https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c0c77a075dca36ccc61e3c969589736b.pdf 5c4ed5570c3860cf24957b243a76bad4 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Actl^A Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a tinfarmatm DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA •**&%-? 071 a 7 OUTGOING MESSAGE DATE -FM: OCT, 195S EXTERNAL - OTTAWA j T ' o A / o - / • * • * » ^ SECRET 2T NUMBER TO: SECURITY FILE. ,PRECEDENCE DL-810 WASHINGTON— ,• COMCENTRE USE ONLY PRIORITY .-f-**" ,E_ ^o^lO^T % . INFO: NATO PARIS / [ $ U ^ K W MJ [U^ASC%AA^A CCOS Ref.: -YOURTEL WISER 74 OF APR 9 Subject: STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR KEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE MINISTERS' HAVE GIVEN THEIR APPROVAL IH PRINCIPLE, S'JBJECT TO THE CONCLUSION OF SATISFACTORY INTER-GOVSRNHENTAL NOTES, TO THE STORAGE AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE OF NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS FOR, USE BY UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SQUADRONS UNDER HOHAD CONTROL. THE TEXT OP A NEGOTIATING DRAFT WHICH YOU ARE AUTHORS ED TO TAKE UP V7ITH TH.'; STATE DEPARTMENT I S SET OUT IM- MY * IMICDIl^XIir' FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. WE HAVE AT'i'J&lPTED III THE DRAFT TO SET OUT- THE CON- DITJONS GOVERNING THE STORAGE OF NUCLEAR 17EAPOHS AT GOOSE AND HARMON 1NGEMERAL TER&S, BE ARE AWARE THAT FURTHER DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS OU OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE WOULD HAV<2 TO BE AGREED BETEEEI THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES OP OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION / • SECRETARYI TO CABINET ^ HO R E G O L /iR DISTRIBUTION </. FIVB COP]LIS FOR MR. J . J . HcCARDLE./ •DIVISION ORIGINATOR NAME. .. .J... .J... rjcCARDLE/bh EXT.18(REV.12/56) , D#L, 3. ' PHONE 6-7921 , \ A Q (A/'A" fl * . - • • • A- bAPPROVED ^...M^mmsm- BY �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur'tacces a I'information 2. THE CONDITIONS SET OUT IN OUR NEGOTIATING DRAFT SHOULD NOT FOR THE MOST PART PRESENT GREAT DIFFICULTIES FOR THE UNITED STATES. PROVISION IS MADE THAT OWNERSHIP OF THE WAR HEADS SHOULD REMAIN WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNITED STATES LAW. THE MOVEMENT OF THESE WEAPONS INTO AND OUT OF CANADA WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES ARE ALREADY FAMILIAR WITH THE REQUIREMENTS IN THIS RESPECT BY REASON OF THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH THE OVERFLIGHT REGULATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN APPLIED FOR SOME YEARS WITH RESPECT TO SAC AIRCRAFT CARRYING NUCLEAR MATERIAL. THE PROVISION IS MADE THAT TEST FIRING OF THE WEAPONS SHOULD TAKE PI4CE OUTSIDE OF CANADA BECAUSE THERE ARE NO FACILITIES FOR THIS TYPE OF TESTING IN CANADA. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS IN THE PAST IN CONNECTION WITH THE MBI OVERFLIGHT AGREEMENT OFFERED THE ASSURANCES CONCERNING SAFEGUARDS IN THE DESIGN AND HANDLING OF THESE WEAPONS WHICH ARE DEALT WITH IN NUMBERED PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE NEGOTIATING DRAFT. PRESUMABLY THE SAME ASSURANCES WILL BE SATISFACTORY TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT SO LONG AS AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OTHER THAN THE MBI ARE NOT INTRODUCED. 3. THE MORE SUBSTANTIVE FEATURES OF OUR NEGOTIATING DRAFT ARE CONCERNED IN ONE WAY OR THE OTHER WITH THE SHARING OF RESPONSIBILITY BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS FOR THE CONTROL AND USE OF THESE WEAPONS. THE PROVISION THAT JOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE USE OF THE WEAPONS SHALL BE SHARED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS FLOWS FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE COMMAND ITSELF. I F CANADA SHARES WITH THE UNITED STATES CONTROL OF NORAD ACTIVITIES IN THE AIR DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA, INEVITABLY CANADA SHARES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE USE OF THE WEAPONS PUT AT NORAD'S DISPOSAL.. THIS 001025 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 3 - PRINCIPLE WAS EXPLICITLY STATED BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON FEBRUARY 20 j A STATEMENT ON WHICH THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES HAD BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT. 4. WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES I S NOT PREPARED TO SHARE WITH CANADA CONTROL OF THE USE OF THESE WEAPONS. I F AS WE UNDERSTAND IT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT JOINT RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS RESPECT, •t- THERE WOULD NOT SEEM TO BE ANY OBVIOUS REASON WHY THERE SHOULD BE UNITED STATES OBJECTION TO RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT REMOVAL OF THE WAR HEADS FROM THE STORAGE SITES SHOULD AS WELL BE A JOINT RESPONSIBILITY. ONCE THE BASIC AGREMENT IS SETTLED IT WOULD SEEM BOTH DESIRABLE AND CONSISTENT V/ITH MINISTERIAL EXPECTATIONS HERE TO SECURE DETAILED WORKING AGREEMENT ON THE ARRANGEMENTS AND CONDITIONS FOR REMOVAL AND USE. THESE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE WORKED OUT BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES- IN CONSULTATION WITH INTERESTED DEPARTMENTS. 5. AS V/E HAVE SAID ABOVE, THESE CONDITIONS STEM FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NORAD ITSELF, THEY ARE SET FORTH IN OUR DRAFT IN ADDITION TO UNDERLINE THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THAT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF WHATEVER SORT I S A MATTER OF HIGH POLICY AND MUST BE SUBJECT TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE OF GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL WHICH IS CONSONANT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY. AS THIS WILL BE THE FIRST OCCASION ON WHICH NUCLEAR'WEAPONS WILL BE HELD IN CANADA, MINISTERS BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF THIS STRONGLY HELD CANADIAN VIEW. 6. THERE I S ONE FURTHER FEATURE OF THE DRAFT WHICH MAY REQUIRE ADDITIONAL COMMENT, IT I S THE PROVISION IN NUMBERED PARAGRAPH 3 THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PHYSICAL �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information *• *•* ; V»Y- ^ J ^ W - 4 - SECURITY FOR THE STORAGE SITES WILL BE THE JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN JUST WHAT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE WORKED OUT IN DUE COURSE FOR GUARDING THE STORAGE S I T E S . SUCH DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE INITIATED BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE MILITARY AUTHORITIES. MINISTERS HOLD THE STRONG VIEW THAT BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR STORAGE, SITES ON CANADIAN TERRITORY IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT SOME CANADIAN PERSONNEL SHARE THESE RESPONSIBILITIES IN SOME MANNER. '7. • THE CONDITIONS WHICH ARE INCLUDED IN OUR NEGOTIATING DRAFT WOULD NOT REQUIRE THAT THE UNITED STATES REVEAL TO CANADIANS THE SECRETS OF CONSTRUCTION OF THE NUCLEAR V/EAPONS WHICH ARE DENIED BY UNITED STATES ATOMIC LEGISLATION. THE CONDITIONS WHICH WE HAVE SUGGESTED DO • HOWEVER PUT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IN THE BEST POSITION TO ARGUE FORCIBLY AS IT WILL HAVE TO DO EVENTUALLY THAT CANADA SHARES REAL RESPONSIBILITY WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONTROL AND.USE OF THESE WEAPONS. 8. . WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL I F YOU COULD OPEN DISCUS- SIONS WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF OUR NEGOTIATING DRAFT, MAKING USE OF THE ARGUMENTS ' PUT FORWARD IN THIS TELEGRAM AND IN RELATED CORRESPONDENCE WHICH I S IN YOUR HANDS. /Lr&£$At£« A 001027 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW16514 Title A name given to the resource CDNW16514 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Continental defence - Atomic capability," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5930, file 50210-F-40, part 4.2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC).