https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/566d8b9b5ef89c763ae515e8fb54e70d.pdf e2cfd99fca96c085dbfc820a759c61b6 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to InformaiionA^^^ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a I’informatio^ * 3 J Defence Liaison (1)/R.B. Edmonds /MM File 50115-G=40 November 3, 1952 TOP SECRET U45) *). Exercise ’’Mainbrace” = September 13”‘y, September 25, 1952 2.5+ I - Advance Information'on Exercise ’’Mainbrace” II - Post-Exercise -Political Comments on "Mainbrace I - Advance Information on Exercise ’’Mainbrace” received by External Affairs 14. ss Prior to the NATO "Mainbrace" Exercise in Northern Europe, held between September 13 and 25, this Department • received several reports from the Standing Group and Military Representatives Committee, from the Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council and from our Scandinavian missions. In despatch No . 374, dated August 18, from the 2. Legation in Copenhagen, entitled "Baltic Phase of Operation Mainbrace”, we were informed about certain political aspects in connection with the Baltic phase of the operation. The British ■ Ambassador had informed the Canadian Charge d’Affaires that the original intention of holding the Exercise off the Island of Bornholm in Denmark had had to be modified because of political implications. The Exercise will still be held off Bornholm but only the Danish Forces will use the Island as a base and not the British and Norwegians as well. -Three reasons for this change were enumerated1:' (a) to avoid the Soviet charge' that Denmark was violating the undertaking, given in 1946 when Soviet forces withdrew from the Island, that no forces other than Danish would ever be posted on Bornholm; (b) to avoid any positive Soviet reaction to the Exercise which might provoke an incident similar to that of the Swedish aircraft which were shot down by the Russians in the Baltic. (c) to avoid giving encouragement to the strong Communist campaign against the establishment of NATO air bases in Denmark. Sir Patrick Brind, NATO Commander in Northern Europe, under < whose responsibility the Baltic phase of Exercise ’’Mainbrace” falls, was in Copenhagen on August'19 to discuss this matter with the Danish Government. He then forwarded his recommendations on this aspect to the Standing Group in Paris. 3. In despatch No. 819 from the Permanent Delegation in Paris, dated September 4, entitled "NATO Manoeuvres”, the discussion of this matter in the informal Council meeting of September 4 was reported. At the end of this meeting, Lord Ismay advised that in future it would be wise to discuss NATO manoeuvres in the Council while plans were still in the tentative stage. This was strongly supported by the Norwegian Representative, who referred to difficulties which had arisen in connection with "Mainbrace", and by the Danish Representative, 000151 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi suri’acces a rinfonpatisR g 2 who proposed that this item should be placed on the Agenda of the Ministerial Meeting. This informal Council meeting of September 4 was also 4. referred to in a message from the Standing Group Liaison Officer to the Standing Group, in a despatch forwarded to us from CJS, Washington, No. 610 of September 16. The SGLO reported that, while the Council emphasized that no blame was attached for misunderstandings over "Mainbrace", the Council reiterated that the machinery for examining exercises for political implications needed revision. Approaches to clear exercises in the future should be made through the Council and not through the individual governments. The U.K. Delegate stated that the Standing Group was discussing this matter. The SGLO then reported that a paper on this subject was being prepared by the Standing Group, suggesting a procedure for clearing manoeuvre plans at all levels. The Liaison Officer observed, however, that the principle of clearing exercises with governments was not in dispute but rather that the problem was one of the best procedures for doing so without impeding the progress of the military planning for exercises. 5 This same matter was discussed in an informal Council meeting on September 16, which is referred to in despatch 915 of September 18 from the Permanent Delegation, Paris. This meeting, which was presided over by Mr. Pearson, had, as one of the two major items on the agenda; the topic, "Political Consultation in the Council on Proposed NATO Military Manoeuvres”. On this item, Lord Ismay mentioned that during, the last meeting on this topic, i.e., September 4, it had been agreed that he would circulate a memorandum on the subject. However, since the Standing Group was submitting a paper on the subject to the Council, he suggested, and the Council agreed, that further discussion on this matter should await receipt of the Standing Group paper.. However, it was also suggested that the Standing .Group Liaison Officer report the Council’s view that the Standing Group paper should include a reference to the security and political aspects of statements made by service officers. This item was inserted because of the unfortunate consequences attached to the release of information by "military spokesmen" of such items as the damage sustained by B-36‘s in a tornado in the United States and the statement by a NATO service representative that the current NATO manoeuvres had important political as well as military,implications. 6. In despatch No. 483,’dated September 12, from Stockholm, entitled ’’Swedish Manoeuvres and NATO Exercise ’Mainbrace”', our Canadian Legation discussed the implications of these two manoeuvres. The Charge d’Affaires reported that the Swedish Armed Forces were holding their usual autumn manoeuvres in two periods - between September 11 and 15 for the Navy, and Air Force near Gotland, and between September 23 and 29, for combined exercises with the Army along the coast of Gastrikeland in the Gulf of Bothnia. He observed in this connection the coincidence of the NATO "Mainbrace” exercise in Northern Europe which was to be held between September 13 and 25. 7. On August 19, Stockholm reported, the Oslo headquarters of Admiral Brind announced the broad pattern for "Mainbrace". The exercise was to consist of five parts: (a) an Allied carrier force will sail north from the United Kingdom for exercises in Northern Norway; 000152 J �. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act .Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisurl’acces a I’informatio^ 8* 2 3 (b) the carrier force will move southwards, replenishing fuel en route at sea, to exercises in Denmark; (o) convoys to and from Scandinavia will be protected by surface naval forces and carrier-and shore-based air forces; (d) an amphibious force, including U.S. Marines, will sail from the United Kingdom to aid the land forces in Jutland; this expedition will be strongly supported and will include its own air support for troops when ashore; (e) in the Kattegat and the Baltic approaches ** to Denmark, west of 16° E., light forces from Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom will exercise under Danish command; the object of this part of the Exercise is to coordinate submarine operations and coastal defence in the protection of the Danish shores. 8. . Thus, it could be seen that the Swedish and NATO manoeuvres would not run into each other. One hundred and seventy-five kilometres separates the waters around Gotland from the waters west of 16° E.’ The Swedish manoeuvres around Gotland were due to end September 15, while the NATO forces - in the last part of "Mainbrace" were not scheduled to arrive until a few days- before September 25, 9. The Swedish Communists, however, saw this overlap of exercises as the thin edge of the wedge for an eventual Swedish entrance’ into an alliance with ”the western imperialist ■ warmongers”. On August 13, Mr. Hilding Hagberg, the leader of the Swedish Communist Party, wrote the Government asking for an alteration of- the manoeuvres. The Government was unmoved by these Communist charges and emphasized that cancellation of these exercises might mean that the Swedes were less entitled to the Baltic than other nations. Government spokesmen stressed that there was no danger of abrogation of the Swedish alliance-free line.. 10. . In order to forestall.the type of unpleasant charges levelled by the Soviet service attaches at the autumn manoeuvres last year, service.attaches were not invited to these current exercises.’ However, accredited attaches were given a- sketchy briefing on September 19, at which the Swedish spokesman emphasized that these manoeuvres were planned a year ago. before they received any knowledge of the ’’Mainbrace” exercise. 11. This seems to be the sum total of information on "Mainbrace" received by External Affairs prior to the actual commencement of the Exercise on September 15. 11. Post-Exercise Political Go mme n t s on "Mainbracen 12, In despatch Noo 836 of September 24, the Canadian Charg d’Affaires in Moscow reported on ’’Soviet Press Reports of Riots, by Canadian Sailors in Norway”. Articles apparently had appeared in the newspapers Red Star and Komsomol Pravda on September 20, dealing with the alleged misbehaviour by Canadian sailors in Narvik, Norway, during the carrying out of -Operation ’’Mainbrace”. In a further despatch, No. 872 from 000153 ' __ \A �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act I Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi surl'acces a /'information 4 .Moscow, dated October 6, 1952, entitled "Exercise ’Mainbrace’", our Charge d'Affaires reported that the Soviet press has, on the whole, played down "Mainbrace”. There were few reports on the Exercise outside of the above-mentioned criticism of Canadian sailors in Norwegian ports and an article which appeared in the Literary Gazette on September 30. The Literary Gazette stated that the main purpose of the Exercise was to solve the problem of how to achieve a rapid military occupation of Norway and Denmark by the United States forces. Pushkin, one of the Deputy Foreign Ministers, called in the Danish Minister on October 1 to tell him that the stationing of NATO forces in Denmark would be regarded as a threat to the security of the Soviet Union and of other Baltic countries. Incidentally, the Soviet press has not stressed the coincidence of the Swedish combined manoeuvres with Exercise "Mainbrace". Soviet reaction to "Mainbrace" was also enumerated 13 in a release of the British Foreign Office dated September 25, 1952, entitled "Trends of Communist Propaganda - 12-24 September”. The outstanding feature of the Moscow line on ’’Mainbrace” was its criticism of the Scandinavian countries for ■ participating in this operation. In an article in Red Fleet on September 13, various Communist propaganda lines were laid down on the "Mainbrace" Exercise. These were that: (a) The "Mainbrace” manoeuvres bear,the stamp of the aggressive intention of the Pentagon. (b) Only Denmark among participating countries is a Baltic power. The armed forces of other countries have no business in the area. (c) The coincidence of the Swedish manoeuvres invites attention. (d) The Danish Government is transforming