https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a49ec90f4b1b1d1c4e3c323553649e93.pdf 160e67e935d792f186d53fe1cfdafa13 PDF Text Text Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T D E P A R T M E N T O F NATIONAL OFFICE DEFENCE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF OTTAWA 16 February I960. Mr. N.A. Robertson, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, East Block, Ottawa, Ontario. 1 H< go Dear Mr. Robertson: Reference is made to your letter of 8 February I960, to which you attached a draft memorandum to Cabinet concerning the storage of air-to-air defensive nuclear weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base. The draft memorandum has been discussed with Mr. Pearkes and while we are not too happy with the proposed text in that we feel that some of the statements are superfluous and the revised text does not fully answer all the points raised by the U.S. authorities, we are prepared to accept the document as a draft for negotiation although we have some doubt as to whether certain parts of the text will be acceptable to the U.S. comments: In clarification of the above we make the following (a) Custody ..... (Paragraph 2) It is stated in your memorandum that inclusion of the words "and custody" would not be acceptable to the Canadian Government. In this regard I would mention that the Prime Minister is quoted in Hansard of 20 February 1959 as follows: "Believing that the spread of nuclear weapons at the independent disposal of individual nations should be limited, we consider it is expedient that ownership and custody of the nuclear warheads should remain with the United States." (b) Canadian Representatives at Each Base (Paragraph 3) . . It is pointed out that at Goose Bay no aircraft can land or take off without Canadian clearance and therefore it would seem that to specify that Canada will station representatives at each base is really not necessary. It will be recalled that the Canadian Government in Note No. 390 of 30 June 1959, agreed that USAF 001160 /£> . ?. t$(o%) �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 2 (b) - Cont'd. interceptors armed with nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons could overfly Canada and land and take off from Canadian military airfields under certain agreed conditions. There is no provision in that agreement to have a Canadian representative at each of the USAF bases to ensure USAF compliance with the regulations. Therefore, we can assume that under present arrangements at Goose Bay, we can ensure Canadian control to meet this point without having to include in the text a statement which might be mis-construed as impinging on the integrity of the U.S. authorities. As far as Harmon Air Force Base is concerned, it is understood that the U.S. authorities may drop this requirement. In view of this, it is suggested that consideration should be given to the withdrawal of the proposal to station a Canadian representative or representatives at each base. (c) Safeguards in the Design of Weapons ... and Safety Procedures ...... (Paragraph 4) The language suggesting that the design of atomic weapons will be subject to approval of the Canadian Government stemmed from the clause in the renewal of the original MB-1 agreement dated 30 June 1959, wherein clause 4, it stated that "The U.S. Government will continue to take the utmost precaution in designing nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons and will exercise equal precaution in establishing operational procedures to ensure a minimum possibility of public hazard when employment df such weapons is necessary. Representatives of the RCAF will continue to be thoroughly informed by the U.S. Air Force concerning both storage and operational safety measures." This text was inserted in order that Canada could be assured regarding the safety precautions taken in the design of the MB-1 weapon and future defensive weapons in order to prevent premature explosion of the weapon in the air, or if accidentally dropped, or if an aircraft crashed. This procedure of informing designated RCAF personnel concerning the safety features incorporated in the weapon, as well as providing training for the appraisal, monitoring and decontamination in the event of accidents has operated satisfactorily. Therefore, the formal transmission of restricted data not authorized under the U.S.A. Atomic Energy Act in this field is not necessary. In view of this, it is considered that the formal "agreement of Canada" as mentioned in paragraph 4, in connection with safety procedures is not necessary as it would seem to contemplate an inter-governmental agreement on this particular aspect. It is considered that the U.S. could be informed that what is 001161 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 3 m (c) - Cont'd. meant by the terms "agreement of Canada" is that procedures would be similar to those used with the MB-1 weapon if and when a new weapon is used instead of the MB-1. The procedure would be for the USAF to brief the RCAF on the safety precautions, etc., and the RCAF will satisfy the Canadian Government that the new weapon satisfies our safety requirements. (d) Transport of the Weapons in Canadian Territory will be carried out in accordance with the Canadian Law .......(Paragraph 5) As the transport arrangements are already covered under the present overflight regulations which have already been agreed to between the two Governments under PC 2307 of 17 April 1952, and as there are at present no safety procedures, as such, in existence under the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Act, it is questioned whether the words "in accordance with Canadian law" is correct. It would seem therefore that the suggested U.S. wording, "The transport of these weapons in Canadian territory will be carried out in accordance with the procedures agreed to between the appropriate agencies of both Governments", might be more appropriate. In the light of the above, I am to advise you that when the memorandum is put before the Cabinet, Mr. Pearkes is prepared to agree to the proposed text subject to clarification of the above points when it is discussed at the meeting. Yours/sincerely, Foulke^l ral Chiefs of Staff. 001162 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16589 Title A name given to the resource CDNW16589 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Continental defence - Atomic capability," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5930, file 50210-F-40, part 5.1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC).