https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/8e8023c9a5a306c0f25e12d1cdc9e0fb.pdf 456c84b52260776040039facf6d18f34 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information APYSEWL A ii I ll. TO BE RETURNED TO FAR EASTERN DIVISION TOP SECRET BACON June 3, 1964 Summary Record of Conversation between the Minister and I. Sullivan, May 29? 1964 Present: Mr. Martin, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Arnold Smith, Mr. R. L. Rogers Mr. Sullivan began by expressing United States concern at the manner in which North Vietnam was forcing the military pace in Laos and South Vietnam. He did not know what were Hanoi’s immediate intentions. However, low level aerial reconnaissance indicated a buildup in Southern Laos which could be preparatory to a move into South Vietnam. It was very important fox' North Vietnam to know the limits of United States patience. ■ The need was for a channel of communications to the North Vietnamese. 2 Mr. Martin expressed concern over the time it had taken to have Mr. Seaborn ready for his mission. He said that we would undertake to do what the Americans asked of us and do so with dispatch, but wondered how effective Mr. Seaborn’s mission would be. North Vietnam must already be in no doubt about the degree of American impatience. Mr. Sullivan replied that Mr. Seaborn would be authorized to present a combination of warnings and inducements to the North Vietnamese. Hanoi might not understand United ■ States motives in South Vietnam. The United States might moreover be able to assist North Vietnam in the resolution of its economic difficulties. Mr. Sullivan was not able to foresee what would be the exact nature of the messages Mr. 3 o • •2 3 000128 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information - 2 Seaborn would carry. The important thing was to have Mr. Seaborn first establish his credentials as "a political personage." Mr. Sullivan said it was not essential that lr. Seaborn endorse all the points he was asked to transmit; the important thing was that he transmit the messages faithfully* Mr. Martin said that it was important that Mr. Seaborn maintain his independence; he undertook however that Mr. Seaborn should pass messages as a friend. Mr. Sullivan added that part of Mr. Seaborn's functions would further be to convey messages from the North Vietnamese. He undertook to provide an outline brief for Mr. Seaborn. 4 The Minister asked what inducements the United States would be able to offer Hanoi. Mr. Sullivan replied that the United States was prepared to accept the independent existence of two Vietnams and hold out the hope of ultimate unity. He conceded that this might, not be viewed as a U.S. concession by North Vietnam and indeed that it might create difficulties for both North and South Vietnam. He noted that North Vietnam was experiencing difficulties in the supply of most commodities except coal. They might therefore be looking for a way in which to obtain United States foodstuffs. They could be offered the prospect of trade. Other lines could be explored but the possibility of an arrangement under PL480 was remote. Mr. Sullivan accepted that North Vietnam might prove totally unreceptive: the United States had tried'once before to communicate with the North Vietnamese without result. At that time however they were much more confident whereas now Communist China was exercising greater pressures in favour of conformity. Mr. Sullivan said the Americans would be interested in Mr. Seaborn's assessment of the weight this factor played in the thinking of the North Vietnamese leaders. The Americans wanted to have someone in Hanoi in whom they could place confidence. At any rate they did not want to pass up the opportunity to let the North Vietnamese know the United States position. » 4 «3 000129 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information - 3 5 The Minister asked what would result if Mr. Seaborn’s approach was not acceptable to the North Vietnamese. Mr. Sullivan indicated that the Americans might nevertheless wish to pass certain specific messages for transmission to Hanoi. He stressed that for the Americans the problem was not limited to Vietnam but was of worldwide significance. The Minister said that Canadians would be concerned about any possible expansion of hostilities. ' Much would depend on how the messages were presented. Mr. Sullivan replied that he hoped the messages could be framed in such a way that there would be no necessity for an endorsement on our part. Mr. Martin asked for an assessment of Peking’s role 6 in Indochina. Mr. Sullivan replied that Peking was limiting itself to encouragement of the North Vietnamese. There was no evidence of physical participation. The Chinese had been responsible for some road construction in northern Laos. There were some Chinese truck drivers in a quasi-military capacity. Communist China also supplied weapons to North Vietnam to. be passed to South Vietnam. The Communist Chinese viewed it as advantageous to keep peripheral areas in turmoil