Denmark into a United States military base. (e) The United States Government is trying to establish control of the International Straits leading from the Baltic to the Atlantic Ocean to the "detriment of vital interests of Scandinavian countries and their security”. (f) This is contrary to the peaceful assurances given by Denmark and Norway when, upon adhering to the Atlantic Pact, they assured Russia of the defensive nature of the alliance. (g) Soviet public opinion cannot ignore these obvious facts of American intervention in the Baltic and the violation of the traditional ' Soviet-Scandinavian friendship 14. On October 1, Mr. Robertson wrote a personal letter to Mr. Wilgress concerning the political implications of Operation "Mainbrace”. The Canadian High Commissioner in London recorded an interview he had held with the Danish Ambassador, Count Reventlow. The Danish diplomat stated that his Government felt that the possible diplomatic and political implications of this Exercise should have been canvassed in the NATO Council before definite plans had taken shape. He mentioned that his Government had received conflicting advice on the political implications of this manoeuvre from Washington and London which had placed Denmark in an awkward situation. 000154 L �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act . Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi suri'acces a /'information • e - 5- The Danish Foreign Office, which carries on a continuing analysis of references to Denmark in the Soviet and satellite press, had noted that hostile and unfriendly references to Danish policies in the months immediately preceding Operation "Mainbrace" had fallen sharply during the period when the Operation was actually being carried out. As a sidelight to the Exercise, Count Reventlow mentioned that the decision of the NATO naval commanders not to venture within fifteen miles of Soviet-controlled territories might contravene the Danish contention that the fishery and police jurisdiction of the Soviet Government did not extend beyond the three-mile limit. i 5 .‘‘ *1 In a personal letter’ to Mr. Claxton on October 2, 15. Mr. Heeney reported on a critique to Exercise "Mainbrace" held in Oslo following the Exercise. This-visit to Oslo by the NATO Council on December 26 and 28 for the ’’Mainbrace” critique’ was reported formally in despatch 1055 from the Permanent Delegation on October 3. On September 26, both Group-Captain ' . Newsome and Mr. Heeney flew to Oslo for the critique on ’’Mainbrace" aboard HMS ’’Eagle”. King Haakon and Crown Prince Olaf were present, which emphasized the importance to the Scandinavian countries of the exercises. Mr. Heeney reported: "As to the value of the Exercise, Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe, observed that no great strategic lessons were learned. ’Mainbrace* was, intended principally to test International cooperation - and tactical coordination among, NATO commanders and forces. In this view Brind was supported by both SACLANT and SACEUR and all agree that, in bringing to light certain weaknesses and deficiencies none of which appeared insurmountable - the Exercise was a success.” A preliminary appraisal of the Exercise showed up 16« certain weaknesses: (a) the lack of rapid long-range communication facilities; (b) the lack of standardization in operating doctrine procedures and techniques. Operation "Mainbrace", however, taught several lessons: (a) the role of naval operations in support of land forces; (b) the use of maritime aircraft as NATO submarine weapons; and (c) the technique of replenishing ships at sea. Both HMCS "Magnificent" and HMCS "Quebec" were reported to have given a good account of themselves 17. Mr. Heeney also observed that: "The political product of‘Mainbrace’ has been considerable. Not only has it provided the spectacle of Allied cooperation and unity but it has as well been a concrete and not unimpressive demonstration on the northeast boundaries of the NATO area of the substance of our professions with respect to mutual defence.** 000155 ( �r L Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi surl'acces a /'information 4 ■ • • 4 - 6 The military authorities in NATO are not unaware, 18 as a consequence of this "Mainbrace" Exercise, of the necessity for political clearances for future exercises. At a meeting of the Military Representatives’ Committee on September 18, it was recognized by the military that political clearance should be obtained in the case of some NATO exercises. The M.R.C. has a proposal in mind of a new way in which matters.that are potentially sensitive in the political sphere could be referred to the North Atlantic Council in advance without burdening the Council with precise details of all routine military exercises. 19 This decision of the MRC was implemented by the Standing Group paper which outlined a procedure to give all nations a chance to comment in advance on political implications of exercises. This paper, SG 207/2, which has been prepared by the International Planning Team of the Standing Group, was approved by the MRC on October 21 and was to be submitted to the North Atlantic Council. 000156 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDEX (NATO Exercises) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDEX00078 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25, 50115-G-40, "North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Military, naval and air exercises," Part 1, Library and Archives Canada. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Exercises Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en