https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f2ffd9a8c0162789643c748ae370273b.pdf 67bdd13fa8c7bd36bbbf6a9c9ef3d7cc PDF Text Text Docvrrient disdoseiLu^der the Access to Information Act •rg pl.C/ !‘ ++ V-A Study errpCcuoC. ’cr rot Respect to the Uretncw Problem (962- (66 Pr. 12 seP'^dTrierftd^ulgu^env^tu de la Loi sur l’acces a /'information September n, 1473 ore 3 dosS er /0 000001 �(753 - Document disclosed under theAcces^^n^omiatiof^c^^ 4 i Acok . - 4: I Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information A STUDY OF CANADIAN POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE VIETNAM PROBLEM 1962 - 1966, o ■ W.T. DELWORTH SEPTEMBER 17, 1973 ■ 4* This study has been prepared with a view to providing / comprehensive background information on Canadian policy formation in connection with an important international problem, by drawing together a ' substantial amount of detail from various sources. While based 9 essentially on documentary evidence, it also draws heavily on personal recollection and assessment - to an extent sufficient'to warrant the author's request that permission be sought before the text is put to any use (that may subsequently be considered) wider than to provide background information for the purposes of the Minister, the Undersecretary and officials of the Department of External Affairs. e j r 5007W t 4 r , y. | I I difii • •■" 000002 ..- ..saeenchmns=SRLSAN=L==G==RRGgd ' 4 Dir �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information PREFACE "A" Canadian Personalities CADIEUX, M. Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, May 1964 - 1970. RITCHIE, A.E. Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, June 1964 - July 1966. Ambassador to Washington, July 1966 - January 1970. 19 ROBINSON, H.B.O Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, July 1966 - 1970. SMITH, A.C. Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 1963 - August 1965. COLLINS, R. E. Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, August 1965 - RITCHIE, C.S.A. Ambassador to Washington - to 1966. COX, G. E. Vietnam ICSC Commissioner, November 1962 - June 1964. SEABORN, J.B. Vietnam ICSC Commissioner, June 196/ - Nov. 1965. Director, Far Eastern Division, August 1967 - Spring of 1970. MOORE, V. C. Vietnam ICSC Commissioner, Nov. 1965 - January 1967. ROGERS, R. L. Director, Far Eastern Division, External Affairs, July 1963 - September 1965. GOIDSCHIAG, K. Director, Far Eastern Division, External Affairs, September 1965 - August 1967. POPE, T. M. Vietnam Desk Officer, External Affairs, to September 19 64. DEIORTH, W. T. Vietnam Desk Officer, External Affairs, September 1964 - 1970. 000003 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l’acces a /'information PREFACE "B" Americ an Per sonalities 09 BUNDY, McGeorge Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 1961-66. BUNDY, William P. Assistant and then Deputy Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, 1961-6. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 196/1-1969. Ambassador to Canada, 1963 until late 'sixties. BUTTERWORTH, W. W. COOPER, Chester Vietnam Specialist. Aide to McGeorge Bundy on White House Staff, 196/-1966 (Member of CIA prior to this). Special Assistant to Averell Harriman, 1967. FORRESTAL, Michael V White House Aide to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson on Vietnam, 196.2-65. Chairman of White House Interdepartmental Vietnam Coordinating Committee, 196/-65. Deputy Ambassador to Saigon, July 1964 - September 1965. Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, September 1965 - September 1966. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Japan, September 1966 - February 194 Officer in State Department’s International Relations Office, May 1965 - March 1969. Ambassador to Saigon, August 1963 - July 196/;; August 1965-1967. . Counsellor and then Minister, USA Embassy in Ottawa, July 1964 - October 1968. Special Assistant to Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, April 1963 - March 196/. Special Assistant to Secretary of State, March 19644 - April 196/. Consul General in Laos, April 196/ - November 1964. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Laos, November 1964 - July 1968. Ambassador to Saigon, July 1964 - August 1965. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1961-1963. Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1963-1965. Ambassador at large, 1965-1968. Personal Representative of the President to conversations on Vietnam in Paris, 19 68-1969. JOHNSON, U. Alexis KREISBERG, Paul H. LODGE, Henry Cabot SCOTT, J. W. SULLIVAN, William H. TAYLOR, Maxwell Do HARRIMAN, William Averell **************** Vietnamese Personalities Col. Nguyen Van An Chief of the South Vietnamese Mission in Charge of Liaison with the ICSC. Col. Ha Van Lau Chief of the PAVN (North Vietnamese) Mission in Charge of Liaison with the ICSC. Lt.Col. Mai Lam Ha Van Lau's Deputy. 000004 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'dcces a I'information ( PREFACE "C” HANOI’S FOUR POINTS April 8, 1965 The unswerving policy of the DRV Government is to respect strictly the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam and to implement correctly their basic provisions as embodied in the following points: ( 1—Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people—peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam U.S. troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, and cancel its military alliance with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam and completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV. 2—Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected. The two zones must refrain from entering into any military alliance with foreign countries and there must be no foreign military bases, troops, or military personnel in their respective territory. 3—-The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the NFLSV without any foreign interference. 4—The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference. This stand of the DRV Government unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace and justice-loving governments and peoples in the world. The government of the DRV is of the view that the stand expounded here is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If this basis is recognized, favourable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along -the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam. The DRV Government declares that any approach contrary to the afore- • mentioned stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate., Such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam. 000005 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en yertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information PREFACE "D" WASHINGTON’S FOURTEEN POINTS January 7, 1966 The following statements are on the public record about elements which the United States believes can go into peace in Southeast Asia: , 1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia; 2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof; 3. We would welcome ’’negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it; 4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it; 5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions; 6. Hanoi’s four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose; 7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia; 8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet-Nam after peace is assured; 9. We support free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice; 10. The question of reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision; 11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral if that be their option; 12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in War. If there is peace, North Viet-Nam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars; ) 13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don’t think that would be an unsurmountable problem". 14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped. 000006 �Document disclosed under the Access to-Information Act Document divulgue eh vertu de la Loisur l'acces a/'information A STUDY OF CANADIAN POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE VIETNAM PROBLEM, 1962-66 The first of what might be called special political contacts between Canadian representatives in Vietnam and. the Government of North Vietnam took place towards the end of November 1962 when the newly appointed Commissioner, G. E. Cox, paid his first visit to Hanoi. It should be borne in mind that this visit took place six months after the presentation of the Commission’s Special Report of June 2 in which Canada and India, in a majority opinion, drew attention - for the first time officially - to the problem of Northern intervention and subversion in the South. Cox had no special instructions and no specific brief to engage the North Vietnamese authorities in discussions of the terms and conditions under which a durable settlement in Vietnam might be arranged. He was received by the North Vietnamese Prime Minister and the interview was cordial and lengthy - a fact that was noteworthy since it took place in the wake of the June 2 Special Report. Pham Van Dong, in reviewing the Vietnam situation for Cox, said that he "wished some way could be found to begin some sort of contacts, however minor, with the authorities in Saigon and added that all their efforts in this direction had been rebuffed”. In response to the Prime Minister’s invitation to comment on the situation, Cox developed the theme that ”the measures which had been taken in the South to ensure the extension of the undisturbed authority of the Government over the whole of the South would eventually be successful”; the North should welcome such a development, for only if this condition prevailed and the Saigon Government felt secure could there be any hope of real progress towards such ultimate goals as reunification. According to Cox’s report, the Prime Minister .../2 t2082E5tue F8nx 13,-8 NTa aPaa.A... ! 42* y *** awe? Avis a is we? hppyndid PPre . . . "0 |000007 K I_ “==rrmpmo==rm===============2========*================================e============================9=s . i• �* Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l’acces a /'information . ' registered considerable interest and invited the Commissioner to accompany him, without advisers and interpreters, for a stroll around the garden. "He said that he wanted me to know that he was very impressed with what I had said and when he had an opportunity to reflect on it, he would like to discuss it further. even a few minutes.” Twice later he invited me to return whenever I had (Saigon telegram 181 of December 4 appears as Appendix It is not clear from the records what action, if any, was taken with respect to this report; my recollection of conversations with officers who had been involved at headquarters at the time is that they were reluctant to interpret this encounter as a significant diplomatic move and even more, they were extremely cautious about following it up. It took almost four months, and then in response to prodding by Cox, for Ottawa to reply. Recognizing the inevitability of discussions in North Vietnam, Ottawa went on to note the ’’dangers of excessive involvement”. , The operative paragraphs of this telegram are worth quoting in extenso as a reflection of official Canadian thinking at that time with respect to the Vietnam problem and the possibility of a special political role being played by Canada: 1 . ”2. We have two main concerns. The first relates to the possibility that your relationship in the South might be undermined if you were to appear to be acting as a bearer of messages from the North ostensibly conciliatory in nature but actually designed merely to weaken resistance in the GRVN and its allies. So long as the DRVN maintains its active policy of undermining GRVN, indications of a desire on the DRVN’s part for the establishment of contacts are probably more tactical than substantive. While there is no reason why these indications should not be passed on objectively to GRVN , leaders and Western Ambassadors, you should be careful not to express any personal view in transmitting them. You should bear in mind that such messages may be aimed at bringing outside pressure to bear on Diem. You Should also bear in mind that the Viet Cong is quite capable of getting messages to Nhu clandestinely and there is evidence that such contacts are made occasionally.... ••/3 yaeaurene -ertf th 2 s p3* ■."•»,yoepubo=mst===oP*e=m===== boa000008 __ 5 Fvarse heep044% �. ( Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue'en vertu de la Loi Sur l'acces a/’information ' ' i ’ - "4. Our second concern relates to limited Canadian responsibilities in Vietnam and our recognition of the large responsibilities of others. We would not wish you to enter any sort of negotiation on matters outside the Commission’s mandate. We are aware that the Indian Chairman has a broader mandate from his Government and we are of course interested in information concerning his initiatives. We have no objection to your stating views on a personal basis to DRVN leaders with our prior approval. We agree that your comments (para 2 of yourtel 181) were along the right lines. We, see no harm and possibly some good in expressing the view that there is an alternative to continuing the war which could lead to stable and profitable relationships between North and South and that the present course will lead only to prolonging human misery without achieving Northern objectives." (Ottawa telegram Y-47 of March 21, Saigon telegram 25 of February 21 and Saigon letter 385 of December 11 appear as Appendix 2). Nothing further came of this encounter and Canadian policy throughout 1963 and early 1964 concentrated on attempts to encourage the Indians to follow through on the commitment outlined in the June 2 Special Report looking to further action on the subversion problem. Within South Vietnam itself, this period was marked by severe political instability beginning with Diem’s troubles with the Buddhists, and leading onto the President’s overthrow before the end of the year. Political instability continued thereafter and was a primary preoccupation for the Americans; obviously the absence of effective political control in Saigon would have implications for military action in the villages and the countryside. Whatever interest may have been attached to the Cox/Pham Van Dong conversation in the beginning was quickly forgotten in circumstances which were leading away from a state of stability and effective control in the South, rather than towards it. In this context and by way of obiter dicta, it is worth noting that the authorities in Hanoi throughout this period were fascinated and apparently puzzled by what was happening in the South. Throughout this period I visited Hanoi approximately once every, six weeks or two months and found the authorities in the North eager for information and interpretation. They seemed to feel that it was as much the Americans as they themselves who were forcing the pace and calling some of the shots in the South. ...A I 1000009 K Uepug �. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces d /'information ' • Canadian attitudes throughout this particular period were marked by a sense of frustration and exasperation with the Indians and their procrastin- ations with respect to follow-up action by the Commission on the subversion problem, and in particular with respect to processing and finalizing the draft report prepared earlier by the Commission’s legal committee (i.e. the so-called ' i Legal Report). The purpose of this report was to present the basic detailed proof of the judgment outlined in the Special Report of June 2, 1962 that the | North had been sponsoring and intervening in armed insurgency in the South. Yle were also pressing the Indians for action on the so-called “new cases” which were allegations of subversion received by the Commission subsequent to the material on which the Legal Report and the Special Report of June 2, 1962 had been based. As time passed, and as the situation in the South became more . * • unstable, it became progressively clearer that the Indians had no intention of cooperating in any significant way, all of which led to increasing Canadian frustration and a serious questioning of the value of our continued participation / in a ’’do-nothing” Commission. This latter consideration was given an added importance by the growing feeling that the politico-military situation in the South would get much worse before it got any better, and that a deeper and deeper American involvement appeared almost tragically inevitable. Many of us felt that we did not wish to be around when that happened - for the sake of the Vietnamese themselves, and for the sake of Canada/USA relations. ********** in the late spring of 19 64 the Americans were growing increasingly e concerned at indications that North Vietnam was planning a significant move into the South in support of Viet Cong military operations there. 1 _ ..** ■ • In terms of the total situation in Vietnam, this concern seemed quite plausible since the ../5 aasgd w kgste ;. •a * 5405* ERGRMaSes tlarlesgesn sA‘? wwu 4" ",2 $ —; ‘****. A. * ~ • -___ v sn .97 000010 EPS-TE �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act , Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a ('information instability that had wracked the South since the overthrow of Diem in late 1963 invited a more active insurgency in the countryside. About mid-May the Americans had decided that it would be necessary to get a message through to Hanoi warning them against.any attempt to push the USA presence but of South Vietnam and to ensure that the North Vietnamese leaders had not seriously miscalculated the strength of USA determination to remain in South Vietnam in support of the government there. What they were looking for was an interlocutor in whom Washington had confidence and who, at the same time, would have access to Hanoi and command the respect of and be given a sympathetic hearing by the top leaders in the North Vietnamese capital. It was decided that the Head of the Canadian Delegation to the International Commission in Vietnam could serve this purpose admirably especially in view of the Commissioner’s ready and relatively inconspicuous access to Hanoi. The incumbent Commissioner, G. E. Cox, was due to leave on the termination of his assignment in July or ** ) early August, and because the Americans envisaged that the diplomatic project they had in mid could be a protracted one, and because they wished to handle the briefings in Ottawa rather than through their Embassy in Saigon, a new Commissioner, J.B. Seaborn, was selected and the changeover as Head of Delegation was brought forward by a few weeks Seaborn’s assignment grew out of a number of top level Canada-USA meetings including one between the Secretary of State of the USA, Mr. Rusk, and the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Pearson, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Martin; another between Prime Minister Pearson and the President of the United States, Mr. Johnson; and finally between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and senior Canadian and American ’ officials. All these meetings took place towards the end of May, and out of them emerged the terms of reference for Seaborn’s special mission. r .../6 2 000011 �Document disclosed under the Access to information Act Document divulgue en vertu de ia Loi sur I'acces a /'information The substance of the Pearson/Martin/Rusk discussions is recorded in I an undated memorandum marked as Appendix 3 . It should be noted that Mr. Rusk ’ } made it clear at the outset that the USA did not wish to ’’develop hostilities on a higher scale and to try for a Korean type of military solution". At the same time, ”... the USA was seeking ways to signal to Hanoi that it would be wrong for the Viet Minh to expect that the USA was getting discouraged and were thinking of pulling out. It was important for them to realize that if they did not put a stop to their operations they would be in trouble". Attached as Appendix 4 are summary records of conversations between Mr. Martin and senior Canadian and American officials on May 28 and 29. Our records show that on the evening of May 28, the Prime Minister l and the President discussed "ways in which we (Canada) could be helpful in N i Vietnam" - a reference to the evolving Seaborn mission. Unfortunately our records contain no information whatsoever on the nature of the Pearson/Johnson discussions beyond the memorandum and its attachment that appear as Appendix 5 . We can therefore neither confirm nor deny the claim stemming from the Pentagon gUUspc A11 ' L- " ’ Papers that "Pearson went along with USA bombing" (Globe and Mail, Friday, July 6, 1973). Personally I doubt very much whether the USA had any clearly thought-out "war game" or carefully graduated plan in mind at the time, as is witnessed by the unwillingness or inability of senior officials to expand upon the precise meaning of the "stick" in the "carrot and stick" approach in North Vietnam as this was being discussed with the Canadians. Clearly they must have had contingency plans for virtually every conceivable situation but how detailed these plans might be and how directly related to specific foreseeable situations as appropriate responses is very much an open question. When Mr. Rusk told the Prime Minister and Mr. Martin that if the North Vietnamese did not stand down, they would "be in trouble", he clearly had the application of military force .../7 000012 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisurl'acces a/’information in mind, but the record gives no hint that this had been thought out in the f precise terms of when, where, how and why. I would not venture a guess as to whether it was "likely” that the Prime Minister may have "gone along" with advance indications that the Americans would bomb North Vietnam. Personally I think it unlikely that the President would have announced to the Prime Minister in May that the USA intended to do something which it did not undertake as a matter of policy until the following February, excluding the use of force in the Tonkin Gulf incidents which probably fall,into a special category. I think it much more likely, in terms of the total context at the time, that the President might have referred to the possibility of bombing as one general option. At a high-level American policy planning meeting in Honolulu on June 1-2 in which Messrs Rusk, McNamara, Lodge, Bundy, Sullivan, McCone, General Westmoreland, Admiral Felt, General Taylor, inter alia, participated, no firm decisions of a far-reaching nature were taken, according to information made available to our Embassy in Washington. * The meeting ”... concentrated mainly on clarifying political and military requirements and risks of various specific courses of action in Southeast Asia - with the choice between those courses of action still to be made by the President in accordance with developments..." - S' / "... On the military side the various graduated alternatives which the USA 1 I considers it has open to it were not explained in full to us but we were given to understand by Cooper that so far as dealing with interference in South Vietnam was concerned, the main discussion focussed on what could be done from the air, i.e. by bombing either (a) VC logistic facilities such as trails and bridges in North Vietnam and Laos along supply routes or (b) North Vietnamese 6 military bases used to channel aid such as Vinh; or (c) significant industrial targets in the North. We were told that while no decisions were reached there was very little disposition at present to contemplate alternative (c) above. —/8 TTp428/et I *4* --"AxeteeS 66gts 570 TT 4000013 A „44t006 er 20: 4remaeareeese2925 �6 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces d /'information There was a thorough discussion of the political and military implications of use, of the South Vietnamese Air Force for such operations, how it would have to be beefed up for the purpose and so on". And in conclusion: "It is our impression that Honolulu has not resulted in any significant shift in USA attitude. A closer contemplation of all the possible alternatives does not seem to have led to any decisive consensus in favour of or against a harder line and the present blend of caution and resolve continues in about the same proportions. Our belief is that USA policy will evolve fairly gradually and will be determined largely by events particularly by the future actions and reactions of Hanoi as they are assessed here.” (Telegram No. 2043 of June 5 from Washington). It was against the background of these trends of thought and these speculations and ’’atmospherics” that Seaborn’s special assignment was agreed to. Codenamed "Bacon”, Seaborn’s assignment was, essentially, to serve as a confidential channel to the Government of North Vietnam, in the first instance to convey to the North Vietnamese leaders a message from the President of the USA concerning American intentions in Southeast Asia, and to transmit any North Vietnamese reaction back to Washington. i ■ Basically, the "message” Washington wanted Hanoi to understand was that American intentions were peaceful, but that just as American objectives were limited, so too was American patience with Communist provocation limited: Washington did not intend to allow a Communist The Americans hoped that Seaborn's first presentation take-over of the South. would elicit a considered North Vietnamese response and they seemed to be hoping that this might initiate a dialogue. Seaborn was also asked to "form an evaluation of their mental outlook”. "In sum, the purpose of Seaborn’s mission in the North would be as an interlocutor with both active and passive functions. On the active side he should establish his credentials with the North .../9 le*aoslot Sepae: a Pre* “ w ewr a he 0 15t *: . :47 - ? • 7 Ba i7 P spESpes = 7***5,******** . . . - ---(2 89948 nted 8 arP2 M 2 000014 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur l'acces a /'information Vietnamese and incidentally with the East Europeans as an authoritative channel of communications with the United States. On the passive side he should function as a channel which could bring back either observances (sic: observations?) or direct communications concerning the North Vietnamese attitude toward extrication from or escalation of military activities. In each of his functions Seaborn should assume the posture that the decision as to the future course of events in Southeast Asia rests squarely with Hanoi and that the United States is looking to Hanoi for the signal which will determine the nature of events to ensue in Southeast Asia." (Concluding paragraph from briefing paper from which Sullivan spoke when in Ottawa; full text as Appendix 6 .) It will be noted that there was no mention of negotiations at this stage: Seaborn was simply being asked to transmit a message, and, hopefully a reaction, together with personal impressions. i i / (Appendix 7 gives the text of the outline of the assignment as proposed by the Americans and agreed to by the Canadian Government: Washington telegram No. 1951 of May 30.) Of special interest is the following qualification in the agreed terms of reference: "The interlocutor or his Government need not agree with nor associate themselves with the messages that are passed. iC w The only requirement J is that there be faithful transmittal of the messages in each direction." The Canadian Government required that other conditions be met: Seaborn was to be regarded as a Canadian diplomatic agent, working for the Canadian Government with his activities controlled by Ottawa; he would transmit faithfully - in each direction, but his instructions must be formulated in Ottawa, the V substance of his messages must be reviewed by Ottawa (although Canada would not be associated with the substance as delivered), and his reports prepared for an submitted to Ottawa. These conditions were made explicit in Ottawa telegram Y-52A of July 9 to Washington and Saigon, attached as Appendix 8 . Evidently these concerns, which had been "understood" at the beginning but not spelled out in detail, seemed in danger of being overlooked by the Americans: hence this reminder shortly after the first Bacon mission. ) Although it was clear from the outset that the assignment raised the V political danger of being criticized by hostile critics for "running errands .../10 "Yni aidt BHHH uimde set 000015 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information for the Americans", the potential impact it might conceivably have on peace and stability in Southeast Asia made this a calculated risk which the Canadian 1 Government was prepared to take - subject to the controls mentioned above. There was also a further danger: Seaborn’s personal security in Saigon where a good many senior generals might well have been hostile to the whole exercise had they know it was being undertaken. therefore necessary. The utmost secrecy was To help protect his position vis-a-vis the Saigon Govern- ment where questions might arise if and when Seaborn’s visits to Hanoi became noticeably frequent (it seems to have been anticipated that they might) he was provided with a sympathetic letter of introduction to General Khanh, the South Vietnamese Prime Minister, from Prime Minister Pearson. With regard to the North, however, Seaborn was given a letter signed by Prime Minister Pearson authorizing him to transmit to the North Vietnamese messages from the United States government and to report back any comments or propositions made by the North Vietnamese. May 30, appears as Appendix 9 .) (The text of this letter, dated Seaborn was authorized to show this letter to President Ho Chi Minh or other senior North Vietnamese personalities. The crux of the Canadian position was expressed in the following words: "I venture to hope that President Ho will welcome the opportunity thus provided to eliminate all misunderstanding and that he will interpret your mission as being founded on a genuine desire to ensure the return of peace to Vietnam and Southeast Asia." t‘- U• \ Seaborn went to Hanoi first on June 16, 1964, and was received by the North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, on June 18. a-half long meeting was cordial. The hour-and- Seaborn explained his mission; Pham Van Dong appeared to understand and indeed to welcome the Canadian Commissioner’s role as an intermediary. Seaborn also felt that when the American message was .../ll ■I 000016 �l Document disclosed under the Access to TnJormatlo^Acr^’ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l’acces a /'information conveyed, Pham Van Dong had understood both its importance and the context in which it was delivered. At the conclusion of his presentation Seaborn noted that he was-at Pham Van Dong’s disposal should the latter wish a reply conveyed back to Washington. Although the North Vietnamese Prime Minister had commented on various points raised by Seaborn’s remarks he stated explicitly that he had no immediate and specific message to transmit at that time in response. Basically, then, all that was accomplished was a prise de contact. No more was really expected, and this was regarded as a successful beginning. At a more general, but equally significant level, Seaborn returned to Saigon with a number of observations regarding conditions and attitudes in North Vietnam which ran counter to the views speculatively held - and published S by contemporary Hanoi-watchers and journalists. ’’Certainly on my brief visit I detected no evidence to suggest (as some columnists have been doing) that starvation, war—weariness and political discontent are bringing the regime close to collapse and that they would therefore grasp at any straw which might enable them to save something before the country falls apart.” He noted further: ' ”I am also inclined to think that the DRVN leaders are completely convinced that military action at any level is not going to bring success for the USA and Government forces in SVN.” The text of Seaborn’s reports are attached as Appendix 10 . These were shared with the interested USA authorities in Washington and of course r with the USA Embassy in Saigon. On June 24 the Embassy in Washington reported that the State Department (Sullivan) had described Seaborn’s assessment of the Hanoi situation as ”a sobering picture which was in line with the least optimistic among various O assessments prevalent in Washington”. Early in July Seaborn reported from Saigon that consideration was * being given to holding a formal meeting of the Commission in Hanoi in mid—July .../12 25 2if t117 *t.P 3-28,40 $$8285 veSPe Ssvi* 0 envtk i e E * Me Asset S.4 ss a i in 000017 $9 Seleent �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Apt Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information and he asked whether there were any specific further points to be conveyed to The Department of External Affairs, in a the North Vietnamese Government. preliminary reaction noted the danger that ”too great an eagerness to reopen the dialogue might in these circumstances be misinterpreted..." North Vietnamese public statements at the time had been interpreted as being cast in maximum terms for the purposes of the record and were designed possibly to discourage any thought that a fruitful dialogue was possible at that stage. The State Department agreed with this assessment and indicated that if the Commission did not meet in Hanoi in July it would be desirable for Seabora to make his next trip to North Vietnam before mid-August. meeting was postponed until mid-August. In the end, the proposed Commission Seaborn noted that if the revised plan to meet in Hanoi the following month was not realized, he would proceed on his own, in order to complete his remaining introductory calls on North Vietnamese leaders. In a conversation of July 13 with Bundy, the Ambassador in Washington asked whether there had been any change in the State Department’s initial assess- ment that the Seaborn operation could be a useful exchange. 'N v Bundy replied that the operation was at least as vital as when it had first been suggested; "in fact it was the sole reliable channel available to USA”. Bundy did not display any concern that Seaborn’s next visit to Hanoi might have to be postponed until. 25 mid-August. In another context, he commented on ’’the current pause as far as USA decision making is concerned”. According to the Ambassador, this was doubtless a partial explanation for the lack of American haste in pursuing the exchange with Hanoi; another reason was a desire not to seem overly eager. ' ■ The Ambassador’s query reflected a fairly general suspicion in Canadian / 4 ? ' . r ■ official circles that USA thinking might be changing and that less importance .../13 sis, at ! RnS22s ee 5erss Hi Uh 28 i Sa Sesr 3 seeweseeeccel See Th mmeeets 000018 4 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a/'information C might now be attached to the Bacon exercise. In public statements, USA spokesmen had been taking issue with South Vietnamese statements that North Vietnamese military units were involved in the South. Had the assessment of the threat lessened? Had Washington simply panicked earlier in asking for the Seaborn mission? A memorandum from Far Eastern Division to the Under- Secretary dated July 31 concluded as follows: * "One can doubt, as we do, the advisability of carrying the war to North Vietnam, while admitting that the United States might at some point reach a conclusion that it had no alternative other than to commit the whole might of the United States Army to the war in South Vietnam. What is disturbing in the USA decision since early June to put less emphasis on warnings to Hanoi, is that it compromises the credibility of the United States position. /We ourselves are confused not; about the likely direction of United States policy. We think a move North is, more likely than withdrawal, but cannot be | entirely certain that the United States* determination might not flinch before embarking on a course that could lead to war with China. If we are confused, it would seem likely that the North Vietnamese are even more uncertain of United States intentions. The principal effect of United States vacillation in its statements about extending the war to North Vietnam seems to us to have been to undermine the object the United States primitively hoped to achieve when it sought to make use of Seaborn as a means of communication to North Vietnam: to ensure that North Vietnam remains absolutely certain of United States intentions and therefore be under no illusions as to the consequences of its acts in South Vietnam." While these questions were being asked in Ottawa, Seaborn was malting plans to visit Hanoi, and he asked, on August 3 whether there would be any special Bacon instructions; by then, his trip had been under discussion for some time. He concluded: "Sullivan’s rather casual reaction July 25 to my telling him of my August 10 trip to Hanoi makes me wonder whether USA has after initial enthusaism and excitement now lost interest in Operation Bacon. If so, I should know it before going to Hanoi." As Seaborn’s message was being transmitted, the first incidents in ""t p •) the Gulf of Tonkin were taking place, and these developments culminated on August 5, in American aircraft bombing four patrol boat bases and an oil depot on the North Vietnamese coast. Two days later a state of emergency was declared in South Vietnam, and the United Nations Security Council was convened at the request of the USA and it agreed to ask both North and South Vietnam , ooenarmgram-2,. Ces taay M/2P Lehe 7 ./14 ri See x. retgo qu-rpfouctoxspompereroaS=p==9 1000019 PfrentE LOg, fesBE l �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information > for information. (Two days later the North Vietnamese Government issued a statement refusing to cooperate with the United Nations and reiterating its established position that only the Geneva Conference machinery had any locus standi and any right to deal with the matter.) On the same day both houses of the USA Congress overwhelmingly approved a Resolution supporting the President’s action in undertaking ' retaliatory air strikes and authorizing further military action if he judged it necessary. It was against this background that Seaborn’s second visit took As noted above, the visit itself had been, in a general way, on the place. planning boards for some time and was not related to these dramatic new developments; indeed, it had been a moot point right up until the last minute whether the Americans would want anything special said. The content of his assignment was adjusted however to reflect developments in the Tonkin Gulf. In an interview with the Canadian Ambassador on August 7, Mr. Bundy expressed regret at the delay in providing material for Seaborn, but at the same time he | welcomed the decision to go ahead with the proposed trip: "The more contact I with Hanoi the better.” Another senior contact in Washington indicated continued interest in Seaborn’s mission as "our only channel”. Finally, on August 8, a request cleared by the White House and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defence was passed to us for use by Seaborn. The full text is contained in Washington telegram No. 2872 of August 8, Appendix 11. h The message was indeed just that: a toughly—worded statement of position providing few, if any openings which might invite a positive response (as opposed to a reaction). It began with an outline of the American version of what had happened in the Gulf of Tonkin earlier in the month. ’’About the only reasonable hypothesis was that North Vietnam was intent either upon making it appear that the USA was ”a paper tiger” or upon provoking the USA. i ser -CeEe EE oECsrco(oaRowaeT In view .../15 was posremsts 000020 feRPu �. 2 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act .. ' : Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information of the uncertainty aroused by the deliberate and unprovoked DRV attacks of this character, the USA has necessarily carried out precautionary deployments of additional air power to SVN and Thailand". The message went on to reiterate the limited nature of USA objectives in Vietnam, and urge that North Vietnam, whose control over the activities of the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao was no secret, confine itself to the territory assigned to its administration under the 1954 Agreement. It was pointed out that there were examples elsewhere - Yugoslavia and Poland - of the USA accepting the existence of Communist regimes in a spirit of peaceful co-existence and tolerance and the economic benefits that had accrued to them for ’’minding their own business” were to be hinted at. Finally, some new points were added: (A) (B) "That the events of the past few days should add credibility to the statement made last time that quote USA public and official patience with North Vietnamese aggression is growing extremely thin unquote. "That the USA Congressional resolution was passed with near unanimity, strongly reaffirming the unity and determination of the USA Government and people, not only with respect to any further attacks on USA military forces, but more broadly to continue to oppose firmly, by all necessary means, DRV efforts to subvert and conquer South Vietnam and Laos. (c) "That the USA has come to the view that the DRV role in South I Vietnam and Laos is critical. If the DRV persists in its present course, it can expect to continue to suffer the conL sequences. "That the DRV knows what it must do if the peace is to be restored. (E) L. K y "That the USA has ways and means of measuring the DRV’s participation in and direction and control of the war on South Vietnam and in Laos, and will be carefully watching the DRV’s response to what Mr. Seaborn is telling them.” Exercising our right to control and amend the content of messages as necessary, officials in Ottawa (subsequently approved by the Minister) told .../16 I S ar 2 ss bemsnes s $54 5*5"* wedesceeecse “rmeparyan==e=eeg=r==g===4======/9======o==4=T===== 000021 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information . I' ' V 4a. Seaborn to .delete from his presentation two points in the American outline (specifically, points D and E) as unclear and possibly compromising but that he could draw on them if he thought it would be useful to do so in certain circumstances. Seaborn’s Subsequent presentation in Hanoi did not in fact cover these points. The Canadian side recognized that there had been a need for hasty preparation and revision on the American side and this had probably resulted At the same time our concern was more than procedural. in sloppy drafting. V*A ( "Our commitment to pass messages faithfully does not mean we can ) be expected to play the role of unthinking mouthpieces. We estimated that passing points D and E to the North Vietnamese without amplification would have reflected on Seaborn and affected his position not only in regard to Bacon but as Canadian representative in Vietnam. We would have preferred to thrash out questions first with the State Department but were prevented from doing so by lack of time. We hope this will not be repeated in future." (Telegram No. Y-606 of August 12 to Washington authorizing discussion of this matter with the State Department: Appendix 12). Seaborn saw Pham Van Dong on August 13 and transmitted the USA message. The North Vietnamese Prime Minister reacted with extreme anger, and warned that if war came to North Vietnam it would come to the whole of Indochina. However, in response to Seaborn’s question as to whether Pham Van Dong found ”the existence of this link useful, despite the tenor of the messages”, the Prime Minister replied ’’without hesitation and with apparent sincerity that he did indeed find it useful and he wanted the channel kept open.” Pham Van Dong also commented favourably, but in general terms, on the possible role of the ICSC in stabilizing the situation and seeking a solution based on the Geneva Agreement. ”The ICC must play a more important role." The texts of Seaborn’s reports - Saigon telegrams 419 of August 15 and 426 of August 17 - are given as Appendix 13 . The State Department had registered some interest in Pham Van Dong’s . references to the Commission, but when Seaborn’s fuller report was received, ■ ST f evt es MR0 503 & yee T 29399* fass 212854052 stettn ’) arrhy Sea ss 0 is 000022 ‘ 1 “2507 $34830 �- 6 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a ^information ... it was revealed that the North Vietnamese Prime Minister had done little more than repeat a standard sentiment: ”The ICC is called upon to play a more and more important role. We (i.e. the ICC) must prepare ourselves for this. We must recognize that the USA is the aggressor, we must take a firm position based on the Geneva Agreement and we must fill this position with honour.” At the end of August, after the dust had settled on the second Bacon encounter, Seaborn, in a personal letter to the Head of Far Eastern Division, echoed the same skepticism that had been evident in Ottawa and the Canadian Embassy in Washington even earlier about the future of the assignment, and the Americans* interest in it: •'One important consideration to be kept in mind, which I have not of course mentioned in the other correspondence, is the Bacon operation. For this one we shall obviously have to consult the Americans before taking any drastic decisions about withdrawing from the ICC, for withdrawal would cut off our access to Hanoi. <How important do the Americans consider my messenger role, either now or for possible future use? Can we persuade them to give an honest, not just a polite answer? I sense that USA interest is far less than it was during the heady days of late May when everyone was all hepped up about it. Having taken two Hanoi runs with messages in my hot little hand, and having seen Pham Van Dong’s reaction, I am not surprised if interest in Washington has waned despite the expressed North Vietnamese desire to keep the circuit open. I suspect one reason the North may want it kept open is the hope they may well entertain that, if things get more muddled and hopeless in the South and after the American elections, the USA might want to put forward a feeler for a negotiated way out of Indochina. Even if that situation should arise, would the USA want to use this circuit for the purpose? These are questions which I cannot answer, but they'll have to be fed into the decision-making machine at some stage. Over.to you.” In the following weeks, neither side took any initiative to activate the channel. Although there was no repetition of the Tonkin Gulf incidents, South Vietnam was in internal political turmoil. In mid-August a new constitution was promulgated - and as a result of consequential political disturbances, it had to be repealed by the end of the month, and new constitutional arrangements made. Mid-September saw an abortive coup, and .../IS STts aea tas Mne s “ seee M FBY A ce 1 tas as 4S9 e see tefean Sessesersets 29 y toraseese ! eroseE cEEUERrsRmr i 4812 000023 MERFa �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur l'acces d/'information P it was not until October 20 that a provisional charter, looking to the restoration of civilian Government, was promulgated. Apart from the military situation itself, it seemed to us at the time that the political situation in the South and the search for a stable' and authoritative Government was a major preoccupation for the Americans: without a stable situation in the South, there would be little prospect of reaching any kind of lasting "understanding" with the North. Similarly, the preoccupations inherent in the USA Presidential % elections scheduled for November 30, 1968, tended to further distract attention from Canadian diplomatic activity in Vietnam. In a memorandum to the Minister dated October 6, we commented: "We have formed the impression that the USA authorities are less actively and immediately interested in Seabora’s special assignment than they were last Spring. We recently asked out Embassy in Washington to review this matter with the interested State Department officials in a general way and without suggesting that we were encouraging - or otherwise - any new initiatives. The Embassy has now replied and the relevant section of their telegram reads as follows: , L "1 "We were left with the distinct impression that the Bacon exercise does not currently have the same importance in USA thinking as it did earlier this year, perhaps because now that both sides have had two occasions on which to state their positions via this channel, there is little more that the USA can say for the time being, barring a change in circumstances or in USA policy, llowever USA interest in the channel is probably only dormant; it could quickly revive in a new situation." "Mr. Seaborn has received a similar impression in Saigon." ************ In the meantime, our patience with Indian procrastination in the Commission had been wearing extremely thin. No action had been taken on the commitment given in the Special Report of June 2, 1962 to follow up on the » 8i 8 s secontb == I5 SeMEssfscttis; sereutr@i"nyuGogtnoeCespeanggnstn 93020852—eseeseeeetecgdeenue l 7 55** 22898*24 $*Y5EReUtredaaueePc 000024 545581565 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces d ^information * problem of subversion - by processing to completion the so-called Legal Report and we were determined to make one last major effort to see whether the Indians could be made to live up to this commitment. We felt that, whatever the rights and wrongs of the situation in Indochina, the basic cause of instability was Northern subversion in the South and the North’s determination to topple the Saigon administration by whatever means. I We felt too that if the Commission could be made to focus international attention on this problem for a second time, there might be some hope of arresting what all of us had apprehended almost 418y viscerally rather than comprehended rationally as a tragic USA involvement in Ak" a deteriorating situation which had all the overtones of inevitability in a Greek tragedy. "We realized that if the Americans were forced to take extreme 1 U' . measures, which would be clearly and obviously ’’indictable” under the Geneva Agreement, there would be little useful purpose served, from a strictly Canadian point of view, by a ’’do-nothing” Commission continuing on the ground: in other words we could see little purpose in a Commission which was powerless to act in any constructive way other than to condemn the South Vietnamese and the Americans. Against this possibility, we could foresee a situation in which it might be necessary to withdraw from the Commission, or indeed to explain publicly the Commission’s failure to act, or to act in a balanced way, if it were asked to withdraw from Vietnam by those it was proposing to condemn. posture in the Commission became activist in the extreme. As a result our We began pressing the Indians for action on the Legal Report and we began preparing and present- ing new cases for Commission consideration which, if they had been dealt with promptly and adequately, would have focussed attention on Northern activities in the South. This was no academic Jesuitical exercise on the part of over- zealous officials who had become too closely identified in their own thinking and sympathies with American policy in Vietnam. Rather it reflected two .../20 ( h i T(2121 “eEMrSNss fwgte usd 05 a t WWW SProeebetsebe 1000025 SseBSse �. € o • • Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information first a sense of anger at being constantly blockaded in the Commission things: by Indian foreign policy objectives without being able to express our ow; and secondly the belief that the Commission, while it could not control the actions of others, might be able to deflect some of the.excesses of a stream of events which showed signs of becoming ugly. Thus if the Commission had come out with a new report in 1964, even if by Indian/Canadian majority, covering the full range of Commission activities including new judgments against Northern subversion as well as against USA and South Vietnamese activities, it might have done something to blunt or buffer the ensuing disaster. It should be remembered that American military strength in Vietnam at the time was less than 25,000 men, and these were non-combat personnel; combat troops were not introduced in strength until April, 1965. Inherent in this situation was the criticism that Canada was playing a double game: through our Commissioner acting strictly as a diplomatic agent, we were conducting a delicate message-carrying exercise based on the confidence enjoyed on both sides of the conflict, while at the same time within the International Commission we were conducting a vigorous exercise aimed at highlighting Northern aggression. Would the policy-makers in Hanoi not misunderstand this situation or regard it as confusing and contradictory? My own view was and is that they had a very good understanding of, what we were attempting to do and even if they did not appreciate it, I think there is not much doubt of the fact that we continued to enjoy a considerable measure of respect in the North largely because they knew where they stood with us ’■ < and they also knew that we could not be handled like politico-diplomatic putty. ************ . X Seaborn’s third trip to Hanoi was originally scheduled for the 1 C 0 i 249 second half of November, this time reflecting continuing preoccupations in 35 nt 25 seegsAMfperee tosssase 000026 �. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgueenvertu de la Loi surl'accesd/'information - Saigon as a result of the stepped-up pace of the Commission’s activities. It should also be pointed out that it was never our understanding that Seaborn would proceed to Hanoi only when he had Bacon messages to deliver. As I Canadian Commissioner, he had legitimate and indeed independent reasons for Our main concern was in coordinating his proceeding, to Hanoi at any time. two reasons for trips to the North so that he would not appear to be going .1 . too frequently, in stark contrast to earlier Commission custom, thus arousing suspicions in the South or the impression in the North that the Americans or More than that, we wished to avoid a indeed ourselves were too eager. situation in which Seaborn might have returned from a routine visit to Hanoi only a few days before Washington might initiate an urgent request for a ( Seaborn’s activities had to be closely coordinated, further Bacon message. | and we made a special point of informing the Americans in Saigon and Washington of Seaborn’s plans well in advance so that adjustments in timing could be made if necessary. When Seaborn’s.plans for a trip North during the last week of November were made known to the Americans, they were also reminded that we wished to have time to study the contents, before authorizing delivery. In conversation with the Americans in Saigon, Seaborn expressed the hope (initially on a personal basis but subsequently endorsed by us) that the USA would not think of a third message simply along the lines of the first one, the main themes of which had been repeated in the second meeting with Pham Van Dong. ,| "I (Seaborn) therefore hoped that if there was to be a new message it would be much more specific whether.it be in the form of an offer or a warning. In response to American requests Seaborn’s departure for Hanoi was ' ' ■ . . postponed until December 10. • I (Circumstances indicated that there might be a i ' new message to deliver following senior level consultations in Washington. Saigon telegram 677 of November 19, Appendix 14 .) On December 3, Bundy .../22 000027 *5 �r © Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l’acces a /’information made available the text of USA suggestions for Seaborn’s visit. (See Washington telegram 4189 of December 3, attached as Appendix 15 .) In essence what Seaborn was being asked to do was to express personal views and convictions that there was a growing possibility of direct Confrontation between South Vietnam and the North and that ”the time is ripe for any message Hanoi may wish to convey”. In Ottawa, our reaction to this request was one of disappointment and indeed anger; what had begun as a serious assignment had become, apparently, almost totally devoid of any real substance. ! i Or had it? Reporting on his conversation with Bundy when the latter made available the text of suggestions for Seaborn, the Ambassador in Washington noted that the State Department’s reactions had been emphatically negative when asked whether Seaborn should imply that the USA would be interested in "eliciting proposals from the DRVN". Clearly the attitudes in post-election Washington seemed to be toughening; in the wake of President Johnson’s land- slide victory over Senator Goldwater, the Administration were still interested in talking to Hanoi but they were not getting down on bended knee to ask for a dialogue. In the same' conversation Bundy made some extremely interesting revelations of the outlines of U.S. policy planning: "In summary these amount for the present to: no radical change of course; no large scale escalation; some limited USA bombing activities in Laos along the infiltration routes, if Souvanna agrees, with operations to begin possibly some days after December 10; and a possible but carefully measured and limited aerial reprisal, perhaps via South Vietnamese aircraft, against targets in the southern part of North Vietnam if there is some dramatic Viet Cong action in the South such as an attack on a provincial capital, mortaring of Saigon or a repetition of a Bien Hoa style operation." (Washington telegram 4190 of December 3 is attached as Appendix 16 .) .../23 “sesakolnsp I 000028 “809085 t �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a J'information Subsequently we learned from Nev; Zealand sources that the Americans ( ■ ' had confirmed these same intentions to them but in rather more specific terms. Indeed the New Zealanders told us that they had been informed that the Americans were even considering sending forces to South Vietnam to be stationed in the northern provinces to prevent Viet Cong cutting across the narrow ’’waist" of the country just below the Demilitarized Zone. We were not pleased with what was being proposed for Seaborn, Not only did it appear to us to be a non-mission, but we were also beginning to suspect that the Americans might not be telling us everything. But because the situation appeared to be shaping up in an ominous way, we thought that the risks involved in carrying out an assignment that seemed almost inconsequential to us might conceivably be less than refusal to do as we had been asked. The text of our telegram Y-883 of December 4 (attached as Appendix 17) comments on the tactics we envisaged Seaborn adopting although it does not outline the other considerations mentioned above; these latter were never committed to paper. We were not quite sure what this mission meant. Because of Seaborn’s mission, and because he was visiting the North in the company of the two other ICC Commissioners, we raised with the Americans the desirability of postponing any air attacks in Laos no matter how limited and initially unobtrusive they might be. This proved to be impossible and in the end, the action in Laos appeared to make no difference - at least it made no obvious impact Throughout this visit to Hanoi the only North Vietnamese official with whom Seaborn had discussions was Colonel Ha Van Lau, Head of the Liaison Mission charged with relations with the Commission. (He saw Pham Van Dong at the theatre but only a few innocuous pleasantries were exchanged.) encounter with Ha Van Lau produced virtually no reaction. Ez The (Saigon telegram 4) te Serhe 000029 �. * , 4 „ A . . in \ 773 ol December 18 appears as Appendix IB.) in Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Do^entdi^ul^fnvertu(tle<lfll-Oi^i'l'accesal'information When the results of veoborn’s visit were made available in Washington to Rusk’s special assistant on Vietnam, the latter commented that "even the fact that the North Vietnamese have had nothing to say to Seaborn was something which was useful for the USA authorities to know". (Washington telegram 4396 of December 23). To us in Ottawa at the time, the whole exercise seemed so peculiar and so devoid of substance, in circumstances which were more threatening than they had been six months before, that we felt that there must be " something else" in the background. It was not until afterwards that we learned that there had been in fact another exercise which we knew nothing about and about which the Americans had not kept us informed. ' If I recall correctly, we first heard of it from the Secretary-General of the United Nations himself some months later. A convenient summary is provided in the context of an article entitled ”The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai Stevenson" by Eric Sevareid, appearing in "Look" magazine of November 30, 1965: "in the early autumn of 1964, he (Stevenson) went on, U Thant, the UN Secretary-General, had privately obtained agreement from authorities in North Vietnam that they would send an emissary to . talk with an American emissary, in Rangoon, Burma. Someone in Washington insisted that this attempt be postponed until after the Presidential election. When the election was over, U Thant again pursued the matter; Hanoi was still willing to send its man. But Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Adlai went on, flatly opposed the attempt. He said the South Vietnamese government would have to be informed and that this would have a demoralizing effect on them; that government was shaky enough, as it was. Stevenson told me that U Thant was furious over this failure of his patient efforts, but said nothing publicly. Time was passing, the war expanding. The pressures of U Thant, supposedly the Number One peacemaker of the globe, were mounting from all sides within the UN. So he proposed an outright cease-fire with a truce line to be drawn across not only Vietnam but neighbouring Laos. U Thant then made a remarkable suggestion: United States officials could write the terms of the cease-fire offer, exactly as they saw fit, and he, U Thant, would announce it in exactly those .../25 kewts NC | aS 0 eds n 000030 % 19 �r - ' ■ • . . Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en'vertu de la Loi sur l'acces al'information words. Again, so Stevenson said to me, McNamara turned this down, and from Secretary Rusk there was no response, to Stevenson’s knowledge. € At the time of this incident, it was official American policy that the fighting would go on until North Vietnam "left its neighbours alone" to use the phrase the State Department was then using. In other words, the Communists would have to quit first. It was not until April, in his Baltimore speech, that President Johnson changed all this and announced that the United States was willing to negotiate for peace without preconditions." It is possible to speculate that the essential passivity of the Seaborn mission in December was designed to see whether the North Vietnamese would themselves mention the possibility of meeting the Americans in Rangoon; there is, however no documentary evidence. As the New Year began, the atmospherics surrounding the Bacon exercise were not characterized by intense enthusiasm or optimism. A memorandum prepared on January 14 by the Head of Far Eastern Division (See Appendix 19 ) is a case in point. On the same day the Embassy in Washington reported that Unger, the newly, appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Far East in charge of Vietnam affairs "indicated today, in response to a direct query, that the USA was most unlikely to have anything to communicate to the DRVN in the near future". ************ ' Throughout January, Canadian Commission policy efforts in Ottawa, Delhi and Saigon continued to encounter Indian obstruction. Our frustration had reached the point where we had almost decided to publish the so-called draft Legal Report, in whole or in part, on our own. We felt that unless there were some international recognition of the importance of North Vietnamese subversion in the South, international prescriptions for the politico-military ailments of Vietnam were likely to be directed at the wrong disease. The events of early February - specifically the commencement of retaliatory air .../26 reTh deoyoukthg hM * *-r.$ PC *** $ CBatecezse =MREEETRRREYi*) “heracrnscielggag 32 semondketeate 2 101000031 K “acpdeT se E emsssPr �, ’ ** • Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information strikes against North Vietnamese targets on February 7 - forced the pace of events within the Commission and our hand in relation to discussions within the Commission. Whether or not we might ever have struck a deal with the Indians and come up with a balanced report is an open question. Personally, I doubt it; I believe that for India the Special Report of 1962 was an aberration rather than a turning point and I am convinced that the Indians would never again have put North Vietnamese action in South Vietnam on one hand and American policy on the other on an equal footing. Be that as it may, the first air strikes gave the Poles and Indians a perfect excuse to demand that the Commission send a special report to the Co-Chairmen announcing what headlines in every newspaper around the world had already told international ' . public opinion - that peace was deteriorating because the USA had, evidently . for no reason in the Indian-Polish scheme of things, decided to initiate a dangerous policy of military action against North Vietnam. We were angered by Indian haste to proceed along these lines and we let the Indians know that while we did not disagree that bombing was a "bad thing”, especially as it related to our responsibilities under the Cease-Fire Agreement, we did not favour a report dealing only with this phenomenon, highlighting it as if it were the only dangerous aspect of the situation in Vietnam and the only thing of importance that had happened since the Commission’s last report in 1962. This was the origin of the Commission’s Special Message of February 13 to which the Canadian Delegation appended a minority statement quoting extracts from the so-called Legal Report. . The burden of the Canadian minority statement was not a disagreement with the substance of the majority report; clearly the bombing had taken place and it was a dangerous policy. Rather, it represented an attempt to restore an essential balance to the Commission’s report when read as a whole. .../27 1 Eomtsgkd* 8 ‘ . CAr£ se bsosshatSatnikodal= oel “*E 1 000032 Sai 20 vres205es; V �' ' ' 1 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information By an unfortunate coincidence this Special Message appeared at (. about the same time as a USA White Paper on Vietnam entitled "Aggression from the North". We knew nothing about the preparation of this American document and its appearance was as much a surprise to us as the Commission’s Special Message probably was to the Americans; with respect to the latter there.was never, any Ottawa-Washington consultation or coordination and no American request for the inclusion or exclusion of anything. The public accusation that the Canadian minority statement was somehow or other an attempt to buttress the "propaganda line" taken in the USA White Paper was therefore totally untrue. I i It was however probably the, first piece of so-called i "evidence" on which critics subsequently based their accusation of Canadian I "complicity". The minority statement of February 1965 is chiefly interesting, in retrospect, as a reflection of Canadian attitudes at the time. and angry. It was tough For almost a decade we had been forced to sit back in Vietnam and . watch peace being eroded by Hanoi’s policies directed at controlling the whole of Vietnam and probably the whole, of Indochina. Whatever the rights or wrongs of the situation were in historical perspective, it would be a distrotion of history to regard the Canadian Government as having had much sympathy for North Vietnamese policies at that time. We were not particularly happy with the measures being adopted by the United States to strengthen its South Vietnamese ally and to counter North Vietnamese actions, and we thought that negotiations - if they could be started - would be a more fruitful avenue. But we were also firmly convinced that the likelihood of North Vietnam undertaking significant political contacts or indeed negotiations would not be I ( increased by international opinion failing to come to grips - and in forthright public terms - with the underlying causes of instability in Vietnam. It was not just a question of questioning the wisdom of USA policy. North Vietnamese .../28 oaeou jeecstte •**(* e 1000033 •( �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi surl'acces a I'information subversion and interference in. the South had to be taken into account as well. In a statement to the House of Commons on February 8, the British Foreign Secretary declared that it could not be held that ’recent USA actions had increased the danger in South Vietnam; these actions however drew attention to a danger that had been present there for some time’. This, in succinct terms, was the message of the Canadian minority statement. In tabling the Commission’s Special Message, including the Canadian minority statement, in the House of Commons on March 8, the Minister made an / extensive series of comments on the Vietnam situation in which he elaborated on the theme of the minority statement. The following extracts from Mr. Martin’s remarks at that time provide a. useful summary of Canadian policy: ”... As both the Prime Minister and I have made clear on several occasions, the factor which underlies the grave situation in that country is the determined and long-standing .attempt of the Hanoi regime to bring South Vietnam Under its control through the pursuit of aggressive policies.... Our independent observer position in Vietnam has brought us face to face with an insidious form of aggression, with which the Free World has yet to devise adequate means of dealing. We have seen a new political entity emerge from colonial status only to be forced into a cruel struggle for survival against hostile pressures beyond its control. In whatever form aggression manifests itself, it must be recognized as such and it must be stopped, not least because we cannot. effort to let the practitioners of this technique come to the conclusion that it pays dividends.” "This is surely the basic issue at stake in Vietnam today, and it is of vital interest to all members of the international community. This is what we, by virtue of our membership on the International Commission, have established as the lesson of the past ten years. I think it is important for all of us to have this fact clear in our minds before we go on to the next and most vital task, which is to attempt to restore peace to that troubled area. And here I must stress that I do not believe that the answer which all concerned would accept lies either in escalation and all-out war or, on the other hand, surrender to Communist pressures.” ”... The Canadian Government, for one, intends to continue using all means at its disposal to see if the prerequisites for negotiations exist and, where possible, to help create those conditions. If .../29 . I 85 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divu/gue en vertu de/a Loi sur i'acces a/'information ■ negotiations can be arranged (let me repeat, it is our hope that conditions conducive to such negotiations will be encouraged by all possible means), our extended experience in the field of Indochina will help us to be of assistance in making concrete and practical proposals as to how the Geneva or any alternative machinery could be developed to achieve a lasting and peaceful settlement." * ( ************ Such was the "shape” of Canadian thinking at the time of Seaborn’s fourth special mission to Hanoi. This was perhaps the least satisfactory of all Seaborn’s missions. Towards the end of February, Seaborn reported that a convenient opportunity I would be available to him the following week - a Commission visit to the North - to speak to the Hanoi leaders without attracting too much attention. In the circumstances of late February, we took the initiative this time in raising the possibility of a message with the Americans. In the light of developments of the preceding weeks we thought it important to do anything we could to facilitate contacts, although once again we had reservations about the possibility of being asked to make another non-substantive presentation. These fears proved well-founded. When it was received, the American ' • ■ ' ' 1 j suggestions amounted to a request that Seaborn re-present a recent American i ■ presentation to the Chinese in Warsaw. i We came close to declining to act. On the other hand, in circumstances in which we accepted among ourselves at least the possibility that we might not know everything that was going on, it was difficult to refuse to cooperate in something that might have been V / | even minimally helpful. In the Minister’s absence, the Prime Minister’s . . .: ' . j I reaction and authorization had to be obtained. He was not enthusaistic at something so non-substantive and was worried about the effect it might have on further downgrading the whole exercise and Seaborn’s role as an interlocuteur .../3o .*$988492/0* 66548SA87 —me s$000035 2*" *-96*er I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgueen vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information 6 valab] o. Nevertheless, he felt that we could not refuse flatly, although he . insisted on Seaborn being given ultimate discretion, in the light of circum- stances prevailing at the time, to decide whether or not to proceed. He also drew attention to the need for Seaborn to parallel the Warsaw presentation very closely since "any material departure from the Cabot (USA Ambassador to Poland) text may widen the gap between your presentation and the possibly harsher version conveyed by the Chinese and cause misunderstanding and uncertainty which would impair the usefulness of your interview". The USA request and suggestions are outlined in Washington telegram 642 of February 27 (Appendix 20 ); our instructions to Seaborn are given in Ottawa telegram Y-108 of February 27 to Saigon (Appendix 21 ). Seaborn arrived in Hanoi on March 1. Although an appointment with the Prime Minister was sought, Seaborn was not received by Pham Van Dong. Instead, his presentation was made to Col. Ha Van Lau, whose personal opinion was that "it contained nothing new". Minister Pham Van Dong. He promised however to report to Prime The text of the presentation and Seaborn’s report- Saigon telegram 203 of March 5 - are given as Appendix 22 . In Hanoi, zero. In Washington, the belief that "two main purposes I - had been achieved inasmuch as the USA position in Warsaw had been made clear to the DRVN and the Bacon channel was kept open for any eventual communication". In Ottawa, severe disillusion not so much with the channel as such - where else was there another means of contacting senior North Vietnamese so easily and inconspicuously? - as with the use to which it was being put. ************ — Me Y . . A « C i The mounting of operation "Flaming Dart" (retaliatory air strikes .) against targets in North Vietnam) by the USA in February and its replacement by operation "Rolling Thunder" (more generalized bombing) in March unleashed •••/» Ieralensnynestos -..A bhset aw."3% : Yant “38516 S-pee f 15 asess ligi 142,295750 m sashgrPT 000036 elf 999 9 y �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information a maelstrom of public diplomatic activity around the world. 4. The British Co- chairman approached his Soviet counterpart asking for cooperation in an initiative vis-a-vis other Geneva parties; the South Vietnam Liberation Front (Viet Cong) issued a five-point statement of its position; a group of 17 non-aligned nations conferred and issued an appeal calling for negotiations without preconditions; and the British Foreign Secretary sent a special emissary on a fact-finding mission to the capitals of Southeast Asia. Canadian policy was based on understanding of what the USA was trying 1 I to do in Southeast Asia, although there was a growing sense of uneasiness about the implications of the directions along which USA policy seemed to be evolving. J In a speech in New York on March 5, Prime Minister Pearson spoke of the containment of aggression as an international responsibility. Y UV../ "So the nations of the world must be ready to produce an alternative. Such an alternative could lie in the international community itself taking over the responsibility of sealing off frontiers against guerilla infiltration and massively and effectively - and I mean effectively - policing and enforcing international agreements that aim to check and control local hostilities. If the Geneva agreements of 195/ had provided for supervision and policing and enforcement in this way, infiltration of Laos and South Vietnam .from outside could have been checked in time." In the House of Commons on April 6 he said that the Canadian Government ”had supported the policy of the United States in Vietnam and wished to be able to continue that support". And again on April 26: "It (the Canadian Government) supports the purposes and objectives of United States policy in Vietnam”. As we understood them at the time, these objectives were to restore a state of stability and equilibrium in Vietnam without the North interfering in the South and without the South feeling that it required a significant American military presence to resist this interference, so that all the Vietnamese themselves could decide whether they wished to remain divided or to be re-united, and if the latter, under what aegis. Since the problem was basically political, .../32 : 42 -SM,A Mg Es WS Sosvaie s 12119!! 5 sa nynl NA aeeak” fecels seesbs042* a 2 besede a th 3000037 fiw ?h 2 s th 9$2.4558 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur Tacces a /'information we were convinced that somewhere along the line political contacts would have, C to be made and negotiations undertaken. The Americans thought that military pressure would encourage these results by demonstrating that the USA meant what it said in supporting an ally and in buttressing the unstable regimes in the South through which South Vietnam was groping towards an alternative form of government to the Diem regime. The first public indication of Canadian skepticism about the techniques the USA was adopting - and even this indication was fairly mild - was contained in the Prime Minister’s speech of April 2 at Temple University in Philadelphia \ when he said: ’’After about two months of air strikes, the message should now have been received loud and clear. The authorities in Hanoi must know that the United States with its massive military power can mete out even greater punishment. They must also know that, for this reason, the cost of their continued aggression against South Vietnam could be incalculable ... There are many factors in this situation which I am not in a position to weigh or even know. But there does appear to be at least the possibility in my view that the suspension of air strikes against North Vietnam at the right time might provide the Hanoi authorities with an opportunity, if they wished to take it, to inject some flexibility into their policy without appearing to do so as a direct result of military pressure." It was this speech, and its timing that so angered President Johnson: ‘G, it would appear that, auite unknown to us, the Americans may in fact have been 8\ 07 (0 1 / planning a bombing pause for the future; the idea of a pause or a respite in military activity was not original and it had featured prominently in the arguments of domestic protest groups in the USA. More than that, the President ' was to deliver a major Vietnam policy statement on April 7 in which he offered unconditional negotiations and proposed a greatly expanded programme of cooperative development assistance for the region. © This offer of unconditional negotiations, outlined in a speech in Baltimore, was the first major breakthrough, since up until that time the USA .../33 Sgo waeasherenaetengg Mt ae srsteassete Pre 0e=*29 i S-reng) Spret SoEs, wotio r l 000038 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information had not offered the prospect of negotiations, but rather the prospect of "rewards for observance of existing agreements”. The next day - and it will probably never be known whether this was directly related to President Johnson’s speech - the Prime Minister of North Vietnam publicly put forward a four point proposal as a basis for the settlement of the Vietnam problem. For a time there appeared to be grounds for a certain amount of optimism; no one thought that either side was ’’giving in”, but at least there were signs of movement, and new positions which might be modifiable through negotiation were being put forward. The first major bombing pause took place in May; from May 12 to 18 all attacks on North Vietnamese targets were suspended. This, together, with I the USA offer to negotiate unconditionally as well as the publication of the North Vietnamese Four Points seemed to indicate to us the desirability of early contact with the North Vietnamese authorities and with this in mind we t began giving urgent consideration to another visit by Seaborn to Hanoi. s 2 i y $ <6 ) 19 8 *,Xy Our discussions with the Americans, prior to despatching Seaborn on his fifth mission on May 31 again gave rise to very mixed feelings on our part, even though the American position this time was not as devoid of substance as On the one hand some interesting it had been on the two preceding occasions. features emerged from our pre-visit discussions in Washington. The principal positive element was a reference to "a solution by reciprocal actions on each side"l . This was explained by Bundy as.something relatively new and it was intended to convey the thought that ”if Hanoi tapered off its activities in I .. the South, the USA could likewise change its tempo”. In its totality, however, the Aide Memoire presented as a basis for Seaborn’s talks in Hanoi was not in 0 our view as forthcoming as the circumstances seemed to require. a bit limp and passive. s3 a 1 It all seemed With regard to the Four Points, the Americans asked tEsA e 20 oseraSol e esttTae Soe a as i 55005 0 slms Eer Yenensi s cweesiR 2000039 sasereenan Bssa �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information C: Seaborn not to initiate any probing questions; only if this matter were raised with him was he to state that he had no specific message about these points but that he should go on to say that his own study of them would indicate that some would be acceptable to the USA and some not. (The text of the USA Aide Memoire as a basis for Seaborn’s presentation is given in Washington telegram 1739 of May 28 and the explanatory comments by Bundy in telegram 17h/) of May 28, appearing as Appendix 23 .) Taken together and even including the positive elements, the package was not overwhelmingly attractive in Ottawa. /t. In our view the circumstances - • demanded a rather more interested-looking and vigorous diplomatic stance. More than that, the total situation was such that it was no longer possible l for the Canadian Government to function simply as a passive transmitter of USA messages; we had come to have our own political interests in the Vietnam situation. Could any Canadian Minister have told the House of Commons or the press that he had sent a Canadian representative to Hanoi without specific and urgent instruct- ions to seek clarification at the highest level of the North Vietnamese Four Points? With these thoughts in mind, our initial instructions to Seaborn (Ottawa telegram G-15/ of May 128 attached as Appendix 24 ) said that on arrival in Hanoi he should seek an appointment with the Prime Minister or the new Foreign Minister and that he should emphasize that his instructions to do so reflected the Canadian Government’s interest in the situation. ”If you are given interview with either of these two you should begin by expressing the Canadian Government's concern with the situation in Vietnam, our interest in seeing whether negotiations can be usefully stimulated and undertaken and willingness to play a helpful role. As a manifestation of our willingness to be helpful, you have conveyed messages in the past and the USA Government now has asked that further comments be conveyed, beyond what has been presented in the points made in paragraphs 1-5 of the proposed message outlined in Washington reftel. Your presentation would. conclude with a request for a clarification of the status of Pham Van Dong’s Four Points of .../35 s less Isay . Ake4 "8990225690 “CEtsse GAU, seces gee) 30800100000401 45* feeress 58 2BeN529s1asesrapse �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la. Loi s'ur i'acfces a /'information - 6 April 8 expressing the comment that on the basis of its close contacts and continuing discussions with the USA Government, the Canadian Government believes that some aspects of Pham Van Dong’s thinking might be acceptable to the USA Government but that other features would clearly be unacceptable. The remainder of your presentation of this matter would then follow the outline given in paragraph 6 (of the USA draft) but as a Canadian Government interpretation rather than your own." . The interested USA authorities were unhappy at our proposed changes and made it quite clear that they considered that the presentation we had in mind would go well beyond what they had envisaged, emphasizing that they had given careful thought to the preparation of this material in light of Seaborn’s earlier reports. Recalling our original undertaking to transmit faithfully without ourselves necessarily agreeing or disagreeing, we acceded to their wishes - but with individual reservations rather stronger than the reluctance we acknowledge officially and textually: w V "We consider that in using Bacon channel so ultra-cautiously there is danger that its usefulness will be completely destroyed, if it has not been destroyed already. After a series of approaches which were in effect merely enquiries whether the other side had anything to say, you were authorized to convey a message which simply repeated a message already passed to the DRVN through other channels. It seemed to us that if any credibility was to remain, something more active would have to be done this time. This we sought to achieve by using the Canadian aspect of the approach more openly, as befitted our own more active approach toward negotiations. In light of your advice and the agreed view between Johnson (Deputy Ambassador in Saigon) and Washington, however, we are reluctantly prepared to acquiesce in the more timid approach the Americans appear to wish on this occasion./You may accordingly proceed as in Washington telegram 1939 May 28." (Our telegram Y-118 of May 30 to Saigon.) I As an indication of the skepticism prevailing in Ottawa about the Seaborn mission it is interesting to note that the Prime Minister, doubtless recalling the non-substantive nature of the March mission, commented as follows Y G on Seaborn’s latest assignment: s "I’ll wager one piastre that no one in Hanoi will talk to him.“ The Prime Minister’s prediction proved wrong. stkes *" Sai “Darleyo* Westerts we wstt *8 ****** Gie Seaborn saw Ha Van “eemocee 99 KM .../36 si 000041 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information ( Lau on June 1 and Was riven an intervicw by the new Foreign Minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, on June 3. With considerable skill, Seaborn managed'to maximize ! the Canadian aspect of his presentation as a lead-in to the presentation of the USA message he had been requested to deliver. The interview produced no clarification of the status of the Four Points and more specifically, threw no light on the crucial question of whether they were seen as a set of pre- conditions to negotiations or as the characteristics of a final negotiated settlement. "Throughout the interview the Foreign Minister showed little inclination to enter into substantive dialogue and even less interest in hearing the USA message". Seaborn concluded - and noted that his conclusion was shared by all the foreign representatives in Hanoi with whom he had spoken - that the North Vietnamese Government was not, interested in talking to the USA at that time, nor was it prepared to clarify the Four Points. "I can find no indication of any desire to pick up several opportunities given by President Johnson and others to talk rather than go on fighting. The leadership gives every sign of being confident in.its stand, perhaps even more confident than during my visit just after the air strikes began and determined not to be dissuaded from its present course almost regardless of the duration of the war or of the damages and hardship to which they may be subjected". (Saigon telegram 4,62 of June A outlining Seaborn’s report is given as Appendix25 .) In the House of Commons on June 7, the Minister was questioned by Mr. Diefenbaker about the possibility of the Canadian Government talcing steps to reconvene the Geneva Conference. No. such steps had of course been taken since we knew perfectly well from the soundings that had been going on almost continuously since February that such a proposition stood no chance of being accepted. O Rather than giving a negative statement to the House in reply, the Minister decided that he was going to have to say something about Seaborn’s activities as an indication that Canada had not been totally passive. .../37 “5* net pttesgegrg was fgetgy Ag toee .-25 Res -daerhe *8” Ae & 5s raj 19 3 2 2. 93 W s "G s as wly. ss wset Eee I Ba elee 1000042 eeers 599 �I1 r..@ Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a ^information "I may say that on May 31 the representative of Canada on the International Supervisory Commission was authorized to proceed to Hanoi and made a contact there with the Foreign Minister of the Government of North Vietnam in order to indicate the concern which the people of Canada feel with regard to developments in Indochina. "He wanted to ascertain as well, as a spokesman for the Canadian Government, the reaction of the North Vietnamese Government to the interruption that occurred a few days ago in the bombing by the forces under the command of the United States. The Foreign Minister of North Vietnam indicated that there were four conditions which stood in the. way of negotiations which had been urged on the North by the President of the United States,. and which had previously been given support by other countries, including Canada. "I regret to say that the reaction of the North, of Communist China and of other interested countries is such at the moment that these overtures for peace discussions have not won their support. We shall continue to resort to every method known to us to try and gather support for our objectives. ’’The Government of the United States has said it is prepared to attend a conference on Cambodia without relating that conference to any other question but the dispute on borders between Vietnam and Cambodia. I would hope that this position may yet encourage all concerned to have a conference on Cambodia with, I would think, quite possibly useful results.” On the same day, our Ambassador in Washington gave Bundy a copy of Seaborn’s telegram reporting on his conversations in Hanoi. I Appendix 26 is Washington telegram 1863 of June 7). (Attached as Two aspects of the Ritchie/Bundy conversation deserve comment: ' I (A) This was the fullest and to the best of my knowledge the only real account that we ever had from the Americans of diplomatic activities during the May bombing pause. Bundy had mentioned it briefly on May.28 but without elaboration. (See Washington telegram 1744 of May 28, para 5.) (B) Bundy‘s reference to the possibility of public disclosure of the fact that a Canadian representative had been taking diplomatic soundings in Hanoi recently and that the replies to his queries had been evasive. Bundy also wondered whether it might not be necessary to brief a few Senators confidentially. "Our conversation on this point concluded with his confirmation that the USA would say nothing publicly about the Canadian role and that if there were any changes in this position he would let me know. I think however that we cannot exclude the possibility .../38 >07 EistETue 559s- 3*8 ‘ Motdllo**** PpsNes -128319995+242,02878913949 5 3 1000043 985 2244) �< • Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information that if further French-inspired leaks develop the USA administration may tell us of a desire to talk. quietly to one or two Senators about the general tenor of Seaborn’s finding in Hanoi.” € We are apprehensive about the prospects (substantive, in terms of Seaborn’s role, and political, in terms of our relations with the Americans) this raised and authorized the Ambassador in Washington to reaffirm, as an official view, the personal reactions he had conveyed to Bundy: the less information made public the better. Attached as Appendix 27 is our telegram Y- 442 to Washington. Whether Bundy had an ulterior motive in raising with us the possibility of disclosure, we do not know; nor do we knot; whether his comments were intended to be an advance tip-off. matter. At all events we were not ’’consulted” again on the Three days later on June 10, the Minister made several references to Seaborn’s missions to Hanoi as a Canadian activity in a statement to the Standing Committee on External Affairs of the House of Commons. The Americans may have felt that this constituted its own form of green light. Without further references to us, the following week the secrecy which had invested Seaborn’s mission from the beginning and his ’’cover” came close to being blown, when President Johnson in a press conference in Washington on June 17 paraphrased parts of Seaborn’s reports of his June 3 discussion with the Foreign Minister of North Vietnam. Worse still, he indicated that he had received the report directly from a foreign diplomat which was acting as his representative. Speculation continued but the special nature of Seaborn’s mission was never publicly acknowledged. What the North Vietnamese thought about all this is a question to which we will probably never know the answer. If they had not already done so, it is a reasonable speculation that they might have come to the conclusion that the Bacon channel was not as reliable as it had been in the beginning through no personal fault of Seaborn’s - nor were its purposes the same. The .../39 eee .A0r,“1f22 20855752*48422 Benieepmegsseoif***t thyBeepet 000044 �" Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information simple truth of the matter was lhat the operation was becoming mixed up with a lot of other factors and considerations which had developed since it was mounted, and this was making a straight and confidential presentation of views almost impossible. ) . ■ It was partly a matter of the political pressures generated virtually everywhere by a public opinion that was becoming more and more aroused and hostile towards American actions in Vietnam. And it was partly a matter of. the diplomatic activity of others, specifically the French, as discussed by Bundy with Ritchie in their conversation of June 7. It was the French "revelations'* about diplomatic activity in Paris at the time of the bombing pause more than anything else that seems to have contributed to the President’s public statement about Seaborn’s role and the press speculation that followed. The French were putting about the story that "something interesting" had happened; whereas Seaborn had reported intransigence in Hanoi. This was the first time - there was to be a second - that evidence of a disparity of views beiween Seaborn and others was to be revealed in the public debate on USA policy in Vietnam, with Seaborn’s reports being adduced as proof that Hanoi was not interested in negotiation. The facts available to us were not extensive. Towards the end of May our Embassy in Paris had reported on a conversation they had had at the Quai on May 26. Translated and paraphrased the report was as follows: ’The only new fact that he (Brethes) believed might interest us was that the Head of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris, having called on the Quai last week to explain the reasons why Hanoi had rejected the Indian proposal, had taken advantage of this occasion to underline that the Four Points in the Pham Van Dong declaration were not preconditions but constituted the principles of a negotiation ... Brethes was under no illusion about what might come of this North Vietnamese demarche given the fact that the proposals of Pham Van Dong were unacceptable to the USA.’ .../AO- gg tee SEEs $51 as % “AC 21 3 1 Gdmeageng 49= b4aesmcler w s sSag or pe I 19 S0eoRerns 3848802910228018285440 wPPPPsT*A £000045 g sasegrt �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'informatidn C In retrospect it is fascinating that this was reported in such a low key and that the whole interview had begun with Brethes saying that he had "pas grand chose” to say on the subject of the Vietnam situation: so low key in fact that the telegram was referred to Saigon only by bag and Seaborn would not therefore have seen it before his trip to Hanoi. Seaborn would have had only the account given by Bundy to Ritchie on May 28, as follows: "According to the French Foreign Ministry, Mai Van Bo (the NVN representative in Paris)’ told the French on May 18 that if NVN’s Four Point proposals were accepted as a basis it would be impossible to find ways and means of applying the proposals in a "peaceful" fashion. He reportedly added that the possibilities of this approach "were many”. French officials said they were convinced that Bo had had instructions to make the approach as a matter of urgency during the pause. Bundy said the NVN approach proved to be a reiteration of previous NVN position. It was made to the French the same day as the pause ended.” That was all we knew of the so-called "Paris response” by North Vietnam to the bombing pause until our Ambassador in Washington, on June 7, discussed with Bundy the results of Seaborn’s discussions in Hanoi. Although the full text of Washington telegram 1863 of June 7 is included as Appendix 27A , the report of Bundy’s comments is worth quoting here in extenso: ”He ... expressed regret that the USA authorities, in their prepared brief for Seaborn, had not felt able to provide a completely frank account of their dealings with the DRVN, until I raised the subject in the manner described in the previous paragraph. He said the USA had of course made no mention of the Canadian channel to the French. The reason for the initial USA reserve with us had been that they wished to see whether anew channel was in fact about to open up at the initiative of the DRVN. "Bundy then recapitulated the DRVN approach to the French as follows: On May 20 (two days after the bombing had resumed following the pause) the French (Lucet) informed the USA that on the morning of May 18, Bo, the DRVN representative in Paris, sought an interview with them, obviously on instructions. (Although the bombing had started again on the night of May 17-18, Bo may not have known this, and his instructions were undoubtedly sent during the pause). The first part of Bo’s communication was to convey in familiar terms the DRVN objections to the Indian proposal for an Afro-Asian force. The second part consisted of a reiteration of Pham Van Dong’s Four Points, but whereas most DRVN public statements (55 wesa5v5447* den*alen 2fEE5 trirel T E . ... “52-5== *' *J #. ,* : 27 sn=d*l Nat 6 wA iroarsl Seereedsere ‘*2; rtrd-sspah hesecsalea05=28081420 000046 ■ weaents �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de. la Loi sur l'acces d/'information had indicated that these points were the essential or the only basis for a settlement, Bo was quoted by the French as saying merely that these points were the "best" basis for a settlement. (Bundy termed this a "shading of wording"). Bo then reportedly went on to say that if there were agreement on these bases of negotiation, ways and means could be found in a peaceful manner. When the French asked whether USA withdrawal could be dependent on the conclusion of a negotiation (i.e. whether USA withdrawal under Hanoi’s point I could come last instead of first), Bo answered affirmatively, and in response to a further question said that his answer was based on instructions. Bundy pointed out that it could be argued that this represented a step forward on the part of the DRVN, so that it was of particular interest that the DRVN Foreign Minister had waffled on the same point in talking to Seaborn (paragraph 3 reftel). C The French did not attempt to draw out Bo further on the question as to whether an acceptance or recognition of four points by the USA was a firm DRVN condition for negotiations. Here again the evasive reply received by Seaborn was of interest. Bundy said the USA did not return any reply through the French, in part because USA officials were not confident that the French could be counted on to present the American viewpoint with precision or impartiality." When this telegram was shown to the Prime Minister, Mr. Pearson sent a handwritten note to Mr. Martin, reading as follows: "This is an unsatisfactory business. (1) The U.SA should have told us of the French exchange before we sent Seaborn to Hanoi. (2) The French told us nothing yet they expected us to, give them an account of Seaborn’s visit. If there is to be any exchange with Paris on these matters it is to be reciprocal. We can be proud too." Quite apart from the lack of serious substance in the Bacon exercise, 7 1 i the whole business was becoming too complicated and too subject to press speculation - even before President Johnson’s ’’revelations’’ of June 17 - following Mr. Martin’s comments in the House and in the Standing Committee. In a telegram from Saigon on June 10 Seaborn recommended that we should 6 "discourage USA from using the Canadian channel again". The attitudes he had encountered in Hanoi led him to the conclusion that not only was the channel .../42 thatt salhed 4* 2 pewtet =884450** Sosdeenge be =220244 0 I met st sesy 1000047 otes — s*sn55-8 rbdteebR) hasesertteanctgc I see ) �’ C 5 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'informatidn not producing significant results but it seemed only to be "exacerbating DRVN antagonism to USA and annoyance with Canada". He also noted that repeated demands to pass messages might give the DRVN the erroneous idea that the USA. was looking for a way out. ."In any event the publicity given to my recent trip to Hanoi both in Ottawa and in Washington, even though it does not specifically refer to the role of intermediary, may well have ’blown* or at least compromised this channel. DRVN. authorities also have some reason based on Western press reports to consider the channel unreliable. My telegram 462 of June 4 and 472 of June 7 emphasized that the Foreign Minister had not removed ambiguities in the Four Points of April 8 whereas press reports have interpreted Ottawa and Washington statements to mean that the Four Points and particularly the one re withdrawal of USA troops are definitely preconditions to any discussions. These reports have caused me some embarrassment with friendly local diplomats to whom I gave a full report of my conversations ... and will certainly have lowered my stock with the DRVN”. On a memorandum recommending the desirability of allowing public .interest in Seaborn’s special assignment to lapse for a time, the Prime Minister commented: "I entirely agree with this". We had explained that we continued to be concerned not only about Seaborn’s position and usefulness but about his own personal safety vis-a-vis conceivably hostile elements in the Government in Saigon. In a memorandum dated June 11 for the Minister and for his onward transmission to the Prime Minister, we commented on the points raised earlier by the Prime Minister in connection with French involvement. is attached as Appendix 28 . 6 This memorandum Of particular interest as a reflection of our reactions at the time is paragraph 2 which, for ready reference, reads as follows: ” "The French told us nothing, yet they expect us to give them .. ./43 V 009855E(E �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information € an account of Seaborn's visit. If there is to be an exchange with Paris on these matters, it is to be reciprocal...’. Although most of our detailed knowledge of what transpired in Paris between the Quai d’Orsay and the North Vietnamese representative has come from Washington, the French were not entirely silent on the subject and on May 28 our Embassy in Paris reported on an carlier conversation with the Quai d'Orsay in which some mention is made of these. discussions. ' I am attaching for your information a copy of telegram 1038 of May 28 from Paris in which the first paragraph is relevant. Although the North Vietnamese approach was mentioned, I would agree that it was not presented in a very forthcoming manner, nor in a way which would indicate the French assessment of its significance." Then came President Johnson’s comments to the press on June 17, in which he drew a piece of paper from his pocket and quoted from Seaborn's latest reports to prove that inflexibility characterized the North Vietnamese Govern- ment’s position and that Hanoi was not interested in negotiations of any kind. (Extracts from this press conference appear as Appendix 29.) Subsequently the press carried reports with headlines such as "LBJ's man in Vietnam Really a Top Canadian". Towards the end of September Seaborn informed us that the Commission would be holding a meeting, as was customary from time to time, in Hanoi early in October; he would therefore be in the North Vietnamese capital from September 30 to October 5 - his first trip north since the May/June visit when he saw the Foreign Minister. In a memorandum to the Minister on September 20 we said: "It must be admitted that Seaborn’s special assignment in Vietnam has proved disappointing in terms of results achieved. Moreover the public interest and speculation about his possible role as a Western representative with access to both Saigon and Hanoi have. tended to reduce the possible usefulness of this channel and perhaps to increase the risks to him personally, since the South Vietnamese do not appear to be very enthusiastic about the USA’s posture of willingness to negotiate." W All things taken into account we recommended that Seaborn not be given any special instructions for this visit "The foregoing recommendation is based on the assumption that the Americans would have nothing more of significant substance to add to the views and comments Seaborn has already transmitted. Although I consider it unlikely that the Americans would be ready .. .//< A } EssgT ee-eer KOoltg Ct 529 an -esSoecsis I Yrt Jlee 1 ‘Are, [000049 -"5 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act . Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information f to consider any new departures in policy at the present time or would wish to convey this to Hanoi via Seaborn, I believe that we should at least let them know that Seaborn will be in Hanoi in early October; this would provide our Embassy in Washington with an opportunity to explain our view that we would not favour any special instructions for Seaborn at this time but that if they have any significant new approaches they wish made in Hanoi, we would of course be fully prepared to consider the matter sympathetically.” In a telegram of instruct- This approach was approved by the Minister. ions to Washington (Y-690 of September 20) he authorized the Ambassador to tell the State Department that we had "serious doubts about the usefulness of attempting to give Seaborn for this trip special instructions of the type he has had for previous visits.”I have therefore decided that unless the Americans have anything of a significantly new and substantive nature to convey to Hanoi it would be better for Seaborn to play this visit in a low key looking to general discussions with any political leaders who might be available and able to see him. If however the Americans have reason to believe that a more specific and substantive approach might be appropriate in terms of the likelihood of it eliciting a useful response, we would of course be prepared to consider their suggestions sympathetically.” As I recall the feeling at the time, this was something of an under- I think the Americans would have had to have given us something of statement. almost staggering significance before we would have agreed to authorize Seaborn to make another presentation. .We were convinced that the Bacon operation was finished, and that it probably had been for some time. The Americans agreed with the approach we had in mind and on what turned out to be his last visit to Hanoi, Seaborn’s most senior contact was with Col. Mai Lam, Ha Van Lau’s Deputy at the Liaison Mission. As was customary, Mai Lam gave nothing away, apart from the usual diatribe. And that was the end of Bacon. In a personal letter to Seaborn just prior to his departure from Vietnam, the Head of Far Eastern Division .../w s s *‘9 tx*nE”P6: catoane g wssosrfiin" Me Abene hel FasKc Gas stee. seucee e1000050 Ed seesn �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information commented: "I think there is general agreement that in its specifics at least the charcuterie exercise can be regarded as having served its original purpose, or more accurately as having failed to serve its original purpose. It .is probably safe to speculate that if any further efforts are to be made in the same direction, an entirely new operation would have to be mounted.’1 ************ Although the final Bacon mission had taken place in June, the operation v N / te \ and its effects continued to make themselves felt for some time. A sensitive diplomatic mission had now become interwoven with public policy and the require- ments of Governments to answer increasingly sharp criticism with factual "proof" rather than statement's of belief. This was clearly the case in Ottawa where the Minister felt that he had no alternative but to reveal part of the Seaborn story to the House on June 7. Three days later, he was scheduled to appear before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and officials were entrusted with the task of drafting a major policy statement for his use. The draft was prepared in essentially historical terms and emphasized, as we had been doing all along, the need to recognize the true nature of the problem in i ■ Vietnam before proceeding to seek a settlement through negotiation. "In our pursuit of a diplomatic solution there should be no misunderstanding of the root causes of the present hostilities... I think it would be dangerous to misjudge the basic responsibilities of those directly involved and to direct our appeals or our strictures only to those who we know are most likely within reason and conscience to heed them. To apply pressure only to those who are susceptible to our concerns is in my judgment naive. It is definitely dangerous and I say dangerous advisedly because the consequences of a refusal to base a policy on facts and a realistic assessment of objectives can only lead to a worse disaster than the one it seeks to avert.” While frank and realistic in analysing the problem, the speech went on to reject an exclusively military response: "I am deeply aware of course of the dangers of responding to aggression by military means alone.” sEeys 2e .../16 g CeRN fWeBeEE 55 Moyeanaee t ."esemcCS ?-‘Psag5ysCEsetp SAFcRte “5511 * "A9y-s0412,0240 Surrender 74469* ‘S ‘ W “*M5EEsR*erESEPS aAT9x access, I =6295 000051 ■ menye “2885 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a/'information 6 to Communist aggression was an unacceptable solution because it only postponed the day when a firmer stand would have to be taken; and on the other hand, a response in exclusively military terms raised the spectre of a wider Both approaches were rejected as not meeting the requirements of conflict. the Vietnam situation. "I have stated repeatedly and I do so today that the only acceptable alternative is to negotiate. negotiations started. Our objective is to get We have lost no time and spared no effort in the pursuit of this objective." The preparation of this speech was the second time - the first was in connection withthe March 8 statement tabling the Commission’s Special Message in the House of Commons - that the Minister scrutinized carefully the details of the draft text and took a personal hand in shaping its presentation. He felt rather strongly that the original draft had highlighted the historical analysis of the problem at the expense of Canadian diplomatic activities in I A search of a solution. But from the drafter’s point of view the problem was that there was not all that much material to draw on that could be revealed Our major effort of course had been the Bacon exercise but this publicly. was regarded as diplomatically and politically very sensitive. Three days earlier, the Minister had informed the House in very general terms of Seaborn’s latest visit to Hanoi and it was therefore decided that without revealing very much more detail, this visit might be dealt with in the statement for the Committee but again in general terms. "More than that, we have been taking our own quiet soundings of opinion, probing the positions of the interested parties to see whether there is any common ground on which we can build or help others to build. Unfortunately, diplomacy, especially in this context, is a form of activity whose success varies inversely with the attendant publicity. Government positions, especially Communist Government positions, tend to harden markedly when exposed to the full glare of public attention." i ...A? s 50555 912 “h 2 (owoor ey LE 0 —522295 SE Sr caeeetel ornt 000052 K �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information In dealing with the Seaborn mission, the Minister noted that this was only one of several trips which the Canadian Commissioner had made over the' He indicated to the Committee that his own reading of preceding months. the situation was that the -North Vietnamese Four Points were preconditions; this personal interjection was rather more'than.Seaborn had reported although in the circumstances, any informed observer had a right to interpret the status of the Four Points in any way he wished: ’’Nov; these are the four so-called "clear-cut” conditions laid down by the Government of North Vietnam. I believe that these represent an uncompromising position and I must say that since Mr. Seaborn was in Hanoi we know that there has not been any satisfactory clarification given to some of the points involved in these four conditions. The real problem is to interpret this .position and to see whether any way can be found of dovetailing it with the require- . ments of the other parties involved.” This speech was one of the turning points in the formulation of Canadian policy and a full text is attached as Appendix 30 . The Minister decided that the ’’diplomatic activities” passages must come at the beginning of his statement rather than at the conclusion a drafted, and right up until he sat down before the Committee, he kept open the option of using the ’’historical analysis” or not; in the end, the entire statement, but in re-ordered form and with a great many personal interpolations in the initial passages, was used. It was against this background that President Johnson made his public revelations a week later and together, all of this public commentary stimulated a certain amount of speculative interest. But while it was in the Canadian interest to indicate that it had been following an active diplomatic W ■ policy in addition to a hard line within the International Commission aimed at highlighting North Vietnamese subversion, it was almost impossible to reveal any of the essential details of that activity for fear of unleashing .. .8 “Tteiehsse?"sC* ", ..se, . —S, 2520* tiet e *50258 0555=92 soee ) the totn 59246 reske ss es 1000053 22 esesp ! 85 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a i'information other forms of criticism. This was basically the difficulty out of which was born the subsequently much-overworked theory of Canadian "quiet diplomacy" in relation to Vietnam. Also mentioned earlier was the Eric Severcid article in Look magazine in November 1965, telling the story of U Thant’s efforts to stimulate USA/North Vietnamese contacts in Rangoon in the autumn of 196. (An earlier account had appeared in the Manchester Guardian of August 9 but failed to stir up the same interest as the advance notification given to the USA Government in mid-November of Look’s intention to publish the Severeid article.) The first official comment in Washington was made by a State Department press spokesman in which he simply referred to the fact that "numerous third party contacts with North Vietnam were reported to us throughout this period. On the basis of the total evidence available to us we did not believe at any serious time that North Vietnam was prepared for/peace talks." (A fuller account appears as Appendix 31 .) This, as well as persistent rumours about the activities of the North Vietnamese representatives in Paris in late May put the USA Administration under some pressure.to "reveal its sources" and to explain why apparent opportunities had been ignored or turned down. On November 2/ the USA Embassy in Ottawa approached the Department to ask whether some of the details of the Bacon exorcise might be made public by Mr. Rusk. This request raised for us the whole spectrum of problems implicit in our position in Vietnam. Basically we felt that the less said in public about the Seaborn exercise, the better - and if anything had to be said, it should be said by the Canadian Government rather than the American Government. Attached as Appendix 32 is a memorandum to the Minister dated November 25 which is worth reading in full as an indication of our concerns at that time. It should be noted that in the end we gave reluctant permission to the Americans to make limited use of this information subject to three major ...-/9 Escca so “20995 Tr tst —eseseemos2704R8F89se 000054 *952819910694*915155*)** �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information conditions: (a) There should be no disclosure of the fact that Seaborn was transmitting messages on behalf of the USA; (b) A confrontation betwecn the views of U Thant and the views of Seaborn should be avoided; and (c) Canadian efforts should not be presented as a ’’major third party approach”, that is, as anything other than a Canadian effort. Evidently these conditions were seen in Washington as too restrict- ive and in his press conference on November 26, Mr. Rusk referred to the Seaborn mission only in general terms: ■ i ”I am not at liberty to cite all of those contacts which were numerous but you will recall that the Canadian Minister of External Affairs reported to his House of Commons in June of this year that the Canadian Commissioner on the ICC had made several trips to Hanoi over the eight monthsprior to the end of May. There were other public indications such as the faillire of Polish proposals on Laos and the refusal of Hanoi to attend the UN Security Council in August. I myself had a number of discussions with representatives of other Governments including Communist Governments. It seems clear beyond a peradventure of doubt that Hanoi was not prepared to discuss peace in Southeast Asia ..." A fuller account of this press conference is given in Washington telegram 3766 of November 26 attached as Appendix 33 . The Americans seem to have made no further public reference to these matters, as a result of the reservations we had expressed. In any event public interest in these so-called lost opportunities was soon overtaken by the prolonged bombing pause and the American "peace offensive” of December 1965/January 1966. ************ Throughout 1963 and for at least part of 196/ the option of with- drawal from the Vietnam Commission had been seen at the official level as a real and valid possibility. The delegation in Saigon had raised this matter with Ottawa in mid-1963 when the Commission seemed to be heading nowhere, except into further inactivity or more awkward still, into a vaguely .../50 5 “Ees rsucce £ erf 2 avbe iett srpe Fss icesesccustPe "Nt eee 000055 29 abastinecedee "t)—EE5y 33* �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur l'acces a I'information perceived possible confrontation with USA-South Vietnamese policies. On October 18, 1963, the Under-Secretary forwarded instructions to Saigon which stated: "Our conclusion is that no fundamental changes are possible at this time and that we must therefore ensure that the Canadian Government is in a position to carry out its functions in the Commission on.the basis of the best and most complete advice possible.” Early in September 1964 the Commissioner (Seaborn) reverted to this matter and his recommendations pointed in the direction of withdrawal. The matter was again reviewed in detail in Ottawa and it was concluded that we simply did not have a sufficient body of well documented evidence to prove the Commission’s ineffectiveness in convincing enough way to justify with- 1 drawal. i • As the storm clouds seemed to be gathering on the horizon we felt i that Canadian withdrawal without a documented justification would look like I an attempt to move out before the Americans moved in. As a major statement of Canadian policy objectives at the time,, the Minister’s instructions to Saigon are worth noting in detail: : 1 . U 11 ? i | | | I i i ’’Until the case for withdrawal can be well documented it is probable that unilateral Canadian withdrawal would be less acceptable than an attempt to arrive at terms, of reference, through a new conference for example ...” ... PI believe howover that the international political forces focussed on Indochina and on Vietnam in particular are changing more rapidly and more significantly than they have for some years. I also believe that the problems of that area arc not going to be resolved by a simple perseverance by all concerned in pursuit of present policies and that we are heading into a conference situation, the precise nature and timing of.which however cannot be determined. This is a factor which in my calculations has an overriding and compelling political importance and I am prepared to subordinate other considerations to the role we may be able to play in the situation I can foresee. If such a conference takes place it will be essential that the Commission render an account of its activities and that this account should provide an adequate picture of the true nature of the problem in Vietnam and the difficulties which the Commission has encountered in discharging-its responsibilities because of this problem. He may have to compromise on certain points in order to get this picture but I believe that the final result can be of some help in strengthening the hands of everyone 1 opposed to a Communist takeover in Southeast Asia.” Vueor .../51 PPbeel ad 340 08d 3 e:54s822295 wspge FErostg 78 8 2 wseszenabet ctdtg8"5R429e 21000056 n MMmpin,iB $=e,95 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information 6 Against the background of these considerations the Commissioner was instructed to make the Commission function as effectively as possible and, as closely as circumstances permitted, in the manner originally intended. ”You should seize every available opportunity, and create new ones wherever possible, for the Commission to take account of Communist infringements of the Geneva Agreement, and build up a record of meaningful findings. You will encounter pressures in the opposite direction in the process, and you should attempt to mute but not, disregard these since in the final analysis the Commission can say nothing new by way of criticizing our friends whereas the factors on the other side of the ledger are neither admitted nor so well publicized in detail let alone officially recognized by an international body. "At the same time your secondary policy guideline should be, in the event that, and to the extent that, you are unable to make the Commission function properly, to build up a precise and accurate record of reasons for this failure, whatever its extent may be. Although you will wish to continue to seek guidance on specific issues and in certain circumstances tactical considerations may indicate otherwise, you should think in terms of bringing issues to a final conclusion even at the risk of being outvoted. While our primary objective as above would most effectively be met by unanimity or majority, our secondary objective leads to the conclusion that we should not worry unduly about going into minority since that situation too may have its advantages. , MAs far as public opinion in Canada is concerned, I am naturally disturbed by criticism of our position in Indochina. I am however prepared to live with this problem for the immediate future until developments confirm that a conference will take place. / | V ’ 6 / *$ (y t / "If international negotiations are undertaken, I consider it important that Canada should have a voice. A decision on future Canadian participation could then be made in light of our experience of what is workable and what is not, depending on (a) the nature of the settlement reached and (b) the degree to which we believe proposed future Canadian membership in any supervisory body could strengthen the existence of an independent reunited Vietnam or more probably an independent South Vietnam rather than helping South Vietnam to slide downhill into Communism. I would be reluctant to jeopardize a claim to a voice in these deliberations (or to bring them about prematurely) by precipitating action now to break up the Commission. I am also anxious to keep open one of the few Western channels of communications with Hanoi. Past results in terms of information obtained or influence exerted have not been impressive but this does not mean that important future opportunities for usefulness will not present themselves." (Attached as Appendix 34 is the text of telegram Y-682 to Saigon.) .../52 1 ___ PYe*eG 4145702(s “Rsesblyte 000057 R*sC �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Ticeo Llica rro the major rinlinus rox"ofne"ccfslvvsefsnrsrtver69tots9s%9ec6s8/"nfommonon ( for the foreseeable future. to do its job. The Commission was to be cranked up and made. The Canadian delegation was to focus attention on Northern activities in the South as the least known and least documented of the troublesome aspects of the Vietnam situation, but without disregarding American and South Vietnamese infringements of the 15/ settlement. Since there were signs and indications of important political movement in the situation and. since a conference seemed a likely outcome, Canada was to maintain a credible locus standi, including access to Hanoi, which would ensure a voice in a Vietnam settlement. These major instructions were formulated and sent after the second Bacon mission to Hanoi, but well before the third and fourth missions., k With the passage of time, the documentation of the Commission’s failure as a prerequisite to withdrawal became less and less valid; as time passed and circumstances changed, the possibility of withdrawing from the Commission became more and more remote. If the Bacon exercise had .done nothing else, it had focussed attention on the use of Comma ssion contacts as a convenicnt and inconspicuous channel of communications with Hanoi. Although it had been Canadian-controlled from the beginning, it had evolved towards the end through exasperation with the Americans’ use of it and in response to our own changing political circumstances - into a diplomatic undertaking in which the content as well as the form was being determined by Canadian considerations. J This led to the realization - tentative at first - that Commission membership offered, in theory at least, special opportunities for dialogue vith Hanoi and if this could be developed, it might become a major element in Canadian diplomacy. Perhaps even more fundamental was the realization that Commission membership - as long as the Commission remained in existence and offered .. ./53 EETRFWt244 Yovehbrerritel Es te" th “eet 5 t 2 0 7 e h te 000058 Hessmces �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I’information 6 real possibilities for contacts across the lines of the conflict - constituted a demonstrable impediment to Canada becoming associated with the military effort being mounted by the USA, in support of which Washington was mustering contributions from friends and allies who had publicly claimed to share its views on containing wars of national liberation. A third consideration was that our Commission membership and presence on the ground in Vietnam gave us the right to claim "an independent assessment”. The future of our participation in the Vietnam Commission formed the subject of a major policy review within the Department in July and August of 1965, and again it was concluded that while there were clearly potential difficulties in continued membership in the Commission, these could not be judged to be sufficiently dangerous to warrant withdrawal or some other radical readjustments of our commitment or policies; the latter might run the risk of creating even greater difficulties for Canada and jeopardizing our claim to participation in international discussions of the Vietnam crisis. In a memorandum to the Minister dated August 25, the Under-Secretary outlined the results of this policy review; three of the paragraphs of this memorandum / are of particular interest: •’This analysis has been carefully studied by senior members of the Department to determine whether we might formulate recommendations to you which would take into account, on the one hand the record of the Commission’s disappointing performance in political terms, and on the other, our desire to maintain a non-military presence in Vietnam which gives us a locus standi in international discussions of this matter. On the basis of our discussions, however, I have concluded that there is no feasible readjustment in our activity in the Vietnam Commission that we can make at this time which would not create serious disadvantages in terms of broader Canadian policy objectives. In this connection, it is clear that if we do not maintain active participation in the work of the Commission, we would be under considerably greater pressure to make a direct military contribution; we would also have difficulty in justifying, | as we can now, our claim that our assessment of the problem in I Vietnam derives from our independent observer position there. S3 Epe 9 wwan eR 26 gry 0 9 1 29549 000059 25 4ss 5598290 $eeCss 5 �Document.disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divuigue en vertu de la Loi sur hacces a Tinformation ( "I have therefore concluded that, all things considered, ve can only reaffirm the objectives set last autumn for the work of the Canadian delegation, namely, to attempt to make the Commission function as objectively and as impartially as possible, and to the extent that this proves incapable of achievement, to establish as clear a record as possible of the Canadian point of view and of responsibility for the Commission's ineffective or non-objective functioning. ”The main difficulty with this course of action however is that Canada alone, as only one member out of three in the Commission, cannot set the Commission’s pace, and that unless the Indians are prepared to support us in some measure, we can easily become involved in an operation which runs counter to our broader political interests. Thus over the past year, the Commission has taken decision after decision against the South Vietnamese and the Americans, while it has been disturbingly slow to take comparable action with respect to North Vietnamese interference in South Vietnam. If, despite all our efforts to convince the Indians to support us and to make the Commission function in an impartial manner, the Commission continues as it has the past year, we are in a paradoxical position; on the one hand the government in Ottawa states that Canada supports the. purposes and objectives of USA policies in Vietnam, while on the other, we are participating in the work of a body in Saigon which is reaching decisions indicating that the South Vietnamese and Americans are repeatedly violating the Geneva Agreement - and this is the more awkward for us because in most instances the facts of the matter are clear and indisputed and in all honesty we must support such decisions by the Commission. Concurrently, we have, as you know, obtained almost no satisfaction in our attempts to have comparable Commission ■ treatment given to evidence of Northern interference. While there have been some hopeful indications recently that Delhi may be in the process of becoming slightly more flexible in its approach, the future of Indian policy remains very much a matter of uncertainty at the moment, and in this connection it is worth noting that the Indian Foreign Minister has not yet, after two months, responded to your most recent personal appeal to him for increased cooperation. The . prospects for success in our operations in the Vietnam Commission for the future are not, therefore, very bright." l I If then we were unwilling to extricate ourselves from the Commission, was there any way in which this arrangement - unsatisfactory in so many ways - could be turned to our diplomatic advantage? By now the obstructive realities of attempting to make the Commission record a satisfactory total judgment on . the Vietnam situation had come to have less priority and Canadian efforts to force the pace of Commission action were beginning to slow down a little. .../55 C SEESDEt fatstelonon rsehatat i se sore waee £ 1 525. 55,% Feeaeed 9992522248 Smstsasee g w wesosan teeYeS* “His Sad 1000060 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act y The idea of the Commission itself being”dseat“xu9ukeBazuss‘ors"EKnccsallnfootlon initiative had been under consideration for some months, especially with the full realization that the Bacon exercise had collapsed. In all the circumstances including the increasingly dangerous situation on the ground in Vietnam, we needed a forward diplomatic posture. At the official level, various forms of diplomatic action were considered, including * (a) the possibility of introducing a resolution at the United Nations*, (b) the. possibility of a special political mission being undertaken by a prominent personality acceptable to both sides (i.e. the President of Finland or the President of the UAR); (c) ■ < the possibility of an initiative within the Vietnam Commission In a memorandum to the Minister dated December 6, the various advantages and disadvantages of the first two alternatives were analysed and we came to the conclusion that a Vietnam Commission initiative was the only realistic possibility. (The text of this memorandum is attached as Appendix 35.) Later in the month the Minister visited London for discussions with British Ministers, and Paris to attend the NATO Ministerial Meeting. In both contexts he raised' the question of a Commission initiative and the reaction was one of interest from the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Stewart, in London and Mr. Rusk in Paris, although these reactions were more to the idea "in principle" than to any concrete proposal; we had not really developed such a proposal at that time. Of the various ideas under consider- ation the Minister seemed most attracted to the idea of our delegation in the Commission working for a message to the Co-Chairmen proposing that a ■ new Geneva Conference be held to draft new terms of reference (i.e. for the Commission). While Mr. Stewart made no commitment, he seemed to think it was something worth considering further. Departmental thinking with .. ./56 SoassopksnuclGvenossiskosodkme=t=gsdt=s anebasckedeKsbansbbaiss-= 000061 �. < , . , . it - Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ^^^^^‘^^^eeovertudelatoisurracces a /'information respect to this and other possblt.Cs was outlined in our telegram 1-3/ of December 13 to Paris, copy attached as Appendix 36 . By way of providing general background ,two extracts from contemporary documents are interesting. In the record of discussions with Mr. Stewart the following account of Canadian thinking appears: "Mr. Martin asked how much longer we could stick with the United States in defence of its- basic purposes., if we did not show that we were taking extraordinary steps toward getting negotiations started. In this connection, our difficulty was that we did not always know what United States intentions were," Some days later the British Prime Minister, Mr. Wilson, visited Ottawa prior to a visit to the USA, and in the briefing material prepared for Prime Minister Pearson the following paragraphs were included: "Canada has supported and continues to support the purposes and objectives of USA policy in Vietnam, namely, to check aggression from without, and to create conditions in which the South Vietnamese can make a meaningful choice about their own future. | "At the same time, we have misgivings about the risks inherent in the rising scale of USA operations undertaken to achieve this end. The really difficult question at this juncture is what other options Washington has open to it. "The expanding scope of hostilities in Vietnam has given rise to considerable public concern in Canada. The prospect of a further intensification of military operations in the area has added to that concern, particularly in the light of the current absence of any positive indication Hooking towards a negotiated settlement of the conflict. In this kind of situation of apparent diplomatic paralysis, public opinion is likely to become an increasingly difficult factor to be accommodated by governments which are closely associated with the United States. ■ .0 ! 6U * "We are not convinced that a completely military solution is possible in the circumstances, While the balance of military advantages may change in a more favourable direction, this in itself may create the danger of building up military pressures to "finish the job", thus shifting the emphasis away from the more limited objectives which have characterized USA policy to the present time. "We believe that an adequate solution in Vietnam can be arrived at only through negotiations, and President Johnson has committed the USA Government.to a willingness to undertake unconditional, negotiations with the interested governments. We would hope that . . ./57 g J 5 3 000062 (( deZrassdsdBrdssideptessmsP F eonagg �Access to Information Act intemaliona clforts could continue to rci n coPeymentd uocument aivuigue en vertu de ia Loi sur / acces a [ information determination." /1 N Then on Christmas live the USA Government initiated a 37-day bombing pause - the bombing was not resumed until January 31 - and a marathon roundthe-world peace probe. As part of this latter peace "offensive", McGeorge Bundy paid- a special visit to Ottawa on December 29 at the request of President Johnson to discuss the Vietnam situation and the current bombing pause with Prime Minister Pearson. As a result of this meeting and his pP conviction that the Americans were sincere in their search for peace, the Prime Minister sent a personal message to Prime Minister Shastri of India appealing for follow-up or supporting action by India through any special channels that might be open to the Government of India in approaching North Vietnam or its friends; he also said that any supporting public comment by India would be helpful. With regard to the total American effort: "Another such effort to end the conflict in Vietnam may not present itself for some time to come." (Attached as Appendix 37 is telegram G-440 of December 30 to Delhi.) In the context of this activity, we learned from Averell Harriman that it was part of his mandate as one of the President’s special representatives to ask the Poles and the Indians if they would be prepared to field a larger supervisory group to police any negotiated settlement. No such request was made to Canada either during the Bundy visit or in President Johnson’s subsecucnt telephone conversation with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister however told the President in general terms that we would be happy to do anything further in the field of diplomacy (i.e. beyond the action outlined in our telegram C-/40) to help carry forward the USA peace probe (Ottawa. telegram Y-1 of January 1, 1966). Throughout the pause, diplomatic interest and activity were intense. Understandably the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, played a particularly forward .../58 EYs ■ Ssmjpkgs r *4, 1 a ‘ suqhens . 000063 f! :2: 4 ’ 'f * �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information role in attempting to capitalize on the opportunities opened up by the bombing pause. Amongst other ideas, he picked up our ow general proposal that the International Commission might be made to play a role. Initially the Secretary-General was thinking in terms of proposing to the three members of the International Commission that they issue an appeal for a conference on Vietnam. (This presented obvious difficulties and was not pursued much further.) Subsequently he evolved a formula for conference participation which would bring together the five Geneva powers, North and South Vietnam, and the Liberation Front, and he raised with us the possibility of the Commission members taking diplomatic soundings to see whether a conference based on this concept might be workable. (The latter idea got nowhere because the proposed inclusion of the Liberation Front as a separate participant was totally unacceptable to the United States.) In the end, nothing came of the Secretary-General’s efforts because for one reason or another they proved to be unacceptable to the USA - we suspected because the Secretary-General himself had made little secret of his total lack of sympathy for American policy. For our own part we were skeptical about the precise form which the Secretary-General’s proposals took and we preferred to have the possibility of a Commission initiative left in general terms, but without letting it recede totally into the background. in fact, we were developing ideas of our own. By mid—January we i were discussing among ourselves the possibility of a senior level emissary visiting Vietnam as a special representative of the Canadian Government, one of the members of the International Commission. In view of general Polish, Indian and Soviet attitudes, we were fairly confident that any initiative W proposed as a tripartite effort was unlikely to win general support, at the moment and that any political exploration exercise - well beyond the Commission’s mandate - would almost certainly have to be done unilaterally. .../59 W jazate e .741 0 * - = ’ apt Ladeee dogs GlRGyse 5 yw r 83 * i > - 1■ 1 . Mey av *2 ,1000064 : �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information Although the cooperation of our partners would be worth trying for, i.t was unlikely to be immediately forthcoming. Even if we had to act unilaterally, we had no wish to de-activate the tripartite Commission concept, partly because Commission membership offered valuable advantages to us, but partly because there was just a remote possibility that the tripartite structure of the Commission might in due course serve to reflect evolving policies on the other side of the conflict. In an attempt to keep this structure alive and showing a semblance of potential vitality, the Minister decided that he wished to approach his Polish and Indian counterparts to see whether the Commission might in certain circumstances take "some action which might carry us some way forward to a negotiation". In his message to the Indian Foreign Minister on February 2/1, Mr. Martin said: "... I am not thinking in terms of a Commission initiative directed to the simple purpose of calling for a resumed Geneva Conference. It is my judgment that such a call would not produce results in present circumstances. "What I envisage.are a series of soundings based on the publicly expressed positions of the parties, to the point where the parties themselves may be prepared to enter into informal contact as a prelude, in due course, to formal negotiations". It was not surprising that the formal replies to'these messages, when they were finally received, were cast in terms that were as general as those of the Canadian proposal; we really had not expected anything else. The exercise had been designed to keep the Commission "open for business", to hold policy options open, and finally, as our plans evolved, to provide a kind of background to, or cover or rationale for, the Ronning missions. Without the Ronning missions the Commission initiative idea would have gone forward but probably at a different pace, and in a different form. (Attached as Appendix 38 are telegrams Y-170 of February 16 to Warsaw, Y-18/ of ../60 ! $ - 000065 SltemenossdeefflleacelgtGGc(Ee*ssett �' Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act of February 24 to Delhi, Warsaw telegram 212 of MRRERen“YlRa6eBuertud&Tk9zszKqccsalinformation Y-347 of May 11 to Delhi.) * -X -X -X X -X -X X -x * * X The prolonged suspension of the bombing,was, of course, welcomed by. the Canadian Government, and our view was that the longer it was possible for the Americans to hold off a resumption, the more likely it was that Hanoi might respond openly or at least come under political pressure to do so from its friends and supporters. Speaking in the House of Commons on January 20, the Prime Minister applauded the latest USA moves, and took a speculative look into the future, at what a new settlement - the end result of the. negotiations we were, all trying to get started - might look like: "Nevertheless the United States has suspended I hope it will be able to maintain that suspension . possible. I also hope that with patience, as well this effort by the Americans for negotiations will "I should like to read just Congressional address to which I should be attached, but to which given. I quote from his address air bombing and as long as as determination, have some success one sentence from the President’s think considerable importance not vory much publicity has been as follows: ’We will respond if others reduce their use of force; and we will withdraw our soldiers once South Vietnam is securely guaranteed the right to shape its own future.’ "Perhaps progress would be possible if the North Vietnamese even .accepted the idea of negotiations. Once that acceptance has . been given by both sides, and it has already been given by the United States, it might be possible, on the acceptance of negotiations, to begin a process of withdrawal. Perhaps that is what the President was hinting at as a possibility in that sentence. I do not know. However, Mr. Speaker, in my view it is perfectly clear that military force alone will not settle this problem, will not resolve this issue either by toppling the regime in the North or by permitting the communists to absorb the South. 9 "Perhaps the result - and it is not one that anyone can get any particular satisfaction out of - perhaps the ultimate solution ■ will have to be, as it has been in other cases since World War II, the acceptance of two Vietnamese communities, neutralized, with other countries staying out. So long as the problem is approached 00/ 61 aqlrtpoGni. AetaronR I 000066 9 ■■ t .. cr=vepjteetpteuosa 4 i �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information in terms of "puppet regimes" or"nat.tonal liberalion strurglor" we run the risk of obscuring the basic fact that there are now two communi ties in Vietnam and we also run the ri.sk of misjudging the possibility of one community gaining a complete ascendency over the other by military means or by subversion, or by any other means not based on the clearly expressed choice of the people concerned. In the case of two communities that have developed for more than a decade along different lines, and toward which such massive outside engagements have already been made, it seems difficult to believe that one would.now be allowed simply to extinguish the other. "in my view we should not preclude the possibility of the reunification of Vietnam which, unquestionably, corresponds with the aspirations of the Vietnamese people, and it would be my hope and I am sure of all honourable members - that when the fighting has ended and peace is restored, the two communities could proceed quickly toward establishing the basis of confidence which would bring about such reunification." The "two communities" concept was not new in Canadian thinking. It had made its first formal appearance in a special briefing paper prepared for the Prime Minister's discussions with President Johnson following the Columbia River ceremonies on September 16, 196/. At that time, it seemed that an open rift might develop between China and the Soviet Union during the coming winter - in actual fact, the confrontation envisaged did not shape up until some years later, and by then the elements of the problem had changed totally - and if so, opportunities might present themselves from which the Americans might extract advantage. In such circumstances, and assuming success at the forthcoming elections, President Johnson might have found himself with more freedom of manoeuvre .than he had had for the preceding year in Vietnam; thus, if acceptable terms could have been arranged, the USA might have been able to "modify its commitment to a course of action whose continuation could have disastrous results," The briefing paper’s treatment of "acceptable terms" and "a more persuasive deterrent" are of 9 some interest: "Thus the New Year might conceivably find.the Chinese ready to reconsider their policy in Indochina and the Americans politically able to make more satisfactory and durable arrangements. .../62 fr r’ U Me 000067 B �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a i'information Specifically a bargain which could, in those circumstance:;, look attractive to both parties might involve a United States military withdrawal from South Vietnam in exchange for Chinese and North Vietnamese acceptance of the existence of South Vietnam as an independent non-aligned sovereign state: in other words a return to something like the 195/. settlement. Consideration might even be given to going beyond the Geneva concepts to arrange a more positive political solution. The claims, as espoused by Hanoi and Peking, of the Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (the Viet Cong organization) to a voice in South Vietnamese affairs would have to be withdratm - which would represent a more significant concession by North Vietnam than by China. All proposals for "reunification by free elections" would be avoided in the bargain but the possibility of establishing some-confederal institutions to deal with such.problems as trade, postal services, free or limited, movement of families, etc., might be left open to appeal to North Vietnamese interests. If in these circumstances China and North Vietnam continued to refuse to "leave South Vietnam alone" and re-embarked on a programme of guerilla warfare or political subversion, the threat of active and substantial United States military intervention might prove a more persuasive deterrent than the present programme of material assistance and advice to South Vietnam. The swift and determined response of the United States to the recent Tonkin Gulf provocations might lend credibility to this argument. If the Chinese and North Vietnamese passive reaction to this vigorous American action can be taken to indicate that they were unable to do anything else, then an anticipated Chinese preoccupation with a threatening Soviet position could lead to an even more persuasive assessment of United States intentions and capabilities." A copy of the full text of this briefing paper is attached as Appendix 39 • Our records indicate that the Prime Minister did in fact speak to the President along the lines of this hypothesis, and the latter "took note of these ideas?’ Whatever validity this analysis may have had at the time, it was quickly nullified by the course of events. Yet the conception of a settle- ment based on a general acceptance of two Vietnamese "communities" - if not states - remained attractive, and seemed sensible and realistic as a long- term. goal. * * * * X ***** * * o.0/63 -20* eeeheseeds R5r I ’ - 000068 “uerggngy �r As noted earlier there was a great deal of Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information the long pause - partly because the Americans had asked their friends for any support they could give in promoting negotiations. We had concluded that our membership in the Vietnam Commission provided us with a locus standi which was in most respects unique and that there could be advantage in developing such opportunities for diplomatic action as this situation might make possible. In the beginning, we had thought in terms of the general proposition that members of the Commission, as a broadly representative group with-direct access in various ways to all the principal parties concerned, might have some useful role to play - in the right circumstances. Such a general approach however required a more precise definition if it were to become a basis for action - and we.had every reason to be skeptical about the prospects for joint action. We suspected that if action were to be undertaken, it would almost certainly have to be unilateral in the first instance, that is, it would have to be a Canadian initiative; the Minister’s formal approaches to his Indian and Polich counterparts were intended as much to set the stage as to define a working basis for immediate cooperation. Consequently, the concept evolved of Canada as a member of the Vietnam Commission - preferably with the cooperation of the other two members but more probably acting alone - seeking to ascertain in the major capitals concerned whether any basis could be found for discussions between the two ■ sides to the conflict leading towards a negotiated settlemento This same trend of thought was evident in our response to the situation that developed in Nev; York when, with the resumption of the bombing on January 31 the USA requested urgent Security Council consideration of the Vietnam problem We knew perfectly well that the North Vietnamese would never consider direct action by the UN and we therefore agreed with others that if the UN were to make any move that might have even minimal chances of success, the action envisaged would have to be linked effectively to the Geneva Conference machinery. Consideration was given to the possibility of the Vietnam Commission, or more .../65 m=*—tbsedbennss 4* sesyaacbeaatanhat �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act probably its three members, being called upon by Sexdmetvyivgvarrokru cecgokurticona I'informotion to take soundings in interested capitals in search of a consensus which might make possible a Geneva Conference situation. In the end however this, as well as other ideas, came to nothing since there was strong opposition from some directions to the idea of the Security Council taking any action whatsoever - although a blanket condemnation of American policy would doubtless have been acceptable in these opposing quarters. ■ The conception of a special Commission role had originally made its i appearance in the period preceding the long pause, and while these various t trends of thought were being carried forward through rapidly changing circumstances, the "Special emissary" idea -emerged from our internal discussions Just as Seaborn had been sent to Hanoi in May/June of 1965 in part to ascertain North Vietnamese reactions to the mid-May bombing pause, so it might now be possible to send a special representative to Vietnam, under cover of Commission business or a "Commission initiative" to determine whether there had been any Initially our discussions had'been evolution in North Vietnamese attitudes. cast in terms of the possibility of a senior official taking on this assignment: he would be less conspicuous under a Commission "cover" than an outsider and if he were thoroughly steeped in the intricacies of the Vietnam problem from an Ottawa point of view, he might be more sharply attuned to the subtleties of the North Vietnamese position as this might be explained in discussion in Hanoi. This line of thought did not commend itself totally to the Minister R, who envisaged operating with a rather differcolkind o(% baand at a rather different level. The Minister was ' eelg weenee vely •* cposllgk ‘60,5- at* convinced thatgeacihes continuing # ■ .. . 502 interest in the problems raised by China’s pesteon in the international community, *s* “neee Thus, ..o' where the road to peace in Vietnam lay through Pche. officials had aer ■' originally conceived a special mission to Vietnam alone, the Minister was thinking . . ./66 th r $ —Pp*wPpom0so000/822.9,/96tss 000070 2E83Pne rPkv “"—==** �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information more in terms of an approach which would place a heavy concentration on China. 66 That being the case, the logical choice for the assignment, in his view, was Chester Ronning whose knowledge of the language and some senior personalities n in Peking constituted credentials which probably no.other Canadian possessed; this was reinforced by the fact that Ronning had never taken up an open-ended invitation issued to him in general terms at the Geneva Conference on Laos by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi . Towards the end of January, the Minister directed that Ronning be brought to Ottawa for discussions. In the course of these discussions, it became clear that the Minister wished to maximize the potential advantages of Ronning’s Chinese connections. In the beginning, he had-not wished-Ronning to visit Saigon at all and a visit to Hanoi would be subordinate to the Peking discussions which it was hoped. Ronning would have; if, in the light of these discussions, it seemed that a visit to Hanoi might be useful, Ronning would go otherwise possibly not. This preliminary trend of thought was modified early on in the discussions, but while the Minister soon envisaged Ronning visiting both Peking (to discuss a variety of subjects including Vietnam) and Hanoi, he continued to have strong reservations about including Saigon. Attached as Appendix 40 are copies of memoranda to the Minister and to the Prime Minister concerning the preliminary planning for the Ronning Mission. Appendix /1 is the text of our telegram Y-66 of January 27 to Saigon authorizing the new Commissioner, Victor Moore, to proceed to Hanoi as soon as possible to make his introductory calls in the North Vietnamese capital, and to take advantage of these calls to initiate arrangements for Ronning's visit to Hanoi. —0 "The Minister has decided that it would be useful at this stage . of developments in the Vietnam crisis, to take soundings of Government opinion in Peking and Hanoi and to convey an expression of the Canadian Government’s views in these capitals. Chester Ronning has agreed to undertake this special assignment on behalf of the Government. Ronning will carry a diplomatic passport but the assignment will have the character of a "special visit" rather than the more formal designation of a "special mission". .. ./67 was7$21e9,t8wo9aag o gSygks; -=--=========================*====-heereeyedRSatmrscl �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a /'information It will be noted from the full.text of the message that a decision regarding Saigon had not then been made, even though it was recognized that Ronning's actual path would have to take him through the South Vietnamese capital; equally noteworthy is the fact that the Commissioner was instructed to make it clear to the North Vietnamese Government that Ronning’s "special visit" was not to be regarded as a continuation of the Seaborn assignments Before any of these arrangements were finalized, we received on January 30 the' text of President Ho Chi Minh’s letter of January 24 to Prime Minister Pearson. Although not very forthcoming in tone or content, it proved useful as a hook on which further action might be hung. the letter might not have merited much attention: In other circumstances, it was more interesting in terms of the timing of its appearance in relation to the long bombing pause-than in indicating any new directions in Hanoi’s policies or outlook. From our point of view, however, the presentation of a reply would add. a further good reason for ) a special visit to Hanoi - and indeed one which could be explained and defended in Saigon if need be. (Attached as Appendix 42 are the texts of Ho Chi Minh's letter of January 24) and the Prime Minister’s reply of February 28.) In the early stages of the operation it was considered that it would be desirable to protect the identity of Ronning against premature leaks in the event that telegrams or other material might be seen by persons other than the very few officials directly involved in the preliminary planning. Consequently, Ronning, and therefore the exercise as a whole, came to be Ionovna as "Smallbridge". (in the search for a suitable cover name the Ottawa telephone directory was consulted and when opened at random at the letter "S", the name "Smallbridge" jumped out with symbolic attractiveness.) Part of the reason for this protective element in an operation regarded as highly sensitive reflected the fact that Ronning was fairly well-known in interested domestic and international circles as a retired senior Canadian diplomat possessing special qualifications with ./68 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information respect to Asia. In agreeing to undertake the assignment Ronning himself had certain reservations. He recognized that he was reasonably well-known and in particular that his personal views on China were not always appreciated by others, specifically, Dean Rusk whom he had met some years ago; Ronning wondered whether Rusk would be prepared to trust fully a man whose views on China and Asia generally differed so markedly from his own. but also related to the fact that he was reasonably well-known, Ronning expressed. (40, vw * r y In addition to these considerations, some concern about the possibility of his assignment eventually becoming part of ! the public debate in Canada through premature revelation or otherwise, thus ! vitiating all of the early precautions with which the operation was being surrounded. After preliminary consultations in Ottawa, Ronning visited Washington and met Bundy and Harriman for discussions to enable him to form his own first- hand impression of American policy. There was never any question of delivering an American "message". The Ronning operation was an entirely Canadian diplomatic effort, mounted on our own initiative and based on our own concerns; in all respects it was intended as a probing operation without prior commitment on either side. To probe effectively in Hanoi, however, would require a comprehensive and up-to-date grasp of American thinking. It was in this spirit that discussions were held in Washington and in Ottawa. Ronning’s’briefing" on American policy on Vietnam took the form of a general review' with Bundy, the outlines of which are given in Washington telegrams 290 and 291 of January 28 attached as Appendix 43 , and conversations with Harriman. 60 Although Rusk welcomed the initiative as "constructive", Bundy asked us to bear in mind that "other developments" might take place at the time of the visit. As matters turned out, the bombing was resumed long before Ronning ever reached Hanoi. .../69 Mass �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act The Chinese aspects of Ronning's assignmeRcumtreeresEemeda tbugives a information the Americans more trouble and Rusk felt it necessary to write to the Minister -expressing his concerns on certain points. With regard to Vietnam, he emphasized the need to handle with care the briefing material the Americans had made available to Ronning; this material was intended exclusively for Ronning’s background and was not to be quoted as ’’the American position" Rusk also expressed concern that Ronning’s trip seemed to be shaping up in a more formal and official way than he had understood was planned originally and this could have wider implications especially for relations with China, Finally Rusk expressed concern over the possibility that Ronning when in Peking might discuss Chinese representation at the United Nations and the question of Canada/China relations. In reply the Minister reassured Rusk that his first concern was fully appreciated and understood and that with respect to the second, "there has never, of course, been any question of Ronning’s being given any sort of formal accreditation as my special emissary". With regard to bilateral relations between China and Canada, the Minister assured his American counterpart that he had "no intention that this particular subject should at this stage be the object of discussion let alone negotiation"; if the Chinese raised it in personal conversations with Ronning, this would be regarded as a listening operation. However, with respect to the question of Chinese representation at the UN, the Minister acknowledged a special Canadian interest in this matter: "It is my hope that Ronning’s talks with Chinese leaders will provide an opportunity to probe Chen Yi’s conditions and will perhaps provide us with information which can help our own consultation and review of the situation. Again, in this area Ronning’s brief will be very much a listening brief and we will certainly wish to discuss with you whatever information he may be able to obtain." 8 Attached as Appendix 44 is the text of the Rusk letter and the Minister’s reply together with a related departmental memorandum. 0/70 $ 4 ,==2,000074 20 wsunenenyees=rS*bdakkkzsscGassagng*gges �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act What mnigzht ll.'lVO happened if the original DollmentdWulguEchverdelalediGl*l‘akdeda /'information worked out as planned is an interesting historical speculation. In actual fact the focus and impact of the project changed in mid-stream when the Chinese Government indicated that it would be ’'inopportune' 1 for Ronning to visit Peking at the time. Ronning had left Ottawa early in February and was waiting in Hong Kong for the formal invitation from Chen Yi to materialize. On February 17 this reply was presented to the senior Canadian representative in Hong Kong; "Vice-Premier Chen Yi was glad to receive Smallbridge’s (hereafter Ronning - ed.) letter and recalled with pleasure his meetings with Ronning in Geneva. At present the Government of the USA is accelerating the expansion of its war of aggression against Vietnam and engineering a peace talks plot in many ways. Regrettably, the Canadian Government has taken a position in support of this policy of the USA Government. In these circumstances, it will be inopportune for Ronning to visit China now. However, Vice-Premier Chen Yi expressed the hope that he would have the opportunity of receiving Ronning in Peking at an appropriate time in the future." The tone and substance of the Chinese reply came as a surprise and was a source of considerable disappointment to the Minister. Consideration was given to asking for a reconsideration of the visit and explaining that the Minister had been prepared for a rather wider exchange of views, in Ronning’s personal discussions in Peking, than Chen Yi had anticipated by singling out Vietnam in his negative reply. Our records do not indicate clearly whether such a follow-up message was ever actually presented to the Chinese at that . time; one was drafted. At all events the visit to China never took place. Meanwhile preparations for the Hanoi aspect of the project had been going forward. Moore visited the North Vietnamese capital in early February and was received by the Prime Minister on February 11. He reported Pham Van Dong as saying that the North Vietnamese Government "would receive Ronning happily although he (Pham Van Dong) doubted it would produce useful results. He welcomed Pearson’s goodwill and asked that his greetings be conveyed." (Saigon telegram 103 of February 11). A fuller account of Moore's. conversation . . ./71 s 3 Baostatgclentskdka “ ' ' sereis£ S86 KCEessSsaols, $000075 — �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act with the Prime Minister of North Vietnam but withoutolmertYorgushventdeYeriFFLCvlfermation is given in Saigon telegram 107 of February 12, Appendix 45 o Subsequently the North Vietnamese indicated that a suitable time for the visit would be between March 6 and March 19. Although we had hoped to keep the visit informal, the North Vietnamese insisted on written notification. Accordingly an Aide Memoire was presented in Hanoi which described Ronning’s assignment as "a special visit on behalf of the Prime Minister of Canada to discuss personally with President Ho Chi Minh or Prime Minister Pham Van Dong the points made in the President’s letter of January 2l) to Prime Minister Pearson, and in general the views of the DRVN Government with respect to the problems in Vietnam”. The Commissioner in Saigon, supported by officials in Ottawa continued to press for the inclusion of Saigon in Ronning’s itinerary as something more than an airport at which to catch the Commission courier aircraft to Hanoi. response to these urgings, the Minister on February 16 instructed Moore as follows: ”I am prepared to agree to minimum contacts with the SVN Government and with the Commission. These will be for the purpose of dispelling suspicions in Saigon and maintaining a cover for the visit. This is that Smallbridge will be reviewing problems in Vietnam at first hand with special emphasis on the current and a possible future role of the Commission in relation to these problems. You should inform Col. An officially of the proposed visit in those terms explaining that Smallbridge will be visiting Hanoi as part of same assignment. ”You should tell Col. An that I would be grateful if the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister could receive Smallbridge to give him his current assessment of the Vietnam problem and his thinking with respect to a peaceful settlement, with particular emphasis on any role the Commission may be able to play in present and future circumstances. I would prefer it if any other calls on South Vietnamese leaders could be avoided since I am concerned not to have unnecessary publicity focussed on this exercise. For the same reason you should do what you1 can to discourage any offers of official entertainment in Saigon.” i Shortly thereafter the China phase of the operation collapsed. The emphasis of Operation Smallbridge was quickly transformed into an exclusively Vietnam undertaking - and it was in this connection that the concept of the .../72 In �- . . ...... ’ . Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation . Commission initiative, which had been our starting point, was again pushed into the foreground. \ In a telegram dated February 22 to Moore we commented: "Events subsequent to the initiation of this operation, have had the effect of changing its emphasis even though its essential purposes remain the same. The Chinese refusal to receive Smallbridge and the public attention that has been focussed recently on Canadian exploration of the possibility of the Commission playing a useful role looking to negotiations have resulted in a situation whereby the "cover" and the substance of the Smallbridge exercise in Vietnam have moved closer together. "The Minister’s agreement that discussions should be held with SVN authorities and with the Commission should minimize or eliminate the possibility of difficulties arising later. "In the arrangements you will be making for the visit you should be guided by our general desire to avoid any apparent disparity between the Saigon and Hanoi aspects of the visit." 0 Shortly thereafter, the Polish Foreign Minister’s reply was received to the Minister’s earlier message about a special Commission role, and the negative position taken by Rapacki confirmed our earlier suspicion that if the concept of a Commission role were to be kept alive until the Poles were prepared to cooperate, responsibility for doing so would clearly rest with Canada. In our preliminary planning for Ronning’s discussions in Hanoi, this aspect of the total situation had been minimized - although Commission business was the "cover" for the Saigon visit - because we felt that there might be complications in possible feed-back from Hanoi to Warsaw if we were to develop these ideas too explicitly in our discussions with the North Vietnamese. Rapacki’s negative reply however made possible a greater degree of latitude for planning Ronning’s talks in Hanoi. In its final formulation, Ronning’s briefing encompassed three main elements: ; j (a) The presentation of the Prime Minister’s reply to Ho Chi Minh’s (b) An oral presentation of the Canadian.Government’s view of a possible peace-seeking role for the Commission; letter; .../73 • 1< . - ‘ ,« .. ..s2.a % “"9 . - .* . ,3 , * p ,/. - „A8 25 , • . nyy - * . f • . 1000077 M megprtgenencndnfpaaB-=eb=bqendrsettBnemonmonovednmzeepyetnt2sust66tokecbmtaundmesudnzpptmenGqeypo==ict=a=asn=kpina===nq=z=q=dqqRBBSR ‘YY �(c) Document disclosed under the Access to Informatidn Act An attempt to obtain clarification from thauerdiligMeketaaBQSSbisurl’accslinfprmation Government - in discussions as specific and detailed as possible of the prospects for negotiations. Of these three elements clearly the third was the most'important although the other two had presentational .and some substantive significance. Attached as Appendix 46 is the text of our telegram I-205 of March 2 outlining the talking points Ronning was to use in seeking a clarification of the North Vietnamese position with respect to negotiations. It was of course understood, and Ronning was so informed, that in the final analysis much would have to depend on his.own discretion in deciding on the specific content of his presentation. The North Vietnamese had indicated that they might wish to issue a "joint communique" at the conclusion of the Ronning visit; they had also made clear that they were not enthusaistic about a cover story involving Commission business since from their point of view they had agreed to receive Ronning as a "special visitor" representing the Canadian Government. We had general reservations about the desirability of highlighting a visit to Hanoi with any kind of special announcement and we had more specific reservations about the possible implications this could have for the question of recognition. If the North Vietnamese insisted on issuing their own announcement, we took the position that it should specify that discussions had taken place with a "special representative of the Government of Canada which is a member of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam. agreement has been reached on any matters". It should not state that (Attached as Appendix 47 is a copy of our telegram Y-212 of March A.) As guidance for dealing with questions, especially from the press since the story was beginning to break, we prepared the following outline: "The Canadian Government is concerned about the course of developments in Vietnam. It has been particularly disappointed by the absence . ‘s* % 000 /7 l+ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information of any prospects of a peaceful settlement of. the- present conflict being reached. In recent weeks it has been giving thought to the possibility which may be.open to the International Commission to play some part, in the present situation. The Commission is in a special position by virtue of its long association with the Vietnam problem and the access it has to all the parties to the conflict. We have had preliminary discussions about a possible Commission role with India and Poland who are our partners on the Commission. To enable us to carry forward our thinking, we have also considered it useful to seek the views of the Governments of North and South Vietnam on the current situation, and any role which the Commission may be able to play in creating conditions . in which a peaceful settlement of the conflict may be possible. It was for this purpose that we asked Mr. Ronning to visit Saigon and Hanoi. In the course of his visit to Hanoi, Mr. Ronning is taking an opportunity to deliver the Prime Minister’s reply to Ho Chi Minh’s message of January 24." Ronning arrived in Saigon on March 5 and during his stay in the South Vietnamese capital he had discussions with the Indian Chairman of the Commission, the Polish Commissioner and senior South Vietnamese personalities. Attached as Appendix 48 are the texts of telegraphic reports of conversation with the Commission ■ Chairman, the Polish Commissioner, the Chief of State and the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam Two days later, on March 7, Ronning took off for Hanoi"accompanied by Victor Moore, the Commissioner. until March 11. They stayed in the North Vietnamese capital Ronning was received by the Vice Foreign Minister, by the Foreign Minister, by Col. Ha Van Lau, Chief of the PAVN Liaison Mission and, on the last day of the visit, by the Prime Minister. lasted for two hours. This final interview Attached as Appendix 49 are the texts of Saigon telegram 184 of March 11 giving Ronning’s own account of the interview and Saigon telegram 189 of March 11, giving Moore’s account based on his own almost verbatim notes. All the discussions in Hanoi were marked by a repeated North Vietnamese emphasis on the necessary acceptance of their Four Points as the only basis on which a peaceful settlement could be built, and by an apparent uncompromising belief in the ultimate "victory" of their cause; their presentations were / 208 budtlri tupll* WREP 99352 "completely hard-line", and "bitter and almost abusive". 00./75 s 806 ; 000079 3 "smpree �. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a /'information The early part of the interviev! with Pham Van Dong revealed these same obdurate attitudes, and seemed to suggest that there would be no deviation by the Prime Minister from the determined, confident, hard-line approach registered by the others in previous discussions. Towards the end of the interview, however, and under persistent questioning by Ronning about the conditions Hanoi would require to have met.before entering into direct or indirect talks with the USA, the North Vietnamese Prime Minister gave the following indication: North Vietnamese willingness to enter into some form of preliminary contact hinged on a commitment by the USA to cease ’’bombing and all acts of war against North Vietnam" "unconditionally and for good". In reply to questioning he made it clear that this condition was limited to North Vietnamese territory and did not encompass USA military activity in the South. It was not clear whether the commitment envisaged by Pham Van Dong was to be given publicly, or diplomatically. "declaration".) (The translator used the term Furthermore, while Pham Van Dong conveyed the impression that Hanoi’s response to such a move by the USA would lead to negotiating contacts, he gave no clarification of whether he envisaged these as being direct or indirect. "In fact, our position includes many aspects. He said: In brief, we can say that informal talks and a cessation of attacks against North Vietnam go. together.” Initially, the North Vietnamese Prime Minister undertook to record this position in an Aide Memoire - which did not materialize subsequently. He did intimate, however, that he was soliciting a USA response, and a further exchange with the USA through Canadian channels. "For our part", Pham Van Dong said, ”we will look into the attitude of the USA, and with all understanding." It was agreed that what had been said to Ronning would be conveyed to the USA, as a Canadian understanding of the North Vietnamese position, and not ../76 egopaaroper 99* wss tsxwxu** *425783p=n-3,676#4/A68,696nRgBRXRNPWSNS—BS nghbldkesedeespheog*tvodtpe==dp=b=a===nd! �as a result of any request by North Vietnam to do that Canada was not volunteering to act as a mediator Emphasis was laid on the importance of absolute secrecy in any exchange that might develop from Ronning’s discussions. Earlier feelers had become public and the North Vietnamese had been forced to issue a denials On his return to Ottawa Ronning reported his impression to the Minister and intensive discussions ensued as to the interpretation to be put on the Pham Van Dong interview. It was decided that Ronning himself should give an account to the Americans, and to this end he proceeded immediately to Washington. He took with him an agreed "piece of paper" summarizing the encounter in Hanoi, highlighting, of .course, what he thought was the essence of the North Vietnamese proposition. Although the immediately preceding paragraphs are drawn from that account, the actual text of that "piece of paper" is attached as Appendix 50 ; a copy was made available to the Americans. Ronning and the Ambassador received Bundy at the Residence in Washington on the evening of March 20, and Ronning presented a detailed account of his mission, concentratling on the proposition and the circumstances surrounding it. "Ronning stressed that he might be entirely wrong in concluding that the DRVN was separating the bombing issue from the Four Points, but the impression that Pham Van Dong sought to create. this was undoubtedly Ronning thought it was significant that the DRVN displayed a desire to keep the channel open". expressed great interest and extensive notes were taken. Bundy "The nature of his questions confirmed that he fully understood the possible significance of what had been said to Ronning. He was particularly concerned to establish whether Pham Van Dong, in bringing up the question of the USA declaration on bombing, had stipulated any other consideration in this context such as de-escalation in the South, prior USA withdrawal, or the position of the VC in negotiations. Ronning replied in the negative..." "Bundy wondered if Pham Van Dong had specifically asked Ronning to return, to which Ronning said that the DRVN was .../77 femRtomenpgdeg eceapGewecnelts �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information merely anxious that the Canadian channel (rather than any one personality) should remain available"o Bundy promised that Ronning’s account of his "findings" would be studied with deliberation and care. The Ambassador concluded: "Bundy himself remarked that the implications of Ronning’s talks constituted hard cards to play, and I should think that the USA authorities will want to give the whole problem very careful study before deciding on any reaction"• • Attached as Appendix 51 is the text of Washington telegram 838 of March 21. About two weeks later, during a call on Bundy, the Ambassador asked whether the USA had reached any conclusion about the significance of Ronning’s conversations in Hanoi. Bundy replied that Rusk had been informed of Ronning’s "report", and that the State Department was now preparing a message for the DRVN authorities which they hoped Moore would take- with him on his next trip to the North. Bundy said that he thought that the American response should be phrased in such a way as to constitute a reply to Hanoi's "suggestion" only if a suggestion had in fact been intended. a bit". The idea, he said, was to "smoke it out It was unlikely, however, he concluded, that much flexibility would be found in Hanoi’s position in view of the situation in the South, If the Americans envisaged the second encounter in the series as a "smoking out" operation, our preliminary thinking was that matters might best be carried forward by Moore, since there would apparently be little or nothing . new to say, and the Commissioner could move into and out of Hanoi relatively I inconspicuously. The Minister however insisted on Ronning carrying out the I assignment, unless USA comments, if and when they came, were of an entirely routine nature. In any event, it was agreed that, whatever the American reaction, the North Vietnamese would infer that the second encounter did not I have the same importance as the first round of discussions if Ronning were I not the interlocutor. i .../78 cMasdnesssesessesgog �sRaWretidsrosshngothefccsrsetfranftionAct we recognized that the political Although Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi surl'acces a I'information * • was Unsettling for the Americans, we were anxious to move ahead as promptly as possible with the dialogue with the North Vietnamese; if the proposition Ronning had brought back from HIanoi was intended as a serious "offer", we did not wish it to go by default, and we were not anxious to see Canadian efforts, or the so-called Canadian "channel" downgraded again by a demonstrable lack of interest. The Minister became impatient. On his own initiative, he telephoned Bundy on April 22 and personally underlined the importance he attached to the V channel and to giving the North Vietnamese some proof that what they had said to Ronning was being taken seriously. . \ . .. ' Bundy apologized for the fact that no ■ . . response had been formulated to the "proposition" Ronning had brought back and hoped that something might be cleared in a few days. By early May arrangements were put in'hand - although nothing formal . had been forthcoming from the Americans. On May 6, the Commissioner in Saigon was instructed to inform the authorities in Hanoi that "the Canadian Government would welcome an early.opportunity for a further exchange of views with the Government of the DRVN in accordance with the Canadian Government’s understanding of the conversations which Mr. Ronning had with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. in March. The Canadian Government hopes that the Government of the DRVN would. find it possible to renew these conversations, and if so, Mr. Ronning would be prepared to visit Hanoi again at an early date". The Government of North Vietnam subsequently indicated that a mid—June visit would be satisfactory. We were encouraged by the North Vietnamese positive response, even though it was conveyed to us - in an Aide Memoire dated May 21 - in terms that were relatively hard and which reiterated the established public position of the North Vietnamese Government. It seemed fair to,speculate, however, that the North Vietnamese could do nothing other than suggest that the second Ronning .../79 . 231/87 . 24 0 2 ‘2 ' 4% Rt -AarGhppetSese 65" 6 24“$789*.95000083 H (2 enerkeryptonteesageisparnSaL �visit would be taking place alinitiative that any exchanges would be carried out within the established framework of North Vietnamese policy. In short, this was yet another demonstration of Hanoi’s interesting ambivalence in their dealings with us: in style and public presentation they could be tough, even abusive, while substantively and in private there was a clear measure of confidence and even goodwill. A copy of the text of the Aide Memoire is attached as Appendix 52 o The reference to the Prime Minister’s‘proposal" concerns a speech delivered in Toronto on May 1 by Mr. Teillet on the Prime Minister’s behalf, advocating a cease-fire as part of a wider pattern of peace negotiations without prior conditions: what irked the North Vietnamese was that the Prime Minister had not condemned the bombing as a separate element in the situation. We had assumed .all along that Hanoi would agree to the second Ronning visit and plans were being developed long before the formal approval for the visit was received. Early in May Ronning returned to Ottawa and accompanied by the Head of Far Eastern Division he proceeded to Washington where discussions were held with Bundy and Kreisberg. In these discussions the Americans indicated that they were anxious to reopen a direct circuit with North Vietnam as soon as possible; they expressed appreciation of the availability of the Canadian channel and said that they wished it kept open. They continued to have reservations, however, about the precise interpretation to be put on the results of Ronning’s first mission to Hanoi; they also had questions about the possibility of there having been any real change in the status of the Four Points. The Americans made it quite clear that they would not regard "a mere willingness on the part of the North Vietnamese to engage in informal talks as an adequate price for a renewed suspension of the bombing, even on the understanding that the suspension would be maintained only as long as meaningful discussions were in progress”. %8o In other words the proposition that Ronning had brought back from U .../BO 5= aM �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Hanoi was rejected by the USA Government. MorcoverocueEyivemeertudelelsurKecceat'information that stage to name a specific price for a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam; our impression was that any package would have to include more than a willingness to talk on North Vietnam’s part - possibly an undertaking to halt the further infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam. Vie had suggested that there might be advantage in countering what we had interpreted as a specific North Vietnamese proposition with a specific American response; for example, that the USA would be prepared to consider an undertaking to cease bombing on condition that and for as long as the North Vietnamese were prepared to abide by some specific reciprocal undertakings of their own which would have the effect of resulting in a reduction in hostilities. The Americans thus continued to favour a generalized approach, designed to elicit further clarification of North Vietnamese thinking. They had prepared a "piece of paper" outlining their own position as a basis for Ronning’s forthcoming presentation to the North Vietnamese Government. "position paper" might be recast and undertook to do so. We thought that this In due course an agreed text of the "oral message" emerged and after approval by officials in Washington and Ottawa it was discussed by the Minister and Mr. Rusk at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in early June. Attached as Appendix 53 is the final text of the document on which Ronning would be basing his presentation in Hanoi. In signifying approval (at the official level) of the final draft Bundy explained the USA desire to delete, from the text, any explicit reference to the Canadian channel by saying that if the dialogue continued, it would become important at some point for the Americans and the North Vietnamese to be able to communicate more quickly and directly than via trips by Canadian a officials. He also noted that "visibility" could become a serious problem if the dialogue developed further: in other words the travels of Ronning could become an apparent indication of serious diplomatic activity. He thought that ../81 ios*********************** tuoemssaghan"ss v.le . ... . ... . — ... . .. 000085 s �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act we might wish to consider making more use of the CoRAfmectdevisuenigrtdeddtqisrCaccsl'information future since Moore could travel to and from Hanoi more inconspicuously. In the course of our continuing discussions the Americans also asked whether we would include in Ronning’s instruction an American request /to deliver a message to the North Vietnamese Government about American prisoners being held in North Vietnam. This we agreed to do but on the understanding. that Ronning would be given discretion to decide, in the light of circumstances .attending his various discussions in Hanoi, on the precise context in which this presentation was to be made. And then the Americans again did something very curious. In the context of their continuing talks with the Chinese in Warsaw, the American Ambassador on May 25 presented a statement of the American position with respect to terms for a mutual reduction of hostilities in Vietnam. This statement was cast in the following terms: "We seek neither territory or bases, economic domination or military alliances in Vietnam. There are many roads to a peaceful solution. We are willing at any time to engage in discussions or negotiations leading towards peace without condition. ’’Alternatively we are willing to undertake a reciprocal dampingdown of war. We will respond if others are prepared to reduce the use of force. Specifically we are willing to suspend or even cease our air attacks on North Vietnam if Hanoi gives clear evidence that it is prepared to take reciprocal action, for example with respect to its infiltration of military personnel and equipment to South Vietnam and its military activity and terrorism in South Vietnam. Such evidence and suspension of the bombing could'be determined by mutually acceptable observers.” (Washington telegram 156/; of May 27). This statement was apparently not regarded as sensitive and within a week its main aspects had been made known publicly. In the context of planning the second Ronning mission to Hanoi, we found it difficult to understand why a message of this character should be conveyed to Hanoi through an intermediary which was assumed to be the most adamantly opposed to any form of accommodation in Vietnam. And then to make it public«... askusowyrenecgemygeyebeHtee- .../82 • , -.. -- , ' r’ * ' * .9 - ’ ‘ 100 thesipll • 000086 7f ■ ' __ 5 '. ,r . r* ‘ . ' SoutebseSs-rescllesgsee -, �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Most curious of all, however, was the TaQecumentrivuqnken.ErtL*Rda ^^'l^JSinformation (3 had told us early in May that they did not wish themselves to propose or suggest the specific price tag to be attached to a cessation of the bombing, they had now done something which amounted to that in their message to the Chinese and moreover they had added a new element, namely, mutually acceptable observation. We decided to interpret this situation in the following terms, should ■the North Vietnamese query Ronning on the relationship between the messages conveyed through the Chinese and the Canadian channels: "In such an event would we be right in telling the North Vietnamese that the USA would be prepared to consider the cessation of the bombing of the North in circumstances where this would be a step towards peace, that the message conveyed through the Chinese outlined certain areas in which the North Vietnamese could make concessions that would be attractive to the USA and South Vietnam, but that the fundamental USA interest was still to elicit from Hanoi some indication of the areas in which they might be able to move towards reduction of the scale and scope of the hostilities." In the absence of any contrary commentary from the Americans we regarded this as an accurate interpretation of their intentions. The general reaction from everyone on the network was one of dismay - and indeed apprehension: was it worth going through the exercise at all in these circumstances? From Saigon, Moore commented in starkly realistic terms by noting that the Americans seemed to be escalating what had begun as a serious diplomatic overture into an enormous "peace offensive" reminiscent of the campaign they had mounted during the long bombing pause in December and January. "I remain convinced that such pressure will be counter-productive. Further, if these tactics raise doubts in even my mind about American sincerity they will surely convince the DRVN leaders of the correctness of their earlier suspicions. We can, therefore, expect them to withdraw into their corner and foolishly but doggedly and stubbornly continue the war As for our "small bridge" there is undoubtedly value in our talking to the' DRVN leaders if only for the sake of talking. However, it is open to question how many more times we shall be received in Hanoi if we come only as a mouthpiece to American propaganda. The state will soon be reached I fear when the sincerity of Canada will appear to Hanoi to be as questionable as that of the USA." s W . ../83 <EStg £ 28802020 x ' 000087 g| : IA> YX, “ARre 1 feaato S258ppsganas �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information y The.Prime Minister commented on this telegram: A ■ " A/ ij "We should take this message seriously. It would be a sad ending to our initiative in this matter if we became merely an instrument of USA propaganda or for putting the' DRVN on the spot." Lli (6 in all the circumstances, however, it seemed unlikely that it would be possible to get the Americans to add something new to the agreed ’'Canadian understanding" of the American position which would make Ronning’s presentation in Hanoi more attractive, authoritative and meaningful than the version received through the Chinese, and we could only interpret the material we had in the best way possible. 