https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d1c2522891672dbc5abd019ba0f7ffa5.pdf ecb84f30b9856c2757ff9339326be6ea PDF Text Text 20-22-TFK-11-24 File No. Dossier _ _ _ VnlnmP / From-De 7 J/AYJ'TO-A 7 ?/«V, 7 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIE . ;'ui » u < m ..OV •• TITLE—TITRE: (XI a POLITICAL AFFAIRS INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORCE ON KIDNAPPING ORAL HISTORY P R O G R A M * M. BLANCHETTE k to s a\ Retention period-Periode de retention: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES ET COMMERCE EXTERIEUR CANADA ~ �JAM .12.1974 MOHJfiEfr continued S*4 i. i3-.-j£p'Pip is Ssri^PPPi'ai \ # i i » L"< ' S A k s - : ••-:,A.iAA^<hS A ^?^nAAr^^f»3 decides policy. Bourne apparently had a hand in suggesting a policy to such departments as the Post Office and External Affairs, for dealing with letter bombs A'& AA AA ^ •^ yp / 6 V.1>»G P / C# fcp 01091 �Cher monsieur Hardy, Pour faire suite a la conversation telephonique que nous avons eue rgcemment concemant la venue a Ottawa de personnes interess6es a la crise d'octobre, nous vous serions reconnaissantes, Jean et moi, de nous faire savoir a l'avance si les personnes, dont les noms suivent, sont susceptibles de venir au pays prochainement. Votre cooperation nous touche beaucoup et nous vous en remercions a l'avance. Sineerement, BARTON Bill, actuellement a Geneve, BARKER, J.R. " Dar-es-Salaam. BILD, F. " Paris. DIER, 0 . " Guyane. n Bruxelles. ROQUET.C. M Paris. ROWE. Alan. ** GenSve. M3MTPETJT . J. 010912 �Barton Bill, actuellement a Berne. Barker J.R. a Dar-es-Salaam. Bild Fred. " Paris. Dier Ormond * Guyane Montpetit Jacques " Bruxelles. Roquet. Claude " Paris. Rowe Alan, Geneve. 010913 �• Ottawa le 19 mars 1974- f ^JU*J£ / l 1 14 «f*CX*»i% * » ^ En suite a votre note d'il y a deja une dizaine de jours, je ne pense pas qu'aucun des agents mentionnes ne vienne k Ottawa prochainement. Monsieur Barton y etait, il y a trois semaines environ; je ne sais pas si vous avez pu le voir a cette occasion. Nous essaierons de vous tenir au courant des deplacements des personnes qui vous interessent. CA*-***. r* \ C h r i s t i a n Hardy Madame Andree Arayot FAH 010914 �A' *1 ( Tour "JTidnappin** Crisis telephone List" has inspired us to wonder about a number of people whose precise role in the crisis is not altogether clear although they may very well have been aware of incidents not on file. We are thinking of people like Ton Church, Mary FacDonald, t'iss Thigal (?), Pat ^lack, Delano "Soily,!'Iberville Fortier, Ken ^ro^n, Peter Roberts, Ivan Fead, and .Tohn Starnes. If we could send them each a letter now fa version of tfte'rou^fe draft enclosed), we mi^ht be able to prepare the ground in advance for further "winter works" in Ottawa. Such a letter wouldn't actually commit us to interviews, but would s^ive us a better picture of the possibilities. Fere too, for your perusal, is a possible letter to r^nd Claude Coquet at an appropriate time - perhans in January - toTether with the rpvised questions for m om Read. (Andr6e *rL\ T are ^oncemet lest he think our elementary ouestions were desi«*ne^ for someone of his stature. • T ' r . Pardy, #ko i s a t p r e s e n t stud'-in^ ^ r p ^ c h , kir-Hy l e n t us h i s cony of humors of n, a r , which we pass s l o n » t o you. T am sure ?/-ou w i l l find i t f a ^ c i n a t i n ? r p a d i n ? , though t p ^ e n t i o u s ami i n a c c u r a t e . Perhaps you would l i k e to have t h e account conies from ^he FIQ, Seven Ypp-^s of Terrorism aR w e l l , ^hat way ,r o» can m"ke notp?, -^n-i comments in the m a r g i n s . A. " -. - - j A ii- /vi- T s< 010915 �^ear , The Historic 1 "Division of t^e department of ^Ttomal Affairs is er,ra<?p4 in an oral history project on the FIQ crisis o° October, 1970 (the kiinappin? of I. p . Cross and Pierre Taporte) with special emphasis on the role of the department of Fxtprral Affairs throughout. TJntil now, our main source of information has been the •Oen-rtment^secret files on the crisis. These, as you may imagine, leave many questions unanswered, including questions on the real extent to which many people were actively involved in the events. Tt would be extremely useful to have your general comments, "nd your additions to the over-all picture from vour experience of the crisis. '"ould you be in a oosi+ion to indicate the scone of your involvement v/ith a view to our preparing some questions for a nossible taperecorded interview? The interview would be informal, open to your own editing, «nd <rf course, suiect to tight security