https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/8f1ebbe9673e7814146f8de6b43c1b01.pdf 422a99c4a69a32eff69569aecc11d4d8 PDF Text Text Department of External Affairs CLASSIFIED CM File No* 20-22-TFK-1-3 Subject: FGLITISAL A F F A I R O I ; : T : O I A L SE^U/MTY VdLJOu - To - 10t>(k TASK FORCE OU KIOTAPPIltl POLICY - F3CTE3T1CR CF~D1 FLCIJATS AND DA::A3IAN C F T I D I A L S IN OANAO —¥0Q+II=: T VOLS ACCESSION "NO References i i Related Files CO BOoKo. I ttykmfBfk • — - • -, •• r- j I v- ^ ^ ^ 4 Hi, 1 n o - f i n l a j r ^ P t a t i o n - F r i v i l e t i and 1 mmun i t i as - i n fla na rla - Pnl i no F r a t f l n t i n n ^nrl ' ^ i . ^ ^ n n f l gp.R-p.ps; Hi pi nm-a t i c ,1 ape 8 ? a n t a t i on - Pr i v i l o g o n XL i ~! I O and nf 1 rnmunftia^ - in Ha na Ha f l i p 1 nm.-* t i n. P o r Q r> n n - Prntar{jn g1 TOP O A C C E S S TO I N r O R M A T ON L'ACCES A L-:N- T OlPM | A1ION PAR: B *mer~ 7^L = DATE: /JDATE /J3ATE: ffipL . : ACCESS TO INFftfcMAIIUM1 iL'AGCtSU'lNFORMATIOIl ^mrt*i***"*\ DJHt t»l-o*t-*\ [^CLASSIFIED 1 002411 n �PPR/A. SSGUIN/lhb EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES iiCSHft T.H.V;. Read TO 4 DATE PROM 0* REFERENCE fUlirenc. J.P.A. JO'NFIDENTIAL SECURITY Securite Seguin Oslo Letter 469 of November 3, 1970 November 19, 1970 NUMBER Numiro DOSSIER SUBJEa Svjuf Suggestions on Protection Against Possible AbductLon 22-S-2-21-: ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION psi- The Norwegian proposal is interesting but, in my viav/j does not differ too much fro;,; our own and certainly not enough to warrant, issuing additional instructions to the foreign missions here. 2. are that u ii) The only two points where the Norwegians diff er they stress the importance of avoiding being a.i.one (items 3, 5 and 7); they deal more directly with protection devices: Item 8 - firearms not to be us ad Item 9 - teargas containers could be supplied, on request to MFA, but danger in misuse "double-edged sword" item 10 - sirer. system, supplied, if requested by MFH . 3. Our effort has more value, I feel, in that it deals more directly with what the individual should or should not io with regard to his family^ staff, home, car and strange occurrences (people/parcels/telephony calls). Z?lF~~- 6ct. 407A/BII. 002412 �PPftyT.R.7. Read/cal • • . • . . • • • & • P3I Dossier Journal Circ. 2TFK~ (-3 COfaTIDSHTIAL -,r • • November 27, 1-970 * • Huxabered Letter 469 of November 3, 1)70 from the Canadian Sabassy* Oslo. . - Sorwegiaa aeaorandua of ISeaaures that ql|fct be taken to avoid abduction, etc. of diplomatic personnel* • TOP (?*£*%****¥ viviac . o ^ « ; .. Attached for your attention ie a copy of memorandum bitten to Kr. Head of thia division by * * 3to^.n recording its toncluijiana as to the iaportaat clifferences between the norwegian maiaoranduu and the memorandum that was attached to our circular note PPR-17U. 2. Jfor# Seguin's review suggests that differences between tfce t**o seta of instructions are not very significant. Do you believe, however, that it .*3uld be worthwhile to distribute copies of the iaemo and of the embassy letter to the other members of the group who aet on November 19 to discuss the protection of Canadian personnel abroad 'i .. • . fr. H. W. READ , • Protocol Division i> . • .-- 002413 • �November 27, 1970. CONFIDENTIAL /iS- MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RITCHIE CJU | O o - 2.2 - ' O * - 1 - 5 ^ Security Panel - Protection of Diplomats. - Policy re Mr. Cross* safety, For the panel meeting, I expect three aspects will come up: (a) a situation report on the present status of protection arrangements; (o) contingency planning for heightened protection in the event that Cross* kidnappers are surrounded; (c) long term problems of protection. Situation report. 2. This is not covered in Protocol*s paper sent to the PCO, which deals only with long term planning. I have asked Protocol for rough notes on the present situation. These can be used for an oral report to the panel. 3. The most important aspect of the situation report, from our view point, is the current proposal by DND (concurred in by QPP Director St-Pierre) to cut down protective / arrangements in Montreal. The panel meeting will give us ,y2 an opportunity of airing our views on the subject and of ^ getting support for our position. If the Cross cell is surrounded. 4« Protection. - You agreed yesterday that this question should be raised in the panel. We could propose that the RCMP make an assessment of the heightened protection measures which might be required in the event the Cross kidnappers are located, and discuss their conclusions with DND and External Affairs. The matter would then have to be taken up with Quebec, either at the political level or perhaps more simply on the police network. 002414 �- 2 - CONFIDENTIAL 5. Policy re Cross* .safety. - Perhaps we should seize the opportunity to raise in the panel a related but much more political question: what would the police and the governments do if it were found that the Laporte and Cross cells have merged and were surrounded while holding Cross? Mr. Ernest Cote suggested to me this morning that it might be useful to get an informal reaction from the panel on this subject and perhaps to urge Kr. Gordon Robertson to sound out the PM. Mr. Cote may raise the question if we don*t. He is worried that we might have to face this problem at any moment: we should therefore define our position without delay, kr. Cote personally is in favour of an approach to Cuba to determine whether it would be willing to receive members of the Laporte cell including presumed murderers on the understanding that we would have to ask later for the extradition at least of the latter. Once we had a reply from the Cubans,the PL should presumably discuss the options with Mr. Bourassa. - It may be of course that Mr. Sharp would prefer to discuss the matter himself with the PL, rather than having it raised by Mr. Robertson. Long term planning. 6. To my knowledge Protocol's paper covers this problem well. It contains no assessment of the future level of threat but I suppose that this is up to the RCMP rather than ourselves, 0- '^| C. R. 002415 �— — ^ • I . . . • O Eead/.al . • COHFID^UViO, • PI o35*-;3-77o^-/-j . for Protection for Portuguese kf.-j jk Fore 9 7 On HP l i , , tfee Second 3ecra... 49t tho Portuguese x&bmas? c a l l e d th. - o f Protocol t o r e p e a t an appointment .Or 1*1=3 -uO ..ior t e c a l l Chief of i r e t o o l i n t n e immediate fature* On yaa arranged for the ambassador a t lr>*i3 hrs an >'riday, Jfoveaber 20, Wsam cenfftralag **• s u i t a b i l i t y of t t o i t l a e . and d a t e , £<Ir. SeadN mm .. Lned t h a t tha aa&aaaaior wished t& p. aaa "jprotaction", and o t h e r ...,cta. 2+ 'During the c a l l en & 4 e * of Protocol, tl .tooaaaaaor voafined h i o e e l f to •aqpyaaelflfc hi a. ceeicern rre*« .-ding *** s e c u r i t y af hie. »-say residence and t. o f f i c e of t h e Consul-General i n Montreal. Ite had ae s p e c i f i c tla-kiut i n adad but he thought t h a t he would be s o r e comfortable i f he had . p.; vit-ti«*> guard a t Lin r a •aidence and i f a day-tiiae guard m*> a. . i n the off a t h e Consul-Generil. Tba Chief of-Protocol .*&ree4 t o have tfaeae guards i n s t i t u t e d , • in - )fr*' K*ad a t t e s t e d t h a t »&& aiteraaoit to aw.cuw a o t a t i o o a r y .uuard from the Universal I n v e s t i e ^ i o n agency but t h e agency could not epntemplate i n i t i a t i n g t h e apurd u n t i l t h e following day. I t i s aaaumed t h a t aince thea t h a t a eosimereial guard haa boon on t h e rosidence property frosa 5 P*au t o 7 a.m. d a i l y . • Um '-tilth regard t o the Gonaulato-Ganviral i n j-iontrikd,, flr« Rftac coaaalted Or»-.Preto again on the sarniag of ;-ioad../, :-aveOe^r 2 J , Lth a vO, . m -X..xi-^nX-^. -J,...P' ifee ^..vji- i o r had i t i n niind. t o Hare a r o c n a r c i a l gnard, awaed a&th a aidearsa, o r porfcai>s a member of the Corpa ef Cosaaiasioaalres s t a t i o n e d i a the Consul-General o f f i c e , $r« ftratO *z&8 unable t o l e t mi lead kao^a u n t i l tfovaabar m t h a t tha Aafe* *•* aor had ao c l e a r idea ef t h e ret3ttireoei*t» Sowever, i t becaaa . . . & 002416 �... .... 1 • mm$*m • -lear that at the laaat he did not want a guard ajraad with a la&ehlas gun. I t v*aa theraupoa agreed t&at a ceoRMirclal guardotNiaslag a sidaarsi would ha a l l o y e d . >• On wv-xaber 25, Sarp'e^nt I'O.sridan of «*C« Directorate of the H*£*M»?# was asited to nave th*a guard an tha Portuguese. Conaul-Genaral offfiee ia Jfttetreal i n .iiitutecU • ••• - ' •' . . f. H. W. READ -• Protocol Civiaton . • - • . 1 • 1 . • . ' i • • . • ' . . . , • 7 • •. - 002417 • �GSU/j.R.D. F o w e l l / b e b EXTERNAL AFFAIRS \° PPR Ot REFERENCE Qu r memoranda of November 25 and November 23 Rifirence AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES SECURITY Hcuriti ss DATE November 2 7 , 1970 NUMBER Numero FILE OTTAWA SUBJECT Sujet C R B J Yugoslav Emigre A c t i v i t i e s DIFS-ZTL DOSSIER ZJ7K- 23. ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION FDG POP(Barker) Mr. Roquet Chief of ^Tajk Force fSI FCN GEU(IO) As you a r e aware, we were informed e a r l y t h i s a f t e r n o o n (November 27) by the C o u n s e l l o r of t h e Yugoslav Embassy t h a t t h e Yugoslav Consulate-General i n Toronto r e c e i v e d a n o t h e r anonymous telephone c a l l on Wednesday, November 2 5 , t h i s time from a C r o a t i a n s o u r c e . According t o t h i s source, C r o a t i a n Canadians with USTASHI sympathies a r e planning a d e m o n s t r a t i o n i n f r o n t of t h e C o n s u l a t e General on November 2 9 , t h e r o l e of D r . J e l i c b e i n g s i n g l e d o u t . 2. We understand t h a t , a s a r e s u l t of e a r l i e r i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a u t h o r i t i e s and the Toronto P o l i c e w i l l t a k e s p e c i a l v i g i l a n c e v i s - a - v i s t h e C o n s u l a t e - G e n e r a l i n Toronto a s November 29 a p p r o a c h e s . We would a p p r e c i a t e your informing t h e a p p r o p r i a t e a u t h o r i t i e s of t h i s new i n f o r m a t i o n . Y. d TURNER European D i v i s i o n 002418 Ext. 4 0 7 A / B H . (Admin. Services Diy.l �••- 'DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTERE" DES AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES y IjfM* $tj} f$ J® CONFIDENTIAL PROTECTION OF EMBASSIES FC 3jb~^~TfK-\ The Federal Government's responsibility for the protection of foreign representatives rests with External Affairs. It is External Affairs that organizes the defence of these representatives by alerting local police forces, or by arranging for guard service whenever the need exceeds the capabilities of local police forces. In this it has had advice and cooperation from the R.C.M.P., in particular its intelligence branch, and its communication links with R.C.M.P. regional headquarters across Canada. The R.C.M.P. have also cooperated with local police forces in defining the extent and timing of demonstrations likely to threaten foreign representatives. However, although it has been prepared to "back up" police in Ottawa, the R.C.M.P. has generally adhered strictly to a non-participating role wherever a provincial police force has existed. 2. The Department's own procedures seem to have developed ad hoc with no clear lines of responsibility officially laid down. They have come to require consultation between the geographical division, the Security and Intelligence Liaison Division and Protocol Division with the principal responsibility being exercised by the appropriate geographical division. This division customarily has undertaken to assess the threat against a foreign representative, basing its consideration upon S&IL's report of the estimate obtained from the national security authorities and upon information obtained from its own sources. This assessment, seen in the context of relations between Canada and the country concerned, and influenced by the expected level of reaction against the Canadian mission in the country concerned has formed the basis for a request for action to Protocol Division as the division responsible for liaison with the foreign representative, with local police and with the R.C.M.P. Protocol Division in turn has related the proposed action to that being taken for other foreign representatives, but only to temper, not to countermand, the requests received. 3. In Protocol Division, the choice of procedures has depended on whether the problem was a hostile demonstration or a subversive threat. The first, has required a telephoned or written request to a local police force and a telephone call to the "C" Directorate of the R.C.M.P. The intention has been to provide warning so that local police could exercise their responsibility; the occasion was never .../2 002419 �- 2 - CONFIDENTIAL offered to provide direction as to the action that local police should take, nor was there constitutional justification for the exercise of supervision. For the second, the division has relied upon the R.C.M.P.'s knowledge of the reliability of commercial guard services and its ability to exercise occasional supervision, and the force therefore acted as the Department's agent in arranging for commercial guards to be employed and thereafter in paying for these services and prior to securing reimbursement from departmental funds. A further service provided by the R.C.M.P. in this connection was to inspect the property of foreign representatives and to consult with the representatives themselves regarding the most efficient way of deploying the commercial guards, some of whom are supplied with cars providing radio/telephone with their headquarters or with the police. 4. The system described in the preceding paragraphs has neither strength nor resilience. It operates through channels which are neither clear cut nor automatic. It is shallow in the extreme: once action has been taken the available force has been exhausted. 5. Given a simple demonstration (which does not fall into the hands of the Maoists) of which notice is given by the leaders and which is well organized, then the system will work. Given a hostile demonstration such as that which occurred at the Soviet Embassy in 1967, then the system cannot hope to protect an Embassy, its occupants and its guests, from the threat of harm. 6. The system offers far less efficiency in the face of subversive threats. A casual threat of assassination can be handled by local police for a week or two. After a short time, however, other tasks come to demand priority, and the police have to assume that the threat is over. When they withdraw there is no means at our disposal, except the provision of caretaker-type guards hired commercially, with which to continue protection. 7. Unfortunately, commercial guards are not impressive and do not offer the same assurances as do police or army guards. Accordingly they may not be considered by foreign governments to constitute an appropriate measure of defence. Any failure of a commercial guard is therefore likely to bring down upon us strong international criticism. 8. In considering the direction that future developments might properly take it seems necessary to conclude that for all intents and purposes the day of the honest demonstration has passed. It must also be assumed that, increasingly, foreign representatives are going to have to be guarded against subversive threat, some lightly and for brief periods of time, others fully and for long periods of time. "Foreign representative", for this purpose, includes all diplomats, consular officers (honorary as well as career), and trade representatives, as well as foreign-based members of consulate, embassy and trade commission staffs. .../3 �- 3 - CONFIDENTIAL 9. To meet this situation, and to ensure that Canada's obligations under international law in respect of protection are fully satisfied the following might be done: (a) Demonstrations: (i) Proceed with the legislation that has been under consideration to restrain demonstrators from approaching embassies to the point where damage to property and harm to occupants becomes possible. (ii) Confer with provincial authorities to open the way for the joint interest of all levels of government in protecting foreign representatives to be fully expressed by the response that a demonstration evokes. It would be in the federal interest to work its way into a position where it can request as a matter of right, not favour, that effective measures be taken to safeguard foreign representatives and their properties. (iii) Establish a set of communications procedures which would allow the immediate flow of warning information and the assessment of the likelihood of danger from any demonstration from the national security authorities or from the geographical divisions of External Affairs to local police forces - and vice versa. (iv) Establish within the R.C.M.P. an operations unit which in cooperation with External Affairs would use the communications network, and be responsible for accumulating the experience that would enable effective guidance to be given to local police regarding the appropriate level of response. (b) The Subversive Threat: Kidnapping, Assassination, Bombs: Quite clearly, at the present tine, the R.C.M.P. has not got the strength to assume any large-scale responsibility for the protection of foreign representatives. It is equally clear from the present emergency that the same is to be said for local police, since the army has had to be called in to provide guards for consulates in Montreal. And it is apparent that the problem of providing adequate numbers of guards is a large one: it was estimated, for instance, that to provide guards for the 65 Heads of Mission resident in Ottawa, a battalion of troops would have been required, and even a battalion would not have enabled ...A 002421 �- 4 - CONFIDENTIAL coverage to be provided for the 350 other resident diplomatic officers (who are also entitled to protection). Yet it seems essential to move as rapidly as possible, in months rather than years, to create at least the nucleus of a guard system, preferably trained and administratively controlled by the R.C.M.P. and perhaps drawing some manpower from the Canadian Forces, but available to undertake guarding tasks for foreign representatives at the decision of the R.C.M.P. and/or the Department of External Affairs. The following might be done: (i) Establish a special force of police guards under the operational control of and trained by the R.C.M.P. which could be called upon to provide the appropriate degree of guarding required by a foreign representative anywhere in Canada, up to full caretaker guarding of property and personal bodyguard for the representative. The force would have to be fully mobile - and to have access all across Canada to equipment such as cars equipped with radio transmitters, it would be manned by recruits lacking the educational training or physical capacities normally demanded by the R.C.M.P. but capable of being instructed in defence of persons and property against subversive acts, and mentally capable of withstanding the monotony of watchman duty. Exceptionally, they would be qualified and trained for personal escort duties. (ii) Confer with the provincial authorities to their approval for the operations of such force, and to secure also the high degree tion with local forces that such a mobile would need. secure a special of cooperaforce (iii) Establish a continuing committee manned by the R.C.M.P. and External Affairs to enable the latter to have a say in the use of the special force. The prospect that retributive action might be taken against Canadian representatives abroad, and the Department's continuing responsibilities in the implementation of the Vienna Conventions require it to have a direct voice in the provision of protection to foreign representatives. (iv) Supplement the Canadian Forces bomb disposal squad by requiring the R.C.M.P. to be prepared to deal with bombs, real or suspected, in Ottawa, and perhaps in provincial centres. This would remedy the embarrassing situation where diplomats seeking advice have to be told to inform the police when • • '/5 002422 �- 5 - CONFIDENTIAL they receive suspicious-looking packages, but the police have no expert on their strength and must call upon the Canadian Forces, whose bomb expert may not be available. (v) Establish a procedure for handling "panic" calls from diplomats. 10. In setting out the above suggestions the intent has been to divide the protection work between the local and provincial forces, who would continue to be responsible for the defence of foreign representatives against demonstrations, and the R.C.M.P. who through the creation of a special force would assume the responsibility of defending foreign representatives against subversive, or long-term threat which local police forces have not got the manpower to take on. Local police, however, would retain the responsibility for taking the initial steps to counter an unexpected, emergency threat and, of course, there would be no interference with the duty of the local and provincial police forces to investigate crimes, including terrorism. A subsidiary, but important intention has been to place the management of the federal government's responsibility for the protection of foreign representatives in a law and order context, and consequently lodging it with the federal agency responsible for law and order. �2 tO(X. , 0 - • * . T L - T F K . - / - 3 CONFIDENTIAL November 27, 1970 PROTECTION OF FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES t~ K&**~+.dL4S*. Measures taken since October 5i 1970» Attached is a list of the commercial and other guards (not army) which were providing"caretaker guard service for foreign representatives during October and November, 1970. 2. Aside from making arrangements for these guards, the following action was taken: General: Increased police surveillance for foreign representatives in Ottawa and district, Montreal and Toronto was requested and obtained. Montreal: From October 15, by the decision of the authorities of Province of Quebec, a number of consuls and trade representatives in Montreal were given army guards. At our request the name of the Brazilian Consul-General was added to the list of those chosen by the authorities to receive guards. The list included: Britain, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Italy, Israel, Germany, France and Belgium. The authorities also decided to add the Consuls, or Consulates of Panama, Ecuador in Montreal, and the Consul of Haiti in the city of Quebec. The continuance of the protection by army guard is now under examination. The Quebec authorities have indicated that they are prepared to agree that the army guards be removed from all foreign representatives except those of Britain, the United States and France. A process of consultation with the Embassies of the countries concerned, or with the consular representatives who do not have diplomatic representation in Ottawa, has begun. Initial indications are that the guards on the Israeli/and Japanese representatives /Brazilian in Montreal will have to be continued. . . . X. 002424 �2. Ottawa: On October 9, 1970, a meeting of police authorities from Ottawa and Rockcliffe Park was held and assurance were received as to the cooperation that would be made available in the form of increased patrolling by the mobile patrols normally on duty. The Diplomatic Corps: In negotiations with the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps it has been made clear that the Government recognizes and will meet its obligations to protect foreigh representatives. The Dean was reminded that it is government policy to offer protection to representatives who believe that they have need of it - and this policy has been implemented, as can be seen from the list of guards now on duty. A list of measures of personal protection which representatives might take to increase their security was drawn up and distributed to all foreign representatives in Ottawa and to independent consular representatives outside of Ottawa. Plasticized cards bearing the telephone numbers of the police forces in Ottawa and district was distributed in quantity to all foreign representatives in the National capital. On November 13, the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps was informed that the Government was disposed to offer to foreign representatives, on request, army guards to the extent required by the representatives. The Dean was invited to communicate this information to his colleagues who were to make their wishes known to the department. So far there has been no response to this offer. To this record of acts should be added the work of the R.C.M.P. in providing personal bodyguards for the British High Commissioner and the Brazilian Ambassador, in providing motorized escort service for certain Heads of Mission in transit between Dorval and Ottawa, and detailed surveillance for Heads of Post visiting other centres. The R.C.M.P. has also been burdened with security for such conferences as the recent Canada-U.S.A. meeting on Trade and Economic Affairs, and they have provided caretaker security for the reside«e« of the Italian Embassy residence and on occasion for diplomatic receptions where the guest list seemed to require special activity. Liaison between representatives and the R.C.M.P. has therefore been an important part of the work performed. ... 3 002425 �CONFIDENTIAL 3. It might also be mentioned that there has been liaison with the Vancouver and Toronto police forces in regard to the security of individual consular representatives, in particular those of the United States. �> PROTOCLJDIVISION: LIST OF COMMERCIAL GUARDS ARRANGED FOR EMBASSIES ETC. AND IN EFFECT DUPING OCTOBER - NOVEMBER, L(&) Date of P l a c e C i t y T y p e Commencement * Date Arrangement Terminated * 4 4 , 7 5 7 '*• &c 4M/M/I. 1. Yugoslav Consul General Toronto - 24-hour by Metro Police 2. Israeli Chancery Ottawa - 16-hour Commercial $5./p.h. Feb.1/69 (night hours) OCt. m 70 - 24 hour 3. Israeli Residence Ottawa -24 hour Commercial $5./p.h. Oct. 12/70 4. Australian Trade Commissioner Residence ." Montreal - 24-hour Commercial Brazilian Embassy Residence/Chancery Ottawa -12-hour Commercial $5./p.h. Oct.5/70 -24-hour Oct. 24/70 Oct. 23/70 United States Embassy Residence Ottawa -12-hour Commercial $5./p.h. Oct. 24/70 (Night hours) -14-hour Commercial (Night hours) Nov. 7/70 Nov. 6/70 French Embassy Chancery/Residence Ottawa -12-hour Commercial $5./p..'.. Oct. 24/70 (Night hours) Nov. 7/70 - 14-hour Commercial (Night hours) Nov. 6/70 British High Commission Residence Ottawa -12-hour Commercial $5./p.b. Nov. 3/70 (Night hours) Nov. 7 / 7 0 - 14-hour Commercial (Night hours) Nov. 6/70 /Vov /cho * 5. 6. 7. i r 1 • Dec. 1/68 Oct.9/70 C<X 22 See >t>K J?A 002427 �City Place 8A. British High Commission Ottawa 9. Mexican Embassy Residence Ottawa 10. 10A. 11. Date of Commencement - 24-hour Commercial 12-hour Commercial Daytime $5./p.h. Noon Nov. 8/70 - 12-hour Commercial Night hrs $5./p.h. Amb. content to have 7 PM - 7 AM Nov. 3/70 Noon Nov.8/70 (see Item 10A.) Nov. 8/70 (noon) Ottawa Peruvian Embassy Residence/Chancery Ottawa - 24-hour Commercial British Regional Information Office Quebec - 24-hour guard by 2 men - 12-hr shift Commercial guard Agence Securite Phillips $5./p.h, Nov. 6/70 Details to be confirmed - Probably 24-hr commercial Nov. 4/70 ? 17:00 - 07:00 hrs 14-hr Commercial Nov.21/70 Montreal Portuguese Embassy Residence Ottawa Portuguese Consulate-Gral Residence of Consul Montreal * Nov. 10/70 ? Nov. 4/70 Peruvian Rmbassy Residence/Chancery Brazilian Consulate-Gral Residence of Consul: M. M. Tarisse de Fontoura C6te Ste-Catherine 13. Type Date Arrangement Terminated - 09:00 - 17:00 hrs 8-hr Commercial Guard Nov.25/70 Personal escort by R.C.M.P. from October 24. 002428 �DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PREMISES In recent years there have b een a large number of demonstrations or threats of demonst rations against diplomatic and consular premises in Can ada. For example, during the year September 1968 to Scpte mber 1969 tlie re were approximately 330such incidents: 1 3 in Ottawa, 9 in Toronto, 9 in Montreal, 1 in Vancouver and 1 in Halifax. Most involved fewer tha-n 50 people, but one demonstration in Toronto, in January 1969, involved a pproximately 400 people, and one in August of the same y ear in Ottawa involved approximately 200 people. In 1967, there was a violent demonstration at the Soviet Emb assy in Ottawa and in that same year and the following yea r there were violent demonstrations at the Consulate General of Yugoslavia in • • M H O i m , a furth.c m .WW front of the Soviet Em s'y in Qtta pan SI mfflr^P^^u i 1d i n g , In consequence oP th 1 s _ Ambassador edged a strong protest with the Can a d i an Cove rnment. For some time tlie Department of External Affairs has been pr e s s i ng for mo re c f fect ive 1e gi s1 at ion to protect diplomat ic and consular premises and, in part lcui ai , it lias been suggested that legislation analogous to that i n force in the United States be adopted. That legi si at ion makes it an offence for persons to congrega te within 500 feet of diplomatic and consular premis es and to refuse to disperse when ordered to do so by the law enforcement authorities. The legis1 at i on also makes it an offence for persons to d i splay , wi thin 50 0 feet of diplomatic and consular prem i ses, flags, banners, placards or devices intended to insult foreign governments. Such legis1 at ion would be of considerable assistance in disc ha r g ing one of t he obligations assumed by Canada in consequence of rati fying the Vienna Convention on Dip 1omati c Re 1 ati ons. Section 2 2.2 of that Convention provides: "The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises o ( the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity." At the present t i me provision s of the C rIm i n a 1 Co de, particularly those r e1 a ti ng to u n awful ass emb1i es 1 and causing disturbances, are relied upo n in coping wi th these demonstrations. tn acco rdance wit h the usua1 practice of 1 eav i n p t. he en 17rcement of t h e p r o v i sions of the Criminal Code to provincial and municip al authori t i e s , it has becn those po1 i ce aut hor i ties who have heen 1 e ft toi th the primary burden of coping with these de monst rat i ons . It. is cons ide red that demonstrations directed a t diplomat ic an d consular premises should be the primary concern o f the Fedc ra1 Government because they direct ly affect Can ad a ' s re 1 at i onsli i ps with foreign cour. trie?. In the c i reurns atn c e s , the task of dealing with these demonstrati ons shou1d b e a ssumed by the Federal Government acting thro ugh the R. C M . ro1 ice. If necessary, interim arrangement s could be made w i th I o c a I Iau enforcement authorities to make thei r po 1ice resources available to assist the R.C.M. Police, b ut th c basic and ultimate responsibility should rest with rhe Federal author i t ies. �LOG PPR C R . FILE SECRET la 30 novenbre 1970. POP (C. Roquet) Protection das representants strangers. PDM 20-22-TF&-1-3 La panel aur la security a diaeuta la 27 novembre da la protection dea representants Strangers au Canada* Las raetabres du panel avaient pris connaissance da votre document a ea sujet. FLE (Beesley) D^pfrrfttrfrffftg. 2. lis oat reeoBBU as particulier l'iraportance da prendre das mesures en ea qui concerne las demonstrations devant das loeaux diplornatiques at consulaires (paragraphs 9(a)l da votra document). Cette question avait d«5ja ste soulert-3 dans un aeaoire du 20 novembre souols, par la Comite1 sur 1*Ordre public (law and order), au Cocdte du Cabinet sur las Priorites at la Planification {pages 119 et 12, copie joints). La panel s'est dit d'accord que l OA devrait proceder iaiaedlateraent A Is redaction d 9 uns legislation pots* empecner les deaoastrateure d'epprochar dee loeaux diplornatiques at consulaires. Le ministere de la Justice etait 1'avis r cette redaction pourrait aa faire rapidement. Zl a demancependant de recevoir, de notre minist&re, un document indleuant aussi preciseoent que possible ce que nous voudrione voir inclure dans use telle legislation, sous prenons pour acquis qua votre direction s'occupera de rediger ee document, avec l'aida de la direction juridique, si vous le souhaitea. 3* Soit dit ea passant, certains membres du panel se sont demandse qui verrsit a faire appliquer cette legislation, par exemple a Montreal. Serait-ce la rosponaiblllte de la police an niveau municipal-provincial? 4. Lee autres recommendations raises de l'avant dans votre paragrapbe 9(a) a9eat pee fait lfobjet d'une discussion detaillee ni de decisions. On a pris pour acquis qu'il fallait d'abord s'interesser a la nouvelle legislation et qua lee entree mesures pourraient suivre. 002430 �. 2 - SECRET Protection contre le terroriame. 5. Le panel s'est aussi interesse aux mesures proposes dans votre paragraphs 9(b)l, en vue da la creation d'un corps special de gardes« Sana formuler una opinion finale a ce sujet, mi s'est dit d'avis que notre ministlre devrait elaborer un projet plus precis a cet egard, de concert avec la Gendarmerie Royale, le ministere de la Justice, etc. 6* On s'est interroge sur les aspects legislatlfs possibles de la creation d'un tol corps. Aurait-il besoin d'une autorite legislative specials pour exercer des pouvoirs de police?(aia poserait-il des probl&r . s ie jurldictlon en rapport avec la police provincials et lunielpals? C'est un aspect qu'il faudrait explorer. 7. De la part de la Gendarmerie et des forces ermees, 11 s'est manifests une certaine confusion quant aux taches qui seraient assignees a un tel corps. S'il n*6tait utilise qu'en temps ue menace ou de crise, quclles seraient ses fonctiona en temps normal? Si on 1'etabliseait & un niveau vlsant uniquement les besoins noraaux, ce corps n'aurait d»autre part aucune capacite da reserve sur laquelle on puisse compter en cas de menace exceptionnelie. 3. Une autre idee, mise de l'avant dans un autre contexte, pourrait peut-etre avoir certains liens avec votre proposition d'un corps de gardes. II s'aglrait de faire des arrangements permanents pour la protection de ministres Canadians an engageant des gardes du corps qui feraient partie du Cabinet des ministres en questions* Cette idle, mise de l'avant soit par lea forces annees ou le Cabinet du Premier Ministre, pourrait etre evoquee dans le contexte de vos plans Sour un corps de gardes. Je note aussi en passant qu'un mamre du Conseil Prive s'est demande si les reserves des forces annees ne pourraient pas etre utilisees pour fins de protection. 9* Les autres propositions mises ds l'avant dans votre paragraphs 9(b) ne furent pas discut£es direct©cent. On a pris pour acquis que la proposition 9(b)l representalt da toute facon le premier paa a faire* Soit dit en passant, pour ce qui est dea menaces de bombea, mentlonnees dans votre paragraphe 9(b)4, le representant dea forces armSes a affirme que dee experts des forces armaes aont diaponiblea a eet egard partout au Canada ot 11 se trouve des bureaux des gouvernements etrangers. . ./3 �• • - • , . - . mm - 3- • 10. J'espere que ces indications vous permettront d'aborder immediatement le travail de mise en oeuvre* • 11* L'eaaentiel de ces renseignements a ete communique par telephoneftM. Read de votre directionft15 h 30 le 30 novembre* •• C . R» • • • • . 002432 �POP/C.Roquet/mk EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES MEMORANDUM TO FILE FROM 0* Mr. Roquet (POP - Task Force) REFERENCE SECURITY StatrM RESTRICTED DATE December 2, 1970 0930 NUMBER Numero Refirence DOSSIER SUBJECT Protection of Foreign Diplomats in Canada Germans 20-22-TFK-1-3 MISSION ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Mr. Read of Protocol informed me that his division would ask the RCMP to assess whether the risk to German diplomats in Canada had increased, following the kidnapping of a German diplomat in Spain. If it has, Protocol would inform the German Embassy and ask whether it wished to see reinstated some of the protective measures recently terminated at German request. C. Roq Ext. 4 0 7 A / B U . (Admin. Services Div.) 002433 �PPR/J^{.0ot(?/ms 10-12 -IF K- !-3 cci PDM POP (Task Force) iS V\SL2ZxZsC^ •-' Ottawa, ieoaaber 3 , 1970. -rtsaersil i k r e , Xale, vri.il caafira tne iftforasatloa wfcica I ^uve on 1 to Mfar« BSRSS OI" your upemtiaag Contre Cailastag our tele,-»aae eoavarcatiafi o&rlier %h&t day on tae subject of the proposed iri.Utciro.wal of ^nasid forces &u&rd fJrwa foreign p<ffieee aad foreign VIF'o i n MbHaxeal* •-•rciTiUji to tne ifP iffla vIP coda bre&kdown attached t o aeaaatfl --X tf&3 ?l/0??4*~ x7 7^ vnltb. ,.*s referred to ua by toe Lxjlicisor *jea«r«*l*a ;>f£ic<a, 1 iaforaeu <-or* -ieuan, c»a i n s t r u c t i o n froa n?y ^ u t r i o r i t i e s , tn&t t a i s i-eparfcueat, teid ao objection to tha proposed wi-j.tKin.wal y£ Um jroteetiow t a s k s , aaeept i a respect of tea CbUautai * • a - ffrlmeft, a r e a l , p i m ~ - • X..X •••.. r .)., 3657 - 4 1*9 ^JooleifeJd, ifaneil, iio* 10 -juatsuoa fefebe, .'o^anase wct&sul, 365 i»adfera - t r e a t , ttteftaeaaJt* iO*30 m fetosil|a& .-aaa.«KiJdor (should be Consul General) 9";- Sate -te nitfljarlae, 'oatra&l* <»*47 - orabeu, aoaeal of l a m e l * 1555 afo'^rc^or * t r e a t , io£rtre*l* *../2 Lt* uofi. . » i.are, Vice tri-daf af tiie defease .»t-ff, . "9jte.rta©at of jjatiooul Defence, SfciwdLta t o r e e s iisa&itf&rttjrs, 002434 X �. . •• • . . p- - • » - ale* 471 - consulate cf iiwitserliiid, 1575 eure&or &tf*et» rfeatreal, >'••%• Ae I iudla&tau to -d** JAeaeh, U4* eoaatiwence i s b&ged on the understanding %tmX the aces mobile patrols will .* ecatinued* *e ;tave <uleo rated that protection t&aks will be retained ia r&ape>ct of trance, the United Kingdom and the United staples* Bra olnoerely, J M. Cote Jtiiaf of Protocol* 002435 �Defence and International Affairs/Defense et affairs internationales 002436 �Defence and International Affairs/Defense et affairs internationales 002437 �! Defence and International Affairs/Defense et affairs internationales 002438 �Defence and International Affairs/Defense et affairs internationales 002439 �TFK-I~ZL 1 ~<s J- m KJ i. X : .; O'O_* ; ^i'0i.-- ; »-J V-- «^. iwciw. O CAJLLCL ' O <JilL.ll. ^ . 0 _ _ w - i ; O i ' 'Ci- .-__ V^-i* 0 O U U.lu iVIoii Oloo • iU..iO ;0 • K J + I K / J ^ oO « L i i O j . ^ c i —< d HlUCOi c i /ion i i O J-CI _..U-Oabc; o.. >. . j - i l l ^ u d O l > i-l"e d oOl/v .: _L 0 C U_' O C~ - . oJ_ J_ 3 O^cuCOIO;"^ u ^0*i ^iOciiO -J C cii _L*i Ud t> COi.i Oi ' O . 1 O 4 . U C 1 , CT' - J d w i ^ -t O • < W m _;. v i KJ ^ ^ _ . ^ O _ «. '.„. „ O- _i.v CiuUSH 002440 �GCO/J.D. P u d d i n g t o n / e l 7 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS PXP xl: XXX, Pd.X:.. {/ O ^7 TO PS^-tMr. A.D. Rowe) s ™ RESTRICTED GCO PROM 0. December 1 6 , 1970 NUMBER Numero REFERENCE Reference FILE _ P e r s o n a l P r o t e c t i o n of Mr. J . R . C r o s s ' s Daughter: Mrs. Susan V e r t e s » Th;ia-J TT w4£? On Decanber 9 the question of the possible need for some form of personal protection for Mrs. Susan Vertes.,when she returned to Montreal on December 11, was raised with Deputy Commissioner Carriere of the RCMP. The following day Mr. Carriere telephoned to say that it was not the responsibility of the RCMP to provide such protection as this is a matter for the local police to handle. Apparently on the basis of present information the authorities doubt if any protection was needed. However, he indicated that the subject had been raised with Mr. St. Pierre of the QPp who in turn said he would be in touch with the police of Ville St Laurent where Mrs. Vertes lived to see what, if any, arrangements could be made for such things as perhaps increased police patrols in the area of her home. LC Ext. 4 0 7 A / B I I . (Admin. Services Div.) ^JUTL F(7- 1 - 3 ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION O &_<XdxL OTTAWA SUBJECT Sujet 7>2J^ <F 002441 �2^j-* i .TFK I ~ ¥ Jt,. •• " " <: . U w ^ d i & • < " T. . * ( . 3*-U •• ^. ZJb<2 Uv4e-^Oo - . Af.xi. " &^^ (jSku^_ \ ^ »• \1cJ^wO^ . a. n ^ U pp\ or U^-Po^Go. OJ.XI. <o 'P.M. vCCL. ST l W ^ z^.xO jiv. 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For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00156 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy - Protection of Diplomats and Canadian Officials in Canada - Part 2 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 26-Nov-70 to 16-Dec-70 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Policy - Protection of Diplomats and Canadian Officials in Canada, RG25, vol. 25742, 20-22-TFK-1-3, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Entire File Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en