorities were not acting with any urgel'l'Cy for they were going to delay the proposed interview with Maclean until mid-June-three weeks after the decision to interrogate him was taken This was putting touching trust in the inadequacy of the Foreign. Office grapevine. 195 �ocu~ent difflosed uqde,-the AfH!.ss:1.crJ.ormation Act a !'information Burgess does not really add much to Bur~~6m~'l\fl~v~W¥~~v.AAWW1c}'{btMir~Wcces Anglo-German Club?) No doubt the story as the diligence of th e news- there is much to be said in censure of papers have built it up over th e laSt the rather wild life in which Burgess four years. In the st ory of th e flight and Maclean sometimes indulged. It the unsolved problem th at remains is : should be a warning to others in the • Who "tipped" them off or. as th e Foreign Service. But we must Government puts it," alerted th em"? remember too that Alger Hiss was Did they just sense that the security impeccably well-conducted. There is service was on their track or did no clear moral to b~ drawn except someone tell them? Burgess had ~that the Foreign Office must look already b€en asked to resign (the date anxiously to its standards of of this is not given). Maclean was efficiency, conduct, and alertness. It about to be closely investigated and will take it a long time to recover his house searched. On May 25 th e [rom the effects of this terrible expothen Foreign Secretary, Mr Herbert ure, and the Government will do •· Morrison, sanctioned a proposal that ell not to ride off in any the security authorities should ques- omplacency. tion Maclean. On the evening of that day Maclean and Burgess fled the country. Who, if anybody, warned him? The White Paper says on this that after searching interrogations " insufficient evidence was obtainable to form a definite conclusion or tci warrant prosecution." But has the Foreign Office no suspicions ? And have there been any staff changes in the Foreign Office to make assutance doubly sure? Has anyone been got off on suspicion ? The other point on which there has been criticism, largely in America, is that it should not havf' been possible for Maclean and Burgess to get away so easily. The White Paper. with America in mind, says rather caustically: In some countries. no doubt. Made.in would have been arrested first and Questioned afterwards. In this countrvi no arrest can be made without adeouate evidence. True enough, but it is also evident that the watch on Maclean was not very close. It was confined to London. Once out of London. he could do as . he pleased. even to getting out of the country. The security authorities were not acting with any urgell'Cy , for they were going to delay the proposed interview with Maclean until mid-June-three weeks after the decision to interrogate him was taken This was putting touching trust in the inadequacy of the Foreign 0ffice grapevine. I The impression most people will form on studying the White Paper is that the security authorities did not take a very serious view of either { Burgess or Maclean. They. were perhaps right prima facie about Burgess, an unreliable type vho had not apparently been in any closely confidential relation. ( Although that is not to sny that he might not have gone to great lengths to steal documents from the British Embassy at Washington when he was there.} They were not. it would seem. moved by any great sense of urgency about Maclean. There is a curious phrase in the account of Maclean. He began as an officer of "exceptional quality"; he misbehaved and had a breakdown in Cairo. When he came back, pronounced as medically fit. he was made head of the American Department of ' the Foreign Office. This, says the White Paper, "since it does not deal with the major problems of AngloAmerican relations.· appeared to be within his capacity." Here ,,1.-asan able person given a responsible position in the Foreign Office. Yet it is now pretended that it was not a really important position, and was therefore "within his capacity." There is something of hindsight in this apologia. Some hindsight also comes into the account of Mrs Maclean in Switzerland. Would it not be fairly true to say that British security was deceived? It thought that Mrs Maclean could not be sympathetic towards a husband who had not treated her over well ; and besides, she was an American. At any rate, there was no watch on her. Call it "old school tie'' or what you will, there was great reluctance to b€lieve the • worst of these two. For this most people who look at J the evidence calmly will not be disposed to be highly censorious of the Foreign Office. It was natural enough that his colleagues should be lath to suspect one• of themselves. a man of great personal attraction, bearing an honoured name. He had his defects �Documen, Document di Tlili u rnras THE ' TIMES root cause of the evident strains which the men were under ? It is good to be reminded in the White Paper that, since the disappearance of the two men, security in the Foreign Service bas been tightened and that more searching inqumes are now made into the characters and antecedents of candidates and members. The whole affair calls for full, honest scrutiny before the forum of Parliament; and there mu~t be no TOO LATE AND TOO disposition, as there bas been on earlier occasions, to score party points. The LITTLE " Two points call for comment," says record of the Foreign Service is second the White • Paper on MACLEANand to none for steadfastness, hard work, BURGESS. That is typical of its prim- and loyalty, but the House will have ness and defensiveness. There are not searching and important questions to two but a dozen points that call for ask. comment, and the White Paper throws little new light upon them. Appearing as it does, scandalously late, four and a quarter years after the two men fled the country, the White Paper might • have been expected to give many details hitherto unknown. It does, indeed, mention that BURGESShad, just before his flight, been specifically asked to resign from the Foreign Office because of reckless and careless conduct while posted in the United States. It also discloses that on May 25, 1951, the very day of the two men's disappearance, the Foreign Secretary at that time (MR. MORRISON)agreed that MACLEAN should be questioned by the security authorities because of suspicions that he had previously passed Foreign Office information over to the Soviet authorities. For some unaccountable reason these facts were not made known until now. For the rest, the Paper does little more than confirm a good part of the information already known through the Press, and especially through the disclosures by MR. PETROVin Australia. There is very little doubt that, but for the knowledge that MR. PETROV was going to make his evidence public, the Foreign Office and the security authorities would not have decided to publish a White Paper at all even now. Throughout the past four and a quarter years the pattern bas been almost invariably the same. A Press report has been followed by a reluctant and often tendentious admission in the House or at the Foreign Office. Official statements were made which are now seen to have been misleading. No doubt the spokesmen themselves were put up without the proper information which is usual on foreign affairs. Even so, it is hard. to square the suggestion a year ago that PE·tRov's evidence was simply based on hearsay, and was "to be treated with some reserve," with the White Paper's admiss10n that PETROVhas " provided confirmation" of parts of the story. An even stronger discrepancy exists between the White Paper's evidence that MACLEAN was being watched on suspicion of passing information and LORD READING'S statement to the Lords on October 28, 1952. " Mr. Maclean," said LORD READING,"performed his official duties satisfactorily up to the date of his <fa-appearance." The White Paper defends what it coyly calls the '' reticence of Ministerial replies " on the grounds that it is not desirable at any moment to Jet the other side know how much has been discovered or guess at the means used to discover it. An excellent principle, but bow docs it apply in this case ? The Foreign Office needed no elaborate means to " discover" that it had asked BURGESSto resign or that it was