0 Attached as Appendix 54 are telegrams 450 of June 6 from Saigon and ourtel Y-05 of June 6 to Brussels (for the Minister and the Under-Secretary) . The Minister raised these questions with his USA counterpart and authorized the exercise to go forward as originally planned without seeking any major revisions. ! In convoying this decision to Ottawa by telegram the Under- ! | Secretary noted that "Mr. Martin considers that we should have no illusions as to possible success, but Mr. Rusk said this seems to be the only channel now available." The Ronning visit, he continued, should still provide the North | Vietnamese with an opportunity to explain their reaction to the American proposals and to indicate if they have any alternative scheme for bringing the hostilities to an end. Ronning’s instructions for his talks in Hanoi had emerged from a long and complicated series of discussions and reconsiderations in the light of fast changing circumstances. The final version, however, is given in the text of the Minister’s telegram I-/25 of June 10 to Saigon which appears as Appendix 55 • After setting the stage in appropriate terms and establishing the essentially Canadian character of the visit, Ronning was authorized to present the "oral message" as agreed to earlier. (The reference to telegram Y-/02 of June 3 to Brussels is to the text of this message that appears earlier as Appendix 53 . Similarly the reference to our telegram Y-11/ of June A is to our attempt to ...M . I 7 2250 000088 ' �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act reconcile the agreed Canadian "oral mnessage" and t]^cl)^9i^e^^tJ^QX4iSMSce^}nformation put to the Chinese in Warsaw,) Then: if circumstances were such as to make this possible "...we regard it as important that he (Ronning) should do everything he can to elicit some element of response from Pham Van Dong....". The instructions continued: "Ronning might make the point that, if the cause of a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem is to be advanced — as all who have the interests in Vietnamese people in mind profoundly hope that it can be - there will have to be a willingness on both sides to move beyond their present positions. As far as the Canadian Government is concerned, we would of course particularly welcome any move which would have a mitigating effect on the present scope and scale of hostilities and in this way provide a better climate for the discussion of substantive issues which will inevitably have to be embarked upon at some stage. We are satisfied that the USA Government are sincere in wishing to work towards a peaceful settlement and prepared to take meaningful steps which would further such an outcome. On the other hand, we would be less than frank if we failed to underline what ve take to be the determination of the USA to persist in their present course of policy in the absence of some indication that the North Vietnamese were willing to meet them part way. "We recognize that, in a situation in which considerable commitments of power and prestige are engaged on both sides, there is an inherent tendency for positions to remain frozen. It would be our hope, however, that if there were to be some beginning of movement' this could be accomplished with minimum embarrassment to either party. If there was anything we could do to facilitate matters with this consideration in mind, we would be glad to take whatever action we could to that end." The lengthy instruction concluded with a brief paragraph inserted at the Minister’s request: "It is important that in any event Ronning should do everything to keep open the contact regardless of the result." (0 It was agreed that any Commission cover story could be dispensed with this time, and that a. more straightforward public explanation would be suitable: in line with the Canadian Government's position as favouring a peaceful and honourable accommodation of interests of those involved in the Vietnam conflict, we had been concerned with exploring the views and attitudes of all the parties, and Ronning’s visit to Hanoi should be seen in that light. If more specific questions were raised we proposed to deal with them in the following terms: 00 /& > 000089 2 . "Populedat, sero rte eeapm*e TAsmeRgleknsw �Document disclosed under the Access to Information'Act (A) "The initiative for Ronning's second visddganonv@gueKvart@delMlsur l'acces a ^information (B) "Ronning’s brief for his discussions in Hanoi of the Vietnam problem as a whole is a Canadian brief. We are aware of USA thinking on the Vietnam problem and we shall be taking soundings of opinion in other interested capitals. This second visit to Hanoi is part of a continuing process. In addition it will provide an opportunity to give and obtain clarification of certain specific matters of mutual interest. (c) "If specific questions arise as to the relationship between the Ronning mission and the much publicized Warsaw exchanges, you could say that we are of course aware of recent USA diplomatic activities such as the discussions in Wersaw with Chinese representatives. These and other factors have been taken fully into account in planning for Ronning’s visit." and not from Hanoi although the latter has obviously agreed to receive him. Although the Commission initiative idea, as a practical possibility in any of its conceivable forms, was pretty far from our thoughts at that time, we still wished to keep channels open to the Indians and Poles. Accordingly, the Minister sent the following explanatory message to his Indian and Polish counterparts on June 10 just a few days before Ronning’s arrival in Saigon. "As you are aware from our earlier exchanges of views, the Canadian Government attaches the highest priority to a peaceful and honourable accommodation of interests between those concerned in the current Vietnam conflict. In line with this objective we have been concerned to explore the views and attitudes of interested parties, and generally, to do what we can to help bring this dangerous situation to a peaceful conclusion. I know that your Government shares the sense of importance we attach to this problem. Accordingly, I thought you should know that I have asked Mr. Chester Ronning to visit Vietnam again in the very near future for discussions in Saigon and Hanoi. Mr. Ronning will be arriving in Saigon on June 12, and he will be visiting Hanoi from June 1/ to 18 for discussions with Vietnamese leaders. I am hopeful that this Visit, which is being carried out on the initiative of the Canadian Government, may help to clarify some of the difficult issues which continue to stand in the way of a settlement of the conflict in Vietnam." At about the same time it was agreed that when in Hong Kong Ronning should attempt to renew contact with the Chinese with a view to determining whether the Chinese Foreign Minister would be prepared to receive him after his proposed visit to Hanoi. This effort was made but the Chinese again declined. .. ./86 �Document djsclQsed under the Access to Information Act By now, however, the possibility of a V-bechmenkGvulguenOertiela€o9GuPPUceeglinformation ( our main preoccupation was with American intentions in Vietnam. Following a I, / conversation with Bundy on June 10 in Washington the Ambassador reported that Bundy had expressed the very strong hope that Ronning would be authorized to convey to Sullivan (US Ambassador in Vientiane) at least a general impression of the flavour of the conversations in Hanoi, for example, whether the North Vietnamese attitude was negative or "teasing" or whether it contained affirmative elements, "Stressing the seriousness and urgency of his request Bundy said that the USA had received indications from a number of sources (including comments by Moore to Lodge) implying that bombing was perhaps how beginning to have a severe effect on the DRVN. The USA was currently giving consideration to "playing about with the pace of its actions" in the light of these indications. Bundy did not elaborate but he seemed to be hinting fairly directly that some kind of early change in the pattern or intensity of bombing is currently under study." (Washington telegram 1725 of June 10.) (Moore’s comments to Lodge had been more balanced than Bundy suggested: he had observed that even though the bombing was undoubtedly hurting the North there were no signs that it was reducing their determination to resist.) This sounded ominous indeed, and while we did not know for certain what it meant, there was enough speculation at the time about the possibility of bombing oil storage dumps and Hanoi and Haiphong to give rise to considerable apprehensiveness and to reinforce the doubts we had been entertaining for some time about the usefulness of this mission. But as was the case with similar operations in the past, we seemed to have little choice but to carry matters forward. We knew that there was a strong possibility that the mission would fail and that failure itself could have embarrassing consequences. We were however also aware of the possibility, no matter how small, that there might just be an element of success - and as in the past this suggested that the risks were worth running. Ronning arrived in Saigon on June 13. He had been authorized to ../87 TEratg 5 i• I I �, Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act . make contact with the South Vietnamese Government Dccumeredvlguken@tHR/aEP&hOGHAsPY‘infrmation some other representatives. In the end he saw no South Vietnamese and departed for Hanoi on June 14 accompanied by Moore. capital lasted until June IS. The visit to the North Vietnamese Moore reported subsequently that the airport reception indicated that expectations were high in Hanoi and suggested that they expected something of substance to emerge from the Ronning mission In the course of his stay in Hanoi, Ronning saw Ha Van Lau, Chief of the Liaison Mission; Nguyen Co Thach, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Nguyen Duy Trinh, in his capacity as Vice-Prime Minister in the absence from Hanoi of Pham Van Dong. The overall atmosphere was cordial although Trinh was unusually critical of Canadian policy in general: moreover the level' at which Ronning was received was one notch lower than it had been on the previous visit. Most important of all, the line taken by the North Vietnamese in discussion was perceptibly harder - in all respects. They seemed to be making a deliberate effort to convince Ronning that they were reconciled to a continuation of the war and to the intensified bombing of North Vietnam if it was necessary to accept such a fate. Ronning presented the USA of the "oral message". position in the terms of the agreed text The North Vietnamese in turn reiterated their willingness to open talks with the USA on the basis of their original proposition, that is, a unilateral USA undertaking to stop the bombing of North Vietnam permanently and unconditionally. They were unwilling to entertain any thought of reciprocity for a cessation of the bombing. The general approach of the USA Government as presented by Ronning was equated by the North Vietnamese with the formula mentioned in Warsaw; the latter was already known to the North Vietnamese from public sources and they expressed the view in strong terms that the approach was unacceptable to them. .../88 s �. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Notwithstanding the fact that no progreegymepfelHet L^^^^j'informgtion on the basis of this particular proposition, the North Vietnamese indicated, in response to Ronning’s questioning,that they would not wish the Canadian channel to be closed and Ronning was told specifically that they would not be opposed to its further use, even though Canadian policy was not to Hanoi’s liking. Attached as Appendix 56 are telegrams 523 of June 18 (Ronning’s ow brief report), 52.8 of June 18 and 527 of June 19 reporting in full on Ronning’s discussions in Hanoi As the Americans had requested, Ronning raised the prisoners issue in discussion with Vice-Foreign Minister Thach. Attached as Appendix 57 is a copy of Saigon telegram 526 of June 18 reporting on this aspect of Ronning’s assignment. The question of whether or not Ronning should give a full briefing to American representatives in the field - more specifically in Vientiane - on his way back to Ottawa continued to receive active consideration. On June 16, the Minister sent a telegram in the following terms to Vientiane for Ronning on his arrival on the courier flight from Hanoi: ( "This is to confirm previous indications given to you of my attitude towards "briefing" USA representatives in the field. I am strongly convinced that your reporting should be to the Canadian , Government in the first instance, and that what we say to the USA should be based on a careful analysis and interpretation of your impressions. However, I appreciate the USA concern to be, given the earliest possible indication of the "general flavour" of your discussions in Hanoi to the extent and only to the extent that this may have "an immediate bearing" on matters raised with Ritchie by Bundy. I am prepared to authorize you to do this on the basis of the absolute minimum required to meet USA concerns and purely in terms of "general flavour". I believe that, if this needs to be done, it should be done in Vientiane to the USA Charge d’Affaires only and not to the USA Ambassador in Bangkok. You are, of course, free to discuss with the USA Charge d’Affaires anything relating to your Subsidiary presentation on USA prisoners which is a presentation we made on behalf of the USA,and which was made in parallel with a similar presentation in Vientiane in which the Charge d’Affaires has been personally involved." W C I As matters worked out, only the barest minimum contact was made 1102000nnsssssss(0 with the Americans at Vientiane airport and the information made available 0/89 �.. to them was confinco 1 • O tlc Ic.ul.1.6 of . Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act the Cem rc 1 \0oc@enzBid/@leflefts de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information Among those waiting at Vientiane airport to greet Ronning was his son-in-law, Seymour Topping of the New York Times who was at that time posted in Hong Kong. Four days later the Times carried an article datelined Hong Kong giving an account of the results - or rather the lack of results - of the Ronning mission. It was a curious way of doing things, if indeed it had been consciously thought out, but at least it allowed time for Ronning to. return to Canada and.Moore to report fully from Saigon on the Hanoi discussions before anything of substance was made available to the USA Government or indeed to the press. The interest of the State Department in this matter is suggested by the fact that Rusk himself telephoned the Minister on the morning of June 18, alleging that no contact had been made in Vientiane! Ronning arrived back in Ottawa on June 20 or 21 and the State Department despatched Kreisberg to Ottawa to discuss the visit. On the afternoon of June 21 the Minister received Kreisberg and Mr. Scott, Minister at the USA Embassy in Ottawa and gave them a preliminary briefing on Ronning’s discussions in Hanoi. After giving an account of the factual results of the mission, including the North Vietnamese comments about the Canadian channel, the Minister went on to make two further points: ’’Because we take it that the maintenance of' the channel is of interest to the USA we would like to draw their attention to the adverse effects which an early escalation of USA activities against North Vietnam is likely to have both retroactively on the Ronning mission and potentially on the future use of the Canadian channel. We would also hope that the USA would not find it necessary, in any public statements, to refer to North Vietnamese attitudes in a way which might imply that their judgment has been arrived at on the basis of indications provided by Canada as a result of the Ronning visit. "It has been our intent to see whether a basis could be found on which it might prove possible for talks to be opened between the USA and the North Vietnamese. It appears that, as far as the North ./90 �6 V: etnamesc are concerned, there rc no presen l, pPeupatdisgosed'undentheAccess to Information Act ' acceptable formula being devised on the basis action for a cessation of bombing. We shall be considering and, we hope, discussing with the USA other possibilities open to us of making use of the channel. to Hanoi." The Minister was not, however, fully satisfied with this preliminary presentation; specifically he felt that Kreisberg, however brilliant, was not ) senior enough and that since Bundy had had such an important role in the planning of these missions, he should be involved in the follow-up discussions. Accordingly, the Minister picked up his telephone and "instructed" Bundy to come to Ottawa for discussions with Ronning and himself the following day. Regardless of what Bundy might have thought or said when he hung up the telephone, he appeared in Ottawa as required. The afternoon of June 22 was spent in intensive discussions in the Minister’s office with Ronning giving a first-hand account and Bundy cross-questioning him. Towards the end of the ) 7 afternoon, Bundy - in a characteristic form of expression - remarked that it was "a little difficult to find the right handle to all this". / He made it quite clear that the Americans were perplexed at best, and not convinced at worst, by Ronning’s "findings". That evening the Minister hosted a dinner in mildly comic semi- 26 secrecy at the Chateau Laurjer - but even so, Bundy’s presence in Ottawa was noted. The discussion at dinner covered the whole Asia-Pacific area in general terms and found Bundy at his philosophic and expository best: a fascinating performance on the future of American-Japanese relations, the role of China, what was happening in Indonesia, to mention only a few of the subjects discussed. Although interested in what Bundy had to say, the Minister was clearly preoccupied with Vietnam and the apparent failure of Ronning’s mission. On a number of points he reiterated to Bundy the view that he had expressed during the afternoon discussions, namely that the American message should have been more forthcoming, and that it was the lack of "give" in the formulation .../91 ■ 000095 �of the Amorj.can posilion that had rcsullled in failure. 4 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ? ' Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'inf^h^,.. t 568 In the months that followed there was of course a great deal of speculation as to whether the Americans had deliberately used the Ronning mission for purposes which werc quite different from those which we had intended it to serve. Some critics felt that this was deliberate, and indeed it was not always possible to argue a totally convincing case in the other T direction. On June 29 the Americans extended the pattern of bombing to P7 ■ include POL dumps in Hanoi and Haiphong and nine other locations in North Vietnam, and on July 8 the Washington Post published an article by Chalmers Roberts in the following terms: “A conversation in Hanoi between a foreign diplomat and North Vietnam’s President Ho Chi Minh was a key element responsible for President Johnson’s current tough policy and hard talk about the war in Vietnam. This is the story as told yesterday by high Administration sources: the diplomatic visitor to Hanoi discussed the war with Ho, who told him that his country was prepared to fight a long war against the Americans and their allies. But, Ho added, that will not be necessary because "we won’t have to wait too long". President Johnson’s political base for his military action, continued Ho, will be shattered in November. This conversation took place about three weeks ago, that is about June 15. Officials will not disclose the source of the report but it may have been Canada’s Chester Ronning, who was in Hanoi from June 15 to 18. I At any rate, the report was ! taken as a genuine reading of Iio’s frame of mind and its arrival on the President’s desk was soon followed by double-barreled action. On . or about June 23, Mr. Johnson at last gave a go-ahead to the longplanned American air attacks on the oil installations in the Hanoi and Haiphong region. The first attack took place on June 29. The day after that raid, the President spoke of the war in both Omaha a . .92 1 237028 19000096 .....'■...tWotw-® i �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act in the months that followed there was oocuecChAseguergeewelodeis@k"oesd ''information speculation as to whether the Americans had deliberately used the Ronning mission for purposes which were quite different from those which we had intended it to serve. Some critics felt that this was deliberate, and indeed it was not always possible to argue a totally convincing case in the other direction. On June 29 the Americans extended the pattern of bombing to include POL dumps in Hanoi and Haiphong and nine other locations in North Vietnam, and on July 8 the Washington Post published an article by Chalmers Roberts in the following terms:. "A conversation in Hanoi between a foreign diplomat and North Vietnam’s President Ho Chi Minh was a key element responsible for President Johnson’s current tough policy and hard talk about the war in Vietnam. This is the story as told yesterday by high Administration sources: the diplomatic visitor to Hanoi discussed the war with Ho, who told him that his country was prepared to fight a long war against the Americans and their allies. But, Ho added, that will not be necessary because "we won’t have to wait too long". President Johnson’s political base for his military action, continued Ho, will be shattered in November. This conversation took place about three weeks ago, that is about June 15. Officials will not disclose the source of the report but it may have been Canada's Chester Ronning, who was in Hanoi from June 15 to 18. At any rate, the report was taken as a genuine reading of Iio’s frame of mind and its arrival on the President’s desk was soon Tollowed by double-barreled action. On or about June 23, Mr. Johnson at last gave a go-ahead to the longplanned American air attacks on the oil installations in the Hanoi and Haiphong region. The first attack took place on June 29. The day after that raid, the President spoke of the war in both Omaha .. .92 t I 000097 �and Desmoincs. The speeches combined Lhe LhemesDdcumeht distlosed under tha hdoss:dthformation Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a i'information would continue unless the Communists agree to negotiate and that "we will see this through; we shall persist; we shall succeed"." Had the Americans tried deliberately to scuttle the Ronning project because they distrusted Ronning personally or because they were less enthusiastic in public and in private about the Canadian channel than was the Minister? Had we been deliberately used by the Americans because the military and civilian hardliners had decided that further escalation was really what was required? Questions such as these were not entirely absent from our thinking at the time but any definitive answers will have to await more authoritative historical judgments. A contemporary commentary however might be worth bearing in mind in attempting to formulate any historical judgment: "As to the seauel of the Ronning mission, there are obviously various ways of looking at it. There can be no doubt that the USA were on the verge of deciding at that time to bomb fuel storage facilities in North Vietnam. All the indications available to us pointed in that direction. If there had been any positive elements emerging from Ronning’s second round of discussions, in Hanoi, it is . possible that the USA would have held back. In the absence of anything really positive from their point of view, they went ahead. So in one sense there is a connection between the results of Ronning’s mission and the bomba ng of fuel storage facilities in the North - but is it really fair to say that it was Ronning’s mission that led to the decision to bomb these facilities?" 000098 �I r MTTOGUT Guri S Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information (INITIATIVES AMD PROPOSALS: 1966-1967) By and large, the more significant peace initiatives with which Canada was associated during this period shared two characteristics: they emanated from other than Canadian sources and, secondly, they revolved around the utilization of the ICSC as a vehicle for establishing a basis for peace negotiations between the warring parties in Vietnam. The two proposals of note during this period were put forward by Professor Roger Fisher of Harvard in early October of 1966 and by Dean Rusk in late November of the same year. Fisher’s proposal, which was informally discussed by representatives of the ICSC countries in New York, involved the convening of an international conference on Vietnam, similar to the Geneva Conference of 195/), to negotiate a halt to the hostilities. Fisher’s general approach to the convening of a conference was, however, dropped in favour of an initiative to be made, after consultations, by the ICSC countries acting through the Commission. In a similar vein, Rusk suggested to the Minister .that the Commission countries meet in Geneva to discuss the potential role of the ICSC in arranging peace talks. Both suggestions, however, foundered when the Minister, during a visit to Warsaw in November, was informed by the Poles that they wished to see the Commission lapse into a state of complete inactivity in order that positions in Vietnam not be complicated while, at the same time, preserving a basis for possible future cooperation. The Polish view, which did not undergo any change during this period, thus effectively precluded the a possibility of any unanimous Commission initiative being undertaken. I theless, Canada continued, with India, to explore the possibility of a Ii I Never- Commission initiative (specifically permutations of the Fisher plan), against .../2 88 g Jo .PmWsmem ..>000099 a hsseecscamlytStg Bee (sekouagnagnceunaegacsnnenetosamrenensppeclcsagpecsegtnccontitacecond �b I IC ‘ ••$ ,y vujtai i u.i .1 ; ui 444t4t‘44.* I ‘.{ "I"’ l-' ^■cul^ie^ uncjer Access- to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'accesa I'information 01 .) modification, indicating that the North Vietnamese might be willing to see action taken. The. last Canadian "proposal" was advanced by the Minister in a statement before the External Affairs Committee of the House Of Commons on April 11, 1967: "It may well be necessary to envisage a progressive re-application of the 1954 cease-fire terms as an agreed preliminary to direct discuss- . ions between the two sides and as something which would of itself, help to create a favourable climate for such discussions. If there were any merit in an approach on these lines, I could envisage it being carried out in four stages. ) "The first step should involve some degree of physical disengagement of the parties. This might he accomplished by restoring the demilitarized character of the zone on either side of the 17th Parallel by the withdrawal of all military forces, supplies and equipment from that zone, by enforcing a prohibition against any artillery action across the zone, and by barring any overflights of the zone except for purposes of impartial supervision. At the same time, it would be necessary to reactivate those provisions of’ the cease-fire agreement which prohibit either North or South Vietnam from being used for carrying-out of hostile acts against the other. In my view, this would, in equity, have to include the bombing and any other military action against North Vietnam, whether actually undertaken from South Vietnam or from some other point of origin.: "Second, I think it would be necessary. to freeze the course of military events in Vietnam at its present level. This might entail undertakings on both sides not to engage in any military activities which differed in either scale or pattern from the, activities which are currently being engaged in. It might also entail the practical re-application, as from an agreed point in time, of those articles of the Geneva cease-fire agreement which prohibit reinforcement of troops or arms, munitions and other war material into North or South Vietnam from any source or quarter. "The third stage of such an approach would logically involve the cessation of all active hostilities between the parties, whether on the ground, at sea or in the air. 1 "The fourth kind final stage would complete the process of return to the cease-fire provisions of the Geneva settlement. At that stage, provision would have to be made for the liberation and repatriation of prisoners, for the withdrawal of all outside forces whose presence in the area of conflict was not provided for at Geneva, and for the dismantling of military bases or their conversion to peaceful purposes. "I want to make it clear that I am not here putting: forward a formal set of proposals, I have been concerned to sketch put one line . :/3 vpreital . i bpdege , GeR==*=m*.,.tcceem* bA ZBEr thee si tMAzke t 000100 i Wsst �J Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a I'information of approach to ending the present conflict which seems practicable to me and which, in addition, has behind it the sanction of the Geneva arrangements, to. which both sides have said that they continue to subscribe. ”Any such approach, however, would clearly have to be acceptable to the parties concerned. I want to be perfectly frank with the Committee and say that, on present evidence, I am not very optimistic on that score. For while it is true that both sides are prepared to subscribe to the objective of a return to the Geneva arrangements, I am not so sure that they are at one in their interpretation of what that objective implies or as to the means by which it can best be achieved. In particular, of course, we cannot be unmindful of the position of the Government of Morth Vietnam, which is that they cannot accept any proposal which treats both sides on a basis of strict equity because this would ignore the factor of responsibility for the present conflict as they ■ see it.” / / "1 -2 sSSWssSSNSssssssossGss beeeecsmneguskdt uuamndbitbEabieCebnkegesg000101, � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource test