https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a8682ad13aa4da847078df99a452f261.pdf d63992d6b2313fe586abd68b46e81b82 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ' Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information APPENDIX 3.2 (OP SECRET BACON; November 25, 1965. * MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER: ; Possible Public Announcement About Seaborn’s Special Role in Vietnam . - . Over the past ten days .there has been considerable press discussion of and speculation about attempts to bring the Vietnam problem under negotiation* While references, have been made to alleged initiatives by Roumania and the United Arab Republic, the most important recent ’’revelations” have been the U. Thant initiative in late 1964 arid the. North Vietnamese conversation at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris on May 18 at the end of the bombing pause. . It seems clear that of these, the U Thant initiative 2. and. the negative hearing the ..Secret ary-General’s efforts were given in Washington, is the more embarrassing and difficult one for the Americans to explain internationally and to their own public opinion. The reason given by Washington at the time . for their negative response to the Secretary-General1s efforts — according to the.account of this initiative given to the Prime Minis ter in New York in March byU Thant — was that "if such talks were being held, the news would inevitably leak out. ■ with predictable impact in the. U.S.A. and in South Vietnam, putting into jeopardy the whole American policy.” It should be.recalled that at the time, the U.S. Government had not ■ committed itself to entering into "unconditional discussions” of the Vietnam problem and the military position on the ground in Vietnam was not strong. Moreover, the newly installed civilian government of South Vietnam was shaky at best and could very easily have collapsed totally, resulting in chaotic . problems for the Americans, if it had become known that the U.S.A, had undertaken negotiations with North Vietnam behind , the backs of the Saigon Government. Finally, it is likely that ■ public disclosure during the. Presidential election campaign of an active interest in undertaking negotiations on the part of the Administration might have strengthened the less moderate forces backing-Senator Goldwater. . The. negotiating hand held by the U.S.A. was thus not a very strong one in the autumn of 1964. ... 2 000298 �Document disclosed under the Access'to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information i ' COP SECRET - 2 BACON It is difficult, however, for the Americans at this time to put their public case in any or all of these terms. 36 The Minister of the U.S. Embassy here, Mr. Scott, called on the Department yesterday to inform us that it would be helpful to the Americans if a fuller account of Seaborn’s responsibilities in Vietnam could be released publicly through related announcements in Ottawa and in Washington, and to this end draft statements had been prepared to show, to the Canadian Government. Scott left with us copies of these draft texts which, I understand, Mr. Butterworth had shown to you earlier® The purpose of these two statements would be to indicate that the U.S. Government had received information through special Canadian channels indicating that the North Vietnamese were not seriously interested in finding a solution to the Vietnam problem at the time and that their positive response, to U Thant’s initiative was not therefore to be taken seriously® 4. The Americans are also, evidently, concerned to strengthen.the position of friendly governments which have supported the American position in Vietnam and may well find themselves under pressure from their own public opinion in the light of what may appear as American rigidity, if not bad faith, in rejecting U Thant’s initiative. No doubt for the purpose of mitigating such pressure, the Americans have now asked for our agreement to have them bring the governments concerned (i.e., Britain, Australia,' New Zealand and Japan) more fully into the picture or to have us take the initiative in doing,so. 5. We understand from our conversation with Scott that Washington wishes to reach agreement with us on these matters by this weekend since they are apparently thinking in terms of putting the proposed American .’’statement” into the text of a ' speech to be delivered by Dean-Rusk on Monday, November 29. in terms of the totality of our relations with the 6. - United States, Canadian cooperation in meeting this request for making public a fuller account of Seaborn’s activities would, of course, be desirable; it is evident that. Washington attaches considerable importance to this problem and, if at all possible, we would clearly wish to be helpful to them. Second, we have publicly stated that we support the purposes and objectives of American policy in Vietnam and we have also made it clear in public statements that we had detected no disposition on the part of the North Vietnamese to bring the Vietnam conflict into a negotiating framework. Finally, the release of this information would demonstrate that Canada has not been diplomatically •a e ) 000299 �Sir! ‘* Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act • Document divulgue en vertu de -la Loi sur l'acces a I'information C' 0 p SECRET c 3 - BACON . passive in relation to the Vietnam problem? as is sometimes charged in criticism of the Canadian Government, but, on