https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e27dae0dea7816b954cf68ca35676172.pdf 1b685e301b8ffc99b84bc599be0888ce PDF Text Text 20-22-TFK-12 File Na Dossier Volume / Frnm-na '/0(b0\ CLASSIFIED Tn.A ?C_ m f VOLS fission-HO: CLASSIFIE .-•N'TSfJ m x on en TITLE—TTRE: &>» POLITICAL AFFAIRS INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORCE ON KIDN. WAR MEASURES ACT Retention period-Penode de retention m EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES ET COMMERCE EXTERIEUR CANADA �(^J^ I ^o - 1 2 - T H < ~ I TH%T L/fS>r <,k \j rx:Kictf oi (LP NOTE FOR MR. SHARP FROM ^HR R.C.M M.P. ON JURISDICTION IN CROSS KIDNAPPING- AMD COOPERATION BETWEEN POLICE 7QRCE3 ' (fts ?***.<> A% •v- l" IA t Z'ZZ CROSS KIDNAPPING IS AN OFFENCE UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE 07 CANADA. ALTHOUGH A FEDER/.L STATUTE, RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENFORCING THE CRIMINAL CODE REST? ENTIRELY WITH THP PROVINCIAL, MINISTERS O1-1 JUSTICE OP ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND THE PROVINCIAL AMR MUNICIPAL POLICE FORCES UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION. AS AS. CROSS WAS KIDNAPPED IN "''ONTREAL, -HE MONTREAL ci m , / POLICE HAS PRIMARY JURISDICTION IN THE IfP/vSTIG AP'T0"'1. 'PA ' PAR O-' THE r" 'SEE SITUATION PROVINCE OE '.-' ' r-'E4 nT ... -,. •• . „ T .. . .... (P,MT'<'"1 TVER |V., rn- "' POPS fPT INCrgfc"- '.ip:/\g "X 4 ^fc"n. THE QUEBEC 7.i : IR^AL ~ :; Pi rn T»; gis.; n ..;..- oggjpg ;\ J r GIVING gsEHEC A;-':' "• -pi •')()(• r ' •• ' ;.:T' ~... A : . ) /' -'E"' I ap: ' EA ,,,r -\P '-"'4: FOLIC1 'EN AS ,; " T E~. ••I-:- :..•! -.7. -.; rrfr i yr'v ACT"!" r, "kEA r A Oi.R. L:-' J" ,^;r-7gg -M;.-- TD/\[ .• .• '".piHgH T A'"":-- • q TNV^'S^IGATINI Tr,"RR0R13 '.if ,;-"- ' ip-UPC POLAPE FORCE AND THE P'T^C''" ' ^PE.°. * P-P.AP KCES IN O'FEBEC (THIS ."-'S ON PUFLIC ^I-HRES AND STRATEGIC P"TR'Tr- i: v, -; POSSIBLE ^""'R INV ^T1 •• '' 'P'-P • ;MiRCfc COMPLETE PALLED ON THE CANADIAN V ARMED FORCES A"- TARE N THE '•? 44- T 'PLEA' NTA'nT^4 °~ PUBLIC ORDER P.p. .VIST A PHx OTR;M"fOi T "'"[: FEDERAL JOVERNMENT HAS, IN TU v Er AND OTHER SUBVERSIVE ACT- �WITH THE PROVINCIAL MINISTERS OF JUSTICE OP ATTORNEYS GENERAL AMD THE PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL POLICE FORCES UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION. AS RE. ZHCSS WAS KIDNAPPED IN MONTREAL, THE MONTREAL CITY POLICE HAS PRIMARY JURISDICTION IN THE INVESTIGATION. BECAUSE O1'1 THE TENSE SITUATION IN THE ,, PROVINCE OF OUEBEC BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC ORDER RE'A'JLA-"r "' ,,rT,... .T.... ,: , UNDER THE WAR MEASURES ACT, THE QUEBEC fi PROVISION IN THE OUEBEC POLICE ACT GIVING THE DIRECTOR GENERAL rP THE OUEBEC ? T U E FORCE COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE MOPE THAU ^00 POI r'*T' 'A^RCES IN OUEBEC (THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THF ^.C.S.P.) APR HR CALLED ON THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES TO TAi:E "VER GUAR! •STIES ON PUBLIC FIGURES AND STRATEGIC POINTS IS ^RDER T^ FFLEASF A3 MANY POLICEMEN AS POSSIBLE f?OR INVESTIGATIONAL DUTIES, THE ^ESPPlNSfrflLITY VOR INVESTIGATING TERRORIST. X / ACTIVITIES IN QUEBEC IS TRAT OF THE OUEBEC POLICE FORCE AND THE VARIOUS MUNICIPAL POLICE FORCES. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS, OE COURSE, A GREAT INTEREST IN THESE AND OTHER SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES THEREFORE THE R.C.M.P., AS THE FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE, FULLY COOPERATES WITH THESE POLICE FORCES IN THE INVESTIGATION ••<•• TERRORIST "ACTS BUT, UNDER OUR SYSTEM, THE R.C.M.P. HAS fiPAP" TED k. '• 1: LY J^P LEGAL CONTROL OVER THE DIRECTION_OF THE INVESTIGA- ALL IT CAN DO, AND THIS IS BEING DONE, IS LEND THE A PAP ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE IN THE CRIMINAL PART OA THE INVESTIGA- 4 T : ' P'HfcRR 4EOUESTED TO DO SO AND ALSO EXPLOIT TO THE FULLEST EXr'RNT ITS INFORMATION ~;APnHERING FACILITIES MAKING THE PRODUCT • • • • A 011141 �- 2 AVAILABLE TO THE OTHER POLICE FORCES FOR FOLLOW-UP INVESTIGATION AND ASSISTING, WHEN REQUESTED, IN THIS FOLLOW-UP. ALL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FACILITIES WHICH CAN BE OF SERVICE ARE BEING UTILIZED TO THE FULLEST EXTENT BY THE R.C.M.P. IN SUPPORT OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATION AND FRIENDLY AGENCIES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE LENT THEIR FULLEST SUPPORT WHENEVER QUERIED REGARDING A PARTICULAR DEVELOPMENT. 4- -.-• I I• •A - \ A fc \ 011142 �Notes on Rumours of War 1. Saulnirr was heartless. He razed slums but didnt provide alternatives. 2. Saulnier had the ear of the P.M. (Trudeau). 3. Like Parliamentary Cabinet, the Montreal Executive Committee meets in private (and until late 1970 was chaired by Saulnier). R. Saulnier's press comference of 11.X.70 condemned "clearly subversive activities of the CYC" funded by the "internationale" as well as by the federal government. CYC became the scape goat in view of a police strike and concurrent taxi violence. (N.B. Police demonstrations of October, 1969) 5. November, 1969» Saulnier testified before the House of Commons hearings on the CYC. He disclosed the FLQ "three point plan" which he already disclosed to the P.M. in one letter, two phone calls, and a personal encounter. were (l) demonstration, (2) bombings, and (3) kidnappings. 6. The three points (4) was assassinations. Significance of above events (1969) was that it coloured Saulnier's £rame of mind. He had furthermore been subjected to t nervous breakdown in 1968. He requested that "all available troops" be sent to Montreal. 7.On the initiateve of the Montreal police forces in most cases, there was much exchange among federal and provincial authorities "to devise a contingency plan for these circumstances." 8. Bourassa's defence of the invocation of the act was based soley on his understaning of the three or four point FLQ plan. 011143 �9. N.B. Michel Cote, Montreal City Attorney, who was to become "the most important behomd-the-scenes figure in pressing Montreal's insistence on invocation of the WMA." (Source of this postulation is Brian Stewart, City Hall columnist of the Montreal Gazette.) 10. C6te's three point plan presented to the Parliamentary Committee was taken from Valliere's "Revolutionary Strategy and the Role of the Avant-Garde: (a). Radicalize exisisting social agitation. (b). Organize exploited classes on a vast scale. (c). public utilitie Promote popular armed insurrection and occupation of factories, schools, etc. (N.B. 'Quebec Court of Appeals had already labelled Valliere's document as seditious.) 11. This three point plan did not correspond to Bourassa's on overleaf. Ergo, the defence of the invocation put forward by Bourassa and Raymond Garneau (Quebec Minister of Finance) was without substance. 011144 �W Assessment of Threat 3.XI.70 EACSte 1. Assessment was made in conjunction with Security Services Branch of the RCMP; It was shown to St. Aubin and to St. Pierre who*: comfirmed the facts but changed the emphasis on idealogy. 2. July, 1970, SS.RCMP made a report on subversive threats in Canada: there was a tiny minority of real revolutionaries in a wider field of discontents (still in the minority) ; plus an evaluation of 13 Quebec organizations. 3. SS.RCMP report went to Cabinet during August, but wasnt considered in detail until after the Cross kidnapping. 4. N.B. There was a Cabinet Study on Law and 6rder in July, 1970. The Secretariat made a list of major forces which threatened. 5. Summary of RCMP report: (a). RCMP figured there were about 100 activists before 5.X.70 concentrated in Montreal, Hull, Shawinigan, St. Maurice, and Alma. (b). A 1964 FLQ document projected kidnapping plans like those of 1970. (c). SS evaluation aws that foreign influence had doubtless had an important effect on their separatist aims. (d) Relied on Morf's understanding of immatmrity, tendency to violence, impatience, lack of organization. 6. October 13th, Montreal Police believed student groups would take to the streets; even a horn-blowing signal had been arranged for 15.X at 1500 to signal rebellion at 1900. Assessment is that uprsing might well have taken place. 7. It was offset by (a) the army, and (b) the Public Order Regulations 011145 �which enabled the authorities to dislocate command structures operating openly through mass communication media, to send terrorists underground, to cool the students and to obtain intelligence on terrorist activities. 8. (a). SS.RCMP assessment of FL3 Likelihood of frther kidnappings or assassinations (probably latter since they were easier). (N.B. New leaders were being found) (b). Would probably remain underground, assuming that Cross would not be found. (c). Would probably continue war of nerves: bomb scares, etc. (d). Would try to ridicule Pulbic Order Regulations and Armed Forces by using "non activists" lie Ryan. (e), Eventual resumption of real bombings and terrorism. (f). Attempt to produce an Anglo-Saxon backlash. 011146 �c — V ~ ^ .&y f %yLJ ACZZ ^-AJ AI / ,.,„. c„y R UA 4 011147 �-. "jjiA JALU y" (rTfaJ tf\*y*% fl^f 011148 �: cQ^^y/ y/ ^ /('-£C^ x-* •"^ ^ ''l 'A WMA 1. Blanket legislation drafet August, 1914 (patterned on Britian's Defence of the Realm Act). 2. Borden couldnt decide specifically what powers her required. Bill of Rights does not apply to WMA except since I960, when review procedure on motion of 10 M.P.s was added as a feature of the Bill of Rights. 3. It has been invoked September 1, 1939 and October 16, 1970. 4. Although it had not been intended as permanent legislation (cf. British precedent) it was not cancelled after 1914* repealed. After 1945» the powers were terminated but not Annual secial legislation extended the powers for purpose of orderly recomstruction ("limitation" initiated by Minister of Justice St Laurent). 5. British WWII legislation was extended annually for three years. The Emergency Powers Ret of 1939 was repealed in the U.K. in 1959. 6. 1920 there was a Svpreme Court decision to strike down an order in council under the WMA. Nevertheless, both the Supreme Court and the Judiciary Committee of the Privy Council consider that invocation is a matter of statesmanship, and that Parliament is the prop er authority to review the exercise of the act. 7. In 1970 the act was used to ensure secrecy, though it was intended to support military and not police action. When secrecy was no longer necessary, it was possible to enact replacement legislation. 011149 �_ -c uy^*i y)— <<s~*y £¥*' .... 17 C EoT LA P O S S I R I L I T E D ONE PLUS GRANDE DETERIORATION DE LA SITUATION. JE N AI PAS FAIT APPEL A L ARMEE SAMEDI S O I R . JE N AI PAS RAIT APPEL ARX MESURES DE GUERRE, SAMEDI SOIR OU DIMANCHER. RAI3 J AI FAIT CE QUE JE CONSIDERAIS COMME NORMAL DANS LES CIRCONSTANCES, CEST- A-DIRE DE COMMUN IQUER AVEC LE PREMIER MINISTRE DP' CANADA, DONT C ETAIT LA J L R 1 D I C T I O N , DE VOIR A CE QUE L ARRLE SOIT P I S P 0 N I 3 L E , QUE L APPLICATION DES MESURES DE GUERRE SOIT DISP0NI3LE. IL AURAIT PU ARRIVES, S I NOUS AVIONS RLTRORVR MM. CROSS ET LAPORTE DANS L E D Q S E L C U E D HEURES QUI CRT S U I V I , QUE NORS N AYONS JAMAIS BE50IN NI DL L UN, NIL DE L A -TRE. SALS JE PERSE QU IL ETAIT NORMAL, QU IL ETAIT TOUT 3 IMPLEMENT ERE QUESTION DE RON SENS QUE LE PREMIER MINISTRE DU QUEBEC, DANS LE RET ET DANS L INTENT ION DE PROTEGER LA POPULATION Au QUEBEC, DEMANDE AU PREMIER MINISTRE DU CANADA DE TENIR D I S P 0 N I 3 L E 3 DERX ELEMENTS, L ARMEE LT LES MESURES DE GUERRE, QUI POUVAIENT CQNTRI3UER A LA SOLUTION'. QU EST-CE QU IL Y A D ANORMAL DANS CETTE QUESTION, D AUTANT FLRS RUE J AI PROUB TAMTOT NOTRE INTENTION DE NEGOCIER PAR LA NOMINATION RE M. DEMERS ET PAR LES OFFRES QUE NOUS AVONS F A I T E S ? AUTRE QUESTION, M. LE PRESIDENT. QUELLE.A ETE L TENEUR DES NEGOCIATIONS ENTRE ME LEMIEUX ET ME RRMRRS? ILS SE SONT RENCONTRES A PLUSIEURS R E P R I S E S . JE CHOIR CUE J AI FiEPONDU 011150 �.... 16 PARTIELLEMENT A CETTE QUESTION TANTOT . ILS ONT DISCUTE DE FIFFERENTES FORMLLES POUR LE SAUF-CONDU1T AUX RAVISSEURS DE M. LAPORTE ET DE M. CROSS. ILS ONT CONCLU, ET LE GOUVERNEMENT A CONCLU, M. DEMERS A CONCLU, QUE CETTE NEGOCIATION DEVAIT ABOUT IR DE LA FACRN QU ELLE A ABOUT I , C EST-A-DIRE QUE M. LEMIEUX DISAIT PAR LE COMMUNIQUE QUE NOUS AVONS SOUMIS, P U I S UNE CHOSE A ME DEMERS ET EN DISAIT UNE AUTRE •• • A LA TELEVISION ET QUE CELA F A I S A I T QUAND MEME QUATRE JOURS QUE M. LAPORTE AVAIT ETE ENLEVE. QU EST VENU FAIRE ME LALONDR , LE CONSEILLER SPECIAL DE M. TRUDEAU, A QUEBEC LE A L EMPLOI DU GOUVERNEMENT Du CANADA, 16 0CT03RR? ME LALONDE EST IL N EST FAS A L EMPLOI AZ GUA- TEMALA OU DU BASUTOLAND. NE 3GMMEb-N0A5 PAR CANAD1ENS, RR F A I SONS-NOUS PAS PARTIE DU CANADA? QU Y A - T - I L D ANORMAL, ALORS QU IL Y AVAIT UN PARTAGE DE J U R I D I C T I O N , A CE QU EN MEMBRE OU UN CCRSE1LLEF, DU GOUVERNEMENT FEDREAL SOIT PRESENT AU QUEBEC? C EST BEAU DE POSER LA QUESTION, MAIS QU Y A - T - I L D INSOLITE ALORS QUE NOUS REV IONS C0LLA30RER? AUTRE QUESTION: QUELLES PRESSJRA^JLT CONTREPRESSIONS ONT EXERCE, A CE MOMENT, SLR LE CABINET LES CORPS DE P O L I C E , LES GOUVERNEMENTS DE MONTREAL ET D OTTAWA ET DIVERSES PERSONNALITES DU QUEBEC? 011151 �....19 COMME JE L AI DIT AU DEBUT, C ETAIT UNE DECISION EXTREMEMENT LOURDE DE CONSEQUENCES. C ETAIT PEUT-ETRE LA D E C I SION LA PLUS LOURDE DE CONSEQUENCES QU UN GOUVERNEMENT AIT EU A PRENDRE. NOUS AVONS ECOUTE LE FORCES DE P O L I C E , NOUS AVONS D I S CUTE AVEC LE GOUVERNEMENT FEDERAL, AVEC LES AUTHORITES DE MONTREAL, ET AVEC LES TENANTS DE DIFFERENTES THESES, MAIS C EST NOUS QUI AVONS DECIDE. C EST LE GOUVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC QUI A PRIS LA D E C I SION, PARCE QUE C EST SEULEMENT LUI QUI POUVAIT LE FAIRE DANS LES CIRCONSTANCES ET PARCE QUE C EST LUI QUI ETAIT LE PLUS DIRECTEMENT IMPLIQUE, ALORS QUE LA V IE D UN COLLEGUE ETAIT EN J E U . DANS DE TELLES CIRCONSTANCES, LE CHEF DU GOUVERNEMENT OU SES MINISTRES DOIVENT-ILS SE TENIR DANS UNE TOUR D IVOIRE? N EST-CE PAS PRECISEMENT LE MOMENT OU NOUS DEVONS ETRE PRETS A DIALOGUER, SANS QUE NOS DECISION^ SOIENT INFLUENCEES D UNE FACON INDE PAR CEUX AVEC QUI NOUS DIALOGUONS? C EST CE QUE NOUS AVONS F A I T . NOUS AVONS DISCUTE ENTRE NOUS, A PLUSIEURS R E P R I S E S , TOUS LES A S PECTS ET TOUTES LES IMPLICATIONS. NOUS AVONS DISCUTE AVEC D AUTRES NIVEAUX DE GOUVERNEMENT. NOUS NOUS SOMMES FAIT DONNER DES RAPPORTS PAR LES DIRECTORS DE POLICE QUI AVAIENT EU A COMBATTRE, DEPUIS DE TRES NOMBREUSES ANNEES. NOUS AVONS RRIS LA DECISION QUI NOUS EST APPARUE LA PLUS CONFORME A L INTERET PUBLIC, A L INTERET DES QUEBECOJ 011152 �....20 EN TENANT COMPTE QU IL F A L L A I T , PAR TOUS LES MOYENS LEG IT I R E S , SAU- VER LA VIE DE MM. CROSS ET LAPORTE, SANS OUVRIR LA VOIE A L ANARC H I E , PARCE QUE C EST NOUS QUI AURIONS ETE CONSIDERES COMME LES RESPONSABLES. ON POSE D AUTRES QUESTIONS: QUEL A ETE L EFFET SUR LE CABINET DE LA PERTE DE LA TRACE DE PAUL ROSE? EVIDEMMENT, C EST UNE QUESTION QUI RELEVE DES FORCES P O L I C I E R E S . NOUS N ET IONS PAS AU COURANT DES MOINDRES DETAILS DES AClIONS DES FORCES POLICIERES MAIS NOUS AVONS P R I S LES DECISIONS A LA LPPMIERE DE TOUTES LES MATIONS QUI NOUS AVAIENT ETE BORISES ET PAR LLS FORCES INFOn-. POLICIERES ET PAR D AUTRES PERSONNES QUI POUVAIENT NOUS INFORMER EN CONNAISSANCE DE CAUSE. M. LEGER: P U I S - J E POSER UNE QUESTION AU PREMIER MINISTRE? M. BOURASSE: OUI M. LEGER: VOUS AVEZ D I T , M. LE PREMIER MINISTRE, QUE C EST LE GOUVERNEMENT PROVINCIAL GUI A P R I S LA DECISION, MERE APRES AVOIR ETE CONSULTE PAR LA VILLE DE MONTREAL ET LES AUTRES PERSONNES. COMMENT^ _SE F A IT - _IL _Q L E J - A V ILLE J ) E MO N T R E A L_ A1T JLNVO Y E SA LETTRE LA VIELLE DE CELLE DU GOUVERNEMENT RE LA PROVINCE DE QUEBEC 011153 �~Xi. a a a a c. 1 M. BOUVASSA: VOUS AVEZ DEJA POSE CETTE QUESTION-LA ET J ETA IS POUR Y VENIR DURANT LA RERIODE DES RPR ST JONS. IL EST EVIDENT QUE C EST L ACTION DU GOUVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC QUI ETAIT DETERMINATE. LA VILLE DE MONTREAL OU D AUTRES VILLES DE LA PROVINCE D QUEBEC OU D AUTRES INSTITUTIONS POUVAIENT ENVOYER DES LETTRES AU GOUVERNEMENT FEDERAL-D AlLLEURS, IL EN A RECU UN NOMBER EONSIDERABLEMAIS C EST LORSQUE LE GOUVERNEMENT DR QUEBEC A DECIDE DE FIXER UN DELAI DE SIX HEURES, C EST AUPRES LE .JERM£.-D£-^E~DE!:A-r QUE AES"MESURES DE QUERRE ONT ETE ADOPTEES. C EST LA LA PREUVE QUE C EST ROUS QUI AVIONS L ACTION DETERM INANTE , PUISQUE C EST*SEULEMENT AU TERME DU DEL5 APRES TROIS HEURES, DE NEUF HERES A TROIS HEURES, QUE L ACTION DU GOUVERNEMENT FEDERAL A ETE ENTREPRISE. JE L AI DIT A PLUSIERS REPRISES: SI LES RAVISSEURS DE M. LAPORTE AVAIENT ACCEPTE NOS OFFRES DE SAUF-CONDUITS, D AVION DISPONIBLE, DE LIBERATION CCRD IT IONNELLE POUR LES CINQ DETENUS, LA LOI DEo MESURES DE GUERRE N AURAIT PAS ETE APPLIQUEE, PEUT-ETRE AURAIT-1L FALLU L APPLIQ'ER A BREVE ECHEANCE, K.«.«!f:,'"««i"^TSVJ.'...'.-r-.i.. J1.AJ1...EU-EN, AURA IT PAS ETE APPLIQUEE A QUATRE HEURES DU MATIN, APRES LE TERME DU DELAI. POUR REPONDRE D UNE FA CON PRECISE A VOTRE QUESTION, LE FAIT QUE LA LOI DES MESURES DE GUERRE N A LIE APPLIQUEE QU APRES LE TERME DU DELAI FIXE PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT DP QUEBEC EST LA PREUVE QUE C EST NOUS QUI AVIORS LE DERNIER MOT DANS LES CIRCONSTANCES. 011154 �• . . « CC* M. LAURIN: EST-CE QUE JE PEUX POSER UNQ QUESTION AU PREMIER MINISTRE? M. BOURASSA: OUI M. LAURIN: ETIEZ-VOUS AU COURANT, M. LE PREMIER MINISTRE^JiUE CETTE LETTRE DE MM.^DRAPEAU ET SAULNIER ETAIT ENVOYEE A OTTAWA E T , S I O U I , QUAND AVEZ-VOUS ETE MIS AU COURANT? M. BOURASSA: M. LE PRESIDENT, ^ A I D I S C U T E , DURANT LA JOURNEE DE MERCREDI, A QUELQUES R E P R I S E S , AVEC MM. SAULNIER ET DRAPMy^_.JO..-.A.L„PAS £TE INFORME, COMME T E L , QU UNE LETTRE SERAIT ENVOYEE. DE TOUTE FACON, S I J AVAIS ETE INFORRE, JE NE VUIS PAS EN QUOI CELA AURAIT CHANGE MA D E C I S I O N . JE NE VOIS PAS EN QUOI LE FAIT QU UNE LETTRE SOIT ENVOYEE AU GOUVERNEMENT FEDERAL PAR LA VILLE DE MONTREAL, OU PAR LA VILLE DE QUE3EC, OU P H R D AUTRES INSTITUTIONS, AH RAIT PU FORCER LE GOUVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC A MODIFIER SON POINT DE VUE, C EST LORSQUE NOUS NOUS SOMMES CONVAINCUS QUE C ETAIT E S S E N T I E L , QUE NOUS NE POUVIONS PLUS ATTENDRE, A LA LUMIERE DE TCUS LES FAITS QUE J AI ENUMERES, QUE NOUS AVONS EMIS CE COMMUNIQUE DONT JE VOUS AI FAIT PART DANS LA SOIREE DE MERCREDI OU J E U D I , A LA LUMIERE DES FAITS ET DES RAISONS QUANT AU TEMPS ET QUANT AU FOND. C EST SEULEMENT APRES AVOIR EXAMINE TOUTES CES RAISONS QUE NOUS AVAONS DECIDE D EMETTRE CE COMMUNIQUE, QUELLES QUE SOIENT LE LETTRES OU LES REPRESENTATIONS QUI POUVAIENT ETRE FAITES PAR LES ARTE 011155 �r a 011156 �011157 �011158 �Time Received RCMP Saturday 9:50 P.M. 24/10/70 LE 18 DEPOSE OCTOBRE DANS 1970, A LA BOITE ET ROSEMONT;- CE DU POSTE NOUS NOS SE AUX COMMUNIQUE HEURES, UN LETTRES ANGLE ETAIT ADRESSE A SIXIEME A ETE AVENUE LOUIS SOURNIER RAPPELDNS NOTRE VOLQNTE EMISE DANS CE COMMUNIQUE: LEADERS DOIVENT LIBEREZ LE PATRIOTE PIERRE LIBEREZ LE PATRIOTE CHARLES GAGNON ETRE LIBERES IMMEDIATEMENT: MICHEL VALIERES LIBEREZ LE PATRIOTE-OOURIER LIBEREZ LE PATRIOTC-CONSEILLER DEFAUT DOUZE DE OjtXJI POURSUIVR* - AVERT PSEMCNTc IL ETT HEURE* CA DIMANCHE SAUTERA VAU1T MIEUX LIBERER NOS ET 24 OCTOBRE 1970 CHARTRAND ROBERT LC 2 5 NOTRE PRENDRE CHSJf SISJT LE COMMUNIQUE C.K.A..C. AVANT A 15 LEMIEUX OCTOBRE CfDOLt AU 1970 P 'EXECUTIONS 8EHIEUX IMMPjlATCMENT CE DERNIER �pv A AC.K.A.C. a / a LOUIS FOUHNIER 011160 �y f •ice Received RCMP Tuesday !0;50 A.M. 22/1C/7C Canada K .i • ••< S & " k * . p •'•- A * * ^ A * L • I ' . I CC;.1* t v p ..£T-'i^ x * ; - * - >*« '3 "••" AS,/ P •^1 •P7>Jj j 'Ap" ." *. »• * A -*;-i- A3 A'* .' - I * * * J.'***> ... * . "• » i j • >.-»'• . 1 ' 3^%tv 4fei*X >A*X.3 •,- » 4 W*j&k<- " - "-' S S M T B S& * .. .•$ ? * > § & y 4&& & t ***.$&'.",* f H a n ; ' • Wr.-fc-^.&M'f * S 5 > ™ S D 5 011161 �y A zlA A \AI J. i Ll S -^ t t A ?-/ e Pe<-' A TAA'TS f Ai £+' r At*~ r*e4 A /f <- >M * 7 / ^ 7 f « x IA sec 4**7 D tf q U€ A' Dt,<Z'C £ LLV t.es i_ £ ^ fc iT z /> w r c * c / A e q <A £ A' i * < k / £ if * * UUT * K <- s <? A/T L R • V •' / # £ & <? *" A^ip .s <k * - T * 6>7k pAJ / r * / * £ «S»^- tec-A* &•&#&&* v z $ £ l C ' & */ £ S, PiF *ei$:::*/e,#SA '•X'AA R/J&'&*&&# PLUS SV A 7 J • . r- ""ft* / *rs A . H-.-ia. •",- ,•.* - -ft X % gpT-k i /. ^ / v ^ s Aee //A / WT A ' ,< r , I • ^ H L A £ # < a A 'Ai A. < , s S AJe I r £ / v r 7 t•i K'c r P i A ' S L e c i / - / • ? A f $ # / / ^ f e « / l / r * X / e*/s A&tKOtfS £ T£ FRtsrxe (J AJ S->ST£A\£ & l / .pi c s £ 7 /I ^ /? /^ ' X P#* P£St//l?£ <A C A? /P ^ J p; /I /> * ft 4z 4 / r £ JZ rt JL S P/ A> >/ 7 AS * S' 011162 �11 ft 0 O £ - S C 44 N £ TtC v i .' A /T s C, £: •p (0 / > At < A \ £ S S H <£ & / ' // / T / Ai / v A'Yvr c i P# S / /^ r< / r+ C£TT£z A\$RCrt£ ^f** A ff L / 0 £Rfi 7"7 0/0 0 Z £B£ c. k 4 £ i / £' 7>fA 7 A '•' ^ - 4 A C, i » /l L i c ( / pf c•••/$ e xc / *c P t A S C A' 7 S <f / ; > •?> ^ - j 7? / P/ c o <L &•*& x 77 ^•••>.,rrv»'r'--.. \m zfr.zffi. ) L < ^ w**/T£ *• fi / r A <> y) P/trR A'A Tt ,i 0*t4g& x" j-?• r /Ae o ^ /^<»l i *** A k s" i ' ^ <• s A //l"4 5 e t / // / / t A' Ae 1/ PIE E c c Bv A f w s.*A*£'i4m< *&:-" A f Kr 11 * /;/ 4 / s ; A t> 11 / 1 st i A'C A (• (S / £T^ T ^^Af /> i e ^ ITC e $ / A ' At CAi'py V A"<: aOe / 4 A & t S- ^ /'^^ Plt'S r 011163 �. - ... \ \ \ 011164 �• fa i i . • ; : p ipSro - ig'l K t cRr«tii i4 .AH' ftSfJ^ORl.l.. .R.!f: I - i •.WvMi.i'rS P.-n t :t»rT9. .-•• ! ' x 3|i"», At 03-. p ii\{,a«;pj-iirti^-fJ«g .:g.S. g.S7S>» -': ' X - ' . •)•;- '. 7"""-A. • :.; -,! . '•if, 7 'X "-' •.. - ..• • ' ' A" A . A. . i ' A - & . -.. .7 g.it...-v , , RtflJ* 'd ' a i d e r * t ?df. plfctfir^w osabres de U • - . -A:, a^owsimoN'pE A V , *~ * '•••.. •-.-.'• •-. -A-t ; -7 ••• -x f k f i... g RPA'-Ag^p 011165 �• AA Time Receive*! RCMP Wednesday 4:20 P.M. 11/10/70 P '_ ' ^ A A . (V ' il V - - - - - - _ '„ f k ^ - - . ' 'V4 ^' A Ptvirea f.F LL.tM.tNi Pv,* ^ FEKETM- fAcFcr-rt* LA k.,7 i*r> refE^c*. PCi/x fivers' Uu* r,u* w P reeFine* IL U w . ^ ^« r ^ n^r,. sy wFuce* raiders U"S* JTUH cFMtTf.r AUFtfFX MUttM'fJ cer/ : fJccJ - ^ ^ ^ \!iCE U TOO £T t/ve * rfmifcfr <JUi £<PUCUF DiieE fa*** vPtttL s'y w t W i r e c . rCLiC^Cc£rsCC£ R l^ tpiSifc^ f£ ^-"'<TF tfo^ n-. Jew IPWCM cfjFeRCS: t.ocs TEkoa; :*,:£;. ric/,• ,»rH K.rci/-e h«nr. CHPHBRC f-:r )^ru r KrKLr/-r^r; PA. 7£ Fr P LH tfcii* rc'iTKiwe. CfuX • !•>•-" ^AhEci PRA> __ \ , ; F.lUCNhr c>uc \i ~ gV re.CNcrs fcim ^. - In# Fl.9. 011166 �•4 V fc^u ime: R e c e i v e d PCMF' F r i d a y ! 2 : 5 0 P.M. I6/1'J/7C / tl': I A U \y I N> ! \ v. -c." [*< ' : 4. <' «... i-*>vx.v.CJL^\ A Q • ^•H.vJxC J . • V'l_ A <J t ^ U ^ r U « V ) - " — , . ^2, A C ^ ' L P R ' g ' * " ^krh^J>L: . A. , r, ^ , b*L lUv U-a - i Ph.OA(R<i, v • <R-4»- 15 ? S A A ^ ' * - ' (-« l"« --'- 4 k, " • . .:• , • i U^_ -w .A' ^•* L Ct~ 011167 �FIQ FIA, FLU Ft,, FLv FU TLM FLQ FLQ FLQ FLQ FUi FLQ FLQ F.L.Q. La c e l l u l e "RUEL" e n t r e en a c t i o n car e l l e a ju£* que l ' a c t i * * paral" l e l e qu'ell*- entame ace$leW«ra l a l i b e r a t i o n des P r i s o n n i e r a P o l i t i q u e s 'Ay d :' LVO .L.Q. F.l.n. F.L.w. F.L.Q. '3A.R •'•: 011168 �I _.. PLfcPE PCTLP NE A 4 . P I'E l.D UA • :•••:.il. D'EXE- I .' in ; 2BU g •• 1 heuren, 011169 �ime Received PCMP Friday 9: P.M. IP/IP 7. 7< and k s l t a i s , CR.AC TtlA-AJyW: " i " . .A1 ^ajpf", kontr£?.l-.;u6boc. "'A'kp/ 011170 �FRONT JS L I P S U A K R CiXl'P.R. tUo Re n : i";3>'g •> * AA,. -'-.' t VA Ar ' ' 3.R r."- '' "Louis-Jo • c-pk-r.-.pir.-: .-• |/ ' " ; r .. P n r Ai prx5s >nte no••? ter • •• •« * A"" "» •.r ) *! i >u (^uobocol'.f«? gue nous,"A c»0" i"1 ! -* • •>;>-? A • f* du FT-*, HYom, deci« i6 d<? passer ..-.>: Act--. 'A . *.- •. ' o-Z., A*"'. U'.rea de nos cej^ara* dea o k ' ^ ' p A 3 o-Alules "'.iteration." & "Chenier" keelson*. Noui avons d'cil' d» extenainer -t de Il^ut'ler g.-'l .u*:- t-(p.;- .<• gvi era p4i3onnant «;uotidienno'i«nt X •»*» ^u^xGa.ls,et pui ne .aSritent .tf.ue de vivre. Nous aurons ta sal© penu, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, eoomu-' rant "prirae minister" du "Do; icnion of -Jatv.A " et traltre national J Res Qu£bt>cois. Nous aurons ta sal* peau, Robert Bourassa,"seraln Res Simard-Cotronin,laquais de I A Hkute xirunce de St,James Street; Vi 1.;' 3tr*ejF »t v 7-13 Street*. Kous aurons ta peau, Srapeau-du7 i pp -'*0r, Eminent neabre de la p$£pre politique qui eiege co**-. me Kaire de Montreal.Nous aurons ta peau, Paul Cooke, criard de * 1 CJKS-Radio-Kutuel!!e, Rous aurons ta sal*.1 „-A.U. Lieutenant Ro^^r n.-r.-.A-- de l»Sscouade Anti-??rroriste, responsable des operations =| policieres on court, Hous aurons ta s^le pwr-.u, Jerome Choquette, xj •.fr.A-t.r-. ••» '''.vvPA-s et pantin de Hubert Bourassa, Que l»on no ' 7LQ est. plus; fo"*"- g'.-• ",,«,x. p-";£ -k'- V.OT; '-.y-fjiii] 5t..r -i5-,r-?ni"> PAS, 1 • A- :•: .i lfon pense; § nous aeul, nous comptons plus A d»eff<>ctifs que La Police de Montreal, "• a ';u>**i.<S .v. Q«..cbc-o, A> Gendarmerie Rnyol° du Canada(R.C,M.P.),1a Canadian Ar y *»t lo PBI r<5unis. Rien no nous fait peur, De toute Evidence, nous so:xnes plui Avis que la Police et les petits xRxr > R•> I'Arra^S*. Le Qu£beo conA-TIPA. "-• • k'-p-pj "< :• pl-v.i .-..!>.-.-•• •- histoire; seul3 les Fran* -:-Zu'A:\HMJOX-J .kiyoAikionnA.A'PS passeront 5. t n r S A , Kous vaincerons, : rkynlvA:* on. Vive le Quebec 3 ibr'j socialiste, / -, V Le FRONT DE LIBERATION DU «VE.H2G, • goViv.lc "LouiS-Joseph Papineau". 011171 �k fo& J" V V V# •y\ A A 3 \ \ La cellule "KIEL" du F.L.Q. oui revendioue la responsibility de nombreux - A V*K >N lA i\\\y v o l s d ' e x p l o s i f s . A ft * \ ^ '* l)Exhorte les cellules de "LIBERATION" et "CHENIER" £ ex4cuter leurs otages. 2)Somme l e s gouvernements a acceder aux six demandes des deux c e l l u l e s sus-nomm^es sans quoi nous s4virons en envoyant un avion s u i cide sur l e s parlements de Qu^bec > d'Ottawa ou sur 1'Hotel de V i l l e de Montreal.Le d i t avion sera charg4 d ' e x p l o s i f s vc!4s aux e x p l o i t e u r s .fcoeurants e t sera p i l o t s par nn brave P a t r i o t e .le la c e l l u l Ceci peut sembler i m p o s s i b l e s mais aue l e s t r a i t r e s qui gouvernent se di~ sent bien q u ' i l s se h e u r t e n t & une force d6cid4e e t armee.La v e r i t a b l e Revolution approche.Le Peuple opprim4 sera I i b 4 r 4 sous peu. MOKT AUX CHIENS EXPLOITEURS VIVE LA LUTTE POUR LA LIBERATION DU TEUPLE OPPRIME VIVE LE FRONT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC. LE SEUL DLLAI DE CETTE SOMMATION EST DE 48 HEURES* IL N'Y AURA AUCUNE NEGOTIATION La c e l l u l e "RUEL" 011172 �• C A LM A- 5- o 011173 �Time Received RCMP Thursday 8:45 A.M. 15/10/70 }> PV W t ?h<\ - «" \ r vc Mu»'" i u •*•! ,. ^ ^ b£ V.*: s M rs, ( | RI c L l i M 'Av f"\ CMiJ H H » n - » , \ ( >^> » ^ « ^ , U ^ , t t i-tltA Ltp . , l "PM ?tw ^ M l , < ,.» ^ . «.c,UO,7C, ^ ^ , 1 , , M L>" L " M " ^fe. t_ M ...I •v L-c pC-1 MCirll, f\ ll^ I N A > I ^ P c T T t t * £ ( w T E > 3 M* f»M>',S »P,r* ){ i t a f W A f t f t t i c ^ *»* P m s y , 7 t 9cf c r r c ' ' l > | - r r C e-(SSiWT£ /*\/.:«Sert >ti L A < M t > O t C it 0C eDILt t t /* £ A A. 4 f f £ H cri / * n f c > l # 9t«fc;<'£ «**,?*{«,£ £* f*>S*rtT /Ai>cs< 7s«H U> A 7 i ^ ^ o Pi ^ ^ ' t ^ R t . t'r/v^./AJj , * ^ L'i>a*f\£ ,7t PflSSc'A ,-f ^ficTit?*. FA^mr ewe* V,~* X- >*it Ac A, c u, £ ^ A S^KOE pi-<*. rt£ &H PcAcf. * I - , ^£ '£T Z***'' i^peF/,. Lts ^ ^ K u*£.*f* »» cxtfure* Ann€s M. €*£M.HC/' *TII«IC^H « A ?6iAn 2 A*TA^i L.&HA ?A-ur <**£*%&*( tw*** itc^*-. c*e AK~*tT <ro*T4£ /Vf^/v/ L A T£A4r1V£n*iilf4 l(_ j HO CHI MINH ^.e^r *.,*,-? ces fiers ,*A, r e 6~e A' £ FFt c H I £ , w ^ ? 1 Z ^ A ••• r OB L o M < U d C+*Ttn*£nT ,*e,u.s »L.h»e .i• ' fiCL£v£.tH c.n£rt^f^^f«A*^/Mtlr t^<r vie * /WV# ppL 0- Tf>H*«x FWL'»rrA»tti*tirl i-fuK fi<^ o.wi, c ^ r ^ u t a l i f t * * - : f t * * * ft4 fHfJff « t « « , a « ? * . t « « ; / ^ ^ ^ CH*t fiC t<Ht MlfiH CT K#MlK*TZ ) €T*<CnT wrs..** Ce Pet!..** A** Ufiirtf rA*n*0ir* ^£ ^fwf.nkr ^ A R ^ C-tfnUi_£ . - **.ri»v>c TMUTC cr PP«A »-« /?C.T€t*I &#Krt MA-iVAfS / w £ ^ > P*,}^ >v^/»i.r^ t:»< * e?£**i£*i J N w r ^ r M » r i v m e c >»H r e r v . r e c f n M ^ t 9 c f ^ RO'iflMiPN >/ i.CJf pu„^f £>k /«M ^ e ^ , C flsdS i>£ ?»UC* 3 £* cn.yiHCH-r uifun**™* /.C> /KtMOAt ^ / £ w M«C L£> u» PfiQ<C t~r*iT fAiriClft cn*(,u£ pcHT »r£ IT wjjj, cO P*A-T,S*TO »e CHern£t\(TAKCHAi£)a liftc* ) \ e ' ?"" > *T rUdWUCl -$ ^ *'fc-V. /<V-T It "** L # '' ***** crrr\,^ <* « r w „, >»^entH?ltt^'""e> . . . ' Ltu ^ ,•-. .. '• ,^j» 'T 011174 �_ v t/eA+£** t C > ,-,t pa< r+i, *.* ) $*«T * I.ACTHP** k- PA»{* patt'Cl* • - . er . t t t L» /*tl> i AAi C £•"• rA"*<-*re A* 4 u rvL.7, cA (C(> *CallJ«t > / / » * « - Ttf*. £* e* L o P*AT|>*»«S t>C J.A ^ l l N f f *>**£ »* f r t l X f 0£ t i r f . *tfc*w **nr**>tc t CfCaa A±H<Vt i-t fii7£ *>£* PfPw*lifts CTAAr4(,c*i j u f r f r t i T ^WN nt j<*.Zrl 1 * * n . A » r A * " * *^ /n»A"t/4C A r * - ' ^ * * ' L£ PfiiaHC/AL OANL Qn >MT fo*-<i*ZH'r *'£ ^ * f * net.£vSA c*-P£Ff* I- -C*. c r e*»* -*-' **« *^£ l ti CH** T- i-A * fa. t6W fiAi<i£.i lEA£T*iN *« ^htOCC y ( " I ' ^ H U R Z«ztti£&(T*tte fil**C)t CtiC, HO (*l MiriH CT K*»tK*z£ )€7*iC~T *..rfrtv..'J» /•^e> U mr>«*r,(>H pK *** #ecn/ ACcc*t>£ n*t\ u6£*£* *« £KLcurc* *;• , „ <c si: ?Afi£* Ce DtAn&A Ppg. US A*t*£$ tfiifit-rgAte* ura £>£*?>.£'• L f e H P A £ 3 f^.nt ( 0 « ^ * * * ********* &* ?L*C£ q *'£&«.«* / j ^ / c ^ r roar .>« V f*tA0*f « * * * « a e * * * * * * ' « * ******<$ /»<£iU, ?/•*»» i w ^ ^ i i « f . A ** 4** t£> £t£A*<L*t k » 8 « r «^rt*ll3ftA*«>-*H <ei*ire ( f n U f l t »* f<-#, S , n t i-£> C . M > * « £ * {Ce^«±*(^AAPjwJ #* Of*T 4fiT Al»llt i> f'e ,**,*£ A ^ > r * * r * r > / e A - S H ^ ^ A ' ... - • A A . ' C ? * * * * ' * " c G*A*T«0T<f .fjbs'^Wft* ^ P i * r U « « M<HN ( 1<RF f£i(IU47C< S3*f D*rtAM.H£S «**"* ^,4^f^^;^0$$j^'r;0lM *4t»i A A 9>£*. rA>*AO<-£ C K ^ 1 A * ™ £ » ; « ' * ^ M ^ ^ P ^ * % CHt Mttw ) r>c- C A M tHTAatMfs e " ' < ^ ^ ^ ' i ^ ^ ^ W ^ ^ ^ ^ - * r v*r*AM D* />*£** fwi.~*trti**'**:*«^-il*& r 1*T*i*-±£, Lt~ i.A 0&*£<7>r i*"' uf«fi k\r*aP£ FAt^ut vie fa.A ,yc, ci~< £ A T^ ' .''feR'^*fe'vfc** .k y.i V&A*A +>^f + a.l7i*# SMrt ?£»* ?** r e s~e HB K t/« £c£fi£ tAPAcAcA^enr v* A*e~„, HVMM£ />£* ei^^A-7'o.-fi A^i £»6«TftLLe ^ Ct£ACi L >trvjl ^t*./^ ^ i^n* .- n r>Mr L£u ,t ^ w r M A£*kuitlr. £ t^c S M r n cc- / At a-.t Ls /.- MNS. "^£i ^^ / r ^ ^ " " ""+" *"* " 6 , **""* ^ ' U °£* CI1**E> ^ ^e</*i//7 >c r AC ~ < "i i;.i WPAi^/j^t^ 6fc A ' /£ ^ ' .- 4 AA M '^ r ; " g j a cere c e h Z ' T ' T 11 C • . —»1=. — LA WvtuT'e ' $»C - ^lufnt^i >/i«.t/tf/yr( *; C ***** i& <-&*rt M £ * * . €****§.; .twA+Atg T c - c ^ ^ t «-<*" t-f^. a * X« fMroitei, tr HAH ^ wc 7c.tTfc «*>i>,r "'A roi'M, ., y . .,* - „ /V»^/*A/ry? / - • * < *-.*• ; /" ' P- > r ^. v f w ^ .. t ^ 011175 �P<i*i»e*u- c m w r r t f 7- LO h . u ^ , ^< ^ H C ^T»(Mei N T Sc^e« LA c P ^ M T ^ M t B ^ r , ( / ^ / AuTo*,.^ ^ > / * f2^ \/A «_c i 011176 �Radio CKLM 1184 ouest, rue Ste-Catherine, Montr NE VOUS DEPARTISSEZ JAMAIS DE VOTRE CARTE OE CREDIT ALWAYS CARRY YOUR CREDIT CARD Elle est precieuse et vous seul devez I'utiliser. Veuillez nous averts immediatement en cas de perte ou de vol. Si vous change! de numero de telephone, veuillez demander une nouvelle carte. It is for your use only and Is valuable. Please notify us immediately if the card is lost or stolen. If your telephone number changes, be sure to ask for a new card. 4 3 £• 3IO 47 I 1 (A i \r,r,p v" * i I '.-%: <t | *rr>rte liii P>. t: v" r r r - r * ? n t . ii''-. 011177 �y y< 0 fs Cr £ » y- T <}iN0tr5 C-MtS CH -file is d\/&.t*T J?l ^ftPOAfe Z^ M*0' AXoo # *A s &Atr*A LL-X •AV^PAIVGS tAH^ci' SV RL L U C H H ^ 1*5 010 iRfi \ ill Ai L- Aizs- J L= fi- N i ? / ^ rl- ^ £" 011178 �/ j-i- L ^ j4 L A ^ A / R k > A IA ^ H i / / /•? o k . t-^- i i ; x- / •) <s R . P <N y'rluzUL.1- ^ r / - ' / J (! & /2 k f N / " c - ^ - t U * M l v) Lr S /> f Rf / ^-1 /" u S c /-' /% /V £ ^r j) £ /N £ R f* £ M U £ K- 6 * At'S P / ^ / J t .vN i t r i i / , i , / - ( f , t- ... U # is 7" P t/ £ $ / o £ H C P/+ J Av/ck & (L (*• <T T £ A. X t Pi / "tAA t L L p e i" 5 •• A i T A SfiiSi 'A? j - / c £ T J y* i' s L c r" & A' T Aiy 3 /ItZ Lftc iXc/; rt£(/tt-i~S iA cj IS H rt^u c' r L £ > ' \ZT K AT i i i 5/ IA A ff I'/L^^,n a ft-i s&A/ltAA&s «C»f . 2-/ <l£&& ~<6A/ A^c u _5 *t- ' # r*T o <W BjAJ-L * . *" <• t* Tic *sA e « > OU * ^ A" t ' A ' - t ' '£ £jA't: //*. c <r_ /" , ji76 o i ztxfMHiz/^r K> cr L-'acni, . f00^ p tT JbJA__f O 6" A Y ri A+ft.c S*ILAC£ o 7 i+t*-us A o ^i 7 i que . £ * A/*- A ^ f Lt#4£At*tf<Aii/^ 4r « D He/ f- o <•' qo^ecrt, t 9 S<~ r <\o , ( u. K J~ IZ S Sets Aji tcfLS C £ 4. L i > 4 a f * jQtyo^i* T<-'><T d li C 6rCi<tmii.fiJCh*Gn7 S' t ¥ c/c Te/J/±C O e A / < / J S <-' - r o c £/ K J^ti 5 o if ror<~<r& i^ft fasri; ct+Ni^iAa / ^ y l o rs r )-£ S J^IF /^Au' s ) - \ ii E ti-frT ION 5 g- AO i^i r is i+ "P/C i T S k / 4 /A ? rv 5 /< 3i R/^c? y ty tz K- 0 i^ H Clls- ggp (±_±JLI C r ^ p ,x c & IZZ f £ fO N 5 - / " ^ c.f $ r c 5 5 k- v tf c > yl-y-c's. Tio,^ A& Liz* po <%O<£ or £~Y IS <LO r< c ru ?£:A(\P5 /fie c 011179 �L £ u„7 R. 1- / >>t, A. C ^ ' ^ O r.. 'V U 3 ) , D C - M f t i f A >V I? *< l ? N f "- ' C{ C- / ^ 3 r £ u n r ^ / i . - 1 t ^ c > ^ p ^ y> MU'-j jVtc-o, dM .*r«r M #p 4. /S. i j i A*H* fur Air Op M~\ tt \ H j ^ A / r - fA? * FT i V ^ c> >- keNt, <- To / ( al j A- '» J- ^ / G * C /"S , t A'£irf,-i/t/t; r/irHsAlLk A*. / r ' X t ' . ' / A K . *e-.S it** J •>*&,» "5• f - s U v i ^ m Z v H Z M U -«•-; . O. / . / . C C P K I . - M T ^'Xi r;<j*"j VlS/i. "> i , .j, <-A"AFX - . , p . - ; . r*. v-- -. # ^ i. «.-AV e * ' •» 4H A* Ai CI Itfit J <«•' rrf*P3 uaNS * . * > i /*£<!.- a-; >.*- Ais C/*«*Jf 1ST A*< MIS/MM &#:•%'• t>iT <to£ ^ofitP-V /. i.' kt ?*3*R**S o Al i*t»? Bt<i K^taA lfc~S. T/> r^^s Af '*?*, J r X l / / r N t V . \\H 0 •** AA 9 * *T ^ A C H f i £ • A fc'-*. v? ^ P (S/C *• T /- k U " 5 \KC- A / \ "i" t-t-'.'-KitA- 2 »/ fc ^ . 4 ^ ,'P 3 4t^lAni3irs **">•* i o ** L # 7 f <sit; »'0fyf« A O r i ' ^ i T f n Lc . */ i?''/V<?AA /^eA+u/ , , ^ ' A A f '»'-.>'* CHW k t ^ V 4 * J t " V * ^ fvs/t- J*'*****" i. A / ov sit J-lTlrS /v^i? <*Af«rfW r A J if JIM ^-"Jf A:<£»*.«• X « « * * s Pi**.*.*" G TC #.«*i *. IA c *<• »>a * t,' <s r J. At'Si ,*• i N t ' j y t <• * r L-IAUCJ //-M*/"- »-» - AACTLSc H A %i 0#Ni <W**AaT C t f / » AA*/A« ^ f « A kAf**>«? /* * ' " J « r P ^ MaTi^ /r/>t 011180 �Monday irme Received AM. 1: A l a s u i t e de l a publication du Piemr aomnu-iqu^ de l a «C c e l l u l e de l i b e r a t i o n e t du dernier coaaaunique' de la c e l l u l e de finan- A' oement "Chenier" l a s i t u a t i o n eat olalrwnent e t a b l i e i l ) l a l i b e r a t i o n aalna a t sauva da M, Croaa suppose l*x vb .f , A Jg \ • 1*acceptation des deux exlgenoea s u l y n t e a t l a l i b e r a t i o n des prisonniera , , ,-\ , > V> V p o l i t l q u e a ^ l a c e s s a t i o n de l a re'preaalon p o l i c i e r s . /, 2) la l i b e r a t i o n da Pierre Laporte auppose le respect Y , lnt^grale dea s i x c o n d i t i o n s j n i t l a l e a du F L q. A p a r t i r de c e c i i l n'y a do-c que t r o i s de*veloppen*nt3 possiblest 1) l e gv. refuse t o u t e s l e s exigences ,ou xmfhnm h e s i t e a l e s r ^ 8 l i s e r , o u net trop de tempa a donner sa repo«se. Face a une t e l l e p o s i t i o - l e s deux otages seront e x e c u t e s . 2) l e g v . decide d'accepter deux c o n d i t i o n 3 ( l i b r ' r a t i o n des p r i s o n n i e r s p o l i t i q u e a , c e s s a t i o n des operations p o l i c i e r e s ) .De-s ce cas James Cross sera U l t f f f i l l i b e r e dans l e s 24 heures suivant l e retour des t r o i s observateurs e t H ^ e x ^ c u t i o n de Pierre Laporte sera l e v e e , ma i s l e ministre du chomage at de l a a a l m l l a t l o n dea Quebecois n 6 ?era pas l i b e r e . 3 ) l e g v , decide d'accedaA aux s i x exigences i - i t i a l e a du F L H .Da-s ce cas Pierre Laporte e t James Cross seront l i b e r e s aai-3 e t sauf dans l e s 24 heures suivant la r e a l i s a t i o n complete de 1'operation l i b e r a - tion. IL ', //<< / A/ / r.. A aJ/<J I I. A ..; I ' I > ' I I- I I. /•/.• HM I: g-P- iAALh-A I 011181 �Ca present coonunique de la c e l l u l e Chenier e s t le dernier avant 1'execution ou la liberation de Pierre Laporte AA ensemble de la considers situation e s t c l a i r . Tout entitenent,tout retard sera comae un refus tsoits. NOUS VADtCRCUS FRCWT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC PSiMous conaiderons ooum retard inadmissible la langeur du gv. a repondre deflnitivemen. a »o« demandes.lous la repetons toutehesitation comae ssrs considere u» refus,toute demande da contact(par voie de cosmunique ou autre)sera consider* canas Un r e f u s , . Vous avez entre ]ns mains la texte complefr ou 11 e s t f a i t mention des 7 exigences i n i t i a l s du F LQ. i i �frott de liberation ilnEg? communique ^**° ? LA w'.Tf NT ViZ L',£"L£v£i^ l0n£u^-«, <u tftf£ LftPoATg ST ~PiA r A tn 'nRx-re^ an Pl/*t<r ^ ^ F ^ o / v r "p<P £ > g » D e l * * P g R N t g R g ^ CQ M D I T I - — —=: i D f ^ N S Ui MOcS <r_cN > *6 M M Ii .— ViQVjtaS "COMieWrft*)Ti P»fc '.. •sr Ley~>ii , \ t.cj«v>r.. Y j b»?Rfl no/o p<?> > f A 1 / AJ<?M£"Arr w*n NJ£R< « icM** »r«t? i> f t <^ M V f t tec 'Biui"" J m . e ^ * pep I H r p7:i7»sXif «f«r .ffLLuLer. I- I<TT ^ov,;* R»^/vAR P ^ ' ^ " " - " M 2 . Z-* cs>< ' • • , . > ...IT. ... .tH 1' otP-^ pcrtf£" , T I © CO I p f « i « « r n LeuA AfTov /lAjAlCAJ d£A. ©£ LA*T «r W^ftC £/»-P<^i|T£r *(f«wktot^i t>* &>* *>ui>)«OA)T <i£"TTff ^**/»fvttNJli' !>£• Ua .47 •«" < K< W., I ! / , » • P . - 011183 �• c K i\ c IL^liA 011184 BT.^ai^BB^BBHa^a^aVal �Time Received RCMP Monday 8:20 A.M. 12/10/70 ' OtSr " "L/^e ) Crv- ^ : V , A ... (p-0-^>^<--dLp A y vwv«- ^ (JO-^V^-TS A o-v-ev .^V O - ' R-^-TAA. V—s>~£*-a 1 k-ajL-v.AA-tp-cX""^- JWN^ "RL..L p-^^TV^^JtA-C^vv, fM Q j^A^Xh^ XftJUL Y-V, * C p* C A 1 • ' — < ^ > i ^ ^ l i Z ^ ^ U. ^ ^ ^ v - J U^J-J? W ^ - 02~<a > ^"^V ^A^,^J ^^r^ J A. Y<rw ^-w^-^-v^^v- ^ Ul^ \r--A U VM4 ^ ^ f r ^ ^ - ,-r-out �I ') 011186 �' ' s R AA^A'H u p&^p&fc *#fe, * %% ./,^Sk^>''' r. A . ,*t* J :-..' & ^ p & » > - . * - « * ' .i &•*'*' P-J* AA 'V ' ' .*£AP.4«!i. • . tA4P*& ^^V!^'-VA-AAA ftA- "ZA*AAsA^AF-^^A^ 'A-kHA. A , ' - ; .-- . 4 '^mf. - Rx. 'VtAkv ., ^im^m^a-cv • A Z A :i- '>•*•. -.. ^ ', 011187 �(f&<l.w$mwi3 '• - A • AA i . • / A h\ -Bl. •: -JA".*. X- '• .:•- X . mmA x' ij*a»Hfimilim • m—•• i MP Sunday 9.CO P.M. 11/10/7C ritr:e Received A ?&JU'A&*& I •'• i" -;-.-• k p p • 7 •:. 1." . ' \ ••'• .^ZitmmiM^dte1m-'<m&o4i«'' : x .-c^mmmmm,- ..:. T..' -.'. k cause de c i r e o a t i t a n c o s t e c h n i q u e s i~>oontrolablas «ous a%'Ons d.u r c d l g e r l e deuxiom© coj2i3u?.ique a I s »>« Inula present© e s t done pour conf i n n e r 1 * a u t h e n t i c i t e du communique" ^o»2« La present© comtaunlcatio" e n t r e l a c e l l u l e Ch^*.ier e t l©s a u t o r i t e s ®« plaoe est l a d e r n i e r e Las gou/ernemants a c c e p t e - t ou n ' 8 c c e p t a n t p a s . F i n i l a p a t e r n a l i s m s , l o s p s u t - e t r e e t l e s pronseasesO s a l t c© quo l ' o n veut,IOQCXSKXiUtt ou l ' o - v a , e t l ' o n e s t deterasi«er a y aller. Nous n ' a v o n s pas ©u d© n o u v e l l e s d® l a c e l l u l e d® l i b e r a t i o n . Normalement s i M.JAMES CROSS e s t ©ncor@ s« vi,® l i e d e v r a i e n t ( l e e n*embre3 de l a c e l l u l e ) fair© p a r v e n i r un 8 ieme communique. S i M.Cross n ' a pea e t e e x e c u t e , l e communique f e r a l e p o i n t s u r 1'ensemble de l a s i t u a t i o n . S i M.CROSS a £te executea a l o r s -ous c o i t i ^ u e r o - 3 1 ' o p e r a t i o n l i b e r a t i o n , noua emettrons a l o r s un a u t r e communique l o r s q u e l e a gouvernements auront f a i t c o n n a l t r e l e u r d e c i s i o n ( o u l e u r i n d e c i s i o n s e l o - l e c e s ) . Ce d e r n i e r consiiunique p o r t e r a s u r 1 ' e x e c u t i o n ou la l i b e r a t i o n de P i e r r e Laporte. Enfir, s i M.CROSS e s t ©ncor© e~ v i e e t que pour des r a l s o n a incontrolables la c e l l u l e dc- Llb-'iatlon - ' H (PJ »'mettre u- 8 ten* coramu~iq»A lo diploma*© s e r e lib^r«' *» meme temps que 1 i e r r e Laporte. NJIT VAINCRJWS FRJ*T DE LIBERATION DU «UEBEC 011188 �rkPlAAH? >>> .*• i. ^B* — -\ f - *J <kA ' V^ ,. ,* t Ov^. 'X * (\» .IL».W- i . t- i't, C A ^ U ksl.^" f v.. A v. t - • .11 A- h^-AyAA-^^AAy.*" ' * L ,>* , i ' A^^^^^kf^ " » . - • ' * J I i*JL~ -^A- '"**- - ,,. ^M ,4. ' . • d F % r - \ y & ~ - c ^ v * " * ** * « J g ' P *„ • / p. #p c k J ^ ^ ^ S I l ^ ^ ^ ^wj* / ^ * -***•" T A k A --H. A.---I "*->••««*• f*X3 '>**R T • L A S t & i y \ * 6,j fA-^v f . A - - V w a s w 6 * V e-^AHRSk*- ^ I K ; " f ^ S S S T - / 1 j < . '• A P ' ; Pi/3PteP.Pi' " n ' ••• - j- R B A ^ C S ^ V - ' ^ X » i L ^ O « 1 ^ * - ' x U ^ i ,,ji A - ^>K. A y.D o^aQ.O^ALM< . W T A ' : - ^ ^ ^ - A I va*. ^ - t o f ^ ^ " jk^U-V. .A* ' . . " - ' " A / A . . . . . . ; i . - , v : ' v - • <ft Jl kA - f W « *^ 6 KU '(t^*- ^ v R*_i kJ*^^'^ J— >J- — Tl - y S J I A ^ ^ , I , / P ^« -«A-'X o ^ Z t ^ - ^ r 7 cgJi. & ,-VLLu. 6 a ^ . jeKA'fr P*""- ^ ^ { . A ^A ' A • cu-^ i • f> -ri L S y ^ - ^ A . > X i - A P • v ^ 1 ^ ; k - : R : ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ a A ^ • & •gn.i^uM ! uJ v W . ^ ^ ^ f-A^ ' < v • '• " ' ..: ' h \tMm^AS^^^n - .7 y^<^vp^ ,R*'' "" - • .- > - - * - t i ^ . A i < ^ ^ ' <sS^o^(Sr^^9^;-A $ • A t dk'yo^^- , \ A- A ^. <.Xi._ , . , '-' i-u.CJ-'yy--^ ( i g. ,, ^$Mi*,ti^-'k.AA,^ ' ^ ^ - * ^ ^ - * a / ' AJ luyAA** - *. - 011189 �'rggf • •-*."! .-'.A • \< A <A i., c • A t .> .->*•• / CIA. - ; ;• / rk 3 , . 4 '/ /'" , ^ / / ,vw p.--..<---<• * •<• I '"' i .^'i--;x» , ' 3 . g , tAj / 'f j diLA,^^-t* kA ' i -1 ""-' i/ "" ' • I J <Lt>rvt.xA V.py.- < '• l- (y Us ,A • .tJ - •*> u - * - ^ # ? "^c *£*-*-* r p.* •-^.-^t^/v--*-^ 'I <Ai/'ciui,- A • . , , t l , tt. p - ( • . i - * i .vik-'-^ . / ^ fc-u- • • > x A : ^ v< -i u^ Oy--^<u. il i A ,, V i.pfc fc.i A r -L.xAXA^ A - — - A-^-A , X. 'J " i I • e; '• k/ ^M^'*^-^''- ^ .-:.A 4 .^..A.--< — V^ Cv r ^ . A ....i.-.p.dtpfc^ Rxfi.i);ky*r: - iXX-C -t tX3PP... 3 .•« U * J * * T • , <2rCtT_ *v 7 Xf*SAW- R> •r . n £ C+-A £• k.."v s^y- :tStt . RR- TVP^- . ^ « ^7- px;x4gpp.-p '^sM.-'.., "i A^,^^^A|^||;;pla|^A33 4 • ' . - A I . ' • , f ~ t } l i - - A A * 1 ~ ^ - ^ Z ! « 3 « ^ ? S » n K » ^ » t i * ; S 1 ' . J < ' ' * ^ : - - • - .<3 C*.»LfrsU- < j p I AX. ,i '. -i. -A''' ^ v,- C ••). -.7-7-^>> , vf / _ <; , '•.' •'- - ' ^ - T£L -U-U- f ^ ? *' if.-ii'Ai^ A)A ^ . ^4-' . ; .•••.-• AA&Z& rAr^^r-AA% -•• Ar ' •"•••-' -'AV^ ..wiT-lp . p.^4'«ii§-^. 011190 �u; -J- .-(N OWIJ i » ^Mpi^B»Wmt7 ""^"Cww/ f*-'..>rs END oi !tea*r^s ~' p; * M $ T CJW£OIT< CARTE ptreiHtoiT • *• . : U:* - v H *. »A '"-' i » ' » | * J A ; 'j * MlN \% ' A '« «[> • ^ J 1 •»» . 7 *" '1 CO^TI0W»<»OT.«r»a©S-CS«5f5««13'WgreR90 • _ j ^ . UWffKB A . ; A K £ - ^ - C : - . . "• "P'A - '•• ;>-AA^ . m . . _ - • - X PP- •» t i f e f ' . • * H uasma f PRi'-J •'•' VOYAOE '"-"R'r^ IKWWMMi LXP'BES fl.0 of raSS?.3SH r jr f iIPC-* i - A W ' t ; ; & A7P¥;A: A' PXPP .3 > '* SM6K."7ft* Ate^iJ^.frWfMSff^WijgffitMfen^ »6.;.-...: --,'.- J" ^ U ^ . ^ ..,., JS-J J lip IX if bASSSOT P C5 C l i 8 » 3 5a»«*i*.«. - ' • v --i -'. ij£pK"<P 3 A fc y i J. W W \rf vy •#«. X- % SAIKT LAMBERT COHTE "DS GHANBLY ©VI /© Sir A? 7,p A A i ". 'fc- \-fotlK ^ A. ...kl'V I- ;-:i l;;x,v.J A* * *& ?v •j£ •* I 9 4 6 4 6 sirs ..A ?££RR£ LAPORTE A 6 ROBITAILLE ST T LAKBSRT QUE ^ k T. CAN ^ • s j a �fRPR mJZIXAi-cA-ir--,- A HR { i-| t-<44 Lirrajq t±i±iitB: ;|±b:n±t± 3_L.Lx.l3ssot ) A' JKHHI tt " i l l t i ' is . «*• I SB**,; C o n d i t i o n a l l y v e l M o n t r a i n s 1 , 2 , 1 1 , a n d 1Z. CP .1 nv-i-,7? J W 3 A - < * Q W * ' ... .—. ^ITJolii ^ jaatwvi JS ariivxiaoH 52/. i Re. sx3taretsSs*«r tettj trwsS ta a — a U i a l n m . V u i l w M f c a i K S t e ' i o M n o l l * cli»s> b u to-dos 1 , X , 1 1 s t 4 * >:es wg& j»s » ^ e ri?,0S\r U imMK ea m a , IN CANADA JO i l 51 HA. d li 5972 AIX UNITS T&U* IE REJtAU PASS LAiSSKZ-PASStR *rrrTzcnzzH E UA NV H J H V . *^0 Kf Jiva A*-'iX_ MO(.-.tWM'131*J Hon. P i e r r e Laporte M i n i s t r e *4u Cabinet Provincial' unHXHcmuniT P r o v i n c e devQ u.§bec si" o r i a e L I at HUM Vwjiwf 57] MA W< 1 [HOOH 51AIV1 * * l Si JO i J " / ^ II:IJ,OTJ.>*O WOIWI: aicsooiit | d y - i i s amen couKTCitsieHia ar VAI :...-: s> c S B T t n t s l M i i » l x R/ -v ^lAU-;&~r:$icky2<- t. F, SAL?f5, T. A. BURNS n/«i j . CS0H£ lS*i i^lbwi5^ JAVA 1ll, 0*. lH-JM M B s - S H * SS5S5SW Ay / ; tA.-..A;.:.-.fcPj. . vicy^itei^sal .-w ... - . „,. * A 3DVAOA-3JLHVO / QU VO13AVH1 iiojino •X.ilPi ! ox...j»n I 7,:.!'.- J MtfsS.ix.1.:.! Of. lAi>>i, . OClACHf-l t ? « £ i : . . , . ) H ' l Au *i W K t T f 'HIS STL'S 1. ;.STu-t>. A M * f ' | . < ! N TO: • U R E A U p e s V £ M i c o t r s «VUTOMOOH.e8 MOTOR VCHICLS H \ JBtA( I C AA<-..^. Ill BI LLlfS32.?7riRRl ,;.,|,u.. S - " V LJ U&QYtSU PIERRE 7 2 5 ROBITAILLB ST LAMBEfer s4T ^ A .r n 011192 �Tfme Received RCMP iuesaay 10:30 P.M. l.yiO/70 *$£ A c *\t [ \\ ft , •_ C' K C <£.< A fl y , . f/V //* 'S F4CAT AUyz jAsTUST^Mevr T>flH i s <?V iL C*AC- Mf/MC^s ?+K\l~sr a U er/qUfS * l -». ?o/,ctF $2lU Rs %t iA •'• *~ -i ', -"'••••'-••-' • , c^UE t FACUT& A/ou* >/S*JUS . * Sz£R*)T,.A$%&-f0##£\VA? 7>f~ *^ T*S '.. yy 'A^Z&tf fA ."•xtvp -• CD A UA' y ^ / M ^ | ^ i ~ R5>' i/lrt iAi.ti -t$ABi-r'Vt-MI ••. -' '« - i ?*R£6A,'/i/JZSA , '^M^PM::dAJ^ rips -ye Th'tzTQ'UT' ',- d/iJ (/, ft v Ad£ivea,\ / ^ r > J>^^ f Rc>c&~Z>#An 11 . f/a Gu^hAC) 011193 �A- Lie ^ ^ ^ ^ , • *--LA- '" ^ ^ fix X> k y-ti^^- 011194 �Time Received I CMP Sunday 6:00 P.M. 11/10/70 -i ... J i I I t i ; L >v l U IV I tx R J \y • rI • | I fc M N| L/ /W £J AA6" R ot} u < LXCI T ,DfV £ ^ n PB(T £ L( EFKCTUE VnUS SA f i L K N I t R E .ACEUL.UA.E pa CEULULE Qui CST o 12 > A f i U f > e,7RX,.-'<A.C£e/v*£Vt-Mtfvr FH.«E CUMMUWIC/* P«^V/« UA/ ' ne » L H rROSS .,„„/. M M U M ? U . TION . wous La pa RT£ T t w»——— . ^s LJ ft K ,Lt k p ...F r ^ ^ DIN/ORE sg^jRgflAAAJA T^7A^TAAi ^tf^-T^rRA^^^ c.« 1 :y£ X- L ' l ' l ' p i - ' » 1 ; rt r-., T- .- A LA P& f, r L : L « A h. < r<v X. L M ' 011195 �•-. lj..A%* dUAA. < - , \ A . y :**..;-<• '-yAl. • * - i 0 • : -i~A <. XAAJ^AX AA ''V 1 U^Hu4„ -*" KUAAI. " U . - 3 ^ . - . . t t f . - ^ U - ("»-«- i*-**-*-* O • ^ />£&T- A!; :.-* *$**-* V - i M . .t«.-*-K- ;AJTXP -7; *Lt y^-^-'J-' A.,A. ^ ,,„•• ts+-"A * 7i.s hi. ^ U^' - '"'" v ' "* I i -v.-—' • y / . — .. <p«- . - <. - *«... - . .p , .JL*A .,- , . : . . '•' ' —• • p p .3 011196 �iX-KxysuJ-I_S± - L <. !Jiu h - JU.. . l < . J L - - x .v . < P A- A . S J - * • ' . i?.A - * - t X ' - . • i , ^ 4J.>.4.-1.. !- «• 'P,. ••-Vi_x3 Lt-fc^jt. i ^ n ^ c -eU-a^-O-C'*. A a 'tU.- p. . . . J 5 7 / z4 C^C-L- I. / l P LiL\.i--L<^_ - :*^A, 5&$^;4vC^^ -P* '-4-g-. , p. -*«*>•.* .>VA-^'~>^Ui&^i^ •-,..£.. A • • ?• ..(V * '•••*>*-*. fay 4 *-<*+*. ' r **-K :.-.-'. /AUL (Xy*. . - A > S 4 ^ < R ^ U . j l ^ .y i ^ r t - * v-.,. .7. „. i • •• \Jyy .. -.4. ^ . -A..k fc£ •.' . xp A ... •t\7U-Aa.i A'^'-. r .... • 7 V^.-4 x^*-**"* •k " * # v . -MX- ,-'*•; kJL i\ .JwJA 3.- °^A~- J t - < „ . ^^i^6^...r ,<t*~ 'V'I c : y\.W^ ;< k.. L^sSr*-*-*- k-.tf-^-^-^-'f ^^^^p-A^^-' s - -A • /> * •>- A W . v / ' ^ . O-«L~ -V,A-~ /J V- U - A -A •*_» »-»--AxAjx A_ PJL« -'--'--O"-—c i%AZV..<—^t.-."-'- X ^ A. •<.-<_-'p-'i.^v. • gVv«—t £-<--*-X«t. ^3 _ �&zA7^^.J> yy k> 4 A^^^-^ -> Pme Received PCI,?/5 55 P.M. 12/10/70 Mono! / v* ¥. A IA J.. J U I . • T. j . ' .,. .i33^ i,acite d e j flii^f^cflj IK1..CI.E iii 1.1; r a i r . u i t / p a r lo gjuver-e^t-^t au ^ufbec v o i c i l e r^po-3e du F L* du 4 r o - t ( c e l l u l e Chfkier) l)"OU3 refuso-s toute -egociatio- qus-.d au fo-d dr-j six conditions qui restent a appliquer. 2) en ce qui touche l e s m o d a l i t e s t e c h n i q u e d * a p p l i c a t i o n des s i x c o n d i t i o n s nous avo»>s pleinement confiance a l ' l n t o g r i t e r ^ v o l u t i o v ^ a i r e de r o b e r t l e m i e u x . Nous l e designons done comne i - t e r - 1>cuteur du f r o n t .Chacune de aes d e c i s i o n s s e r a i r r e v o c a b l e . L u i s ' e s t >ou3»"Qus c ' e s t lui. 3) l a s e u l e g a r a n t i e que nous pouvo«3 do-~er quand I l u l i b e r a t i o n de p i a r r e l a p o r t e c ' a s t n o t r e p a r o l e de r e v o M t i o ^ w a i r e qu*'b r ' c o i s . C e l u i - c i s e r a relache* sain e t sauf da«s l e a "24H h e u r e s s u i v o - t l - j r ' a l i 3 a t i o n des exgigences du F L ^ U) ^ue^d a l a l i b e r a t i o n de M.Cross nous pouvo-3 vous a s s u r e r que c e l a s e r a f a i t a i c e l u i c i e s t encore e-< v i e . Cependand conme la c e l l u l e de L i b e r a t i o n do-c - ' a do-^e encore aucu- s i g - e de v i e r i e - vous p r o m e t t r e -ous - e pouvo-s gtttiM l a - d e a a u s . Nous ne savons pas s i K.Cross a e t e ou no-< e x e c u t e s * Mais -ous l e repeton s s i James Cross E s t encore v i v a n t i l s e r a llbertEXifomme pi£fjca..la£g£tg,. 5) conme preuvo de n o t r e bonne f o i - o u s s u s p e - d o - s nos a c t i v i t e s r't demendons aux a u t r e s c e l l u l a a d ' e - f a i r e auta-t. 6 ) t o u t e h e s i t a t i o n de v o t r e p a r t 3cra consider* 3 ' coi/m* Un r e f u s teciteXdJUfc<lii£i'ftPX$Iil e t e n t r a i n e r a 1 ' e x e c u t i o n de p i e r r e l a p o r t e . 7) >~ou3 -A<i fixony aucun d e l a i s , c e p e - d a - t s i vous iua-ii'e. 011198 �V — u-e evi.j* ^ u v a i a e foi -ous p a s s e r ' - * a l ' a c t i o - . gOC.S /RQKT VABiCROUS DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC 011199 �i J A.'. :h October 13, 1970 n n-.n MEMORANDUM FOR FROM RE DEPUTY MINISTER eft^-TFKH . J. A. Scollin F. L. Q. This note sets out the advantages and disadvantages of Federal Government.action under the War Measures Act and under special legislation. (1) General Ca) Need for express written request by Province of Quebec establishing conditions in that Province and acknowledging inadequacy of normal lav; enforcement methods for dealing with those conditions. Such request might be tabled. (b) Provision for enforcement by Federal as well as provincial authorities. (c) Provincial, national and International implications of any emergency action. (d) Importance of recitals in light of Government's • general position On civil rights. Ce) Substance of provisions would be the same whether Government resorts to War Measures Act or brings in special legislation. See note attached setting out essential provisions. (f) Avoidance of overreaction. (2) War Measures Act Advantages Ca) Speed and effectiveness - proclamation legally conclusive evidence of Insurrection, real or apprehended. (b) Built-in exclusion of Bill of Rights. . • . AA. 011200 �(c) Easy to revoke when emergency passes. (d) Can readily be preceded by debate on a resolution. (e) Action can be taken even if the members of tlie F.L.Q. appear under the guise of some other association. Disadvantages (a) Political and economic effect of admitting existence of insurrection is more serious than in the case of special legislation. Cb) Although main impact of regulations under the Act would be confined to Quebec, Act would be officially in force throughout Canada. (c) Although regulations could provide for Federal participation in enforcement, the principle of Federal control in areas of national]interest would not be as plainly or as permanently asserted as would be the case with special legislation. Special legislation • Advantages Ca) The remedy is restricted to tlie malady. As the legislation only deals with the F.L.Q. organization, the Government is not open to the allegation that any otjier politically repressive action is being taken under the guise of anti-F.L.Q. action. Cb) It preserves the principle of law-making by Parliament wc«. (M.} °-±-~* . Cc) Because on the face of it, it is more limited than a proclamation Under the War Measures Act, its side effects are likely to be less serious. Cd) It gives Parliament's recognition to the principle of Federal right and responsibility for direct enforcement of the criminal law in areas of primary national concern. >jJUt^d~y, ^JCwuw ^JL-^UC A^~~w< */ 3 C,'.AJL..*. t- i iy '^J r*™<-- 011201 �- 5 - Disadvantages (a) It cannot be put into effect as quickly as the War Measures Act. (b) To avoid the risk by the courts, it express provision standing the Bill Cc) In the event that a defect in its operation is discovered, it is slower and more difficult to amend than regulations under the War Measures Act. (d) It highlights the abandonment of the recent liberal trend in penal legislation. of it being immediately nullified must contain an unpalatable that it is to operate notwithof Rights. ] �.JA.'.:WJI D • October 13, 1970 RJAl provisions Recital. Statement of facts; provincial request; peace, order and good government basis; need to maintain foundation for exercise of civil rights. (2) Title for Act (or regulations). Very genera] . Suggest 'Tublic Order Act'k Compare Public Rrdcr Act 1936 (U.K.) passed to restrict pro-Razi activities of Sir Oswald Mosley's Blackshirts. C3) (Special legislation only) - Act Operates notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights. C4) "Attorney Generali: defined to include Attorney General of Canada to enable him to) fastitite proceedings. CS) The association Known as the F.L.Q. is declared to be an unlawful association. if- C6) A person who (a) is or professes to be a member of the F.L.Q., Cb) acts or professes to ac,t as an officer of the F.L.Q., Cc) communicates statements as the representative or professed representative of the F.L.Q., . Cd) advocates, promotes, or defends the acts, aims, principles or policies of the F.L.Q., Ce) contributes anything as dues or otherwise to the F.L.Q. or to anyone for the F.L.Q., or Cf) solicits subscriptions or contributions for the F.L.Q., is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to iaprisonment for not more than twenty years. C7) In any prosecution, evidence that the accused Ca) attended a meeting of the F.L.Q., (b) spoke Publicly in advocacy of the F.L.Q., or 7 a t a r i - 011203 �- 2 (c) communicated statements of the F.L.Q. is, in the absence oC proof to the contrary, proof that he is a member of the F.L.Q. (8) A peace officer may arrest without warrant :. person whom he has reason to suspect is or who professes to be a member of the F.L.Q. or who has committed, is committing, or is about to co:..mit any act mentioned in subparagraphs (b) to (f) of paragraph (6). (9) A person arrested for an offence under this Act shall be detained in custody pending trial unless the Attorney General consents to that person being released on bail, (10) • Provision for expediting trial of person detained in custody under the Act. Cll) B. Limit to, say, three months the period of Operation of the special provisions for arrest and detention without bail. Ancillary provisions Certain other provisions may be necessary to provide, for example, for search of premises without warrant and seizure of F.L.Q. material and making it an offence for a person to provide accommodation for the purpose of members of the F.L.Q. holding meetings. 011204 �In the light of the abduction of Mr. Cross and of Mr. Laporte and the cemauniques that have heen issued by or in the name of the F.L.Q. and other factors relating thereto, I am satisfied after careful consideration 'vith senior officials directly responsible for the administration of justice in the Province of Quebec, tuat those nro'le^s arising out of the abductions and other related matters thereto, cannot be dealt with adequately under the existing law. Tn tho circumstances, I siust on behalf of the Government of Quebec, request that emergency powers be provided at soon es possible to allow irore effective measures to be taken. In particular, I request that those powers include authority for the arrest and detention of persons who, the Attorney General of Ouebec is satisfied on reasonable grounds, arc dedicated to the violent and illegal overthrow of Government. On the basis of information we have end which is available to you, my Government is apprehensive of insurrection on the part of those just mentioned. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly apparent that a massive attempt is being made to intimidate and subvert democratic Government and institutions in this nrovince by the ...II �-2completely innocent men under threat of ^eir? murdered hut we are faced with an attemnt to Rest roy OMT social institutions by a small ninority rajnrtinr to criwtnal acts and it is tKese considerations that 1e*d mv to mal-e what I fullv sppreciate is ar» extra -ordinary rer.u<-st. 011206 �Z ri: tie rcA \ 1 In the light of tho ahduction of Mr. Tross and of ".r. Lanorte: th* communiques which have R^on issued by tve F.L.^. and other matters relating *o t'o^c ahluctlons, T ip satisfied after careful conriR"rr»T ion with senior official? directly responsible for the aR ninistr.it ion of justice in the Province of ^lehec, thit those "roMeas arising out of the abductions and otber related matters thereto, cannot *e adequately dealt vith inker rh.» existing: lav. I'nder rh<e clrcunstanccs, I -nust on Jrkilf cf the Governr.:nt of Qurhec, request that rncr^mcv legislation K e exacted as r.onr. as ro^slMe to allow more effective measures to be talrn. Tn .articular, T request that the legislation incluJe authority f:>r the arrert ar.d detention of persons who tne Attrrrey General of Quebec is satisfied on reasonable grounds nrc dedicated to the violent and illegal overthrow of Government. the basis of information we have aad vhUR is available to you, my Government is apprehensive of insurrection on tho part of those just mentioned. I am assured ly law enforcement authorities and I aa satisfied that such legislation is necessary to cope with the present emergency. On Not only are two �-2well organized and planned commission of illepal acts of a most reprehensible nature and that those enp,:?ged in this process derive their ir.spirntjop from sources and philosophies that are wholly foreign to us and to our concept of freedom under lav. I am assured by law enforcement authorities and I am satisifed that such legislation is necessary to cope with the present emergency. Not only are two completely innocent men under threat of being murdered hut we are faced with an attempt to destroy our social order by a small minority resorting to criminal acts as I have mentioned, and it is these considerations that lead me to make what I fully appreciate is an extra-ordinary request. �Projet I A la lumi&re des enlevements de messieurs Cross et Laporte, des communiques 6mis par le F.L.Q. et des autres donnees reliSes a ces enlevements, et apres avoir consults les hauts fonctionnaires immediatement responsables de 1'administration de la justice dans la Province de Quebec, je suis convaincu que les problemes resultant de ces enlevements et des autres sujets connexes ne peuvent etre r6gl6s de facon satisfaisante en vertu de la loi telle qu'elle existe prgsentement. Dans les circonstances, au nom du Gouvernement du Quebec, je demande qu'une loi d'urgence soit pass6e le plus t6t possible permettant de prendre des mesures plus efficaces. En particulier, je demande que cette loi autorise I'arrestation et la detention des personnes que le Procureur gen6ral du Quebec estime, selon des motifs raisonnables, Stre des personnes d6di6es a la cause du renversement du Gouvernement par des moyens violents et ill£gaux. Selon les informations que nous posse'dons et qui vous sont accessibles, mon Gouvernement craint une insurrection de la part des personnes en question. J'ai regu l'assurance des autorites responsables de 1'application de la loi et je suis convaincu de la neAessite" d'une telle legislation pour faire face a �.2. cette crise. Non seulement deux hommes completement innocents de tout crime sont menaces de meurtre mais encore nous devons faire face a une tentative de destruction de nos structures sociales mSmes de la part d'un petit groupe minoritaire qui n'hesite pas a recourir au crime et a la violence; ce sont ces consi derations qui motivent la pr6sente requete dont j'appr6cie pleinement le caracte*re extraordinaire. �Projet 2 A la lumie're des enlevements de messieurs Cross et Laporte, des communiques 6mis par le F.L.Q. ou en son nom et des autres facteurs relies a cette question, et apr&s avoir consulte les hauts fonctionnaires imm6diatement responsables de 1'administration de la justice dans la Province de Quebec, je suis convaincu que les problemes qui ont r6sult6 des enlevements et des autres affaires s'y rapportant ne peuvent etre r6gl6s de facon satisfaisante en vertu de la loi actuelle. Dans les circonstances, au nom du Gouvernement du Quebec, je demande que des pouvoirs d'urgence soient prevus le plus t6t possible permettant de prendre des mesures plus efficaces. Je demande en particulier que ces pouvoirs comprennent l'autorite d'arrSter et de d6tenir du Quebec les personnes que le Procureur g6neral/estime selon des motifs raisonnables 8tre des personnes dediees au renversement du Gouvernement par la violence et des moyens illegaux. Selon les informations que nous poss6dons et qui vous sont accessibles, mon Gouvernement craint une insurrection de la part des personnes en question. De plus en plus apparait 1'evidence d'un effort concerte pour intimider et renverser le Gouvernement et les institutions democratiques de cette Province par la commission planifi6e et systematique d'actes iliegaux • �.2. de nature odieuse; de plus en plus il est clair que les individus engag6s dans cet effort concerte puisent leur inspiration de sources et de philosophies totalement etrangeres aux nOtres et au principe de la liberte dans le respect du droit. J'ai regu 1'assurance des autorites responsables de 1'application de la loi et je suis convaincu de la necessite d'une telle legislation pour faire face a la crise actuelle. Non seulement deux hommes compietement innocents de tout crime sont menaces de meurtre mais encore nous faisons face a une tentative de destruction de l'ordre social par une petite minorite ayant recours & la commission d'actes criminels; ce sont ces considerations qui m'amenent a faire une demande dont j'apprecie pleinement le caractere extraordinaire. 011212 �- 3conditions mentioned in the Laporte letter, then proceeded to ignore the matter, one would have expected a strong FLQ reaction if the police aspect were a crucial one for them. This did not occur. Nonetheless, it is obvious that, if we intend to make a deal with the FLQ or at leaat to gain time, a low profile of police activity would be desirable. The most interesting aspect of the communique, from the federal viewpoint, is the reference to an intarmediaire: "De plus, Maitre Lemieux devrait servir d»interm&iiaire entre les deux cellules du FLQ et les autorites en place". rVhat this means is far from clear. At a minimum, it aiay simply mean that Lemieux will deal with the governments on behalf of the FLQ in the practical arrangements for the departure of the prisoners. The reference to the "intermediaire" comes at the end of a paragraph on practical arrangements for the release of the prisoners and should perhaps be read strictly in that context. It may mean no more than what was said in comnunique' No. 6 of October 8 i.e. that Lemieux will watch and assist that process. There is also, however, a. possibility that the FLQ is trying to give minimal satisfaction to Mr. Bourassa's instance on some form of negotiation. Under this interpretation, the communique would be hinting that we should talk to Lemieux. If we do we may well find he has no particular mandate and that the only line he can take with us is to request full compliance with the FLQ communique, The federal and Quebec governments will have to decide whether to sound out Lemieux in order to determine if he can or will discuss substantive issuea. There would be obvious risks. He might seek to embarrass the governments in public. He might interpret his role in a different way from the two governments. There would be the added problem of establishing a secure contact, between him and the FLQ, of a kind which would be necessary if there were to be bargaining over more than technical and administrative issues connected with the prisoners1 release. On "political prisonera", the lateat communique restates all the detailed requirements put forward in the very first communique. These relate to publicity, wives and children and accompanying lawyers and journalists. If the prisoners were released, presumably there would be here an area of practical acconmodation arrangements to be agreed with Lemieux. A long section is devoted to a solemn guarantee by the FLQ concerning the release of the hostages. Incidentally, even if we cannot have meaningful negotiations with an FLQ representative, the question of guarantee need not present insurmountable difficulties. If the federal and Quebec governments were willing to release the prisoners, it would be possible to make with the receiving country (and not with the FLQ) a public arrangement which would tie prisoners* release to the release of Cross and Laporte. We believe this technique has been used in similar cases in other countries. The prisoners would proceed to Cuba but remain in Canadian hands there. Once confirmed that the hostages had been released, the Cuban government would take custody of the prisoners. If the hostages were not released within an agreed period, the Cubans would allow their return to Canada. (The need for complicated and negotiated guarantees would arise only if the kidnappers themselves wanted safe conduct which is not the case as yet.<) r A A213 011 �v. / £"<£y£ PA j. . / i i /C S E C R E T AA. October 14, 1970 oZo-aa- TFK-) MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE Abduction Cases The Cabinet Committee agreed at the morning meeting on October 14 that the following possible actions should be Lu-ksx L .A. . £ \ discussed at a further meeting to be held at 8:30 p.m., A October 14: I. [\A^.VI(JA> ' 3 L - Consultation with Opposition Leaders This would have to take place on Thursday, October 15, prior to the proposed statement by the Prime Minister. II. Statement by the Prime Minister After direct consultation with Mr. Bourassa, and provided that he agreed with the federal position, the Prime Minister would make a statement on Thursday, the 15th of October, after federal arrangements to support action delineated in the statement had been completed * (e.g. consultation with the British; army and police preparations). Consultation might proceed along the lines of two draft letters entitled "Draft 1" and "Draft 2" provided by the Department of Justice. The statement would (a) set a deadline (for example midnight Friday, October 16th) beyond which the governments of Quebec and Canada would no longer continue negotiations with the FLQ; (b) indicate that up until the deadline the sole negotiable questions would be the mechanisms by which the two hostages of the FLQ could bo released and those by which the abductors could bo given safe conduct out of the country. Instructions to this end would be issued concurrently to Mr. Demers. (Advice from S E C R E T 011214 , _ mmmmm^mH • :•* �s t-. c (•: i K V Kxternal AJ lairs P M f JPSP i IA <• MK-PII.UI J P:UP ,-ni'l instructions to Mr. Demers will be available at the meeting). (c) announce the government's intention to introduce, A at the request of the Government of Quebec, special legislation in the House providing the powers required to deal with the kidnapper's and with the FLQ if agreement on (b) above were not reached; (d) Indicate that, in the period up to tho deadline, A 'A U->t 3 ; . c < -p- no raids would be made by police, although normal surveillance procedures would continue. Any act of violence by the FLQ during this period would be regarded as the end of the V"\ deadline. The statement would further make . , P -*. clear that the responsibility for any harm to Mr. Cross or Mr. Laporte would be that of the abductors and theirs alone. Public Relations Advice for the Committee, in addition to an outline of the proposed statement would be available from officials concerning timing and means of securing the cooperation of press media in publicizing the statement by the Prime Minister; and in ensuring responsible reporting of events. Consideration should be given as to how last minute A RRA— -*» emotional appeals by either family could be directed before the deadline to the kidnappers rather than after A P ,1s the deadline toward either government. Should either hostage be forced by the FLQ to make a last minute appeal through the media, consideration 3 S E C R E T 011215 �S E C R E T - 3 should be given as to whether and how publication could be prevented, or at least, if pub]ication occurred, reaction by the public could best be directed where it properly belonged, against the kidnappers. IV. Foreign Consultation (a) O n tish - Prior to the Prime Minister As statement the British Government would have to be made aware of, and to the extent possible agree with, the contents of the statement and the reasoning behind it. This consultation would be necessarily delicate and complex and require specific direction by the Cabinet, as the British Government would feel bound to support any last minute public appeal made by Mrs. Cross. in / (rXi r A rr /( f* f < .. . 4 S E C R E T �S E C R E T _ 4 - (b) Other - Negotiations with the Cuban (or Algerian) autliorities would be necessary prior to the expiration of the deadline against the prospect that the FLQ would agree to the safe release of the hostages and seek safe conduct out of the country. V. Legislation (to be introduced on Friday, Oct.16) The Committee will have for consideration f A (a) a document prepared by the Department of Justice setting out the advantages and disadvantages of the federal government faking action under the War Measures Act; and (b) the advantages arid disadvantages of special legislation, including a basic outline of a bill which could deal with the immediate problem emd also be used in future if required. It was considered that the pr-.rposed legis] a'sion should be flexible enough to ci rcumscribe regions in which provisions of the Act would be applied but. not be so specific as to identify a particular province. Action After Deadline (a) Army - The Committee will have for consideratior. a list of suggested areas to be protected, not necessarily in terms of actual threat, but in terms of their symbolic value to both governments. Those of symbolic value to Quebec would rccjuire consultation with the Quebec authorities at the appropriate time. Aside from specific "target" protoctipp, it was suggested that a show of strength in major population centres, predominantly Montreal, and the availability of mobile tactical elements (e.g. helicopters) to assist other authorities as required would be necessary. (b) Police - The RCMP would arrange with, their immiejration counterparts a visible strengthening S E C R 4 T • -5 011217 �- 5 - of coverage at major border crossing point It was recognized that not all could be covered. Two to three hundred RCMP officers would be available who, once tied in with local police authorities would be multiplied by a factor of two or three, to proceed initially in selective arrests related to the two kidnappings as criminal acts. A list of prime suspects in relation to each case was available. Cooperation in making these preparations with Quebec and other police authorities would not be initiated or explored without direction by the Cabinet as to timing. Further consideration would be required as to the conduct on a broader basis for arrest in relation to disrupting the FLQ after passage of special legislation. (NOTE: Prior to arrests arrangements would have to be considered to ensure the physical and monetary support of the families of those arrested, for example, by cooperation with Montreal or other welfare authorities, in order to ensure that martyrs could not be claimed as a consequence of the arrest of criminals.) VII. Offer of Reward Consideration should be given to offering, concurrently with Army and Police action, a reward of possibly $100,000 for information leading either to the safe return of the hostages or the capture of the abductors. H . TA |(oX (Vtrv <AW.OA C.A3.-P-' f Secretary. ^ [ ,cV P A-\~AT-\ \ >>~c~i^. tji^^R tv u«-\Si/\i*"C. ("i^y S E C R E T 011218 1 �. QUE MZ r-lmh OQA^OTI *aW< OE PARL9UE "0 lSG20t5Z OCT 7(9 S E C R E T . A THANSMETTRE D URGENCE AU TRES . C PIERRE ELLIOT TRUDEAU OU A H R . GORDON ROBERTSON DEBUT TEXT I 1 >>g I QUEBEC, LE 16 OCTOBRE • ' • ' - . - MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MfMISTRE, AU CORS DES DEMUERS JOURS, LA POPULATION DU QUEBEC A ETE • A BOULEVERSEE PAR U S - ENLEVEMENTS DE MONSIEUR JAMES R. CROSS, REPRESENTANT DU OOUVERMEMENI BRITANNIQUE A MONTREAL, ET DE L HONORABLE PIERRE LAPORTE, MINISTRE DU TRAVAIL ET DE LA MAIN- r " 4 D OEUVRE ET MINISTRE Ot L IMMIGRATION DU QUEBEC, AINSI QUE PAR LES MENACES PRQFEREES CONTRE LA SECURITE DE L ETAT ET DES PERSONNES DAMS DES COMMUNIQUES RMI* m LE PTfONT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC OU EM SON NOM,- ET ENFIN PAR L ENSEMBLE DES CIRCONSTANCES RELIEE0 k- '' • ••' , A CES EVENEMENTS* • I -; APRES CONSULTATION 0£S AUTORITES DIRECTEMENT RESPONSABLES fiz... C DE L ADMINISTRATION DE LA J U S f t € t Afc QUEBEC, LE GOUVERNEMENT DU A . ;-.:' . - QUEBEC EST CONVAINCU QUE LA L O I , DANS SON ETAT ACTUEL, NE PERMET -•fc-• PAS DE REPOMDJjf 0 UM« FACQM S A T I I F A I S A N T E A CETTE SITUATION, t£ fc; " ' -A--' ' •' "-• DANS LES CIRCONSTANCES, AU NOM DU GOUVERNEMENT DU CUEP.EC, ^IDEMAMDE QUE DES POUVOIIS D URGENCE SOIENT PREVUS LE PLUS TOT • tJa POSSIBLE PERMETTANT DE PRENDRE DES MESURES PLUS EFFICACES. JE DEMANDE IFPAJWRICULIETQU^ CES POUVOIRS COMPRENNENT L AUTHORITE ' D ARRETER ET BE DETENIR LES PEJKSONNEF QUE LE PROCUREUR GENERAL • DU QUEBEC ESTIME RENVERSEMEN1; J0U^gaWWRWMEfT PM URAISONNABLE, VIOLENCE ETETRE DES DED1EES MOYENS ILLEGAUX. AU F POUR DES MOTIFS ' -C 011219 • �• • • » . » * * . -*-—-»*. . , , ^ « , -. ~^„—'iA^-a - «*— 4r SELON L INFORMATION QUE NOUS POSSEDONS ET QUI ' nl(lflTn,r . .( FAISON FACE A UN EFFORT CONCERTE POUR INTIMIDER r . ft&4VERS£R LE GOUVERNEMENT ET LES INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRAT IQUE • DE CtTTl PROVINCE PAR LA COMMISSION PLAMIFIEE ET A SYSTEMATIQUE D ACTES ILLEGAUX, Y COMPRIS L INSURAECIIONf IL EST CUIR CUE LES INDIVIDUS ENGAGES DANS CET EFFORT COtoBEMTE REJETTENI TOTALEMENT LE PRINCIPE DE LA LIBERTE DAMS • P f f c U DROIT. LE GOUVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC EST CONVAINCU DR,LA NECESSITE DE HRS POUR FAIRE FACE A LA CRISE ACTUtLLE*HSU SEULEMENT .:•}. • DEUX HOMMES COMPLETEMENT INNOCENTS SONT MENACES ^ ASSA SSI NAT, MAIS ENCORE NOUS FAISON FACE A UNE TENTATIVE DE DESTRUCTION DE L ORDRE SOCIAL PAR UNE MINORITE AYANI RECOURS A LA COMMISSION - |H I IkACTES CRIMINELSf CE SONT CES CONSIDERATIONS QUE AWENENT NOTRE GOUVERNEMENT A FAIRE CETTE DEMANDE. ' LE GOUVERNEMENT EST CCNFIANT QUE PAR LE RECORS A DE TELS POUVOIRS, IL POURRA SANS DELAI METTRE UN FREIN A L INTIMIDATION * ET A LA TERREUR. ET ASSURER A TOUS LES CITOYENS LA PAIX ET LA - SECURITE. VEUILLEZ ACCEPTER, MONSIEUR tER MINISTRE, L EXPRESSION U • DE MES SENTIMENTS LES MEILIEURS. .... SIGNE HONORABLE R OBERT BOURASSA PREMIER DU QUEBEC FIN TEXT • i • ' 011220 �P.C.1970-1807 . 16 October, 1970 CANADA PRIVY C O U N C I L • CONSEIL PRIVE •RkOi . WHEREAS the War Measures Act provides that the issue of a proclamation under the authority of the Governor in Council shall be conclusive evidence that insurrection, real or apprehended, exists and has existed for any period of time therein stated and of its continuance, until by the issue of a further proclamation it is declared that the insurrection no longer exists. ANU WHEREAS there is in contemporary Canadian society an element or group known as Le Front de Liberation du Quebec who advocate and resort to the use of force and the commission of criminal offences, including murder, threats of murder and kidnapping, as a means of or as an aid in accomplishing a governmental change within Canada and whose activities have given rise to a state of apprehended insurrection within the Province of Quebec. THEREFORE, HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, is pleased to direct that a proclamation do issue proclaiming that apprehended insurrection exists and has existed as and from the fifteenth day of October, one thousand nine hundred and seventy. C E R T . F . E D T O BF. A T R U E C O R V COPIE CERTIFIES C O N F O R M E 7 A- A y /9/ '. t , " /^'..^•^A'^.'-x^, .--• CL-ERK O F 1 | E p R I V Y C O U N C I l . UE O B E F F I E R n u C O N S E I L . P R I V E 011221 �P.C. 1970-1800 16 October, 19 70 L&^ *A&A CANADA PRIVY C O U N C I L • CONSEIL PRIVE *) < WHERRAS it continues to be recognized in 6 Canada that men and institutions remain free only when freedom is founded upon respect for moral and spiritual values and the rule of law; J AND WHEREAS there is in contemporary Canadian society an element or group known as Le Front de Liberation du Quebec who advocate the use of force or the commission of crime as a means of or as an aid in accomplishing a governmental change within Canada and who have resorted to the commission of serious crimes including murder, threat of murder and 'kidnapping; AND WHEREAS tlie Government of Canada desires to ensure that lawful and effective measures can be taken against those who thus seek to destroy tlie basis of our democratic governmental system on which the enjoyment of our human rights and fundamental freedoms is founded and to ensure the continued protection of those rights and freedoms in Canada. THEREFORE, HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, pursuant to tlie War Measures Act, is pleased hereby to make the annexed Regulations to Provide Emergency Powers for the Preservation of Public Order in Canada. E R T I F I E D T O 13" A T R U E C O P Y C O P I E C F A l F1EE C O N F O S M E / .A' .-/ - .p - v ^ f c « . v ^ v C;_r.RK O F T H E P R I V Y C O U N C I L UK O H E F F l E O o u CONS12IL. F»f*lv£ 011222 �REGULATIONS RO RuuVILS EMERGENCY PO'REALS FOR TRp PRESERVATION OR PUBLIC ORRER IN Z.AZDA Short Title 1. Those Regulations may be cited as the Public Rroer .. cfu":.-.: t i on s, 1970. interpretation 2. in these Regulations, "communicate" includes the act of communicating by telephone, broadcasting or other audible or visible means; "peace officer" means a peace officer as defined in the Criminal Ccrie ane includes a member of the Canadian Armed Forces; '•'statements" includes worcs spoken or written cr recorded electronically or electromagnetically or otherwise, and gestures, signs or other visible representations; and "the unlawful association" means the group of persons or association declared by these Regulations t-o be an unlawful association. General 3. The group of persons or association known as Le Front ce Liberation du Quebec and any successor group or successor association of the said Le Front de Liberation du Quebec or any group of persons or association chat advocates the use of force or the commission of crime as a means of or as an aid in accomplishing governmental change within Canada is declared to be an unlawful association. 4. A person who is or professes to be a member of the unlawful association, (b) acts or professes to act as an officer of the unlawful association, (c) communicates statements on behalf of or as a representative or professed representative of the unlawful association, (d) advocates or promotes the unlawful acts, akr.p, principles or- policies of the unlawful association, (e) cont.-ibutes anything as dues or otherwise to the unlawful association or to anyone for the benefit of the unlawful association, (f) solicits subscriptions or contributions for the unlawful association, or (g) advocates, promotes or engages r the use of force or the commission of criminal offences as a means of accomplishing a governmental change within Car.aca is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. (a) . . 011223 �P• 3 3C'3P3_; V.'30j Ci..Ut.CA AJ CO ^J <.. ~—Lu\ L.r.Cer w3SSC o 3 3 GWAVig 0 3 c. P 0 .... : -.:. J'1 o.fcfc >j i^^ 3 . S c 3 7 O S ^ I, naVSng S^PP^33 -''AVSS A OSP S .A .7. rCSSOSfc P_.S ' AA... 7 - . 3 / OS S3 OJX 0 P . n s 3 3 1 3 3 0 3 33fc' 11 SA 3 3 3 3 4 3 OA'- 1 3 S S 3 P . C 3 t s 3 . c s ipi'c.': D.3scri'c "cnc-reo"/ t o orovcr.i :ns:...or, trra.:. or- pupisr.rrsnt or crat porsoi l / . S V P. : is guilty of an indictable off si.ss and 3 3 3 3 . 7 3 t o 13pA313C3.S331 i o r a t o r s , n o t . 0 • ~ \..C0.. AJ. . _L 6„ An 0".3i err-. r . n s s e , P P C S S or s u p s r r n t e n c . - e n t o 3 3 3 sfcPfcAarn--- roorrp prersr.ses o r c • V3S-.3 ..3 U.'. 3 S S O 0 . ' 3 G j.OA O* .~i,-".".-» s.A r\ r- -* - •-" -. r *- c- -. ~| I i y on • A. .. , .tees - . : . . . v^P— , p_ ...J. C. - .-. 0.1 parsons v;no pros;ots tne acts, SJ.SP-P grpfccrgsos or 333 unlawful association i::: g:ur3.tpr ok sn Indict-Aols o. ana liable to a kins ok not.sAS'r than five thousand d.c-lJ i ..P^ i;..PP. 'rr f ' A ' f l -.rc--r-r-'--, ,--..- 3,-7 o \j - v> o -^- p^>. ' • r 7. (1) R psr-scn a 3 3 s s r ;.d f o r s n o: SnS.^.3 33 CAC.,S 3 3 Sfc.. 3 3 OP33S A ,vA .'...fc-.-v. c o n s e n t s \ .- .., .-" .....* ,- ';- ,. ... .-j C ». 7. .A ^ . . '. trsa.L us. V . ' P t n o U t . fcfc ..-o o..^ rpp.G: 3v A. rr o P-.A3'PG3 G or. S P . •" reused hr p R S S P srst-stc-c for as of font a:.3 is Z,.:Z'.Z::cZ in custody for Ass ^ AL,. ; CUStOAy p .- ...^-i r. - -; Q "oursosp onk.y or' t n s r . s charge under these .regulations in res-pact of which he is in r- ••: c- — r- '-•\ A* A . A ^ J A J I^A •--• P j • 1 . . i -t- 4 , - - ' - • " -i --. > u U l ! V . - . - . . . - - S ; o . I I W X -r, ^ - - J . i ^ ,-. r- ••-.•- L L . i . ; " t" h ": " - r- -. 3 AJ.'. _ . AJ £ . A.A At custody of she a c c u s a c s h a l l j f o r t h w i t h C f * — c c : i • U r > ^ ' . • V . . - . — - i - . - - • c j ^ : i • - . ^ r 4 _ y ^ . r . w . > r . ^ - . . . r , U - - L . - > - J • " J , i * - . . / - J i - n A J ' r U A > . A J - ^ * A - ~ • " c • - . " - ^ of cnisksal jurisdicti is beir_ ";<.-','' ^- 3. -I.-A ^s O c * «.< C . k"" -k C L • . A-y '. _ il: C h- L- . . - A. A r "i r. "•*'- v . . ^ J v.- J p ^ T C j L * " J A.J icpo'Ci t h e e n p i n s t i e r : r ^ " ^ . _ ^ " 7 k ^ /_ - . ' ; . - " • ^ . c ^ * _ > ' • " " ~ * A " ± , i — v " - ^ _ | P — v -• ' " _ ' r v n ^ ^ i > v 'i ^ - . - ' 4 ^ S.C--. A :•"! A :. C - ' --O . R . - 3 . 3) R U C i C;-... the t r i a l -• v . - _ c^ L-he c. c c u s c c . S - C . P C U..A. AJ: IA> - . ---, -• " F-<-CJU- va) (b) (c) £ G l AP' t rA C - 1 3P:UJ. assocsatson s p o k e p u b l i c l y i n a d v o c a c y p J. A.- .: u -\-i- I '| l.TV * •< • P.- J_cl V. ^ L.— associat-ion, or cornmuriicatea s t a t O.'.G un_av.pui a s s o c i a t i o n as a representative on p. o._ P S S P - . r u 1 . _-f. o s n o . . . AJ~.v v G — c o P L. •--J •• OJ. Ah:: unIT'PAA association IS, 33 tP3 "fcfcSCfc G-. G'Afc._ 3C.S C-v.' L.P r-y, p r o oi Si S.3S S 3 of t h e SSAAAAU. th.st he is t': (1J (a) a p s r s o n v.'hc:- h e h. h a s r s a s o n t o SIP.PG merfosr ok 3 n s unrpprriA a s s o c i a t : (b) a p e r s o n \Z:.o p r o f e s s e s t o be a r oi t n e ur Rank AA a s s c c A A i o n • c r v c j a p e r s o n A.srs na .ras SP . .• on r.oo e <7 v r:. s c 4 i s corrfc.itting o r i s a o c u t t o c e r r r s t an ^.ct c . s s c r i c e c i n p a r a g r a p h s (b) t o (g) of s e c t i o n 4 . ...3 011224 �(Ri k p. iursua.nt t o s u b s e c t i o n (,lj s h a l l be t a k e n 1 charged w i t h an .ss J.3 s e c t i o n 4 not Is t e n than sever, days of t h a p r o v i n c e in which t n e parson i s being; d e t a i n e d h r s , before t h e e x p i r y of t h o s e s i r e n d a y s , issued an o r d e r tne A t.:P accs.sea oe ires-tncr ecea.pp. c. untifc t n e e x p r r v o.- a s e r i e s . not exceeding twenty-one esp-p a f t e r h i s a r r e s t , a t t h e endok which poeriod t h e per-.AOS arr-psted s h a l l be taken b-sr'cre a j u s t i c e having pAprPsareekcr :.:r. crr.-rged w i t h en offence ccscrr_uea m secfcAiori L cc roic-: see. rrc.'."; custoc-/. PS 3 : k ; p e , p l a c e , v c h i d S j v e s s e l or a i r e s m wr.sc;': (a) 3 .P £.nytn: 3 3 1 : C t '-v 03 1-3 3 . proposing the p o l i o s e s G. c.'ie tire r e r s amp.'" t n in (b) .-:..-.-....,,.,. C i i c . l i , . . , .A t . . . . . G-.VA.. (a.) a l. 'J 21. C:... 1' S G 3 be •evidence of an .-. -., .--. -fc .Ai 33e s u m ose o: s l e s or •:., O 0 3. A u j . O-.' J any :.r..rsber of t k p r e s e i r t ; or (C; ''A -~" (.- O . ' v.. 0 o ) detained by the unlawful Any propser'ty that a peace c •..- *s". - x 1 LX v U :^ ,A e s s e n c e isecss" t n e s c r'eguiaofficer d a t e of s e i s m or u n t i l s e e i n g s i s r e l a t i o n t o an trass nay, without, warrant, be sr-rz rzed by a peace c i"' u.A A1 e c "r" 1 -A.V~ rial . a'AJy u ..-. Ci. of R. C e c 3 u - ; ^.«. 0 D Ci e £ 'j.2.r* C^c*. n which such proc---'A-J may -yi -^- \^ _ . >- iO-"'ILV. 1 A S I L T l C 3 _ C o a 0 i p O I i C . ' 1 C G S C A * C J A , ^ £ •' £ S GT.A OJTC 0: >y t : 011225 �CA C.I. PRIVY COUNCIL . COKPSEIL PRIVi 19 7 0 - 1 8 0 7 16 o c t o b r e 19 70 ? Ac- < -- /< s-y/A A t t e n d u q u e la Loi sur les m e s u r e s Ro g u e r r e e c i c t e q u o 1 'emission d'une p r o c l a m a t i o n sous 1'aui.or.i x.e du g o u v e r n e u r en c o n s e i l e s t une p r e u v e concluarssc quo. l'etat d' insup-rection, r o e l l c ou !.pprobend.ce ex.i r.t.c et a ex: pendant toute periode C te y e n o n c e e ct q u ' i l c o n t i n u e j u s q u ' a co q u e , par imp p r o c l a m a t i o n u l t c r i e u r e , il soit d e c l a r e que l'etat d ' i n s u r r e c t i o n a p r i s fin. Et att e n d u qu'il PAS I s >to actuellc s o c i e t e c a n a d i e n n e un nor at) ou g r o u p e a p p e l e -n> 2o F r o n t de L i b e r a t i o n d u Q u e b e c qui p r c e o n i s e 1'cms.loi d 1a force ou la p e r p e t r a t i o n de c r x mc -]'i le s o u r L r O ; les meirw.cp-s de mort et 1 ' e n l e v e m e n t et a recours , r ccm.vie m o y e n ou instrument: i.ns Re reali: r un changement: de gouverno-men' s u C a n a d a , .1 'ac fric vit.R a e n g e n d r e un etat c\ n s u r r c c Li.pr , ~ p r e end do d a n s .la p r o v i n c e de Q u e b e c . j. En c o n s e q u e n c e , sur avis c o n f o r n c c.v, Prui; j e i" ministre,. il p l a i t a Son E x c e l l e n c e lo G c u v e r u e u r genera.! en conseil d e d e c r e c e r q u o soit er.use une p r o c l a m a t i o n d e c l a r a n t qu ' u i e t a t cl' i n s u r r e c t i o n a p p r e h e n d e o e x i s t e et a 2XJste d e p u i s lc q u i n p e octobro mil neuf cent soixantc-dix. ct; n: ;••'.<:- iu - P.'-JiVF 011226 �; CA c cr l t ' . - . c : : L. c: o ITVP e r p r d - p D< s P.e ... ^_ s ' s s r :-. c'.cr i o n c e cos._ o p r s.s s egjr.o.Ap .. r a i s e . . . . s s u s i c . ' i o u ds- c o c s u n R o . ' - r t i o s . v i s u e k P : . - ov. s e n . : cr: Pp.. p a i x " d a s a g : i ^ - I. PS ... I . c r is'iS.r. t ' u e s s ' s p ' c e r . o e g e . . s : . . s \ s e ces Forces errkps csiukisrnss; un s. ac e c o r s e s o u s i r . , g s s i s ' d s p i s P A S ...spa PS e l e e i r o n R g u s p s ct. P P s c s c - f c s . g k P k i A . s ; o 3W.P , i • a; GS 7. p p C\ .-.'7.7.7, ; j_S:S S'LCP'.SAS', OU S.3 reprrRsesrst s l o p s v k s - P i : . ' ; es s o l e t i o n i l l c ^ c s P e " c d s i g e e l e gs-eargsp c - ' - r e s s s s s u .' • s s s o c k s ' s i o r . c u r l a ]'-'; l o i C.ZCA. e r e e s s e ver. ps i l l s p w i l e Disi 7<. AS g r o u g e ee p e r s o n s . :t\ e g g 3 3 . e s i c P r c r r t c e L r . b C r e s s s e.vi ess n peers..:; o r : t o s r s SPA s o s P - c s s s c p s u c s d ; . s i r . a u d i t . F r o n t e s i d 1 : c d p R U P P S P C ov. p e u t g r o u p i e a e p s r s c r e i e s e's 'souv.C' s s:,-.i-s r 3 e " i s . ess excess a s e. n a 1 esfcfcfc — e s e s ; _ a see. ep. c.si —s e^ . s u n erie.nges.7Si'c CAP g e n e r i c s . . S I S a u sure des associations illeeales. Canoe, e r e pc-rsonr.e gss PAS o u S P d e c l a r e sesrP^eo d A..llegele , c. z. A. c s p - j . e s e P c • AP .. s A:CO s e s ay b) a I •1 ess see c -.- A c . r es. p S3 .OS: ... '< 3 c) ECAAS S P eJ ass ee e r SG-. esse 011227 �e) f) g) fournit gueJ.c uc chose, sous forme de cotisations ou sous v.ne autre forme, a 1 'association illegale ou R. oui que ce soit au profit de 1 'association illegale, sollicite des souscriptions ou contributions pour 1 : association illegale,'ou preconise ou favcrise 1'ernploi de la force ou la per petration ee crimes ou y a recoils, coarse moves; de realiser un chengemens de gouvorrcsont au Canada, ess coupabie d'un acta criminel et passible d'un s-ssprisonnemer.t de cinq ans au plus. 5. Une personne qui, sachant ou ayant des motifs -raisonnables de croire qu'une autre personne est coupabie d'une infraction sous le regime du prSser.t Reglement, fournit une aide quelconque a cette autre personne dans 1'intention d'errspecher ainsi I'arrestation, le jugement ou le chatiment de cette-personne pcur cette infraction ou dans 1'intention de nuire ou de rs.ettre obstacle t cette arrestation, £ ce jugement ou a ce chatiment, est coupabie d'un acte criminel et passible d'un emprisonnement fie cinq ans au plus; 6. Un proprietaire,. iocataire, rofcgisseur ot surintendant d'.v.n immauble, d'une pi£ce, d'un local ou de tout autre lieu, qui y permet sciemmert la tehue d'une reunion fie 1'association illegale ou d'une cellule, d'un comite ou de rr.smbres de cel'Ie-ci, ou de tout groupement de personnes qui favoriser.t les actes, dessei.-.s principes ou lignes cle concPuite de 1' association illegale, est coupabie d'un acte criminal-, et passible d'une arr.er.ce de cinq, mille dollars au plus ou d : un errprisonnersent do cinq ans -au plus ou dc 1'une et 1'autre peine. 7. (1) Une personne arretce pour une infraction sous le rSgime de I'article < doit, en attendant le proc5s, €tre gard£e en detention et ne peut, sans le consen'terr.eni: du procureur g5na:-:al de la province dans laquelle elle est deAenue, etre relachSe sous caution. (2) Lorsqu'un prevenu a ete arrete pour une infraction sous le regime du present Reglement et est garde en detention a la seule fin d'assurer sa presence au proees sur 1'inculpation, sous le regime du present Reglement, pour laquelle il est detenu, et que le proees n'est pas commence dans les quatre-vinqt-dix jours a partir du moment ou il a ete mis en detention en premier lieu, lapersonne ayant la garde du prevenu doit, des 1'expiration de ce delai, demander a un juge de la cour superieure de juridiction criminelle de la province dans laquelle est detenu le prevenu, de fixer une date pour le proees; et le juge peut fixer une date pour le commencement du proees ou donner Jes instructions qu'il estime necessaires pour hater le proees du prevenu. 8. Dans toute poursuite d'une infraction sous le regime du present Reglement la preuve cru'une personne �a) a assiste a une reunion de I 'associatio:: illegale, b) a parle publiquement en favour de 3 Association illegale, ou c) a communique des declarations de 1'association illegale a titre de representant reel ou declare de 1'association illegale, , constitue, a defaui: de preuve contraire, la preuve qu'elle est membre de 1'association illegale. 9. (1) Un agent de la paix peut arreter une personne sans mandat a) lorsqu'il a des raisons de soupconner qu'elle est membre de 1'association illegale; b) lorsqu'elle se dSclare membre de 1'association illegale; ou c) lorsqu'il a des raisons de soupconner qu'elle a cornmis, est en train de commettre ou est sur.lc pcij de commettre un acte vise aux aiineas b) S g) de , 1 ' article 4. (2) Une personne arretee en application du paragraphe (I) doit etre conduite devant un juge de paix ccmpltent et inculpSe d'une infraction visee a I'article 4 dans les sept jours qui suivenc son arrestation, S moins cue le procureur general de la province dans laquelle la personne est dStersue:n'ait, avant 1'expiration de ceute periode de sept jours,lance" un "ordre prescrivant que le prevenu soit garde: en ddsention jusqu'a 1'expiration d'un dSlai de'vingt et un jours, au plus, suivant son arrestation; a" 1'expiration de ce delai, la personne arratSe doit etre conduite devant un juge de paix competent et inculpde d'une infraction visee a I'article 4 ou remise en liberte. 10. Un agent de la paix pert, sans mandat, entrer dans tout local, lieu, veh'icule, bateau ou aeronef, et y perquisitionner, lorsqu'il a des raisons de soupgonner a) que quelque chose y est garde ou utilise en vue de favoriser les actes, desseins, principes ou lignes de conduite de 1'association illegale qui sont contraires a la loi; b) qu'il s'y trouve quelque chose qui peut contribuer a gtablir la preuve d'une infraction sous le regime de la presente loi; c) qu'un membre de 1'association illegale s'y trouve; ou d) qu'une personne y.est detenue par 1'association illeqaie. 011229 �• 11. Lorsqu'un agent de-la paix a des reiioss de soupconner qu' un bien peut ccntribuer a Etablir le preuve d'une infraction sous le regime du prd'sent Reg!es.ent, ce bien rout, etre saisi, sans nandat, pas: ua agcst de la paix et sctosu pendant cuatre-viret-dix -jours a partir de la elate die la saisie ou jusgu'a la date a laquelle prennent fin def i nitivement toutes procedures relatives a une infraction seres le regime du present Reglement, au cours descuelles ce bien peut etre requis, si elles prennent fin ap^res 1'expiration de ce delai. Idle presort leg lessees sera e a l s - n ' ?ar les tribunaux, Ronctionnaires et autorites qui.applicuent les regies de droit concernant les actes criminels crees par le Code criminal et de la rnaniere dont ces recfles sont appiiquSes. 011230 �QUE 0 0 2 / 1 6 Qr k /OTT DE PARLQUE '0 1 6 0 2 0 0 2 OCT 7 0 ... S E C R E T A TRANSMETTRE D URGENCE AU TRES HONORABLE PIERRE ELLIOT TRUDEAU OU A MR. GORDON ROBERTSON DEBUT TEXT I QUEBEC, LE 16 OCTOBRE 1970 MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, AU CORS DES DERNIERS JOURS, LA POPULATION DU "QUEBEC. A ETE BOULEVERSEE PAR LES ENLEVEMENTS DE MONSIEUR JAMES R. CROSS, REPRESENTANT DU GOUVERNEMENT BRITANNIQUE A MONTREAL, ET DE L HONORABLE PIERRE LAPORTE, MINISTRE DU TRAVAIL ET DE LA *AlND OEUVRE ET MINISTRE DE L IMMIGRATION DU QUEBEC, AINSI CUE PAR LES ' MENACES PROFEREES CONTRE LA SECURITE DE L ETAT ET DES PERSONNES DANS DES COMMUNIQUES EMIS PAR LE FRONT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC • OU EN SON NO*, ET ENFIN PAR L ENSEMBLE DES CIRCONSTANCES RELIEES A CES EVENEMENTS. i APRES CONSULTATION DES AUTORITES DIRECTEMENT RESPONSABLES DE L ADMINISTRATION DE LA JUSTICE AU QUEBEC, LE GOUVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC EST CONVAINCU QUE LA LOI, DANS SON ETAT ACTUEL, NE PERMET PAS DE REPONDRE D UNE FACON SATISFAISANTE A CETTE SITUATION. DANS LES CIRCONSTANCES, AU NOM DU GOUVERNEMENT DR QUEBEC, JE DEMANDE QUE DES POUVOIRS D URGENCE SOIENT PRrVUS Lf PLUS TCT POSSIBLE PERMETTANT DE PRENDRE DES MESURES PLUS EFFICACEE. JE DEMANDE EN PARTICULAR QUE CES. POUVOIRS COMPRENANT L AUTHORITE D ARRETER ET DE DETENIR LES PERSONNES QUE LR PRCCl.RiiJ t GENERAL DU QUEBEC EST1ME, POUR DES MOTIFS RAIS0NNA5LE, ETRE DEDIEES AU RENVERSEMENT DU GOUVERNEMENT PAR LA VIOLENCE RT DES MOYEKa ILLEGAUX, �r /* - .- SELON | INFORMATION QUE NOUS POSSEDONS ET QUI VOUS EST ACCESSIBLE, NOUS FfctSDN FACE A UN EFFORT CONCERTE POUR INTIMIDER ET k^VERSER LE GOUVERNEMENT ET LES INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRATIQUE - DE CETTE PROVINCE PAR LA COMMISSION PLANIF1EE ET SYSTEMATIQUE D ACTES ILLEGAUX, Y COMPRIS L INSURRECTION! IL EST CLAIR QUE LES INDIVIDUS ENGAGES DANS CET EFFORT CONCERTE REJETTENT - TOTALEMENT LE PRINCIPE DE LA LIBERTE DANS LE RESPECT DU DROIT. LE GOUVERNEMENT DU QUEBEC EST CONVAINCU DE JLA NECESSITE DE TELS POUVOIRS POUR FAIRE FACE A LA CRISE ACTUELLE. HON SEULEMENT DEUX HOMMES CONPLEI EMENT INNOCENTS SONT MENACES D ASSASSINAT, S ENCORE NOUS FAISON FACE A UNE TENTATIVE DE DESTRUCTION DE L ORDRE SOCIAL PAR UNE MINORITE AYANT RECOURS A LA COMMISSION 0 ACTES CRIMINELS; CE SONT CES CONSIDERATIONS QUE AMENENT NOTRE I 4i GOUVERNEMENT A FAIRE CETTE DEMANDE. LE GOUVERNEMENT EST CONFlANT QUE PAR LE RECORS A DE TELS POUVOIRS, IL POURRA SANS DELAI METTRE UN FREIN A L INTIMIDATION ET A LA TERREUR, ET ASSURER A TOUS LES CITOYENS LA PAIX ET LA ... SECURITE. VEUILLE2 ACCEPTER, MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, L EXPRESSION DE MES SENTIMENTS LES MEILLEURS. SIGNE HONORABLE ROBERT BOURASSA PREMIER DU QUEBEC FIN TEXT 011232 �CONFIDENTIAL M ' " IRANI M October 19, 1970. Mr. Pitfield Ed Ritchie came down to see me this morning to ask about coordinating our activities with his. I briefed him on what we were doing. He agrees fully and is deeply concerned about the government being tempted to overreact grossly. He feels that the reaction to date has been excessive. You might want to show the Prime Minister a note from Mr. Ritchie, that I have just received. He makes points which we would want to make, in another context. ^"Vl^' ,J ^ 16 NOV 70 12: 4 5 AA ,xP M.E.B. �A.E. Kitchie/RS RESTRICTED October 19, 1970. ^fr ,"pA'^ Re our interesting conversation with you about the strategy, I wonder if you shouldn't try to work in somewhere the two thoughts: (a) Eeed^for the Government to resist the temptation (and tn tMffllf^n have resisted the temptation) to overdo the use of the great powers entrusted to it; and (b) Need for the Government to keep and increase the support of the young v/hich may be endangered by the inevitable identification of the Government with the police and the military (e.g. by continuing a liberal attitude to - non-criminal - activities at the universities; by adopting a policy on drugs which takes account of the current attitudes of the young; bpv increasing job opportunities and helping with accommodation for the transient young; and perhaps even by eventuallp/ attracting the young to the positive aspect of police and military careers for themselves). > b« . s t e^ These are personal and not External observations. Ed Ritchie (dictated but not read) 011234 �CONFIDENTIAL October 19, 1970. Mr. Pitfield Ed Ritchie came down to see me this morning to ask about coordinating our activities with his. I briefed him on what we were doing. He agrees fully and is deeply concerned about the government being tempted to overreact grossly. He feels that the reaction to date has been excessive. You might want to show the Prime Minister a note from Mr. Ritchie, that I have just received. He makes points which we would want to make, in another context. ? 16 NOV 70 12: 4 5 M.E.B. �A.IA. uitchie/Pb RESTRICTED October 19, 1970. ^ /? ? R ^ ' ^ Re our interesting conversation with you about the strategy, I wonder if you shouldn't trv to work in somewhere the two thoughts: (a) Reed/?for the Government to resist the temptation (and A n 'fftrtr^o have resisted the temptation) to overdo the use of the great powers entrusted to it; and (b) Reed for the Government to keep and increase the support of the young which may be endangered by the inevitable identification of the Government with the police and the military (e.g. by continuing a liberal attitude to - non-criminal - activities at the universities; by adopting a policy on drugs which takes account of the current attitudes of the young; by increasing job opportunities and helping with accommodation for the transient young; and perhaps even by eventually attracting the young to the positive aspect of police and military careers for themselves). o b* ietN These are personal and not External observations. /Q(A) Ed Ritchie (dictated but not read) 011236 �October 26, 1970. WORK PROGRAMME Jo -^ -TAK- \ (A) Involving; the Task Force only. !