https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/2040acc272c50778383bcd0d07f0fe40.pdf 7f3859bb618154b0ee2f0780753836e8 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi surl'acces a i’information DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. NUMBERED LETTER No: FROM: .PERMANENT .DELEGATION .OF. CANAPA .TO. THE NORTH .ATLANTIC. COUNCIL. AND .THS .GEES Reference: Subject: losures: 7 .. (YoPPPwvewll V . ... Qctobar. 6,. .......... Surface Mail:. Air xxarossq. "sads-Atam-. ... Z . e X.... ... ....... A. 6.02e..2212 Security:... SFCRFT..... TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA. ) //5-6. Post File No.- Ottawa File No. k/ JJ — 5o 2-5 l 40 References D- / 1] ' 2. 3 __ 4 ___ _ 3__ _ 6 8 S 10 12 OCT 1959 it to certain The North Atlantic Council has concluded NATO headquarters while Exercise "Side-Step" was being conducted. The itinerary included visits to the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force, the Central Army Group, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force and Northern Army Group. Some impressions of this trip might be of interest to the ' Department. Before undertaking this tour, the Council was briefed at the 2. Palais de Chaillot by Admiral Anderson of SHAPE. During his briefing Admi ral Anderson said that the Exercise "Side-Step" imagined a war situation in which the Council had played the following role: (a) (b) (c) Internal Circulation Distribution to Posts Following certain military developments that had been observed on the "other side", Council had authorized a simple alert; As it was being noted that the "other side" was moving missiles up to forward area, Council had then been asked to authorize a reinforced alert; At the same time Council had been asked to authorize NATO Commanders to declare a general alert when necessary and also to authorize them to launch "R-Hour" (release of atomic strike force) if an attack.occurred. The Exercise then assumed that attacking enemy aircraft had been detected by the DEW Line and that the atomic strike aircraft of NATO had been able to take off before being destroyed on the ground. It has been assumed, for purposes of this Exercise, that 3. the Council would have time to authorize a series of alerts as the result of action taken by the "other side", both in Europe and over the North American continent. The assumed role of the Council in declaring alerts is more clearly defined in relation to this Exercise than it is in fact. More specifically, it envisages Council being asked to authorize the release of SACEUR's atomic strike forces in the event of attack; this specific authorization is not required by the agreed alert procedures and it seems somewhat inconsistent with the analysis given us by General Norstad last month, as reported-in our Letter No. 4295 of August 25. It is inconsistent in that it provides for a positive decision by Council to release atomic strike forces and, in that respect, it goes a long way towards spelling,out "who pushes . the button" insofar as NATO - rather than, say, the President of the United States through his control of SAC - would be pushing it. This is but another indication of the confusion that prevails 4. in the related fields of alert procedures, Council responsibility and control aspects over the use of nuclear weapons. Ext. 182A (Rev. 2/52) ... 2 000748 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi surl'acces a I'information 77. o.te . P i ,» ? CY: T' ■ 7 .: Ge t T6 n P 4,7 - " :8, ) ;,■ 3 *..! Ci, JC 2 C“0 t’"— 5 .C P "C .K ’ ' p Ci ' Tor* . C ." ...r: .C .. , ..3 rCai > 40? ' ( l ~t > * > i. • * nr Gu 1,C * ’. (T‘T. * 3 - "J% "*TT D ontom 2“ CLP 1 ■ J ■ I P or 753 210 C IC *(7 — p . 3 21004 1TC n, * Tptt T -03 nc-— '• • ron1077 ‘ ng r. ■ * Cif Cn ?' G i — G0 20 3 1 000749 �. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi surl'acces a /'information - SECRET 2 October 6, 1959» The hypothetical situation described by Admiral Anderson was seen in 5 a more realistic light, however, as Exercise "Side-Step" progressed, since the Exercise ,was based on-the full use of whatever atomic weapons are at present or will in the near future be available to NATO forces in the field. Throughout the Exercise, however, no reference was made as to the role SAG might play. The Exercise did, on the other hand, take into consideration the use of atomic weapons by the "other side”. During one of the briefings we were told, for example, that in order'to give more realism to the Exercise, atomic warheads - where available were being sent from their normal stockpiles to battalion formations by the United States. The commanders could not be drawn out, however, as to whether or not some aircraft had also been provided with such warheads. 6. The pressure of some commanders, particularly those of the ’2nd Tactical Air Force, to obtain atomic warheads may, we think, be taken as a clear indication that their most important requirements are in that field. At present, for example, the stockpile of nuclear warheads which could become available to the Northern . Army Group in which the Canadian Brigade is integrated - is in the United States Zone some three hundred miles away. This situation is described as totally unsatisfactory by senior officers of the command since it would take a minimum of two days for such warheads to be made available to their forces, while their greatest impact on the "other side" would be felt within the first hour. Commanders of that force hope that this will be remedied as soon as possible and that the warheads as early as possible will be brought closer to their command. . 7. - The use of atomic weapons is more or less taken for’granted by all commands. • Indeed, no indication was given that it would be possible to hold any line unless such weapons were used and the whole strategy now under consideration in the commands we visited is based on the promise that authority to use such weapons will be forthcoming within a few minutes of an attack. The commands visited are no longer geared to conventional wars and at least to a layman the mixture of conventional and atomic formations is so complete that one wonderswhether it would even-be possible for those forces to meet the "other side" with conventional weapons only. There is the further point that the more sophisticated aircraft, launchers, storage facilities and launching sites made available or in the process of construction are destined to atomic use. Since there is no indication that conventional weapons are to be provided in similar quantities to NATO forces, one must conclude that, over a fairly short period, most-if not all NATO forces will have their atomic component and that the strategy of the commanders in the field will be conditioned more and more by the use of new weapons. It is 'therefore more and more unreal to think that a distinction can much longer be established between conventional weapons on the one hand and atomic weapons on the other. If any element of control is to be exercised by the Alliance over the use of atomic weapons, this can only be done over the warheads and no longer over the delivery systems, as might have been the case earlier. Another impression which may be worth noting here is the intimate and 8. fruitful relationship which is developing between United States and German forces. Naturally the build-up of German forces is somewhat slower than was to be expected, but the flow of German officers and recruits is now being felt and the training of the German divisions and air units is making steady progress. To illustrate this point, it might be worth mentioning that the 7th United States Army Training Centre is in an area in the Grafenwohr region that was first used by the Regent of Bavaria to train the Bavarian Army just after the turn of the century. The camp has been in operation ever since and in 1938 the "training area was expanded by Hitler to approximately eighty-nine square miles. This camp is now used not only as a training centre for United States troops but also for German units. In such surroundings the Germans feel at home and are being rapidly trained in the use of all weapons at the disposal of United States forces. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to think that a distinction could be established whereby the United States would use the most modern weapons at their disposal while the Germans being trained in the same area would be satisfied with different types of weapons. The political implications of the building of the German strength with • 9., United States know-how and weapons are obvious and far-reaching. After a joint U.S.-German demonstration at the training centre of the 7th U.S. Army, Mr. Spaak told me that he now realized better why .the Soviets felt so strongly about German rearmament. 3000750 C �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi surl'acces a /'information $ Ca’d SECRET 3 October 6, 1959« 10, One last point might be worth recording here, The Canadian Brigade, as part of the Northern Army Group, falls under the command of the Commanderin-Chief whose headquarters are at Wilderath. This command also includes troops from the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. While these nations are liberally represented in senior positions on the Staff of the Commander-inChief, Northern Army Group, Canadians do not fill any senior appointments,. I wonder how Canada can have any say in the policy at the Headquarters, particularly in the control of the use of atomic warheads when Lacrosse comes into operation* There seems to be a missing link here. / THE DELEGATION. I 4 i 000751 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDEX (NATO Exercises) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDEX00556 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25, 50115-G-40, "North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Military, naval and air exercises," Part 3, Library and Archives Canada. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Exercises Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en