closely watching MACLEAN;and the Russian<; already knew-otherwise they would not have helped the two men to escape. The net result of " reticence " was the opposite of that intended. Instead of becoming bored with the affair, the public scented a mystery·and wondered uneasily •how much was being hidden. The White Paper does little to remove doubts about the security authorities' handling of the matter. It says that, once suspicions fastened on MACLEAN,· \ they took a calculated risk that he became aware of their watch and made tracks for abroad. Events showed that they calculated wrongly; he did escape. But it is more extraordinary to read that, although gravely suspecting him, they As soon as Parliament reassembles time will be given for a debate on the White Paper on the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean, which was issued yesterday. (pp. 4 and 6) Mr. John Profumo has spoken of the difficulties which have to be overcome before regular helicopter services can be introduced as a commercial proposition. (p. 4) Sept ember, 1955 �through the Press, and especially through tfie disclosures by MR. PETROVin Australia. There is very little doubt that, but for the knowledge that MR. PETROV was going to make his evidence public, the Foreign Office and the security authorities would not have decided to publish a White Paper at all even now. Throughout the past four and a quarter years the pattern has been almost invariably the same. A Press report has been followed by a reluctant and often tendentious admission in tbe House or at the Foreign Office. Official statements were made which are now seen to have been misleading. No doubt the spokesmen themselves were put up without the proper information which is usual on foreign affairs. Even so, it is hard. to square the suggestion a year ago that PETRov's evidence was simply based on hearsay, and was "to be treated with some reserve," with· the White Paper's admission that PETROVhas " provided confirmation " of parts of the story. An even stronger discrepancy exists between the White Paper's evidence that MACLEAN was being watched on suspicion of passing information and LORD READING'S statement to the Lords on October 28, 1952. "Mr. Maclean," said LORD READING,"performed his official duties satisfactorily up to the date of his disappearance." The White Paper defends what it coyly calls the "reticence of Ministerial replies" on the grounds that it is not desirable at any moment to let the other side know how much has been discovered or guess at the means used to discover it. An excellent principle, but how does it apply in this case ? The Foreign Office needed no elaborate means to " discover" that it had asked BURGESSto resign or that it was closely watching MACLEAN ; and the Russians already knew-otherwise they would not have helped the two men to escape. The net result of " reticence" was the opposite of that intended. Instead of becoming bored with the affair, the public scented a mystery and wondered uneasily how much was being hidden. The White Paper does little to remove doubts about the security authorities' jhandling ~f- the matter. It says that, once susp1c1ons fastened on MACLEAN, • they took a calculated risk that he became aware of their watch and made tracks for abroad. Events showed that they calculated wrongly ; he did escape. But 1t is more extraordinary to read that, although gravely suspecting him, they decided not to keep a watch on his home in Kent. More extraordinary still, on the very day that authority was given to question him, he was allowed to go from London (where he was watched) on leave to :Kent (where he was not watched). And, according to the White Paper,· his flight that same evening, May 25, " did not become known to the authorities until the morning of Monday, May 28." They had cut themselves off from all means of knowing. Another point, Jess serious but no less bewildering, is that the White Paper says that the two men left the country " when the security authorities were on their track." Was BURGESS, then, also being watched ? There is nothing else in the White Paper to suggest it. The evidence produced i5 simply that he had • been asked to resign after the Ambassador in Washington had reported on his personal behaviour. The authorities cannot have it both ways. If there was suspicion of espionage in his case the evidence should be in the White Paper. If the authorities had no such suspicions, they evidently had been caught napping. The mystery is deepened by the Foreign Office statement last weekend that it was now believed that both men were" long-term agents" for the Soviet Union. PETROV has said so, and his testimony ts accepted, but on British evidence the part cf BURGESShas not been brought to light. Equally unsatisfactory is the way in which the White Paper deals with the manner in which the two men were kept for so long in the Foreign Service. All questions of spying apart, their personal behaviour at times should have raised far stronger and earlier questionings about their suitability for responsible work. Stories of their riotous bouts were common talk in London. Were they the men to be trusted with State secrets ? Did the authorities go on to ask what was the I Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divu!gue en vertu de lo Loi sur /'acces a !'information �ocument isc osed under the ccess to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur J'acces a /'information • .,We icoop the world again ·t(lday ! , Sunday SEPTEMB ,R 25 1955 THE PEO-PLE No. 3851 74th Year .. 2 21D, MORE SECRETS FROMPETROV Petrov has ·put the Foreign Office in a panic. What the White Paper did not tell you Noonnewspaper has staggered the world the scale 'The People' did ·1ast Sunday. Our publication of the facts concerning the missing British diplom'ats, Maclean and Burges5; by Vladimir Petrov, the former Russian agent, has had 'amazing repercussions. It forced the Governme~t to publish a White Paper. BUT the document did not tell ALL the facts, and today w~ publish new disclosures from Petrov-who ran out on the Russians in Australia-that will add to the outcry. For Petrov reveals that after Maclean and Burgess escaped, the Foreign Office were fooled by Mrs. Maclean as well. They were foaled byMr.Maclea By VLADIMIR PETROV -.- Jlllllll""I ...... TODAY I can disclose the most astounding secret of the entire Maclean and Burgess affair-the part played in it by that remarkable woman Mrs. Melinda Maclean. This wife and mother, who earned widespread sympathy when her husband, the Soviet spy Donald Maclean, fled to Moscow, was herself, I am now sure, guilty of a staggering piece of duplicity She fooled the Secret Service chiefs of Britain, and then those of France and Switzerland, in a series of cunning manreuvres that few master spies can match. It was my comrade Kislytsin who placed me in possession of the Burgess and Maclean secrets. He was my assistant in Canberra, the Australian capital, where I was chief of the M.V.D., the Soviet spy network. From 1945 to 1948 Kislytsin was stationed in London, where he was in personal touch with the two diplomats. Afterwards he worked at M.V.D. headquarters in Moscow in the department handling the Maclean and Burgess operation. The truth of the disclosures he made to me have now been confirmed by the British Foreign Office. Since I broke with Moscow and was given refuge in Australia last year I have studied the published documents in the case of the missing diplomats. 1 Fitting together all that Klslytsin told me with these publicly known facts, I can now complete my dossier on Burgess, Maclean-and Mrs. Melinda Maclean. Urgent conference in Moscow A:s I disclosed last week, Maclean and Burgess spied for Russia over a period of many years before the sus- eign Office Information for transmission by code to Moscow. In the Soviet capital he later had charge of the secret library, consisting entirely of documents supplied by the two diplomats. Kislytsln was never allowed to meet the two men whose highly valuable information w e n t through his hands. Only on their arrival In Moscow did be greet IUaclean and Burgess for the first time. And Kislytsin was given the job of looking after the precious pair. He became, indeed, their wel- three men were' well known to me personally. The conference quickly decided that Burgess and Maclean were agents of such value, tKat at all costs they must be saved from arrest and brought to sanctuary In Russia. How to stage the escape Itself was a much tougher problem. Plan after plan was discussed, on.✓ to be rejected. Everyone at the conference was obsessed with the perils of whisking away from London two spy suspects holding Important Foreign Office posts. At last the route Maclean and Burgess are. now known to have taken from London to Paris was plotted In Paris fare supervisor. He saw them installed in a comfortable house on the outskirts of Moscow. He signed the chits for all their food, clothing and personal necessities. And he prepare~ plans for exploiting their diplomatic knowledge and skill in the .service or the Kremlin. 'Supplied with the best' ate notes and placed money to her account in a Swiss bank. And so the M.V.D. had started to plan the final operation in the missing diplomats affair-the spiriting away of Mrs. Maclean and her- children. It was even more daring than th~ coup by which Burgess and Maclean themselves w er e snatched from under the noses of the.British Security services. Kislytsin was in it from the begmning. though he was not in Moscow to see Its final outcome. By this time he had joined me in Australia. But when he read the reports 1n Australian newspapers of Mrs. Maclean's disappearance he recognised some or the details or the escape plan to which he had devoted so much of his skilled attention. And the most breathtaking feature of the scheme was the part assigned to that attractive, enigmatic, American - born mother and wife of a top Soviet spy, Mrs. Melinda Maclean. He told her his plans I am now convinced, though conclusive evidence is lacking, that she knew all about her husband's plan to flee. At any rate, she began to play a willing and highly astute part in her own successful disappearance very soon after Donald Maclean passed behind the Iron Curtain. When her husband vanished on May 25, 1951,the birth of her baby Melmda was only a month ahead. Yet on the morning Obviously, Burgess and Mac- after Donald's disappearance lean would best be used as she was reported cheerful. advisers to th-\ Soviet Ministry " Mr. Maclean isn't here," she of Foreign Affairs, especially on• is said to have told her housequestlions affecting Russia's rela- keeper with the utmost calm. tions with Britain and America. !n private she was, of course, And that was the job which closely interrogated by men of Kislytsin arranged for them. the British security servu:·.....,__ _ They were engaged in it when told them she knew noth 000123 Kislytsln left Moscow to join She She so firmly convinced me m Australia. They are. no British authorities of her en'-----' doubt, doing 1t now. �MORE SECRETS FROMPETROV Petrov has ·put the Foreign Office in a panic. What the White Paper did not tell you NO newspaper has stagg~red the world on the scale 'The People' did ·1ast Sunday. Our publication of the facts concerning the missing British diplomats, Maclean and Burgess) by Vladimir Petrov, the former Russian agent, has had amazing repercussions. It forced the Governme~t to publish a White Paper. BUT the document did not tell ALL the facts, and today we publish new disclosures from Petrov-who ran out on the Russians in Australia-that will add to the outcry. For Petrov reveals that after Maclean and Burgess escaped, the Foreign Office we re fooled by Mrs. Maclean as well. They were fool dbyMrs. Maclea By VLADIMIR PETROV ,,.., . iy, I can disclose the most astounding secret of TODAY the entire Maclean and Burgess affair-the part played in it by that remarkable woman "Mrs.Melinda Maclean. This wife and mother, who earned widespread sympathy when her husband, the Soviet spy Donald' Maclean, fled to Moscow, was herself, I am now sure, guilty of a staggering piece of duplicity. She fooled the Secret Service chiefs of Britain, and then those of France and Switzerland, in a series of cunning manreuvres that few master spies can match. It was my comrade Kislytsin who placed me in possession of the Burgess and Maclean secrets. He was my assistant In Canberra, the Australian capital, where I was chief of the M.V.D., the Soviet spy network. From 1945 to 1948 Klslytsin was stationed In London, where he was in personal touch with the two diplomats. Afterwards he worked at M.V.D. headquarters In Moscow in the department handling the Maclean and Burgess operation. The truth of the disclosures he made to me have now been confirmed bY the British Foreign Office. Since I broke with Moscow and was given refuge In Australia last year I have studied the published documents In the case of the missing diplomats. , Fitting together all that Kislytsln told me with these publicly known facts, I can now complete my dossier on Burgess, Maclean-and Mrs. Melinda Maclean. Urgent conference in Moscow As I disclosed last week, Maclean and Burgess spied for Russia over a period of many years before the suspicions o f t h e Br! tlsh Sec·urity Services were aroused. Then came catastrophe. The two men discovered that they were under Investigation. • Terrlfl.ed, they reported to their Soviet contact 11'1London. • At once, Kislytsin revealed to me, the full resources of the M.V.D were mobilised to snatch them from danger. In Moscow an urgent conference of top M.VD. agents was calleo. Chtef of thosP present was Colonel Rama. head of the First Directorate, which Is responsible for Intelligence work in Britain and America. His deputy, Gorsky, since dismissed from his post, was there. So was Klslytsin himself. All • etgn Office Information for transmission by code to Moscow. In the Soviet capital he later had charge of the secret library, consisting entirely of documents supplied by the two diplomats. Kislyts!n was never allowed to meet the two men whose highly valuable information w e n t through his hands. Only on their arrival In Moscow did he. greet Maclean and Burgess for the first time. And Kislytsin the job of looking was after given the precious pair. He became. indeed, their wel- three men were· well known to me personally. The conference quickly decided that Burgess and Maclean were· agents of such value, tKat at all costs they must be saved from arrest 11,nd brought to sanctuary In Russia. fare supervisor. He saw them installed in a comfortable house on the outskirts of Moscow. He signed the chits for all their food, clothing and personal necessities. And he prepare<;l plans for exploiting their diplomatic knowledge and skill in the .service of the Kremlin. 'Supplied with the best' ate notes and placed money to her account in a Swiss bank. And so the M.V.D. had started to plan the final operation in the missing diplomats affair-the spiriting a.way of Mrs. Maclean and hel' children. It was even more daring than th~ coup by which Burgess and Maclean themselves were snatched from under the noses of the,Brltish Security services. Kislytsin was in it from the beginning. though he was not in Moscow to see its final outcome. By this time he had joined me in Australia. But when he read the reports in Australian newspapers of Mrs. Maclean's disappearance he recognised some of the details of the escape plan to which he had devoted so much of his skilled attention. And the most breathtaking feature of the scheme was the part assigned to that attractive, enigmatic, American - born mother and wife of a top Soviet spy, Mrs. Melinda Maclean, He·told her his plans I am now convinced, though conclusive evidence i& lacking, that she knew all about her husband's plan to flee. At any rate, she began to play a willing and highly astute part in her own successful disappearance very soon after Donald Maclean passed behind the Iron Curtain. When her husband vanished on May 25, 1951,the birth of her baby Melmda was only a month ahead. Yet on the morning Obviously, Burgess and Mac- after Donald's disappearance lean would best be used as she was reported cheerful. advisers to thii Soviet Ministry " Mr. Maclean isn't here," she of Foreign Affairs, especially on• 1s said to have told her housequestiions affecting Russia's rela- keeper with the utmost calm. tions with Britain and America. In private she was, of course, And that was the job which closely Interrogated by men of Kislytsin arranged for them. the British security services. They were engaged in It when She told them she knew nothing. Kislytsln left Moscow to join She so firmly convinced the me in Australia. They are. no British authorities of her entire doubt, doing 1t now. ignorance of her husband·s Kislytsin reported to me that life as a spy and runaway he had left Burgess and Maclean secret the Foreign Office made no in exce!lent health, leading a that objection when she took her most comfortable existence and children holiday to France supplied with the best of every- only threeonmonths after Donald thing. Maclean's flight. Life for the two rescued How to stage the escape Itself was a much tougher problem. Plan after plan was discussed, on., to be rejected. Everyone at the conference was obsessed with the perils of whisking away from London two spy suspects holding important Foreign Office posts. At last the route Maclean and Burgess are.now known to have taken from London to Pans was plottoo In Pans M.V.D agents took complete charge. IA Soviet or Czech plane-K1slytsm was not sure which-flew them to Prague.J The joy and relief with which the M.V.D. chiefs received them in Moscow can well be imagined. spies was idyllic-but for one Though he had· been 1n intithing. They I i:nissed their mate contact with them for families. years, the rule.s of the spy game Maclean especially was no had prevented Ki.slytsin from actually meeting Maclean and doubt concerned about his wife Burgess. • and three children, one of wtiom As cypher clerk to the London was born only a few weeks after branch of the Soviet spy net- his flight across the Iron Curtain work Klslytsin had handled large quantities of' secret ForHe had sent Melinda alfectton- Yet it now seems certain that in France she made contact with an M.V.D. agent and finally agreed to take part in the plot that led to her own flight across the Curtain to Moscow. For Kislytsln made it clear to me tha,t the M.V.D. was seeking an opportunity to contact her /TURN TO' PAGE THREE) 000124 �·- • -~ -~----------,.---,___,,.,~-~----~~~-:-:~---- Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lo Loi sur /'occes a /'information .. ■ Continued from Page 1 immediately after her husband's get-away. It was even intended that an official of the Soviet Embassy should approach her in London or at her house in Kent! But the M.V.D. chiefs decided it would be too risky. She must be contacted in a. spot where British security agents could' be evaded. On 11erRiviera holiday, agents of the French secnrity service kept the Maclean nmily under constant watch in the villa they occupied. Yet Mrs. Maclean managed to slip away for two whole days. This may have been the occasion for her fateful rendezvous with the M.V.D.• But the eyes of the Western counter-spy agents were still upon her. It was too soon for flight. She returned with her children to England. There she at once began to play a game of incredible duplicity. She spoke of 'divorce' She unburdened herself to her friends about her broken home. Tragically she spoke of the " fac;ade" of her marriage. She annouq~ed her intention of divorcing Donald. This was a sheer blind to throw British security off the ~cent. I have no doubt that her story of a forthcoming divorce was part of a " cover " plan in which she was cooperating with the 1'11.V.D. In July, 1952, Mrs. Maclean announced that she was leaving Britain to live in Switzerland with her children. The vigilance of British .!iecurity had by now completely relaxed. "Surely," they must haYe argued, "a woman who has finished with her husband will make no move to rejoin him." The Swiss Intelligence organisation did, however, maintain some sort of surveillance over Petrov on the woman who lied Mrs. Maclean's new home 1n Geneva. She clearly fooled the Swiss agents, too. For Kislytsin reported to me that in Geneva a M.V.D. representative arranged with Mrs. Maclean the final details of her journey to Moscow. On Friday, September 11, .1952, two years and four months after her husband's disappearance, Mrs. Maclean drove off with her children in her black Chevrolet car, ostensibly on a. visit to friends. Their movements were traced to the Austrian border. There the trail ended. Mrs. Melinda. Maclean had triumphed over the security services of three countries. The part she had played as an abandoned wife, disillusioned in her traitor husband, was crowned with success. Now she 1s living with her husband in Moscow as he secretly continues with his work for the Soviet Foreign Ministry alongside his fellow spy Guy Burgess. Burgess and Maclean were undoubtedly prize " catches " for the M.V.D. But it is certain that the Soviet spy network has· recruited informers of greater or le s s er usefulness in every country with which Moscow maintains diplomatic relations. These time-honoured diploma.tic contacts be tween States are- vital for the working of the Russian secret service. Almost invariably the head of the Soviet s~y ring in any country is to be found safely installed in the Soviet Embassy itself. That was the pattern in Australia when I headed the M.V.D. organisation. It was the same when I was stationed in Sweden from 1943 to 1947. And the pattern is duplicated in every capital of the world. Each head of M.V.D. TOO? is the block of ABOVE buildings in which Mrs. Donald Maclean lived in Geneva. And in the picture on the right she is seen at London Airport with her son, as she walks out to join the plane which brought her on the first leg of her escape. No wonder she smiles! * branch is known as a " Resi- out the l'erret.5 of the country to which he is accredited. dent." He holds military rank in • the M.V.D. that corr~ponds As Consul Jn Australia it was with the importance of the my duty to look after the intercountry in which he works. ests of Soviet citizens all over When I was sent to Australia, the country. That meant travelthen beginning to assume great ling and meeting people who importance politically as a might be enlisted to supply Pacific power and militarily as secret information. the centre of secret rocket The approach to pros1>ective experiments, I held the rank of informers is the crucial point Lieut.-Col. of State Security. or a Soviet agont's work. One Later I was promoted full false move and he frightens off Colonel. his contact or exposes himself But my rank and the nature as a spy. of my work were kept secret Moscow's standing instr~cfrom everybody in our Canberra t!on to all its agents abroad is Embassy save the Ambassador himself. M.V.D. headquarters in nPVer to approach a possible Moscow appointed me and my source of information without a.-~king permission from headassistants. We were responsible qua 7ters. Even when pcrm,sl!ion to the· M.V.D., not to the is grven, the agent proceeds with Foreign Ministry. • All the same.• we spiel'! irnd tht> utmost caution. T~ere is first a period o! real jobs in the Embassy. I v:ll.~ ~tuidy," to discover the suitThird Secretary and Consul. ab1li( '.Jf the contact. It has My wife Evdokia, who held the rank of Captain in the M.V.D. so,u~'mes taken me weeks to CflmpJete even this preliminary and acted as my cypher clerk, s:a~"was Embassy account.ant. I had to weigh up how symThere were two reasons for pathetic my contact was to the this arrangement. It kept our Could he be colleagues in ignorance cif our Soviet system. real function. And it gave us. useful to us? Did he have as diplomat.-;, immunity from access to Government informatio11? Did._he have any weaka r r est by the Australian ness on wluch we could play to counter-spy organisation should • enlist him in our cause? we be unmasked. Knowledge of a contact's income is important, for we might Their agent be able to tempt him with money. I;Iis religious beliefs, any associawas safe tions with women, especially If I were caught in espionage outside marriage, whether he .work the Australian Govern- <;!rank-all these were included ment could only ask Moscow to in my " study " of a victim. withdraw me from Canberra. I reported to Moscow the reMoscow would have to comply, sults of my inquiries. Then, if but their agent would be safe. And, more important still, the they agreed that I had a likely recruit in tow, I was allowed to M.V.D. could send out another "diplomat "-in the guise of a go ahead and delicately probe for the secret information he new Counsellor or Press Attache or Second Secretary - and the possessed. Some contacts did not know spy ring would carry on. Besides, by doing a real diplo- they were divulging anything of ma tic job, the Soviet spy has importance. They were our unmany opportunities for worming witting helpers. Others became conscious agents-and sometimes recPived pa?ment. Messages from M.V.D. headquaiters were sent to us in the diplomatic bag. I knew which letters to pick out because the f'nvelopes bore the initial letters of three Russian words meaning "Office of Weights and Measures." The messages lnsidl' were on undeveloJ>ed film wrapped In light-proof paper. I developed and printed the films myself, then passed them to my wife to be decoded. I burned the negatives. One print of each message was kept in my safe. After 12 months the print was destroyed. Afraid of discovery Moscow was morbidly afraid of our secret documents-some of them with names and addresses of informants-being discovered by the Austral!an Security Service. At one stage they asked me to find a hiding place for them outside the Embassy. I chose a spot underneath a bridge on a road outside Canberra. But Moscow told me it was unsuitable. They refused to approve of two other suggested hiding places. Before I could propose a. fourth, the crisis that brought about mv breach with the M.V.D. had com'e to a head. When I was given refuge in Australia and diplomatic relations were broken between Moscow and Canberra, my spy-ring collapsed. But let no .one imagine that a smashed Soviet spy network cannot be rebuilt. I saw the way this was done in Sweden. WORLD COPYRIGHT RESERVED ~ext week Petrov reports on his spying assignment in Sweden-an investigation into the private life of his own ambassador! 'I blame the diplomat HE revelations about Maclean and Burgess in our columns a week ago resulted in general attacks on our Whitehall T " diplomats " that were more unrestrained than any launched against any Government department during my half-century in politics. .. People shouldn't blame our civil servants," pleaded Lord John Hope, a raw junior Minister. .. Blame us Ministers! " Fancy the Government put.Ung up an ol'fice-boy to answer the Press! The plain truth is that our entire "'diplomatic" system needs o\'erhauling-the Foreign Office, our Embassies and the consular A warning in 1941 s long ago as May, 1941, I A wrote in my column: " Sooner or later-and the sooner the better-we must reform the _Foreign Office." ed uttered in an hour oi crisis, did no good. The old school tie was pulled a little tighter; that was all. So we lost the peace o it was that, after the war, we lost the pe~e. SIn Rome, says,HANNEN our diplomats palled up again with their pre-war friends, the nobles and the wealthy ones, who owned the best polo ponies and had the best booze. The views of the workers were never heard. (Incidentally, it was from our Embassy, in• Rome that two chests of secret documents wer stolen.) SWAFFER for the resolute spirit with which he had imbued the nation, Maugham declared: "The only persons who seemed to me unchanged were the officials of the Foreign Office. " I met them sometimes at dinner and I was amazed to hear the casual, ironical way in which they spoke of the situation. "You would havetthought the Wanted : the names ao was the Whitehall diplo mat who ad • s W Bevin, new to the 000125 c the Arab League? _____ o that stupidity, we lost srae . ur\-.,,., urn ... +h...,, 1XThih::,hQ11 rlinln �rur: ay have been the r her fateful rendezthe M.V.D.• eyes of the Western agents were still It 11•astoo soon for e returned with her England. e at once began to play incredible duplicity. rdened herself to her ut her broken home. she spoke of the of her marriage. She her intention of onald. s a sheer blind to foh security off the ha,·e no doubt that of a forthcoming s part of a " cover " which she was cowith the !U.V.D. 1952, Mrs. Maclean that she was leaving live in Switzerland ilrlren. ilance of British ct by now completely 'Surely," they must ed. " a woman who d with her husband no move to rejoin woman who lied Mrs. Maclean's new home In Geneva. She clearly fooled the Swiss agents, too. For Kislytsin reported to me that in Geneva a M.V.D. representative arranged with Mrs. Maclean the final details of her journey to Moscow. On Friday, September 11, J952, two years and four months after her husband's disappearance, Mrs. Maclean drove off with her children in her black Chevrolet car, ostensibly on a. visit to friends. Their movements were traced to the Austrian border. There the trail ended. Mrs. Melinda Maclean had triumphed over the security services of three countries. The part she had played as an abandoned wife. disillusioned in her traitor husband, was crowned with success. Now she 1s living with her husband in Moscow as he secretly continues with his work for the Soviet Foreign Ministry alongside his fellow spy Guy Burgess. Burgess and Maclean were undoubtedly prize " catches " for the M.V.D. But it is certain that the Soviet spy network has· recruited informers of greater or 1 es s e r usefulness in every countr}' with which Moscow maintains diplomatic relations. These time-honoured diplomatic rontacts between States are- vital for the working of the Russian secret service. Almost invariably the head of the Soviet Sl)Y ring in any country is to be found safely installed in the So,•ict Embassy itself. That was the pattern in Australia when I headed the M.V.D. organisation. It was the same when I was stationed in Sweden from 1943 to 1947. And the pattern is duplicated in every capital of the world. Each head of M.V.D. TOO! Is the block of ABOVE buildings in which Mrs. Donald Maclean lived in Geneva. And in the picture on the right she is seen a.t London Airport with her son, as she walks out to join the plane which brought her on the first leg of her escape. No wonder she smiles! • * branch ls known as a " Resi- out the secrets of the country to dent." He holds military rank which he is accredited. in· lhe M.V.D. that cqrre.~ponds As Consul in Australia it \\'as with the importance of the my duty to look after the intercountry in which he works. ests of Soviet citizens all over When I was sent to Australia, the country. That meant travelthen beginning to as:mme great ling and meeting people who impor,tance politically as a might be enlisted to supply Pacific power and militarily as secret information. the centre of secret rocket The approach to prospective experiments, I held the rank of informers is the crucial point Lieut.-Col. of State Security. of a Soviet agent's work. One Later I was promoted full false move and he frightens off Colonel. his contact or exposes himself But my rank and the nature as a spy. of my work were kept secret Moscow's standing instr~cfrom everybody in our Canberra tlon to all its airents abroad is Embassy save the Ambassador himself. M.V.D. headquarters in never to approach a possible Moscow appointed me and my source of information without asking permission from headassistants. We were responsible to the• M.V.D., not to the qua1ters. EYen w_henpermission is grven, the agent proceeds with Foreign Ministry. . ,, All the same.• we spie~ {1ad thP utmost caution. real jobs in the Embassy. I w Tl)ere is first a period of ~tuldy," to discover the suitThird Secretary and Consul. My wife Evdokia, who held thP ab11it:V'.)f the contact. It has rank of Captain in the M.V.D. so11.E'•mes taken me weeks to cr,mple•e even this preliminary and acted as my cypher clerk, s'-.a'5P. was Embassy accountant. There were two reasons for I had to weigl1 up how symthis arrangement. ,It kept our pathetic my contact was to the colleagues in ignorance of our Soviet s.1•stem. Could he be real function. And it gave us. useful to us? Did he have as diplomats, immunity from access to Government informaarrest by the Australian tion? Did. he have any weakcounter-spy organisation should ness on which we could play to we be unmasked. enlist him in our cause? Knowledge of a contact's income is important, for we might Their agent be able to tempt him with money. was safe His religious beliefs, any associaIf I were caught in espionage tlons with women, especially _work the Australian Govern- outside marriage, whether he ment could only ask Moscow to <;!rank-all these were included in my " study" of a victim. withdraw me from Canberra. I reported to Moscow the reMoscow would have to comply, sults of my inquiries. Then, if but their agent would be safe. And, more important still, the they agreed that I had a likely recruit in tow, I was allowed to M.V.D. could send out another "diplomat "-in the guise of a go ahead and delicately probe for the secret information he new Counsellor or Press Attache or Second Secretary - and the possessed. spy ring would carry on. Some contacts did not know Besides, by doing a real diplo- they were divulging anything of matic job, the Soviet spy has ,importance. They were our unmany opportunities for worming witting helpers. Others became conscious agents-and times received payment. Messages from M.V.D. headquarters were sent to us in the diplomatic bag. I knew which letters to pick out because the rnvelopes bore the initial letters of three Russian words meaning "Office of Weights and Measures." The messagrs insidr were on undeveloped film wrapped in light-proof pa.per. I developed and printed the films myself, then passed them to my wife to be decoded. I burned the negatives. One print of each message was kept in my safe. After 12 months the print was destroyed. ·~----- Afraid of discovery Moscow was morbidly afraid of our secret documents-some of them with names and addresses of informants-being discovered by the Australian Security Service. At one stage they asked me to find a hiding place for them outside the Embassy: I chose a spot underneath a bridge on a road outside Canberra. But Moscow told me it was unsuitable. They refused to approve of two other suggested hiding places. Before I could propose a fourth, the crisis that brought about my breach with the M.V.D. had come to a head. When I was given refuge in Australia and diplomatic relations were broken between Moscow and Canberra, my spy-ring collapsed. But let no one imagine that a smashed Soviet spy network cannot be rebuilt. I saw the way this was done in Sweden. WORLD COPYRIGHT RESERVED Next week Petrov reports on his spying assignment in Sweden-an investigation into the private life of his own ambassador ! 'I blamethe.diplomats revelations about Maclean and Burgess in our columns THEa week ago resulted in general attacks on our Whitehall " diplomats " that were more unrestrained than an¥ launched against any Government department during my half-century in politics. " People shouldn't blame our 1 civil servants," pleaded Lord John Hope, a raw junior Minister. "Blame us Ministers!" Fancy the Government, putt,ing up an office-boy to answer the Press! The plain truth is that our for the resolute spirit with entire "diplomatic" system needs which he had imbued the nation, overhauling-the Foreign Office, Maugham declared: our Embassies and the consular "The only persons who seemed to me unchanged were the officials of the Foreign Office. A warning in 1941 " I met them sometimes at s long ago as May, 1941, I dinner and I was amazed to wrote in my column: hear the casual, ironical way in "Sooner or later-and the , sooner the better-we must re- which they spoke of the situation. form the Foreign Office." "You would havecthought the In proof of that, I quoted war was a game of chess; if your Somerset Maugham, the distinopponent made a move that enguished novelist, who had escaped from France on a coal- dangered your queen, you parried it, of course, but had to boat. • admire his nimble strategy; and After a tribute to Churchill if, in the end, he beat you-well, <Jo.,V,JV'V'VV'v'V'o."-"-'V'JV'VVVVVVVVV: after all, it was only a game, a FIND THE FAMOUS very interesting one, and, next time, perhaps you would beat JNthis week's word. puzzle, set b11 H. C. G. Stevens, him." 1101i have to find the missing Our diplomat.~, added letters of four word.• meaning Maugham, " led Jives so shu.t (al retract, (b) ltlmps, (Cl elf! from ordinary human intergap and. (dJ fret.,, These letests that they are incapable of ters spell, in ·their right order, a name prominent in sporttaking serious tiiings seriously." ing circles. He saw them having Jong (al • E C • • T lunches at the Dorchester, dis(bl • • L • 0 * S cussing Ming china or Water(c) • I A * • S ford glass. M~anwhile the (d) • E • • • E S world was crashmg ! Solution at foot of Paie Five. Even this terrible criticism, uttered in an hour oi crisis, did no good. The old school tie was pulled a little tighter; that was all. So we lost the peace o it was that, after the war, we lost the pe~e. SIn Rome, saysHANNEN our diplomats palled up again with their pre-war friends, the nobles and the wealthy ones, who owned the best polo ponies and had the best booze. The views of the workers were never heard. (Incidentally, it was from our Embassy. in· Rome that two chests of secret documents were stolen.) SWAFFER A Wanted : the names l;IO was the Whitehall diplomat who advised Ernest W Bevin, new to the game, to back the Arab League? Because of that stupidity, we lost Israel. Who was the Whitehall diplomat who persuaded Bevin to cold-shoulder Tito-until the Labour. M.P .s whom r had accompanied to Jugoslavia were proved, by events, to be right? The cocktail set LMOST all over the world our Embassies wasted small A fortunes every year on cocktail parties, inviting only " the. best people." Well, because of the Foreign Office's blunders and evasions and lies over the Mac:ean and Burgess scandal. even our boasted Security Service is suspect! It let two spies escape, right under its nose. I do not wonder that nation ls aroused to anger. �-- ---- . 5 ·-- D0cument disclosed u () '2... {p O D~uf;t1) divulgue ltE, er the Access to lnformat1on Act ' • ,, I People 25th September, 1955 000127 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Doc ment divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information !)c.>:2., 6 The Times, Se-ptember, V I • ' 'THE TIMES As soon as Parliament rcfassembles time will be given for a debate on the White Paper on the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean, which was issued yesterday. (pp. 4 and 6) Mr. John Profumo has spoken of the difficulties which have to be overcome before regular helicopter services can be introduced as a commercial proposition. (p.A) root cause of the evident strains which the men were under ? It is good to be reminded in the White Paper that, since the disappearance of the two men, security in the Foreign Service has been tightened and that more searching inqumes are now made into the characters and antecedents of candidates and members. The whole affair calls for full, honest scrutiny before the forum of Parliament; and there must be no TOO LATE AND TOO disposition, as there has been on earlier LITTLE occasions, to score party points. The "Two points call for comment," says record of the Foreign Service is second the White Paper on MACLEANand to none for steadfastness, hard work, BURGESS. That is typical of its prim- ·and loyalty, but the House will' have ness and defensiveness. There are not searching and important questions to two but a dozen points that call for comment, and the White Paper throws ask. little new light upon them. Appearing as it does, scandalously late, four and a quarter years after the two men fled the country, the White Paper might have been expected to give mao.y details hitherto unknown. It does, indeed, mention that BURGESShad, just before his · flight, been specifically asked to resign from the Foreign Office because of reckless and careless conduct while posted in the United States. It also discloses that on May 25, 1951, the very day of the two men's disappearance, the Foreign Secretary at that time (MR. MORRISON) agreed that MACLEAN should be questioned by the security authorities because of suspicions that he had previously passed Foreign Office informat\on over to the Soviet authorities. Fo'r some unaccountable reason these facts were not •made known until now. For the rest, the Paper does little more than confirm a good part of the information already known through the Press, and especially through the disclosures by MR. PETROVin Australia. There is very little doubt that, but for the knowledge that MR. PETROV was going to make his evidence public, the Foreign Office and the security authorities would not have decided to publish a White Paper at all even now. Throughout the past four and a quarter years the pattern has been almost invariably the same. A Press report has been followed by a reluctant and often tendentious admission in the House or at the Foreign Office. Official statements were made which are now seen to have -been misleading. No doubt the spokesmen themselves were put up without the proper infor~ation which is usual on foreign affairs. Even so, it is hard to square the suggestion a year ago that PETRov's evidence was simply based on hearsay, and was " to be treated with some reserve," with the White Paper's admission that PETROVhas " provided confirmation " of parts of the story. An even stronger discrepancy exists between the White Paper's evidence that MACLEAN was being watched on suspicion of passing information and LORD READING'S statement to the Lords on October 28, 1952. " Mr. Maclean," said LoRD READING,"performed his official duties satisfactorily up to the date of his disappearance_." The White Paper defends what it coyly calls th "reticence of Ministerial on the grounds that it is no desirable at any moment to let the othe side know how much has been discovered or guess at the means used to discover it. An excellent principle, but how does it apply in this case ? The Foreign Office needed no elaborate means to " discover " that it had asked BURGESSto resign or that it was closely watching MACLEAN;and the Russian5 already knew-otherwise they would not have helped the two men to escape. The net result of " reticence " was the opposite of that intended. Instead of becoming bored -with the affair, the public scented a mystery and wondered uneasily how much was being hidden. The White Paper does little to remove doubts about the security authorities' handling of the matter. It says that, once suspicions fastened on MACLEAN, they took a calculated risk that he became aware of their watch and made tracks for abroad. Events showed that ==~-~-~-~-~=-~-~-~= ~--1 19::6 �information over to the Soviet authorities. For some unaccountable reason these facts were not •made known until now. For the rest, the Paper does little more than confirm a good part of the information already known through the Press, and especially through the disclosures by MR. PETROVin Australia. There is very little doubt that, but for the knowledge that MR. PETROV was going to make his evidence public, the Foreign Office and the security authorities would not have decided to publish a White Paper at all even now. Throughout the past four and a quarter years the pattern has been almost invariably the same. A Press report has been followed by a reluctant and often tendentious admission in the House or at the Foreign Office. Official statements were made which are now seen to have -been misleading. No doubt the spokesmen themselves were put up without the proper infon1jlation which is usual on foreign affairs. Even so, it is bard to square the suggestion a year ago that PETRov's evidence was simply based on hearsay, and was "to be treated with some reserve," with the White Paper's admission that PETROVhas "provided confirmation " of parts of the story. An even stronger discrepancy exists between the White Paper's evidence that MACLEAN was being watched on suspicion of passing information and LORD READING'S statement to the Lords on October 28, 1952. "Mr. Maclean," said LoRD READING,"performed his official duties satisfactorily up to the date of his disappearance." The White Paper defends what it coyly calls th " reticence of Ministerial replies ' on the grounds that it is no desirable at any moment to let the othe side know how much has been discovered or guess at the means used to discover it. An excellent principle, but how does it apply in this case ? The Foreign Office needed no elaborate means to " discover" that it had asked BURGESSto resign or that it was closely watching MACLEAN ; and the Russian~ already knew-otherwise they would not have helped the two men to escape. The net result of " reticence " was the opposite of that intended. Instead of becoming bored -with the affair, the public scented a mystery and wondered uneasily how much was being hidden. The White Paper does little to remove doubts about the security authorities' handling of the matter. It says that, once suspicions fastened on MACLEAN, they took a calculated risk that be became aware of their watch and made tracks for abroad. Events shO\,yedthat they calculated wrongly ; he din escape. But it is more extraordinary to read that, although gravely suspecting him, they decided not to keep a watch on his home in Kent. More extraordinary still, on the very day that authority was given to question him, he was allowed to go from London (where he was watched) on leave to Kent (where he was not watched). And, according to the White Paper, his flight that same evening, May 25, "did not become known to the authorities until the morning of Monday, May 28." They had cut themselves off from all means of knowing. Another point, less serious but no less bewildering, is that the White Paper says that the two men left the country " when the securify authorities were on their track." Was BURGESS, then, also being watched ? There is nothing else in the White Paper to suggest it. The evidence produced fa simply that he had been asked to resign after the Ambassador in Washington had reported on his personal behaviour. The authoriti~s cannot have it both ways. If there was suspicion of espionage in his case the evidence should be in the White Paper. If the authorities had no such suspicions, they evidently had been caught napping. The mystery is deepened by the Foreign Office statement last weekend that it was now believed that both men were "long-term agents " for the Soviet Union. PETROV has said so, and his testimony is accepted, but on British evidence the part of BURGESShas not been brought to light. Equally unsatisfactory is the way in which the White Paper deals with the manner in which the two men were kept for so long in the Foreign Service. All questions of spying apart, their personal behaviour at times should have raised far stronger and earlier questionings about their suitability for responsible work. Stories of their riotous bouts were common talk in London. Were they th'e men to be trusted with State secrets ~ Did the authorities go on to ask what was the �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces /'information a I anche s ter Guardian, 24th September 6 of character, but he seemed to be overcoming them. What we do not get from the White Paper is any hint of the evidence on which the security inquiry was based. It was investigating a leakage that took place " some years " before 1949; this might have been only - casual MATTRESSES • indiscretion. Clearly security had not the remotest idea that in AND the archives of Moscow was a whole Maclean-Burgess sub-departDIVANS ment under the busy Kislytsin. On the general question of the treachery of Maclean and Burgess there is not are made unhurriedly much new to say. That they had Communist leanings at Cambridge in but also take their time the early thirties means little. Those abottl wearing out were the days of the Popular Front, of Spain, of the Left Book Club. Com/,i rpite of thir they cort. munism was an epidemic disease and mrprmngly little more. with most of its sufferers-and from all appearances with Maclean and Burgess-it quickly passed. We shall never know why, like Alger Hiss, »»«« these two men developed the strange kink that led them in the .late forties to feed documents to the Russians. We do not, for instance, know when this Makers of Bedding for particularpeople. spying is supposed to have begun ; we Manchester4• shall probably find that it was during the war when the Grand Alliance was in being and everybody was prepared to think so well of our Eastern ally. AN This is not a case of a generation GUARDI being on trial, but of two clever but rather unbalanced persons going MANCHESTER SATURDAY wrong. The ne·w security checks adopted by the Foreign Office in 1951 SEPTEMBER 24 1955 are all very well in their way, but if; a really cl~ver man wants to be a spy I I a check on his antecedents and assoTHE SPIES ciates is not necessarily a sure means The Government's White Paper. on of discovery. (What, for instance. of the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess, who played about with the Burgess does not really add much to Anglo-German Club?) No doubt the story as the diligence of the news- there is much to be said in censure of papers have built it up over the last the rather wild life in which Burgess four years. In the story of the flight and Maclean sometimes indulged. It the unsolved problem that remains is : should be a warning to others in the Who "tipped" them off or, as the Foreign Service. But we must Government puts it, " alerted them " ? remember too that Alger Hiss was Did they just sense that the security impeccably well-conducted. There is service was on their track or did no clear moral to be drawn except someone tell them ? Burgess had that the Foreign Office must look to its standards of already been asked to resign (the date anxiously of this is not given).. Maclean was efficiency, conduct, and alertness It about to be closely iQvestigated and will take it a long .time to recover his house searched. On May 25 the from the effects of this terrible expothen Foreign Secretary, Mr Herbert sure, and the Government will do Morrison, sanctioned a proposal that well not to ride off in any the security authorities should ques- complacency. tion Maclean. On the evening of that day Maclean and Burgess fled the country. Who, if anybody, warned him? The White Paper says on this that· after searching interrogations " insufficient evidence was obtainable to form a definite conclusion or t0 warrant prosecution." But has the Foreign Office no suspicions ? And have there been any staff changes in the Foreign Office to make assurance doubly sure? Has anyone been got off on suspicion ? The other point on which there has been criticism, largely in America, is that it should not haVE' been possible for Maclean and Burgess to get away so easily. The White Paper. with America in mind, says rather caustically : THE !------~-~--~-~---- In some countries. no doubt. Maclean would have been arrested first and oues: tioned afterwards. In this countrv no arrest can be made without adeouate evidence. True enough, but it is also evident that the watch on Maclean was not very close. It was confi:I}edto London. Once out of London, he could do as he pleased, even to getting out of the country. The security authorities ,vere not acting with any urgency for they were going to delay the proposed interview with Maclean until mid-June-three weeks after the decision to interrogate him was taken This was putting touching trust in the inadequacy of the Foreign Office grapevine. The impression mo t people will t the White Paper is 0 9 5,,. �--~THE SPIES a cneck on ffiscm1t~ fflr tfss~eess to Information Act ciates is nBt>C:tf~s~lfl{~6£'StweUtffi!'/in~ sur/'accesa /'information The Government's White Paper. on of discovery. (What, for instance, of the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess, who played about with the Burgess does not really add much to Anglo-German Club?) No doubt the story as the diligence of the newsthere is much to be said in censure of papers have built it up over the last the rather wild life in which Burgess four years. In the story of the flight and Maclean sometimes indulged. It the unsolved problem that remains is : should be a warning to others in the Who "tipped" them off or, as the Foreign Service. But we must Government puts it, "alerted them" ? remember too that Alger Hiss was Did they just sense that the security impeccably well-conducted. There is service was on their track or did no clear moral to be drawn except someone tell them ? Burgess had that the Foreign Office must look already been asked to resign (the date anxiously to its standards of of this is not given). Maclean was efficiency, conduct, and alertness It about to be closely iivestigated and will take it a long .time to recover his house searched. On May 25 the from the effects of this terrible expothen Foreign Secretary, Mr Herbert sure, and the Government will do Morrison, sanctioned a proposal that well not to ride off in any the security authorities should ques- complacency. tion Maclean. On the evening of that day Maclean and Burgess fled the 1....-~----~--~ ---~-country. Who, if anybody, warned him? The White Paper says on this that· after searching interrogations "insufficient evidence was obtainable to form a definite conclusion or tC> warrant prosecution." But has the Foreign Office no suspicions ? And have there been any staff changes in the Foreign Office to make assurance doubly sure? Has anyone been got off on suspicion ? The other point on which there has been criticism, largely in America, is that it should not havt> been possible for Maclean and Burgess to get away so easily. The White Paper. with America in mind, says rather caustically : In some countries. no doubt. Maclean would have been arrested first and oues: tioned afterwards. In this countrv no arrest can be made without adeouate evidence. 1 True enough, but it is also evident that the watch on Maclean was not very close. It was confined to London. Once out of London, he could do as he pleased, even to getting out of the country. The security authorities ·were not acting with any urgency for they were going to delay the proposed interview· with Maclean until mid-June-three weeks after the decision to interrogate him was taken This was putting touching trust in the inadequacy of the Foreign Office grapevine. 1 The impression most people will form on stuqying the White Paper is that the security auth'orities did not take a very .serious view of either Burgess or Maclean. They were perhaps right prima facie about Burgess, an unreliable type who had not apparently been in any closely confidential relation. (Although that is not to say that he might not have gone to great lengths to steal documents from the British Embassy at Washington when he was there.) They were not. it would seem, moved by any great sense of urgency about Maclean. There is a curious phrase in the account of Maclean. He began as an officer of "exceptional quality" ; he misbehaved and had a breakdown in Cairo. When he came back, pronounced as medically fit, he was made head of the American Department of the Foreign Office. This, says the White Paper, "since it does not deal with the major problems of AngloAmerican relations, appeared to be within his capacity." Here was an able person given a responsible position in the Foreign Office. Yet it is now pretended that it was not a really important position, and was therefore "within his capacity." There is something of hindsight in this apologia. Some hindsight also comes into the account of Mrs Maclean in Switzerland. Would it not be fairly true to say that British security was deceived? It thought that Mrs Maclean could not be sympathetic towards a husband who had not treated her over well ; ;nd besides, she was an Ameriean. At any rate, there was no watch on her. Call it "old school tie'' or what you will, there was great reluctance to believe the worst of these two. For this most people who look at the evidence calmly will not be disposed to be highly censorious of the Foreign Office. It was natural enough th-flt his colleagues should be loth to suspect one of themselves, a man of great personal attraction, bearing an honoured name. He had his defects � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDMB Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDMB00016 Title A name given to the resource Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London to USSEA, Burgess and MacLean, 26 September 1955 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 26-Sep-55 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived LAC RG25/R219 2017-0440-5 Box 11 File 7-5-Burg Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Library and Archives Canada Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource MacLean/Burgess Description An account of the resource A-2023-02971 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English