to distract and exhaust the free world. Mr. Sullivan cited Sarawak and Singapore as examples. The Chinese had not however made a specific commitment to come to North Vietnam’s aid if attacked. Mr. Martin remarked that it was a disadvantage not to know Communist China’s exact thinking. Mr. Sullivan implied that he did not think Peking would intervene directly. Mr. Martin remarked on the Soviet Union’s interest in winning support for co-existence. . Mr. Sullivan thought that the Soviet Union was rapidly abandoning hope of exerting influence in South East Asia. It wanted to disengage itself from the problem of Laos because the prospect of exerting its influence through lines of communication across Communist China was not attractive. The United States felt that the Soviet Union had "played out" its chances in South East Asia. It may originally have expected that the role of co-chairman 7 oo o4 000130 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a i’information I - 4 would be sufficient to give it influence. Khrushchev was bored with Laos. The Poles on the other hand were frightened. In their position they could not simply ignore what was happening in the Plaine des Jarres as could the Russians. Mr. Smith noted that the Poles seemed ready to help destroy Souvanna Phouma's position in order to be able to protect their essential interests elsewhere. Mr. Sullivan agreed. He went on to say that Polish-Soviet tactics seem to be to denigrate Souvanna Phouma in order to return to a situation in which three factions face each other. They would therefore join in efforts to get rid of Souvanna Phouma. The French were to a certain extent lending themselves to these efforts. The Minister said that he would be surprised if it 3 proved possible for us to hold Laos. He asked whether the United States was prepared to intervene seriously. Mr. Sullivan replied that the source of the trouble was the same in Laos as in South Vietnam. There would not be much advantage in initiating ground operations from Thailand. The forthcoming meeting in Honolulu would di scuss the nature of the military posture to be adopted. The probable recommendation. ’would be to strengthen their general position in the area; Mr. Sullivan did not know whether any recommendation would be made to commit ground forces. 9 On the question of the conference on Laos Hr. Martin said that Canada preferred informal consultations in Vientiane. Mr. Sullivan replied that the United States intended and expected that the Government of Laos should initiate the discussions. The French proposal for consultations on Laos gave them too great an air of formality. 10 The Minister asked for Mr. Sullivan’s views on the reasons which led the French to take the position they did. Mr, Sullivan surmised that the French expected that G 000. i 000131 Bl �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divutgue en vertu de la Loisur l'acces a I'information - 5 - ? consultations would expand to cover all of Indochina. Why the French wanted this would remain a matter for speculation. De Gaulle however had simple views of power blocs and South East Asia lay within the Communist Chinese sphere of influence. Jealousy as a motive was probably nothing more than an emotional overtone. Mr. Martin intervened to say that he agreed with the’ article by Lippman which had appeared in the paper that day. Mr. Sullivan recounted the view of the French Ambassador in V,'ashington that Communist Chinese influence would expand as far as the Anglo-Saxons would allow. To check Chinese influence would however take more force than the Anglo-Saxons had yet committed. Mr. Sullivan surmised that the British would in that case have to withdraw forces from western Europe ? a prospect that was pleasing to de Gaulle. ' The French expected that South East Asia would be turned over to an Asian Tito (China) if the West withdrew. ■ ■ (N . A©ci ) Mr. Martin said that he did not see how a conference 11 could be avoided unless the United States took a course in favour of direct intervention. Mr. Sullivan thought that these were extreme alternatives and said he would prefer to find a middle course. He conceded however that intervention rather than a conference seemed to be a more likely course at the present time. The Minister said that Canada wanted to give all help but would have to express serious views on such a possibility. Speaking as a politician he said he would find it difficult to condone, Mr. Sullivan replied that any military response would be commensurate, with the degree of provocation. Hanoi might be banking on the possibility that the United States would be incapable of action in an election year. He hoped that Mr. Seaborn might open the way to a middle course. Mr. Martin remarked that he hoped that lo Seaborn would be able to move as soon as possible. 