https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c3dd576b6725a077ea74b1b692b9d6fc.pdf 59b4bff3af5ebc1d319ea4806f35ec66 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to InformaiionAct^B Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a LinformationX ee Ext. 180 a * OTTAWA FILE 28 M45.2.4/.5...65. ________ 50 Despatch No SECURITY Date... 3rd. October .1952 CLASSIFICATION SECRET FROM: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND OEEC., PARIS. TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA 3 4 ference feotl ject:. Exercise ."MAINRRACE" Critique; Visit .to. .Oslo, by the NATQ .Council, 26-28 September. deias 10,—=—i 10 OCT 1952 Copies Referred To...................... On September the 26th members of the Council visited 1. Oslo to attend the "critique" of exercise MAINBRACE. As each delegation was offered two spaces in the aircraft provided by SHAPE for this purpose, I thought it appropriate that Group Captain Newsome should go along with me, and this he did. 2. We found the programme (a copy of which is attached) both interesting and, I think, profitable. Certainly it served to give the Council a better grasp of the practical military problems confronting our commanders. The fact that the critique itself was given in Oslo harbor aboard HMS Eagle, the latest and most modern British carrier, and in the presence of King Haakon and Crown Prince Olaf or Norway, added a good deal of interest and exphasized the importance of the event for the two Scandanavian members of NATO. 3. No.(, of Enclosures One Post File No... 6/22 As to the value of the exercise, Admiral Sir PatricBrind, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe, observed that no great strategic lessons were learned. Mainbrace was intented principally to test international cooperation and tactical coordination among NATO Commanders and forces. In this view, Brind was supported by both SACLANT and SACEUR and all agreed that; in bringing to light certain weaknesses and deficiencies - none of which appeared insurmountable, the exercise was a success. After a running "narrative" of the sequence of events 4. given by an allied team, the main part of the critique took the form of very short (4 or 5 minutes) talks by the twenty subordinate commanders who had participated in the exercise, (e.g., Senior Officer Minesweepers; Commander Coastal Forces; Commander Amphibious Group, etc.). Each described briefly the phase of the operation for which he was responsible, giving his appraisal of its effectiveness and its shortcomings, and suggestions as to how the latter might be overcome. These comments with the narrative that preceded them and the remarks which followed by Ridgway, McCormick and Brind, occupied us from 9 o’clock until 12.30, when we rose for lunch. For the most part, the expositions which we heard were 5. carefully prepared and well presented. Because they were given on short notice, immediately after the completion of the exercise, they OSS e) **** LuLLoreo llayln. .814) WOlork2 Mwntha • )9ob NMV / W %o ( allle Qaout 000222 / 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi surl’acces a /'information • $ 1 5 -v 7 . is—* ( 4 C O G 2' 2 , I J (3 ( D C . C s j "A * 29 — .* ** a C O ( ( J 5 c 582 2. C" () ' 2 — 2 * aran O. > " 42 c q* W C a J 0 4/ ( (1 J - C ts -2 — * *970* 33 t y7 2. C ( U () G ? - £ ■ E ' ( ( 21/ E P )t : tygsurtodl l N‘ J — ' 0 O (5 ( < i 3 ts ( . .0 O - 3 Y. y> d - I "t JL' *3 000223 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I’information - 2 - represented only a first analysis. In consequence, the effect was perhaps less balanced and less clear cut than would otherwise have been the case. The final report is to be prepared only after several weeks of careful and exhaustive study of the results. Nevertheless, this preliminary appraisal was exceedingly 6. interesting to all of us. It served to point up such weaknesses as the lack of rapid, long-range communications facilities and the lack of standardization in operating doctrine, procedures and techniques. It raised important issues concerning the role of naval operations in support of land forces and the use of maritime aircraft as antisubmarine weapons. It taught valuable lessons on the technique of replenishing ships at sea. I have no doubt that the Canadian Naval officers who were present will, in due course, be reporting to National Defence in detail- on these and the many other problems that were touched upon. 7. You are no doubt aware that two Canadian vessels participated in Mainbrace - HMCS "Magnificient" and HMCS "Quebec". Unfortunitely, neither of these ships was at Oslo. However, in conversation with'some of senior commanders, I got the impression that Canadian personnel and ships had given a good account of themselves during the exercise. There were several references to the success of Quebec in her role as raider. While aboard the carrier, I had an opportunity to meet 8, and talk briefly with the following Canadian officers: Captain D.L. Dyer, RCN, Commanding Officer, and Lieutenant Porter, RCN, of Magnificient; Commander F.C. Frewer, RCN, Director of Weapons and Tactics, Naval Headquarters, Ottawa; Captain D.W. Piers, RCN, on the Staff of SACLANT; Wing Commander B. Moffatt, RCAF, on the Staff of SACLANT; and Major B.W. Blyth, School of Land/Air Wafare, Old Sarum. Whatever the value of the exercise and the critique from 9 the military point of view, (and it seemed the consensus of the officers I spoke to that it had been most useful) I am satisfied that the political product of Mainbrace has been considerable. Not only has it provided a spectacle of allied cooperation and unity but it has, as well, been a concrete and not unimpressive demonstration on the north east boundaries of the NATO area of the substance of our professions with respect to mutual defence. 10 Furthermore, the attendance of members of the Council at Mainbrace as at Holdfast was in my opinion a most useful experience for all of us. It gave us some more real appreciation of the meaning and possibilities of the Alliance over which we preside. Q .). V.s Permanent Representative 000224 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDEX (NATO Exercises) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDEX00035 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25, 50115-G-40, "North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Military, naval and air exercises," Part 1, Library and Archives Canada. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Exercises Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en