the contrary, has been exploiting to the full the special channels available to it. These general considerations must however be carefully 7. weighed in the light of the specific disadvantages we can see for the Canadian Government in revealing, at this time, anything more about Seaborn’s special role in Vietnam than has already ' been made public by your statements in the House of Commons and ■ in the External Affairs Committee. These disadvantages are as follows: The Canadian Government is on record as (a) being in favour of a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict. The net effect of a public disclosure of Seaborn’s special role will be to justify the rejection of -what public opinion is bound to regard as a serious negotiating initiative on the basis of an assessment of information derived through Canadian channels. Domestically this could lead to criticism that the Government had allowed itself to be used to reinforce American determination to rely primarily on military power to influence the outcome of the issue. In Canadian terms? it might also be argued (b) that Seaborn, the Canadian Government’s representative? had been used as a "messenger boy” for the United States rather than as an agent for a more active and independent Canadian policy. (c) The course the Americans are urging upon us would have the effect of pitting Seaborn’s judgment against that of U Thant? to the latter’s disadvantage. Thus the United States Government would be seen to be relying on Seaborn’s analysis (which tended to confirm what they wanted it to confirm) rather than U Thant’s, which tended in another direction. The disclosure of this information now might (d) have a serious effect on our role in the Commission in Vietnam and on our possible future usefulness in this capacity. The North Vietnamese might well react by saying that Canadian efforts .were not seriously motivated and were intended only as part of an American 66 6 4 000300 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information AoPSECRZT e L • CU. ... .. BACON • propaganda exercise® Equally serious is the possible reaction in the South where the Prime Minister, Air Vice-Marshal Ky, has been stating recently that he will never negotiate with the Communists. The full publicity which would no doubt be given to any disclosure now of Seaborn’s past activities in Hanoi could have serious implications for the relations of confidence and trust between the South Vietnamese Government and the Canadian Delegation in Saigon, more specifically in the person of Victor Moore, who will be replacing Seaborn very soon® Finally, we have reservations about meeting (e) the present U.S. request on grounds of historical fact® It should be kept in mind that Seaborn’s special responsibilities were never intended to provide negotiating contacts,. nor, so far as we were aware, even to lay the groundwork for negotiations® ’ Rather he was to ■ act as a channel for the transmission of messages, or statements of position between Hanoi and Washington and beyond that to establish himself as a significant political personality and to report his assessments of attitudes and events in the Norths When this exercise was first set up in May and June of 1964 the Americans were not prepared for negotiations; what they were interested in was a channel which would make clear to Hanoi their long-term peaceful intentions in Vietnam coupled with their determination to resist further . Northern aggression with all possible means. They were thus interested in eliciting a response from Hanoi in terms of the latter’s agreement to a stabilization of the Vietnam situation, in return for which there might have been economic advantages for North Vietnam such as trade with South Vietnam and even economic assistance® To disclose Seaborn’s activities now, in the context of the rejection of U Thant's initiative and particularly in the terms suggested -by Washington might make it appear as if his assignment had been in a fundamental way different from what it was in facto (f) Canada knew nothing about the U Thant initias tive until 1-iar ch and April when, on two different occasions, the Prime Minister and you visited New York and received from the Secretary-General (but at no time from the United States) an account of his efforts to arrange contacts in Rangoon. A reviev; of the record ! o•« 2 a f L 000301 1 nj �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information C /oP. SECRET - 5 - BACON of Seaborn’s activities in North Vietnam indicates that after -Seaborn’s first two discussions in Hanoi in June and early August, we became progressively more concerned about the lack of substance in what the Americans were asking us to do® It was this factor among others which led us to put the exercise in early June 1965 in a special Canadian context® Had we known about the U Thant initiative earlier, our own approach at the time (December, 1964) would almost certainly have been cast in somewhat different terms® In short, there is evidence to indicate that the Americans, although they had asked us to under» take a very sensitive diplomatic operation on their behalf, were not prepared to take us into their confidence to the fullest possible extent® They are now asking us to help them justify a position in terms of information from Canadian sources, relating to an initiative of which at the time we had no knowledge whatever. The issuance of related statements in (g) Washington and Ottawa, far