• Study of kidnappings elsewhere.- Compare Canadian experience wTtn Uruguayan, on which we now have a draft text. Get additional information from our posts as required; then formulate precise questions for PSI Division. - In addition the experiences in Guatemala and Brazil should be the object of a similar study. - Survey of literature and study centres dealing with such subjects (e.g. London School of Economics has a specialist; Institute of Strategic Studies?). Perhaps ask our missions in London and Washington to take an interest. - Survey of other techniques by terrorists. 2. Contingency for the worst.- Kow do we stand on a statement" messages , etc. 3* Draft statement for the Quebec government. - Repeal for* public support" and" information with possible request that the people supports police efforts which are designed for their protection, etc. 4. Reward.- Outcome of Cabinet Committee discussions? Memorandum to Minister (cc. PRO, PCO) on a discreet formula: reward without public announcement, publicized only through coveraT police channels. The amount should be in excess of $5,000. Perhaps the amount previously suggested should be reduced to a sum for keeping with ordinary levels of rewards offered through police channels for serious crimes. 5• Irish/human interest angle •! 3 011237 �- 2- (B) Tasks with the b_earing on SOC ane _geg~cral go ;ernss..3gs policies. 1* fisted to inf^r.atipni work.- pegal Division to obtain (a) data on ordinary police powers in other countries (USA, France, Germany, Japan, UK Third World; Mr. Ritchie also suggests Sweden) for purposes of comparison with present extraordinary police powers in Canada(b) information on devices abroad for general surveillance and control of the population (e.g. national registration passport control at hotels, immigration lews etc.) which do not exist in Canada. Object would be to stress the degree of openness of the Canadien society. This material would provide talking points to our posts and should Re provided to SOC for possible use in general government statements; they will have to be carefully handled. 2- Departmental comments to SOC and Justice Department on t he legisl a"ti on to re pi Ace use_ o^J^^^fejT Mejjsures_ J^^ ~ Legal Division"will stucfy the" aguestion. The object will be to ensure that the new legislation does not create s new form of political crime and therefore political prisoners in Canada. Our decisions should be justified in terms of the international impact of such development although the internal impact is even more important, 3- EfT^tijr^ne^ss of police, action. - We might pass to SOC some com~ments""bn the impact of police effectiveness in a case like this. On this '«•; we could add comments (a) on the need for policies to ensure RCMP effectiveness (financial resources manpower including French Canadian personnel); (b) policies on the pooling of intelligence resources at the federal (RCMP, DND) and provincial levels; (c) policies to help the provincial end municipal police.Whether we want to make any comments on the broader government policies relating to national security is also for consideration (e.g. implementation of the national security recommendations; problems relating to immigration, etc.). 011238 �} 4. Point out to SOC the need for information on the arrests in Quebec. Will they yield any general information? V/ill they lead to charges ana of what kind? If the whole operation has led to nothing, the government will have to be ready to face the resulting political problem (credibility gap, police inaptitude). Could there also be some legal problems, resulting e.g. from lawsuits against the Crown for unjustified arrests, loss of reputation, loss of income. 5.Point out to SOC that someone in Ottawa should get \ all the facts on Mir. LaporteTs death. If the theory of accidental death spread or if it is used as a 1 defence by the killer, it is better that it be discredited beforehand by the publication of complete information as soon as possible. 6. Poll.- Does SOC see any advantage in a survey of Canadian opinion on political aspect of this affair. If so, it would be useful to know what the reactions are, mainly.in French Canada, to Cross' continued detention and to the possibility of his being murdered C. R. 011239 �cAAcu JZ _ leSs" #~^ October 26, 1970. WORK PROGRAMS 7A0 -*R -rr/c'-1 (A) Involving the Task. Forc_e-._onlv. 1. Study ^of kidnappings elsewhere.- Compare Canadian experience with "Uruguayan, on which we now have a draft text. Get additional information from our posts as required; then formulate precise questions for PSI Division. - In addition the experiences in Guatemala and Brazil should be the object of a similar study. - Survey of literature and study centres dealing with such subjects (e.g. London School of Economics has a specialist; Institute of Strategic Studies?). Perhaps ask our missions in London and Rashington to take an interest. - Survey of other techniques by terrorists. 2. Contingency for the worst.- How do we stand on a statement,messages, etc. 3« Draft statemen^for the _Quebec_ government. - Appeal for public support and information with possible request that the people supports police efforts which are designed for their protection, etc. Reward.- Outcome of Cabinet Committee discussions? Memorandum to Minister (cc. PMO, PCO) on a discreet formula: reward without public announcement, publicized only through covereE police channels. The amount should be in excess of $5,000. Perhaps tho amount previously suggested should be reduced to a sum for keeping with ordinary levels of rewards offered through police channels for serious crimes. 5• Irish/human interest angle. /2 011240 �- 2 - (3) Tasks with the bearing on policies. 1. Related to information / .7 (') / i ^') /SA-A ane me 1 •ov - Legal pivision to (a) data on ordinary police powers in other countries (USA, France, Germany, Japan, UK. Third World; Mr. Ritchie also suggests Sweden) for purposes of comparison with present extraordinerp/- police powers in Canada(b) information on devices abroad for general surveillance and control of -the population (e.g. national registration passport control at hotels, immigration laws etc.) which do not exist in Canada. Object would be to stress the degree of openness of the Canadian society. This material would provide talking points to our posts and should be provided to SOC for possible use in general government statements, they will have to be carefully handled. 2. Departmental cpmments to _S0Cj_and_i Justice_gPepartment jpn t he_ legi"sla tl oh" to r eplfc e__use" o ~f~_'AAy* _the_Me?sures /ct Hegai" Division wiTl study the" question. The" object"will be to ensure that the new legislation does not create a new form of political crime and therefore political prisoners in Canada. Our decisions should be justified in terms of the international impact of such development although the internal impact is even more important. 3 • Effecj^iyeness of police action, We might pass to SOC "some comments oh "the impact of police effectiveness in we could add comments a case like this. On this A (a) on the need for policies to ensure RCMP effectiveness (financial resources manpower including French Canadian personnel); (b) policies on the cooling of intelligence resources at the federal (RCMP, END) and provincial levels; (c) policies to help the provincial and municipal police.Whether we want to make any comments on the broader government policies relating to national securitp^ is also for consideration (e.g. implementation of the national security recommendations; )roblems relating to immigration, etc.). 011241 �JA /6 h 4. Point out to SOC the need for information on the arrests in Quebec, kill they yield any general information? Will theps lead to charges and of what kind? If the whole operation has led to nothing, the government will have to be ready to face the resulting political problem (credibility gap, police inaptitude). Could there also be some legal problems, resulting e.g. from lawsuits against the Crown for unjustified arrests, loss of reputation, loss of income. 5.Point out to SOC that someone in Ottawa should get \ all the facts on Mir. LaporteTs death. If the theory j of accidental death spread or if it is used as a ! defence by the killer, it is better that it be discredited beforehand by the publication of complete information as soon as possible. Poll.- Does SOC see any advantage in a survey of Cana"dian opinion on political aspect of this affair. If so, it would be useful to know what the reactions are, mainly.in French Canada, to Cross' continued detention and to the possibility of his being murdered C. R, 011242 �UA ST) CONFIDENTIAL October 30, 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER Publie handling of FLQ cc—naiques In connection with your Cabinet Committee meeting today, yen may find useful some further o s — t a on the above question. 2. The way in which the Quebec police, and later Mr. Choquette, refused to allow publication of the latest FLQ communique" has led to a rather unfortunate presentation of the matter in the media. Hie impression has been created that there is something mysterious about the communique or that the governments are afraid of the political consequences of its publication. The bald statement that publication would impede police investigation does not carry conviction. A 3. At the suggestion of the Special Operations Centre, we have examined the advantages of a procedure for immediate official response to further FLQ communiques similar to the last one. We feel that this would be both feasible and desirable. 4* Assuming that the governments intend to continue opposing publication (we believe this justified), we would recommend prompt issuance of an official statement each time a communique of this type is received. The statement would first focus attention on the fat* of Mr. Cross. It oould indicate for instance that the communique" gave no infonaation about Mr. Cross, no evidence that he was alive and no indication that the kidnappers intend to release him. To this might bo added that the rest of the communique was merely a tiresome repetition of FIQ propaganda, possibly with some attempt to c o — m i — t o with other FIQ groups through the public madia. It was for this reason that publication was believed not to be in tha public interest. -" ...2 4 o. 10. J (VA>.ynrf 011243 �- 2 5. I believe it would be advantageous to get this kind of approach on a government-wide basis. For this reason, you may wish to raise this point at the Cabinet Conaoittee meeting. If this line is agreed, we should no doubt raise the matter with Quebec. I take it that the Quebec authorities would be the ones to issue such a statement, but any convents made in Ottawa would be along the same line. h£. A. R. �CONFIDENTIAL October 30, 1970 MEMORANDUM TO: Special Operations Centre FROM: Task Force, Operations Centre DAILY ANALYSIS OF MEDIA We are grateful to receive your daily analysis of the total impact of developments and of media, comments on the present crisis. We would recommend, however, that this material be classified. We recognize that its distribution may be very restricted, but it would nonetheless be most undesirable that a copy should fall into the hands of the press and be published. 2. I am glad to note that the analysis has become a little more explicit, particularly in No. 8. We have had some difficulty on occasion in understanding why a given development was considered to be positive or negative. One case in point is of direct interest to us ; Why was it considered negative that a press series of October 27 should draw attention to the length of time since Mr. Cross has been heard from? 'Re have assumed that every reminder to the public of Mr. Cross' continued captivity was a useful development. However it may be that we should be a little more discriminating in that respect and we would welcome your comments on this point. C. Roquet �LOG d^UA^J CR. FILE ZA^A PSI 9ECRST la ler decembre 1970. POP (C. Roquet) Reunion du panal aur la sdcurite, 27 norembre Documents. Koua joignons pour Totre information at voa doaaiars ua ensaasle da documents qui oat ete dlstribuda lora da la daralere reunion da ee panel. II e'agit netaament du ooapt* rendu da la reunion precedente, da l*ordre du Jour da cell* du 27 no venire, at da di vera documents prepares aur lea points cooprie dane oat ordre du Jour. Caa derniere documents eont lea suivaatst 1* ua pro jet da meaoire aur la distribution daa reepon- '/ u ( — a&billtea faaa au terrorisme; 2. ua rapport trie interessant da la Candaraarie aur aa 34.-.,, strategie envara la PLQ; 3(a).un rapport daa forces amcea aur la reduction daa meis da protection par laa forces araees; 3(b).ua rapport do notre ministere sur la protection daa reardsentante diplomatiques; 3(c).una etude du Conseil Prive aur lea nenacea da boabea daas laa edificea fdderaux; 4. ua rapport da notre minietere aur 1*activity international* du FLQ. Da plus nous joignons w e copie d'un memolre du 20 noveabre souais par la Comite aur I'Ordre public (Law end Order) au comite du Cabinet aur laa prloritea et la planlfleatioa. (II y a lieu da aoter a ca sujet qua la direction juridlqua tenters da participer a l'avenir aux reunions du Coalte aur I'Ordre public. 31 elle y rduasit, T O U S pourrias lui demander de . ./2 011246 �- 2 - BSML fort important que la minietere perticipe I l'&la&oretion d'une legislation perm&nente Eventual la sin* l'ordre saiblic, mama si ce n'est que pour signaler les implications Internationales d'une telle legislation. Le ioua-Secretaire voudrait s'assuror aa particulier que nous n'ellions pas beaucoup plus loin qua las autree pays d&na ce domains, qu'il s'aglsse da la ereation de crimes ifopinion, ds crimes da l'appartenanoe a das organismee politiquea, da crimas relatifa a das inaltations de caractire rdadral a la violence, etc. 011247 �LOG FIX (Mr. Coplthorns) CR. FILS ggcagT le ler decembre 1970< POP (C. Roquet) Le Comite sur I'Ordre Public (Law and Order). PSI La Sous-Secretaire croit que notre ministere devrait s'intereseer da plua pris et partlciper sua activites du Comite sur I'Ordre publie. COGBW vous le eonsteteres an lisaat la memoirs cl-joint.aoumis pmr oa comite a ua somite' du Cabinet. 11 na aaable pas quo notre ministers alt ete Indus I Vorigins parrai lee membres du "owite sur I'Ordre publie, Cependant,>.. Ritchie se sourlent avoir 4*4 iavitl a assist er a una do ses reunion© il y & quelque temps. Do touts fsqoa, plusieurs das sujets dont traite ce comite intarosasat notro alnlstere, 11 serait normal quo nous fssslons use contribution & aes travaux. IA Ritchie muggers done que vous vous mattlas en rapport avec le secretaire de ce coaite su Conseil Prlve afin d'etre invito a l'avoalr a y rapresaaisr la ministere. 2. En favour de notre participation, on pourrait citer, s'il est besoin, ds nombreux arrunents. D'abord 11 faut noter que le panel sur le securite, duns un rapport qu'il prepare au somite du Cabinet aur la security et I'latclll&ence, assigns aux Affaires exterleureo et a son Contre d»Operatlons Is respoasabllitd, entre autres, "dMtudler et de preparer des roeowmanrtatlone sur les aspects internatloaaux de la crime y^comprlases aspects Juridiques". II noua asslgne aussi la tacae ao ''preparer un plan pour la protection des diploaatos dtranfors au Canada en consultation avoc le ministors ds la Defense*. Cs sont la dsux questions dont oa traits au Comite sur I'Ordre public. En effet vous auras not** que le memoirs joint eomportait, aux pages 11 et 12, une section sur los locaux diplomatiques et consul*.ires. 21 out 6t6 normal que nous partlciplous a la preparation de eette section. Ds msao notre ministere ne peut s© ciSslntlresser de la revision do la politique d» immigration (paces 12 et 13). II sera aussi ./2 011248 �- 2 - SBCRgT vous eommunlquer les informations qui pourraient vous interesser au sujet des reunions ds cs comitg). On a aussi distribue a la r4tuiion un document de deux pagea aur lea 25,000 pages ds doouaoatation FLQ qui sont a l'atude. Nous vous avons deja transmis ee document sous eouverturs d'un autre oaaoire. C. R. �LOG PSI ___ ._ _ POP (C. Roquet) fc. CR. FILE SECRET le ler decembre 1970. Reunion du panel sur la security, 27 novombro Documents. Kous Joignons pour votrs information et voa dossiers ua ensemble do documents qui ont ete dlstribuds lors de Is derniere reunion ds es psasl. II s'agit notsmmont du compte rendu do la reunion prdcedente, de 1'ordre du jour de cello du 27 novembre, ot ds divers documents preparts aur lea points compris dsas cet ordre du jour. Cos derniers documents sont les suivanta: 1. ua projet do memoirs sur la distribution dea responsabilites fans au terrorisme; 2. ua rapport tres Interessant de la Gendarmerie sur sa strategie envsrs Is FLQ; 3(a).ia rapport des forces armeea sur la reduction des mesures ds protection par lea forces armeee; 3(b).ua rapport do notre ministere sur la protection des rsaressatants diplomatiques; 3(chums etude du Conseil Priv* sur lee menaces de bombea dans lss edifices f4d4raux; 4. ua rapport de notre ministere sur l'ectivite Internationale du FLQ. Do plus nous joignons une copie d'un meraoire du 20 novembre senilis par le Comite sur I'Ordre public (Law and Order) au comitd du Cabinet sur les prioritee et la planification. (II y a lieu ds noter a ce sujet que la direction jurldique tentera do participer a l'avenir aux reunions du Comite aur I'Ordre public. Si elle y reussit, vous pourriea lui demander de >/ «- 011250 �- 2- gggfJB • vous comrauniquer les informations qui pourraient vous lntdresser au sujet dos reunions de ee comite). On a auaai distribue a la reunion un document de deux pages sur les 25,000 pagea de doeuaoatation FLQ qui sont a 1'etude. Noua voua avoaa d4Ja transmis ee document sous eouverturs d'un autre memoirs. 011251 �LOG FLK (Mr. Coplthome) ^^ POP (C. lioquet) CR. FILS SgCRffi le ler d<Scsmore 1970, Le Coaitd sur I'Ordre Public (Law sad Order). PSI Le Sous-Secretaire croit que notre ministers devrait s'lntlresser ds plus aria et partlclpar aux activites du Comitd aur 1'Ordre public. Comme vous le conatateres en 1leant is acmolro ci-joiat.soumis par es coaitd a un comite du Cabinet. 11 as semble pas ous notre ministere sit ftif Indus I Tnrlclne pprml Ian asalrrea"^ Onmitd g ltom, o W p a b l i o . CspenrtantA*. Ritchie ss souvient avoir e U invit4 s asslster a une do sss r4uaions 11 y a quolquo terapa. Ds touts fscoa. plusieurs dos sujots dsat traite ee comite intsrsassnt notre alaistsre, 11 sarsit normal qua nous fassi ons was contribution a sss travaux. K. Ritchie suggere dane que vous vous aettiss en rapport avoc lo eecretaire de os comite aa Conseil Prlve afin d'etre invite & l'avsnir a y representor Is alaistsre. 2. 8a favour ds notro participation, on pourrait alter, s'il est besola, ds aombroux arguments. D'abord 11 faut noter qas Is panel sur la securite, dans an rapport qu'il prepare au comite du Cabinet sur la securite et 1'intelligence, essigne sax Affaires exterleures et a son centre d'Operations la responsabillte, entre autres, "d'etudler st de preparer des recommendationa sur los aspects intsraatioasux ds Is crise y oemprio sss aspects jurldlques". II nous assigns aussi Is tache do "preparer un plan pour la protection dee dlplomatea 4traagors au Canada on consultatioa avos Is ministors ds la Defense". Cs sont la deux questions dont on traits au Coalt4 sur l'Ordro public. &> effet vous auras not4 quo lo acmolro joint somportalt, aux pages 11 st 12. use section sur les locaux diplomatiques st consulalras. II out ete normal quo nous partieipione ft la preparation de cette section. Ds aaas notre ministere ne pout ae dftslntsrssser de la revision 4s la politique d'iaalgratlon (pares 12 et 13). II ssra aussi . a/2 011252 �mm - 2- fort important que le ministere pertlclpo h V Elaboration d'une legislation psrnanente eventuelle sur 1'ordre public, rrjePn© si ce n'est que pour signaler les implications Internationales d'uno telle legislation. Le Sous-Secretaire voudralt a*assurer oa particulier que nous n'allions pas beaucoup plus loin quo les autrea pays dans ee douains, qu'il s'aglsse do la creation do crimea d'opinion, da crimes ds l'appartenance ft das oreaniernes politiques, ds crimes relatifa ft das lncitations de caractere general ft la violence, etc. CR. 011253 �When was WMa first considered? Influence of Quebec government. What alternative measures were considered? How was the decision made as to exactly when it should be invoked? What influence did DEA have in it? What direct interest? Discrepancies between Turner's and Trudeau*s explanations. �at the end of October that the Prime Minster make a television appeamace following the passage of the Emergency legislation in order to correct the bad civil rights image of Canada abroad. Did the PM take this consideration into account? 011255 �October ICth Bourassa called Trudeau and discussed the WMA. and got agreement in principle on it. True or false? Had Trudeau considered it before the Laporte kidnapping? Had he discussed it with Bourassa before the Laporte kidnapping? Did Trudeau suggest the possibility to Bourassa, or Bourassa to Trudeau? — - i A - Justice prepared material on the use of the Act by October 13th for use when needed. True or false? When did they start preparing it? Did the idea come from Justice or from the P.M.? Bourassa chose the timing of the WMA? True or false? On the basis of what information did he choose that particular moment? Was the course of the negotiations a factor, as he said, or did he tailor the negotiations to fit his strong-armed plans(which would help solve other problems as welj? The timing of the onvocation was determined in Ottawa. True or false? On the basis of what information was it decided? Was the Solicitor General"s evaluation of the situation at that time the same as that of Saulnier and Choquette, Drapeau and Bourassa? 011256 �Was the idea actually initiated in Quebec, or in Ottawa? On the Qubec side who was the strongest proponaent of the WMA? How great was Saulnier's influence? Choquette's influence in invoking the act? Did the Prime Minister require persuasion? How would you describe Saulnier's motivation in urging invocation? Did it differ from that of Bourassa, Choquette, Drapeau? Were the interests of the federal government and the provincial government in invoking the act identical? Were the dangers inherent in the WMA and Bill C181 discussed openly within the government in Quebec? Was possible repeal of the act ever considered or proposed following the crisis? �Was Bourassa consulted, or did he proffer advice on the type of legislation for emergency measures. Were alternatives to the WMA discussed with him? 011258 �A quel ami ant vous-*tes w a s rends cmapte que le gouvernement dn Quebec avait 1* intention de demander lea •e'sures de guerre? D'ou vient l'idee du QUEBEC de faire appel aox assures de guerre? (Compile ite" •unicipal- provlncial-f ederal) Eties-vous aa courant an Task Force que la proclamation des me'sures de guerre serait invoqufv? Qa'aves-voua, lea aeabree da Teak Force, anticipe comae reaultat lamedlate de 1* invocation daa as" sores do guerre? Le cooplot none par le groupe do Quebecois influents, etait-11 une des causes iaportantes dans la decision do faire appel aux Mesures de Guerre, aussi bien par le federal que lo provincial? 011259 �L'avis legal des experts du ministere sur le Bill C 181 a-t-il St6 sollicite par le gouvernement? Le gouvernement da Quebec 7 avait offert quelques suggestions concretes. Le MEA a-t-il aaaai specifie* certaines considerations? Au point de vue legal, les vues du ministere de la jusitce concords!entelles avec cellos du MBA? gtaient-ile du meme avis? Les hovnes qui represeotaient ces minlsteres �W\.G urrv\ft A quel moment vous-etes vous rendu compte que le gouvernement du Quebec avait 1'intention de demander les mesures de guerre? D'ou vient l'idee du QUEBEC de faire appel aux me'sures de guerre? (Complicite municipal- provincial-federal ) Etiez-vous au courant au Task Force que la proclamation des mesures de guerre serait invoquew? Qu'avez-vous, les membres du Task Force, anticipe comme resultat immediate de 1*invocation dea assures de guerre? Le complot mene par le groupe de Quebecois influents, 6talt-il une des causes importantes dans la decision de faire appel aux Me'sures de Guerre, aussi bien par le federal que le provincial? 011261 �L'avis legal des experts du ministere sur le Bill C 181 a-t-il 6t6 sollicite" par le gouvernement? Le gouvernement du Quebec y avait offert quelques suggestions concretes. Le MEA a-t-il aussi specifie* certaines considerations? Au point de vue legal, les vues du ministere de la jusitce concordaientelles avec celles du MEA? Les hommes qui repr^semtaient ces ministeres 011262 e"taient-ils du meme avis? �BLEEDING HEARTS # 1. Suggests Sharp*a apeeach of October 6 was the rault of a hard line taken 2. in Cabinet Committee for Prioroties and Planing. Was part of the Government's assessment of FLQ that they wouldnt murder? 3* Did Cosette-Trudel write the first vomnunique? 4. Was there a decision taken daring the first week of the crisis that S harp would be government spokesman and would play down the concern to the public? 5. Was hard line really less risky in tho long run than compromise? 6. When was Op Centre aot op and for what particular purpose? 7. Was Marshall MeLuhan really consulted by the government (PMO) as reported by Anthony Woatall in Toronto Daily Star for the purpose of analysing the technique and use of the media by the FLQ? (p.153) 8. Did the Task Force consider the effect on the public of the reading of the manifesto? 9. Did the Prime Minister read Task Force recommendations himself? 10. Did no one on the Task Force urge complete silence toward the kidnappers after the first communique? U . Did anyone consider that temporizing might not have had a beneficial effect? 12. What did the Prime Minister think of the Quebec line? 13* Do you feel that Choquette'a famous speech represented a compromise among all the conflicting elements, that it desired to satisfy the FLQ with half measures, and that it sought to rally Quebec opinion against the FLQ? 14. Waa pressure in fAVOUR OF THE WMA greater from Ottawa or from Quebec? 15* W hat was the effect of Robert'a speech on the Quebec Government? the Task Force take any action Did you or on it? 16. Did Quebec consult Ottawa on the suggestion of exchanging two hostages from the FLQ cells to be held until the realease of Cross and Larporte? 17. Did Cross resent the WM A? 18. What conflicts were there between the govenments of Montreal and Quebec? 19. If Trudeau had enforced a really hard lione during the first week of the crisis (the second week would have been too late) aould the WMA have been avaoided? 20. Was the WMA not a response to a conspiracy or peot, but rather, as Turner suggested, a meANS OF REASSURING THE PUBLIC AND RESTORING pulic confidence which had been degenerating through the climate of weakness? 21. Turner talks about FULL DETAILS ON WHICH GOVERNMENT ACTED AS NOT BEING APPARENT, while the P.M. says government's Justification rests on available evidence. 011263 �22. Note Turner's House of Commons speech October 16 referring to Bourassa's weakness (p. 47). 23. Book says the FLQ did not present a threat to overthrow the government because it 24 was anarchist-utopian in theory. 24* Suggests hard U n e czused the death of Laporte (p.71, last paragraph). 25. Reistance to -^police action is usually passive (p74)» (p. 71) 26. Evidence of APPREHENDED INSURRECTION Descente dans la rue CNTU, CEGEP support Ryan's rebellion FLQ long term plans (four stages) 011264 �vd / nPoartment of E x t e r n a l Home 237-1884 236-8112 731-8271 The M i n i s t e r 1 s Office Jon Church Miss Dugal ( S e c . t o Min.) j . N. Taylor 224-6088 749-3317 1- • /5*c-& Affairs Office 1 Mr. S h a r p 3 home ( u n l i s t e d ) GUAhD USSEA Mr. A. E . R i t c h i e PDF - P . A. B i s s o n n e t t e . - Task Force ( C h i e f ) C. Roquet (0/USSEA) P . M. R o b e r t s (PMO) D. F . Wall (PCO) J . H. Taylor (O/SSEA) - T.H.W. Read (PPR) - J . D. Puddington (GCO) D . S t a n s f i e l d (FCO) 0 . D i e r (GLA) J . Demers (FLE) A. D. Rowe (PSI) J . R. Barker(PGP) '• C . E . Glo,-c-r (POF) 2-2150 6-1025 5-6y68 2-3996 2-2150 6-4039 2-2424 2-7917 2-2430 6-5407 2-7809 5-6107 6-28 ? 9 6-2467 6-5621 6-2467 6-2528 6-5533 2-5677 6-2370 2-8166 2-20^4 5-6694 2-3059 M. K. Esselmont (FOP) N. E t h e r i d g e (PO?) P . Ducharme (POP) J . McNeish (POP) I n s p . F e r r a r i s (RCMF) Chief S u p t . Ouimet (RCMP) D. H. C h r i s t i e ( J u s t i c e ) Miss P . Sprague ( J u s t i c e ) W.R.C. L i t t l e ( S o l . Den.) B . C. Hofley ( S o l . Gen.) M. Fleming ( T r a n s p o r t ) W. M. M c l l i s h ( C i v i l Av.) R. F r a n c i s ( P r e s s Office) O p e r a t i o n s C e n t r e Conference Room 5-643 5; 2-6694; 6-542? 2 2 -m 237-0514 733-3068 746-4492 733-2343 237-7966 233-4838 238-1626 731-1002 746-8247 733-4614 224-1565 236-3067 232-1008 728-8854 737-3042 737-3434 733-1468 235-2379 233-3568 728-3834 728-2212 836-1377 731-6191 O f f i c i a l s G a l l e r y , hVuse of Commons ? r o 3 3 G a l l e r y (Mr. F r a n c i s ) 2-6677 2.4511 M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e John T u r n e r 2-4621 749-4151 2-3474 749-0158 232-8686 P •tfdfek '--olicitor-G.-rneral ^ ^ . G g o r g e Mcliraith E r n e s t Cote (D. M.) KIDNAPPING CRISIS > TELEPHONE LIST r Office 2-4211 The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s ] O f f i c e 5T6968 — P . M . Roberts 6T4265 _ Ivan Head am Mary MacDonald 2-8990 6-5402 J . Davey Mr. Lawless 2-8362 P r i v y Council Office ; • Gprdon Robertson D'. F . Wall Mr. Beavis PCO Committee Room Messenger lV-ioinj-PiJiiJ Home OPT Operations C e n t r e 746-6694 2-3996 733-3068 2-8348 733-4762 2-8348; 2-3996; 2-8348 6-6220 SDecial O p e r a t i o n s Centre 2-5085 Department of N a t i o n a l Defence The M i n i s t e r 2-4535 L i a i s o n O f f i c e r Lt.Gen. Dare O p e r a t i o n s Centre U d i - i l l s 2-2708 a l s o 233-4995; 233-5273; 233-4071 Aircraft: Col. Christie 2-4535 ROMP U~~~^<U+c'~*£*M 745-7913 2-9704 Government of Quebec Robert Bourassa, Mtl. Off. 183-9-873-3411 M. Langlois (adjoint)Que. Off. 187-9-643-5321 Jerome Choquette Mtl. Off. 183-9-873-3317 Que. Off. 187-9-643-4210 "Hot Line" 183-9-873-2927 F. Gendron, adjoint executif Mile. Richard, secretaire Julien Chouinard, Sec.du Govt. 187-9-643-7355 Robert Demers, negotiateur del. Hotel Reine Elizabeth, Mtl. 183-9-861-21A8 Home 183-9-334-6420 City of Montreal Mayor Drapeau1s Off, Chsrles Roy, chef de cabinet 183-9-872-3100 Home 183-9-384-3433 Paul Leduc Off. 183-9-872-3100 Home 183-9-738-6156 728-9209 Cuba frV- V?>1 Amb Dr. Jose Fernandez de Cossio Chancery 233-1497 Home 745-9527;746-5997 i^>-y^ c>r<>n- ^~*~i^'^ •'—Acting Consul Alfredo Ramirez 6-5933 737-3042 Inspector F e r r a r i s 1255 University St., Ste. 1514, 2-5677 737-3434 Chief S u p t . Ouimet 861-4396;332-1147 2-4142— ^ V i W - R^2*1Montreal, "A" D i v i s i o n , C. I . B. X4 2S£rade Commissioner Ricardo C a b risas 3 is.? 5RA731-3183 Commissioner H i g g i t 3737 M e t r o p o l i t a n B l v d , S t e . 1 2 0 0 827-088V • Dep, Commissioner J . S t a r n e s V i l l e S t . Michel 725-5235 A s s t . Commissioner P a r e n t 2-2267 731-0797 O f f i c e r s 1 Mess, Rockliffe 749-2356 Great. B r i t a i n High Commission n i g h t l i n e 237-1541 home Canadian High Commissioner.xLoridon Dep. High Comm. Whitehead 237-1533 749-3393 C.S.A. Ritchie 9-0 (overseas operator for Ldn) 745-63V'4 2 . Da v i e s i ^ ^ ^ , 237-1530 _^ 01-499-4671 Algeria "^^W^N^-V-RJL Canadian Embassy, Washington 1 8 2 - 7 - p l u s e x t . Charge Tayeb Seddikioui 749-1121 K. Cadieux (home) 182-9-332-2615 200 Rideau T e r r a c e , S t e . 4 0 9 P e t e r Towe (home) 182-9-362-0679 Keith Henry (home) 182-9-654-6836 183-9-843-8402 Mr. Leon Mayrand, Front Desk 182-9-332-1011 2045 Peel St., Montreal Canadif!n_ Emba 3 sy, P a r i s Passriort Office, Montreal Pat" Black 225-99-55 553-6434 Mr. Courchesne Off. 183-2152 1 Home 183-9-271-3963 Canada an Embassy, Havana — Anb. K. C. Rrov,Ti 6) f't^'VV-'.lS.-'t, 26421 210620 MAA.-CUO-<^. } -A)y ^li'l-A 011265 1 �If c^iAc^. \ * fvw^uS( 011266 L --L. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00153 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - War Measures Act Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1-Oct-70 to 1-Dec-70 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - War Measures Act, RG25, vol. 25748, 20-22-TFK-12, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Entire File Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en