in keeping with departmental regulations, ^e would be able oerhaps to supnly you in advance with documents you might require to refresh your memory, as well as the questions themselves. We look forward with gre^t pleasure to having the benefit of your experience. Very truly yo:rs, �Recemment M. Blanchette vous remettait un questionnaire se rapportant 8. l a crise d1 octobre 70. Cette s e r i e de question? sp°cialement pr^parees 8 l ' i n t e n t i o n de M. Puddington eft autant pour notre informati( ion personnelle que pour des interviews futurs. Par l a mime o ccasion. nous vous faisons par- venir une l i ' t e revis^e de questions dirige>s vers M. Read. Nous vous serions tre s reconnai--santes s i vous pouviez nous l a i s s e r savoir si l e ton de notre questionnaire e s t ad^quat et s i nous avons d i r i g e nos recherches dans l e bon sens. corrections et d i r e c t i o n s VeuillM agr,er, Des que l e temps vous l e permettra. vos commentaires nous seraient des plus procieux. oher monsleur ^ ^ m ^ . ^ ^ et 1.expression de nos meilleurs sentiments. > 010917 �It would help us agreat deal in formulating questions and In our technique generally if, on the basis of the Hayaan interview, you could comment on the following points: 1. Was the substance of the questions appropriate? Was their objective too superficial? 2. Was the style of the questions stagnant, un-provocative? 3. Is providing a complete list of questions beforehand conducive to pat, un-spontaneous answers? Ua Were the tangential questions asked dusLng the interview too limited? 5. What areas or specific questions were Insufficiently developed? Might we three talk this over together sometime? �Would it be possible to send Sir Peter Hayman a copy of the interview transcript before he goes next month? This might be done with an official letter of thanks from you or from Ed Ritchie, which I am sure he would appreciate very ouch indeed. from us If, on the other hand, you think a letter (in this case, from me) would be adequate, I would propose something along the lines of the attached draft. " I i • •,"- R. s .' !>J A 010919 �At long last, the Interview on October, 1970, which you so graciously accorded us, has been transcribed. The copy which we are enclosing is for you to keep. May we re-emphasise the absolute dicretion with which the External Affairs copies will be guarded. And may we thank you again on behalf of future generations, the present government, and those of us directly concerned, for your great kindness and generosity in sharing your experience. How much we shall miss you and Rosemary! But that is another story. �(£AACJ<-^-~7 S E C R E T EVENTS OF OCTOBER 1970 The main objective that Blanchette will be seeking to achieve during such interviews as he may have on the occasion of his forthcoming trip to Europe will be designed essentially to fill gaps in the Departmental files on the subject. Who determined the initial line taken in External on October 5, which seemed ready to countenance negotiations, possible parole for prisoners, and compromise generally? These were described as half-way compromises. What was the Minister's Did he agree? response? The Minister and Prime Minister spoke at 11 a.m. that morning (October 5)« Any idea about what they said, they decided? (We shall be interviewing Jon Church soon about this and other i matters). '•ilt On October 6, the idea of a safe conduct had already • II I appeared. This was the key to the eventual solution of the problem. It would be interesting to know whose Idea this was. There is no evidence on the file as to its origin. Task Force? The Department seemed to be in favour of the provision of money, the release of some prisoners, and suggested that the FLQ n V^ ^A \ ,ii A V \ request that its memo might be published should be Ignored. Who - At-fr A A i killed the first two ideas and how diQ^it come to pass the third one was the first step taken? Again on October 6, there is a memorandum from Gordon Robertson stating that Mr. Jamieson had objections to even the promise of a safe conduct. Gordon Robertson took a very tough line in his memo stating that no FLQ demands should be met. This line * o * • a .Z 010921 �-2- was eventually softened, although the M i n i s t e r ' s statement in the House of Commons that evening made no mention of a possible safe conduct. Who were the hawks and the doves or was there general unanimity regarding the general approach? Among Cabinet members? Among officials? Who drafted the Minister's statement which took a somewhat softer line bearing in mind that Cabinet had rejected most of the initial suggestions contained in the Department's (Who in Cabinet determined the initial line? memo on the subject? (Mow was it determined? (Who were most influential? It is not clear from the files which Cabinet Committee first handled the crisis. At times it would seem to be the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning; at times, that on Security and Intelligence. Could this be clarified? The file mentions that, on the morning of October 6, the Prime Minister and Mr. Bourassa had a long talk over the telephone. Could light be thrown on what they discussed? on the file. There is no evidence (This might be cleared up by later interviews on the political level of course.) On October 10 Mr. Sharp had several telephone conversations with Mr. Choquette. There is virtually no evidence on the file as to whether it was these conversations that decided Mr. Choquette to be firm against the release of prisoners or whether his decision reflected other pressures. It was immediately after his statement at 5*30 that evening (October 10) that Mr. Laporte was kidnapped. On October 11, the Prime Minister and Mr. Bourassa had several further conversations. They discussed the War Measures Act, the possibility of military assistance and the attitude of the Quebec 3 010922 �-3Government on the possible release of the prisoners, as well as Federal security measures and means of contact and communication between the two levels of government. The file merely mentions the subjects discussed. It gives no idea as to the tenor of the conversations nor the decisions reached. There are several discrepancies. For instance, on October 11, the Prime Minister and Mr. Bour43.sa_- seemed to agree on the possibility of releasing some prisoners. Yet earlier, this seemed to be ruled out completely. Likewise later. What happened? Regarding the War Measures Act, there is evidence on the file that very early during the crisis, perhaps even as early as October 6, somebody in the Department of Justice was drafting in English possible legislative action. Whose idea was this? Between October 10 and October 14, Prime Minister Bourassa toughened his stand. Why? The file indicates several telephone conversations at various levels between Ottawa and Quebec at the Prime Ministerial and official levels. Who was most influential in persuading Mr. Bourassa to take a tougher stand? What factors involved? In the more detailed sector, who chose Demers as negotiator? Who set his mandate? Bearing in mind that Departmental and other Federal officials had suggested quite different people for the post, for instance, Claude Ryan, Louis Laberge, etc. Who decided on a Task Force type of operation on October 5? Were other possibilities considered? �- 4 - Those are the main gaps of substance of direct concern to us in our files, which should be cleared up for future researchers. The lists of questions in the pages below are of course much more detailed and will at times duplicate some of the themes mentionned above. It will not be possible to ask all the questions nor cover all the themes contained therein of course. Nevertheless it is hoped that all this material will help to focus attention and recollections. There are many other gaps, but they concern our files less than those of other Departments and also less than those on the political level and those of other Governments. Some of the more detailed questions concern these gaps and are perhaps unanswerable by Task Force members. We shall be reaching ouu to other levels eventually. �1 ^ 1 • <m Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canada CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET A compter du / A / oJ~/ <S Jusqu'au A 3 /<=>* / A J AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - A METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTERIEURE VOIR File No. - Dossier n° Volume <?o -^.p - r/^< -//QC 31 (88/08) ^ ^ ^ 7540-21-857-8809 010925 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTF00150 Title A name given to the resource Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - M. Blanchette Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 13-Dec-73 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Political Affairs - Internal Security - Task Force on Kidnapping - Oral history programme - M. Blanchette, RG25, vol. 25748, 20-22-TFK-11-24, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource October Crisis, TFK Description An account of the resource Entire File Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en