from closing off discussion of this matter, will amost certainly stimulate further questions by the press and probably in Parliament when the new House meets. There will be increasing pressure to disclose more and more of the background on Seaborn’s activities with all the attendant risks of embarrassment to the government suggested above® In view of the foregoing considerations we would recom8. mend that we inform the Americans that we still feel it necessary to keep any public discussion of Seaborn’s activities within a Canadian framework® This position could -be justified on the . grounds of: (a) Domestic political implications in Canada; The unfortunate juxtaposition of Seaborn’s (b) judgment with that of U Thant which might have serious implications for us in the United Nations; (c) Our present and possible future role in the Commission and our relations with both the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese authorities; ... 6 000302 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I’acces a I'information 0 LoP SECRET - 6 - BACON ' Our reluctance to have a Canadian diplomatic (d) exercise which was designed to meet a specific set of circumstances, drawn into a domestic and international discussion of U.S. policy which is related to an essentially different set. of circumstances from those in which Seaborn’s mission was first conceived. 9. Although it would be preferable from our point of view to have no further public discussion of Seaborn’s special activities in Vietnam, it seems reasonably clear that the Americans hope to refer to these matters in one way or another in the near future. Moreover, as indicated above, we would presumably wish in terms of our relations with Washington to give what assistance we can. In these circumstances our efforts might be concentrated on ensuring that the substance of a disclosure is acceptable to the Canadian Government. From our point of view there are three considerations of over-riding importance which should be taken into accounts There should be no disclosure of the fact (a) that Seaborn was acting on behalf of the U.S.Ao at any time; ... An explicit confrontation between the views (b) of U Thant and the views of Seaborn should be avoided; Reference to Seaborn’s activities as " a (c) major third party1' approach should be eliminated.6 ota *• If you agree, I would propose informing the U.S. Embassy here that while we are not enthusiastic about this exercise, we appreciate their problem and would be prepared to go along provided that the three criteria mentioned above are met. At . the same time we could make available to the Embassy a re-draft of their proposed statement (as left with you by the Ambassador) which meets these requirements, explaining that this ’would bo the sort of formulation we would wish the U.S. statement to take. A copy of the text of our re-draft is .attached for your consideration. 10. The plan as proposed by the Americans would envisage the issuance in Ottawa of a statement by you or in your name and this would be followed by a statement (or speech) in Washington covering much the same ground, but from a different point of view. We believe that this procedure would appear too artificial and contrived and would stimulate criticism in Canada that we were acting as stooges of the Americans. Unless you ... 7 000303 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information go? SECRET « 7 - BACON’ feel, therefore, that there are compelling reasons for your .issuing a special statement here in advance of Mr. Rusk's speech on Monday, we believe that it would be more satisfactory if the Secretary of State were to make his speech as planned and to await the public response to it. If circumstances are such as to indicate that this would be useful from our point of view, Mr. Rusk’s speech could be followed up here by a brief confirmatory statement in response to press enquiries or requests for official comment. Attached for your consideration is a text designed to meet this situation. MM OS The problem remains of advance notification to the 11. governments of Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, as suggested by the Americans (see paragraph 4 above). We do not believe, in all the circumstances, that this would be desirable especially in advance. In the event however that Mr. Rusk’s speech is followed by a statement here, we might consider, -if you agree, giving the four countries concerned a somewhat fuller range of background information about Seaborn’s activities but omitting any reference to his message-carrying futions on Washington’s behalf. Attached for your consideration is the text of an outline of these activities which might be used for these briefings. The text of this briefing might also, if you agree, be transmitted to the Secretary-General in New York. -// M.C. ! X 000304 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Indochina (CDVN) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDVN00051 Title A name given to the resource Appendix 32 - Memorandum to the Minister Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 25-Nov-65 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25/R219, 2017-00506-1, Box 3, Pt. 12, "A study of Canadian Policy with respect to the Vietnam Problem," Library and Archives Canada. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP EA_2023_020916 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Vietnam Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en