00.6 000132 p l i �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information ( - O Mr. Sullivan said that Vietnam was becoming an 12 emotional issue in the United States. The letters from men serving in Vietnam about the alleged poor quality of their .equipment had caused a stir. It was difficult for the people to understand how military personnel should not engage in direct military action but restrict themselves to the training of military and paramilitary forces to protect the local population. The United States role was limited to the provision of equipment and instruction, and support units such as helicopter and transport units. The Americans had 16,000 men in Vietnam of which only 300 were in the field. About 6,000 were in support forces, flying, servicing, maintenance, transport or communications. 700 were in headquarters planning. About 400 were responsible for the bringing in of equipment for the Vietnamese Army. There was no massive influx of Americans and none were in command positions. The military now understood the situation. On Cambodia the Americans had thought of proposing 13 a force along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border made up of 13 battalions from each side. U.N. liaison officers were to be attached to these battalions which would be under U.No command for purposes of policing the border. Such an operation would require a U.N. force of 700-800 men. The placing of a pure U.N. force along the border would take some 4,000 men. The South Vietnamese had said that 1,500 would be sufficient. Mr Martin noted the British view that a conference 14 on Cambodia was essential. Mr. Sullivan replied that the question was the attitu.de of the Thais and the South Vietnamese. Mro Martin asked whether a conference on Indochina. was not becoming inevitable. Mro Sullivan said that the ...7 000133 �Document Disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur l'acces a {'information -7= usual Communist tactic when a conference was in the offing Was to bring significant .military force to bear to prepare the opposition for negotiation. He mentioned Dien Bien Phu in this connection.' A quadripartite conference on Cambodia would be possible if one could bring the South Vietnamese, Thais and Cambodians together. This had very nearly happened (in March). The United Staves did not object in principle to a conference on Laos provided there was a cease-fire, a return to military positions1 prior to the most recent outbreak and provided Souvanna Phouma was confirmed as spokesman of the government of national unity. The machinery set up by the Geneva Agreements had been abused and the ICC and the cochairmen were not proving effective. On Vietnam, Mro Sullivan said that a conference without cessation of Viet Cong activity would lead to a collapse of morale in South Vietnam.- A general conference on Indochina as a whole while at the same time reinforcing non-Communist military positions would be very difficult unless military action were taken against North Vietnam. Mr. Martin said that he might be questioned in the 15 House about the meeting between the Prime Minister_and President Johnson. He would have to roply vaguely. Mr. Smith supgeatedthat it might be possible to say that Mr. I i i Sullivan had been to Ottawa but Mro Sullivan preferred to avoid mention of his presence here. Mr. Martin suggested that it would be possible to say that Canada had carried on the fullest consultations with the U.S. on Indochina, lr. Sullivan hoped that it would in that case prove possible for us to indicate the President’s concern at the pace of North Vietnamese recklessness in Laos and South Vietnam. He thought it would be better however not' to let it be known that he had been in Ottawa. 16 The Minister said that the Opposition tended to be suspicious of .United States policy in Indochina.' He had defended. U.S. position on South Vietnam; there would be 08 000134 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a information .. 8 trouble however if operations in Vietnam were to expand. Mr. Sullivan said that the press had already carried reports of the fuller aerial reconnaissance which had recently been undertaken. It was known that the United States felt grave concern about the situation. He thought it would be useful for the United States’ allies to know how seriously the United States felt on the issue. Mr. Martin asked when the results of the Honolulu conference would be made known to us. Mr. Sullivan said that if decisions and conclusions were reached they would be conveyed to Canada as soon as possible-possibly as early as Wednesday. Mr. Smith said that if the right wing were to again take extreme action in Laos it would be very difficult to defend. .Mr. Martin said we would do our best. Mr. Sullivan expressed his thanks and said United States had confidence in Seaborn. in reply to a question from the Minister he said that he hoped Seaborn’s mission had not been undertaken too late. 17 000135 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divujgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information TO BE RETURNEE TO FAR EASTERN DIVISION TOP SECRET BACON June 3, 1964 Record of Conversation Visit of Messrs Sullivan-and Cooper to the Department •===**=**===**mr***=ere***=a==d==r=== —=================================2=========================*=============== Present: U.S.A. - Mr. William Sullivan ("Vietnamese Co-ordinator". State Department); Mr. Chester Cooper (C.I.A.), • Mr. C. Kiselyak (U.S. Embassy) Canada - Mr. Arnold Smith (chairman); lo J. McCardle (DL2), Mr. R. L. Rogers (Far Eastern Division), Mr. H. B. Singleton, Mr. T. M. Pope An. Je« bov I The following is a summary of the discussions on May 28 with lr . William Sullivan of the State Department and Mr. Cooper of the C.Te. as they affected Vietnam. Separate memoranda are being prepared on the discussion on Laos and Cambodia. Mr. Sullivan began by emphasizing the gravity of 2 the present situation. It was likely that greater risks would have to be faced in Indochina now than at any other time in the recent past--despite any hopes the North Vietnamese might have of the alleged paralysis of United States policy in an election year. 2 0005 000136 �Document efisclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information 2 Mr. Sullivan said that the problem at the present 3 time was to come to an accurate estimate of Sino-Vietnamese intentions. The military situation in Laos was now thought to be ■ more si niz leant than it hod originally appecrcd to be and it’was not clear how far the rathet Lao would push at this time. It was likely that decisions would have to be taken in the very near future that would bring us closer to a confrontation than even in the early days of the Laotian crisis. The United States was therefore requesting Canadian good offices to “convey signals” to Hanoi both so that the North Vietnamese leaders would understand the seriousness of the United States determination and also in order to learn something of North Vietnam’s intentions. Lr. Sullivan informed the Canadian side of the 4 forthcoming conference in Honolulu during which Messrs Rusk and licNamara would confer with high officials to decide on policy for the immediate future. The recontly-begun low level photographic reconnaissance flights inso Laos had brought startling evidence of a missive buildup of materiel in the Plain of Jars and, more serious, in southern Laos adjacent to Military Recion 5 in Couth. Vietnam. The possibility therefore arose that Worth Vietnam’s intentions were to force a showdown in South Vietnam. Mr. Arnold Smith intervened at this point to confirm 5 that we agreed both with the United States estimate of the situation and that we did not propose any alternative to tne present policy of resistance. Mr. Smith recalled General Collins’ judgment in 1954-55 chat South Vietnam was defen able. The Unioed States was undertaking great burdens in defence of Vietnam and deserved our support and appreciation. in answer to a question by Mr. McCardle, Mr. Cooper confirmed that the evidence no. at hand was the result of a O o G • © . ( 000137 �f r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divCilgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information 3 ■ new collection, effort through low level photographic flights begun on lay 19 but -not continuing On a regular daily basis. The bull dun. in the Plain.of Jars was a continuation of a long■ standing Vietnamese effort in the area. In southern Laos however there was evidence of a rapid and continuing buildup which had shown significant development even since the beginning .of the low-level reconnaissance flights, moreover, high level vhotogranby showed an acceleration of the logistic buildup in Vietnam since the beginning of the year in the form of new roads and extensions to the railray system. One could only speculate about North Vietnam’s ultimate intentions; but one effect of this increased North .Vietnamese effort had already been seen in the improvement of the armament available to the Viet Cong. It could not be ruled out that the North Vietnamese micht even be contemplating some new Dien Bien Fhu in South Vietram. Passing to what he called the "political dimensions" 7 Mr. Sullivan said that the lines between the Chinese and moderate caps within the Vietnamese Lao Dong party had become cleanly drown folloinz Le Duan’s tri" to Fekins and Moscow in the fall. Mr. Sullivan surmised that this apparent factionalization of the Lao Dong party, was something that. Ho Chi Minh might have hoped to avoid. At the Lao Dong party congress in December Le Duan’s speech indicated that a choice had beer. made in favour of the Chinese line. By contrast the special political conference held in February indicated that the moderates—Mr. Sullivan mentioned Ho Chi Minh, Gian and Pham Van Dong--were fighting' a rear guard action against the activists. In speaking of the war in South Vietnam the moderates had been arguing that'the period of military decision was not yet at hand and that the rebels should drop back to standard tactics of harassment. In South .Vietnam the Viet- Con: had a well-develored 8 command apparatus controlled through Hanoi. The military arm of theViet Cong was however not yet able to inflict decisive def eats-.on the government forces. The Viet Cone ...1 000138 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information 4 ( was organized into 44 regular battalions totalling 25,000 men, (Mr. Cooper later qualified this figure- as a minimum), to which could be added some 60 - 80,000 part-time guerilla troops. The Viet Cong was not yet capable of mounting regimental-size operations; at the most it could organise co-ordinated battalion, attacks. rhe targeting of the Viet Cong effort indicated that the Viet. Cong was still basing • • itself on standard tactics of terrorism. ' 9 The government forces had now swung completely around to an acceptance of Trinquier’s theses on the nature o: . revolutionary war. ihe fabric however of the Vietnamese government’s ability was thin and the Viet Cong had madeefficient local administrators a favourite target for the army was the' only well-articulated assassination, or anization on the government side. It was not yet able however to give protection to the local population and so make the oil spot technique effective. The situation was characterized essentially by the Viet Cong’s inability to topple the government militarily while the government was unable to meet the Viet Gong threat by offering protection to the people in the rural areas. in Laos the Communist objective was not to destroy 10 the risht winE at the present time but to destroy the neutralists. “In this way they could eliminate the remaining symbol of national unity, ii. Sullivan summed up by saying that two operations directed from Hanoi.were concurrently being carried out. One was .the erosion of the popular will in South Vietnam. Ihe second was, the erosion of neutral strength in Laos. what was alarming in the present situation was the 11 pace at which Hanoi seemed prepared to push. i. oullivan speculated that Hanoi might hope to exploit a supposed election year paralysis in the united abates. In fact, there would be a demonstration of .bi-partisan support on the issue. L • o * . i 000139 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document'divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information 5 There was no illusion in the United States government that ' war in South East Asia could possibly result in anyone’s advantage. ..hat was therefore needed was a clarification, of Hanoi’s goals; an explanation to Hanoi of United braces goals; and a mutual caminttion whether there would be a • confrontation or a standing down. lr. Smith intervened at this oint to note shat what was required Was a definition of United States goals. Mr. Sullivan replied that the ideal would be for the .OPtA so accept .the fact that their ambitions must be limited to the territory assined to. them under the. 1954 Cease biro -grecment; that is, to accept the fact that the 1954 settlement was permanent. At a, later point in he conversation r. Rogers made the point chat the 1954 cease-fire and regrouping had not been intended to be permanent but as designed to pave r. ullivan the' way for a settlement throu! elections. 12 nevertheless indicated that in cho nited Sta e8 viet the 195/, settlement should be re garded. as creating a permanent dividing line in Vietnam. • i-i. icCardle asked whether the American side had 13 envisaged that, any confrontation ould eventually involve r. Sullivan replied that they had been the Chinese. working on the assumption that the Chinese objective was (a) to isolate cheir own people from outside influence and (b) to restore the military and economic situation in their own country. ihey wished to avoid situations of maximum risk but were quite happy,to have the situation on their borders remain tense through forth Vietnamese action. Sr. Cooper intervened to say that in his view the Chinesc would give strong vocal support' to the North Vietnamese, would keep'prodding them to maintain their pressures in Couth Vietnam., but would not take risks chemselves. He based his reasoning on three points: (a) North Vietnam would be e.cO 000140 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divuigue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information ! 6 f reluctant, to compromise its independence through being forced ■ to call on a Chinese military presence in north Vietnam; the North vieinsmese military establishment wS not helpless and was sufficiently well-organised to meet most threats; and (c) the Chinese do not have a great deal to offer in a military way apart from overwhelming land forces. 11 • lr. Smith recalled the Yallu and said-that the Chinese response to American action would depend on the choice presented by the U.S. ir. Sullivan replied that the as not limited significance of uh C as happening in Viebna: could be soon as a test to that particular country alone other possible Counist targets in South Last Asia, case for . Latin merica and Africa, who question that was being posed was 12 thur the est was physically capable of protecting its allies from the technique of revolutionary war. ir. Smith noted that the problem Was partly indigenous and vas not merely one of northern fomentation of an outside movement. Mr. Sullivan agreed and said that the political problem was to deal with a situation which made it possible for the Viet Cong to recruit the bulk.of its stren bh Prom the local population.- He also envisaged that the integration of the Viet Cong into the national life would be-a. difficult problem •• if a settlement was ever reached. Mr. Cooper admitted an indigenous component to the rebellion. At the same time he thought that the Viet Cong rebellion could be brought to an . end if instructions to that effect were issued from Hanoi. The rebellion would not come to an end immediately; it would however become a problem that could be handled by the South Vietnamese government. 15 Mr. Sullivan came to the question of the nature of the message which he .hoped Mr. Seaborn might convey to the Vietnamese authorities. He said the United States as c o 07 000141 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information 7 ■ prepared to get into a dialogue with North Vietnam and had thought Canada might be a useful intermediary. The French were not a this time considered to be capable of playing the role of an honest intermediary. The British said that "their man” was not qualifisd by temperament to carry out the task the Americans had in ind. A United States attempt to talk directly to. Ung Van Khie i, wne then foreign minister, in the Spring of 1951 had failed. Mr. Sullivan described Mr. Seaborn’s mission as being "to see whether there are any grounds for carrotingthom or whether the threat of sticks produces any movement," Durin3 the c o ur s e of the discussion, which became general about this stage. the following points were made. (a) Mro Smith raised our concern that the channel of c o mu nications to lr. Seaborn should remain within Canadian hands. i-r. Sullivan confirmed that the- channel would be from the State Department to the Embassy in Washington to Ottawa to Mr. Seaborn. (b) Mr. Sullivan said that it was not the American intention to have ir. Seaborn’s mission conflict with our obligations in the Commission. i. Smith replied that this was not a limiting problem. (c) Er. Sullivan said that he hoped that 1r. Seaborn would transmit messages faithfully even if he did not agree with the content. Mr. Smith reassured him on this point. (d) r. icCardle raised the question whether the north Vietnamese might not be overconfident because they had not yet met with. a military defeat, i. Sullivan replied that he hoped that ir. Seaborn could inform us hot great a burden north Vietnamese find the war in the South. Er. Cooper thought this aspect was not a negligible faccor in Hanoi’s motivation. He thought the high casualty figures received through U.S. intelligence sources were probably accurate and might even contain a degree of understatement. lro Sullivan confirmed that in the American view there was a possibility both. of war-weariness in North Vietnam and of war jitters. ooo 000142 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a i’information 8 The basic problem discussed wE.S the manner in which - 16 The American lir. Seaborn should establish his credentials side put forward the possibility of a discreet lealin of the fact that there had been contacts between rr esidet J ohn son. and lr. Pearson . The consensus of the meeting, however. Was fter some discussion that publicity should be shunned. agreement was reached that ir. Seaborn might be provided with a letter from Prime Minister Pearson setting out his status as an ilinorlocuteur." On the actual nature of the approach to be made to 17 the Horth iT. Sullivan read from a paper he had prepared ssion. setting out the desirable obj ectives of i Seaborn's The paper covered the following points: (a) Mr. Seaborn’s .credentials; (b) ir. Seaborn’s estimate of the horth Vietnamese "rationale for action"; (c) ir. Seaborn’s estimate of the effect of the Sino-Soviet split-on the formation of factions within the Lao Long party; (d) evidence of the importance of the Chinese Communist presence in north Vietnam as .ell a an assessment of the soviet and eastern European presence; (e ) the. degree of interest on the part of North Vietnam in increased contacts with the best. ed that Mr. Seaborn should lro Sullivan envi is make clear to the iorth Vietnamese leaders the eztt-ent of the United States determination to defend South Vietnam, and at' the same time, emphasize the limitations of UiS. ambitions in South ietnam, in parti enlar it required no bases or other military prosence of a permanent nature in that country. Mr. Seaborn was to make clear. also to the North Vietnamese authorities that rhe united Status hold _anoi--and not feking or ioscow-- directly responsible for the tensions- in Laos and Vietnam. ir. Sullivan touched on the inducements that could be offered to the North Vietnamese to ut a has to their efforts in. South Vietnam. . Seaborn was to say that the ••19 0co9 000143 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act' Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information 9 United states accepted peaceful co-cxistence with the i.orth; he should also hold out the prospect of trade between forth .Vietnam and south Vietnam, trade which was necessary to the North because of its unviability as an economic unit when ■ cut off from the South. It might oven e possible to . envisage some sort of help for the north such as Poland and ■ Yugoslavia hove enjoyed. As for he "stich", 1. seaborn might- catalogue United states strength in the area and emphasize the vulnerability of North Vietnam to attack. He should.also stress the inability of the Chinese within their present capabilities to counter any American move. The prospect that was facing che North Viconamese was that of turning Horth Vicuna, into a battlefield.. (In answer to a qustion ir. Sullivan scid that the Americans c aviso, ed air strikes and not the commitment of U.do troops.) ih. Seaborn expressed the four that the above might S22L3 he re rar dad as empty threats. i. . Cooper assured cl e meet 31.33 that by ■ in Hanoi there would be available the time ix. Seaborn to the north Viconqmese loaders tangible evidence of United States seriousness. Sullivan Victngmese leaders should emphasise the limited ne.6c of U o 5 . ambitions in Vietnam but, the total nature of its involve S 1t 5 , He should also emphasise the global clificance or uno wan 0 Sa that the United abates • government ■ for the United Sta would not be hajastruns by election year politics „. ihe United th Jom.mist rC mes such as States accep ted co-cxf senc ey refrained from interference in north Vietna :2 so lone At a later point in the conversation i 20' . said that lr. Seaborn’s first ascage to the for other countries. Irada wiith South Vietnam and assistance from the United States should be held up as inducements Mr. Sullivan mentioned the examples of Yugoslavia’and'Poland in this connection. Finally-this should be acc railed by a description of United States military poor in the area to ensure that the North Vietnamese leaders were labouring under no illusions as ohet awaited them1. Far Eastern Division 000144 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information TO BE RETURNED TO FAR EASTERN DIVISION SECRET June 3, 196A Summary Record of Conversation with Mr. Sullivan May 28, 196/ Cambodia Present: U.S.A. - Mr. William Sullivan ("Vietnam Co-ordinator", State Department) , Mr. Chester Cooper (C.ZA,}, ' Mr. Co Kiselyak (U.S. Embassy) Canada - Mr. Arnold Smith (chairman), Mr. J. McCardle (DL2), Mr. R. L. Rogers (Far Eastern Division), Mr. H«. B. Singleton, Mr. T. M. Pope Following is a record of the discussion on Cambodia during Messrs Sullivan and Cooper’s call on the Department May 28. After noting that Cambodia was an area in which we 2 disagreed with U.S. views, lao Arnold Smith stressed the Cambodians’ traditional fear of the Vietnamese. Cambodians: were lackadaisical and felt with reason that the much more active, intelligent and capable Vietnamese presented a threat to their futures. Sibanouk had been consistent in one thing, and that was his insistence that he receive reassurances regarding his borders. Canada thought that it might have been possible to have been more forthcoming in meeting SihanoukTs concern. Mr. Sullivan agreed that Sihanouk did indeed have an ancient and deep-rooted fear of the Annamites. His basic attitude was however a barometer of his optimism or pessimism regarding the course of the war in Vietnam. When he found himself taking a pessimistic view he tended to look towards China. His concern for the convening of a f ourteen-nation conference reflected an anxiety to have China and North Vietnam become parties to any multilateral treaty recognizing his bore PS. 3 ...2 000145 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur l'acces a /'information 2 Mr. Cooper, conceded that the commander of the 5th Division (in whose area many of the border incidents had taken place) took an unhelpful attitude towards Cambodians. The United States had long pressed that he be relieved and were hopeful that this would now be done. (It was reported on June 1st that he had in fact been replaced.) With regard to the May 8 incident there was evidence that the Viet Cong had mounted a trap to lure the Vietnamese forces across the bordero 4 Regarding the discussion of the Cambodian problem 5 in the United Nations, Mr. Sullivan revealed that the U.Se plan envisaged that 13 battalions from each of Cambodia and Vietnam .should be placed on the border along with some 700 or 800 UoN. observers. The South Vietnamese estimated that a pure U.N. force of some 1,500 men (i.e., without Cambodian and Vietnamese participation) would be sufficient to patrol the border. The U.S. estimate was that a minimum of 4,000 men would be necessary for this purpose. 6 Mr. Smith noted that Sihanouk regarded a conference as a way in which he could get recognition of his borders from other countries including China and North Vietnam. 1. Sullivan informed the meeting that Huot Sambath (Cambodian Foreign Minister) realised that the Security Council would not give an end sement of the principle of a Geneva Conference on Cambodia. 2 went on to say that Sihanouk was having second thoughts about the French neutrality proposals which, Sihanouk had come to realise, envisaged a Titoist Indochina dominated by Hanoi. Returning to the problem of the Cambodian-South 7 Vietnamese border, Mr. Sullivan said that the United States hoped that a United Nations commission of inquiry might look into the means for solving the problem and for increasing the degree of co-operation between Cambodia and Vietnam along the border. Mr. Sullivan said that he did not think a United Nations force on the border between Laos and South Vietnam would have a useful, role to play because the real problem lay in Hanoi’s decision to support the war in South Vietnam. 000146 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information TO BE RETURNED TO FAR EASTERN DIVISION Top Secret . Bacon June Lp s 1964 Re cord of Di s cus S i on Q n 195 during visit of Mosers Sullivan and Cooper May 26, 1964 Present: U.S.A. - Mr. William Sullivan (’'Vietnamese Co-ordinator", State Department), Mro Chester Cooper (C.T.Ae), • Mr: C. Kiselyak (U.S. Embassy) Canada - Mr. Arnold Smith (chairman), Mr. J. McCardle (DL2), Mr. R. L. Rogers (Far Eastern Division), Mr. H. Be Singleton, Mr. T. M. Pope Mro Sullivan said that the Americans thought that the Pathet Lao wanted to get Souvanna out of the country and restore the equality of the three parties. Their belief that the French also supported this policy was based on the fact that Princess Souvanna Phouma had told the U.S. Ambassador in Paris on May 26 that "the French have now turned on my husband.” The Americans were afraid that the situation in Laos 2 might fall apart to such an extent that it might not be possible, for them to continue their non-confrontation policy for the entire area. 3 With respect to-Laos, the U.S.A, wanted Canadian support on: (1) holding fast to Souvanna Phouma as the spokesman of the RIG and not accepting a three-party approach; (2) opposition to the Polish proposal for a conference with limited participation; (3) Article 4 consultations in Vientiane. Mr. Arnold Smith said that Canada thought that it 4 would be unwise to have formal consultations between Souvanna Phouma and exclusively Western countries because this would damage Souvanna*s. neutral image. Mr. Munro had, however, been instructed to attend informal consultations. o6.2 000147 �’ Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information - 2 - Mr. Sullivan said that the purpose of Article 4 was something more than mere informal discussions; other-wise it would not have been necessary. Furthermore, Souvanna's neutrality had already been compromised by the actions of the Pathet Lao® 5 Mr. Smith said that he had been referring to 6 Souvanna’s international neutrality as between Western and non-Western countries, not to his neutrality among the Laotian factions. could accomplish. He wondered what formal consultations 7 Mr. Sullivan said that their main purpose was to keep Souvanna ’’bucked up.1 if his request for consultations was not met he would be pushed closer to the end of his rope® There was also the face-saving aspect—he had gone on record as wanting consultations and must be given satisfaction. It would be misunderstood by him and in other quarters if the Canadians were absent. If Mr. Munro's duties as Commissioner did not allow him time to attend consultations, perhaps Canada would consider pending another delegate. Mr. Smith said that, although the Indians had been 8 most unreasonable recently in all three Commissions, it was most desirable, from the point of view of the Geneva settlement, to have them participate in any consultations that took place. Mro Sullivan requested that Canadian participation 9 not be made contingent on Indian participation® Mr. Smith said that no purpose would be served by a 10 Canadian boycott of purely Western consultations® If consultations were going to take place anyway, Canada would have to consider the situation on that basis. Mr. Rogers asked what it was anticipated would come out of these consultations. Mr. Sullivan said that this was the aachinery 11 provided by the Geneva Agreements for correcting the present situation® It might, of course, fail® 000148 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Indochina (CDVN) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDVN00023 Title A name given to the resource Appendix 4 - summary records of conversations between Mr. Martin and senior Canadian and American officials Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 28-29, 1964 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25/R219, 2017-00506-1, Box 3, Pt. 11, "A study of Canadian Policy with respect to the Vietnam Problem," Library and Archives Canada. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC ATIP EA_2023_020888 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Vietnam Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en